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卷301 列傳八十八 讷亲 傅恒 福灵安 福隆安 福隆安 丰绅济伦 福长安

Volume 301 Biographies 88: Ne Qin, Fu Heng, Fu Ling An, Fu Long An, Fu Long An, Feng Shenjilun, Fu Chang An

Chapter 301 of 清史稿 · Draft History of Qing
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Chapter 301
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Biography 88
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Neqin; Fu Heng; [their sons] Fu Ling'an and Fu Long'an; Fu Long'an's son Feng Shenjilun; Fu Chang'an
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祿滿 使 祿 滿 滿
Neqin, of the Niohuru clan, was a Manchu bannerman of the Bordered Yellow Banner and a great-grandson of Ebilun. His father Yinde is discussed in the biography of Ebilun; Neqin was Yinde's second son. In 1727 he inherited the ducal title and was appointed a minister without portfolio. In 1732 he was made director of the imperial equipage. In late 1733 he was ordered to serve on the Grand Council. In 1735, as the Yongzheng Emperor lay gravely ill, Neqin was named to the regency council. When the Qianlong Emperor took the throne, Prince Zhuang Yunlu, Prince Guo Yunli, Ortai, and Zhang Tingyu formed the regency styled the 'Chief Ministers in General Affairs.' Neqin was made banner general of the Bordered White Banner Manchus and grand minister of the imperial bodyguard, assisting in general affairs. That December an edict praised Neqin's diligence; in recognition of the empress dowager's kin, he was raised to duke of the first rank. In 1736 he was transferred to banner general of the Bordered Yellow Banner Manchus. In 1737 he was appointed minister of war. In the eleventh month, after the Prince of Zhuang and others asked to abolish the general ministerial board, Neqin was made a grand councillor. For his services he received the hereditary rank of tušan gūsan hafan. In February 1738 he assumed charge of the three treasuries of the Ministry of Revenue. In September he was ordered to assist at the Ministry of Revenue. When Zhili governor Li Wei accused river director Zhu Zao of fraud and corruption, Neqin and Minister Sun Jia'en were sent to investigate; Zhu was sentenced to exile. Neqin and Jia'en also submitted a detailed memorial on sluices and dams along both banks of the Yongding River. In December he was transferred to minister of personnel. In May 1739 he received the honorary title Grand Guardian of the Heir Apparent.
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滿
A noble by birth and a minister of long standing merit, Neqin had served near the throne from youth and won Yongzheng's trust as a man fit for high office. Under Qianlong his favor was especially deep. Diligent and attentive to the emperor's wishes, he above all held himself to strict integrity, and no one dared solicit him privately. At his house a huge mastiff was tied beside the gate, and no carriage or horse ever came to call. Yet having risen early to high rank, he grew proud and overbearing, and in office he was relentlessly harsh. Censor-in-chief Liu Tongxun memorialized that Neqin held too many posts and was too sharp in his handling of affairs. The emperor replied: 'As minister, Neqin must not be evasive or shirking—but it is also inevitable that he sometimes mishandles affairs; I constantly warn him against self-satisfaction. Now that I see this memorial, he should strive all the more to improve.' The full exchange is recorded in Liu Tongxun's biography.
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使 簿 殿
In the first month of 1744 Neqin was ordered to inspect troops in Henan, Jiangnan, and Shandong and to survey sea walls and river works. Tianjin and Hejian in Zhili were then under famine relief, and he was told to go first by the way to inspect. He memorialized to extend relief by one month, and the request was granted. When his tour was finished, Neqin submitted separate memorials; on the troops of the three provinces he wrote: 'Having reviewed the standards set by the governors-general, governors, grain commissioners, and regional commanders—seventeen in all—merit and demerit were mixed. Only the Nanyang garrison in Henan and the Suzhou-Songjiang naval command in Jiangnan ranked worst. He asked that the ministries verify rewards and punishments.' On the Jiangsu and Zhejiang sea walls he wrote: 'Formerly the Zhejiang tide passed through the Small Waist at Shushan; near Haining lay the Great Northern Waist and near Xiaoshan the Great Southern Waist, and the broad buildup of sand protected Hangzhou and Shaoxing. After the Small Waist gradually silted shut, the tide shifted north of Shushan and surged destructively. If the old channel of the Small Waist were dredged to weaken the Great Waists, upper and lower embankments could all be secured; even if the Small Waist could not soon be restored, dangerous points should be faced with earthen slopes and timber-and-stone wing-dams so diverted water might deposit silt against the tide. As for wattled embankments elsewhere, they hold sand and obstruct water—there is no need to convert them to stone. In Jiangnan, where the land is flat and the tide slow, Huating's old dike was solid, but Baoshan's new dike varied in size and the workmanship fell short. Jinshan, Fengxian, Nanhui, and Shanghai all have earthen dikes somewhat inland; if maintained properly, they should give no further trouble.' On Hongze Lake he asked to dredge the Salt River to the Yangtze, clear the Chuan-chang Canal to the sea, and halt the two Tianran dams and the two dikes below Gaoyan. On Nanwang Lake he proposed leasing dried lake bed to poor peasants for farming. In another memorial he said: 'In every province administration runs from governor-general and governor to circuit intendant and then to prefecture and county; magistrates busy themselves only with ledgers, cash, and grain. Household wealth and poverty, soil quality, local products, popular sentiment, customs, terrain, bridges, and roads—all are ignored. Officials issue regulations; the people owe only taxes; paperwork abounds while real concern is slight. He asked that governors-general and governors order magistrates to tour their districts, report what should be promoted or rectified and with what effect, so superiors could grade them honestly for the court. This, he said, would be one way to prize results over empty forms, tighten administration, and benefit the people. All proposals were sent to the ministries for deliberation and action.
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殿 西祿
In the third month of 1745 he was appointed associate grand secretary. In the fifth month he became grand secretary of the Hall of Preserving Harmony while retaining the Ministry of Personnel. In the fourth month of 1747 he was sent to Shanxi to join Governor Ai Bida in trying Zhang Shilu of Wanmin, Zhang Yuan of Anyi, and others who had led mobs against officials; all were sentenced by law. Ai Bida, Commander Luo Jun, Pu prefect Zhu Fa, and others were all reprimanded and removed. In the first month of 1748 he was ordered to Zhejiang to join Grand Secretary Gao Bin in reinvestigating Governor Chang An; before he arrived, Gao Bin had proved Chang An's bribes, and Neqin joined the memorial; sentence followed the law. In the third month he was again sent to Shandong to join Governor Aligun in famine relief.
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調
The Jinchuan chieftain Slob Dpon had attacked the Gbashi-za chief and raided the border; the emperor ordered Sichuan-Shaanxi governor-general Zhang Guangsi to punish him. Jinchuan country was utterly rugged; the people blocked the mountains with stone fortresses called diao, and the army could not break them. In the fourth month Neqin was recalled to the capital, made commander-in-chief, and sent at the head of the Gendarmerie to oversee the campaign. In the sixth month Neqin reached the front and ordered Gala-i—Slob Dpon's stronghold—taken within three days. The army marched down the Serli Stone Beam to assault the diao without immediate success; acting brigadier Ren Ju, brave in battle, led the van and fell. Neqin lost heart and proposed that all forces build diao of their own, sharing the terrain with the enemy for a war of attrition. When the memorial arrived, the emperor mourned Ren Ju deeply and held that building diao was folly; he personally drafted an edict telling Neqin to weigh time and circumstance in advancing or holding back. Neqin and Guangsi jointly wrote: 'Season and terrain favor the enemy; our troops find no opening. Between winter and spring we should reduce the army to garrison duty; next year add thirty thousand picked men and advance in the fourth month—success is assured, or at latest by autumn.' Neqin also wrote separately: 'Reinforcements next year will cost several million. If we wait two or three years for an opening, that too cannot be foretold.' When the memorials arrived, the emperor said: 'You are in the field and see the situation yet cannot fix a plan, wavering between two courses. I am thousands of li away—how can I judge from afar? Our force is forty thousand; they have barely three thousand—why do they have enough to meet us while we lack enough to attack? Decide whether to attack or withdraw; do not speak with a forked tongue.' The emperor knew Neqin could not handle the enemy and told the grand councillors to consider recalling him; yet he also thought that Jinchuan was no great enemy, and that a senior minister returning without victory would wound the state's dignity and invite ridicule from the four quarters. He secretly told Neqin as much, hoping to stir him to defeat the enemy. After several months the army won small fights but gained not a foot of ground. Neqin could only ask to return to the capital for audience; Neqin and Guangsi were summoned; Yue Zhongqi became acting commander-in-chief, Fu Erdan acting Sichuan-Shaanxi governor-general, and Minister Ban Di was again sent to manage affairs jointly. Soon Neqin was stripped of rank and ordered to furnish his own horse and follow the campaign against the Eleuths to redeem his guilt; Guangsi was arrested.
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退 '' 調'滿' 滿調
In the ninth month Grand Secretary Fu Heng was made commander-in-chief in his place; guard Fu Cheng was sent separately to arrest Neqin, question him, and report his words and conduct. The emperor's successive personal edicts condemning Neqin ran to thousands of words, saying in sum: 'Neqin took command as commander-in-chief yet was perverse, fearful, and shrinking. He wrote that during night attacks on diao he watched the fire from his tent and had never faced the enemy. He also said that supervising the assault on Ali Mountain, he returned to camp while several dozen of our men scattered like birds and beasts. Knowing he faced the enemy only by chance, he again fell back ahead of his men. Fu Cheng reported Neqin's words: 'The Jinchuan affair is very hard and cannot be lightly undertaken—I dare not put this in a memorial.' Neqin had received favor so long—what could he not say? If he truly could not win, he should have honestly memorialized to withdraw. When affairs failed he wished to blame the court for 'not lightly undertaking'—cunning beyond expectation. Again when reinforcements arrived he would say, 'This is all my fault, making so many Manchu soldiers suffer.' Manchu soldiers hearing of transfer leaped for joy, eager to fight as one. Neqin called this suffering—in truth he envied others' success, shook the army's heart, and disregarded the state's business. Ungrateful and contemptuous of law—his crime could not be pardoned.' End of the imperial edict.
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In the tenth month an edict said: 'Neqin's forebears were enfeoffed duke of the second rank for military merit; as kin of Empress Xiaozhaoren he served diligently and was raised to duke of the first rank. Having incurred guilt, the title should still revert to duke of the second rank for his elder brother Celeng to inherit.' Neqin relied on imperial favor and still hoped to explain himself at audience; the emperor again sent personal edicts: 'Military affairs weigh heavily; ordinary diligence and clean integrity count for nothing. Also: Neqin was cautious in small things, but once his mind turned corrupt heaven took his wits—even wishing to escape, he could not. In the twelfth month, after Guangsi was executed, the emperor sealed Ebilun's heirloom sword and gave it to guard E Shi to escort Neqin back to the army and execute him as a warning. In the first month of 1749 the emperor ordered Fu Heng to withdraw the army and told E Shi to carry out the sentence on the road. On the wuyin day of that month, E Shi escorting Neqin reached Banlan Mountain; hearing the later order, he executed Neqin.
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滿 殿滿 西西 西
Fu Heng, whose style was Chunhe, of the Fuca clan, was a Manchu of the Bordered Yellow Banner and younger brother of Empress Xiaoxianchun. His father Li Rongbao is discussed in the biography of Misanhan. Fu Heng rose from the guards to vice-minister of the Ministry of Revenue. In June 1745 he was ordered to serve on the Grand Council. In 1747 he was made minister of revenue. In March 1748 Empress Xiaoxianchun died at Dezhou on the southern tour; Fu Heng had accompanied the emperor and directed the mourning rites. In April an edict praised his diligence and made him Grand Guardian of the Heir Apparent. While Neqin commanded in Jinchuan, Minister Aikedun was replaced as associate grand secretary by Fu Heng, who also took charge of the Ministry of Personnel. After Neqin's failure, in the ninth month Fu Heng was ordered to act as Sichuan-Shaanxi governor-general and take command of the campaign. He was soon made grand secretary of the Hall of Preserving Harmony; 35,000 Manchu and Han troops marched out with four million taels for supplies and 100,000 taels from the privy purse for rewards. In November the army marched; the emperor sacrificed at the Tangzi and sent princes and Grand Secretary Lai Bao to escort Fu Heng to Liangxiang. After Fu Heng left, the emperor sent him personal edicts of praise each day. Passing through Shaanxi, Fu Heng reported that bad courier service was hindering the army; Yin Jishan was ordered to act as Shaanxi governor-general and handle supply. In Sichuan horses were scarce; Yin Jishan was again ordered to supervise between Sichuan and Shaanxi. When Fu Heng's march proved swift and discipline strict, the ministry proposed Grand Tutor of the Heir Apparent; the emperor instead made him Grand Preceptor. He declined firmly but was overruled; 7,000 horses from the capital, Shanxi, and Hubei were sent to the army. Leaving Chengdu he crossed Tianshe Mountain; after snow the road was treacherous and he walked seventy li to the next station. On hearing this the emperor gave him a double-eyed peacock feather, which Fu Heng again declined.
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使 使
Earlier, Lesser Jinchuan chieftain Liang Erji had betrayed his brother Zewang to Slob Dpon, seized his seal, and taken his sister-in-law A Kou. When Slob Dpon invaded, Liang Erji had aided him; later he pretended to surrender and spied for the enemy. Zhang Guangsi trusted the traitor Wang Qiu, who led tribal troops, so the enemy always knew our movements. En route Fu Heng asked to execute Liang Erji; near the front he had Ma Liangzhu summon Liang Erji to Bangga Mountain, tried him, and executed him with A Kou and Wang Qiu. The emperor praised Fu Heng's decisiveness and told him to accept the peacock feather he had earlier refused.
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巿 宿 使
In the tenth month he reached Kasa; the camp was cramped and mixed with tribal markets, so he moved the lines forward under Ye Daxiong's supervision. In the first month of 1749 he wrote: 'At the army I reviewed the campaign: when Ji Shan first attacked, Ma Liangzhu fought through Wo Ri, took Lesser Jinchuan, and reached Danga with great momentum. Had Zhang Guangsi advanced quickly then, the enemy was unprepared and could have been destroyed easily; instead he lost the moment; Song Zongzhang stalled at Zagu, Xu Yinghu was beaten at Dijiao, and the enemy held the passes and strengthened their diao. When Neqin arrived he pressed battle hard; Ren Ju fell, morale collapsed, and he handed everything to Zhang Guangsi. Guangsi was fooled by traitors and attacked only diao. Thousands were killed or wounded, which he hid from reports. Assaulting diao is the worst plan: guns cannot breach solid walls or harm the enemy. A few men in the dark shoot at many in the light, and every shot tells. We strike stone while the enemy strike men. They dig moats we cannot cross and fire downward from within. The diao rise like pagodas, built in days and patched as fast as they crumble. The people stand firm: when diao are smashed they do not flee, and when cannon pass they rebuild. Guest fights host on unequal terms; one diao is harder than a city. At Kasa alone more than three hundred diao crown the hills; to take them day by day would take years. Each diao costs dozens or hundreds of lives—the gain is not worth the price. In war, strike the hard point and the soft hardens; strike the soft and the hard weakens. Only by depriving the enemy of what they rely on can our troops use their strengths. When the armies gather I plan to advance on separate routes. Picked troops will find by-paths, carry rations, pass the diao without fighting, and strike from behind. The tribes are few; thick outer defense means thin inner defense. Once we penetrate by a swift route, defenders will look homeward and collapse without a fight. Kasa is the main road to Gala-i; I shall take that hard road myself. Dangba is almost as narrow as Kasa; I shall reinforce that route too. Both columns will drive at the nest and seize the chiefs. I expect victory by the fourth month.' The emperor thought Jinchuan no great foe, yet two years of war had cost ministers' lives and good generals, and he was displeased. Learning how hard the country was, he wished to end the war on the empress dowager's order, though Fu Heng was still taking diao under Ha Panlong and Ha Shangde. He sent Fu Heng ginseng and rewards for the generals and repeatedly recalled him, citing Jinchuan's foul climate. On the empress dowager's order he was made Duke of Loyal Valor of the first rank, with jeweled finial and four-dragon patch. Fu Heng wrote: 'Jinchuan was mishandled once; to end it lightly now will only embolden the rebels. Every tribal chief suffers them; the frontier will never be quiet. Not every diao blocks the road; their nests are weak; advancing from Xiling Peak to Gala-i would be irresistible, and to stop now would be wasteful. Having been ordered to campaign, how can I return without destroying the nest and capturing the leaders?' He also refused honors; the emperor refused to accept and wrote: 'Until the Xiongnu are destroyed there is no home—that was Huo Qubing's spirit. How should a grand secretary who aids the state vie with field commanders for a day's glory?' He wrote thousands of words in personal edicts and sent a poem to make his meaning plain.
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殿
Fu Heng and Yue Zhongqi chose to push deep; Slob Dpon sent headmen to sue for peace, and Fu Heng ordered him bound to camp. Slob Dpon also sent Chuosi Jia to Yue Zhongqi; Zhongqi entered Lewuwei and brought Slob Dpon and his son Lang Ka to camp. The full account is in Yue Zhongqi's biography. Fu Heng accepted their surrender on six oaths: no harm to neighbors, return of lands, labor like other chiefs, surrender of resisting chiefs, return of plunder, and delivery of arms—then pardoned them. Slob Dpon offered a Buddha image and ten thousand taels of silver; Fu Heng refused the silver, and Slob Dpon asked to build him a shrine with it. The next day Fu Heng withdrew the army. The emperor praised him and, following Yangguli's precedent, gave two leopard-tail spears and two personal guards. In the third month the army reached Beijing; the heir apparent and the Prince of Yu welcomed it outside the walls. The emperor received congratulations in court and held the victory feast. Fu Heng declined the four-dragon patch but was ordered to wear it; a ancestral hall was built after the precedents of Ebilun and Tong Guowei, Li Rongbao was given a posthumous title, and a mansion was granted inside the East Gate.
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In 1754 the Dzungars fell into civil strife and many tribal taiji submitted. When the emperor planned war he consulted the court; only Fu Heng approved. In 1755 Ili was taken and Dawachi captured; the emperor offered him the first-rank dukedom again, but Fu Heng wept and declined until allowed. Portraits were painted in the Hall of Purple Splendor; the emperor wrote the praises and still ranked Fu Heng first, comparing him to Xiao He. In 1756 General Celeng failed to catch Amursana; Fu Heng was sent to Irkhabirga to assemble the Mongol taiji. The day Fu Heng set out, Celeng reported he had already advanced deep; Fu Heng was recalled.
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滿殿 西沿 使 滿
In 1768, after Mingrui's defeat in Burma, Fu Heng was made commander-in-chief in the second month. Aligun led as deputy commander; Agui and Shuhede were appointed to assist, and Shuhede went first to Yunnan with Aligun to plan. In February 1769 Fu Heng marched with 13,600 Manchu and Mongol troops; the emperor bestowed command and armor in the Hall of Supreme Harmony. At Tengyue he decided to advance along the Jiugu: the main column west through Menggong and Mengyang toward Mushu, the fleet downstream in concert. A flank column east of the river would take Mengmi and pinch Laoguantun. Formerly troops waited until after the ninth month to avoid miasma, letting Burma prepare. Fu Heng urged advancing weeks early by surprise; the fleet must have boats. The emperor had ordered boats built; Aligun said the cliffs and streams forbade it and there was no shipyard. Santai and Fuxian were sent to inspect and agreed with Aligun. At the front Fu Heng learned from headmen of Wengguduomu near Manmu and the cool, miasma-free Yeniuba. There they cut timber for boats; tribesmen gladly worked for pay. Fu Heng put Fuxian in charge. When the boats were done, troops and servants relayed them in turns. Gunsmiths from Maolong were set to cast bronze guns. Each report brought imperial praise and a poem on boat-building.
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西
Fu Heng first planned to lead 9,300 men across the Jiugu; in July, before the army gathered, he sent 4,000 from Tengyue. The emperor thought the commander-in-chief had too few men and urged the armies to gather as planned. In the eighth month Fu Heng rushed from Nanbang to the Jiugu. When the memorial arrived the emperor was at the Mulan hunt and sent a roe deer by Fulong'an as gift to Fu Heng. At the Jiugu, Tuomengwumeng of Menggong and He Bing came to surrender. Tuomengwumeng brought riverside headmen to welcome the army, and he and He Bing supplied boats. Fu Heng ferried troops in detachments and set riverside camps; Queen Hunjue of Menggong surrendered with four elephants. The emperor gave a three-eyed peacock feather; Fu Heng declined. The army took Mengyang, stormed four stockades, and executed headman Lanilasai. Relay stations were set up and Hu Erqi garrisoned with 700 men. They reached Nandonggan, took the Nanzhun stockade, and captured thirty-five headmen including Mubomeng. They advanced to Mula, then pushed on to Xinjie.
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西 西 西
After crossing the Jiugu Fu Heng fought no Burmese troops; he lived off the harvest and marched two thousand li unblooded, but heat and rain brought widespread sickness. Agui brought more than ten thousand men from Huju Pass to Yeniuba; when the boats were ready and Guangdong and Fujian fleets arrived, the armies joined and advanced. Ha Guoxing led the fleet; Agui and Aligun the land forces—Agui east of the river, Aligun west. The Burmese fortified both banks of the Jinsha and blocked the mouth with boats. Agui met the Burmese first, poured musket and arrow fire into them, sent cavalry to break their line, and routed them. Ha Guoxing drove the fleet downwind into the enemy; thousands died as boats collided. Aligun broke the west-bank Burmese as well, and Fu Heng sent up the captured banners. The emperor wrote another poem; Aligun took miasma fever, switched to the fleet, and soon died. In the eleventh month Fu Heng attacked Laoguantun on the Jinsha, the junction of Mengmi, Mengshu, Menggong, Mengyang, and the road to Ava. The Burmese built a timber stockade; Ha Guoxing assaulted it hard but could not take it quickly. Our troops took the southeast timber camp; the Burmese sallied by night from the water camp; Hailancha repelled them and Yiletui's fleet seized more boats and banners. The Burmese built riverside forts and struck from the woods; Hailancha beat them back again and again.
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After long assaults, miasma killed many; of 31,000 land and water troops only 13,000 remained. Fu Heng reported the losses; the emperor ended the campaign and recalled him. Fu Heng soon fell ill; Agui informed the court. The emperor ordered him home by relay post and left the army to Agui. The Burmese chief Meng Bo sent Nuoerta with a palm-leaf plea for peace; Fu Heng reported it and the emperor agreed to truce. Fu Heng added: 'When war began everyone called it hard. I insisted on going and failed my charge; punish me severely.' The emperor wrote: 'War is never chosen lightly; if it was wrong, I should bear the blame. Under the Kangxi Emperor, when Wu Sangui asked to give up his fief, only Misanhan, Mingzhu, and a few others favored withdrawal. When Sangui rebelled, many wanted those ministers killed; the grandfather firmly refused. I follow that teaching; Fu Heng's case is like it. For recovering Menggong he should have the three-eyed peacock feather; he declined until victory. Since the nest was not taken, he should return the feather to match his plea for guilt. Meng Bo sent headmen with tribute to the army. In the tenth month Fu Heng garrisoned Huju Pass and met Governor Zhang Bao to reform Yunnan's military and civil posts. In the second month of 1769 the army withdrew. In the third month the emperor went to Tianjin and Fu Heng attended him on the journey. When Burma's apology lagged, the emperor spared Fu Heng because he was ill. In the seventh month he died; the emperor poured libation at his house, gave him a prince's funeral, and posthumous title Wenzong. He was also enshrined in the hall built for his family. Later visits to Tianjin and offerings at Fu Heng's tomb were all remembered in the emperor's poems. In a poem of remembrance he called Fu Heng a pillar of the state. In 1796 Fukang'an's pacification of the Miao won Fu Heng a posthumous beile rank. After Fukang'an's death the family was raised to princely rank and granted shared sacrifice in the Ancestral Temple.
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退稿 使
For twenty-three years Fu Heng served on the Grand Council at the emperor's side and won favor by diligence. By precedent councillors did not all attend together; early in Qianlong only Neqin took edicts. Fu Heng said he could not remember enough and asked that all ministers attend together. After supper the emperor still summoned Fu Heng alone for consultation—the 'evening audience.' Formerly councillors drafted their own memorials after audience; Fu Heng had secretaries draft them first. The emperor relied on Fu Heng but admonished even small slips. Fu Heng grew more humble and would not decide affairs alone. He honored scholars and helped younger men use their talents. On campaign he shared the soldiers' hardships. He was not yet fifty when he died, and the emperor mourned him deeply.
20
His sons were Fuling'an, Fulong'an, Fukang'an, and Fuchang'an. Fukang'an has a separate biography.
21
滿
Fuling'an, a prince consort, was made a guard. In the Dzungar war he fought with Zhaohui at Yarkand, earned merit, and received the hereditary rank yunqiwei. In 1767 he became vice banner general of the Bordered White Banner Manchus. He served as acting regional commander at Yongbei in Yunnan. He passed away.
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Fulong'an married Princess Hejia and became prince consort and personal guard. In 1768 he became minister of war and grand councillor, then minister of works. In 1770 he inherited the first-rank dukedom of Loyal Valor. In 1771 Brigadier Song Yuanjun impeached Governor Guilin; Fulong'an was sent to try the case. Fulong'an cleared Guilin and convicted Yuanjun. In 1776 he was again minister of war while retaining works. When Jinchuan was pacified his portrait joined the Hall of Purple Splendor. In 1784 he died with posthumous title Qinke.
23
His son Feng Shenjilun, as the princess's son, held princely rank and became vice banner general of the Bordered Blue Banner Han Army and parks director. In 1784 he inherited the title. He rose to minister of war and directed the imperial equipage. Under Jiaqing he was punished twice and ended as Mukden vice president of war. In 1807 he passed away. His son Fulehunwengzhu inherited the title.
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滿 使 滿
Fuchang'an rose from blue-feathered guard to vice banner general of the Bordered Red Banner, armory director, and household head. In 1780 he was ordered to study on the Grand Council. He rose to minister of revenue. In 1788 Taiwan was pacified. In 1792 Gurkha was pacified. His portrait too was painted in the Hall of Purple Splendor. In 1798, when Wang Sanhuai was captured, service on the Grand Council won him a marquisate. In 1799, after Qianlong's death, Heshen fell; Jiaqing arrested Fuchang'an for siding with Heshen, stripped his rank, and seized his property. Ministers proposed decapitation under the faction law; the emperor commuted it to imprisonment, executed Heshen, and made Fuchang'an watch. He was sent to serve at the Yuling mausoleum, then made a department secretary. In 1801, for asking to return to Beijing, he was stripped and sent to Mukden as a common soldier. From brave-rider secretary he rose twice to hunting-park director, once to Malan commander, twice acting Gubeikou commander. He was repeatedly punished and demoted. In 1816 he became vice banner general of the Bordered Yellow Banner Manchus. In 1817 he passed away.
25
The commentator writes: In Qianlong's early reign government was lenient and clear, and the realm rejoiced in peace. Ortai and Zhang Tingyu assisted the throne, but the emperor's voice in council was first Neqin, then Fu Heng. The emperor wrote that while Ortai served he nurtured talent until he produced Neqin; while Neqin served he nurtured talent until he produced Fu Heng. He also said Neqin received the most favor, then Fu Heng. Neqin failed in command and was executed, yet his diligence and integrity were not forgotten; Fu Heng twice returned victorious after accepting surrender; the emperor trusted his caution, not merely his birth and rank.
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