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卷三百二十四 列傳第八十三 石普 張孜 許懷德 李允則 張亢 劉文質 趙滋

Volume 324 Biographies 83: Shi Pu, Zhang Zi, Xu Huaide, Li Yunze, Zhang Kang, Liu Wenzhi, Zhao Zi

Chapter 324 of 宋史 · History of Song
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Chapter 324
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1
使 禿 殿 西 西使 西使 使 使使使
Shi Pu came from Youzhou stock; he claimed descent from Xiong, the Tang military governor of Hezhong, and his family later settled in Taiyuan. His grandfather Quan had served the Later Zhou as commander of the Iron Cavalry. His father Tong had attended the future Emperor Taizong when he was still prince at the Jin residence. Pu entered princely service at ten. His steadiness won him favor; he was made an acting attendant on the heir's staff and twice promoted to eastern head palace attendant. Bandits led by Xing Tuoluo and Jia Tuzhi, several hundred strong, were raiding Yongxing's counties. Pu was ordered to lead troops against them and took every one. He was promoted to inner hall honored guard and imperial arms bearer. When Li Shun rose in rebellion, Pu served as vanguard of the western Sichuan campaign force and, with Han Shouying and Ma Zhijie, killed him. He was made commissioner of the western capital workshops and prefect of Qinzhou. Li Shun's remaining followers raided Qiong and Shu again and proclaimed a King of Southern Qiong. He was again appointed overall bandit-suppression commissioner for western Sichuan. Sichuan's people were uneasy and mistrustful; many were ready to turn bandit. Pu rode posthaste to court and argued in person: "The unrest in Shu springs from crushing taxes. Farmers have lost their livelihood. Lighten the levies a little and let people support themselves again, and the province will settle without another expedition." The emperor agreed. Pu returned to Sichuan the same day, posted notices explaining the change, and won the people's willing obedience. After the rebels were suppressed, he received three thousand taels of silver, ceremonial robes, a gold belt, and a saddled horse from the throne. He rose through appointments as Luoyuan commissioner, Fuzhou militia training commissioner, and comprehensive frontier patrol commissioner at Yanzhou. When the Qiang leader Miye raided inward, Pu pursued and killed him.
2
使 退 使
Accompanying Emperor Zhenzong to Daming, he was caught up in Wang Jun's rebellion. He was named pacification and patrol commissioner for the Sichuan gorges route to assist Lei Youzhong in leading the generals against the rebels. At Tianhui town the rebels came out to fight. Pu led the van and broke them in a fierce assault. The rebels fell back on Yizhou. Imperial troops besieged the city for months without success. Pu repaired siege engines and catapults and opened a tunnel assault. When the city fell, Wang Jun broke out at midnight through the south gate. Pu pursued him to Fushun and forced him to kill himself; the remaining rebels were pacified. He was promoted to militia training commissioner of Jizhou and rewarded with three hundred taels of gold and three thousand of silver. By custom, regular provincial appointees did not also carry the imperial arms privilege; the emperor made an exception for Pu.
3
退 穿
During a Khitan border raid he served as Baozhou military supervisor and strategic-planning vanguard on the northern field staff. He fought them at Liangliang city and again at Changcheng pass, taking many prisoners and a large haul of weapons and armor. He was reassigned as deputy overall commander on the Dingzhou circuit. After Lingzhou fell, reinforcements were sent to secure Guanzhong, and Pu became deputy overall commander of the Yongxing army. Military procedures were still crude: orders to advance, retreat, summon officers, or unite separate camps all went out by mounted messenger. Pu petitioned the throne: "When I commanded troops, I would break a coin in half—each commander kept one piece, and matching halves proved the message was genuine." The emperor ordered communication tokens made: lacquered wooden plaques six inches long and three wide, inscribed on both sides and split in half with a mortise-and-tenon joint so the pieces would fit together. Each token had two holes for brush and ink and a paper slip attached. Before battle the halves were distributed; orders could be written on the slip, tied to a courier's neck, and matched at the other camp to verify authenticity. He also submitted his Defenses against the Barbarians, proposing ditches to trap enemy horses, along with numerous siege devices of his own design. He was reassigned as overall commander of Mozhou.
4
Earlier, when the Khitan raided south, they had routed Song forces at Wangdu. Soon intelligence reported another major invasion. The emperor drafted the campaign plan himself and showed his chief ministers a handwritten edict:
5
Forces from the Zhen, Ding, and Gaoyang circuits should concentrate at Dingzhou, straddling the Tang River in a fortified main camp. Deploy detachments according to how far the enemy had advanced. When the enemy tired, the vanguard would offer battle: cavalry in the center, infantry around them, fighting only at close range and never leaving the formation.
6
使
Three detached cavalry commands were also set: six thousand horsemen at Weilu, under Wei Neng, Bai Shousu, and Zhang Rui; five thousand at Baozhou, under Yang Yanzhao, Zhang Xi, and Li Huaizhe; and five thousand at Beiping pass, under Tian Min, Yang Ning, and Shi Yanfu, to blunt the enemy's advance. They were not to engage rashly on arrival, but to wait until Khitan morale flagged and then fight with the city at their backs. If the Khitan slipped south of Baozhou and ran into the main army, the Weilu and Baozhou commands would unite so the enemy would be caught between two forces. If they bypassed Dingzhou and raided deeper south, Tian Min at Beiping would combine with them, strike into Liao territory to cut off supply trains, and coordinate with garrisons from Xiongzhou, Bazhou, and Pohuo southward.
7
西 西西
Sun Quanzhao, Wu Dejun, and Pei Zirong were to hold Ningbian with eight thousand men; Li Chonggui, Zhao Shoulun, and Zhang Jimin would block the eastern and western approaches from Xingzhou with five thousand. If the Khitan withdrew, the Dingzhou main force and the three cavalry commands would converge on them. Pu would command ten thousand men at Mozhou under Lu Wenshou and Wang Shoujun; if enemy horsemen fled north, he was to strike west toward Shun'an and sever their escape through the western hills. If the rivers froze and the enemy used the eastern route, Liu Yong, Liu Hanning, and Tian Siming would bring five thousand men to support Pu and Quanzhao in a pincer. Shi Baoji would hold Daming with ten thousand to magnify the army's presence.
8
He had the plan painted as a chart and issued it to his commanders.
9
使 西
Months later he instructed his ministers: "We have massed huge forces on the northern frontier, yet the border reports no enemy movement. Keeping this army idle wastes the people's strength—how long can we sustain it? We need a measured plan to hold the frontier without ruinous expense. Between Jingrong and Shun'an we should open military farms and canals to block Heilukou, Santai, and the Xiaoli route and extend the grain supply line to the border. Use the army now to dig canals and extend them to the frontier garrisons; if the Khitan interfere, unite and drive them off. Li Hang and others replied: "Fortifying the frontier to contain the enemy is the soundest border policy." The emperor sent the eunuch Yan Wenqing with Wang Neng and Ma Ji, who commanded Jingrong and Shun'an, to oversee the works, and moved Pu west of Shun'an to coordinate with Wei Neng, Yang Yanzhao, and Tian Min in a mutual-support triangle.
10
使 使 使使 使
The eunuch Feng Renjun, who carried the imperial sword at Mozhou, clashed with Pu. The emperor said: "Do not press the investigation too far and spoil our commanders' morale." He simply recalled Renjun to court. Pu was ordered to move his troops to Qianning; he was again made militia training commissioner of Jizhou and overall commander of his home circuit. During the emperor's stay at Chanyuan, Wang Jizhong had already gone over to the Khitan, who now sought peace. Through Jizhong they sent a messenger with a trust arrow and a secret message to Pu. After peace was concluded, he was promoted to military commissioner of Rongzhou. When Xiang Minzhong became overall commander on the Fuyan circuit, Pu served as his deputy. As Zhao Deming came in to submit, the court prepared a formal commission. Pu warned: "Do not make him overseer of the frontier tribes and give him authority over all the Qiang—once strengthened, he will be impossible to control." The court therefore dropped the concurrent post of inner overseer of frontier tribes.
11
使 使 西 西 西使
Soon he was posted to the Bingdai circuit with 2,500 strings of envoy funds; Pu cited precedent for 3,000 strings a year, but the Bureau of Military Affairs denied the claim. He argued that Li Hanchao on the Hebei frontier had once received annual payments in the tens of thousands, whereas Bingdai's larger garrison could not be sustained on the present allowance. The emperor refused. He was reassigned as observer of Guizhou and overall commander on the Zhenzhou circuit, then as acting military commissioner of Baoping, and went to take up his post. Returning from the Fenyin sacrifices, the emperor reached Shaanxi; Pu urged him to lodge inside the city walls. The emperor rewarded him with a poem and had him escort the procession to the western capital. He was made military commissioner of Hexi and administrator of Heyang, then transferred to Xuzhou. He constructed the Great Flowing Weir, diverting the Yellow River to feed the capital's grain transport canals. He presented two scrolls of military regulations and two illustrated manuals on the use of generals. The court was promoting miraculous signs, but Pu urged an end to empire-wide Daoist prayer assemblies, arguing the savings—over seven hundred thousand strings a year—should go to state expenses. The emperor took offense.
12
使 使 使
In 1016, he memorialized that three solar eclipses would occur in the last ten days of the ninth month; and added: "Traders from Qinzhou say Gusiluo plans a secret attack on Cao Wei. Give him the battle diagrams I submitted, and Wei will surely prevail." The emperor judged Pu's speech presumptuous; Wang Qinruo of the Bureau of Military Affairs said Pu was trying to alarm the court with frontier crises. Enraged, the emperor ordered Lü Yijian to investigate. When the case closed, the court assembled officials to verify his claims: no eclipse had occurred in late ninth month. Pu was found guilty of privately possessing astronomical texts. The assembled officials ruled the offense capital. They commuted the death sentence by rank. He was stripped of office, demoted to Hezhou, and bound under escort to his place of exile. The emperor told his ministers: "Pu rose from nothing. He is impulsive and never stops angling for favor. He has no learning, yet hires ghostwriters to sound learned and court the mood of the moment. They say he weeps in prison for his young son. Let him take his family into exile." Hardly had he reached Hezhou when he was given a nominal post in the heir apparent's household and confined at Fangzhou with a hundred extra guards.
13
Pu was bold and resourceful; in every campaign, as soon as he learned where the enemy was, he rode straight for them. He helped suppress two Sichuan rebellions in dozens of fights, always leading the charge; soldiers acclaimed his bravery. He was well read in military classics, divination, calendrics, and astrology. Taizong once remarked: "Pu is stiff-necked and rarely gets on with other commanders." Still, valuing his fighting ability, he always treated him well. After his disgrace he observed every anniversary of Taizong's death by taking his entire household to Buddhist temples for memorial offerings—a habit he never broke.
14
殿
Zhang Zi was a native of Kaifeng. His mother bore him while she was still a commoner; later she entered the palace as wet nurse to the late heir apparent. While Zhang Zi was still an infant, Zhenzong gave him to the eunuch Zhang Jingzong, saying, "This boy looks sturdy—look after him carefully." Jingzong raised him as his own son. He entered service by hereditary privilege as a third-class palace attendant in the heir apparent's household and was promoted to hall direct attendant.
15
使 西使使使 使殿使使 使 使
When the Khitan threatened to renounce the treaty, Fu Bi led the embassy and Zhang Zi served as deputy. Fu Bi shaped the policy, but Zi was steady and knew the business. Rewarded for his service, he became western upper gate commissioner and prefect of Yingzhou, then militia training commissioner of Shanzhou, overall commander of the fourth dragon divine guard barracks, and deputy overall commander on the Bingdai circuit. Hedong revised its iron-cash currency, stirring public distrust. Troops marched on the yamen to protest, and officials shut the gates against them. Riot nearly broke out that day. Zhang Zi rode out with a handful of men, talked the soldiers down, and sent them back to camp. He became defender of Jizhou and chief of the palace horse guards, then chief commandant before the hall with concurrent observer of Guizhou, and finally deputy overall commander of the palace foot guards. When Tiger Wing troops failed their drill inspection, their commander questioned them; they refused to answer. That night a dozen men raised a clamor and moved to kill their officers. Zhang Zi seized the ringleader, executed him, and only then reported the affair. He was made acting military commissioner of Zhaoxin and deputy overall commander of the horse guards.
16
使 使
Having been raised inside the palace, Zhang Zi attracted suspicion on many sides. Critics urged stripping him of military power; he was sent out as military commissioner of Ningyuan and prefect of Luzhou, then moved to Chenzhou. Finding no other fault in him, Emperor Renzong recalled him as deputy overall commander of the palace cavalry. Vice Censor-in-Chief Han Jiang protested again: "Zi should not hold military command, yet Chief Councilor Fu Bi sponsored his appointment. I ask that Bi be removed." Bi accepted blame and asked to leave office. Remonstrance officials and censors alike said the nomination had not come from Bi. Jiang stayed home awaiting punishment, saying, "I no longer dare call myself a censor." For this he was demoted to prefect of Cai. Zi was soon removed for misconduct and appointed prefect of Cao. When he died he was posthumously enfeoffed as grand marshal with the temple name Qinhuai. Zi had originally been named Maoshi; to avoid Emperor Yingzong's former personal name he changed it to Zi.
17
Xu Huaide
18
使 西殿殿使
Xu Huaide, style name Shigu, came from Xiangfu in Kaifeng. His father Jun served as regimental commander of Cizhou. Huaide stood more than six feet tall and was skilled in horsemanship, archery, and close combat. As a young man he entered service through his father's privilege as a palace attendant of the eastern and western classes, rising eventually to commander of the palace front guard and chief commandant of the left class.
19
使
When Yuan Hao attacked the frontier, Huaide was chosen prefect of Yizhou and military inspector on the Fuyan circuit, then promoted to deputy overall commander. When thirty thousand Xia cavalry besieged Chengpu Stockade, Huaide was inside the walls; he led over a thousand elite troops in a breakout and routed the enemy. The Xia re-formed their lines. One warrior rode forward, sat on his saddle, and hurled insults. Huaide loosed a single arrow and dropped him; the enemy then withdrew. They sacked Jinming County and pressed on to besiege Yan Prefecture. Huaide rushed back and that night sent a subordinate with over a thousand foot and horse to strike by surprise, taking two hundred heads and relieving Yan Prefecture. He was made regimental commander of Feng and given sole charge of affairs along the Jiaocun sector of Yanzhou's eastern route.
20
使使 使 殿使使殿使使 殿使 使
Transferred to the Qinfeng circuit, he had not yet left when the Xia stormed Saimen Stockade without his going to the rescue; he was demoted to prefect of Ning. Soon he was promoted to commander of the dragon spirit guard's four wings, regimental commander of Ling, and deputy overall commander of the circuit. Made defender of Kang, he was punished again for delaying a campaign against bandits while his laborers abandoned the army's fodder. After another amnesty he became deputy overall commander on Qinfeng and was reassigned to the Penglai and Tianwu wings. When raiders harried subject Qiang and more than ten camps were lost, he was moved to Yongxing Army, then Gaoyang Pass and the Bingdai circuit, serving in turn as palace front chief commandant, observation commissioner of Suizhou, deputy overall commander of the imperial guards cavalry, Wuxin military commissioner and observation remnant, deputy palace front commander, and military commissioner of Ningyuan. When a maternal cousin died childless, Huaide tried to seize her land by false claim. Exposed, he lost command of the guards and was made prefect of Bo, then transferred to Xu. After a year he again became deputy overall commander of the palace front. At the Bright Hall rites he was promoted to overall commander and in turn held the Ningbao and Jianxiong commissions.
21
宿
At eighty he still fathered a child, his strength surpassing that of ordinary men. He served in the palace guards for fourteen years and repeatedly asked to retire; the emperor refused. Huaide said, "I am too old; if the censors attack me, I may not be allowed an honorable exit." The emperor then ordered several years struck from his recorded age. He died and was posthumously made palace attendant with the temple name Rongyi.
22
祿 使
From his first frontier appointment Huaide was repeatedly demoted for cowardice, yet later rose with distinguished generals to high command; punished once for patronage, he left office and came back again. In an age of peace he kept imperial favor and died on his stipend. By custom, when a commissioner changed posts and received new honors he filed a separate memorial declining twice; each time the throne answered and sent a palace eunuch with gifts, always with something extra. Huaide had received honors for ancestral rites and, on shifting posts again, rolled both into a single declining memorial. Hanlin academician Ouyang Xiu charged him with disrespect for court procedure; the emperor had the memorial shown to him. Huaide apologized and submitted no further separate memorial. Such was his pettiness and meanness.
23
Li Yunze
24
使 使殿 使 使使 西 西 便 使
Li Yunze, style name Chuifan, was the son of Jizhou regimental commander Li Qianbo. Known young for ability and strategy, he entered by privilege as inner-yamen commander and became a left-class palace attendant. In Taiping Xingguo 7, when troops withdrew from You and Ji, the first border market was set at Jingrong Army; Yunze ran it. Returning, he was sent to Hedong to adjudicate bound prisoners and forgive overdue taxes. He was next sent to Jinghu to inspect officials and, with the transport commissioner, review funds, arms, and prisons, and was promoted to palace gate usher. He dredged the capital's waterways, built sluice gates, and established the Zhengzhou water mill. After Liu Chang's rebellion in Xichuan was crushed, Shang Guanzheng had debated wall repairs without deciding; Yunze was sent with Wang Chenghan and Yan Chenghan to inspect. He reported that Xichuan could not be held without walls and that Zheng's plan should be adopted. He also argued that scattered troops could not meet emergencies and asked to concentrate them at key points to ease logistics. When Tian Yanyi of the Gao-Xi Man raided, Yunze was sent to Chen to confer with Transport Commissioner Zhang Su and Liu Changyan of Jingnan. Yunze held the Man border did not need more troops and pacified them by summons and settlement.
25
使 便 使 使 使
He rose in turn to deputy commissioner of the supply depot and prefect of Tan. Before he left, Zhenzong said, "When I was heir apparent, Bi Shi'an spoke of your family; now I entrust Hunan to you." Under the Ma clan the people had paid a "land tax" in silk from harsh exactions. When Pan Mei pacified Hunan, silk was assessed per dwelling as "house tax." Colonists given oxen paid four hu of grain yearly; even when the ox died they still paid—the "dead-bone tax." Tea levies had begun at nine jin to the "large jin" and risen to thirty-five. Yunze abolished the three taxes and fixed tea at thirteen and a half jin per standard measure, to the people's relief. Hunan had abundant hillside land for grain, but the people were idle and would not farm. He required monthly horse fodder to be paid in kind, and hillside fields were brought under cultivation. When famine struck Hunan he wanted to open granaries first and report later; the transport commissioner refused. Yunze said, "A month's delay in reporting means the hungry go unserved." The next year, famine again, he again sought to relieve first; blocked again, he pledged his personal wealth as bond and was allowed to sell grain cheap from the granaries. He then enrolled able-bodied famine victims in the army, gaining ten thousand men. The transport commissioner wanted the new troops sent against the Shao Man; Yunze objected: "The tribes are quiet; pointless reinforcement only worsens the frontier. Besides, they were raw recruits, still thin from hunger, unfit for garrison duty." He memorialized and the deployment was canceled. When Chen Yaosou pacified Hunan, the people petitioned to keep Yunze; Yaosou reported it. Recalled, he had three days of audiences; the emperor said, "Bi Shi'an knew his man."
26
使 穿 西使 忿
He became deputy commissioner of the Luoyuan and prefect of Cang. Touring his jurisdiction he dredged Fuyang Lake, repaired fortifications and offices, and dug wells among the buildings. Soon the Khitan attacked; civilians took refuge inside and water held; defenders hurled chopped ice like catapult stones, and the Khitan withdrew. Zhenzong summoned him and said, "Some called your wells and repairs a burden on the people—until the Khitan came and showed how well you had prepared." He was made deputy chief of the western upper palace gate, overall military inspector of the Zhending-Gaoyang three routes, commanding the array's east face. He asked audience and admitted martial skill was not his forte and he could not bear the frontier's strain. The emperor said, "Plan for me—you need not stand under arrows and stones." He received two thousand taels of silver plus tents and equipment; edicts to the circuits had to pass his review first. After Wang Chao's defeat shook morale, Yunze urged him to wear mourning and weep before the troops to defuse their fury. Knowing Yunze had repeatedly pressed Chao to advance, Zhenzong sent a personal edict of praise.
27
西使 使 使
At Khitan peace he became prefect of Ying and memorialized: "Choose good border commanders, keep the treaty, and dismiss anyone who says peace harms us." Zhenzong said, "That is my intent." He was promoted deputy chief of the western upper palace gate. When He Chengjue, Hebei frontier commissioner and market intendant, fell ill and was told to pick his successor, he named Yunze for Xiong Prefecture. Markets had barred exotic goods, yet a frontier trader acquired a jade belt in exchange. Yunze said, "We trade our surplus for their need," and took no action. He became chief of the eastern upper palace gate and prefect of Jiang. With fighting ended in Hebei, Yunze kept fortifying; the Khitan ruler asked whether this broke the treaty. Councilor Zhang Jian replied, "Commissioner Li of Xiong is a man of integrity—not to be doubted." When the court questioned him, Yunze wrote: "We did not finish repairs at once lest later ruin force us to abandon the walls—frontier risk is incalculable." The emperor agreed.
28
西
North of the city lay an outer barbican; Yunze wanted to join it to the main wall. He first built an Eastern Peak temple, donated a hundred taels of gold for ritual vessels, and marched with music; townspeople vied to give gold and silver. He later secretly removed the gold and claimed northern thieves had struck; ordering a manhunt and thrice notifying the northern border, he began building, saying it was to guard the shrine. He closed the wall, dug the moat, and raised crescent embankments until barbican dwellers all moved inside. Most roofs had been thatch; Yunze brought timber from the western hills and built granaries and barracks on a large scale. He taught tile-making, laid out wards and markets, inns, and water mills. The ramparts were fully tiled; moats encircled them, planted with hemp, elm, and willow. He expanded Yan Chenghan's garrison farms, bridged streams, built pavilions, and linked Ansu, Guangxin, and Shun'an garrisons with raised roads.
29
滿
Each year he held spring rites and regatta on the border river, letting northerners watch while secretly drilling naval tactics. North of the city lay many horse pits; watch towers on the walls commanded ten li of view; since the truce, no one had dared man them. Yunze said, "North and south are at peace—what need for these?" He had the towers torn down and pits filled, turned the ground into army vegetable plots, dug wells and channels, laid fields behind low thorn hedges, and made the terrain still harder to cross. He rebuilt streets, moved a pagoda to the northern heights so townsfolk could scan thirty li, and ordered spare land planted with elm until the border was thick with trees. He told his staff, "This suits foot soldiers, not cavalry—was it only for lumber?"
30
使 使 使
Lantern Festival lights had been forbidden; Yunze built a decorated mountain, hired performers, and let the people celebrate at night. Next day intelligence said the Khitan leader meant to enter the city in disguise; Yunze and colleagues waited outside. A man in purple arrived; Yunze escorted him to the guesthouse, said nothing, set slave girls to serve wine, and drank him under the table. He stabled the visitor's mule and let him slip away—it was Youzhou's supreme commander. Days later the Khitan executed him. Once at a camp feast the armory burned; Yunze kept the music playing while his deputy begged to fight the flames in vain. When the fire died he buried the ruins, secretly requisitioned arms from Ying packed in tea chests. Within ten days stores were full again, unnoticed. The Bureau of Military Affairs moved to impeach him for not fighting the fire; Zhenzong said, "Yunze must have had his reasons—question him first." He answered, "The armory is fire-hardened; a blaze during a feast must be sabotage. To break off the feast might have caused worse trouble."
31
Ignoring pomp, he walked among the people, sat and talked with whomever he met, and knew the mood of the realm. He heard every suit in person, great or small, and judged at once. He won his soldiers' loyalty and used them well. Thieves were always caught, though none knew how. He owned one coat, one plate at table, and no savings. Twenty years in Hebei brought his greatest deeds; even measures hidden in festivals and inns later generations dared not undo. He standardized much of the cost and ceremony of diplomatic traffic. In old age at court he sheltered every Khitan defector in his own house. After his death they were moved to the Bureau's guest quarters.
32
西
Zhang Kang, style name Gongshou, claimed descent from Later Tang's Henan governor Quanyi, seven generations removed. His family lived at Linpu. Young, he was daring and principled and served his elder brother Kui with devotion. A jinshi graduate, he served as Guang'an Army judge and Yingtian investigating officer. He managed the Baisha and Shiliang canals and ended flooding for the people. He became a director of the Court of Judicial Review and recorder at the western capital.
33
西 涿使
As intendant at Zhenrong he warned: "Deming is dead and Yuan Hao loves killing; the frontier must be secured at once." He sent dozens of memorials on northwest defense; Renzong meant to employ him, but mourning for his mother intervened. When the Khitan gathered at You and Zhuo and Hebei mobilized, he was recalled as palace envoy and prefect of Ansu. At audience he said the Khitan lived on Song tribute; their weak ruler and bad harvest made their threats empty. If they break faith, I will arm first and lead the van."
34
使
When Yuan Hao rebelled he became Jingyuan military inspector and Wei prefect, then Zhong prefect, then Fuyan inspector and Fu prefect. He memorialized:
35
使使使
"Formerly each route had at most two or three overall commanders, inspectors, and supervisors; higher titles did not multiply commands. Overall commanders and inspectors did not meddle in routine circuit business. Now each route has ten to fifteen officers sharing duties without a single chain of command, so orders conflict. Tang and early Song precedents had deputies and frontier commissioners; restore clear titles so two or three men lead each route's forces.
36
On Jingyuan alone sixty-odd posts split forces of one to several thousand—too weak against a major invasion. If the enemy feints with twenty squads then hits with thirty or fifty thousand, how do we hold?
37
使
Commanders and units shift constantly; strong and weak troops are unevenly assigned. Jingyuan has fifty thousand regulars and twenty thousand archers; Fuyan sixty or seventy thousand—pre-formed regiments, clear command, and mutual relief could defeat hungry rabble. Send Han Qi and Fan Zhongyan to assign eight to ten thousand troops per route under the ablest senior commanders. Under each, three generals: vanguard, vanguard reserve, and rear. Each general with aides holds key points—small raids meet one general, large ones the chief.
38
使 西
Scale response to enemy strength and coordinate neighboring routes—the 'Constant Mountain serpent' deployment. Today ten thousand men per 'great general' fragments Fuyan's fifty thousand among Yan, Fu, Bao'an, and Dejing commands. Jingyuan's fifty thousand should cluster under Wei, Zhenrong, Wating, and mountain posts—not scattered titular generals. Archers and allied tribes are extra. Yanzhou fell because generals refused to support each other. Pre-assign who leads, who ambushes, who reinforces, and which stockades sortie when the enemy strikes a given point.
39
Neighboring routes should answer with agreed banner signals. At Yanzhou Liu Ping never knew two thousand of his vanguard were already trapped. Zhao Yu's cavalry took a side road while Zhao Zhen mistook him for the enemy on the Gaotou plain and attacked his own man. Outside the mountains I never used standard signals but private banners keyed to the sexagenary cycle. On a jiazi day the first party raised green, the second crimson—stems and branches coded friend from foe. Beyond a hundred paces troops cannot recognize friends; without preset signals disaster follows. Peace has rotted training; barely a hundred men per unit are fit. The army depends on infantry and heavy crossbows. At Wei I found only a hundred of three hundred fifty Guangyong crossbowmen could draw full weight—most cheated on drill day. Stirrup-drawn bows failed; ten days' drill yielded a hundred men. Small-sitting and armored drills took fifty days to master. Old habits against a new foe guarantee no victory.
40
使
Officers court glory and advance rashly—Ping's defeat; at Zhenrong every alarm sends commanders to the moat after the enemy has left. Rivals dare not stay in camp lest they be called cowards. Cavalry cannot ride rough ground; one horse feeds five foot soldiers. Return undersized horses to stud farms, keep a third, replace the rest with infantry. Palace guards win civil posts while frontier archers whose families fought for generations have no promotion—how motivate the border?
41
使 使
I hear talk of a five-route invasion; repeated failures show deep penetration is premature. Mountain stockades sit two or three hundred li from the border; Xia arms are fine but their fighters and supplies depend on the frontier tribes. After the tenth month rotate raids across the border to deny Xia pasture and plowing. Then march infantry with ten days' rations—men one sheng rice, horses four sheng grain—and graze half the horses in enemy grass to halve convoys. Let Gusiluo and the Nine-Clan Uyghurs strike the rear and the Xia nest will fall."
42
西調 殿使
He also urged suspending Shaanxi's multiplied levies so pacification offices could cut other labor and fund the frontier. Pick thirty guards and generals each, two hundred camels and mules, split between Hezhong and Qianzhou to supply eastern and western routes under one transport commissioner. Half of Fu's four routes are critical; shift idle relay troops to the busy lines. Three men per cart at two hundred fifty jin, if convoyed in groups, keeps the border ready while easing the people's burden."
43
西使
Kang had asked to rush to court; ordered to write instead, much of his plan was adopted. Promoted deputy western palace gate chief and overall inspector, he garrisoned Yanzhou. He listed ten frontier military failures:
44
退便
"Every campaign fails from broken command, unclear orders, poor training, or bad arms—or enemy tricks or our own greed; wings that do not help, maneuvers misunderstood; too many men unused or too few to escape; pressure from superiors or cowardly subordinates; starved troops or impassable terrain—generals who do not know war. We add troops without studying why we lose. First.
45
退
Last spring at Yanzhou relief came a thousand li from Hedong and Qinfeng, ten stages from Jingyuan and Huanqing. Last autumn Fuyan marched a thousand li to Zhenrong after the enemy left—next raid, same waste: defeat without fighting. Second.
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Xu Huaide commands both Fuyan and Huanqing; Wang Zhongbao both Huanqing and Fuyan—cross-commands span ten to fifteen stages. Jingyuan to Qinfeng is a thousand li of brutal mountain marches that exhaust men and horses. Third.
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Each route has fifty or sixty thousand men at imperial expense, yet officers demand another hundred thousand without results. No unified command, no regular and irregular tactics, no mutual aid, divided leadership, and scattered strength—five fatal flaws. With these five flaws a million men fight like a mob. Fourth.
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Ancient drill took three years; after three years of war we still do not know which frontier commanders are fit or which tactics work. If war drags on, how can treasury and people endure? Add famine and other enemies, and no one knows what will keep the realm safe. Fifth.
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Border memorials flood the court—some approved at once, some sent back for study, some delegated. New orders cancel old ones before clerks finish copying; frontier policy has no stable rules. Sixth.
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Great ministers Xia Song and Chen Zhizhong should run border affairs with full trust. Instead they only file papers and relay edicts downward; local reports must wait for capital instructions. Why keep great ministers in charge at all? Seventh.
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西使使
Hebei had cut redundant posts to save money; Shaanxi multiplies salt and tribal commissioners costing ten thousand strings a year for a thousand idle troops. New armory chiefs and locally raised units drain rations without training or strengthening the border. Eighth.
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便
Commanders skim a third of every skilled soldier from each unit. At Yanzhou twenty thousand men minus five thousand garrison leaves only fifteen thousand. They cannot muster in three days while the enemy sits forty li away—how meet a sudden raid? Ninth.
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西
Shaanxi militia exceed a hundred thousand. Market thugs on the rolls despise farmers—surely thieves hide among them. Without control they will become a grave menace. Tenth."
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He again asked to present his case in person and received no answer.
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輿 使 使
Yuan Hao grew bolder and besieged the Yellow River frontier. Kang Deyu could not defend; tribal chief Yeluo guided Xia raiders up the rear river valleys into Fu before anyone noticed, slaughtering many. Failing to storm the city, they camped at Liuli and raided between Lin and Fu while both towns shut their gates. Water sold for a tael of gold a cup. Feng had fallen; Lin and Fu were isolated. The court hesitated to abandon the river bend but made Kang overall inspector of Bingdai and Lin-Fu forces. He rode alone to the gate, showed his edict, entered, and let the people forage for fuel and water. Xia raids continued; Kang built Dongsheng Stockade at Jiao Mountain's coal pits; Jin Fort Stockade by the city gardens; Anding Stockade at northern springs, each garrisoned. Harvesters outside shared their sickle-cut gains equally with their guards. Demoralized palace troops were shamed when corvée volunteers ambushed Xia scouts at night. At dawn head-bearers won brocade robes; the palace troops asked, "Are we worse than they?" He let them drink and gamble until broke men begged for a fight. Planning to hit Liuli, spies heard old Qiang divining over mutton: "Enemy tomorrow—flee." They laughed: "Song men hide their heads—how would they dare?" Kang struck by night and routed them. The Xia abandoned Liuli; Kang built Xuanwei Stockade on the raider path.
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Lin's supply line was still cut; Kang was ordered to escort provisions there himself. Denied raids, the enemy massed tens of thousands to ambush him at Bozi Stockade. With only three thousand men he shouted: "Fight or die—no mercy if you flee." The men roared back. A gale favored them; six hundred heads fell and countless men and horses plunged off cliffs; a thousand horses were captured. He then built Ning Stockade. The Xia fought him repeatedly at Tumaomao River. Kang held the main line while Zhang Bian hid thousands of crossbowmen behind the hill. The enemy despised the soft "Eastern Army" recruits but feared the Tiger Wing veterans. Kang swapped banners; the enemy charged the "Eastern Army" and met Tiger Wings; the ambush broke them—two thousand dead. Within a month five stockades opened the Lin-Fu road.
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使 使使 使 使 使沿 使
He asked for more border stockades to widen pasture and strengthen the river bend. Before the court decided, the Khitan threatened the treaty and he was sent to Ying as Guo regimental commander. After Ge Huaimin's defeat he was rushed to Jingyuan as pacification commissioner but arrived after the enemy left. He clashed with four-circuit commander Zheng Xian and was moved to Bingdai deputy commander. Censor Liang Jian accused him of using treasury silver for Chengdu trade for personal gain and demoted him to circuit inspector. When Xia and Khitan fought on the frontier he again became promotion commissioner and Dai prefect with Hebei border duties. Fan Zhongyan urged that Kang finish the stockades he had planned. Ming Hao repeatedly ordered him to stop building. Kang said, "Imperial orders to build stockades are not canceled by a frontier memo. I accept death for disobedience—the stockades will stand." Each stop-order went on his desk while work sped up. When the forts were done he impeached himself; the court ignored it. Thousands of families returned; ten thousand garrison troops were cut; the river bend shielded Bing and Fen.
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西 使 便 使 使使 使
As Ying prefect he urged widening the southeast gate so the crowded town could shelter everyone in a siege. Xia Song, who disliked him, tried to block the wall but it was finished anyway. He again commanded Jingyuan and served as Meizhou defender. He equalized shoddy central goods and good local goods in suburban rewards so soldiers were not cheated. The transport commissioner accused him of cutting central appraisals. Xia Song as military commissioner demoted him to Ci prefect. Censor Song Xi renewed the silver charge and made him a guard general at Shou.
59
西使 使使使 使 使使
Later inquiry cleared the silver trade; he became palace construction director at He. A bad recommendation sent him to Yun. He soon regained promotion commissioner rank and Zhending deputy command. Foot trouble made him Wei then Huai prefect. A night crossing into a neighbor's territory to discuss river works cost him his post to Cao inspector. He became Heyang commander, then secretary director on illness. He briefly returned as Xuzhou commander and died.
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貿
Kang gave lavishly, even trading to pay for feasts and gifts. Men gladly served such a generous commander. He recommended an aged classmate from the Ministry of Personnel as county magistrate. That man later ruined him; after exile the same man begged again and Kang still gave gold without resentment. His strict command left a mark; people enshrined his portrait.
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His elder brother Kui
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使
Kui, style name Zhongye, took the jinshi before his brother. He served as investigator in Bing and Xiu and as Qu wine supervisor. Xu, held for beating a man to death in Wu, insisted he was innocent. The transport commissioner sent Kui to retry the case. Kui found forged seals on the register, exposed the jail clerk, freed Xu, and awed the crowd. Recommended with thirty-nine others, he became a judicial director and magistrate of Hefei and Nanchong.
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殿 貿 殿
As palace censor he served at Luzhou and was dismissed. A Qin salt deficit implicated eleven prefectures. Kui found the three departments slow to issue notes, not local guilt. He argued the salt monopoly funds the army but is not benevolent policy. Better let merchants circulate salt and tax only at passes, benefiting all. How is that worse than choking trade with harsh bans? All debts were forgiven. He became Jiang and Chu prefect, erudite of imperial sacrifices, remonstrance censor, and prefect of Hua and Xing. When his mother fell ill he cut thigh flesh for medicine and she recovered. After his mother died he lived at her tomb, carrying earth and planting pines himself.
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使使 使 西使 西使使
After mourning he rose through revenue and transport posts to vice minister of justice and censorial supervisor. Pacifying Hedong he raised a hundred twenty thousand militia and rated dozens of local officials. He returned as vice revenue commissioner. When Shaanxi split into four circuits he became Huanqing pacification commissioner and Qing prefect; he declined the post because his father's name was Yuqing but was overruled. He served as Shaanxi and Hedong transport commissioner, Yongxing prefect, and prefect of several eastern circuits, rising to personnel director.
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Li You's Jiangning government compound had burned to the ground. Censors said Jinling, the dynasty's first capital, needed a capable rebuild after the fire. Kui was made right remonstrance grandee and Jiangning prefect. Kui rebuilt on the old plan with chosen craftsmen, finishing on schedule. Back at court he ran personnel rosters, then became Henan prefect. He restored Henan's long-ruined palaces and gates. He restored Tang street grids and posted ward signs. Quanyi had governed Luoyang forty years and the people had kept his living shrine. Seeing Kui's bearing they said, "Truly Quanyi's heir." They restored the Prince of Qi shrine. After a year his governance won praise and he returned to court as giving-the-throne attendant. When bandits rose in Hedong he became Yan prefect and cleared them within months.
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Kui ruled with discipline and force; clerks feared him, though some found him harsh. Kang was bold, ambitious, and careless of small proprieties. The brothers differed in character yet both won fame. His son Tao became a Dragon Diagram academician.
67
Liu Wenzhi
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使 殿西 西使使
Liu Wenzhi, style name Shibin, of Baosai in Bao, was a kinsman of Empress Jianmu. His father Shenqi, Tiger Cage Pass commissioner, died fighting Li Chongjin. Raised in the palace, Taizong made him a left-class attendant and western-head usher. Taizong trusted him and often asked about outside affairs. He told Dou Shenxing, "Wenzhi is kin and loyal—give him a hundred jin of silver." Sent to Zhe-Liang as imperial courier, he became Kailan commissioner with gold belt and a fine horse. He became Lin prefect, then inspector of the Lin-Fu Zhuolun stockade. He routed the tribal chief Wan Baoyi. He crossed the river, beat the Khitan, took Yellow Grand Marshal Stockade, and won tens of thousands of captives. He became Qing prefect.
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殿 使使
When Li Jiqian invaded, officials would not release treasury funds for the campaign. He paid two million strings from his own purse; the troops rallied and crushed the enemy. At Jing and as Lin-Qingyuan supervisor he again defeated the enemy at Zhizi Plain. When Qingyuan fell in Xianping he was demoted to Lei for delay. He was later made crown prince's rate and Hangzhou garrison chief. At the Mount Tai fengshan he inspected Qing, Qi, Zi, and Wei. He became ritual deputy commissioner and Shiyi border inspector, then Qin military inspector. He built Xiaoluomen Stockade and labored on the walls himself. While Li Jun governed Qin he received five hundred taels of silver.
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使
In Tianxi he became Dai prefect. Tribes had been paid silk and tea for captured deserters who were then executed. Of a hundred thirty-nine captives he executed twenty-nine after amnesty and assigned the rest elsewhere. Promoted inner-garden commissioner and Bin prefect, he campaigned with Cao Wei and built fortifications. He again inspected Qin, held Lian, and died as Dai prefect. The court richly compensated his family and enfeoffed three sons.
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Imperial kinship and his father's death in battle brought him unusual rewards. Zhenzong asked about Baosai; Wenzhi presented five cases of founding emperors' letters. Renzong too granted him imperial writings. Rigid and outspoken, he criticized even the powerful and never rose highest. Of sixteen sons, Huan and Hu were best known.
72
His son Huan
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簿
Huan, style name Zhongzhang, entered as palace construction clerk and supervised Bing's granary. During Empress Zhangxian's regency Huan memorialized that the emperor was grown and should rule. The empress would have tattooed and exiled him; Lü Yijian and Xue Kui saved him. When Renzong took power Huan became right rectifier. He joined Kong Daofu and Fan Zhongyan protesting Empress Guo's deposition and was fined. Accused of consorting with camp courtesans at Bing he was demoted to Ci intendant, then Liao prefect.
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使西 西 西使
When the Xia rebelled Huan volunteered to treat with the Hexi Gus. He reached Qingtang by secret route and won them with trust. The Gus swore to defend the border, escorted him out, and gave oath texts and maps of Xizhou. He became Zhaowen academician, Shaanxi transport commissioner, and prefect of Cang, Ji, and Bao. Since a corvée mutiny Bao's garrison had grown insolent. Tiger Wing troops plotted to seize the city when Huan arrived. He rode alone into camp, seized the ringleader, executed him, and the army submitted. At Deng he built patrol boats; sea raiders dared not approach and the emperor praised him.
75
He governed Xing, En, Ji, Jing, and Chan. Rebuilding ravaged En with harsh law he restored order and awe. After a Hebei earthquake farmers sold oxen cheap to buy food. At Chan Huan used public funds to buy the oxen. Next year he sold the oxen back at cost so Chan farmers could plow. He commanded four circuits and rose to Zhenning military commissioner. In Xining he retired as minister of works.
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Talented and bold, he shirked nothing yet hungered for advancement. Though eighty he volunteered for the Tuo-Min and Annan campaigns and was ignored. He died at eighty-one.
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His son Hu
78
Hu, style name Zijun, was learned, quiet, and shrewd. By privilege he rose to right palace guard. At Wating he smashed the Dangliu clans, killed a fierce chief, and took vast herds. After Ren Fu's defeat he alone opened his gates to refugees while others were looted.
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西 使 退 殿
Han Qi and Fan Zhongyan made him a palace gate usher. He also defeated the Muning Sheng Di. Two hundred li southwest lay Shuiluo, fertile and rich in metals, a mini-state of fugitive Han teaching crafts to tens of thousands of tents. Cao Wei had failed to take Shuiluo from Qin. Hu seized farmland near Zhangchuan and secretly won lord Tiesina's submission. When Zheng Xian toured the border Tiesina surrendered Jiegong, Shuiluo, and Luoluo Gan. Xian ordered Hu to occupy the surrendered lands. The Di rebelled, besieging his thousand men by night with tens of thousands. With a thousand men and no relief Hu ate slowly from a camp chair, routed the Di, and chased them to Shimen. He enrolled the tribes and opened the Qin-Wei road. He beat the Lintao Di below the walls. He was promoted to inner-palace honored class.
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使便 使 使西 殿
When Yin Zhu canceled the fort and recalled Hu, Hu kept building faster. Yin Zhu had Di Qing arrest Hu and Dong Shilian. The Di rioted until Yu Zhouxun restored Hu as Shuiluo chief with tribal labor. The city finished, he lost one rank for disobeying the pacification commissioner and became Zhenrong western inspector. Restored to honored class, he died of a head abscess. Brother Yuan tried to take the body home but the people wept and begged to keep him; they buried Hu at Shuiluo and built a shrine.
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Tribal officers petitioned for Hu's kin to command Shuiluo. His brother Chun became Shuiluo garrison chief; a stele in the city records Hu's deeds.
82
西 使使
Zhao Zi, style name Zishen, was from Kaifeng. His father Shilong died fighting as Binning-Huanqing supervisor in Tiansheng. Zi entered service as third-class attendant by his father's merit. Young Zi was bold, spirited, and shrewd. In Kangding he captured western rebels and became Jingyuan and Zhenrong inspector. Yao Gui killed his supervisor, seized a thousand Xuanwu cavalry, and attacked Yangmulong. Zi rushed in and persuaded eight hundred to surrender; Yao Gui fled. Zi refused to reward the mutineers lest it encourage rebellion and lost his own reward.
83
西西 西西西 使
Fan and Han recommended him; he became Zhenrong western inspector. He crushed Zhang Hai's bandit army within months as overall bandit hunter. He then became eastern capital east-route inspector. Fu Bi recommended him for a second term at Deng. When Rushan garrison mutinied the prefect executed only a few ringleaders. Zi rode into the camp, tried every man, and jailed a hundred accomplices.
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使 使
After five years catching bandits quietly, Fu Bi secured his leap promotion to supply deputy and Dingzhou garrison chief. When a colleague called the rations bad Zi snapped, "Do you want to incite a mutiny? If the men complain I will behead you first." Han Qi praised him as true general material. In Hedong Han Qi made him acting Bingdai inspector and frontier commission supervisor. He proposed farming ten thousand qing at Dai and Ninghua and training militia in fortified farms. The plan was welcomed.
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西使 涿 使使 使使使
He rose to deputy western palace gate chief and served as Ansu and Bao prefect. Strong and capable, he governed wherever he was posted. Khitan boats fished the border river for years while officials feared to stop them. They then sent a dozen large boats hauling salt up the border river. The court sent Zi to Xiong to stop the incursions. Zi seized Khitan boats and crews and sent the boats back to Zhuo until fishing stopped. The Khitan protested and Peng Siyong and the transport commissioners tried to remove him for provoking trouble. Instead the court promoted him to dragon spirit and Tianwu-Penglai guard commander.
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使 使
Yingzong made him foot-guard chief commandant with five hundred taels silver and kept him on. He soon died and was posthumously made Suizhou observation commissioner.
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簿 使
For six years at Xiong the Khitan feared him. During a Khitan famine Zi said, "They are our people too," and lifted the rice limit. He let grain flow freely and the border people blessed him. He made combat troops do corvée like garrison soldiers and none dared complain. He rebuilt walls and towers and regulated every ledger down to salt rations. So honest he never took official wine home. His flaw was arrogance and self-praise.
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退
The historians say Shi Pu knew war and labor yet meddled in politics and ended disgraced. Zhang Zi, called steady, had little to his credit. Cowardly Xu Huaide, repeatedly demoted, was no match for Pu. Liu Wenzhi, who paid armies from his purse and spared lives, kept a shining name despite setbacks. Huan's defiance of the empress dowager and suppression of villains overshadowed his other deeds. Was Hu's calm withdrawal at Shuiluo not his finest hour? Zhao Zi's grain to starving Khitan showed a humane heart. Li Yunze ruled Hebei twenty years so quietly the Khitan called him a elder statesman. Scholar Zhang Kang's victories at Liuli and Tumaomao were thrilling proof that a literatus could win glory. Kui's governance fame makes the brothers a pair hard to rank—who was the greater?
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