1
夏書：禹堙洪水十三年，過家不入門。 陸行載車，水行乘舟，泥行乘毳，山行則梮，以別九州； 隨山浚川，任土作貢； 通九道，陂九澤，度九山。 然河災之羨溢，害中國也尤甚。 唯是為務，故道河自積石，歷龍門，南到華陰，東下底柱，及盟津、雒內，至于大伾。 於是禹以為河所從來者高，水湍悍，難以行平地，數為敗，乃釃二渠以引其河，北載之高地，過洚水，至於大陸，播為九河，同為迎河，入于勃海。 九川既疏，九澤既陂，諸夏乂安，功施乎三代。
The Book of Xia says that Yu spent thirteen years controlling the great flood, even passing his own home without going inside. He used carts on dry ground, boats on water, drag-sleds in marsh, and spiked footwear in the mountains, mapping out the nine provinces. Tracing the mountain ranges, he dredged the waterways and set tribute quotas according to local soils. He cleared the nine transport routes, regulated the nine marshlands, and surveyed the nine major mountain systems. Of all flood disasters, the Yellow River's overflows were the most destructive to the central plains. So Yu focused on this above all: he redirected the Yellow River from Jishi through Longmen, south to Huayin, east past Dizhu, through Mengjin and the Luo region, and on to Dapi. Yu recognized that the river descended from great height with ferocious current, impossible to tame on open plain and repeatedly breaching control. He therefore cut two diversion channels, led the flow north over higher terrain, past the Hong waters to the Dalu plain, where it dispersed into the Nine Rivers, rejoined as the Ying River system, and emptied into the Bohai. With the nine rivers dredged and the marshes regulated, the Xia heartland was pacified, and the benefit lasted through three dynasties.
2
自是之後，滎陽下引河東南為鴻溝，以通宋、鄭、陳、蔡、曹、衛，與濟、汝、淮、泗會。 於楚，西方則通渠漢川、雲夢之際，東方則通溝江淮之間。 於吳，則通渠三江、五湖。 於齊，則通淄濟之間。 於蜀，則蜀守李冰鑿離馈，避沫水之害，穿二江成都中。 此渠皆可行舟，有餘則用溉，百姓饗其利。 至於它，往往引其水，用溉田，溝渠甚多，然莫足數也。
Later, from below Xingyang, a southeast diversion formed the Hong Canal, connecting Song, Zheng, Chen, Cai, Cao, and Wey and linking with the Ji, Ru, Huai, and Si systems. In Chu territory, western canals linked the Han watershed and Yunmeng wetlands, while eastern canals connected the Yangtze-Huai corridor. In Wu, waterways were opened to connect the Three Rivers and Five Lakes. In Qi, canal works linked the Zi and Ji rivers. In Shu, Governor Li Bing carved diversion channels to avert Mo River flooding and split the flow into two channels through Chengdu. All these canals supported navigation, and excess flow was turned to irrigation, greatly benefiting local communities. Elsewhere too, water was repeatedly drawn off for farming. Irrigation ditches and canals became so numerous they defied counting.
3
魏文侯時，西門豹為鄴令，有令名。 至文侯曾孫襄王時，與群臣飲酒，王為群臣祝曰：「今吾臣皆西門豹之為人臣也！」 史起進曰：「魏氏之行田也以百畝，鄴獨二百畝，是田惡也。 漳水在其旁，西門豹不知用，是不智也。 知而不興，是不仁也。 仁智豹未之盡，何足法也！」 於是以史起為鄴令，遂引漳水溉鄴，以富魏之河內。 民歌之曰：「鄴有賢令兮為史公，決漳水兮灌鄴旁，終古秽鹵兮生稻梁。」
Under Marquis Wen of Wei, Ximen Bao governed Ye and earned an excellent reputation. By the reign of King Xiang, Marquis Wen's great-grandson, the king drank with his court and said, "Would that all my ministers served as Ximen Bao did." Shi Qi then said, "Wei allotments are normally one hundred mu, yet in Ye they run to two hundred. That means the soil there is bad. The Zhang River lies right beside it, and Ximen Bao did not exploit it. That was not wisdom. And to know that yet do nothing is not benevolence. So Bao did not fully realize either wisdom or benevolence. Why should he be our standard?" Shi Qi was then appointed magistrate of Ye and drew off Zhang River water for irrigation, enriching Wei's lands east of the river. People praised him in song: "Ye found a worthy magistrate in Lord Shi; he cut the Zhang to water the fields, and the old saline flats now yield grain forever."
4
其後韓聞秦之好興事，欲罷之，無令東伐。 乃使水工鄭國間說秦，令鑿涇水，自中山西邸瓠口為渠，並北山，東注洛，三百餘里，欲以溉田。 中作而覺，秦欲殺鄭國。 鄭國曰：「始臣為間，然渠成亦秦之利也。 臣為韓延數歲之命，而為秦建萬世之功。」 秦以為然，卒使就渠。 渠成而用溉注填閼之水，溉秽鹵之地四萬餘頃，收皆畝一鍾。 於是關中為沃野，無凶年，秦以富彊，卒并諸侯，因名曰鄭國渠。
Later, Han learned that Qin favored large public works and sought to drain Qin's strength so it could not campaign eastward. Han therefore dispatched the water engineer Zheng Guo as an agent to lobby Qin into digging a canal from the Jing, starting at Hukou west of Zhongshan, running along the north hills and east into the Luo for more than 300 li, ostensibly for irrigation. The deception was discovered during construction, and Qin moved to kill Zheng Guo. Zheng Guo said, "Yes, I came at first as a spy, but once finished this canal will still profit Qin. I may have bought Han only a few years, but I will leave Qin a work for ten thousand generations." Qin accepted this argument and ordered the project carried through to completion. After completion, the canal both irrigated and drained low stagnant tracts, reclaiming over 40,000 qing of salty soil, with yields reaching one zhong per mu. As a result, Guanzhong became prime agricultural land and escaped bad-harvest years. Qin's wealth and power surged, enabling eventual unification. The canal was thereafter called the Zhengguo Canal.
5
漢興三十有九年，孝文時河決酸棗，東潰金隄，於是東郡大興卒塞之。
Thirty-nine years into the Han, in Emperor Wen's reign, the Yellow River breached at Suanzao and smashed the Golden Dike; Dong Commandery mounted a major closure effort.
6
其後三十六歲，孝武元光中，河決於瓠子，東南注鉅野，通於淮、泗。 上使汲黯、鄭當時興人徒塞之，輒復壞。 是時武安侯田蚡為丞相，其奉邑食鄃。 鄃居河北，河決而南則鄃無水災，邑收入多。 蚡言於上曰：「江河之決皆天事，未易以人力彊塞，彊塞之未必順天。」 而望氣用數者亦以為然，是以久不復塞也。
Thirty-six years after that, in Emperor Wu's Yuanguang period, a breach at Huzi sent the river southeast into Juye, where it linked to the Huai and Si. The emperor dispatched Ji An and Zheng Dangshi to mobilize workers for repairs, but each closure failed and broke open again. At the time, Chancellor Tian Fen, Marquis of Wu'an, drew revenues from Yu. Yu stood north of the river, so a southward breach spared his territory from floods and increased his fief income. Tian Fen told the emperor, "Major river breaches are Heaven's doing. Human force cannot easily compel them shut, and forcing closure may violate Heaven's pattern." Diviners and numerological experts agreed, so the breach remained unsealed for a long period.
7
時鄭當時為大司農，言「異時關東漕粟從渭上，度六月罷，而渭水道九百餘里，時有難處。 引渭穿渠起長安，旁南山下，至河三百餘里，徑，易遭，度可令三月罷； 罷而渠下民田萬餘頃又可得以溉。 此捐漕省卒，而益肥關中之地，得穀。」 上以為然，令齊人水工徐伯表，發卒數萬人穿漕渠，三歲而通。 以漕，大便利。 其後漕稍多，而渠下之民頗得以溉矣。
Zheng Dangshi, then Grand Minister of Agriculture, argued: "Formerly, grain transport from east of the passes moved up the Wei and was not finished until the sixth month; the route ran over 900 li and had many difficult segments. If we draw off the Wei and cut a canal from Chang'an along the southern foothills to the river, the route would be only about 300 li and much straighter; shipments could finish by the third month. Once transport season ends, the canal could also irrigate over 10,000 qing of downstream farmland. That would cut transport waste and labor while enriching Guanzhong farmland and increasing grain output." The emperor agreed, appointed the Qi water engineer Xu Biao, and mobilized tens of thousands. The canal was completed in three years. Once used for grain transport, it brought major logistical benefits. As shipments increased, communities along the canal also gained increasing irrigation benefits.
8
後河東守番係言：「漕從山東西，歲百餘萬石，更底柱之艱，敗亡甚多而煩費。 穿渠引汾溉皮氏、汾陰下，引河溉汾陰、蒲阪下，度可得五千頃。 故盡河堧棄地，民茭牧其中耳，今溉田之，度可得穀二百萬石以上。 穀從渭上，與關中無異，而底柱之東可毋復漕。」 上以為然，發卒數萬人作渠田。 數歲，河移徙，渠不利，田者不能償種。 久之，河東渠田廢，予越人，令少府以為稍入。
Later, Hedong governor Fan Xi reported: "We haul over a million shi of grain annually from east of the mountains. The Dizhu passage is dangerous, losses are severe, and costs are crushing. If we draw the Fen by canal to irrigate lands below Pishi and Fenyin, and divert the Yellow River below Fenyin and Puban, we can reclaim about 5,000 qing. Those riverbank wastelands are now used only for rough grazing; irrigated, they could yield over two million shi of grain. With that output moved up the Wei, Guanzhong would be fully supplied, and transport east of Dizhu could be eliminated." The emperor approved and conscripted tens of thousands to construct canals and reclaimed fields. After a few years, however, river courses shifted, the canals failed, and farmers could not even recover seed expenses. In time, the Hedong canal farms were abandoned and handed over to migrant groups, with the Lesser Treasury treating returns as incidental revenue.
9
其後人有上書，欲通褒斜道及漕，事下御史大夫張湯。 湯問之，言「抵蜀從故道，故道多阪，回遠。 今穿褒斜道，少阪，近四百里； 而褒水通沔，斜水通渭，皆可以行船漕。 漕從南陽上沔入褒，褒絕水至斜，間百餘里，以車轉，從斜下渭。 如此，漢中穀可致，而山東從沔無限，便於底柱之漕。 且褒斜材木竹箭之饒，儗於巴蜀。」 上以為然。 拜湯子卬為漢中守，發數萬人作褒斜道五百餘里。 道果便近，而水多湍石，不可漕。
Later, a memorial proposed opening the Baoxie corridor and associated shipping routes. The case was referred to Censor-in-chief Zhang Tang. Zhang Tang examined the proposal. It argued: "The old route to Shu is steep and winding. If we cut through the Baoxie corridor, gradients are gentler and distance is nearly 400 li shorter. Moreover, Bao River links to the Mian and Xie River to the Wei, so both can support boat transport. Cargo could move from Nanyang up the Mian into the Bao, then over a dry transfer of just over 100 li to the Xie, and then by water down to the Wei. In this way Hanzhong grain becomes deliverable, eastern supply through the Mian is virtually unlimited, and it is far easier than Dizhu transport. Also, Baoxie is rich in timber, bamboo, and arrow materials - resources comparable to Ba and Shu." The emperor accepted the proposal. He appointed Zhang Tang's son Ang as Hanzhong governor and mobilized tens of thousands to open more than 500 li of road through Baoxie. The route proved shorter and easier on land, but the waters were too swift and stony for shipping.
10
其後嚴熊言「臨晉民願穿洛以溉重泉以東萬餘頃故惡地。 誠即得水，可令畝十石。」 於是為發卒萬人穿渠，自徵引洛水至商顏下。 岸善崩，乃鑿井，深者四十餘丈。 往往為井，井下相通行水。 水隤以絕商顏，東至山領十餘里間。 井渠之生自此始。 穿得龍骨，故名曰龍首渠。 作之十餘歲，渠頗通，猶未得其饒。
Later Yan Xiong reported: "People in Linjin request a Luo diversion canal to irrigate more than 10,000 qing of poor land east of Chongquan. If water can be secured, yields could reach ten shi per mu." So 10,000 laborers were mobilized to cut the canal, drawing Luo River water from Zheng down to below Shangyan. Because the banks collapsed easily, they resorted to shafts; the deepest exceeded forty zhang. Shafts were sunk at intervals and linked underground so water could flow between them. The channel cut through beneath Shangyan and ran eastward for over ten li toward the ridge. This was the beginning of the shaft-canal technique. Because "dragon bones" were found during excavation, it was named the Dragon-Head Canal. After over a decade, the canal was largely opened, but the expected bounty still fell short.
11
自河決瓠子後二十餘歲，歲因以數不登，而梁楚之地尤甚。 上既封禪，巡祭山川，其明年，乾封少雨。 上乃使汲仁、郭昌發卒數萬人塞瓠子決河。 於是上以用事萬里沙，則還自臨決河，湛白馬玉璧，令群臣從官自將軍以下皆負薪寘決河。 是時東郡燒草，以故薪柴少，而下淇園之竹以為揵。 上既臨河決，悼功之不成，乃作歌曰：
Over twenty years after the Huzi breach, harvest failures persisted, with Liang and Chu hit especially hard. After the emperor completed the Feng-Shan and toured sacrificial sites, the next year brought scant rainfall. He then dispatched Ji Ren and Guo Chang, mobilizing tens of thousands to close the Huzi breach. While on campaign activity at Wansha, the emperor personally returned to the breach, offered a white horse and jade disc to the river, and required all officials from the generals down to carry fuel bundles into the closure works. Because burned grasslands in Dong Commandery left little timber, bamboo from Qiyuan was felled for piling stakes. Standing at the breached river and grieving the unfinished work, the emperor composed this song:
12
瓠子決兮將奈何？ 浩浩洋洋，慮殫為河。 殫為河兮地不得寧，功無已時兮吾山平。 吾山平兮鉅野溢，魚弗鬱兮柏冬日。 正道弛兮離常流，蛟龍騁兮放遠游。 歸舊川兮神哉沛，不封禪兮安知外！ 皇謂河公兮何不仁，泛濫不止兮愁吾人！ 齧桑浮兮淮、泗滿，久不反兮水維緩。
"Huzi has broken - what are we to do? The waters roll boundless; all my thoughts are consumed by the river. Spent in struggle with the river, the land finds no rest; the labor never ends, and my sacred hills are worn flat. When the mountain sinks low, Juye floods wide; fish will not stay confined, and cypress stands through winter glare. The true course is loosened from its ancient flow; dragons and river-serpents run wild in distant wanderings. Return, river, to your old bed - divine and overflowing! Had I not made Feng and Shan, how could I know these outer realms? I, the emperor, ask the River Lord: why this cruelty? Your endless floods bring only sorrow to my people. You tear at mulberry banks and drift onward; Huai and Si run full to bursting, and long have not returned to bounds.
13
一曰：
Another stanza says:
14
河湯湯兮激潺湲，北渡回兮迅流難。 搴長茭兮湛美玉，河公許兮薪不屬。 薪不屬兮衛人罪，燒蕭條兮噫乎何以御水！ 隤林竹兮揵石菑，宣防塞兮萬福來。
"The river roars and foams in racing torrents; crossing north then turning back, the current is too fierce. We raise long reeds and sink bright jade; though the River Lord accepts, the timber lines still do not join. If timber fails to link, the fault is Wey's; with all scrub burned bare, alas, how are we to master the flood? Cut bamboo from the woods, drive stakes, and brace stone embankments; when Xuanfang is sealed, a myriad blessings will arrive.
15
於是卒塞瓠子，築宮其上，名曰宣防。 而道河北行二渠，復禹舊跡，而梁、楚之地復寧，無水災。
At last the Huzi breach was closed. A ceremonial structure was raised there and named Xuanfang. Two channels were also opened on the north side, restoring Yu's ancient alignment. Liang and Chu regained stability, free again from major floods.
16
自是之後，用事者爭言水利。 朔方、西河、河西、酒泉皆引河及川谷以溉田。 而關中靈軹、成國、湋渠引諸川，汝南、九江引淮，東海引鉅定，泰山下引汶水，皆穿渠為溉田，各萬餘頃。 它小渠及陂山通道者，不可勝言也。
Afterward, officials handling public works competed to submit new hydraulic proposals. In Shuofang, Xihe, Hexi, and Jiuquan, diversions from major rivers and valley streams were used for irrigation. In Guanzhong, the Lingzhi, Chengguo, and Wei systems drew local streams; Runan and Jiujiang drew from the Huai; Donghai from Juding; and south of Mount Tai from the Wen - each region opening canals irrigating more than 10,000 qing. Smaller canals, embankments, and mountain passages were too numerous to enumerate.
17
自鄭國渠起，至元鼎六年，百三十六歲，而兒寬為左內史，奏請穿鑿六輔渠，以益溉鄭國傍高卬之田。 上曰：「農，天下之本也。 泉流灌寖，所以育五穀也。 左、右內史地，名山川原甚眾，細民未知其利，故為通溝瀆，畜陂澤，所以備旱也。 今內史稻田租挈重，不與郡同，其議減。 令吏民勉農，盡地利，平繇行水，勿使失時。」
From the opening of the Zhengguo Canal to Yuanding year six, 136 years had passed. Then, as Left Director of the Inner Region, Er Kuan petitioned to excavate the Six Auxiliary Canals to irrigate elevated fields beside the Zhengguo system. The emperor said, "Agriculture is the foundation of the realm. Springs, channels, and soaking irrigation are what nourish the five grains. In the jurisdictions of the Left and Right Inner Directors lie many notable mountains, rivers, and plains. Since common households have not yet tapped their full benefit, we must open ditches and waterways and store water in embanked basins to guard against drought." The rice-land levy in the Inner Historian districts is now heavier than in other commanderies; it should be reviewed and reduced. Officials and commoners should be urged to farm diligently, exploit every advantage of the land, balance labor service and water allocation, and never miss the planting season."
18
後十六歲，太始二年，趙中大夫白公復奏穿渠。 引涇水，首起谷口，尾入櫟陽，注渭中，袤二百里，溉田四千五百餘頃，因名曰白渠。 民得其饒，歌之曰：「田於何所？ 池陽、谷口。 鄭國在前，白渠起後。 舉臿為雲，決渠為雨。 涇水一石，其泥數斗。 且溉且糞，長我禾黍。 衣食京師，億萬之口。」 言此兩渠饒也。
Sixteen years later, in Taishi year two, the Zhao grandee Lord Bai again submitted a memorial proposing canal excavation. He diverted the Jing River, beginning at Gukou and ending at Liyang where it entered the Wei. The canal ran 200 li and irrigated more than 4,500 qing, and was called the Bai Canal. The people prospered from it and sang: "Where are the finest fields? At Chiyang and Gukou. First came Zheng Guo, then came the Bai Canal. Lift the spade and clouds gather; cut the channel and rain seems to fall. A single shi of Jing water bears several dou of rich silt. It waters and manures at once, making our crops flourish. It feeds and clothes the capital - countless mouths." The song praises how rich those two canal systems were.
19
是時方事匈奴，興功利，言便宜者甚眾。 齊人延年上書言：「河出昆侖，經中國，注勃海，是其地勢西北高而東南下也。 可案圖書，觀地形，令水工準高下，開大河上領，出之胡中，東注之海。 如此，關東長無水災，北邊不憂匈奴，可以省隄防備塞，士卒轉輸，胡寇侵盜，覆軍殺將，暴骨原野之患。 天下常備匈奴而不憂百越者，以其水絕壤斷也。 此功壹成，萬世大利。」 書奏，上壯之，報曰：「延年計議甚深。 然河乃大禹之所道也，聖人作事，為萬世功，通於神明，恐難改更。」
At the time, with campaigns against the Xiongnu and active state projects underway, practical policy proposals poured in. A man of Qi, Yannian, petitioned: "The Yellow River rises at Kunlun, passes through the central realm, and enters Bohai, proving that the land is high in the northwest and low in the southeast. By studying maps and terrain and having water engineers measure elevations, we could open an upper channel of the Yellow River, carry it through Hu lands, and send it east to the sea. Then the eastern regions would be free of chronic floods, frontier pressure from the Xiongnu would ease, and we could cut dike construction, border garrisons, military transport, nomad raids, catastrophic defeats, and the sight of bones bleaching on open ground. The realm fears the Xiongnu but not the Baiyue because waterways isolate and separate the latter from us. If this project is completed even once, it will benefit ten thousand generations." After receiving the memorial, the emperor praised its ambition and replied: "Yannian's proposal is deeply thought out. But this river course was established by Yu himself. The works of sages serve ages and accord with the numinous order; changing them is no light matter."
20
自塞宣房後，河復北決於館陶，分為屯氏河，東北經魏郡、清河、信都、勃海入海，廣深與大河等，故因其自然，不隄塞也。 此開通後，館陶東北四五郡雖時小被水害，而兗州以南六郡無水憂。 宣帝地節中，光祿大夫郭昌使行河。 北曲三所水流之勢皆邪直貝丘縣。 恐水盛，隄防不能禁，乃各更穿渠，直東，經東郡界中，不令北曲。 渠通利，百姓安之。 元帝永光五年，河決清河靈鳴犢口，而屯氏河絕。
After the Xuanfang closure, the river again breached north at Guantao and formed the Tunshi branch, running northeast through Wei, Qinghe, Xindu, and Bohai to the sea. Its size matched the main stream, so officials let it run naturally rather than force closure. Afterward, though four or five northeastern commanderies around Guantao suffered occasional minor flooding, the six commanderies south of Yan were largely free from water disasters. During Emperor Xuan's Dijie period, Grand Master Guo Chang was dispatched to inspect the Yellow River. He found that all three northern bends drove the current obliquely toward Beiqiu County. Fearing that floodwater might overwhelm the dikes, he cut fresh channels straight east through Dong Commandery to prevent the current from returning northward. The new channels worked well, and local people accepted them. In Yongguang year five under Emperor Yuan, the river breached at Lingmingdukou in Qinghe, and the Tunshi branch was severed.
21
成帝初，清河都尉馮逡奏言：「郡承河下流，與兗州東郡分水為界，城郭所居尤卑下，土壤輕脆易傷。 頃所以闊無大害者，以屯氏河通，兩川分流也。 今屯氏河塞，靈鳴犢口又益不利，獨一川兼受數河之任，雖高增隄防，終不能泄。 如有霖雨，旬日不霽，必盈溢。 靈鳴犢口在清河東界，所在處下，雖令通利，猶不能為魏郡、清河減損水害。 禹非不愛民力，以地形有勢，故穿九河，今既滅難明，屯氏河不流行七十餘年，新絕未久，其處易浚。 又其口所居高，於以分殺水力，道里便宜，可復浚以助大河泄暴水，備非常。 又地節時郭昌穿直渠，後三歲，河水更從故第二曲間北可六里，復南合。 今其曲勢復邪直貝丘，百姓寒心，宜復穿渠東行。 不豫修治，北決病四五郡，南決病十餘郡，然後憂之，晚矣。」 事下丞相、御史，白博士許商治尚書，善為算，能度功用。 遣行視，以為屯氏河盈溢所為，方用度不足，可且勿浚。
Early in Emperor Cheng's reign, Qinghe commandant Feng Jun reported: "Our commandery lies in the downstream path and shares watershed boundaries with Yan and Dong. Our settlements are particularly low, with friable soils that are easily damaged. Our relative safety in recent years came only because the Tunshi branch was open, splitting the waters into two channels. Now Tunshi is sealed and Lingmingdukou has worsened. A single channel is forced to carry several rivers; no matter how high we build dikes, discharge will still fail. If heavy rain persists for ten days without a break, flooding is inevitable. Lingmingdukou sits in low ground on Qinghe's eastern edge. Even if reopened, it cannot significantly reduce flood harm in Wei and Qinghe. Yu did not ignore labor burdens; he worked with topographic force, which is why he opened nine distributaries. Their traces are now obscure. Tunshi has been inactive for over seventy years, but because the closure is recent, the channel can still be dredged. Its inlet is also favorably elevated, allowing us to split and diminish flood force. The route is practical. Re-dredging it would help the main river vent sudden surges and prepare for extraordinary events. Moreover, when Guo Chang opened the straight channel in the Dijie era, the river shifted again after three years - about six li north of the old second bend - then bent back south to rejoin. Now the bend is once more turning toward Beiqiu, alarming the populace. Another eastward cut should be made. If we do not repair proactively, a northward breach will damage four or five commanderies, and a southward breach over ten. Waiting until then would be too late." The case went to the chancellor and censors, who consulted Academician Xu Shang - a Documents specialist skilled in calculation and cost-benefit assessment. After field inspection, they concluded the flooding stemmed from Tunshi conditions, but current funds were inadequate, so dredging should be deferred.
22
後三歲，河果決於館陶及東郡金隄，泛溢兗、豫，入平原、千乘、濟南，凡灌四郡三十二縣，水居地十五萬餘頃，深者三丈，壞敗官亭室廬且四萬所。 御史大夫尹忠對方略疏闊，上切責之，忠自殺。 遣大司農非調調均錢穀河決所灌之郡，謁者二人發河南以東漕船五百馏，徙民避水居丘陵，九萬七千餘口。 河隄使者王延世使塞，以竹落長四丈，大九圍，盛以小石，兩船夾載而下之。 三十六日，河隄成。 上曰：「東郡河決，流漂二州，校尉延世隄防三旬立塞。 其以五年為河平元年。 卒治河者為著外繇六月。 惟延世長於計策，功費約省，用力日寡，朕甚嘉之。 其以延世為光祿大夫，秩中二千石，賜爵關內侯，黃金百斤。」
Three years later, the river did breach at Guantao and the Golden Dike in Dong Commandery, inundating Yan and Yu and pouring into Pingyuan, Qiancheng, and Jinan. Four commanderies and thirty-two counties were flooded; over 150,000 qing lay underwater, depths reached three zhang, and nearly 40,000 official and private structures were ruined. Censor-in-chief Yin Zhong gave only vague policy responses. The emperor rebuked him harshly, and Yin Zhong took his own life. The Grand Minister of Agriculture was tasked with reallocating equalized funds and grain to affected commanderies. Two envoys requisitioned 500 transport vessels east of Henan and relocated over 97,000 people to higher ground. Dike commissioner Wang Yanshi sealed the breach using bamboo gabions four zhang long and nine chi around, packed with stone and lowered between paired boats. The closure was completed in just thirty-six days. The emperor said, "The Dong Commandery breach ravaged two provinces, yet Commandant Yanshi sealed it in only three ten-day periods. Accordingly, let year five be renamed the first year of Heping. All men assigned to river-repair duty shall receive six months' credit toward external corvee obligations. Yanshi alone showed outstanding strategic skill: he kept costs tight and labor demands low. I commend him highly. Promote Yanshi to Grand Master of Palace Revenue at the middle-2000-shi rank, ennoble him as a Marquis Within the Passes, and award one hundred jin of gold."
23
後二歲，河復決平原，流入濟南、千乘，所壞敗者半建始時，復遣王延世治之。 杜欽說大將軍王鳳，以為「前河決，丞相史楊焉言延世受焉術以塞之，蔽不肯見。 今獨任延世，延世見前塞之易，恐其慮害不深。 又審如焉言，延世之巧，反不如焉。 且水勢各異，不博議利害而任一人，如使不及今冬成，來春桃華水盛，必羨溢，有填淤反壤之害。 如此，數郡種不得下，民人流散，盜賊將生，雖重誅延世，無益於事。 宜遣焉及將作大匠許商、諫大夫乘馬延年雜作。 延世與焉必相破壞，深論便宜，以相難極。 商、延年皆明計算，能商功利，足以分別是非，擇其善而從之，必有成功。」 鳳如欽言，白遣焉等作治，六月乃成。 復賜延世黃金百斤。 治河卒非受平賈者，為著外繇六月。
Two years later the river again breached at Pingyuan and flooded Jinan and Qiancheng. Damage reached about half the Jianshi disaster, and Wang Yanshi was again sent to direct repairs. Du Qin advised Grand General Wang Feng: "During the earlier breach, chancellery clerk Yang Yan claimed Yanshi had used his techniques for closure but then shut him out. If we rely solely on Yanshi now, he may treat this as easy based on last time and underestimate the risks. And if Yang Yan's account is true, Yanshi's technique may actually be inferior to Yan's. Water conditions differ each time. If we do not debate options broadly and instead entrust one man, failure to finish before winter will invite spring peach-blossom floods, certain overtopping, and severe silt and soil damage. Then several commanderies will miss planting, populations will disperse, and banditry will emerge. Even severe punishment of Yanshi afterward would be useless. Yang Yan should be sent together with Minister of Works Xu Shang and Remonstrance Grandee Chengma Yannian to work jointly. Yanshi and Yang Yan will check one another, forcing a thorough practical debate on what should be done. Xu Shang and Yannian are both strong in technical calculation and cost-benefit assessment. They can sort right from wrong; choose the best option and success should follow." Wang Feng accepted Du Qin's advice, petitioned accordingly, and dispatched Yang Yan and the others. The work was completed by the sixth month. Yanshi was again awarded one hundred jin of gold. River workers not compensated at the standard rate were credited with six months of external labor service.
24
後九歲，鴻嘉四年，楊焉言「從河上下，患底柱隘，可鐫廣之。」 上從其言，使焉鐫之。 鐫之裁沒水中，不能去，而令水益湍怒，為害甚於故。
Nine years later, in Hongjia year four, Yang Yan argued, "The key danger along the river is the bottleneck at Dizhu; it should be cut wider." The emperor accepted the recommendation and ordered Yang Yan to carry out the cutting. The excavation never got beyond the submerged section and failed to clear the obstruction; instead it accelerated and intensified the current, causing worse damage than before.
25
是歲，勃海、清河、信都河水湓溢，灌縣邑三十一，敗官亭民舍四萬餘所。 河隄都尉許商與丞相史孫禁共行視，圖方略。 禁以為「今河溢之害數倍於前決平原時。 今可決平原金隄間，開通大河，令入故篤馬河。 至海五百餘里，水道浚利，又乾三郡水地，得美田且二十餘萬頃，足以償所開傷民田廬處，又省吏卒治隄救水，歲三萬人以上。」 許商以為「古說九河之名，有徒駭、胡蘇、鬲津，今見在成平、東光、鬲界中。 自鬲以北至徒駭間，相去二百餘里，今河雖數移徙，不離此域。 孫禁所欲開者，在九河南篤馬河，失水之跡，處勢平夷，旱則淤絕，水則為敗，不可許。」 公卿皆從商言。 先是，谷永以為「河，中國之經瀆，聖王興則出圖書，王道廢則竭絕。 今潰溢橫流，漂沒陵阜，異之大者也。 修政以應之，災變自除。」 是時李尋、解光亦言「陰氣盛則水為之長，故一日之間，晝減夜增，江河滿溢，所謂水不潤下，雖常於卑下之地，猶日月變見於朔望，明天道有因而作也。 眾庶見王延世蒙重賞，競言便巧，不可用。 議者常欲求索九河故跡而穿之，今因其自決，可且勿塞，以觀水勢。 河欲居之，當稍自成川，跳出沙土，然後順天心而圖之，必有成功，而用財力寡。」 於是遂止不塞。 滿昌、師丹等數言百姓可哀，上數遣使者處業振贍之。
That year, flooding in Bohai, Qinghe, and Xindu inundated thirty-one counties and ruined over forty thousand official and private buildings. Dike commandant Xu Shang and chancellery clerk Sun Jin conducted a joint inspection and drew up response plans. Sun Jin argued, "Current flood damage is several times what it was at the earlier Pingyuan breach. We should open a controlled breach between Pingyuan's Golden Dikes, reconnect the main stream, and direct it into the old Duma channel. It runs over 500 li to the sea with a deep, smooth channel. It would also dry flooded lands in three commanderies and recover over 200,000 qing of good farmland - enough to offset losses to houses and fields - while saving more than 30,000 annual laborers otherwise tied up in emergency dike work." Xu Shang replied, "Ancient records name among the Nine Rivers channels such as Tuohai, Husu, and Gejin, and their traces still lie around Chengping, Dongguang, and Ge. From Ge north to Tuohai is more than 200 li. Though the river has shifted repeatedly, it has remained within this zone. Sun Jin's proposal opens south of the Nine River zone, at the Duma line, away from the river's natural trace and across flat terrain. In drought it silts up; in flood it collapses. It should not be approved." The court's top ministers sided with Xu Shang. Earlier, Gu Yong had argued: "The Yellow River is the great central channel of China. Under sage rule, auspicious charts appear; when the kingly way declines, waterways fail. Now it bursts and runs wild, drowning even ridges and mounds. This is an extreme portent. Reform government in response, and these disasters and portents will fade of themselves." At the same time, Li Xun and Xie Guang said, "When yin force becomes excessive, water rises. That is why within a single day decline by day and increase by night can be observed, and rivers overflow. So-called failure of water to flow down follows celestial causation: signs appear with new and full moons, showing Heaven acts through definite causes." Because Wang Yanshi had been lavishly rewarded, many people rushed to submit flashy "ingenious" plans; these should not be adopted blindly. Many argued for reopening the old Nine River courses. For now, since the river has already broken out naturally, we should refrain from immediate closure and first observe the flow dynamics. Let the river settle where it tends to settle and carve its own bed clear of silt; then, aligning policy with that natural course, we can act successfully with far less money and labor." Accordingly, they suspended closure efforts. Man Chang, Shi Dan, and others repeatedly urged compassion for the people, and the emperor repeatedly dispatched envoys for resettlement and relief.
26
哀帝初，平當使領河隄，奏言「九河今皆寘滅，按經義治水，有決河深川，而無隄防雍塞之文。 河從魏郡以東，北多溢決，水跡難以分明。 四海之眾不可誣，宜博求能浚川疏河者。」 下丞相孔光、大司空何武，奏請部刺史、三輔、三河、弘農太守舉吏民能者，莫有應書。 待詔賈讓奏言：
Early in Emperor Ai's reign, Ping Dang was put in charge of river dikes and memorialized: "The Nine Rivers are now entirely blocked and erased. Classical water policy speaks of opening channels and deepening rivers, not of choking them with embankments. East of Wei Commandery, repeated northern overflows and breaches have made channel traces difficult to determine. The people of the realm cannot be fooled. We should widely recruit those truly skilled in dredging channels and clearing rivers." The case was referred to Chancellor Kong Guang and Grand Minister of Works He Wu, who ordered regional authorities and commandery governors to recommend capable talent, but no one answered the summons. Then waiting appointee Jia Rang submitted a memorial, stating:
27
治河有上中下策。 古者立國居民，疆理土地，必遺川澤之分，度水勢所不及。 大川無防，小水得入，陂障卑下，以為汙澤，使秋水多，得有所休息，左右游波，寬緩而不迫。 夫土之有川，猶人之有口也。 治土而防其川，猶止兒啼而塞其口，豈不遽止，然其死可立而待也。 故曰：「善為川者，決之使道； 善為民者，宣之使言。」 蓋隄防之作，近起戰國，雍防百川，各以自利。 齊與趙、魏，以河為竟。 趙、魏瀕山，齊地卑下，作隄去河二十五里。 河水東抵齊隄，則西泛趙、魏，趙、魏亦為隄去河二十五里。 雖非其正，水尚有所游盪。 時至而去，則填淤肥美，民耕田之。 或久無害，稍築室宅，遂成聚落。 大水時至漂沒，則更起隄防以自救，稍去其城郭，排水澤而居之，湛溺自其宜也。 今隄防骥者去水數百步，遠者數里。 近黎陽南故大金隄，從河西西北行，至西山南頭，乃折東，與東山相屬。 民居金隄東，為廬舍，住十餘歲更起隄，從東山南頭直南與故大隄會。 又內黃界中有澤，方數十里，環之有隄，往十餘歲太守以賦民，民今起廬舍其中，此臣親所見者也。 東郡白馬故大隄亦復數重，民皆居其間。 從黎陽北盡魏界，故大隄去河遠者數十里，內亦數重，此皆前世所排也。 河從河內北至黎陽為石隄，激使東抵東郡平剛； 又為石隄，使西北抵黎陽、觀下； 又為石隄，使東北抵東郡津北； 又為石隄，使西北抵魏郡昭陽； 又為石隄，激使東北。 百餘里間，河再西三東，迫阨如此，不得安息。
"River management has upper, middle, and lower strategies. In antiquity, when states were founded and populations settled, land planning always reserved space for rivers and wetlands and respected the limits of water power. Major rivers were not tightly barricaded, and minor streams could merge into them. Low tracts were set aside as retention marshes, giving autumn floods room to rest and spread, so side currents moved broadly and gently rather than under pressure. Rivers in the land are like a mouth in the human body. Trying to govern terrain while blocking its rivers is like silencing a crying child by stuffing its mouth: the crying stops at once, but death soon follows. Hence the saying: "The one who governs rivers well opens them and gives them a path. The one who governs people well lets them speak." Heavy dike-building is a late Warring States habit: rivers were blocked everywhere for local self-interest. Qi, Zhao, and Wei all treated the Yellow River as a political border. Because Zhao and Wei were mountain-side while Qi lay low, each built embankments about twenty-five li from the channel. When the river hit Qi's dikes, floodwaters spread west into Zhao and Wei, and those states answered by building their own dikes at the same distance. Even outside the natural channel, the water still had room to move and disperse. When flood season ended, rich silt remained, and people cultivated those newly fertile fields. When floods stayed away for years, people gradually built homes, and those sites turned into settled communities. Then, when major floods came and swept things away, they built still more dikes for self-protection, moved off old urban sites, and lived by draining wetlands - only to suffer the inundation that naturally followed. At present, these embankments stand several hundred paces from the water, some even several li away. Near Liyang, the old Great Golden Dike runs northwest along the river's west side to the south tip of West Mountain, then turns east to connect with East Mountain. People settled east of the Golden Dike. After more than a decade, they built yet another embankment, running straight south from East Mountain's southern spur to join the old main dike. Inside Neihuang there is a marshland tens of li wide, encircled by dikes. Over ten years ago, the governor levied taxes there; today people have built dwellings right inside it - something I saw with my own eyes. At Baima in Dong Commandery, the old great dike also has multiple embankment lines, with people living between them. From north of Liyang to the Wei boundary, old major dikes in places sit dozens of li from the channel, with multiple interior lines as well - all formed by earlier river expulsions. From Henan northward to Liyang, stone embankments forced the river eastward toward Pinggang in Dong Commandery; other stone dikes then drove it northwest toward Liyang and Guania; others redirected it northeast toward the north of Jin crossing in Dong Commandery; others forced it northwest toward Zhaoyang in Wei Commandery; and still others pushed it northeast again. Across just over one hundred li, the river is bent west twice and east three times. So tightly constrained, it cannot stabilize.
28
今行上策，徙冀州之民當水衝者，決黎陽遮害亭，放河使北入海。 河西薄大山，東薄金隄，勢不能遠泛濫，期月自定。 難者將曰：「若如此，敗壞城郭田廬冢墓以萬數，百姓怨恨。」 昔大禹治水，山陵當路者毀之，故鑿龍門，辟伊闕，析底柱，破碣石，墮斷天地之性。 此乃人功所造，何足言也！ 今瀕河十郡治隄歲費且萬萬，及其大決，所殘無數。 如出數年治河之費，以業所徙之民，遵古聖之法，定山川之位，使神人各處其所，而不相奸。 且以大漢方制萬里，豈其與水爭咫尺之地哉？ 此功一立，河定民安，千載無患，故謂之上策。
The highest policy is this: relocate Jizhou residents in direct flood paths, open a controlled breach at Zhehai Pavilion near Liyang, and let the river run north to the sea. With mountains to its west and the Golden Dike to its east, the river's force cannot fan out widely; within a month it should settle naturally. Critics will object: "That would ruin tens of thousands of walls, fields, homes, and tombs, and the people will hate it." But when Yu governed the flood, he cut through mountains that blocked the course: he opened Longmen, cleft Yique, split Dizhu, and broke Jieshi - reshaping even the natural frame of heaven and earth. Those were man-made achievements of far greater scale; why shrink from this one? Today ten commanderies along the river spend nearly a hundred million each year on embankments, yet when major breaches come the losses are immeasurable. If only several years of river-control spending were redirected to resettling displaced populations, we could follow ancient sage practice, re-establish proper mountain-river positions, and let both human and numinous domains remain in their proper bounds without conflict. And for a Han empire spanning ten thousand li, why should we fight the river for a few narrow strips of ground? Once carried out, this would stabilize the river and secure the people for a thousand years. That is why it is called the highest strategy.
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若乃多穿漕渠於冀州地，使民得以溉田，分殺水怒，雖非聖人法，然亦救敗術也。 難者將曰：「河水高於平地，歲增隄防，猶尚決溢，不可以開渠。」 臣竊按視遮害亭西十八里，至淇水口，乃有金隄，高一丈。 自是東，地稍下，隄稍高，至遮害亭，高四五丈。 往六七歲，河水大盛，增丈七尺，壞黎陽南郭門，入至隄下。 水未踰隄二尺所，從隄上北望，河高出民屋，百姓皆走上山。 水留十三日，隄潰二所，吏民塞之。 臣循隄上，行視水勢，南七十餘里，至淇口，水適至隄半，計出地上五尺所。 今可從淇口以東為石隄，多張水門。 初元中，遮害亭下河去隄足數十步，至今四十餘歲，適至隄足。 由是言之，其地堅矣。 恐議者疑河大川難禁制，滎陽漕渠足以下之，其水門但用木與土耳，今據堅地作石隄，勢必完安。 冀州渠首盡當卬此水門。 治渠非穿地也，但為東方一隄，北行三百餘里，入漳水中，其西因山足高地，諸渠皆往往股引取之； 旱則開東方下水門溉冀州，水則開西方高門分河流。 通渠有三利，不通有三害。 民常罷於救水，半失作業； 水行地上，湊潤上徹，民則病溼氣，木皆立枯，鹵不生穀； 決溢有敗，為魚鱉食：此三害也。 若有渠溉，則鹽鹵下溼，填淤加肥； 故種禾麥，更為岻稻，高田五倍，下田十倍； 轉漕舟船之便：此三利也。 今瀕河隄吏卒郡數千人，伐買薪石之費歲數千萬，足以通渠成水門； 又民利其溉灌，相率治渠，雖勞不罷。 民田適治，河隄亦成，此誠富國安民，興利除害，支數百歲，故謂之中策。
A secondary option is to cut numerous canals in Jizhou for irrigation and to split the river's force. It may not be the sages' ideal, but it can still rescue a failing situation. Critics will say: "The river already stands above the plain. Even with yearly dike increases, breaches continue, so new canals are impossible." I personally inspected the stretch from eighteen li west of Zhehai Pavilion to the Qi mouth; there stands a Golden Dike one zhang high. East of that point the ground falls while embankments rise, reaching four to five zhang near Zhehai Pavilion. Six or seven years ago, flood level rose an additional one zhang seven chi, smashed Liyang's south outer gate, and reached the foot of the dike. The river came within two chi of overtopping. From atop the dike, one could see water standing above rooftops, and people fled to the hills. The flood persisted for thirteen days; two dike sections failed, and officials and locals closed them by force. I walked the embankment to inspect current strength. More than seventy li south at the Qi mouth, water reached only mid-dike, roughly five chi above ground level. Accordingly, east of the Qi mouth we can build stone embankments and install numerous sluice gates. In the Chuyuan era, the river below Zhehai Pavilion was still dozens of paces from the dike toe. After forty-plus years, it has only now reached it. This shows that the ground there is structurally stable. Some may still doubt whether a great river can be controlled. But Xingyang's transport canal shows it can: even wood-and-earth gates worked there. On this firmer foundation, stone dikes should be even more reliable. All Jizhou canal heads should be aligned to and regulated through these sluice gates. This is not deep excavation. It mainly requires building a single eastern levee running north for over 300 li into the Zhang system; on the west side, canals can branch off from high foothill ground. In drought, open the lower eastern gates for irrigation; in flood, open the higher western gates to divide and release the main current. Opening these canals brings three major benefits; refusing to open them brings three major harms. People are perpetually exhausted by flood response and lose half their productive labor. Surface-standing water drives dampness upward; people fall ill, trees wither in place, and saline soils fail to produce grain. And when breaches occur, destruction is total, with people dying in floodwaters - these are the three harms. With irrigation canals, salty lowlands can be leached and drained, and silt deposition will improve fertility. Then wheat and millet yields rise sharply, and paddy cultivation becomes possible - roughly fivefold returns on uplands and tenfold on low fields. Transport by grain boats also becomes easier. These are the three benefits. Currently thousands of officials and troops are tied to embankment duty, and annual fuel-and-stone costs run into the tens of millions - enough capital to complete these canals and gates instead. Moreover, because people directly benefit from irrigation, they will willingly maintain the canal network despite the labor. With farmland stabilized and embankments properly completed, this would enrich the state, secure the population, and convert harm into long-term gain for centuries - hence it is the middle strategy.
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若乃繕完故隄，增卑倍薄，勞費無已，數逢其害，此最下策也。
Simply patching old dikes, endlessly raising weak sections and thickening thin ones, means unending expense and recurring disaster. That is the worst strategy.
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王莽時，徵能治河者以百數，其大略異者，長水校尉平陵關並言：「河決率常於平原、東郡左右，其地形下而土疏惡。 聞禹治河時，本空此地，以為水猥，盛則放溢，少稍自索，雖時易處，猶不能離此。 上古難識，近察秦漢以來，河決曹、衛之域，其南北不過百八十里者，可空此地，勿以為官亭民室而已。」 大司馬史長安張戎言：「水性就下，行疾則自刮除成空而稍深。 河水重濁，號為一石水而六斗泥。 今西方諸郡，以至京師東行，民皆引河、渭山川水溉田。 春夏乾燥，少水時也，故使河流遲，貯淤而稍淺； 雨多水暴至，則溢決。 而國家數隄塞之，稍益高於平地，猶築垣而居水也。 可各順從其性，毋復灌溉，則百川流行，水道自利，無溢決之害矣。」 御史臨淮韓牧以為「可略於禹貢九河處穿之，縱不能為九，但為四五，宜有益。」 大司空掾王橫言：「河入勃海，勃海地高於韓牧所欲穿處。 往者天嘗連雨，東北風，海水溢，西南出，浸數百里，九河之地已為海所漸矣。 禹之行河水，本隨西山下東北去。 周譜云定王五年河徙，則今所行非禹之所穿也。 又秦攻魏，決河灌其都，決處遂大，不可復補。 宜卻徙完平處，更開空，使緣西山足乘高地而東北入海，乃無水災。」 沛郡桓譚為司空掾，典其議，為甄豐言：「凡此數者，必有一是。 宜詳考驗，皆可豫見，計定然後舉事，費不過數億萬，亦可以事諸浮食無產業民。 空居與行役，同當衣食； 衣食縣官，而為之作，乃兩便，可以上繼禹功，下除民疾。」 王莽時，但崇空語，無施行者。
During Wang Mang's rule, more than a hundred "river experts" were recruited. Among the distinct proposals, Guan Bing of Pingling argued that breaches consistently occurred around Pingyuan and Dong Commandery because terrain was low and soils loose. He said Yu had intentionally left this area open as flood-retention space: high water could spread there and later recede naturally. Though channels shifted, they remained within this zone. Ancient evidence is obscure, but from Qin through Han, breaches in the Cao-Wey region stayed within about 180 li north-south. This zone should be kept empty rather than occupied by offices and homes." Zhang Rong, clerk under the Grand Marshal in Chang'an, said: "Water naturally seeks lower ground. Fast flow scours channels and deepens them on its own. The Yellow River is extremely muddy - proverbially one shi of water to six dou of silt. Now, from western commanderies to the capital corridor, people everywhere divert the Yellow River, Wei, and mountain streams for irrigation. Spring and summer are dry seasons, when water is least. Diversions slow the current, trap silt, and progressively shallow the channel. Then when heavy rains and flash surges arrive, overtopping and breach become inevitable. The state responds by repeatedly diking and plugging, raising channels ever higher above the plain - like building a wall and then living inside water. We should let each river follow its own natural tendencies and stop over-diversion for irrigation. Then waterways will regulate themselves and breach disasters will diminish." Censor Han Mu of Linhuai proposed reopening channels roughly where the Nine Rivers were described in the Yu Gong: even if not all nine, opening four or five would still help. Chief clerk Wang Heng objected: "The river empties into Bohai, but Bohai terrain is actually higher than Han Mu's proposed cuts. There have been periods of prolonged rain and northeast winds when seawater surged inland, spreading hundreds of li; the old Nine River zone has already been encroached by the sea. Yu's original river line ran northeast beneath the western mountain front. Zhou records say the river migrated in King Ding's fifth year, so the current line is no longer Yu's original channel. And when Qin attacked Wei, it intentionally breached the river to flood Wei's capital; that cut widened so much it could never be fully repaired. The proper solution is to relocate to more stable terrain and open a fresh course along elevated foothill ground to the northeast sea outlet; only then can major flood disasters be avoided." Huan Tan of Pei, serving as a Works clerk, oversaw the debate and told Zhen Feng: "Among these proposals, at least one is correct. They should be examined and tested rigorously, since outcomes can be predicted in advance. Decide the plan first, then act. Costs should stay within a few hundred million, while also employing idle, landless populations. Whether idle or in labor service, people require food and clothing all the same. If the state feeds and clothes them while employing them in works, both sides benefit - continuing Yu's legacy above and relieving popular hardship below." Under Wang Mang, however, empty theorizing was prized and none of these plans were implemented.
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贊曰：古人有言：「微禹之功，吾其魚乎！」 中國川原以百數，莫著於四瀆，而河為宗。 孔子曰：「多聞而志之，知之次也。」 國之利害，故備論其事。
The appraisal concludes with the old saying: "Without Yu's achievement, would we all not have become fish?" China has hundreds of river-and-plain systems, but among the Four Great Waterways the Yellow River is preeminent. As Confucius said, "To hear broadly and record it well is the next step toward knowledge." Since the state's gains and losses rest on this question, it has been discussed here in full detail.