1
錢幣。 金初用遼、宋舊錢,天會末,雖劉豫「阜昌元寶」、「阜昌重寶」亦用之。 海陵庶人貞元二年遷都之後,戶部尚書蔡松年複鈔引法,遂制交鈔,與錢並用。 正隆二年,曆四十餘歲,始議鼓鑄。 冬十月,初禁銅越外界,懸罪賞格。 括民間銅鍮器,陝西、南京者輸京兆,他路悉輸中都。 三年二月,中都置錢監二,東曰寶源,西曰寶豐。 京兆置監一。 曰利用。 三監鑄錢,文曰「正隆通寶」,輕重如宋小平錢,而肉好字文峻整過之,與舊錢通用。
Money and currency. In the early Jin period the state used old Liao and Song coinage; by the end of the Tianhui reign even Liu Yu's Fuchang yuanbao and Fuchang chongbao were accepted. After Prince Hailing relocated the capital in Zhenyuan 2 (1154), Revenue Minister Cai Songnian revived the note-circulation system, and exchange notes were issued to circulate together with cash. In Zhenglong 2 (1157), more than forty years after the founding of the dynasty, the court first debated instituting official coinage. In the tenth month of that winter the state first barred the export of copper beyond the frontier and posted statutory penalties and rewards. Household bronze and brass ware was seized: items from Shaanxi and Nanjing circuits went to Jingzhao, while every other circuit sent its haul to the Central Capital. In the second month of year three (1158) two mints were set up at the Central Capital, Baoyuan in the east and Baofeng in the west. A single mint was also established at Jingzhao. It was named Liyong. All three mints cast Zhenglong Tongbao cash, matching the Song small-denomination standard in weight but with sharper rims, square holes, and lettering; the new pieces circulated alongside older coin.
2
世宗大定元年,用吏部尚書張中彥言,命陝西路參用宋舊鐵錢。 四年,浸不行,詔陝西行戶部、並兩路通檢官,詳究其事。 皆言:「民間用錢,名與鐵錢兼用,其實不為准數,公私不便。」 遂罷之。 八年,民有犯銅禁者,上曰:「銷錢作銅,舊有禁令。 然民間猶有鑄鏡者,非銷錢而何?」 遂並禁之。 十年,上諭戶部臣曰:「官錢積而不散,則民間錢重,貿易必艱,宜令市金銀及諸物。 其諸路酤榷之貨,亦令以物平折輸之。」 十月,上責戶部官曰:「先以官錢率多,恐民間不得流通,令諸處貿易金銀絲帛,以圖流轉。 今知乃有以抑配反害百姓者。 前許院務得折納輕齎之物以便民,是皆朕思而後行者也,此尚出朕,安用若為。 又隨處時有賑濟,往往近地無糧,取於它處,往返既遠,人愈難之。 何為不隨處起倉。 年豐則多糴以備賑贍,設有緩急,亦豈不易辦乎? 而徒使錢充府庫,將安用之。 天下之大,朕豈能一一遍知,凡此數事,汝等何為而使至此。 且戶部與它部不同,當從宜為計,若但務因循,以守其職,則戶部官誰不能為。」 十一年二月,禁私鑄銅鏡。 舊有銅器悉送官,給其直之半。 惟神佛像、鐘、磬、鈸、鈷、腰束帶、魚袋之屬,則存之。 十二年正月,以銅少,命尚書省遣使諸路規措銅貨。 能指坑冶得實者,賞。 上與宰臣議鼓鑄之術,宰臣曰:「有言所在有金銀坑冶,皆可采以鑄錢,臣竊謂工費過於所得數倍,恐不可行。」 上曰:「金銀,山澤之利,當以與民,惟錢不當私鑄。 今國家財用豐盈,若流布四方與在官何異? 所費雖多,但在民間,而新錢日增爾。 其遣能吏經營之。」 左丞石琚進曰:「臣聞天子之富藏在天下,錢貨如泉,正欲流通。」 上複問琚曰:「古亦有民自鑄錢者乎?」 琚對曰:「民若自鑄,則小人圖利,錢益薄惡,此古所以禁也。」 十三年,命非屯兵之州府,以錢市易金帛,運致京師,使錢幣流通,以濟民用。 十五年十一月,上謂宰臣曰:「或言鑄錢無益,所得不償所費。 朕謂不然。 天下如一家,何公私之間,公家之費私家得之,但新幣日增,公私俱便也。」 十六年三月,遣使分路訪察銅礦苗脈。 十八年,代州立監鑄錢,命震武軍節度使李天吉、知保德軍事高季孫往監之,而所鑄斑駁黑澀不可用,詔削天吉、季孫等官兩階,解職,仍杖季孫八十。 更命工部郎中張大節、吏部員外郎麻珪監鑄。 其錢文曰「大定通寶」,字文肉好又勝正隆之制,世傳其錢料微用銀雲。 十九年,始鑄至萬六千餘貫。 二十年,詔先以五千進呈,而後命與舊錢並用。
In Dading 1 (1161), at Minister of Personnel Zhang Zhongyan's recommendation, Emperor Shizong ordered the Shaanxi Circuit to accept Song iron cash alongside other currency. By the fourth year the policy had largely lapsed; the throne ordered the Shaanxi revenue office and the circuit inspection commissioners on both routes to investigate. They all reported that although cash and iron coin were supposed to circulate together, in practice no reliable standard held and both government and populace found the arrangement unworkable. The measure was therefore withdrawn. In the eighth year, after subjects breached the copper ban, the emperor remarked, "Turning coin into copper wares has been forbidden for generations. Yet people still cast bronze mirrors—where else would the metal come from if not melted coin?" He therefore banned mirror-casting as well. In the tenth year he told revenue officials, "When the treasury hoards coin, private cash grows scarce and commerce stalls—buy gold, silver, and other commodities to draw money back into circulation. Monopoly goods on the circuits were likewise to be collected in kind at fair assessed values." In the tenth month he rebuked them: "We had ordered markets to trade gold, silver, and silk because the treasury held too much coin and private circulation was stifled. Now we find that forced quotas have ended up harming the people instead. I myself authorized the palace workshops to accept portable goods in lieu of cash to ease burdens on the people—policies I devised before issuing—and you still botch them. What need is there for officials like you? Relief is handed out everywhere, yet nearby districts often lack grain and must draw supplies from afar; the long haul only adds to popular hardship. Why not build granaries locally in every region? In good harvest years you could buy extra grain for relief stores, so that when crisis comes supplies would be close at hand. Instead you merely let coin pile up in the treasury—what good does that do? The empire is vast and I cannot know every detail myself—how did you officials let these several abuses reach this point? The Revenue Ministry is not like other departments—it must adapt policy to circumstances. Anyone can hold the post if all you do is cling to precedent." In the second month of the eleventh year private mirror-casting was banned. Householders had to surrender existing copper ware to the state, receiving half its appraised value in return. Only religious images, temple bells and chimes, cymbals, ritual implements, official belt fittings, and fish pouches were exempted. In the first month of the twelfth year, with copper in short supply, the Secretariat sent envoys to every circuit to procure metal. Informants who located workable mines and smelters received rewards. Discussing minting policy with his ministers, they replied, "Some propose mining every gold and silver deposit to cast coin, but labor costs would exceed output several times over—we doubt it is feasible." The emperor answered, "Gold and silver are natural resources that should benefit the people; only coin must never be privately cast. The treasury is flush today—if wealth spreads through the realm, how is that different from hoarding it in government coffers? Costs may be high, yet the money stays among the people and fresh coinage grows day by day. Send capable administrators to oversee the work." Left Vice Censor Shi Jue added, "A ruler's wealth lies with the people; currency should flow like a spring—that is the whole purpose." The emperor asked again, "Did commoners ever cast their own coin in antiquity?" Jue answered, "If subjects minted their own coin, schemers would debased it for profit—that is why antiquity banned private casting." In the thirteenth year non-garrison prefectures were told to buy silk and cloth with coin and ship the goods to the capital, keeping currency moving to meet popular needs. In the eleventh month of the fifteenth year he told his ministers, "Some claim minting is pointless because costs exceed returns. I disagree. The empire is one household—why split public and private? Treasury spending becomes popular income as new coin multiplies, benefiting state and people alike." In the third month of the sixteenth year envoys were sent on each circuit to survey copper veins. In the eighteenth year Daizhou gained a mint supervised by Li Tianji of Zhenwu command and Gao Jisun of Baode command, but their coin came out blotchy, dark, and unusable; both men were demoted two ranks and dismissed, and Jisun was flogged eighty strokes. Zhang Dajie of the Works Bureau and Ma Gui of the Personnel Bureau were reassigned to oversee minting. The new cash bore the legend Dading Tongbao, with sharper characters and rims than the Zhenglong issue; tradition holds that the alloy contained a trace of silver. By the nineteenth year output reached just over sixteen thousand strings of cash. In the twentieth year five thousand strings were presented for inspection before the court authorized circulation alongside older coin.
3
初,新錢之未行也,以宋大觀錢作當五用之。 二月,上聞上京修內所,市民物不即與直,又用短錢,責宰臣曰:「如此小事,朕豈能悉知? 卿等何為不察也。」 時民間以八十為陌,謂之短錢,官用足陌,謂之長錢。 大名男子斡魯補者上言,謂官私所用錢皆當以八十為陌,遂為定制。 二十年十一月,名代州監曰阜通,設監一員,正五品,以州節度兼領。 副監一員,正六品,以州同知兼領。 丞一員,正七品,以觀察判官兼領。 設勾當官二員,從八品。 給銀牌,命副監及丞更馳驛經理。 二十二年十月,以參加政事粘割斡特剌提控代州阜通監。 二十三年,上以阜通監鼓鑄歲久,而錢不加多,蓋以代州長貳廳幕兼領,而奪於州務,不得專意綜理故也。 遂設副監、監丞為正員,而以節度領監事。 二十六年,上曰:「中外皆言錢難,朕嘗計之,京師積錢五百萬貫亦不為多,外路雖有終亦無用,諸路官錢非屯兵處可盡運至京師。」 太慰丞相克甯曰:「民間錢固已艱得,若盡歸京師,民益艱得矣! 不若起其半至都,餘半變折輕齎,則中外皆便。」 十一月,上諭宰臣曰:「國家銅禁久矣,尚聞民私造腰帶及鏡,托為舊物,公然市之,宜加禁約。」 二十七年二月,曲陽縣鑄錢別為一監,以利通為名,設副監、監丞,給驛更出經營銅事。 二十八年,上謂宰臣曰:「今者外路見錢其數甚多,聞有六千餘萬貫,皆在僻處積貯。 既不流散,公私無益,與無等爾。 今中都歲費三百萬貫,支用不繼,若致之京師,不過少有挽運之費,縱所費多,亦惟散在民爾。」 章宗大定二十九年十二月,雁門、五台民劉完等訴:「自立監鑄錢以來,有銅礦之地雖曰官運,其顧直不足則令民共償。 乞與本州司縣均為差配。」 遂命甄官署丞丁用楫往審其利病,還言:「所運銅礦,民以物力科差濟之,非所願也。 其顧直即低,又有刻剝之弊。 而相視苗脈工匠,妄指人之垣屋及寺觀謂當開採,因以取賄。 又隨冶夫匠,日辦淨銅四兩,多不及數,複銷銅器及舊錢,送官以足之。 今阜通,利通兩監,歲鑄錢十四萬餘貫,而歲所費乃至八十餘萬貫,病民而多費,未見其利便也。」 宰臣以聞,遂罷代州、曲陽二監。
Before the new coin circulated, Song Daguan pieces were accepted at a five-for-one valuation. In the second month he learned that Shangjing palace workshops haggled over market purchases and paid in short strings; he scolded his ministers, "How can I know every petty abuse myself? Why were you not watching for this?" Private trade counted only eighty cash per string—"short money"—while official accounts used full hundreds, called "long money." A Daming commoner named Wolu Bu petitioned that government and private accounts alike should adopt the eighty-cash string, and the rule became permanent law. In the eleventh month of the twentieth year the Daizhou mint was renamed Futong, with a rank-5a superintendent post held concurrently by the circuit commissioner. A rank-6a vice superintendent was added, filled by the prefectural vice commissioner. A rank-7a assistant post went to the circuit surveillance judge. Two rank-8b handling clerks were also appointed. They received silver courier tallies and rotated duty traveling the post roads to manage operations. In the tenth month of the twenty-second year Participating Administrator Nianzha Gwatela was placed in charge of the Daizhou Futong mint. In the twenty-third year he noted that despite years of operation Futong output had not grown, because prefectural leaders and staff held the posts concurrently and were distracted by routine administration. Vice superintendent and assistant became full-time posts, with the military commissioner retaining nominal oversight. In the twenty-sixth year he remarked, "Everyone complains of scarce cash, yet five million strings in the capital is not excessive; coin hoarded on distant circuits does no good—treasury cash from non-garrison districts should all be shipped to the capital." Grand Preceptor Kening objected, "Cash is already scarce among the people—draining the provinces would only make matters worse! Better to move half to the capital and convert the rest into portable goods, benefiting court and countryside alike." In the eleventh month he told his ministers, "Despite the long-standing copper ban, people still forge belts and mirrors, disguise them as antiques, and sell them openly—tighten enforcement." In the second month of the twenty-seventh year Quyang County gained its own Litong mint with full-time deputies who rotated along the post roads to procure copper. In the twenty-eighth year he told his ministers, "Cash on the circuits is enormous—some sixty million strings sit idle in remote storehouses. Because it never circulates, it helps neither state nor people—it might as well not exist. The Central Capital spends three million strings a year and still runs short; shipping the hoard here would cost little in transport, and even heavy expense would only spread wealth among the populace. In the twelfth month of Dading 29 (1189) Liu Wan and others of Yanmen and Wutai petitioned Emperor Zhangzong: "Since the mints opened, districts with copper mines must cover shortfalls in official transport wages. We ask that levies be shared equally among prefectural and county offices." Selection Office aide Ding Yongji was dispatched to investigate and reported that households supplied transport through corvée assessments against their property, not voluntarily. Official wages were low to begin with, and officials extorted more on top. Survey crews falsely marked private walls and monasteries for mining and took bribes. Smelters owed four ounces of refined copper daily, often fell short, and melted household ware and old coin to meet quotas. Futong and Litong together mint about 140,000 strings a year while costing over 800,000—burdening the people without clear benefit. The ministers relayed the findings and the Daizhou and Quyang mints were abolished.
4
初,貞元間既行鈔引法,遂設印造鈔引庫及交鈔庫,皆設使、副、判各一員,都監二員,而交鈔庫副則專主書押、搭印合同之事。 印一貫、二貫、三貫、五貫、十貫五等,謂之大鈔; 一百、二百、三百、五百、七百五等,謂之小鈔。 與錢並行,以七年為限,納舊易新。 猶循宋張詠四川交子之法而紓其期爾,蓋亦以銅少,權制之法也。 時有欲罷之者,至是二監既罷,有司言:「交鈔舊同見錢,商旅利於致遠,往往以錢買鈔,蓋公私俱便之事,豈可罷去! 止因有厘革年限,不能無疑,乞削七年厘革之法,令民得常用。 若歲久字文磨滅,許於所在官庫納舊換新,或聽便支錢。」 遂罷七年厘革之限,交鈔字昏方換。 法自此始,而收斂無術,出多入少,民浸輕之。 厥後其法屢更,而不能革,弊亦始於此焉。
When the Zhenyuan note system began, the court created the Note Printing Treasury and Exchange Note Treasury, each headed by a commissioner, deputy, and reviewer plus two inspectors; the exchange deputy handled countersignatures and seal contracts. Large notes were printed in denominations of one, two, three, five, and ten strings; small notes came in five grades of one hundred, two hundred, three hundred, five hundred, and seven hundred cash. They circulated with coin on a seven-year cycle of exchange for new notes. The system followed Song Zhang Yong's Sichuan jiaozi model with a longer redemption period—a stopgap born of copper scarcity. Some had wanted to abolish notes altogether; after the mints closed officials argued that notes equaled ready cash, eased long-distance trade, and benefited everyone— they must not be scrapped. Only the seven-year renewal cycle breeds distrust; abolish it so people can rely on notes indefinitely. Worn notes may be exchanged at local treasuries or cashed out on demand. The seven-year renewal rule was dropped; notes were replaced only when the text faded. From this reform onward the state lacked recall discipline, issued more than it redeemed, and popular confidence eroded. Later statutes changed repeatedly without fixing the problem; the chronic abuses trace to this decision.
5
交鈔之制,外為闌,作花紋,其上衡書貫例,左曰:「某字料。」 右曰:「某字型大小。」 料號外,篆書曰:「偽造交鈔者斬,告捕者賞錢三百貫。」 料號衡闌下曰:「中都交鈔庫,准尚書戶部符,承都堂劄付,戶部覆點勘,令史姓名押字。」 又曰:「聖旨印造逐路交鈔,於某處庫納錢換鈔,更許於某處庫納鈔換錢,官私同見錢流轉。」 其鈔不限年月行用,如字文故暗,鈔紙擦磨,許于所屬庫司納舊換新。 若到庫支錢,或倒換新鈔,每貫克工墨錢若干文。 庫掐、攢司、庫副、副使、使各押字,年月日。 印造鈔引庫庫子、庫司、副使各押字,上至尚書戶部官亦押字。 其搭印支錢處合同,餘用印依常例。
Exchange notes had a decorative border; the denomination ran across the top, with the left margin reading "Batch [character]." The right margin read "[Character], size large/small." Beyond the batch number seal script warned, "Forgers of exchange notes face execution; informants receive three hundred strings." Below the batch line: "Central Capital Exchange Note Treasury, per Revenue Ministry authorization, per Council directive, Revenue re-audit, clerk signature." It also stated: "By imperial order circuit notes are printed; specified treasuries exchange coin for notes and notes for coin, circulating like ready cash for public and private use." Notes had no expiry; faded text or worn paper could be exchanged at the responsible treasury. Cashing out or swapping for new notes incurred a per-string labor and ink fee. Treasury clerks, collectors, deputies, and commissioners each signed with the date. Note Printing Treasury staff signed in turn, up to Revenue Ministry officials in the Secretariat. Where cash disbursement required combined seals, officials co-signed together; all other seal usage followed standing procedure.
6
初,大定間定制,民間應許存留銅鍮器物,若申賣入官,每斤給錢二百文。 其{去廾}藏應禁器物,首納者每斤給錢百文,非器物銅貨一百五十文,不及斤者計給之。 在都官局及外路造賣銅器價,令運司佐貳檢校,鏡每斤三百十四文,鍍金禦仙花腰帶十七貫六百七十一文,五子荔支腰帶十七貫九百七十一文,抬鈒羅文束帶八貫五百六十文,魚袋二貫三百九文,鈸鈷鐃磬每斤一貫九百二文,鈴杵坐銅者二貫七百六十九文,鍮石者三貫六百四十六文。 明昌二年十月,敕減賣鏡價,防私鑄銷錢也。 舊嘗以夫匠逾天山北界外采銅,明昌三年,監察御史李炳言:「頃聞有司奏,在官銅數可支十年,若複每歲令夫匠過界遠采,不惟多費,複恐或生邊釁。 若支用將盡之日,止可於界內采煉。」 上是其言,遂不許出界。
Under early Dading rules the people might keep copper and brass wares; voluntary sale to the state paid two hundred cash per jin. Private hoarders of banned metalware who came forward first received one hundred cash per jin, or one hundred fifty for loose copper; amounts under one jin were paid by weight. Transport deputies were to verify prices for state-made copperware in the capital and provinces: mirrors at 314 cash per jin; gilded Imperial Immortal Flower belts at 17,671 strings; Five Sons Lychee belts at 17,971; embossed cinctures at 8,560; fish pouches at 2,309; cymbals and bells at 1,902 per jin; bronze bell-stands at 2,769; brass bell-stands at 3,646. In Mingchang 2 (1191), tenth month, mirror prices were cut to deter illicit minting and coin-smelting. Corvée miners had long crossed north of the Tianshan for copper. In Mingchang 3 (1192) Censor Li Bing warned: "Official stores can last a decade—annual border expeditions waste money and risk frontier friction. Only when supplies ran low should mining be limited to within the border. The emperor agreed and banned cross-border mining.
7
五月,敕尚書省曰:「民間流轉交鈔,當限其數,毋令多於見錢也。」 四年,上諭宰臣曰:「隨處有無用官物,可為計置,如鐵錢之類是也。」 或有言鐵錢有破損,當令所司以銅錢償之者,參知政事胥持國不可,上曰:「令償之尚壞,不償將盡壞矣! 若果無用,曷別為計?」 持國曰:「如江南用銅錢,江北、淮南用鐵錢,蓋以隔閡銅錢不令過界爾。 如陝西市易亦有用銀布姜麻,若舊有鐵錢,宜姑收貯,以備緩急。」 遂令有司籍鐵錢及諸無用之物,貯於庫。
In the fifth month the Secretariat was ordered to cap note circulation so it would not exceed hard cash. In the fourth year he told his ministers to repurpose idle state goods, citing iron cash as an example. When an official proposed redeeming damaged iron cash with copper, Xu Chiguo demurred. The emperor replied: "Paying replacements they may still break; refuse payment and none will survive! If iron cash is truly worthless, find another use for it. Xu Chiguo explained: "Jiangnan uses copper while the north and Huainan use iron expressly to keep copper from crossing regional lines. Shaanxi also trades in silver, cloth, ginger, and hemp—existing iron cash should be stockpiled for emergencies." Officials were told to inventory iron cash and other idle goods for storage.
8
八月,提刑司言:「所降陝西交鈔多於見錢,使民艱於流轉。」 宰臣以聞,遂令本路榷稅及諸名色錢,折交鈔。 官兵俸,許錢絹銀鈔各半之,若錢銀數少,即全給交鈔。 五年三月,宰臣奏:「民間錢所以艱得,以官豪家多積故也。 在唐元和間,嘗限富家錢過五千貫者死,王公重貶沒入,以五之一賞告者。」 上令參酌定制,令官民之家以品從物力限見錢,多不過二萬貫,猛安謀克則以牛具為差,不得過萬貫,凡有所餘,盡令易諸物收貯之。 有能告數外留錢者,奴婢免為良,傭者出離,以十之一為賞,餘皆沒入。 又諭旨有司,凡使高麗還者,所得銅器令盡買之。
In the eighth month the Judicial Commission reported that Shaanxi notes outnumbered cash, stifling trade. Ministers relayed the complaint; Shaanxi excise and miscellaneous fees were made payable in notes. Salaries could be half cash, silk, silver, and notes; shortages of coin and silver were met fully in paper. In the third month of the fifth year ministers blamed scarce cash on hoarding by officials and rich households. Tang Yuanhe law had executed families hoarding over 5,000 strings, punished great clans with confiscation, and paid informants one-fifth of the seizure. The emperor drafted limits by rank and wealth: officials and commoners might keep up to 20,000 strings; chiefs and company officers up to 10,000; surplus had to be invested in goods. Informants on illegal hoarding won slaves their freedom, freed hired workers, took one-tenth of the hoard as reward, and forfeited the rest. Envoys returning from Goryeo were required to sell any copperware they had acquired.
9
承安二年十月,宰臣奏:「舊立交鈔法,凡以舊易新者,每貫取工墨錢十五文。 至大定二十三年,不拘貫例,每張收八文,既無益於官,亦妨鈔法,宜從舊制便。 若以鈔買鹽引,每貫權作一貫五十文,庶得多售。」 上曰:「工墨錢,貫可令收十二文。 買鹽引者,每貫可權作一貫一百文。」 時交鈔所出數多,民間成貫例者艱於流轉,詔以西北二京、遼東路從宜給小鈔,且許於官庫換錢,與它路通行。
Chengan 2 (1197), tenth month: ministers noted that renewing old notes had cost fifteen cash per string in labor and ink fees. Since Dading 23 (1183) the fee had been a flat eight cash per note, helping neither treasury nor circulation—they urged a return to the old rule. They also proposed valuing each note string at 1.05 strings when buying salt certificates to boost sales. The emperor set the renewal fee at twelve cash per string. Salt-certificate purchases would credit each string at 1.1 strings. With heavy note issuance making large denominations unwieldy, the Northwest capitals and Liaodong were allowed to issue small notes redeemable at treasuries for use nationwide.
10
十二月,尚書省議,謂時所給官兵俸及邊戍軍須,皆以銀鈔相兼,舊例銀每鋌五十兩,其直百貫,民間或有截鑿之者,其價亦隨低昂,遂改鑄銀名「承安寶貨」,一兩至十兩分五等,每兩折錢二貫,公私同見錢用,仍定銷鑄及接受稽留罪賞格。
That December the Secretariat noted that salary silver came in fifty-tael ingots worth 100 strings—often chipped by traders. They recoined Chengan Treasure silver in five denominations from one to ten taels, two strings per tael, usable like cash, with penalties for illicit smelting or hoarding.
11
承安三年正月,省奏:「隨處榷場若許見錢越境,雖非銷毀,即與銷毀無異。」 遂立制,以錢與外方人使及與交易者,徒五年,三斤以上死,駔儈同罪。 捕告人之賞,官先為代給錢五百貫。 其逮及與接引、館伴,先排、通引、書表等以次坐罪,仍令均償。 時交鈔稍滯,命西京、北京、臨潢,遼東等路一貫以上俱用銀鈔、寶貨,不許用錢,一貫以下聽民便。 時既行限錢法,人多不遵,上曰:「已定條約,不為不重,其令御史台及提刑司察之。」 九月,以民間鈔滯,盡以一貫以下交鈔易錢用之,遂複減元限之數,更定官民存留錢法,三分為率,親王、公主、品官許留一分,餘皆半之,其贏餘之數期五十日內盡易諸物,違者以違制論,以錢賞告者。 於兩行部各置回易務,以綿絹物段易銀鈔,亦許本務納銀鈔。 赴榷貨出鹽引,納鈔于山東、河北、河東等路,從便易錢。 各降補官及德號空敕三百、度牒一千,從兩行部指定處,限四月進納補換。 又更造一百例小鈔,並許官庫易錢。 一貫、二貫例並支小鈔,三貫例則支銀一兩、小鈔一貫,若五貫、十貫例則四分支小鈔、六分支銀,欲得寶貨者聽,有阻滯及輒減價者罪之。 四年三月,又以銀鈔阻滯,乃權止山東諸路以銀鈔與綿絹鹽引從便易錢之制。 令院務諸科名錢,除京師、河南、陝西銀鈔從便,余路並許收銀鈔各半,仍於鈔四分之一許納其本路。 隨路所收交鈔,除本路者不復支發,余通行者並迴圈用之。 榷貨所鬻鹽引,收納寶貨與鈔相半,銀每兩止折鈔兩貫。 省許人依舊詣庫納鈔,隨路漕司所收,除額外羨餘者,亦如之。 所支官錢,亦以銀鈔相兼,銀已零截者令交鈔庫不復支,若寶貨數少,可浸增鑄。 銀鈔既通則物價自平,雖有禁法亦安所施、遂除阻滯銀鈔罪制。 四年,以戶部言,命在都官錢、榷貨務鹽引,並聽收寶貨,附近鹽司貼錢數亦許帶納。 民間寶貨有所歸,自然通行,不至銷毀。 先是,設四庫印小鈔以代鈔本,令人便齎小鈔赴庫換錢,即與支見錢無異。 今更不須印造,俟其換盡,可罷四庫。 但以大鈔驗錢數支易見錢。 時私鑄「承安寶貨」者多雜以銅錫,浸不能行,京師閉肆。 五年十二月,宰奏臣:「比以軍儲調發,支出交鈔數多。 遂鑄寶貨,與錢兼用,以代鈔本,蓋權時之制,非經久之法。」 遂罷「承安寶貨」。
Chengan 3 (1198), first month: the ministry warned that letting cash cross border markets was tantamount to export smelting. Cash given to foreign envoys or used in cross-border trade drew five years' penal servitude, death for amounts over three jin; brokers faced the same penalties. Informants received five hundred strings upfront from the state. Escorts, guides, clerks, and others involved were punished in descending order and made to share restitution. To ease note stagnation, the western and northern capitals and Liaodong required silver notes or treasure goods for payments of one string and above; smaller sums remained at choice. Despite strict cash-hoarding limits, compliance was poor; the emperor ordered the Censorate and Judicial Commissions to enforce them. In the ninth month small notes were cashed out and hoarding limits tightened to one-third of prior quotas—princes and ranked officials kept one share, others half; surplus had to be invested within fifty days or face penalties, with cash rewards for informants. Route headquarters opened exchange offices trading silk and cloth for silver notes and accepting note payments. Salt certificates could be bought with notes and cashed at choice in Shandong, Hebei, Hedong, and allied circuits. Three hundred honorary appointments and one thousand blank ordination certificates were offered for redemption at designated route offices by the fourth month. New small notes in 100-string denominations were issued, redeemable at treasuries. Payments of one or two strings came in small notes; three-string payments split one tael silver plus one string in notes; five- and ten-string payments were 40% notes and 60% silver—or treasure goods on request—with penalties for obstruction or discounting. Chengan 4, third month: flexible note-to-cash exchange in Shandong was suspended amid silver-note stagnation. Wine-shop and other official fees—except in the capital, Henan, and Shaanxi—could be half paid in silver notes, one-quarter of which might be local-circuit notes. Notes collected locally were not reissued; notes from other circuits were recycled back into circulation. Salt certificates required half payment in treasure goods and half in notes, with silver valued at only two strings per tael. Treasuries still accepted note deposits; transport surplus above quotas followed the same rule. Official payouts mixed silver and notes; chipped silver was no longer issued from note treasuries; more treasure goods might be cast if supplies ran low. With free circulation prices would stabilize without need for coercion—penalties for hoarding silver notes were lifted. Chengan 4: at ministerial request, capital treasuries and monopoly salt offices were ordered to accept treasure goods, including supplemental salt fees. With official outlets for treasure goods, private stock would circulate rather than be melted. Four treasuries had issued small notes backed by reserves, letting people redeem them for cash on demand like hard coin. Printing would cease; once existing small notes were redeemed out, the four treasuries could close. Large-denomination notes alone would back cash disbursement. Counterfeit Chengan treasure alloyed with copper and tin drove the currency from markets until capital shops shut their doors. Chengan 5 (1200), twelfth month: ministers reported heavy note issuance to fund military deployments. Treasure goods had been coined alongside cash as a temporary substitute for note reserves—not a permanent fix. Chengan treasure was abolished.
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泰和元年六月,通州刺史盧構言:「民間鈔固已流行,獨銀價未平,官之所定每鋌以十萬為准,而市肆才直八萬,蓋出多入少故也。 若令諸稅以錢銀鈔三分均納。 庶革其弊。」 下省議,宰臣謂:「軍興以來,全賴交鈔佐用,以出多遂滯,頃令院務收鈔七分,亦漸流通。 若與銀均納,則彼增此減,理必偏勝,至礙鈔法。 必欲銀價之平,宜令諸名若'鋪馬'、'軍須'等錢,許納銀半,無者聽便。」 先是,嘗行三合同交鈔,至泰和二年,止行於民間,而官不收斂,朝廷慮其病民,遂令諸稅各帶納一分,雖止系本路者,亦許不限路分通納。 戶部見征累年鋪馬錢,亦聽收其半。 閏十二月,上以交鈔事,召戶部尚書孫鐸、侍郎張複亨,議於內殿。 複亨以三合同鈔可行,鐸請廢不用,既而複亨言竟詘。 自是而後,國虛民貧,經用不足,專以交鈔愚百姓,而法又不常,世宗之業衰焉。 以至泰和三年,其弊彌甚,乃謂宰臣曰:「大定間,錢至足,今民間錢少,而又不在官,何耶? 其集問百官,必有能知之者。」 四年七月,罷限錢法,從戶部尚書上官瑜所請也。 四年,欲增鑄錢,命百官議所以足銅之術。 中丞孟鑄謂:「銷錢作銅,及盜用出境者不止,宜罪其官及鄰。」 太府監梁絪等言:「鑄錢甚費,率費十錢可得一錢。 識者謂費雖多猶增一錢也,乞采銅、拘器以鑄。」 宰臣謂:「鼓鑄未可速行,其銅治聽民煎煉,官為買之。 凡寺觀不及十人,不許畜法器。 民間鍮銅器期以兩月送官給價。 匿者以私法坐,限外人告者,以知而不糾坐其官。 寺觀許童行告者賞。 俟銅多,別具以聞。」 八月,定從便易錢法,聽人輸納于京師,而于山東、河北、大名、河東等路依數支取。 後鑄大錢一直十,篆文曰「泰和重寶」,與鈔參行。 五年,上欲罷交鈔工墨錢,複以印時常費遂命貫止收六文。
Taihe 1 (1201), sixth month: Tongzhou Prefect Lu Gou noted that while notes circulated, silver traded at 80,000 against an official 100,000 per ingot because supply outran demand. Require taxes to be paid one-third each in cash, silver, and notes. That might balance the market." Referred to ministry debate, ministers replied that wartime finance depended on notes; though oversupply had stalled them, requiring wine shops to take 70% notes was restoring circulation. Equal silver shares would cannibalize note demand and undermine paper currency. To stabilize silver, named levies such as relay-horse and military-supply fees should accept half payment in silver where available. Triple-contract notes had circulated only privately until Taihe 2 (1202), when the court required one-tenth of all taxes—even local levies—to be paid in them, acceptable nationwide. The Revenue Ministry also allowed half of accumulated relay-horse fees to be paid in these notes. Intercalary twelfth month: the emperor summoned Revenue Minister Sun Duo and Vice Minister Zhang Fuheng to discuss note policy in the inner palace. Fuheng favored triple-contract notes; Duo wanted them scrapped—and Duo prevailed. Thereafter fiscal exhaustion and erratic note policy eroded Shizong's legacy as the state leaned on paper money to the people's detriment. By Taihe 3 (1203) he asked his ministers why Dading-era coin abundance had given way to private hoarding with empty public coffers. Summon the bureaucracy—someone must know the cause." Taihe 4 (1204), seventh month: cash hoarding limits were lifted at Revenue Minister Shangguan Yu's request. That year, planning expanded minting, he ordered officials to propose ways to secure copper. Censor Meng Zhu urged punishing local officials and neighbors for coin-smelting and copper smuggling. Palace Storehouse Director Liang Yin reported minting cost ten cash for every one produced. Advisors argued the cost still netted one cash per coin and urged mining and confiscating vessels for bronze. Ministers replied minting could wait but the state would buy privately smelted copper. Temples with fewer than ten residents could not retain ritual bronze. Household brass and copper had to be surrendered within two months for official payment. Concealment brought criminal penalties; officials who failed to act on outside reports shared guilt. Temples might reward novice informants. Further minting plans would follow once copper stockpiles grew." August: a flexible remittance law let people deposit at the capital and draw cash in Shandong, Hebei, Daming, Hedong, and allied regions. Later the court issued Taihe chongbao heavy coins worth ten cash each, circulating alongside paper. Taihe 5: he nearly abolished note renewal fees but settled on six cash per string given printing costs.
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六年四月,陝西交鈔不行,以見錢十萬貫為鈔本,與鈔相易,複以小鈔十萬貫相參用之。 六年十一月,複許諸路各行小鈔。 中都路則於中都及保州,南京路則于南京、歸德、河南府,山東東路則於益都、濟南府,山東西路則于東平、大名府,河北東路則於河間府、冀州,河北西路則於真定、彰德府,河東南路則於平陽,河東北路則於太原、汾州,遼東則於上京、咸平,西京則於西京、撫州,北京則於臨潢府官庫易錢。 令戶部印小鈔五等,附各路同見錢用。 七年正月,敕在官毋得支出大鈔,在民者令赴庫,以多寡制數易小鈔及見錢,院務商稅及諸名錢,三分須納大鈔一分,惟遼東以便。 時民以貨幣屢變,往往怨嗟,聚語於市。 上知之,諭旨于御史台曰:「自今都市敢有相聚論鈔法難行者,許人捕告,賞錢三百貫。」 五月,以戶部尚書高汝礪議,立「鈔法條約」,添印大小鈔,以鈔庫至急切,增副使一員。 汝礪又與中都路轉運使孫鐸言錢幣,上命中丞孟鑄、禮部侍郎喬宇、國子司業劉昂等十人議,月餘不決。 七月,上召議於泰和殿,且諭汝礪曰:「今後毋謂鈔多,不加重而輒易之。 重之加于錢,可也。」 明日,敕:「民間之交易、典質、一貫以上並用交鈔,毋得用錢。 須立契者,三分之一用諸物。 六盤山西、遼河東以五分之一用鈔,東鄙屯田戶以六分之一用鈔。 不須立契者,惟遼東錢鈔從便。 犯者徒二年,告者賞有差,監臨犯者杖且解職,縣官能奉行流通者升除,否者降罰,集眾沮法者以違制論。 工墨錢每張止收二錢。 商旅齎見錢不得過十貫。 所司籍辨鈔人以防偽冒。 品官及民家存留見錢,比舊減其數,若舊有見錢多者,許送官易鈔,十貫以上不得出京。」 又定制,按察司以鈔法流通為稱職,而河北按察使斜不出巡按所給券應得鈔一貫,以難支用,命取見錢。 御史以沮壞鈔法劾之,上曰:「糾察之官乃先壞法,情不可恕。」 杖之七十,削官一階,解職。
Taihe 6 (1206), fourth month: Shaanxi notes failed; the state backed them with 100,000 strings cash plus 100,000 in small notes. Taihe 6, eleventh month: circuits regained authority to issue local small notes. Each circuit redeemed notes at designated treasuries: the Central Capital route at the capital and Baozhou; the Southern Capital route at Nanjing, Guide, and Henan; Shandong east at Yidu and Jinan; Shandong west at Dongping and Daming; Hebei east at Hejian and Jizhou; Hebei west at Zhending and Zhangde; southern Hedong at Pingyang; northern Hedong at Taiyuan and Fenzhou; Liaodong at the Upper Capital and Xianping; the Western Capital at Fuzhou; the Northern Capital at Linhuang. The Revenue Ministry issued five denominations of small notes for circuit-wide use with cash. Taihe 7 (1207), first month: offices could not pay out large notes; holders had to redeem them for small notes or cash; a third of wine-shop and commercial fees had to be paid in large notes—Liaodong excepted. Repeated currency changes bred market grumbling and public gatherings. He told the Censorate to reward three hundred strings for reporting groups discussing note policy in the capital. May: Minister Gao Ruli's Note System Covenant expanded printing and added a deputy commissioner to overstretched note treasuries. Gao Ruli debated currency with transport chief Sun Duo; ten officials including Meng Zhu, Qiao Yu, and Liu Ang debated for over a month without agreement. July he convened them at Taihe Hall and warned Gao Ruli not to swap note issues merely because circulation was heavy. He might add nominal weight against cash—but not replace denominations lightly." Next day an edict required notes for private trade and pawn of one string or more; cash was banned. Written contracts might value one-third of the payment in goods. West of Liupan and east of the Liao, one-fifth of transactions had to be in notes; eastern garrison colonists paid one-sixth. Informal transactions remained free to use cash or notes only in Liaodong. Violators faced two years' penal servitude, with graded rewards for informers. Supervising officials who broke the rules were beaten and stripped of office. County officials who kept notes circulating were promoted; those who failed were demoted and fined. Anyone who rallied crowds to sabotage the system was charged with violating imperial orders. Processing fees were capped at two cash per note. Merchants and travelers could carry no more than ten strings of ready cash. Authorities registered note authenticators to prevent forgery and fraud. Cash holdings for officials and households were cut below previous limits. Those with large reserves could exchange surplus cash for notes at the treasury, but amounts of ten strings or more could not be taken out of the capital. New rules tied surveillance commissioners' performance ratings to note circulation. But Hebei commissioner Xie Bu-Chu, finding a one-string note from his travel voucher impractical on inspection rounds, demanded cash instead. Censors impeached him for undermining the note system. The emperor said, "An inspector who breaks the law first cannot be forgiven. He received seventy blows, lost one rank, and was dismissed.
14
戶部尚書高汝礪言:「鈔法務在必行,府州縣鎮宜各籍辨鈔人,給以條印,聽與人辨驗,隨貫量給二錢,貫例雖多,六錢即止。 每朝官出使,則令體究通滯以聞。 民間舊有宋會子,亦令同見錢用,十貫以上不許持行。 榷鹽許用銀絹,余市易及俸,並用交鈔,其奇數以小鈔足之,應支銀絹而不足者亦以鈔給之。」 上遣近侍諭旨尚書省:「今既以按察司鈔法通快為稱職,否則為不稱職,仍于州府司縣官給由內,明書所犯之數,但犯鈔法者雖監察御史舉其能幹,亦不准用。」 十月,楊序言:「交鈔料號不明,年月故暗,雖令赴庫易新,然外路無設定庫司,欲易無所,遠者直須赴都。」 上以問汝礪,對曰:「隨處州府庫內,各有辨鈔庫子,鈔雖弊不偽,亦可收納。 去都遠之城邑,既有設置合同換錢,客旅經之皆可相易。 更慮無合同之地,難以易者,令官庫凡納昏鈔者受而不支,於鈔背印記官吏姓名,積半歲赴都易新鈔。 如此,則昏鈔有所歸而無滯矣!」
Revenue Minister Gao Ruli urged strict enforcement: every prefecture, district, county, and town should register note authenticators, issue them official seals, and allow them to verify notes for the public at two cash per string, capped at six cash regardless of denomination. Every court envoy was to investigate local note circulation and report back. Old Song hui notes were allowed alongside cash, but holdings of ten strings or more could not be carried on the road. Salt monopoly payments could still be in silver or silk; all other trade and salaries had to use exchange notes, with small notes covering odd amounts and notes substituted where silver or silk ran short. The emperor instructed the Secretariat that surveillance commissioners would be judged competent only if notes circulated smoothly. Violations had to be recorded on officials' service credentials, and anyone who had broken the note law could not be appointed even with a censor's recommendation. In the tenth month Yang Xu reported that worn notes had illegible serial numbers and dates. Though holders could redeem them at treasuries, remote regions had no designated offices, forcing distant subjects to travel all the way to the capital. The emperor asked Gao Ruli, who replied that every prefectural treasury had authenticating clerks who would accept worn but genuine notes. In towns far from the capital, licensed exchange houses already let travelers swap notes along the route. Where no exchange house existed, official treasuries could receive worn notes without immediate payout, stamp officials' names on the backs, and after six months send them to the capital for new notes. "That way worn notes have somewhere to go and will not pile up idle!" he said.
15
十一月,上諭戶部官曰:「今鈔法雖行,卿等亦宜審察,少有壅滯,即當以聞,勿謂已行而憚改。」 汝礪對曰:「今諸處置庫多在公廨內,小民出入頗難,雖有商賈易之,然患鈔本不豐。 比者河北西路轉運司言,一富民首其當存留錢外,見錢十四萬貫。 它路臆或有如此者,臣等謂宜令州縣委官及庫典,於市肆要處置庫支換。 以出首之錢為鈔本,十萬戶以上州府,給三萬貫,以次為差,易鈔者人不得過二貫。 以所得工墨錢充庫典食直,仍令州府佐貳及轉運司官一員提控。」 上是之,遂命移庫於市肆之會,令民以鈔易錢。
In November the emperor told the Revenue Ministry that even though notes were mandatory, they must report any stagnation at once and not hesitate to propose changes just because the policy was already in place. Gao Ruli replied that treasuries inside government compounds were hard for common people to reach, and even merchant exchange was hampered by thin note reserves. Recently the Hebei West transport office reported one wealthy man who admitted to holding 140,000 strings of cash beyond the retention limit. Other regions surely had similar hoards. He proposed that counties post officials and treasurers at busy market sites to run exchange offices. Confiscated or surrendered cash would fund note reserves—30,000 strings for prefectures over 100,000 households, scaled down for smaller ones—and no one could exchange more than two strings at a time. Processing fees would pay the treasurers' wages, with a deputy prefect and a transport official supervising each office. The emperor approved and ordered treasuries moved to market crossroads so people could exchange notes for cash.
16
是月,敕捕獲偽造交鈔者,皆以交鈔為賞。
That month rewards for capturing counterfeiters were paid in exchange notes.
17
時復議更鈔法,上從高汝礪言,命在官大鈔更不許出。 聽民以五貫十貫例者赴庫易小鈔,欲得錢者五貫內與一緡,十貫內與兩緡,惟遼東從便。 河南、陝西、山東及它行鈔諸路,院務諸稅及諸科名錢,並以三分為率,一分納十貫例者,二分五貫例者,餘並收見錢。
Debating further reforms, the emperor adopted Gao Ruli's plan to stop paying out large-denomination notes from government treasuries. Holders of five- and ten-string notes could redeem them for small notes at treasuries, or take partial cash—one string from a five-string note, two from a ten-string note—except in Liaodong, where rules were relaxed. In Henan, Shaanxi, Shandong, and other note-issuing circuits, a third of wine-shop and commercial taxes had to be paid in notes—one part in ten-string notes and two parts in five-string notes—with the rest in cash.
18
八年正月,以京師鈔滯,定所司賞罰格。 時新制,按察司及州縣官,例以鈔通滯為升降。 遂命監察御史賞罰同外道按察司,大興府警巡院官同外路州縣官。
Taihe 8, first month: stagnation in the capital prompted standardized rewards and penalties for responsible offices. New rules tied promotions for surveillance commissioners and local officials to how well notes circulated. Capital surveillance censors and Daxing patrol officials were subjected to the same note-circulation incentives as their provincial counterparts.
19
是月,收毀大鈔,行小鈔。
That month large notes were withdrawn and small notes put into circulation.
20
八月,從遼東按察司楊雲翼言,以咸平、東京兩路商旅所集,遂從都南例,一貫以上皆用交鈔,不得用錢。 十月,孫鐸又言:「民間鈔多,正宜收斂,院務稅諸名錢,可盡收鈔,秋夏稅納本色外,亦令收鈔,不拘貫例。 農民知之則漸重鈔,可以流通。 比來州縣抑配市肆買鈔,徒增騷擾,可罷諸處創設鈔局,止令赴省庫換易。 今小鈔各限路分,亦甚未便,可令通用。」 上命亟行之。
In August, on Yang Yunyi's advice, Xianping and Tokyo routes—major merchant hubs—followed southern capital rules requiring notes for any transaction of one string or more. In October Sun Duo argued that with notes abundant, the state should absorb them—accepting notes for all commercial taxes and for summer and autumn levies beyond grain payments, regardless of denomination. Once farmers understood this, they would begin to value notes and circulation would improve. County coercion forcing shops to buy notes had only caused trouble; he urged abolishing local note bureaus and limiting exchange to provincial treasuries. Route-specific small notes were inconvenient; he proposed making them valid everywhere. The emperor ordered these measures implemented at once.
21
十二月,宰臣奏:「舊制,內外官兵俸皆給鈔,其必用錢以足數者,可以十分為率,軍兵給三分,官員承應人給二分,多不過十貫。 凡前所收大鈔,俟至通行當複計造,其終須當精緻以圖經久。 民間舊鈔故暗者,乞許于所在庫易新。 若官吏勢要之家有賤買交鈔,而於院務換錢興販者,以違制論。 複遣官分路巡察,其限錢過數雖許奴婢以告,乃有所屬默令其主藏匿不以實首者,可令按察司察之。 若舊限已滿,當更展五十日,許再令變易鈔引諸物。」 是制既行之後,章宗尋崩,衛紹王繼立,大安三年會河之役,至以八十四車為軍賞,兵衄國殘,不遑救弊,交鈔之輕幾于不能市易矣。 至宣宗貞祐二年二月,思有以重之,乃更作二十貫至百貫例交鈔,又造二百貫至千貫例者。 然自泰和以來,凡更交鈔,初雖重,不數年則輕而不行,至是則愈更而愈滯矣。 南遷之後,國蹙民困,軍旅不息,供億無度,輕又甚焉。
In December ministers reported that salaries were paid in notes, with up to 30% in cash for soldiers and 20% for officials and attendants, capped at ten strings. Collected large notes would be reissued once circulation recovered, and future printings had to be refined for durability. They asked that worn notes be redeemable for new ones at local treasuries. Officials or powerful families who bought notes cheaply and resold them for cash at wine shops would be charged with violating imperial orders. Inspectors would tour the routes again. Though servants could report hidden cash hoards, surveillance commissions were empowered to investigate masters who silenced them. They proposed extending the conversion deadline by fifty days so people could again exchange notes and goods. After these reforms Zhangzong died and Weishao succeeded. At the Da'an 3 Battle of Hui River the state paid military bonuses in eighty-four cartloads of notes; defeat left the dynasty too battered to fix monetary abuses, and notes sank so far they could barely buy anything. In Zhenyou 2 (1214), second month, Xuanzong tried to restore value by issuing new notes from twenty to one hundred strings, and even two hundred to one thousand strings. Since Taihe every note reform had briefly strengthened currency only to see it depreciate within years; now each new issue made circulation worse. After the court moved south, a shrinking state, exhausted people, endless warfare, and limitless spending drove notes to new depths of debasement.
22
三年四月,河東宣撫使胥鼎上言曰:「今之物重,其弊在於鈔窒,有出而無入也。 雖院務稅增收數倍,而所納皆十貫例大鈔,此何益哉? 今十貫例者民間甚多,以無所歸,故市易多用見錢,而鈔每貫僅直一錢,曾不及工墨之費。 臣愚謂,宜權禁見錢,且令計司以軍須為名,量民力征斂,則泉貨流通,而物價平矣。」 自是,錢貨不用,富家內困藏鏹之限,外弊交鈔屢變,皆至窘敗,謂之「坐化」。 商人往往舟運貿易于江淮,錢多入于宋矣。 宋人以為喜,而金人不禁也,識者惜其既不能重無用之楮,而又棄自古流行之寶焉。
In the fourth month of year three, Hedong commissioner Xu Ding wrote, "Prices are high because notes stagnate: the state pays them out but does not take them back in. Commercial taxes had been raised several times, but payment came in worthless ten-string notes—what good did that do? Ten-string notes piled up in private hands with nowhere to go, so markets ran on cash while each string of notes traded for a single coin—less than the printing fee. He proposed temporarily banning cash and levying supplies in the name of military needs according to ability—thus restoring circulation and stabilizing prices." Cash fell out of use. Wealthy families chafed at hoarding limits while repeated note changes eroded their fortunes—a ruin known as "sitting transformation," watching wealth evaporate in place. Merchants shipped goods to the Yangtze-Huai region, draining coin into Song territory. The Song welcomed the influx while the Jin did nothing. Observers lamented that the dynasty could neither restore worthless paper nor keep the coin that had circulated for millennia.
23
五月,權西安軍節度使烏林達與言:「關陝軍多,供億不足,所仰交鈔則取于京師,徒成煩費,乞降板就造便。」 又言:「懷州舊鐵錢钜萬,今既無用,願貫為甲,以給戰士。」 時有司輕罪議罰,率以鐵贖,而當罪不平,遂命贖銅計贓皆以銀價為准。
In May acting Xi'an commissioner Wulinda Yu argued that Guan-Shaan's large garrison could not afford to haul notes from the capital and asked permission to print locally. He also proposed stringing Huai Prefecture's hoard of obsolete iron cash into armor for soldiers. Minor penalties had been commuted in iron at uneven rates, so the court standardized copper fines and compensation by silver value.
24
六月,敕議交鈔利便。 七月,改交鈔名為「貞祐寶券」,仍立沮阻罪。 九月,御史台言:「自多故以來,全藉交鈔以助軍需,然所入不及所出,則其價浸減,卒無法以禁,此必然之理也。 近用'貞祐寶券'以革其弊,又慮既多而民輕,與舊鈔無異也,乃令民間市易悉從時估,嚴立罪賞,期於必行,遂使商旅不行,四方之物不敢入。 夫京師百萬之眾,日費不貲,物價寧不日貴耶? 且時估月再定之,而民間價旦暮不一,今有司強之,而市肆盡閉。 復議搜括隱匿,必令如估鬻之,則京師之物指日盡,而百姓重困矣。 臣等謂,惟官和買計贓之類可用時估,餘宜從便。」 制可。
In June the court ordered a review of note policy. In July notes were renamed "Zhenyou Precious Certificates" and penalties were set for obstructing their use. In September the Censorate observed that since the crises began the state had relied on notes for military supply, but when outflow exceeded intake their value inevitably fell with no way to stop it. The new Zhenyou Precious Certificates were meant to fix the problem, but fearing overissue would debase them like the old notes, the court forced all trade to follow official price appraisals with harsh penalties—merchants stopped traveling and goods ceased to flow in. With a million mouths to feed in the capital, how could prices not rise by the day? Official prices were reset twice a month while market prices shifted daily; forced compliance had shut the shops entirely. Plans to seize hidden stock and sell it at official prices would empty the capital within days and crush the people further. They argued that official price controls should apply only to government purchases and compensation cases, leaving ordinary trade free. The emperor approved.
25
十二月,上聞近京郡縣多糴于京師,穀價翔踴,令尚書省集戶部、講議所、開封府、轉運司,議所以制之者。 戶部及講議所言,以五鬥出城者可闌糴其半,轉運司謂宜悉禁其出,上從開封府議,謂:「寶券初行時,民甚重之。 但以河北、陝西諸路所支既多,人遂輕之。 商賈爭收入京,以市金銀,銀價昂,穀亦隨之。 若令寶券路各殊制,則不可複入河南,則河南金銀賤而穀自輕。 若直閉京城粟不出,則外亦自守,不復入京,穀當益貴。 宜諭郡縣小民,毋妄增價,官為定制,務從其便。」
In December the emperor learned that nearby counties were buying grain in the capital, driving prices skyward, and ordered the Secretariat, Revenue Ministry, deliberation office, Kaifeng prefecture, and transport commission to find a remedy. Revenue and the deliberation office proposed blocking half the grain purchases of anyone exporting five dou from the city; the transport office wanted a total ban. The emperor sided with Kaifeng prefecture, noting that when precious certificates first appeared the people had valued them highly. But heavy disbursements in Hebei, Shaanxi, and other circuits had since made people treat them lightly. Merchants rushed notes into the capital to buy gold and silver, driving up silver prices and grain along with them. If each circuit issued certificates under separate rules, they could not circulate back into Henan—where silver would cheapen and grain prices would fall. Sealing the capital's grain supply would make the provinces hoard their own and stop shipping to the capital, making grain even costlier. County folk should be warned against price gouging while the government set fair rules for everyone's convenience."
26
四年正月,監察御史田迥秀言:「國家調度皆資寶券,行才數月,又複壅滯,非約束不嚴、奉行不謹也。 夫錢幣欲流通,必輕重相權、散斂有術而後可。 今之患在出太多、入太少爾。 若隨時裁損所支,而增其所收,庶乎或可也。」 因條五事,一曰省冗官吏,二曰損酒使司,三曰節兵俸,四曰罷寄治官,五曰酒稅及納粟補官皆當用寶券。 詔酒稅從大定之舊,餘皆不從。 尋又更定捕獲偽造寶券官賞。
In the first month of year four, censor Tian Jiongxiu argued that although state finances depended on precious certificates, they had stagnated again within months—not from lax enforcement. Currency circulates only when issuance and recall are balanced with deliberate technique. The problem was too much paid out and too little taken back in. Cut spending and increase collections as conditions required, and the system might recover. He offered five reforms: trim redundant officials, cut wine-tax offices, reduce military pay, abolish supernumerary posts, and require precious certificates for wine taxes and grain payments for purchased office. The court kept wine taxes on the old Dading basis and rejected the rest. Official rewards for catching counterfeiters of precious certificates were soon revised.
27
三月,翰林侍講學士趙秉文言:「比者寶券滯塞,蓋朝廷將議更張,已而妄傳不用,因之抑遏,漸至廢絕,此乃權歸小民也。 自遷汴以來,廢回易務,臣愚謂當複置,令職官通市道者掌之,給銀鈔粟麥縑帛之類,權其低昂而出納之。 仍自選良監當官營為之,若半年無過,及券法通流,則聽所指任便差遣。」 詔議行之。
In March Hanlin lecturer Zhao Bingwen said recent stagnation stemmed from rumors of impending reform; panic hoarding had nearly killed the notes, handing market power to private traders. Since the move to Bian the state exchange office had been abolished; he urged restoring it under market-savvy officials who would trade silver, notes, grain, and cloth at adjusted prices. Capable supervisors should run it; after six months without fault, with notes circulating smoothly, they could be appointed wherever they chose. The court ordered the proposal studied and carried out.
28
四月,河東行省胥鼎言:「交鈔貴乎流通,今諸路所造不充所出,不以術收之,不無缺誤。 宜量民力征斂,以裨軍用。 河中宣撫司亦以寶券多出,民不之貴,乞驗民貧富征之。 雖為陝西,若一體徵收,則彼中所有日湊於河東,與不斂何異? 又河北寶券以不許行于河南,由是愈滯。」 宰臣謂:「昨以河北寶券,商旅齎販繼踵南渡,遂致物價翔踴,乃權宜限以路分。 今鼎既以本路用度繁殷,欲征軍須錢,宜從所請。 若陝西可征與否,詔令行省議定而後行。」 五月,上以河北州府官錢散失,多在民間,命尚書省經畫之。
In April Hedong branch secretary Xu Ding warned that notes mattered only in circulation, yet provincial minting could not keep pace with payouts and nothing was being done to recall them. He urged levies scaled to local capacity to support the army. The Hezhong military commission likewise cited overissue and public distrust, asking for levies graded by wealth. Even in Shaanxi, a uniform levy would simply funnel its resources into Hedong—no different from collecting nothing at all. Hebei certificates also stagnated because they were barred from Henan. Ministers replied that Hebei certificates had once flooded south with merchants, spiking prices, so route limits had been a temporary fix. Since Xu Ding's route faced heavy expenses and sought military levies, his request should be granted. Whether Shaanxi should be levied was left for the branch secretariat to decide. In May the emperor learned that much official cash in Hebei had leaked into private hands and ordered the Secretariat to recover it.
29
八月,平章高琪奏:「軍興以來,用度不貲,惟賴寶券,然所入不敷所出,是以浸輕,今千錢之券僅直數錢,隨造隨盡,工物日增,不有以救之,弊將滋甚。 宜更造新券,與舊券權為子母而兼行之,庶工物俱省,而用不乏。」 濮王守純以下皆憚改,奏曰:「自古軍旅之費皆取于民,向朝廷以小鈔殊輕,權更寶券,而複禁用錢。 小民淺慮,謂楮幣易壞,不若錢可久,於是得錢則珍藏,而券則亟用之,惟恐破裂而至於廢也。 今朝廷知支而不知收,所以錢日貴而券日輕。 然則券之輕非民輕之,國家致之然也。 不若量其所支複斂於民,出入迴圈,則彼知為必用之物,而知愛重矣。 今徒患輕而即欲更造,不惟信令不行,且恐新券之輕複同舊券也。」 既而,隴州防禦使完顏宇及陝西行省令史惠吉繼言券法之弊。 宇請姑罷印造,以見在者流通之,若滯塞則驗丁口之多寡、物力之高下而征之。 吉言:「券者所以救弊一時,非可通流與見錢比,必欲通之,不過多斂少支爾。 然斂多則傷民,支少則用不足,二者皆不可。 為今日計,莫若更造,以'貞祐通寶'為名,自百至三千等之為十,聽各路轉運司印造,仍不得過五千貫,與舊券參用,庶乎可也。」 詔集百官議。 戶部侍郎奧屯阿虎、禮部侍郎楊雲翼、郎中蘭芝、刑部侍郎馮鶚皆主更造。 戶部侍郎高夔、員外郎張師魯、兵部侍郎徒單歐裏白皆請征斂。 惟戶部尚書蕭貢謂止當如舊,而工部尚書李元輔謂二者可並行。 太子少保張行信亦言不宜更造,但嚴立不行之罪,足矣。 侍御史趙伯成曰:「更造之法,陰奪民利,其弊甚於征。 征之為法,特徵于農民則不可,若征於市肆商賈之家,是亦敦本抑末之一端。」 刑部主事王壽寧曰:「不然,今之重錢輕券者皆農爾,其斂必先於民而後可。」 轉運使王擴曰:「凡論事當究其本,今歲支軍士家口糧四萬余石,如使斯人地著,少寬民力,然後征之,則行之不難。」 榷貨司楊貞亦欲節無名之費,罷閑冗之官。 或有請鑄大錢以當百,別造小鈔以省費。 或謂縣官當擇人者。 獨吏部尚書溫蒂罕思敬上書言:「國家立法,莫不備具,但有司不克奉之而已。 誠使臣得便宜從事,凡外路四品以下官皆許杖決,三品以上奏聞,仍付監察二人弛驛往來,法不必變,民不必征,一號令之,可使上下無不奉法。 如其不然,請就重刑。」 上以示宰臣曰:「彼自許如此,試委之可乎?」 宰臣未有以處,而監察御史陳規,完顏素蘭交諍,以為:「事有難行,聖哲猶病之,思敬何為者,徒害人爾。」 上以眾議紛紛,月餘不決,厭之,乃詔如舊,紓其征斂之期焉。 未幾,竟用惠吉言,造「貞祐通寶」。 興定元年二月,始詔行之,凡一貫當千貫,增重偽造沮阻罪及捕獲之賞。
In August Grand Councilor Gao Qi reported that since the wars began the state had lived on precious certificates, but outflow exceeded intake until a thousand-cash note traded for pennies; printing costs rose daily and the abuse would worsen without reform. He proposed new notes to circulate alongside old ones as parent and child denominations, saving printing costs while keeping supply adequate. Prince of Pu Shou Chun and others resisted further change, noting that armies had always been funded by the people; when small notes collapsed the court had swapped in precious certificates and banned cash. Ordinary people, thinking paper fragile and coin durable, hoarded cash and spent certificates as fast as possible for fear they would tear and become worthless. The court kept paying out without taking notes back in, so cash grew dearer and certificates cheaper by the day. The notes were not undervalued because the people despised them—the state itself had made them worthless. Better to calibrate disbursements and levy notes back from the people in a circular flow, so they would see them as essential currency and treat them with respect. To panic over devaluation and rush to remint would undermine public trust and likely leave the new notes as worthless as the old. Soon afterward Long Prefecture Defense Commissioner Wanyan Yu and Shaanxi Branch Secretariat clerk Hui Ji also weighed in on the failings of the note system. Yu urged a halt to new printing and circulation of existing stock, with levies based on household size and wealth if notes piled up unused. Ji argued that notes were only a stopgap: they could not circulate like hard coin, and forcing them to would mean collecting far more than was paid out. Heavy collection harmed the populace while meager disbursement left the treasury short—neither course was workable. For the present crisis he proposed reminting notes called "Zhenyou Tongbao" in ten denominations from one hundred to three thousand cash, printed by circuit transport offices up to five thousand strings each, to circulate alongside the old notes. The emperor ordered a full court debate on the matter. Revenue Vice Minister Outun Ahu, Rites Vice Minister Yang Yunyi, Bureau Director Lanzhi, and Justice Vice Minister Feng E all favored reminting. Revenue Vice Minister Gao Kui, Vice Director Zhang Shilu, and War Vice Minister Tushan Oulibai argued for a levy instead. Only Revenue Minister Xiao Gong wanted to keep the existing system; Works Minister Li Yuanfu thought both reminting and levies could proceed together. Junior Tutor to the Heir Zhang Xingxin also opposed reminting, arguing that stiff penalties for refusing to accept notes would be enough. Attending Censor Zhao Bocheng said reminting covertly stripped the people of their assets and was worse than a direct levy. A levy was tolerable only if it fell on merchants rather than farmers—it would at least serve the policy of favoring agriculture over trade. Justice Clerk Wang Shouning countered that farmers were the ones hoarding cash and shunning notes, so any collection would inevitably fall on them first. Transport Commissioner Wang Kuo urged addressing root causes: this year over forty thousand shi of grain had been paid to dependents of garrison troops; if those men were settled locally and the people's burdens eased, a levy would be far easier to enforce. Monopoly Bureau officer Yang Zhen called for cutting wasteful spending and abolishing redundant posts. Others proposed casting hundred-cash coins or issuing smaller notes to cut printing costs. Still others argued that local magistrates simply needed to be better chosen. Personnel Minister Wanyan Sijing alone submitted a memorial arguing that the laws were adequate but officials simply failed to enforce them. If granted discretionary authority to flog fourth-rank officials and below in the provinces, report third-rank offenses to the throne, and deploy two censors on relay courier duty, he could enforce existing law without reminting or levies—one order and all would comply. If refused, he asked to be punished severely. The emperor showed this to his chief ministers and asked whether they should give Sijing the assignment he demanded. The chief ministers could not decide. Censor Chen Gui and Wanyan Sulan objected that even sages struggled with impracticable schemes and accused Sijing of wanting to harm the people. After more than a month of fruitless debate the emperor tired of the wrangling and ordered that existing policy continue, only postponing the levy schedule. Before long the court adopted Hui Ji's proposal and issued the "Zhenyou Tongbao" notes. In the second month of Xingding 1 (1217) the new notes were formally issued, each one-string note redeemable for one thousand old strings, with heavier penalties for counterfeiting or obstructing circulation and rewards for informants.
30
五月,以鈔法屢變,隨出而隨壞,制紙之桑皮故紙皆取於民,至是又甚艱得,遂令計價,但征寶券、通寶、名曰「桑皮故紙錢」。 謂可以免民輸挽之勞,而省工物之費也。 高汝礪言:「河南調發繁重,所征租稅三倍於舊,僅可供億,如此其重也。 而今年五月省部以歲收通寶不充所用,乃于民間斂桑皮故紙鈔七千萬貫以補之,又太甚矣! 而近又以通寶稍滯,又增兩倍。 河南人戶農居三之二,今年租稅征尚未足,而複令出此,民若不糶當納之租,則賣所食之粟,舍此將何得焉? 今所急而難得者芻糧也,出於民而有限。 可緩而易為者交鈔也,出於國而可變。 以國家之所自行者而強求之民,將若之何? 向者大鈔滯則更為小鈔,小鈔弊則改為寶券,寶券不行則易為通寶,變制在我,尚何煩民哉! 民既悉力以奉軍而不足,又計口、計稅、計物、計生殖之業而加征,若是其剝,彼不能給,則有亡而已矣! 民逃田穢,兵食不給,是軍儲鈔法兩廢矣。 臣非于鈔法不加意,非故與省部相違也。 但以鈔滯物貴之害輕,民去軍饑之害重爾。」 時不能用。
In May, as repeated note reforms had exhausted mulberry-bark scrap paper requisitioned from the people, the court ordered a cash levy called "mulberry-bark recycled-paper money" payable in precious certificates or tongbao at assessed prices. Officials claimed this would spare the people transport duties and save the state material costs. Gao Ruli protested that Henan's levies and requisitions had already tripled old rates and barely kept the state afloat. Then in May the central ministries had collected seventy million strings in mulberry-bark notes from the populace because tongbao receipts fell short—a step too far. When tongbao circulation slowed, they doubled the levy again. Two-thirds of Henan households were farmers still struggling to pay this year's taxes; if they did not sell grain to meet rent they would have to sell their food stores—how else could they comply? Fodder and grain, drawn from a finite peasant surplus, were what the state urgently needed and could not easily find. Paper notes, which the state could issue at will, were the flexible instrument. How could the court shift onto the people burdens it ought to bear itself? When large notes stalled the court had switched to small notes, then precious certificates, then tongbao—monetary reform was the state's prerogative, so why keep burdening the people? The people already gave all they had for the army and still fell short; now levies taxed their persons, lands, goods, and very livelihood—if stripped so bare they could only flee. Flight would leave fields fallow and armies hungry, ruining both military supply and the note system. I am not indifferent to monetary policy nor deliberately opposing the central ministries. Stagnant notes and rising prices were lesser evils than mass flight and army starvation. The court did not act on his advice.
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三年十月,省臣奏:「向以物重錢輕,犯贓者計錢論罪則太重,於是以銀為則,每兩為錢二貫,有犯通寶之贓者直以通寶論,如因軍興調發,受通寶及三十貫者,已得死刑,准以金銀價,才為錢四百有奇,則當杖。 輕重之間懸絕如此。」 遂命准犯時銀價論罪。 四年三月,參知政事李複亨言:「近制,犯通寶之贓者並以物價折銀定罪,每兩為錢二貫,而法當贖銅者,止納通寶見錢,亦乞令依上輸銀,既足以懲惡,又有補於官。」 詔省臣議,遂命犯公錯過誤者止征通寶見錢,贓汙故犯者輸銀。
In the tenth month of year three provincial officials reported that because goods were dear and cash cheap, valuing bribes in coin had made punishments absurd: thirty strings of tongbao carried the death penalty under military requisition law, yet at silver rates that was worth only about four hundred cash—barely warranting a beating. The disparity between penalties was outrageous. The court ordered that bribery be assessed at prevailing silver rates. In March of year four Vice Grand Councilor Li Fuheng noted that while bribes in tongbao were now converted to silver at two thousand cash per tael, offenders who could commute punishment still paid in paper instead of silver; he asked that they pay silver too, both to deter crime and replenish the treasury. After consultation the court ruled that petty official errors could be redeemed in tongbao cash, but deliberate corruption required silver payment.
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十二月,鎮南軍節度使溫蒂罕思敬上書言:「錢之為泉也,貴流通而不可塞,積於官而不散則病民,散於民而不斂則闕用,必多寡輕重與物相權而後可。 大定之世,民間錢多而鈔少,故貴而易行。 軍興以來,在官殊少,民亦無幾,軍旅調度悉仰于鈔,日之所出動以萬計,至於填委市肆,能無輕乎? 不若馳限錢之禁,許民自采銅鑄錢,而官制模範,薄惡不如法者令民不得用,則錢必日多,鈔可少出,少出則貴而易行矣。 今日出益眾,民日益輕,有司欲重之而不得其法,至乃計官吏之俸、驗百姓之物力以斂之,而卒不能增重,曾不知錢少之弊也。 臣謂宜令民鑄錢,而當斂鈔者亦聽輸銀,民因以銀鑄錢為數等,文曰「興定元寶」,定直以備軍賞,亦救弊之一法也。」 朝廷不從。
In December Zhennan Army military commissioner Wanyan Sijing wrote that money, like a spring, must flow freely: hoarded in treasuries it oppressed the people, scattered unchecked it left the state short; only when quantity and value matched goods could it function. Under Emperor Shizong coin had been plentiful and notes scarce, so cash held its value and circulated easily. Since the wars began official and private coin had dwindled while army logistics depended entirely on notes poured out by the ten thousands daily until markets overflowed—is it any wonder they collapsed in value? Better to end the cash monopoly, let people mine copper and cast coin to government specifications, and ban substandard coin; supply would grow, note printing could shrink, and notes would regain value. Today ever more notes drove ever greater devaluation; officials seeking to restore their value even taxed officials' salaries and assessed household wealth, yet failed because they ignored the root problem—too little coin. He proposed private coinage with silver accepted in lieu of note levies, new "Xingding Yuanbao" coin in several denominations at fixed values for military pay—another stopgap reform. The court rejected the proposal.
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五年閏十二月,宰臣奏:「向者寶券既弊,乃造'貞祐通寶'以救之,迄今五年,其弊又複如寶券之末。 初,通寶四貫為銀一兩,今八百餘貫矣。 宜複更造'興定寶泉',子母相權,與通寶兼行,每貫當通寶四百貫,以二貫為銀一兩,隨處置庫,許人以通寶易之。 縣官能使民流通者,進官一階、升職一等,其或姑息以致壅滯,則亦追降的決為差。 州府官以所屬司縣定罪賞,命監察御史及諸路行部官察之,定撓法失糾舉法,失舉則御史降決,行部官降罰,集眾妄議難行者徒二年,告捕者賞錢三百貫。」 元光元年二月,始詔行之。 二年五月,更造每貫當通寶五十,又以綾印製「元光珍貨」,同銀鈔及餘鈔行之。 行之未久,銀價日貴,寶泉日賤,民但以銀論價。 至元光二年,寶泉幾於不用,乃定法,銀一兩不得過寶泉三百貫,凡物可直銀三兩以下者不許用銀,以上者三分為率,一分用銀,二分用寶泉及珍貨、重寶。 京師及州郡置平准務,以寶泉銀相易,其私易及違法而能告者罪賞有差。 是令既下,市肆晝閉,商旅不行,朝廷患之,乃除市易用銀及銀寶泉私相易之法。 然上有限用之名,而下無從令之實,有司雖知,莫能制矣。 義宗正大間,民間但以銀市易。 天興二年十月印「天興寶會」于蔡州,自一錢至四錢四等,同見銀流轉,不數月國亡。
In the intercalary twelfth month of year five the chief ministers reported that the "Zhenyou Tongbao" issued five years earlier to replace failed precious certificates had now deteriorated to the same degree. Tongbao had initially traded at four strings per tael of silver; by now it took over eight hundred. They proposed new "Xingding Baoquan" notes in parent and child denominations to circulate alongside tongbao, each new string worth four hundred tongbao or half a tael of silver, with exchange treasuries where people could swap old notes. Magistrates who kept notes circulating would be promoted; those whose lax enforcement let them stagnate would be demoted and beaten. Prefecture officials would be judged by their counties' performance; censors and circuit inspectors would patrol and punish obstruction or failure to report violations; organizing resistance carried two years' penal servitude; informants received three hundred strings. The new system took effect in the second month of Yuanguang 1 (1222). In May of Yuanguang 2 the exchange rate was revised to fifty tongbao per new string; silk-printed "Yuanguang Zhenhuo" notes were also issued alongside silver and older notes. Before long silver rose daily while Baoquan fell, and the market priced everything in silver alone. By Yuanguang 2 Baoquan was nearly worthless, so the court capped exchange at three hundred Baoquan per tael of silver, banned silver for purchases under three taels, and required larger transactions to split one-third silver and two-thirds Baoquan or other notes. Exchange offices were established in the capital and prefectures to swap Baoquan and silver, with graded penalties for private dealing and rewards for informants. Markets shut during daylight and commerce halted, so the court repealed the restrictions on silver use and private exchange. On paper use of paper money was restricted, but in practice no one obeyed and officials could not enforce the rules. Under Emperor Yizong during the Zhengda reign the public traded only in silver. In the tenth month of Tianxing 2 (1233) the court at Caizhou printed "Tianxing Baohui" notes from one to four qian in four denominations to circulate like silver; within months the dynasty fell.