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卷407 列傳一百九十四 江忠源弟:忠济 族弟:忠信 罗泽南

Volume 407 Biographies 194: Jiang Zhongyuan younger brother: Zhong Ji, Zu younger brother: Zhong Xin, Luo Zenan

Chapter 407 of 清史稿 · Draft History of Qing
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Chapter 407
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Biographies 194
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Jiang Zhongyuan; his younger brother Zhong Ji; his clansman Zhong Xin; and Luo Zenan
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西
Jiang Zhongyuan, styled Minqiao, came from Xinning in Hunan. He passed the provincial examination in the seventeenth year of Daoguang (1837). He steeped himself in practical statecraft and was known for his forthright, principled character. On his journey to the capital for the metropolitan examination, he first paid a visit to Zeng Guofan, who told him, "In all my days I have never seen anyone like you. You will win fame across the realm—and yet you will die a martyr's death in the end." He was assigned a teaching post in the grand allocation and went home. Seeing that sectarian unrest was about to erupt, he quietly trained the young men of his district in military tactics. Soon afterward the Huangbei Cave bandit Lei Zaihao did join forces with Guangxi ruffians to rebel. Jiang smashed their stronghold in one battle, seized Zaihao, and put him to death. His service earned him promotion to magistrate and assignment to Zhejiang. When Xiushui was stricken by famine, he was sent to administer relief and ended up acting as county magistrate. Once relief was complete, he rounded up more than a dozen major bandits, and the county was brought firmly under control. Governor Wu Wenrong treated him as a premier talent, gave him the Lishui post, and put him in charge of the coastal dikes. After Emperor Wenzong took the throne, Zeng Guofan recommended him by imperial edict. He was presented at court in the capital, then left office to observe mourning for his father.
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調 使 調
In the first year of Xianfeng (1851), Grand Secretary Sai Shang'a took field command against the Guangdong rebels. Jiang was called to the front, where Vice Commander Ulan Tai came to depend on him heavily and consulted him before every move. Zhongyuan raised five hundred of the militiamen he had trained at home and sent his younger brother Zhong Jun to lead them. They were called the "Chu Braves." Rebel power was at its peak, and regular troops would not stand up to them. As soon as Zhongyuan's men arrived, they pressed up against the rebels and threw up entrenchments. The rebels, judging them few and freshly gathered, attacked at once. He kept his walls and held his ground until the enemy came close, then burst out in a charge and took several hundred heads. The entire army was stunned. His repeated victories won him the peacock feather insignia and promotion to sub-prefect of Zhili. When the rebels massed at Yong'an, Xiang Rong and Ulan Tai fell out. Zhongyuan tried to mediate, but no one listened. Convinced disaster was coming, he pleaded illness and went home.
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歿鶿 滿 退 西 調
That spring in the second year, the rebels broke out as he had foreseen and struck at Guilin. At the news Zhongyuan recruited another thousand men and rushed to the rescue with Liu Changyou. Before they arrived, Ulan Tai was killed in action. Zhongyuan then took sole command, seized Luzhou outside Guilin, won three straight battles, broke the siege, and was promoted to prefect. The rebels slipped into Quanzhou and were heading for Hunan. Zhongyuan marched with the allied forces to intercept them. They seized the city but would not stay, broke out again, stowed all their supplies aboard boats, and planned a combined land-and-river advance. Zhongyuan felled trees to dam the river and caught the rebels at Saoyi Ford. After two days and nights of bitter fighting, the rebel commander Feng Yunshan was killed by artillery. The rebels abandoned their boats and fled under cover of night, leaving all their supplies behind. Zhongyuan had urged blocking the eastern bank, but his advice was ignored. The rebels broke east into Hunan and captured Daozhou. He argued again that the rebels numbered fewer than ten thousand and that, given time, they would swell their ranks by coercion. Concentrated assault was better than scattered defense, and pressing the attack was better than distant blocking. The allied armies then besieged Daozhou. The rebels dug in, clearly planning a long occupation. He bribed agents inside the walls and arranged a coordinated strike. The rebels retreated toward Lanshan and Jiahe, struck Guiyang, and captured Chenzhou. Zhongyuan warned that the harder they pressed from behind, the more towns would fall ahead, and he renewed his plea for a united offensive. The authorities paid no heed. The rebels grew bolder still and marched straight on Changsha. Zhongyuan rushed to the rescue with Regional Commander Hechun, only to find the rebels already holding the southern quarter, tunneling through civilian neighborhoods, and pressing the assault fiercely. Zhongyuan saw Tianxin Pavilion on its commanding height, with rebel barricades on top, and cried out in alarm, "If they hold that ground, Changsha is lost!" He led a band of volunteers to seize it, and the rebels were driven back. He moved his camp up against the rebel lines so close that both sides drew from the same well and could hear each other's night watches. Zhongyuan's brother Zhong Ji, who had pursued the rebels from Chenzhou, planned a pincer attack but was wounded in a rebel ambush. He was lowered into the city by rope to confer on strategy and told the commanders, "Imperial forces are closing in from every side except the west bank of the river, which lies open. The rebels are seizing civilian boats to cross the river for food. Once their supplies run out, they will break out somewhere else. We should mass troops at Huilong Pond to block them." Governor Zhang Liangji agreed, but the generals hung back and would not move. Sai Shang'a had been removed and Xu Guangjin appointed in his place but had not yet arrived. Three governors, two commanders-in-chief, and ten regional commanders operated inside and outside the city with no one in overall command. Zhongyuan went to Xiangtan to plead his case to Guangjin, but again was not heeded. The rebels eventually broke out through Huilong Pond, seized Yuezhou, and went on to take Wuchang. Bitter that his counsel had gone unheeded, Zhongyuan refused to march east. Zhang Liangji had him kept in Hunan, where he pacified the Baling bandits, then sent him to Liuyang against the Zhengyitang rebel Zhou Guoyu. He killed seven hundred men and dispersed ten thousand followers. After Liuyang was pacified, he was promoted to circuit intendant.
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使 退退 退 宿 退退 退 調 -{}- 西 使西 使 使 退 便
In the first month of the third year he was made Hubei judicial commissioner. Zhang Liangji, acting as governor-general, relied on him for all military matters. He put down banditry in Tongcheng, Chongyang, Jiayu, Puqi, and elsewhere, capturing ringleaders including Liu Lijian, Chen Baidou, and Xiong Kaiyu. Emperor Wenzong, knowing Zhongyuan's loyalty and valor could be trusted, ordered him to join Xiang Rong's army with his troops, then appointed him to assist in Jiangnan military affairs. Before he left, he submitted a blunt memorial on military affairs that began: "The Guangdong rebellion has dragged on for years, devoured twenty million taels in supplies, left the troops without firm resolve, and offered few defensible cities. Your servant has been in the thick of battle for three years now. I venture to set out the main points for Your Majesty's judgment. First: enforce military law rigorously. A general who will not enforce the law is no general at all; and troops who will not obey the law are no army at all. Quanzhou fell for want of reinforcements, and one retreat followed another. Daozhou fell because the city was abandoned, and rout piled upon rout. Yuezhou was fortified yet could not hold for a single day. Jiujiang lined up warships yet could not stop the combined land-and-river advance. Was there any other cause? Fear of the rebels had taken root in men's hearts. The rebels are always willing to die facing us, yet we are not willing to die facing them. In battle the rebels drive their newest recruits to the front, station veterans behind them, and kill any man who falls back. For them, retreat means death and advance means life. For us, retreat means life and advance means death. Before the lines even meet, the outcome is already decided. If we truly mean to turn fear into strength, we must replace leniency with severity. Let Your Majesty enforce the law upon your generals, let generals enforce it upon their officers, and let officers enforce it upon the rank and file. Execute any who shirk the enemy, any who fail to reinforce, any who retreat without orders. Once discipline is strict, the army's morale will stiffen of its own accord. This is the first great principle of suppressing the rebels. Second: remove the senior commanders. After so long a peace, the old generals are gone. Commanders-in-chief and regional commanders now advance by seniority alone, waiting their turn for promotion. High rank breeds evasion, and junior officers dare not challenge them; heavy authority makes swift punishment impossible, and governors cannot act on their own authority. Men in their prime at the bottom of the ladder burn to distinguish themselves. Once they rise high, ambition fades, and they cannot throw themselves into the crisis at hand. After years of war, supplies grow ever scarcer, yet what a commander-in-chief or regional commander costs dwarfs what a deputy or staff colonel requires. Cut one such post and you could maintain two hundred crack troops with money to spare. Why pour our limited resources into these useless senior commands? Choose one man who truly understands strategy to command them, and send the rest into retirement. Promote deputies and lower ranks strictly on merit. This is the essential path to reorganizing the army. Third: weed out useless troops. In choosing troops, put courage first, stolid dependability second, and technical skill last. Steady men who can endure hardship advance when told to advance and retreat when told to retreat. They obey their commander and nothing else. The frivolous and timid strut in peacetime, hang back in battle, scheme for promotion when credit is handed out, and blame others when defeat comes. These are the first class to cut. Constant levies have left some men frail and elderly, kept on the rolls only to consume rations, and others with their units shattered, their nerves barely steady again. With supplies already exhausted, we cannot afford further waste. These are the second class to cut. Order every camp commander to inspect his unit rigorously. Keep the bold and spirited for offensive operations and the steady, hardy men for garrison duty. Everyone outside these two categories should be cut. This is the urgent work of building a strong force. Fourth: make rewards and punishments clear. Reward victory and punish defeat: that has been the unchanging rule since antiquity. But if rewards are given for victory yet go to men who did not win, it would be better to give no rewards at all; and if punishments are imposed for defeat yet fall on men who did not lose, it would be better to impose no punishments at all. With neither rewards nor punishments, men still hope that justice will come in time. But when rewards miss the deserving and punishments miss the guilty, discipline collapses, resentment spreads, and the army cannot be led. Today, when a battle is won, the victors ought to be rewarded—but court attendants receive the lion's share of commendations; and not once has a man been executed for breaking discipline or punished for letting the enemy escape. Victory and defeat are the common lot of armies, yet commanders speak only of victories and hide their defeats; merit and fault ought to stand side by side, yet commanders conceal their faults and trumpet their merits. Such conduct will not do even in peacetime—how much less in an age of crisis? Military rewards and punishments cannot be applied by a single rule. Victory deserves reward, yet if men advance in a mob merely to claim heads and steal credit, or break off pursuit to plunder and win only a trifling gain, they deserve punishment; Defeat deserves punishment, yet if a man charges ahead as vanguard while reinforcements fail to follow, or the army retreats while one officer presses forward alone, he deserves reward. Today the commander-in-chief trusts only what his camp generals tell him, and they in turn trust only their aides. The truth of who deserves credit or blame cannot be learned by hearsay, and personal favor and dislike, shaped by gossip, are often mistaken. To judge right and wrong in a way the troops will accept is nearly impossible. Unless the commander goes to the front himself and deals openly and fairly, how can he steady the troops' hearts and break the habit of panic flight? This corruption of morale must be reversed without delay. Fifth: avoid reckless battles. The art of war demands that one defend before one attacks, control the enemy before being controlled, and avoid the rebels' strengths before exploiting our own advantages. Since Guangxi I have studied the rebels closely. When they camp, they build earthworks suited to the ground and ring them with deep trenches; in battle they put regular troops in front and strike from the flanks with ambush forces; when they halt they recruit agents everywhere to watch our movements; when they march they inflate their reputation from afar and strike when we are in disarray. I have long held that when the rebels stop, we should seize key points to cut their supplies and post strong forces to block their escape; when they march we should meet them head-on to blunt their advance and lay ambushes to break their momentum. Yet we besiege without holding our lines and assault walled cities head-on; we pursue without cutting off retreat and merely chase from behind. At the slightest setback morale collapses. Our tactics must change. Sixth: read the terrain. Strategic advantage is not the fixed terrain marked on maps and histories. Watch where the rebels come and go and block them in advance; observe when they split or unite and control them from a distance; then even a shallow ford or a low hill, if the ground must be fought for, must not be lost for an instant. After the battle at Saoyi Ford in Quanzhou had broken the rebels' momentum, we should have fortified the east bank at once and severed their line of retreat; after Daozhou had blunted their advance, we should have posted troops at Qili Bridge to block their eastward march; as Changsha was about to be relieved, we should have fortified Huilong Pond and Tuqiaotou so the rebels could not break westward. At Daozhou's Lotus Pond and Liantao Bay—a sixty-li killing ground—we let them escape alive; Xiangyin's Linzikou and Yuezhou's Chenglingji were ground we had to hold, yet we let the enemy slip through. Disaster was sown within arm's reach, and its poison spread a thousand li. These defeats must be studied as a stern warning. Seventh: enforce strict discipline. We kill rebels to secure the people, and only by securing the people can we kill rebels. The Guangdong rebels' cruelty beggars description, yet they prey on the wealthy and rarely bother the poorest households. Sometimes they feign goodwill and pay fair prices in the markets. Our troops seize goods and commit outrages from which even the poorest households cannot escape. The people may even make excuses for the rebels, yet how can they feel anything but hatred toward our soldiers? Porters and merchants drift without fixed posts, pose as soldiers, and loot and assault at will. Villagers are terrified and dare not resist. Every camp commander should be ordered to enforce strict control, keep registers, and inspect them regularly. Violators should be punished under military law before the evil spreads. This is essential to winning the people's loyalty and preventing future trouble. Eighth: show leniency to those coerced into service. The rebel ranks have suffered heavy losses; what remains are mostly men pressed into service. Former secret-society men and bandits, shielded by lenient laws, or convicts and exiles released in the crisis and sent as guides, serve the rebels willingly. Such men have no excuse under the law and must be executed once captured. But good people driven under duress, families torn apart—the anguish of men trapped between two fires, the misery of lives overturned again and again—fills me with private grief whenever I think of it. Every camp should post proclamations far and wide, raise a banner on the battlefield promising immunity from death, and invite coerced men to turn their weapons and come over in safety. This will both yield intelligence and peel away the rebel ranks. This is both an act of humane governance and a powerful tactic for defeating the rebels. If these eight measures are adopted—recruit exceptional talent without regard to convention, give able commanders full discretion, appoint good officials to secure the foundations, and audit supplies rigorously to keep the army fed— and yet the rebels are not destroyed and good order does not return, I beg that my head be struck off to answer to the empire." The memorial reached the throne, and the Emperor praised and accepted it.
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西 退
At Jiujiang he learned that Nanchang was under siege. Though an edict had just ordered him to relieve Fengyang, he memorialized to rescue Jiangxi first, led thirteen hundred men, and reached Nanchang after three days and nights of forced marches. Governor Zhang Fu presented him with the imperial mandate banner and gave him full command of the city's defense. Zhongyuan burned the buildings outside the walls and executed deserters. Saying Zhangjiang Gate faced the heaviest assault, he took that sector himself and went up on the walls every day to direct the fighting. The rebels tunneled under the wall and blew a breach dozens of feet wide. He killed the rebels who had broken through and had the breach filled with sandbags. He led several sorties through the gates and at night lowered volunteers by rope to burn the rebel camps. The court commended him and bestowed precious gifts. Hunan reinforcements soon arrived. He posted troops at Zhangshu Town and sent Luo Zenan to pacify banditry in Taihe, Wan'an, and Anfu. After defending Nanchang for more than ninety days, by the eighth month repeated artillery fire had smashed rebel fortifications and sunk their boats. When he set fires with the wind at his back, the rebels withdrew. The court praised his achievement and granted him the second-rank official insignia. The rebels fell back on Jiujiang, raided Xingguo in Hubei, and marched straight on Tianjiazhen. Zhongyuan hurried to the rescue with two thousand men but was delayed on the road. He pushed ahead with a few dozen personal guards and reached Tianjiazhen first. Within a day rebel boats swept in on a favorable wind. Circuit Intendant Xu Fengyu and others were killed. Zhongyuan submitted a self-accusation. The court pardoned him, demoted him four ranks while keeping him in post, and soon afterward appointed him governor of Anhui.
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沿 西 使
The rebels had already taken Huangzhou and Hanyang and were besieging Wuchang. He attacked the rebels along the river, defeated them, and lifted the siege of Wuchang. He memorialized for ten thousand more troops to hold the Huainan front, but Hubei held back most of his force. He marched on with only two thousand men in the rain. His troops were exhausted, and Zhongyuan himself fell ill. By the time he reached Lu'an, the rebels had already captured Tongcheng and Shucheng. Officials and townspeople begged him to stay, but he could not. He left a thousand men at Lu'an and was carried, ill, to Luzhou. Before his dispositions were complete, the rebels were upon him in force. Relief troops and militia inside the city numbered only three thousand. Though gravely ill, Zhongyuan held the walls and repeatedly beat back assaults. Rebel mines repeatedly blew gaps in the walls, and each time he fought them off. The court praised Zhongyuan for holding the endangered city and fighting at the front in person, and granted him the title Huolongwu Batulu. Governor-General Shu Xing'a of Shaanxi-Gansu had more than ten thousand men nearby but hung back in fear and would not advance. Zhongyuan's brother Zhong Jun came with Liu Changyou to relieve the city and camped at Wulidun outside the walls, but could not break through. After more than a month under siege, Luzhou Prefect Hu Yuanwei was secretly in league with the rebels. Learning that food was short and ammunition nearly gone, they redoubled their assault. The West Water Gate collapsed. He fought even as his men rebuilt it. Rebels broke in through the South Gate on scaling ladders. Zhongyuan drew his sword to kill himself. His attendants seized him. A servant tried to carry him away, but Zhongyuan broke free. He fought his way to Shuizha Bridge, took seven wounds, and threw himself into Gutang Pond to die. Provincial Commissioner Liu Yuzhen, Chizhou Prefect Chen Yuanyuan, Sub-Prefects Zou Hanxun and Hu Ziyong, Assistant Magistrates Xing Fu and Ai Yanhui, Vice General Song An, and Staff Generals Ma Liang and Dai Wenyuan perished with him. Hu Yuanwei ultimately surrendered to the rebels. Zhong Jun hired men to search for his body. Eight days later a soldier named Zhou Chang found it and carried it out; his face looked as if he were still alive.
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西 歿
When word reached the throne, Emperor Wenzong was stricken with grief. Zhongyuan was posthumously made governor-general, granted hereditary ranks as Cavalry Commandant and Cloud Cavalry Commandant, enshrined in the Shrine of Loyalty and Fidelity, and given the posthumous title Zhonglie (Loyal Martyr). Early in Tongzhi, after Jiangnan was pacified, his earlier service was remembered. He was granted the hereditary rank of Third-Rank Light Chariot Commandant. Separate shrines were built in Hunan and Jiangxi, and in the Hubei capital he was enshrined with Luo Zenan in the Shrine of the Three Loyal Ones. More than a year after Zhongyuan's death, bandits threatened Hunan. His brother Zhong Shu was ordered to raise militia and help suppress them. His mother, Lady Chen, contributed her private wealth to the war fund and offered rich rewards to encourage the troops. When order was restored, Governor Luo Bingzhang reported the family's service. A special edict granted Zhongyuan's parents the first-rank patent of nobility for three generations. Zhongyuan had three younger brothers—Zhong Jun, Zhong Ji, and Zhong Shu—and clansmen Zhong Yi and Zhong Xin. All had followed him into the army from the beginning. Zhong Jun and Zhong Yi have biographies of their own.
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西 歿 調 西 使
Zhong Ji helped defend Changsha. When the wall was breached he plugged the gap and killed dozens of rebels who had scaled it, earning a reputation for valor. In the third year Zhongyuan went to Hubei and left a thousand of his veterans with Zhong Ji to hold Changsha. When Zhongyuan's campaign at Tongcheng went badly with too few men, Zhong Ji force-marched to the rescue. At Guikou he killed the rebel leader Chen Shenzi in battle, routed He Tianjun and others, and burned their stronghold; and when he relieved Nanchang he twice sealed breaches in the wall and killed the rebels who broke through first. Governor Zhang Fu memorialized that he was sharp, brave, and respected throughout the army. His accumulated merit won him promotion to candidate prefect. After Jiangxi was secured, Zhong Ji went home to care for his mother. After Zhongyuan's death, an edict ordered Zhong Ji and Zhong Jun to continue leading troops against the rebels. Zhong Jun was marching to relieve Luzhou and fought under Hechun. Luo Bingzhang sent Zhong Ji to Lanshan and Ningyuan against local bandits. He won repeated victories, lifted sieges, and was promoted to circuit intendant. In the fifth year he was posted to garrison Yuezhou. While Hu Linyi besieged Wuchang without success, rebels allied with bandits in Chongyang and Tongcheng. Zhong Ji sent troops to retake Tongcheng and remained garrisoned there. In the spring of the sixth year, rebels from Jiangxi fled in from Yining. Zhong Ji attacked and broke several stockades, but fierce bands numbering tens of thousands surrounded him. He fought for three days until his camp was overrun and he was killed. He was posthumously given the rank of surveillance commissioner, granted a hereditary cavalry commandant's post, and honored with the posthumous name Zhuangjie.
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西 西
Zhong Xin was wild and undisciplined in his youth. At sixteen he followed Zhongyuan to the Guangxi front. He broke military discipline, and Zhongyuan was about to have him executed until the men pleaded for his life. In battle he proved fierce and fearless, often leading the vanguard, and rose steadily to the rank of company commander. When he heard that Zhongyuan was besieged at Luzhou, he marched with Zhong Jun to relieve him. When they arrived, rebel forces blocked them at Wulidun, five li outside the western gate, and they could not get through. That night Zhong Xin led a dozen picked men through the rebel lines, slipped into the city by rope, and brought word that relief was coming. He stayed inside the walls, repeatedly repairing breaches, and slipped out by rope to raid rebel stockades. For these feats he was promoted to garrison commandant and awarded the peacock feather. When the city fell, Zhongyuan ordered him to escape. In the fifth year he helped Zhong Jun retake Luzhou. For his distinguished service he was promoted to battalion commander and granted the title Yiyong Baturu. When Zhong Jun went home on leave, he assumed command of his troops. In the sixth year he served under Hechun in the capture of Sanhe and Chaoxian and rose to vice commander. Serving under Qin Dingsan in the campaign against Tongcheng, he proposed a flanking maneuver with surprise troops, stormed sixteen rebel camps, and pushed to the foot of the walls. When the rebels poured out to meet him, he rode to the eastern gate, leaped the moat, and seized a rebel general before a cannonball struck his left side and killed him in the fighting. He was granted a hereditary cloud cavalry commandant's post and honored with the posthumous name Zhongjie. Both Zhong Ji and Zhong Xin were granted secondary enshrinement in Zhongyuan's memorial temple.
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西 -{}-
Luo Zenan, styled Zhongyue, was from Xiangxiang in Hunan. A licentiate, he taught in his home district and drew a large circle of students. In the first year of Xianfeng he was nominated as a filial and upright candidate. In the second year, when the Guangdong rebels threatened Changsha, Zenan organized local militia while still at home. In the third year his service was rewarded with registration for a post as assistant prefect of education. When Zeng Guofan was ordered to command the district militia, he dispatched Zenan to suppress bandits in Guidong, and Zenan was promoted to magistrate. When Jiang Zhongyuan marched to relieve Jiangxi, he asked Guofan for reinforcements, and Guofan sent Zenan to lead them there. His troops were mostly scholars. In their first taste of battle under the walls of Nanchang, they fought with such eagerness that several were killed. When Guofan heard of it, he rejoiced and said, "The Hunan Army is truly worth deploying." After the siege was lifted, he suppressed bandits in Anfu, routing thousands of rebels with only three hundred men, and was promoted to sub-prefect of Zhili Prefecture. Back in Hunan, he pacified bandits in Yongxing, expanded his force to a thousand men, and encamped at Hengzhou. He and Guofan reviewed troop strength, reorganized the regimental system, and drilled for six months.
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便 退 退
In the sixth month of the fourth year he joined Taqibu in the assault on Yuezhou. Holding Big Bridge—a choke point the rebels had to fight for—he refused to budge until the moment was right, then struck. Three battles, three victories, and a thousand rebels destroyed. In the intercalary seventh month he stormed nine stockades at Gaoqiao. The rebels fell back to Chenglingji, where he and Taqibu pressed the attack, broke camp after camp, and drove them into full retreat. He was promoted to prefect and awarded the peacock feather. From then on the Hunan Army's reputation spread, and Zenan and Taqibu were spoken of in the same breath. Fighting eastward, he retook Chongyang, drove the Xianning rebels back, defeated them again at Jinniu, and established camp at Zifang. Guofan gathered his generals at Jinkou to plan the assault on Wuchang. Zenan submitted a map and battle plan, noting two routes from Zifang toward Wuchang. He proposed that Taqibu block Hongshan while he assaulted Huayuan. More than ten thousand rebels held Huayuan behind three fortified positions—one on the great river, one on Qinglin Lake, one astride the long dike—deep moats and heavy palisades lining the east bank opposite Xiama Ji. Heavy guns lined the inner and outer riverbanks, blocking both land and water approaches. Zenan led his brigade straight at Huayuan, and the rebels answered with cannon fire from behind their wooden walls. His men crawled forward in low skirmish lines, dropping and rising three times before reaching the stockades. Detachments seized the rebel boats; as the boat crews fled, the garrisons broke, and all three positions fell at once. The next day he stormed Miaoyutao. Rebels who tried to escape toward Hongshan were blocked by Taqibu, and that night they abandoned the city and fled. Wuchang and Hanyang were both retaken—just seven days after the council of war. Word of the victory reached the court, and he was placed on the list for circuit intendant. He was soon appointed to the Ning-Shao-Tai circuit in Zhejiang, but Guofan asked that he stay with the army.
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使 退 沿
Rebels held Xingguo and had seized Daye in a secondary thrust. Zenan swiftly retook Xingguo while Taqibu secured Daye from the Wuchang front; they then turned their sights on Tianjiazhen. The rebels blocked the river with iron chains and held Banbishan as a flank position, defending both banks. Zenan advanced and encamped at Maling'ao, roughly three li from Banbishan. Several thousand rebels attacked suddenly, and nearly ten thousand more were crossing the river from Tianjiazhen to reinforce them. With only two thousand men, Zenan kept his troops hidden until the rebels relaxed their guard, then struck. They broke and fled, but their retreat was cut off and thousands plunged to their deaths from the cliffs. He took Banbishan; the navy severed the river chains and burned the rebel fleet; Tianjiazhen fell. He was granted the title Pukeng'e Baturu and promoted to surveillance commissioner. A three-pronged land-and-river campaign was then approved. Governor-general Yang Yining commanded the north-bank forces; Zenan and Taqibu struck from the south; Guofan led the fleet downstream. Yang proved unable to hold his command. When the rebels again thrust north, Zenan joined Taqibu in crossing the river to the north bank and retaking Guangji and Huangmei. The rebels fell back and held Konglong Station and Xiaochikou; Zinan coordinated the allied forces for a joint assault. Mid-crossing, the rebels struck and the force briefly gave ground. Zinan, though wounded in the arm, continued to direct the assault, sent detachments to smash the rebel stronghold at Jiekou, and drove off the rebel leader Luo Dagang. In that engagement, five thousand men routed twenty thousand rebels. The rebels thereupon abandoned their riverside camps and massed their defenses at Jiujiang alone. Taqibu laid siege to Jiujiang while Zinan mounted a separate operation against Kuishan to cut off rebel reinforcements from Hukou. Meanwhile the naval force entered Poyang Lake and was ambushed by the rebels, losing all its supplies and baggage. Guofan hurried to Zinan's camp, but the fleet was trapped at Hukou and could not break free.
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西 使 西 西
In the fifth year of the reign, the imperial armies in Hubei suffered repeated defeats and Wuchang fell once more. Zinan accompanied Guofan to Nanchang and marched to relieve Raozhou. At Chenjiashan and Dasonglin he inflicted a crushing defeat on the rebels and recovered Yiyang. He then marched to the relief of Guangxin, routed the rebels at Wushi Mountain west of the city, and retook it. He went on to recover Xing'an, Dexing, and Fuliang in succession, then pressed the campaign into Yining. After victories at Liangkou and Aoling he retook Yining and was granted the honorary rank of Bureau Commissioner. Seeing that the Jiangxi campaign lacked a coherent strategy, Zinan wrote to Guofan in summary: "Jiujiang lies near Jiangning and also pins down Wuchang, which is why the rebels are contesting it with their full strength. They strike at Yiyang, reinforce Guangxin, come down the Xin River into Lake Poyang, and threaten our right flank; they hold Yining, garrison Meiling Pass, descend the Xiu River into Lake Poyang, and threaten our left flank. With both routes now secured, Jiujiang's approaches are growing firm—but in Tongcheng and other parts of Hubei, rebel bands swarm like weeds. Yining and Wuning in Jiangxi, Pingjiang and Baling in Hunan—these counties will never know a day of peace so long as those bands remain. To seize the fate of Jiujiang, one must strike south from Wuchang; and to lift the siege of Wuchang, one should advance through Chongyang and Tongcheng. The present plan should be this: use the Hukou fleet and Jiujiang land forces to block rebel shipping up and down the river, then send a picked column to sweep Chongyang and Tongcheng and drive on Wuchang—from Wuchang to take aim at Jiujiang. Only thus may the whole southeastern front find its turning point. Guofan forwarded this memorial to the throne and ordered Zinan to shift his forces to Hubei for a joint campaign. Peng Sanyuan and Pu Chengyao, former subordinates of Taqibu, were placed under his command with their Baoyong regiment—five thousand men in all.
16
西
In the ninth month he reached Tongcheng. The rebels claimed numbers in the tens of thousands, but they were a rabble—one battle and they scattered. He pressed forward, took the strategic pass at Guikou, captured Chongyang, and encamped at Yangloudong. The formidable rebels Wei Jun and Shi Dakai joined forces—more than twenty thousand strong—and marched from Puchi to attack. Zinan intercepted them and drove them back. Hu Linji arrived to review the troops. Together they assaulted Puchi, retook the city, and exploiting a fog advanced to capture Xianning. From that point south of Wuchang, rebel activity ceased entirely. In the eleventh month the army reached Zifang, where Zinan and Linji plotted the sequence of their advance. Zinan camped at Mount Hong, Linji on the southern embankment outside the city walls, and the fleet anchored at Jinkou. Outside the walls the rebels had raised thirteen fortified camps, each as strong as the city itself. In the first engagement twenty thousand rebels poured out through Shizi Street. Linji locked with them in a seesaw fight, falling back and surging forward by turns. Zinan and Li Xubing split into two columns, stole around the rebel positions, smashed the Shizi Street camp, and tore down every fort southeast of the city. Babujiekou was the army's vital corridor to the river; Tangjiao the rebels' grain supply line. Both were taken in turn, the shipyard burned, and the northwestern ring of rebel camps wiped out. The rebels rebuilt two stone fortifications outside Wangshan Gate; he ordered his men forward and leveled them; then fought them again and again at Yaowan and Tangjiao, killing several thousand. The rebels finally shut the gates and refused to come out.
17
西 西
After his defeat at Chongyang, Shi Dakai fled into Jiangxi and gathered strength once more. Zeng Guofan ordered Zinan back to Jiangxi, but Zinan argued that Wuhan was the hinge of north and south: if the Hunan troops were suddenly pulled away, Hu Linji's force could not hold alone. The rebels' supplies were nearly spent and victory was within reach—to abandon the siege now would be folly. His father, eighty years old, wrote to the camp exhorting him to loyalty and duty; Linji forwarded the letter to the throne. In the second month of the sixth year, an edict specially granted second-rank posthumous honors to Zinan's grandparents and parents in token of distinguished service. In the third month the rebels threw open the gates and rushed out to attack; Zinan personally directed the fighting. Rebel reinforcements arrived in force. Our troops charged down from Mount Hong, struck hard in pursuit, and pressed to the walls—when a cannon shot caught Zinan on the left brow, blood streaming down his face. He reined in for the better part of an hour, then rode back to Mount Hong and, still bleeding, sat upright outside his tent, sketching out the disposition of the battle. The next day he died in camp. Emperor Wenzong was stricken with grief and ordered posthumous honors befitting a provincial governor. His father Jiadan was granted a first-rank official's finial; his sons Zhaozuo and Zhaosheng, both provincial graduates, were given the hereditary rank of Captain of Cavalry. He was enshrined in the Shrine of Loyal and Faithful Officials, with dedicated temples raised in his home province, Hubei, and Jiangxi. His posthumous title was Loyal Integrity. When the Jiangnan region was finally pacified, Emperor Muzong, recalling his earlier service, added a hereditary Cloud-Cavalry Captaincy to the family's honors.
18
西輿 退歿
Zinan's writings included Elementary Learning in Rhyme, Lectures on the Western Inscription, Supplementary Notes on the Book of Changes, Extended Meaning of the Human Ultimate, Discernment of the Yaojiang School, Essentials of Geography, and others. Equal in cultivation and practical application, he devoted himself wholly to the Cheng-Zhu school of Neo-Confucianism. Scholars honored him as Master Luoshan. Discussing military strategy, he said the opening of the Great Learning—those lines on knowing when to stop—contained the whole doctrine, and the Zuo Commentary's warning that spirit flags at the second drum and fails at the third was its practical illustration. Many of his disciples who took the field rose to eminence as commanders; the most celebrated—Li Xubing, Li Xuyi, Wang Zhen, Liu Tenghong, and Jiang Yili—each has a biography of his own. Among Zenan's disciples who died young before their fame spread was Zhong Jinheng. He had studied under Zenan from boyhood, disciplined himself rigorously, kept a diary of his conduct, and rose at once to reproach himself whenever he found fault. Zenan told Liu Rong, "Our school teaches self-cultivation for its own sake—young Zhong may come close to living it!" He helped pacify banditry in Chenzhou and Guilin and was entered on the rolls for the ninth-rank follower post. When the rebels fled down from Nanjing and struck at Yuezhou, he and his brother Jinlian each commanded five hundred men under Wang Zhen and routed the enemy at Jinggang. Pursuing them to Yanglou Cave in Puqi, they were defeated in battle and killed. Wang Zhen fell back to defend Yuezhou, but the rebels returned in strength and Jinlian was killed in battle as well. Yi Lianggan and Xie Banghan also died fighting beneath the walls of Nanchang. After Banghan's death Li Xubin took over his command—the unit known as the "Xiang Right Battalion." All were natives of Xiangxiang and were later enshrined together in Zenan's memorial temple.
19
The historian remarks: The practice of Hunan recruiting militia to campaign beyond the province began with Jiang Zhongyuan. When Zeng Guofan built the Xiang Army, Luo Zenan was his indispensable right hand. The ethos of plainspoken loyalty and fearless courage was theirs to establish. Zhongyuan had won Emperor Wenzong's trust and was on the verge of great power when he died suddenly. Zenan held fast to the strategy of seizing the upper hand. His work was unfinished when he fell, and the empire mourned him. Zhongyuan's memorial on military affairs and Zenan's letter on relieving Hubei were both decisive to the larger campaign. They are recorded here together as a lesson for posterity. This is the standard of great commanders—not merely the ornament of Hunan's finest sons.
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