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卷四十八 志第二十九: 食貨三 錢幣

Volume 48 Treatises 29: Finance and Economics 3 - Money

Chapter 48 of 金史 · History of Jin
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1
西 西
Money and currency. In the early Jin period the state used old Liao and Song coinage; by the end of the Tianhui reign even Liu Yu's Fuchang yuanbao and Fuchang chongbao were accepted. After Prince Hailing relocated the capital in Zhenyuan 2 (1154), Revenue Minister Cai Songnian revived the note-circulation system, and exchange notes were issued to circulate together with cash. In Zhenglong 2 (1157), more than forty years after the founding of the dynasty, the court first debated instituting official coinage. In the tenth month of that winter the state first barred the export of copper beyond the frontier and posted statutory penalties and rewards. Household bronze and brass ware was seized: items from Shaanxi and Nanjing circuits went to Jingzhao, while every other circuit sent its haul to the Central Capital. In the second month of year three (1158) two mints were set up at the Central Capital, Baoyuan in the east and Baofeng in the west. A single mint was also established at Jingzhao. It was named Liyong. All three mints cast Zhenglong Tongbao cash, matching the Song small-denomination standard in weight but with sharper rims, square holes, and lettering; the new pieces circulated alongside older coin.
2
西 西 便 貿 貿 便 使 使 使 使 便 使 使
In Dading 1 (1161), at Minister of Personnel Zhang Zhongyan's recommendation, Emperor Shizong ordered the Shaanxi Circuit to accept Song iron cash alongside other currency. By the fourth year the policy had largely lapsed; the throne ordered the Shaanxi revenue office and the circuit inspection commissioners on both routes to investigate. They all reported that although cash and iron coin were supposed to circulate together, in practice no reliable standard held and both government and populace found the arrangement unworkable. The measure was therefore withdrawn. In the eighth year, after subjects breached the copper ban, the emperor remarked, "Turning coin into copper wares has been forbidden for generations. Yet people still cast bronze mirrors—where else would the metal come from if not melted coin?" He therefore banned mirror-casting as well. In the tenth year he told revenue officials, "When the treasury hoards coin, private cash grows scarce and commerce stalls—buy gold, silver, and other commodities to draw money back into circulation. Monopoly goods on the circuits were likewise to be collected in kind at fair assessed values." In the tenth month he rebuked them: "We had ordered markets to trade gold, silver, and silk because the treasury held too much coin and private circulation was stifled. Now we find that forced quotas have ended up harming the people instead. I myself authorized the palace workshops to accept portable goods in lieu of cash to ease burdens on the people—policies I devised before issuing—and you still botch them. What need is there for officials like you? Relief is handed out everywhere, yet nearby districts often lack grain and must draw supplies from afar; the long haul only adds to popular hardship. Why not build granaries locally in every region? In good harvest years you could buy extra grain for relief stores, so that when crisis comes supplies would be close at hand. Instead you merely let coin pile up in the treasury—what good does that do? The empire is vast and I cannot know every detail myself—how did you officials let these several abuses reach this point? The Revenue Ministry is not like other departments—it must adapt policy to circumstances. Anyone can hold the post if all you do is cling to precedent." In the second month of the eleventh year private mirror-casting was banned. Householders had to surrender existing copper ware to the state, receiving half its appraised value in return. Only religious images, temple bells and chimes, cymbals, ritual implements, official belt fittings, and fish pouches were exempted. In the first month of the twelfth year, with copper in short supply, the Secretariat sent envoys to every circuit to procure metal. Informants who located workable mines and smelters received rewards. Discussing minting policy with his ministers, they replied, "Some propose mining every gold and silver deposit to cast coin, but labor costs would exceed output several times over—we doubt it is feasible." The emperor answered, "Gold and silver are natural resources that should benefit the people; only coin must never be privately cast. The treasury is flush today—if wealth spreads through the realm, how is that different from hoarding it in government coffers? Costs may be high, yet the money stays among the people and fresh coinage grows day by day. Send capable administrators to oversee the work." Left Vice Censor Shi Jue added, "A ruler's wealth lies with the people; currency should flow like a spring—that is the whole purpose." The emperor asked again, "Did commoners ever cast their own coin in antiquity?" Jue answered, "If subjects minted their own coin, schemers would debased it for profit—that is why antiquity banned private casting." In the thirteenth year non-garrison prefectures were told to buy silk and cloth with coin and ship the goods to the capital, keeping currency moving to meet popular needs. In the eleventh month of the fifteenth year he told his ministers, "Some claim minting is pointless because costs exceed returns. I disagree. The empire is one household—why split public and private? Treasury spending becomes popular income as new coin multiplies, benefiting state and people alike." In the third month of the sixteenth year envoys were sent on each circuit to survey copper veins. In the eighteenth year Daizhou gained a mint supervised by Li Tianji of Zhenwu command and Gao Jisun of Baode command, but their coin came out blotchy, dark, and unusable; both men were demoted two ranks and dismissed, and Jisun was flogged eighty strokes. Zhang Dajie of the Works Bureau and Ma Gui of the Personnel Bureau were reassigned to oversee minting. The new cash bore the legend Dading Tongbao, with sharper characters and rims than the Zhenglong issue; tradition holds that the alloy contained a trace of silver. By the nineteenth year output reached just over sixteen thousand strings of cash. In the twentieth year five thousand strings were presented for inspection before the court authorized circulation alongside older coin.
3
便 便
Before the new coin circulated, Song Daguan pieces were accepted at a five-for-one valuation. In the second month he learned that Shangjing palace workshops haggled over market purchases and paid in short strings; he scolded his ministers, "How can I know every petty abuse myself? Why were you not watching for this?" Private trade counted only eighty cash per string—"short money"—while official accounts used full hundreds, called "long money." A Daming commoner named Wolu Bu petitioned that government and private accounts alike should adopt the eighty-cash string, and the rule became permanent law. In the eleventh month of the twentieth year the Daizhou mint was renamed Futong, with a rank-5a superintendent post held concurrently by the circuit commissioner. A rank-6a vice superintendent was added, filled by the prefectural vice commissioner. A rank-7a assistant post went to the circuit surveillance judge. Two rank-8b handling clerks were also appointed. They received silver courier tallies and rotated duty traveling the post roads to manage operations. In the tenth month of the twenty-second year Participating Administrator Nianzha Gwatela was placed in charge of the Daizhou Futong mint. In the twenty-third year he noted that despite years of operation Futong output had not grown, because prefectural leaders and staff held the posts concurrently and were distracted by routine administration. Vice superintendent and assistant became full-time posts, with the military commissioner retaining nominal oversight. In the twenty-sixth year he remarked, "Everyone complains of scarce cash, yet five million strings in the capital is not excessive; coin hoarded on distant circuits does no good—treasury cash from non-garrison districts should all be shipped to the capital." Grand Preceptor Kening objected, "Cash is already scarce among the people—draining the provinces would only make matters worse! Better to move half to the capital and convert the rest into portable goods, benefiting court and countryside alike." In the eleventh month he told his ministers, "Despite the long-standing copper ban, people still forge belts and mirrors, disguise them as antiques, and sell them openly—tighten enforcement." In the second month of the twenty-seventh year Quyang County gained its own Litong mint with full-time deputies who rotated along the post roads to procure copper. In the twenty-eighth year he told his ministers, "Cash on the circuits is enormous—some sixty million strings sit idle in remote storehouses. Because it never circulates, it helps neither state nor people—it might as well not exist. The Central Capital spends three million strings a year and still runs short; shipping the hoard here would cost little in transport, and even heavy expense would only spread wealth among the populace. In the twelfth month of Dading 29 (1189) Liu Wan and others of Yanmen and Wutai petitioned Emperor Zhangzong: "Since the mints opened, districts with copper mines must cover shortfalls in official transport wages. We ask that levies be shared equally among prefectural and county offices." Selection Office aide Ding Yongji was dispatched to investigate and reported that households supplied transport through corvée assessments against their property, not voluntarily. Official wages were low to begin with, and officials extorted more on top. Survey crews falsely marked private walls and monasteries for mining and took bribes. Smelters owed four ounces of refined copper daily, often fell short, and melted household ware and old coin to meet quotas. Futong and Litong together mint about 140,000 strings a year while costing over 800,000—burdening the people without clear benefit. The ministers relayed the findings and the Daizhou and Quyang mints were abolished.
4
使 便 便
When the Zhenyuan note system began, the court created the Note Printing Treasury and Exchange Note Treasury, each headed by a commissioner, deputy, and reviewer plus two inspectors; the exchange deputy handled countersignatures and seal contracts. Large notes were printed in denominations of one, two, three, five, and ten strings; small notes came in five grades of one hundred, two hundred, three hundred, five hundred, and seven hundred cash. They circulated with coin on a seven-year cycle of exchange for new notes. The system followed Song Zhang Yong's Sichuan jiaozi model with a longer redemption period—a stopgap born of copper scarcity. Some had wanted to abolish notes altogether; after the mints closed officials argued that notes equaled ready cash, eased long-distance trade, and benefited everyone— they must not be scrapped. Only the seven-year renewal cycle breeds distrust; abolish it so people can rely on notes indefinitely. Worn notes may be exchanged at local treasuries or cashed out on demand. The seven-year renewal rule was dropped; notes were replaced only when the text faded. From this reform onward the state lacked recall discipline, issued more than it redeemed, and popular confidence eroded. Later statutes changed repeatedly without fixing the problem; the chronic abuses trace to this decision.
5
使使 使
Exchange notes had a decorative border; the denomination ran across the top, with the left margin reading "Batch [character]." The right margin read "[Character], size large/small." Beyond the batch number seal script warned, "Forgers of exchange notes face execution; informants receive three hundred strings." Below the batch line: "Central Capital Exchange Note Treasury, per Revenue Ministry authorization, per Council directive, Revenue re-audit, clerk signature." It also stated: "By imperial order circuit notes are printed; specified treasuries exchange coin for notes and notes for coin, circulating like ready cash for public and private use." Notes had no expiry; faded text or worn paper could be exchanged at the responsible treasury. Cashing out or swapping for new notes incurred a per-string labor and ink fee. Treasury clerks, collectors, deputies, and commissioners each signed with the date. Note Printing Treasury staff signed in turn, up to Revenue Ministry officials in the Secretariat. Where cash disbursement required combined seals, officials co-signed together; all other seal usage followed standing procedure.
6
{}
Under early Dading rules the people might keep copper and brass wares; voluntary sale to the state paid two hundred cash per jin. Private hoarders of banned metalware who came forward first received one hundred cash per jin, or one hundred fifty for loose copper; amounts under one jin were paid by weight. Transport deputies were to verify prices for state-made copperware in the capital and provinces: mirrors at 314 cash per jin; gilded Imperial Immortal Flower belts at 17,671 strings; Five Sons Lychee belts at 17,971; embossed cinctures at 8,560; fish pouches at 2,309; cymbals and bells at 1,902 per jin; bronze bell-stands at 2,769; brass bell-stands at 3,646. In Mingchang 2 (1191), tenth month, mirror prices were cut to deter illicit minting and coin-smelting. Corvée miners had long crossed north of the Tianshan for copper. In Mingchang 3 (1192) Censor Li Bing warned: "Official stores can last a decade—annual border expeditions waste money and risk frontier friction. Only when supplies ran low should mining be limited to within the border. The emperor agreed and banned cross-border mining.
7
西
In the fifth month the Secretariat was ordered to cap note circulation so it would not exceed hard cash. In the fourth year he told his ministers to repurpose idle state goods, citing iron cash as an example. When an official proposed redeeming damaged iron cash with copper, Xu Chiguo demurred. The emperor replied: "Paying replacements they may still break; refuse payment and none will survive! If iron cash is truly worthless, find another use for it. Xu Chiguo explained: "Jiangnan uses copper while the north and Huainan use iron expressly to keep copper from crossing regional lines. Shaanxi also trades in silver, cloth, ginger, and hemp—existing iron cash should be stockpiled for emergencies." Officials were told to inventory iron cash and other idle goods for storage.
8
西使 使
In the eighth month the Judicial Commission reported that Shaanxi notes outnumbered cash, stifling trade. Ministers relayed the complaint; Shaanxi excise and miscellaneous fees were made payable in notes. Salaries could be half cash, silk, silver, and notes; shortages of coin and silver were met fully in paper. In the third month of the fifth year ministers blamed scarce cash on hoarding by officials and rich households. Tang Yuanhe law had executed families hoarding over 5,000 strings, punished great clans with confiscation, and paid informants one-fifth of the seizure. The emperor drafted limits by rank and wealth: officials and commoners might keep up to 20,000 strings; chiefs and company officers up to 10,000; surplus had to be invested in goods. Informants on illegal hoarding won slaves their freedom, freed hired workers, took one-tenth of the hoard as reward, and forfeited the rest. Envoys returning from Goryeo were required to sell any copperware they had acquired.
9
便 西
Chengan 2 (1197), tenth month: ministers noted that renewing old notes had cost fifteen cash per string in labor and ink fees. Since Dading 23 (1183) the fee had been a flat eight cash per note, helping neither treasury nor circulation—they urged a return to the old rule. They also proposed valuing each note string at 1.05 strings when buying salt certificates to boost sales. The emperor set the renewal fee at twelve cash per string. Salt-certificate purchases would credit each string at 1.1 strings. With heavy note issuance making large denominations unwieldy, the Northwest capitals and Liaodong were allowed to issue small notes redeemable at treasuries for use nationwide.
10
That December the Secretariat noted that salary silver came in fifty-tael ingots worth 100 strings—often chipped by traders. They recoined Chengan Treasure silver in five denominations from one to ten taels, two strings per tael, usable like cash, with penalties for illicit smelting or hoarding.
11
使 西便 綿 便 綿便 西便 便 調
Chengan 3 (1198), first month: the ministry warned that letting cash cross border markets was tantamount to export smelting. Cash given to foreign envoys or used in cross-border trade drew five years' penal servitude, death for amounts over three jin; brokers faced the same penalties. Informants received five hundred strings upfront from the state. Escorts, guides, clerks, and others involved were punished in descending order and made to share restitution. To ease note stagnation, the western and northern capitals and Liaodong required silver notes or treasure goods for payments of one string and above; smaller sums remained at choice. Despite strict cash-hoarding limits, compliance was poor; the emperor ordered the Censorate and Judicial Commissions to enforce them. In the ninth month small notes were cashed out and hoarding limits tightened to one-third of prior quotas—princes and ranked officials kept one share, others half; surplus had to be invested within fifty days or face penalties, with cash rewards for informants. Route headquarters opened exchange offices trading silk and cloth for silver notes and accepting note payments. Salt certificates could be bought with notes and cashed at choice in Shandong, Hebei, Hedong, and allied circuits. Three hundred honorary appointments and one thousand blank ordination certificates were offered for redemption at designated route offices by the fourth month. New small notes in 100-string denominations were issued, redeemable at treasuries. Payments of one or two strings came in small notes; three-string payments split one tael silver plus one string in notes; five- and ten-string payments were 40% notes and 60% silver—or treasure goods on request—with penalties for obstruction or discounting. Chengan 4, third month: flexible note-to-cash exchange in Shandong was suspended amid silver-note stagnation. Wine-shop and other official fees—except in the capital, Henan, and Shaanxi—could be half paid in silver notes, one-quarter of which might be local-circuit notes. Notes collected locally were not reissued; notes from other circuits were recycled back into circulation. Salt certificates required half payment in treasure goods and half in notes, with silver valued at only two strings per tael. Treasuries still accepted note deposits; transport surplus above quotas followed the same rule. Official payouts mixed silver and notes; chipped silver was no longer issued from note treasuries; more treasure goods might be cast if supplies ran low. With free circulation prices would stabilize without need for coercion—penalties for hoarding silver notes were lifted. Chengan 4: at ministerial request, capital treasuries and monopoly salt offices were ordered to accept treasure goods, including supplemental salt fees. With official outlets for treasure goods, private stock would circulate rather than be melted. Four treasuries had issued small notes backed by reserves, letting people redeem them for cash on demand like hard coin. Printing would cease; once existing small notes were redeemed out, the four treasuries could close. Large-denomination notes alone would back cash disbursement. Counterfeit Chengan treasure alloyed with copper and tin drove the currency from markets until capital shops shut their doors. Chengan 5 (1200), twelfth month: ministers reported heavy note issuance to fund military deployments. Treasure goods had been coined alongside cash as a temporary substitute for note reserves—not a permanent fix. Chengan treasure was abolished.
12
''''便 殿 便
Taihe 1 (1201), sixth month: Tongzhou Prefect Lu Gou noted that while notes circulated, silver traded at 80,000 against an official 100,000 per ingot because supply outran demand. Require taxes to be paid one-third each in cash, silver, and notes. That might balance the market." Referred to ministry debate, ministers replied that wartime finance depended on notes; though oversupply had stalled them, requiring wine shops to take 70% notes was restoring circulation. Equal silver shares would cannibalize note demand and undermine paper currency. To stabilize silver, named levies such as relay-horse and military-supply fees should accept half payment in silver where available. Triple-contract notes had circulated only privately until Taihe 2 (1202), when the court required one-tenth of all taxes—even local levies—to be paid in them, acceptable nationwide. The Revenue Ministry also allowed half of accumulated relay-horse fees to be paid in these notes. Intercalary twelfth month: the emperor summoned Revenue Minister Sun Duo and Vice Minister Zhang Fuheng to discuss note policy in the inner palace. Fuheng favored triple-contract notes; Duo wanted them scrapped—and Duo prevailed. Thereafter fiscal exhaustion and erratic note policy eroded Shizong's legacy as the state leaned on paper money to the people's detriment. By Taihe 3 (1203) he asked his ministers why Dading-era coin abundance had given way to private hoarding with empty public coffers. Summon the bureaucracy—someone must know the cause." Taihe 4 (1204), seventh month: cash hoarding limits were lifted at Revenue Minister Shangguan Yu's request. That year, planning expanded minting, he ordered officials to propose ways to secure copper. Censor Meng Zhu urged punishing local officials and neighbors for coin-smelting and copper smuggling. Palace Storehouse Director Liang Yin reported minting cost ten cash for every one produced. Advisors argued the cost still netted one cash per coin and urged mining and confiscating vessels for bronze. Ministers replied minting could wait but the state would buy privately smelted copper. Temples with fewer than ten residents could not retain ritual bronze. Household brass and copper had to be surrendered within two months for official payment. Concealment brought criminal penalties; officials who failed to act on outside reports shared guilt. Temples might reward novice informants. Further minting plans would follow once copper stockpiles grew." August: a flexible remittance law let people deposit at the capital and draw cash in Shandong, Hebei, Daming, Hedong, and allied regions. Later the court issued Taihe chongbao heavy coins worth ten cash each, circulating alongside paper. Taihe 5: he nearly abolished note renewal fees but settled on six cash per string given printing costs.
13
西 西西西西 便 使 使 殿 西 便 使
Taihe 6 (1206), fourth month: Shaanxi notes failed; the state backed them with 100,000 strings cash plus 100,000 in small notes. Taihe 6, eleventh month: circuits regained authority to issue local small notes. Each circuit redeemed notes at designated treasuries: the Central Capital route at the capital and Baozhou; the Southern Capital route at Nanjing, Guide, and Henan; Shandong east at Yidu and Jinan; Shandong west at Dongping and Daming; Hebei east at Hejian and Jizhou; Hebei west at Zhending and Zhangde; southern Hedong at Pingyang; northern Hedong at Taiyuan and Fenzhou; Liaodong at the Upper Capital and Xianping; the Western Capital at Fuzhou; the Northern Capital at Linhuang. The Revenue Ministry issued five denominations of small notes for circuit-wide use with cash. Taihe 7 (1207), first month: offices could not pay out large notes; holders had to redeem them for small notes or cash; a third of wine-shop and commercial fees had to be paid in large notes—Liaodong excepted. Repeated currency changes bred market grumbling and public gatherings. He told the Censorate to reward three hundred strings for reporting groups discussing note policy in the capital. May: Minister Gao Ruli's Note System Covenant expanded printing and added a deputy commissioner to overstretched note treasuries. Gao Ruli debated currency with transport chief Sun Duo; ten officials including Meng Zhu, Qiao Yu, and Liu Ang debated for over a month without agreement. July he convened them at Taihe Hall and warned Gao Ruli not to swap note issues merely because circulation was heavy. He might add nominal weight against cash—but not replace denominations lightly." Next day an edict required notes for private trade and pawn of one string or more; cash was banned. Written contracts might value one-third of the payment in goods. West of Liupan and east of the Liao, one-fifth of transactions had to be in notes; eastern garrison colonists paid one-sixth. Informal transactions remained free to use cash or notes only in Liaodong. Violators faced two years' penal servitude, with graded rewards for informers. Supervising officials who broke the rules were beaten and stripped of office. County officials who kept notes circulating were promoted; those who failed were demoted and fined. Anyone who rallied crowds to sabotage the system was charged with violating imperial orders. Processing fees were capped at two cash per note. Merchants and travelers could carry no more than ten strings of ready cash. Authorities registered note authenticators to prevent forgery and fraud. Cash holdings for officials and households were cut below previous limits. Those with large reserves could exchange surplus cash for notes at the treasury, but amounts of ten strings or more could not be taken out of the capital. New rules tied surveillance commissioners' performance ratings to note circulation. But Hebei commissioner Xie Bu-Chu, finding a one-string note from his travel voucher impractical on inspection rounds, demanded cash instead. Censors impeached him for undermining the note system. The emperor said, "An inspector who breaks the law first cannot be forgiven. He received seventy blows, lost one rank, and was dismissed.
14
使
Revenue Minister Gao Ruli urged strict enforcement: every prefecture, district, county, and town should register note authenticators, issue them official seals, and allow them to verify notes for the public at two cash per string, capped at six cash regardless of denomination. Every court envoy was to investigate local note circulation and report back. Old Song hui notes were allowed alongside cash, but holdings of ten strings or more could not be carried on the road. Salt monopoly payments could still be in silver or silk; all other trade and salaries had to use exchange notes, with small notes covering odd amounts and notes substituted where silver or silk ran short. The emperor instructed the Secretariat that surveillance commissioners would be judged competent only if notes circulated smoothly. Violations had to be recorded on officials' service credentials, and anyone who had broken the note law could not be appointed even with a censor's recommendation. In the tenth month Yang Xu reported that worn notes had illegible serial numbers and dates. Though holders could redeem them at treasuries, remote regions had no designated offices, forcing distant subjects to travel all the way to the capital. The emperor asked Gao Ruli, who replied that every prefectural treasury had authenticating clerks who would accept worn but genuine notes. In towns far from the capital, licensed exchange houses already let travelers swap notes along the route. Where no exchange house existed, official treasuries could receive worn notes without immediate payout, stamp officials' names on the backs, and after six months send them to the capital for new notes. "That way worn notes have somewhere to go and will not pile up idle!" he said.
15
西
In November the emperor told the Revenue Ministry that even though notes were mandatory, they must report any stagnation at once and not hesitate to propose changes just because the policy was already in place. Gao Ruli replied that treasuries inside government compounds were hard for common people to reach, and even merchant exchange was hampered by thin note reserves. Recently the Hebei West transport office reported one wealthy man who admitted to holding 140,000 strings of cash beyond the retention limit. Other regions surely had similar hoards. He proposed that counties post officials and treasurers at busy market sites to run exchange offices. Confiscated or surrendered cash would fund note reserves—30,000 strings for prefectures over 100,000 households, scaled down for smaller ones—and no one could exchange more than two strings at a time. Processing fees would pay the treasurers' wages, with a deputy prefect and a transport official supervising each office. The emperor approved and ordered treasuries moved to market crossroads so people could exchange notes for cash.
16
That month rewards for capturing counterfeiters were paid in exchange notes.
17
便 西
Debating further reforms, the emperor adopted Gao Ruli's plan to stop paying out large-denomination notes from government treasuries. Holders of five- and ten-string notes could redeem them for small notes at treasuries, or take partial cash—one string from a five-string note, two from a ten-string note—except in Liaodong, where rules were relaxed. In Henan, Shaanxi, Shandong, and other note-issuing circuits, a third of wine-shop and commercial taxes had to be paid in notes—one part in ten-string notes and two parts in five-string notes—with the rest in cash.
18
Taihe 8, first month: stagnation in the capital prompted standardized rewards and penalties for responsible offices. New rules tied promotions for surveillance commissioners and local officials to how well notes circulated. Capital surveillance censors and Daxing patrol officials were subjected to the same note-circulation incentives as their provincial counterparts.
19
That month large notes were withdrawn and small notes put into circulation.
20
便
In August, on Yang Yunyi's advice, Xianping and Tokyo routes—major merchant hubs—followed southern capital rules requiring notes for any transaction of one string or more. In October Sun Duo argued that with notes abundant, the state should absorb them—accepting notes for all commercial taxes and for summer and autumn levies beyond grain payments, regardless of denomination. Once farmers understood this, they would begin to value notes and circulation would improve. County coercion forcing shops to buy notes had only caused trouble; he urged abolishing local note bureaus and limiting exchange to provincial treasuries. Route-specific small notes were inconvenient; he proposed making them valid everywhere. The emperor ordered these measures implemented at once.
21
滿
In December ministers reported that salaries were paid in notes, with up to 30% in cash for soldiers and 20% for officials and attendants, capped at ten strings. Collected large notes would be reissued once circulation recovered, and future printings had to be refined for durability. They asked that worn notes be redeemable for new ones at local treasuries. Officials or powerful families who bought notes cheaply and resold them for cash at wine shops would be charged with violating imperial orders. Inspectors would tour the routes again. Though servants could report hidden cash hoards, surveillance commissions were empowered to investigate masters who silenced them. They proposed extending the conversion deadline by fifty days so people could again exchange notes and goods. After these reforms Zhangzong died and Weishao succeeded. At the Da'an 3 Battle of Hui River the state paid military bonuses in eighty-four cartloads of notes; defeat left the dynasty too battered to fix monetary abuses, and notes sank so far they could barely buy anything. In Zhenyou 2 (1214), second month, Xuanzong tried to restore value by issuing new notes from twenty to one hundred strings, and even two hundred to one thousand strings. Since Taihe every note reform had briefly strengthened currency only to see it depreciate within years; now each new issue made circulation worse. After the court moved south, a shrinking state, exhausted people, endless warfare, and limitless spending drove notes to new depths of debasement.
22
使 貿
In the fourth month of year three, Hedong commissioner Xu Ding wrote, "Prices are high because notes stagnate: the state pays them out but does not take them back in. Commercial taxes had been raised several times, but payment came in worthless ten-string notes—what good did that do? Ten-string notes piled up in private hands with nowhere to go, so markets ran on cash while each string of notes traded for a single coin—less than the printing fee. He proposed temporarily banning cash and levying supplies in the name of military needs according to ability—thus restoring circulation and stabilizing prices." Cash fell out of use. Wealthy families chafed at hoarding limits while repeated note changes eroded their fortunes—a ruin known as "sitting transformation," watching wealth evaporate in place. Merchants shipped goods to the Yangtze-Huai region, draining coin into Song territory. The Song welcomed the influx while the Jin did nothing. Observers lamented that the dynasty could neither restore worthless paper nor keep the coin that had circulated for millennia.
23
西使便
In May acting Xi'an commissioner Wulinda Yu argued that Guan-Shaan's large garrison could not afford to haul notes from the capital and asked permission to print locally. He also proposed stringing Huai Prefecture's hoard of obsolete iron cash into armor for soldiers. Minor penalties had been commuted in iron at uneven rates, so the court standardized copper fines and compensation by silver value.
24
便 ''使 便
In June the court ordered a review of note policy. In July notes were renamed "Zhenyou Precious Certificates" and penalties were set for obstructing their use. In September the Censorate observed that since the crises began the state had relied on notes for military supply, but when outflow exceeded intake their value inevitably fell with no way to stop it. The new Zhenyou Precious Certificates were meant to fix the problem, but fearing overissue would debase them like the old notes, the court forced all trade to follow official price appraisals with harsh penalties—merchants stopped traveling and goods ceased to flow in. With a million mouths to feed in the capital, how could prices not rise by the day? Official prices were reset twice a month while market prices shifted daily; forced compliance had shut the shops entirely. Plans to seize hidden stock and sell it at official prices would empty the capital within days and crush the people further. They argued that official price controls should apply only to government purchases and compensation cases, leaving ordinary trade free. The emperor approved.
25
西 便
In December the emperor learned that nearby counties were buying grain in the capital, driving prices skyward, and ordered the Secretariat, Revenue Ministry, deliberation office, Kaifeng prefecture, and transport commission to find a remedy. Revenue and the deliberation office proposed blocking half the grain purchases of anyone exporting five dou from the city; the transport office wanted a total ban. The emperor sided with Kaifeng prefecture, noting that when precious certificates first appeared the people had valued them highly. But heavy disbursements in Hebei, Shaanxi, and other circuits had since made people treat them lightly. Merchants rushed notes into the capital to buy gold and silver, driving up silver prices and grain along with them. If each circuit issued certificates under separate rules, they could not circulate back into Henan—where silver would cheapen and grain prices would fall. Sealing the capital's grain supply would make the provinces hoard their own and stop shipping to the capital, making grain even costlier. County folk should be warned against price gouging while the government set fair rules for everyone's convenience."
26
調 使
In the first month of year four, censor Tian Jiongxiu argued that although state finances depended on precious certificates, they had stagnated again within months—not from lax enforcement. Currency circulates only when issuance and recall are balanced with deliberate technique. The problem was too much paid out and too little taken back in. Cut spending and increase collections as conditions required, and the system might recover. He offered five reforms: trim redundant officials, cut wine-tax offices, reduce military pay, abolish supernumerary posts, and require precious certificates for wine taxes and grain payments for purchased office. The court kept wine taxes on the old Dading basis and rejected the rest. Official rewards for catching counterfeiters of precious certificates were soon revised.
27
便
In March Hanlin lecturer Zhao Bingwen said recent stagnation stemmed from rumors of impending reform; panic hoarding had nearly killed the notes, handing market power to private traders. Since the move to Bian the state exchange office had been abolished; he urged restoring it under market-savvy officials who would trade silver, notes, grain, and cloth at adjusted prices. Capable supervisors should run it; after six months without fault, with notes circulating smoothly, they could be appointed wherever they chose. The court ordered the proposal studied and carried out.
28
西 西
In April Hedong branch secretary Xu Ding warned that notes mattered only in circulation, yet provincial minting could not keep pace with payouts and nothing was being done to recall them. He urged levies scaled to local capacity to support the army. The Hezhong military commission likewise cited overissue and public distrust, asking for levies graded by wealth. Even in Shaanxi, a uniform levy would simply funnel its resources into Hedong—no different from collecting nothing at all. Hebei certificates also stagnated because they were barred from Henan. Ministers replied that Hebei certificates had once flooded south with merchants, spiking prices, so route limits had been a temporary fix. Since Xu Ding's route faced heavy expenses and sought military levies, his request should be granted. Whether Shaanxi should be levied was left for the branch secretariat to decide. In May the emperor learned that much official cash in Hebei had leaked into private hands and ordered the Secretariat to recover it.
29
使西 '' 使使 使便使
In August Grand Councilor Gao Qi reported that since the wars began the state had lived on precious certificates, but outflow exceeded intake until a thousand-cash note traded for pennies; printing costs rose daily and the abuse would worsen without reform. He proposed new notes to circulate alongside old ones as parent and child denominations, saving printing costs while keeping supply adequate. Prince of Pu Shou Chun and others resisted further change, noting that armies had always been funded by the people; when small notes collapsed the court had swapped in precious certificates and banned cash. Ordinary people, thinking paper fragile and coin durable, hoarded cash and spent certificates as fast as possible for fear they would tear and become worthless. The court kept paying out without taking notes back in, so cash grew dearer and certificates cheaper by the day. The notes were not undervalued because the people despised them—the state itself had made them worthless. Better to calibrate disbursements and levy notes back from the people in a circular flow, so they would see them as essential currency and treat them with respect. To panic over devaluation and rush to remint would undermine public trust and likely leave the new notes as worthless as the old. Soon afterward Long Prefecture Defense Commissioner Wanyan Yu and Shaanxi Branch Secretariat clerk Hui Ji also weighed in on the failings of the note system. Yu urged a halt to new printing and circulation of existing stock, with levies based on household size and wealth if notes piled up unused. Ji argued that notes were only a stopgap: they could not circulate like hard coin, and forcing them to would mean collecting far more than was paid out. Heavy collection harmed the populace while meager disbursement left the treasury short—neither course was workable. For the present crisis he proposed reminting notes called "Zhenyou Tongbao" in ten denominations from one hundred to three thousand cash, printed by circuit transport offices up to five thousand strings each, to circulate alongside the old notes. The emperor ordered a full court debate on the matter. Revenue Vice Minister Outun Ahu, Rites Vice Minister Yang Yunyi, Bureau Director Lanzhi, and Justice Vice Minister Feng E all favored reminting. Revenue Vice Minister Gao Kui, Vice Director Zhang Shilu, and War Vice Minister Tushan Oulibai argued for a levy instead. Only Revenue Minister Xiao Gong wanted to keep the existing system; Works Minister Li Yuanfu thought both reminting and levies could proceed together. Junior Tutor to the Heir Zhang Xingxin also opposed reminting, arguing that stiff penalties for refusing to accept notes would be enough. Attending Censor Zhao Bocheng said reminting covertly stripped the people of their assets and was worse than a direct levy. A levy was tolerable only if it fell on merchants rather than farmers—it would at least serve the policy of favoring agriculture over trade. Justice Clerk Wang Shouning countered that farmers were the ones hoarding cash and shunning notes, so any collection would inevitably fall on them first. Transport Commissioner Wang Kuo urged addressing root causes: this year over forty thousand shi of grain had been paid to dependents of garrison troops; if those men were settled locally and the people's burdens eased, a levy would be far easier to enforce. Monopoly Bureau officer Yang Zhen called for cutting wasteful spending and abolishing redundant posts. Others proposed casting hundred-cash coins or issuing smaller notes to cut printing costs. Still others argued that local magistrates simply needed to be better chosen. Personnel Minister Wanyan Sijing alone submitted a memorial arguing that the laws were adequate but officials simply failed to enforce them. If granted discretionary authority to flog fourth-rank officials and below in the provinces, report third-rank offenses to the throne, and deploy two censors on relay courier duty, he could enforce existing law without reminting or levies—one order and all would comply. If refused, he asked to be punished severely. The emperor showed this to his chief ministers and asked whether they should give Sijing the assignment he demanded. The chief ministers could not decide. Censor Chen Gui and Wanyan Sulan objected that even sages struggled with impracticable schemes and accused Sijing of wanting to harm the people. After more than a month of fruitless debate the emperor tired of the wrangling and ordered that existing policy continue, only postponing the levy schedule. Before long the court adopted Hui Ji's proposal and issued the "Zhenyou Tongbao" notes. In the second month of Xingding 1 (1217) the new notes were formally issued, each one-string note redeemable for one thousand old strings, with heavier penalties for counterfeiting or obstructing circulation and rewards for informants.
30
調
In May, as repeated note reforms had exhausted mulberry-bark scrap paper requisitioned from the people, the court ordered a cash levy called "mulberry-bark recycled-paper money" payable in precious certificates or tongbao at assessed prices. Officials claimed this would spare the people transport duties and save the state material costs. Gao Ruli protested that Henan's levies and requisitions had already tripled old rates and barely kept the state afloat. Then in May the central ministries had collected seventy million strings in mulberry-bark notes from the populace because tongbao receipts fell short—a step too far. When tongbao circulation slowed, they doubled the levy again. Two-thirds of Henan households were farmers still struggling to pay this year's taxes; if they did not sell grain to meet rent they would have to sell their food stores—how else could they comply? Fodder and grain, drawn from a finite peasant surplus, were what the state urgently needed and could not easily find. Paper notes, which the state could issue at will, were the flexible instrument. How could the court shift onto the people burdens it ought to bear itself? When large notes stalled the court had switched to small notes, then precious certificates, then tongbao—monetary reform was the state's prerogative, so why keep burdening the people? The people already gave all they had for the army and still fell short; now levies taxed their persons, lands, goods, and very livelihood—if stripped so bare they could only flee. Flight would leave fields fallow and armies hungry, ruining both military supply and the note system. I am not indifferent to monetary policy nor deliberately opposing the central ministries. Stagnant notes and rising prices were lesser evils than mass flight and army starvation. The court did not act on his advice.
31
調
In the tenth month of year three provincial officials reported that because goods were dear and cash cheap, valuing bribes in coin had made punishments absurd: thirty strings of tongbao carried the death penalty under military requisition law, yet at silver rates that was worth only about four hundred cash—barely warranting a beating. The disparity between penalties was outrageous. The court ordered that bribery be assessed at prevailing silver rates. In March of year four Vice Grand Councilor Li Fuheng noted that while bribes in tongbao were now converted to silver at two thousand cash per tael, offenders who could commute punishment still paid in paper instead of silver; he asked that they pay silver too, both to deter crime and replenish the treasury. After consultation the court ruled that petty official errors could be redeemed in tongbao cash, but deliberate corruption required silver payment.
32
使 調
In December Zhennan Army military commissioner Wanyan Sijing wrote that money, like a spring, must flow freely: hoarded in treasuries it oppressed the people, scattered unchecked it left the state short; only when quantity and value matched goods could it function. Under Emperor Shizong coin had been plentiful and notes scarce, so cash held its value and circulated easily. Since the wars began official and private coin had dwindled while army logistics depended entirely on notes poured out by the ten thousands daily until markets overflowed—is it any wonder they collapsed in value? Better to end the cash monopoly, let people mine copper and cast coin to government specifications, and ban substandard coin; supply would grow, note printing could shrink, and notes would regain value. Today ever more notes drove ever greater devaluation; officials seeking to restore their value even taxed officials' salaries and assessed household wealth, yet failed because they ignored the root problem—too little coin. He proposed private coinage with silver accepted in lieu of note levies, new "Xingding Yuanbao" coin in several denominations at fixed values for military pay—another stopgap reform. The court rejected the proposal.
33
'' '' 使
In the intercalary twelfth month of year five the chief ministers reported that the "Zhenyou Tongbao" issued five years earlier to replace failed precious certificates had now deteriorated to the same degree. Tongbao had initially traded at four strings per tael of silver; by now it took over eight hundred. They proposed new "Xingding Baoquan" notes in parent and child denominations to circulate alongside tongbao, each new string worth four hundred tongbao or half a tael of silver, with exchange treasuries where people could swap old notes. Magistrates who kept notes circulating would be promoted; those whose lax enforcement let them stagnate would be demoted and beaten. Prefecture officials would be judged by their counties' performance; censors and circuit inspectors would patrol and punish obstruction or failure to report violations; organizing resistance carried two years' penal servitude; informants received three hundred strings. The new system took effect in the second month of Yuanguang 1 (1222). In May of Yuanguang 2 the exchange rate was revised to fifty tongbao per new string; silk-printed "Yuanguang Zhenhuo" notes were also issued alongside silver and older notes. Before long silver rose daily while Baoquan fell, and the market priced everything in silver alone. By Yuanguang 2 Baoquan was nearly worthless, so the court capped exchange at three hundred Baoquan per tael of silver, banned silver for purchases under three taels, and required larger transactions to split one-third silver and two-thirds Baoquan or other notes. Exchange offices were established in the capital and prefectures to swap Baoquan and silver, with graded penalties for private dealing and rewards for informants. Markets shut during daylight and commerce halted, so the court repealed the restrictions on silver use and private exchange. On paper use of paper money was restricted, but in practice no one obeyed and officials could not enforce the rules. Under Emperor Yizong during the Zhengda reign the public traded only in silver. In the tenth month of Tianxing 2 (1233) the court at Caizhou printed "Tianxing Baohui" notes from one to four qian in four denominations to circulate like silver; within months the dynasty fell.
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