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卷五十 志第三十一: 食貨五 榷場 和糴 常平倉 水田 區田之法 入粟鬻度牒

Volume 50 Treatises 31: Finance and Economics 5 - Monopoly Markets, State Purchase of Grain, Rice Fields, Agricultural Land Administration, Buying of Titles or Pardons with Grain and Selling of Ordination Certificates

Chapter 50 of 金史 · History of Jin
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1
西 西 西沿 西 西西西 西貿
These were the designated sites for border trade with hostile states. Each market had its own superintendent, strict regulations, and ample warehouses to move goods between the two realms, and annual receipts substantially eased the state's budget. In the fifth month of Xizong's Huangtong 2 (1142), the court granted the Song petition and set up markets on both sides of the frontier. In the ninth month the court ordered markets established at Shouzhou, Dengzhou, Fengxiang Prefecture, and other points. In the first month of Hailing's Zhenglong 4 (1159), the court closed the markets at Fengxiang Prefecture and at Tang, Deng, Ying, Cai, Gong, Tao, and Jiaoxi County, concentrating border trade at Sizhou alone. When war against the Song broke out soon after, those markets were closed as well. In the eighth month of year 5 the court ordered the border markets relocated to the Southern Capital. Early in the dynasty a market had stood between Swallow City and North Sheep City under the Northwestern Pacification Commission, where Jin goods were traded for livestock from the northern steppe. In Shizong's Dading 3 (1163) the court bought horses at the Western Xia border market. In the fourth year, acting on a memorial from the Department of State Affairs, the court reopened markets at Si, Shou, Cai, Tang, Deng, Ying, Mi, Fengxiang, Qin, Gong, and Tao. In the seventh year the Qinzhou market was barred from exporting rice, flour, cured meats, or any material that could be turned into weapons. In the second month of year seventeen the emperor told his ministers, "The Song delight in provocation and treaty-breaking and may even deal with the Kara-Khitai. Innocent lives could be lost if we are caught unprepared. Along the Shaanxi frontier only one border market should remain; all others are to be closed. Responsible offices were ordered to tighten scrutiny of spies and infiltrators." Earlier, to block spies, the court had already closed the three western markets at Lanzhou, Bao'an, and Suide. In the first month of year twenty-one Western Xia's King Li Renxiao petitioned for restoration, noting that Bao'an and Lanzhou yielded little produce and scant revenue, whereas Suide was a strategic site where border trade should resume; the court referred the matter to provincial ministers. The chief ministers argued that with Western Xia on Shaanxi's border, frontier residents crossed illegally to steal, and open markets let agents move freely; they proposed keeping Dongsheng as before while closing every Shaanxi market. The emperor replied, "Dongsheng and Shaanxi are too far apart for trade to flow; establish a market at Huanzhou instead." A market at Suide Prefecture was reopened soon afterward.
2
In the twelfth month the court forbade the Shouzhou market from accepting kickback payments. Fenli were gratuities merchants paid market officials on presentation.
3
西 貿
In the seventh month of Zhangzong's Mingchang 2 (1191) the Department of State Affairs noted lax controls at the Sizhou market and proposed adopting the Dading 5 rules: state-funded repairs, doubled checkpoints, supervision by market officials and control offices, and inspection by the surveillance commission. Only Dongsheng, Jing, Qingzhou, and Laiyuan Army were left unchanged; all other sites were refurbished. During the Dading era the Sizhou market yielded 53,467 strings annually; in Cheng'an 1 (1196) receipts rose to 107,893 strings and 653 cash. Each year the Sizhou market also forwarded tribute goods: 1,000 bundles of fresh tea, 500 jin of lychee, 500 jin of longan, 6,000 jin of kumquat, 500 jin of olives, 300 dried plantains, 1,000 jin of sappanwood, 7,000 Wenzhou oranges, 8,000 oranges, 300 jin of sugar, 600 jin of ginger, and 90 sheng of gardenia—excluding rhinoceros horn, ivory, cinnabar, and similar luxuries. The Song likewise collected 43,000 strings in annual duties. During Dading the Qinzhou Xizi City market yielded 33,656 strings a year; in Cheng'an 1 receipts reached 122,099 strings. In Cheng'an 2 (1197) markets at Bao'an and Lanzhou were reopened. In the ninth month of year three the Mobile Privy Council reported that Xiechu and others sought to open a border market and proposed siting it at a strategic point in Xialini. Trade was authorized beginning in the eleventh month of that year. Regulations soon fixed that taking cash across the border or trading it with foreigners at any circuit market drew five years' penal servitude, and three jin or more meant death. Every market on the Song frontier was closed when war against the Song resumed. In the eighth month of Taihe 8 (1208), after peace with the Song and a Song request to restore the old arrangement, markets reopened at Tang, Deng, Shou, Si, Xizhou, and in the Qin and Feng regions.
4
西
Tax on Gold and Silver In Shizong's Dading 5 (1165) the court allowed competitive bidding for the Baoshan County silver works. In the ninth year the Censorate reported that Henan Prefecture had used state gold-and-silver purchases to coerce the populace and cut payment below fair value. The emperor said, "I ordered this to keep currency circulating. How can it end up harming the people instead?" The practice was abolished. In the twelfth year an edict allowed free private mining of gold and silver without tax. In year twenty-seven the Department of State Affairs proposed letting farmers mine silver in slack seasons while paying official dues. By Mingchang 2 (1191) circulating gold exceeded 1,200 ingots and silver more than 552,000 ingots empire-wide. In the third year, on the surveillance commission's advice, silver works were sealed nationwide and private mining forbidden. In the fifth year the Censorate asked to reopen local gold, silver, and copper works to private operators; the emperor referred the matter to the Department of State Affairs. The chief ministers argued that after long peace and rising population, bans had failed: the poor still banded together to smelt in secret. Prohibition existed in name only. Yet smuggling continued unchecked, so the state gained nothing while commoners broke the law in droves. Competitive bidding would let poor households deploy strong men as master smiths and elders and children as helpers, share work fairly, and still leave contractors a margin. Such a system could be sustained long term. It would be far cheaper than state-run operations that hired labor at ruinous cost. Regulations followed: wherever mines existed, mouke and county magistrates were to register sites and invite competitive bids. Powerful families, officials, bow soldiers, and village clerks were barred from taking contracts. As with the old market system, one prefectural chief supervised each site while the surveillance commission investigated abuses. The emperor said, "This is no lasting solution." Vice Director Xu Chiguo replied, "Let it stand for now; once revenues justify it, the state can appoint officials. It resembles the wine trade: private workshops come first, state monopoly later." The emperor agreed, and the proposal was adopted. Fen Mountain and West Silver Mountain together held 113 silver mines.
5
西 西 宿
In the tenth month of Xizong's Huangtong 2 (1142), after the harvest in Yan, Western, Eastern Capital, Hedong, Hebei, Shandong, and Bianjing circuits, officials were ordered to buy grain at premium prices. In Shizong's Dading 2 (1162), with granaries depleted since the Zhenglong era, Junior Tutor Wanyan Shoudao was sent to eastern and western Shandong to buy army grain, requiring households to sell all surplus beyond annual rations at fair price. In the third year he told his ministers, "State expenses are enormous. The last Shandong purchase brought only 450,000-odd shi—not enough for reserves. Floods and droughts are as old as history; states escaped harm only when granaries were full. Shandong garrison districts need two years' grain on hand at once for relief when disaster strikes. Other provinces hosting troops must buy grain until stores are full. The capital's needs are vast; the Revenue Ministry must plan reserves without delay." In the fifth year he rebuked his ministers: "Stored grain is the state's foundation. Repair granaries and expand government purchases. I hear outer-circuit officials treat this as paperwork only. Your inattention falls far short of what I entrusted to you." In the eighth month of year six an edict ordered broad post-harvest purchases on every circuit against flood and drought. In the first month of year nine he warned his ministers, "The Song are unreliable; they may not keep the treaty for long. Order frontier commanders to tighten defenses against surprise attack. Henan had a bumper harvest last year; every locality should buy grain widely and fill the granaries. An edict forbade counties and prefectures from coercing the populace during government grain purchases." In the twelfth year
6
使 西 西
In the twelfth month an edict ordered capital grain purchases to fill granaries and keep currency circulating. Another edict required every district with a good harvest to buy grain broadly against disaster. In the fifth month of year sixteen he told Left Chancellor Heshenilie Liangbi, "The west has never stockpiled grain; order local purchases for emergencies." In the spring of year seventeen the Department reported that relief for famine victims in the Eastern Capital region had exhausted grain in three circuits. The emperor said, "I told you to buy grain generously in good years against famine. You all claimed granaries were overflowing; now you say there is nothing left for relief. Emperors since antiquity stored grain as a long-term policy. I did not stockpile it for myself alone. If supplies run short now, draw from neighboring circuits. Stockpile heavily from now on and make that the norm." In the fourth month the Department reported that the neediest of the twelve meng'an in the three Eastern Capital circuits had already been relieved. Others still awaited relief. Officials were sent to Fuzhou and the Hesuguan circuit to inspect wealthy households and buy surplus grain at premium prices. Nearby residents were to collect the grain on site. In the fourth month of year eighteen the court ordered meng'an under Taizhou and the Xi under the Northwestern Pacification Commission, and places such as Shisong River in Qingyun County, Xianping Prefecture, to buy grain heavily in good harvest years.
7
In the seventh month of Zhangzong's Mingchang 4 (1193) the emperor asked Revenue officials whether the state should buy Tongzhou's cheap grain at fair price. Offices replied that although the Central Capital circuit had failed last year, prices had eased only because merchant caravans kept arriving. Immediate official buying would likely spike prices and hurt the poor; they asked to wait until harvest and buy under Ever-Normal Granary rules. The edict approved the delay. In the fifth month of Mingchang 5 (1194) the emperor said, "Rice prices are soaring, but state shipments have created a surplus—sell grain at reduced prices. Tell the people plainly they need not pay private merchants inflated prices." In the seventh month of year six he charged his ministers, "Statutes require discounted sales in famine districts, but how will the poor without cash eat? Propose relief measures." Provincial ministers held that famine counties should receive loans the first year and free grain the second, and that households without fixed property should receive grants even in the loan year. The emperor ordered discounted sales where buyers could pay, and free relief for the destitute without means.
8
沿 便 沿 使 調 使
In the tenth month of Xuanzong's Zhenyou 3 (1215) Gao Rulü was sent to buy grain in Henan and require transport to the capital; capital granaries were also to buy any surplus the people still held. Attending Censor Huang Zhinu protested that Gao Rulü's purchases already met annual needs, yet the people had hauled grain beyond rent and tax and were exhausted. They were entitled to keep the remainder as travel costs—how can the state seize it again? Purchases have run for days yet yielded only 200-odd shi—of what use is that? The edict halted the practice. In the twelfth month neighboring districts bought heavily in the capital, grain prices soared, and the court barred grain from leaving the region. In the fourth year Hebei Branch Secretariat Hou Zhi reported that people in Hebei were eating one another and that a dou of rice in Guan and Cang prefectures cost more than ten liang of silver. River crossings allow grain to be shipped north, yet the state buys eight-tenths of each shi, leaving merchants no profit—who would undertake the trade? The people north of the river are Your Majesty's children. They have already suffered war, yet we watch them starve. Rebels may seize on this as a pretext to rise. I ask that purchases cease and private transport be permitted. The edict approved the proposal. Regulations also imposed one hundred blows on soldiers, civilians, or travelers who sold grain privately across the river rather than at official purchase stations. River troops, inspection officers, and powerful families who violated faced on-the-spot sentencing with added severity, and their goods were confiscated. Because Hebei held much currency widely dispersed among the populace, the emperor ordered the Department of State Affairs to devise remedies. Provincial ministers reported that Shandong and Hebei wine monopolies and the Bin and Cang Salt Offices had already been ordered to accept fractional payment in kind. With Hebei in famine and many shipping grain north, they proposed provisional rules to block state purchases. They proposed posting skilled finance officials on the south bank of each crossing to trade gold, silver, silk, and satin for merchants' grain, move it north, fund purchases from the proceeds, and collect cash. This would curb abuse and draw currency into the capital. The proposal was approved. Another memorialist said that repeated food shortages stemmed not only from heavy requisitions but also from wealthy consolidators who seized grain from the poor. At harvest they bought cheaply in bulk; in distress they lent on private pledges advertised as interest-free but yielding several times the principal. Starving peasants dared not bargain, so threshing had barely ended and official rent was still unpaid when their bins stood empty. Thus the rich grew richer and the poor poorer. Dynasty law capped monthly interest at three percent and stopped accumulation at double the principal, yet lenders now sometimes triple interest within a month. He asked for an edict enforcing the old interest caps and premium government purchases in good harvest years, benefiting the state without harming private interests. The edict ordered chief ministers to implement the policy. That year Acting Vice Pacification Commissioner Wugulun Qingshou of the Hedong South Circuit addressed compulsory grain purchases. See the Salt Treatise, Part 2.
9
西
In Xingding 1 (1217) the emperor heard that heavy government grain purchases drove many to abandon their trades and ordered chief ministers to address the problem. In the eighth month Revenue Director Yang Zhen was named acting Shaanxi Six Ministries Chancellor to fund Tong and Shaan cavalry and proposed buying only half the grain merchants sold across the river to ease the burden on the people. The proposal was approved.
10
In the sixth month the court established reward standards for government grain purchases.
11
Ever-Normal Granaries
12
使 使
In Shizong's Dading 14 (1174) regulations were enacted empire-wide, but the system was soon abandoned. In the eighth month of Zhangzong's Mingchang 1 (1190) censors asked to restore the system; the court ordered provincial ministers to deliberate and report. Provincial ministers cited the old Dading rule: in good years buy at two-tenths above market price, in lean years sell at one-tenth below, and in normal years take no action. Prices were raised in good years lest cheap grain harm farmers. Prices were lowered in scarcity lest dear grain harm the people. Raising and lowering prices stabilized grain markets—hence the name ever-normal—not a plan to make the entire populace depend on these granaries alone. With the empire's vast population, storing a full year's grain per capita would be unmanageable and risk spoilage if not released in time. Forced apportionment by local officials made the scheme unsustainable. If each county stored three months' grain per capita at the standard three-dou monthly ration, totals would reach tens of millions of shi—enough to stabilize prices and relieve famine. Districts with three months' surplus beyond troop rations should be exempt from purchase; deficient districts should buy in good years—then the system could endure. Effective enforcement was essential: the surveillance commission and circuit accounting offices should jointly oversee the system, obstructing clerks impeached and successful implementers promoted. Where the Central Capital circuit had a poor harvest, grain should be bought at one-third below market under ever-normal rules. The edict approved the plan.
13
西
In the eighth month of year three an edict required ever-normal granaries to buy in good years and sell in lean years, with rewards and punishments for diligent or lax enforcement announced on every circuit; the surveillance commission was to report lax officials. He also told his ministers that ever-normal granaries everywhere often existed in name only. Remote county households would not travel to prefectural seats to buy or sell grain. Each county should have its own granary supervised by prefectural and county officials. Counties within sixty li of the prefectural seat used the prefectural granary; those beyond sixty li had their own. The original three-month-per-capita target risked spoilage and was replaced by tiered quotas: 30,000 shi for counties above 20,000 households, 20,000 for above 10,000, 15,000 for 5,000–10,000, and 5,000 for below 5,000. Counties in Henan and Shaanxi that already stored garrison grain were exempt. Existing county granaries were retained; others were newly built. Outgoing county officials had one month to certify and hand over purchased grain in good condition. Where no co-supervisor existed, the same handover rules applied. Missed deadlines were referred to prefectures and the surveillance commission to dispatch overseers for supervised handover. Officials who bought less than one-tenth of quota in a good year were demoted within grade; the surveillance commission investigated and reported to the Department for evaluation.
14
In the ninth month an edict made prefectural officials responsible for ever-normal granaries with county officials assisting, tying promotion to purchase volume as permanent policy. He also instructed the Department that if Upper Capital counties could host ever-normal granaries, they should fix required reserves and report. In the tenth month of year four the Department reported that Upper Capital, Puyu, Supin, Yilao, and Hurigai circuits held over 176,000 meng'an and mouke households, collected 205,000 shi in tax grain annually, disbursed 66,000 shi, and held 2,476,000 shi in reserve. They argued that with high receipts and low disbursements, existing reserves sufficed for disaster relief and granaries were unnecessary. The plan was dropped.
15
便
In the ninth month of year five the Department reported that ever-normal granaries had been established in Mingchang 3 with permanent rules fixed. The empire had 519 ever-normal granaries holding 37.86 million shi of grain—five years' rations for troops and officials—and 8.1 million shi of rice for four years, but only 33.4 million strings in cash, barely two years' expenses. With cash scarce and rice still dear despite recent fair harvests, further purchases would likely spike prices and harm the people. An edict provisionally suspended ever-normal purchases empire-wide until official funds were in surplus.
16
沿 便
In the intercalary tenth month of Mingchang 5 a memorialist proposed opening canals where rivers existed; the edict was sent to all prefectures. Soon all eight surveillance commissions reported irrigation impossible despite rivers, except the Central Capital, which identified 4,000 mu in Ansu and Dingxing counties; an edict ordered work to proceed. In the tenth month of year six regulations promised first-rank promotion to county officials who opened 100 qing or more of irrigated land within their term. Colony Fields under Mouke Supervision Those who opened 30 qing or more received twenty liang of silver and bolts of silk, with rent and tax assessed at dry-field rates. In Cheng'an 2 an edict released water from the eastern sluice of White Lotus Pool for irrigation. In the third year the court again forbade destroying the Gaoliang River sluice and allowed public irrigation. In the seventh month of Taihe 8 the court ordered every surveillance commission to plan paddy development; a ministry official noted that canals along rivers and wells as at Pingyang could irrigate dry fields. Recently at Pi and Yi near the river, farmers sowed beans and wheat and dug wells when water failed, irrigating over 600 qing at several times dry-field yields. By that measure, the method could work elsewhere as well. The Transport Commission was to inspect during accounting tours; surveillance commissions promoting agriculture should report whether canals or wells were feasible, pending construction.
17
退
In the eighth month of Zhenyou 4 memorialist Cheng Yuan said that Dangshan counties' lakes could grow rice when flooded and wheat when drained, yielding double dry-field harvests. Tenants should be recruited with the state taking one-third, yielding 100,000 shi annually. The edict approved the plan. In the fifth month of Xingding 5 Nanyang Magistrate Li Guorui opened over 400 qing of paddy and was promoted two grades; his record was circulated to all circuits.
18
穿 西 西
In the eleventh month the court discussed expanding paddy cultivation. The Department cited Han precedent: Shao Xinchen was summoned to Nanyang and irrigated 30,000 qing. Under Wei, Jia Kui dammed the Ru River into a new reservoir linking transport for over 200 li, known as Marquis Jia's Canal. Deng Ai repaired the Huaiyang and Baichi canals, linking the Huai and Ying and major reservoirs south of the Ying with canals over 300 li long, irrigating 20,000 qing. Henan prefectures and counties still hold many ancient paddy sites yielding several times dry-field harvests. The Revenue Ministry was to tour prefectures, encourage reclamation where feasible, assess rent at dry-field rates without surcharges, and offer official rewards. Shaanxi, apart from the Sanbai Canal's established officials, should follow the same precedent. In the first month of Yuanguang 1 Revenue Director Yang Dayou and others were sent to the eastern, western, and southern capital circuits to open paddy.
19
Method of Plot Farming
20
使 使 便
See Ji Kang's Treatise on Nourishing Life; no method since has been applied empire-wide like Zhao Guo's three-furrow-per-mu system. In the third month of Zhangzong's Mingchang 3 chief ministers discussed plot farming before the throne; the emperor said their proposal was excellent but feared farmers would not understand it. If feasible, it should be announced throughout the realm. In the fourth month of summer, year four, the emperor raised plot farming again; Vice Director Xu Chiguo said population and expenses now far exceeded the Dading era. Adopting plot farming would bring great benefit. The emperor said, "This method is ancient; if it works, why has it not been adopted?" Chiguo replied that farmers had not yet seen its benefits. Trial plots south of the city were already under official supervision. Once farmers saw the harvest gains, others would follow without prompting. Vice Director Jiagu Heng objected that if the method were profitable, antiquity would already have used it. It required heavy labor for little planting and might waste ordinary field work. The emperor said, "Try it for now." In the sixth month the emperor asked Vice Director Xu Chiguo about the plot-farming trials. He replied that results would be visible only around the sixth and seventh months. He also asked, "How are the crops this year in Hedong and Daizhou?" The reply was that harvests were better than usual. That day two attendants were sent by post horse to inspect the capital region's crops. In the first month of year five an edict ordered plot farming; memorialist Wu Zhi Gao Yi had earlier submitted the method and asked to set planting quotas based on household registers and land holdings. After the Department finalized rules, farms of 100 mu or more near rivers had to plant at least 30 mu by the plot method, with more permitted. Waterless land was left to farmers' discretion. Thousand-household mouke and county officials were to encourage compliance.
21
祿
In the fourth month of Cheng'an 1 plot farming took effect: males fifteen to sixty with land planted one mu per ding, capped at five mu per household. In the second month of year two nine-circuit surveillance commissioner Ma Bailu cited the imperial rule of one mu plot farming per qing, capped at five mu. He argued that soil fertility varied and asked that mu quotas not be fixed. The regulation was approved.
22
使
In the ninth month of Taihe 4 the Department argued that plot farming was meant to help the people, but starting only in drought would make hasty implementation useless. Soils differ across the five regions; where plot farming works, farmers seeing profit would adopt it willingly. Otherwise strict enforcement would achieve nothing. An edict ordered local chiefs and surveillance commissions to encourage adoption, but the method never took hold.
23
Submitting Grain and Selling Ordination Certificates
24
西 西
In the third month of Xizong's Huangtong 3 (1143) drought and famine struck Shaanxi; wealthy households were allowed to buy offices with grain. In Shizong's Dading 1 (1161) war and crop failure led the court to allow grain payments for offices. Those who relieved famine victims were also recruited, with office grades set by the number saved. In the fifth year the emperor told his ministers that with the frontier unsettled and funds short, the court outside the two capitals had sold offices, ordination certificates for clergy, master titles, and temple name quotas. With the frontier now calm, all these measures were abolished. Qingshou Temple and Tianchang Abbey received annual certificate allotments worth 200,000 cash each. In Mingchang 2 graded rates for grain office purchases applied in famine-stricken parts of Shandong and Hebei. In Cheng'an 2 the court again sold certificates, master titles, and temple quotas and allowed grain office purchases. In the third year famine in the Western Capital led the court to sell ordination certificates for relief.
25
使 簿 簿 簿使 耀 滿
In Xuanzong's Zhenyou 2, on Daxing Prefecture Administrator Xu Ding's request, provisional favor-sale rates were fixed for rank advancement, mourning candidates seeking office, manumission of registered households, and similar benefits, each with set grain or fodder payments. In year three anyone, official or commoner, who induced others to submit goods received one promotion rank and regular appointment for 150 shi of rice. 700 shi brought two ranks and appointment in various offices. 1,000 shi brought three ranks and appointment as aide or registrar. Larger contributions required court deliberation on rewards. Investigation and county officials who induced 2,000 shi received one rank and 3,000 shi two ranks, to fill army stores. Officials who induced 5,000 shi or more had one review grade reduced; 10,000 shi brought one promotion and two grades reduced; 20,000 shi one promotion and one grade raised—all to current vacancies. In year four Hedong Branch Secretariat Xu Ding reported that Hedong had many troops, few people, empty granaries, and famine. Although Luzhou Marshal's headquarters had favor-sale rules, the articles were too few to encourage full participation. Purchased regular-rank posts would grant only one yin privilege by regulation. Additional payment could buy one more yin privilege. Monks and Daoists with master titles could purchase posts in their own bureaus. Officials who submitted grain or waived salary and ration certificates should receive measured promotions. Exam candidates aged fifty or above after three rounds, or forty-five after four, could buy minor offices or attendant posts with grain. Clerks, translators, and scribes not yet on the roster could also buy promotion. Ranked officials awaiting assignment could submit goods for provisional aide or registrar posts. Aides and registrars could advance to county magistrate; one dispatch tour was waived. Commanders who supplied their own fodder received promotions under the usual official rules. In year four Yaozhou monk Guanghui proposed that monastic officials at capital, prefectural, and military commission level submit 100 shi each because army stores were insufficient. Deputy abbots and masters of ceremony in defense prefectures required 70 shi and served thirty-month terms. Supervisory temples required 10 shi yearly, with renewal permitted. The edict approved the proposal.
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