Volume 139 Biographies 89: Lu Zhi

陸贄，字敬輿，蘇州嘉興人。父侃，溧陽令，以贄貴，贈禮部尚書。贄少孤，特立不群，頗勤儒學。年十八登進士第，以博學宏詞登科，授華州鄭縣尉。罷秩，東歸省母，路由壽州，刺史張鎰有時名，贄往謁之。鎰初不甚知，留三日，再見與語，遂大稱賞，請結忘年之契。及辭，遺贄錢百萬，曰：「願備太夫人一日之膳。」贄不納，唯受新茶一串而已，曰：「敢不承君厚意。」又以書判拔萃，選授渭南縣主簿，遷監察御史。德宗在東宮時，素知贄名，乃召為翰林學士，轉祠部員外郎。贄性忠盡，既居近密，感人主重知，思有以效報，故政或有缺，巨細必陳，由是顧待益厚。

Lu Zhi, whose courtesy name was Jingyu, came from Jiaxing in Suzhou. His father Lu Kan had served as magistrate of Liyang; when Zhi rose to prominence, Kan was posthumously ennobled as Minister of Rites. Orphaned in youth, Zhi held himself apart from others and devoted himself earnestly to classical studies. At eighteen he earned his jinshi degree and also passed the Broad Learning and Grand Composition examination; he was then appointed assistant magistrate of Zheng County in Hua Prefecture. After his term expired he traveled east to visit his mother. His route took him through Shou Prefecture, where he called on the prefect Zhang Yi, then a man of considerable renown. Yi initially took little notice of him, but after Zhi stayed three days and they met and talked again, Yi was deeply impressed and asked to become his friend despite the age gap. When Zhi departed, Yi gave him a million in cash, saying, "Please accept this for your mother's daily needs. Zhi refused the money and accepted only a single string of fresh tea, saying, "I dare not fail to honor your kindness." He later passed the Outstanding Documents and Judgments examination and was appointed principal clerk of Weinan County, then promoted to investigating censor. While still crown prince, Dezong had long known Zhi's reputation and summoned him as a Hanlin academician, later appointing him vice director in the Ministry of Rites. Devoted by nature, Zhi now served in the emperor's inner circle. Grateful for the sovereign's exceptional trust, he sought every means to repay it. Whenever he saw a flaw in policy, large or small, he spoke out without reserve, and the emperor's regard for him deepened accordingly.

建中四年，硃泚謀逆，從駕幸奉天。時天下叛亂，機務填委，征發指蹤，千端萬緒，一日之內，詔書數百。贄揮翰起草，思如泉註，初若不經思慮，既成之後，莫不曲盡事情，中於機會；胥吏簡劄不暇，同舍皆伏其能。轉考功郎中，依前充職。嘗啟德宗曰：「今盜遍天下，輿駕播遷，陛下宜痛自引過，以感動人心。昔成湯以罪己勃興，楚昭以善言復國。陛下誠能不吝改過，以言謝天下，使書詔無忌，臣雖愚陋，可以仰副聖情，庶令反側之徒，革心向化。」德宗然之。故奉天所下書詔，雖武夫悍卒，無不揮涕感激，多贄所為也。

In the fourth year of the Jianzhong era (783), Zhu Ci rebelled, and the court fled with the emperor to Fengtian. Rebellion engulfed the empire. State affairs piled up without end; levies, deployments, and orders crisscrossed in every direction. In a single day the court might issue hundreds of edicts. Zhi drafted these documents at speed, his thoughts flowing like a spring. His prose seemed effortless, yet every finished text fully grasped the situation and struck precisely the right note. The clerks could scarcely keep pace with his drafts, and his colleagues in the Hanlin Academy all marveled at his skill. He was promoted to director in the Bureau of Evaluations while retaining his Hanlin duties. He once urged Dezong: "Rebels now hold sway across the empire, and the throne is in exile. Your Majesty should openly acknowledge your faults to move the hearts of the people. In antiquity, King Cheng Tang revived his power by confessing his faults, and King Zhao of Chu recovered his kingdom through words of repentance. If Your Majesty will truly repent without reserve, speak frankly to the realm, and issue edicts without holding back, then though I am unworthy, I can help fulfill your intent and perhaps turn those who waver back to loyalty. The emperor agreed. The edicts issued at Fengtian moved even rough soldiers to tears; most of them were drafted by Zhi.

其年冬，議欲以新歲改元。而卜祝之流，皆以國家數鐘百六，凡事宜有變革，以應時數。上謂贄曰：「往年群臣請上尊號『聖神文武』四字，今緣寇難，諸事並宜改更，眾欲朕舊號之中更加一兩字，其事何如？」贄奏曰：「尊號之興，本非古制。行於安泰之日，已累謙沖；襲乎喪亂之時，尤傷事體。今者鑾輿播越，未復宮闈，宗社震驚，尚愆禋祀，中區多梗，大憝猶存。此乃人情向背之秋，天意去就之際，陛下宜深自懲勵，收攬群心，痛自貶損，以謝靈譴，不可近從末議，重益美名。」帝曰：「卿所奏陳，雖理體甚切，然時運必須小有改跡，亦不可執滯，卿更思量。」贄曰：「古之人君稱號，或稱皇稱帝，或稱王，但一字而已。至暴秦，乃兼皇帝二字，後代因之。及昏僻之君，乃有聖劉、天元之號。是知人主輕重，不在自稱，崇其號無補於徽猷；損其名不傷其德美。然而損之有謙光稽古之善，崇之獲矜能納諂之譏，得失不侔，居然可辨。況今時遭迍否，事屬傾危，尤宜懼思，以自貶抑。必也俯稽術數，須有變更。與其增美稱而失人心，不若黜舊號以祗天戒。天時人事，理必相符，人既好謙，天亦助順。陛下誠能斷自宸鑒，煥發德音，引咎降名，深示刻責，惟謙與順，一舉而二美從之。」德宗從之，但改興元年號而已。

That winter the court debated changing the reign title at the new year. Diviners and ritual specialists argued that the dynasty had entered an inauspicious cycle in the cosmic order and that reforms were needed to align with the times. The emperor said to Zhi, "Years ago the ministers asked to bestow on me the honorific 'Sacred, Divine, Martial, and Civil.' Now, with rebellion upon us, many say all things should change—including adding a word or two to my existing title. What do you think? Zhi replied, "Honorific titles were never part of ancient practice. Even in peaceful times they burdened a ruler's humility. To adopt them amid rebellion and disorder is especially unseemly. The throne is still in exile, the palace unrestored. The altars of state lie in peril, sacrifices remain neglected, the heartland is beset with troubles, and the great rebel still holds power. This is the moment when hearts turn toward or away from the throne, when Heaven's favor hangs in the balance. Your Majesty should discipline yourself, win back the people's loyalty, and humble yourself to answer Heaven's rebuke—not heed petty counsel and pile up empty titles." The emperor said, "Your reasoning is sound, but the times demand some outward change. One cannot be inflexible. Consider the matter again." Zhi said, "Ancient rulers called themselves Huang, Di, or Wang—never more than a single word. Only under the tyrannical Qin were the two characters Huang and Di combined, and later dynasties followed suit. Only debased rulers took such titles as Sacred Liu or Celestial Prime. A ruler's stature does not depend on what he calls himself. Adding to his title does nothing for good governance. Reducing his title does not diminish his virtue. To diminish one's title shows humility and respect for antiquity; to exalt it invites the charge of pride and flattery. The difference between gain and loss is plain. Now, in this time of obstruction and peril, you should all the more reflect in fear and humble yourself. If you must heed numerology and fate, change is still required. Better to set aside your old title and heed Heaven's warning than to add grand titles and lose the people's hearts. Heaven's will and human affairs must align. When men love humility, Heaven aids those who submit. If Your Majesty will judge for yourself, issue words of virtue, confess fault and lower your title, and show deep self-reproach, then in one act you will gain both humility and submission to Heaven." Dezong accepted his advice and changed only the reign title to Xingyuan.

初，德宗倉皇出幸，府藏委棄，凝冽之際，士眾多寒，服禦之外，無尺縑丈帛。及賊泚解圍，諸籓貢奉繼至，乃於奉天行在貯貢物於廊下，仍題曰「瓊林」、「大盈」二庫名。贄諫曰：

When Dezong first fled in haste, the treasury was abandoned. In the bitter cold the soldiers had little to wear; beyond the emperor's own garments there was scarcely a scrap of silk or cloth. After Zhu Ci's siege was lifted, tribute poured in from the provinces. At the Fengtian encampment the gifts were stored in the corridors and labeled with the names of two treasuries: Jade Grove and Great Abundance. Zhi remonstrated:

「瓊林」、「大盈」，自古悉無其制，傳諸耆舊之說，皆云創自開元。貴臣貪權，飾巧求媚，乃言：「郡邑貢賦所用，盍各區分：賦稅當委於有司，以給經用；貢獻宜歸於天子，以奉私求。」玄宗悅之。新是二庫，蕩心侈欲，萌柢於茲，迨乎失邦，終以餌寇。《記》曰：「貨悖而入，必悖而出。」豈其效歟！

"The treasuries called Jade Grove and Great Abundance have no precedent in antiquity. Elders say they were created in the Kaiyuan era." Powerful ministers, greedy for influence and skilled in flattery, proposed: "Let us separate the uses of local tribute: taxes should go to the regular offices for state expenses, while gifts of tribute should belong to the Son of Heaven for his private use. Emperor Xuanzong approved. Thus were these two treasuries born, planting the seeds of dissolute desire. In the end the dynasty lost the realm and fed its enemies. The Record of Rites says, "Wealth gained unjustly will be lost unjustly. Was this not exactly what followed!

陛下嗣位之初，務遵理道，敦行儉約，斥遠貪饕。雖內庫舊藏，未歸太府，而諸方曲獻，不入禁闈，清風肅然，海內丕變。近以寇逆亂常，鑾輿外幸，既屬憂危之運，宜增儆勵之誠。臣昨奉使軍營，出經行殿，忽睹右廓之下，榜列二庫之名，戄然若驚，不識所以。何者？天衢尚梗，師旅方殷，痛心呻吟之聲，噢咻未息；忠勤戰守之效，賞賚未行。諸道貢珍，遽私別庫，萬目所視，孰能忍情？竊揣軍情，或生觖望，或忿形謗讟，或醜肆謳謠，頗含思亂之情，亦有悔忠之意。是知氓俗昏鄙，識昧高卑，不可以尊極臨，而可以誠義感。

When Your Majesty first ascended the throne, you devoted yourself to right governance, practiced frugality, and kept the greedy at a distance. Though the inner treasury's old hoards had not yet been returned to the Grand Treasury, regional gifts no longer entered the palace. A refreshing discipline prevailed, and the realm was transformed. Now rebellion has thrown the realm into disorder and the throne is in exile. In such a time of peril you should redouble vigilance and restraint. Yesterday, on mission to the army camps, I passed the traveling palace and suddenly saw under the right corridor placards bearing the names of those two treasuries. I was struck with alarm and could not understand why. Why? The roads are still blocked, the armies still engaged. The wounded groan and cry without cease. Those who fought loyally have yet to receive their rewards. Tribute from the provinces is suddenly set aside in private treasuries before ten thousand watching eyes. Who can bear it? I fear the army may grow resentful, break into open slander, or spread ugly songs of discontent. Some already harbor thoughts of rebellion; others regret their loyalty. The common people are dull and cannot judge high from low. They cannot be won by displays of majesty, but they can be moved by sincerity and justice.

頃者六師初降，百物無儲，外扞兇徒，內防危堞，晝夜不息，殆將五旬。凍餓交侵，死傷相枕，畢命同力，竟夷大艱。良以陛下不厚其身，不私其欲，絕甘以同卒伍，輟食以啖功勞。無猛制人而不攜，懷所感也；無厚賞士而不怨，悉所無也。今者攻圍已解，衣食已豐，而謗讟方興，軍情稍沮，豈不以勇夫常性，嗜貨矜功，其患難既與之同憂，而好樂不與之同利，茍異恬默，能無怨咨！此理之常，故不足怪。《記》曰：「財散則民聚。」豈其效歟！陛下天資英聖，見善必遷，是將化蓄怨為銜恩，反過差為至當，促殄遺寇，永垂鴻名，大聖應機，固當不俟終日。

When the imperial armies first arrived, there were no stores of any kind. Outwardly they fought the rebels; inwardly they defended the walls. Day and night without rest—for nearly fifty days. Cold and hunger assailed them together; the dead and wounded lay piled upon one another. Yet they gave their all in common effort and at last overcame the great peril. This was because Your Majesty did not pamper himself or indulge his desires—he gave up delicacies to share with the ranks and went without food to feed those who had earned it. Without harsh discipline the men did not desert you, because they felt your care. Without rich rewards they did not complain, because you had nothing to give. Now the siege is lifted and food and clothing are plentiful, yet slander rises and army morale falters. Brave men by nature love gain and prize merit. They shared your hardship but do not share your ease. How can they remain silent without complaint? This is only human nature and is not to be wondered at. The Record of Rites says, "When wealth is dispersed, the people gather. Is this not the lesson! Your Majesty is gifted and sage, and turns to good at once. You can turn stored resentment into gratitude, correct error into right conduct, destroy the remaining rebels, and win lasting fame. A great sage acts when the moment calls—surely he need not wait even a day.

上嘉納之，令去其題署。

The emperor approved and ordered the placards removed.

興元元年，李懷光異志已萌，欲激怒諸軍，上表論諸軍衣糧薄，神策衣糧厚，厚薄不均，難以驅戰，意在撓沮進軍。李晟密奏，恐其有變，上憂之，遣贄使懷光軍宣諭。使還，贄奏事曰：

In the first year of Xingyuan (784), Li Huai'guang's disloyalty had already shown itself. Seeking to provoke the other armies, he memorialized that their rations of clothing and grain were meager while the Shence Army's were ample—unequal treatment, he claimed, made united campaigning impossible. His aim was to obstruct the advance. Li Sheng secretly warned that Huai'guang might rebel. The emperor was alarmed and sent Zhi to his camp to deliver the imperial message. On his return Zhi reported to the throne:

賊泚稽誅，保聚宮苑，勢窮援絕，引日偷生。懷光總仗順之軍，乘制勝之氣，鼓行芟翦，易若摧枯。而乃寇奔不追，師老不用，諸帥每欲進取，懷光輒沮其謀。據茲事情，殊不可解。陛下意在全護，委曲聽從，觀其所為，亦未知感。若不別為規略，漸相制持，唯以姑息求安，終恐變故難測。此誠事機危迫之秋也，故不可以尋常容易處之。

The rebel Zhu Ci awaits punishment, holed up in the palace grounds. His strength is spent, his allies gone; he merely prolongs his days. Huai'guang commands armies loyal to the throne and holds the advantage. He need only march forward to cut Zhu Ci down as easily as breaking dry wood. Yet he does not pursue the fleeing enemy. His army grows idle. Whenever the other commanders wish to advance, Huai'guang blocks them. On these grounds his conduct is utterly inexplicable. Your Majesty has sought to protect him and indulged his wishes, yet he shows no gratitude. Unless you adopt another strategy and gradually restrain him, seeking only temporary peace through indulgence, I fear an unforeseen crisis will arise. This is a moment of grave urgency and cannot be handled with ordinary ease.

今李晟奏請移軍，適遇臣銜命宣慰，懷光偶論此事，臣遂泛問所宜，懷光乃云：「李晟既欲別行，某亦都不要藉。」臣猶慮有翻覆，因美其軍強盛。懷光大自矜誇，轉有輕晟之意。臣又從容問云：「昨發離行在之日，未知有此商量；今日從此卻回，或恐聖旨顧問，事之可否，決定何如？」懷光已肆輕言，不可中變，遂云：「恩命許去，事亦無妨。」要約再三，非不詳審，雖欲追悔，固難為詞。伏望即以李晟表出付中書，敕下依奏，別賜懷光手詔，示以移軍事由。其手詔大意云：「昨得李晟奏，請移軍城東以分賊勢。朕緣未知利害，本欲委卿商量，適會陸贄從彼宣慰回，雲見卿論敘軍情，語及於此，仍言許去，事亦無妨，遂敕本軍允其所請。卿宜授以謀略，分路夾攻，務使葉齊，克平寇孽。」如此詞婉而直，理當而明，雖蓄異端，何由起怨？

Li Sheng has now asked to move his army. It happened that I was on mission to comfort the troops when Huai'guang raised the matter. I asked his view, and he said, "If Li Sheng wishes to march separately, I need no support from him at all. Fearing he might change his mind, I praised the strength of his army. Huai'guang swelled with pride and showed contempt for Li Sheng. I then asked calmly, "When I left the imperial camp yesterday, this matter had not been discussed. If I return now, the emperor may inquire. Has the matter been decided, or not? Huai'guang had spoken rashly and could not take it back. He said, "If the emperor permits it, there is no objection." He repeated his assent several times, clearly and deliberately. Though he may wish to retract it, he can hardly find words to do so. I beg Your Majesty to send Li Sheng's memorial to the Secretariat, issue an edict approving it, and separately send Huai'guang a handwritten edict explaining the reasons for the troop movement. The handwritten edict might read in substance: "Yesterday I received Li Sheng's memorial asking to move his army east of the city to divide the rebel force. Not knowing the full implications, I meant to consult you. Lu Zhi has just returned from your camp and reports that in discussing the army's situation you agreed that Li Sheng's move would be acceptable. I have therefore ordered Li Sheng's request granted. You should give him your counsel, attack by separate routes, and together destroy the rebels. Such words would be tactful yet direct, reasonable and clear. Even if he harbors disloyalty, how could he take offense?

臣初奉使諭旨，本緣糧料不均，偶屬移軍，事相諧會。又幸懷光詭對，且無阻絕之言，機宜合並。若有幽贊，一失其便，後何可追，幸垂裁察！

My original mission concerned unequal rations. The question of moving troops arose by chance, and the two matters fell conveniently together. Fortunately Huai'guang answered evasively and did not refuse outright. The opportunity should be seized at once. If Heaven favors us and we miss this chance, it cannot be recovered. I beg Your Majesty to decide!

德宗初望懷光回意破賊，故晟屢奏移軍不許；及贄縷陳懷光反狀，乃可晟之奏，遂移軍東渭橋。而鄜坊節度李建徽、神策行營陽惠元猶在咸陽，贄慮懷光並建徽等軍，又奏曰：

Dezong had initially hoped Huai'guang would return to loyalty and destroy the rebels, so Li Sheng's repeated requests to move his army were denied. When Zhi detailed Huai'guang's signs of rebellion, the emperor approved Li Sheng's request, and the army was moved to East Wei Bridge. Meanwhile Li Jianhui, military governor of Fufang, and Yang Huiyuan of the Shence mobile camp were still at Xianyang. Fearing that Huai'guang would absorb their armies, Lu Zhi memorialized again:

懷光當管師徒，足以獨制兇寇，逗留未進，抑有他由。所患太強，不資傍助。比者又遣李晟、李建徽、陽惠元三節度之眾附麗其營，無益成功，只憂生事。何則？四軍懸壘，群帥異心，論勢力則懸絕高卑，據職名則不相統屬。懷光輕晟等兵微位下，而忿其制不從心。晟等疑懷光養寇蓄奸，而怨其事多陵己。端居則互防飛謗，欲戰則遞恐分功，齟齬不和，嫌釁遂構，俾之同處，必不兩全。強者惡積而後亡，弱者勢危而先覆，覆亡之禍，翹足可期。舊寇未平，新患方起，憂嘆所切，實堪疚心。太上消慝於未萌，其次救失於始兆，況乎事情已露，禍難垂成，委而不謀，何以制亂？李晟見機慮變，先請移軍就東，建徽、惠元，勢轉孤弱，為其吞噬，理在必然。他日雖有良圖，亦恐不能自拔，拯其危急，唯在此時。今因李晟願行，便遣合軍同往，托言晟兵素少，慮為賊泚所邀，藉此兩軍，叠為掎角。仍先諭旨，密使促裝，詔書至營，即日進路。懷光意雖不欲，然亦計無所施。是謂先人有奪人之心，疾雷不及掩耳者也。

Huai'guang commands enough troops to subdue the rebels on his own. If he has lingered without advancing, there must be another reason. The concern is not that he lacks support, but that he is too strong. Recently Li Sheng, Li Jianhui, and Yang Huiyuan—the forces of three military governors—were attached to his camp. This will not help achieve victory; it will only provoke trouble. Why? Four armies camp apart, and their commanders are at odds. In strength they are vastly unequal, and in rank none is subordinate to another. Huai'guang looks down on Li Sheng and the others for their weaker forces and lower rank, and resents that he cannot fully command them. Li Sheng and the others suspect Huai'guang of deliberately sparing the enemy and harboring treachery, and resent his habit of riding roughshod over them. In camp they trade slander; in battle each fears the other will steal credit. Mutual distrust breeds conflict, and if they remain together, neither side can survive intact. The stronger will be destroyed only after hatred has built up; the weaker, more endangered, will fall first. Their ruin is only a matter of time. The old enemy is not yet subdued and a new threat is already rising. The anguish of this situation is truly hard to bear. The wise eliminate evil before it takes root; the next best remedy is at the first sign of trouble. When the danger is already exposed and disaster imminent, how can we refuse to act and still hope to control the chaos? Li Sheng saw what was coming and asked to move his army east. Jianhui and Huiyuan, left isolated and weak, will inevitably be swallowed up by Huai'guang. Even if they devise a better plan later, they may not escape in time. To save them, we must act now. Use Li Sheng's request as pretext to send all three armies east together. Say that Li Sheng's force is too small and might be intercepted by Zhu Ci's rebels, and that the other two armies will support him in a coordinated pincer. First send secret orders to prepare to march; when the edict reaches camp, they should move that same day. Huai'guang will dislike it, but will have no way to stop it. This is what the ancients meant by striking first: thunder before one can cover one's ears.

夫制軍馭將，所貴見情，離合疾徐，各有宜適。當離者合之則召亂，當合者離之則寡功；當疾而徐則失機，當徐而疾則漏策。得其要，契其時，然後舉無敗謀，措無危勢。而今者屯兵而不肯為用，聚將而罔能葉心，自為鯨鯢，變在朝夕。留之不足以相制，徒長歷階；析之各競於擅能，或成勛績。事有必應，斷無可疑。

In commanding armies and managing generals, what matters is reading the situation. Whether to unite or divide, to act quickly or slowly—each has its proper moment. Joining those who should be kept apart invites chaos; separating those who should act together diminishes their effectiveness. Moving too slowly when speed is needed loses the opportunity; acting too quickly when caution is needed ruins the plan. Seize the essential point and act at the right moment, and no plan will fail and no move will create danger. Now troops are assembled but will not cooperate, and generals are gathered but cannot unite. They are turning into mortal enemies, and disaster may strike at any moment. Keeping them together will not allow them to check one another; it will only escalate the danger. Separating them, each may strive to prove himself and perhaps achieve merit. This must be done; there is no room for doubt.

德宗曰：「卿之所料極善。然李晟移軍，懷光心已惆悵，若更遣建徽、惠元就東，則使得為詞。且俟旬時。」晟至東渭橋，不旬日，懷光果奪兩節度兵，建徽單騎遁而獲免，惠元中路被執，害之。報至行在，人情大恐。翌日，移幸山南。贄練達兵機，率如此類。

Dezong said, "Your assessment is excellent. But Li Sheng has already moved his army, and Huai'guang is already aggrieved. If we also send Jianhui and Huiyuan east, he will have grounds for complaint. Let us wait a little longer. Li Sheng reached East Wei Bridge. Within ten days Huai'guang seized the armies of the two governors. Jianhui escaped alone on horseback; Huiyuan was captured on the road and killed. When the news reached the emperor's camp, panic seized everyone. The next day the emperor moved his court to Shannan. Lu Zhi understood military affairs with similar insight throughout.

二月，從幸梁州，轉諫議大夫，依前充學士。先是，鳳翔衙將李楚琳乘涇師之亂，殺節度使張鎰，歸款硃泚。及奉天解圍，楚琳遣使貢奉，時方艱阻，不獲已，命為鳳翔節度使。然德宗忿其弒逆，心不能容，才至漢中，欲令渾瑊代為節度。贄諫曰：「楚琳之罪，固不容誅，但以乘輿未復，大憝猶存，勤王之師，悉在畿內，急宣速告，晷刻是爭。商嶺則道迂且遙，駱谷復為賊所扼，僅通王命，唯在褒斜，此路若又阻艱，南北便成隔絕。以諸鎮危疑之勢，居二逆誘脅之中，恟々群情，各懷向背。賊勝則往，我勝則來，其間事機，不容差跌。儻楚琳發憾，公肆猖狂，南塞要沖，東延巨猾，則我咽喉梗而心膂分矣，其勢豈不病哉！」上釋然開悟，乃善待楚琳使，優詔安慰其心。

In the second month he accompanied the emperor to Liangzhou and was promoted to Remonstrating Censor while continuing as a Hanlin academician. Earlier, Li Chulin, a garrison officer at Fengxiang, had taken advantage of the disorder among the Jingzhou troops to kill the military governor Zhang Yi and declare allegiance to Zhu Ci. After the siege of Fengtian was lifted, Chulin sent envoys with tribute. The court, still in dire straits, had no choice but to appoint him military governor of Fengxiang. Dezong, however, could not forgive Chulin's murder and treason. As soon as he reached Hanzhong, he wanted Hun Jian to replace him as military governor. Lu Zhi remonstrated: "Chulin's crimes certainly deserve death. But the emperor has not yet returned to the capital, the great rebel still holds power, and all the armies that came to the throne's aid are still in the vicinity. Every moment counts in dispatching orders. The route over the Shang Mountains is long and circuitous, and Luogu Pass is again held by the enemy. Imperial orders can barely get through only via Baoxie. If that route is also blocked, north and south will be completely cut off. The commanderies are uncertain and caught between two rebels who press and seduce them. Public feeling is turbulent, and each man wavers between loyalty and defection. They will go over to whichever side is winning. At such a moment we cannot afford the slightest misstep. If Chulin turns hostile and acts recklessly, he will block the vital southern route and link up with the great rebel in the east. Our throat will be cut and our forces divided. Would that not be disastrous! The emperor took his point and treated Chulin's envoys kindly, sending a gracious edict to reassure him.

德宗至梁，欲以谷口已北從臣賜號曰「奉天定難功臣」，谷口已南隨扈者曰「元從功臣」，不選朝官，一例俱賜。贄奏曰：「破賊扞難，武臣之效。至如宮闈近侍，班列員僚，但馳走從行而已，忽與介胄奮命之士，俱號功臣，伏恐武臣憤惋。」乃止。

When Dezong reached Liangzhou, he proposed to grant the title "Meritorious Pacifier of the Fengtian Crisis" to followers who had been north of Gukou and "Meritorious Companion from the Outset" to those who had accompanied him south of Gukou—all without distinction between court officials and others. Lu Zhi memorialized: "Defeating rebels and bearing hardship are the deeds of military men. Palace attendants and ordinary officials merely followed along. To call them meritorious alongside soldiers who fought in armor may provoke resentment among the military. The emperor abandoned the plan.

李晟既收京城，遣中使宣付翰林院具錄先散失宮人名字，令草詔賜渾瑊，遣於奉天尋訪，以得為限，仍量與資糧送赴行在。贄不時奉詔，進狀論之曰：

After Li Sheng recaptured the capital, he sent an imperial envoy to the Hanlin Academy with orders to compile a list of palace women who had been displaced, draft an edict for Hun Jian, and send him to Fengtian to find them and escort them to the emperor's camp with provisions. Lu Zhi did not draft the edict immediately. Instead he submitted a memorial arguing:

頃以理道乖錯，禍亂薦鐘，陛下思咎懼災，裕人罪己，屢降大號，誓將更新。天下之人，垂涕相賀，懲忿釋怨，煦仁戴明，畢力同心，共平多難。止土崩於絕岸，收版蕩於橫流，殄寇清都，不失舊物。實由陛下至誠動於天地，深悔感於神人，故得百靈降康，兆庶歸德。茍不如此，自古何嘗有捐棄宮闕，失守宗祧，繼逆於赴難之師，再遷於蒙塵之日，不逾半歲，而復興大業者乎！

Because governance had gone astray, calamity followed calamity. Your Majesty reflected on his errors, blamed himself before the people, and repeatedly issued great amnesties, vowing to begin anew. The people wept with joy, set aside old grievances, and united in gratitude to restore peace together. You halted collapse at the brink, gathered the fragments from the flood, destroyed the rebels, and recovered the capital without losing the dynasty's heritage. This was because Your Majesty's sincerity moved Heaven and Earth and your repentance touched gods and men, so that all spirits brought peace and the people returned to allegiance. Without this, when in all history has an emperor who abandoned his palace, lost his ancestral shrine, faced successive rebellions while rallying relief armies, and fled twice in disgrace restored the empire in less than half a year?

今渠魁始平，法駕將返，近自郊甸，遠周寰瀛，百役疲瘵之氓，重戰傷殘之卒，皆忍死扶病，傾耳聳肩，想聞德聲，翹望聖澤。陛下固當感上天悔禍之眷，荷列祖垂裕之休，念將士鋒刃之殃，湣黎元塗炭之酷。以致寇為戒，以居上為危，以務理為憂，以復宮為急。損之又損，尚懼汰侈之易滋；艱之惟艱，猶患戒慎之難久。謀始盡善，克終已稀；始而不謀，終則何有！夫以內人為號，蓋是中壺末流。天子之尊，富有宮掖，如此等輩，固繁有徒，但恐傷多，豈憂乏使！翦除元惡，曾未浹辰，奔賀往來，道途如織。何必自虧君德，首訪婦人，又令資裝速赴行在！萬目閱視，眾口流傳，恐非所以答慶賴之心，副惟新之望也。

Now that the rebel leader has just been crushed and the imperial carriage is about to return, from the capital outskirts to the farthest corners of the realm, exhausted laborers and battle-wounded soldiers alike endure their pain, straining to hear your benevolent words and hoping for your grace. Your Majesty should respond to Heaven's mercy in turning aside disaster, honor the blessing left by your ancestors, remember the wounds of your soldiers, and pity the suffering of the people. Take the rebels as a warning, regard your position as perilous, make good governance your concern, and return to the palace your urgent task. You must keep stripping away excess, for luxury spreads easily. The road ahead is hard, and vigilance is hard to sustain. Many begin well. Few finish well. If you do not plan from the beginning, what can you hope for at the end? To make palace women the priority belongs to the least worthy concerns of the inner court. The Son of Heaven has a full palace. Such women are hardly scarce. You should fear causing too much harm, not worry about finding attendants! The chief villain has been eliminated only days ago. Messengers of congratulation fill the roads like threads on a loom. Why diminish your stature as ruler by seeking out women first and ordering them rushed to your camp with provisions? Ten thousand eyes are watching and ten thousand tongues are speaking. This will not meet the people's joy and hope for renewal.

夫事有先後，義有重輕，重者宜先，輕者宜後。武王克殷，有未及下車而為之者，有下車而為之者，蓋美其不失先後之宜也。自翠華播越，萬姓靡依，清廟震驚，三時乏祀，當今所務，莫大於斯。誠宜速遣大臣，馳傳先往，迎復神主，修整郊壇，展禋享之儀，申告謝之意。然後吊恤死義，慰犒有功，綏輯黎蒸，優問耆耋。安定反側，寬宥脅從；宣暢郁堙，褒獎忠直；官失職之士，復廢業之人。是皆宜先，不可後也。至如崇飾服器，繕緝殿臺，備耳目之娛，選巾櫛之侍，是皆宜後，不可先也。

Affairs have their order of priority. Weighty matters come first; lesser ones afterward. When King Wu conquered the Shang, some things he did before he even left his chariot and others only after he dismounted—because he never lost the proper sense of priority. Since the imperial progress fled into exile, the people have been without refuge, the ancestral temple has been desecrated, and sacrifices have ceased for seasons. Nothing is more urgent than this. You should promptly send high ministers posthaste to recover the spirit tablets of the ancestors, restore the suburban altars, perform the sacrificial rites, and offer thanks to Heaven. Then mourn the dead, reward the meritorious, restore order among the people, and show kindness to the elderly. Reassure those who wavered and pardon those who were forced to follow the rebels. Give voice to silenced grievances and honor the loyal and upright. Restore officials who lost their posts and help those whose livelihoods were destroyed. All of these should come first, not last. As for fine dress and ornaments, palace repairs, diversions for amusement, and choosing personal attendants—these must wait and cannot come first.

散失內人，已經累月，既當離亂之際，必為將士所私。其人若稍有知，不求當自陳獻；其人若甚無識，求之適使憂虞。自因寇亂喪亡，頗有大於此者，一聞搜索，懷懼必多；余孽尚繁，群情未一，因而善撫，猶恐危疑，若又懼之，於何不有！昔人所以掩絕纓而飲盜馬者，豈必忘其情愛，蓋知為君之體然也。以小妨大，明者不為。天下固多褻人，何必獨在於此。所令撰賜渾瑊詔書，未敢順旨。

The displaced palace women have been gone for months. In the chaos they have surely been taken by soldiers. If any are sensible, they will come forward on their own without being sought. If any are foolish, searching for them will only cause trouble. Many have suffered losses far worse in the rebellion. Once a search is announced, fear will spread widely. Rebel remnants are still numerous and public feeling is not yet unified. Even with gentle handling they remain unsettled. If you frighten them further, what calamity might not follow? The ancients who hid a dropped cap-string and watered a stolen horse did not forget personal attachment. They understood what conduct befits a ruler. The wise do not let small matters obstruct great ones. The world has no shortage of humble women. Why must you focus on these alone? Your servant dare not draft the edict for Hun Jian as ordered.

帝遂不降詔，但遣使而已。

The emperor did not issue the edict, and sent only an ordinary envoy.

德宗還京，轉中書舍人，學士如故。初，贄受張鎰知，得居內職；及鎰為盧杞所排，贄常憂惴；及杞貶黜，始敢上書言事。德宗好文，益深顧遇。奉天解圍後，德宗言及違離宗廟，嗚咽流涕曰：「致寇之由，實朕之過。」贄亦流涕而對曰：「臣思致今日之患者，群臣之罪也。」贄意蓋為盧杞、趙贊等也。上欲掩杞之失，則曰：「雖朕德薄，致茲禍亂，亦運數前定，事不由人。」贄又極言杞等罪狀，上雖貌從，心頗不說。吳通微兄弟俱在翰林，亦承德宗寵遇，文章才器不迨贄；而能交結權幸，共短贄於上前。故劉從一、姜公輔自卑品蒼黃之中，皆登輔相；而贄為朋黨所擠，同職害其能，加以言事激切，動失上之歡心，故久之不為輔相。其於議論應對，明練理體，敷陳剖判，下筆如神，當時名流，無不推挹。

When Dezong returned to the capital, Lu Zhi was promoted to Secretariat Drafter while continuing as a Hanlin academician. Earlier, Lu Zhi had owed his position in the inner court to Zhang Yi's patronage. When Zhang Yi was ousted by Lu Qi, Lu Zhi lived in constant apprehension. Only after Lu Qi was demoted did he dare to speak frankly in memorials. Dezong loved literature and favored Lu Zhi all the more. After the siege of Fengtian was lifted, Dezong spoke of having been driven from the ancestral temple and wept: "The blame for bringing on the rebels is mine alone. Lu Zhi wept in reply: "Your servant believes today's disaster is the fault of your ministers. He had Lu Qi, Zhao Zan, and others in mind. Wishing to shield Lu Qi, the emperor said: "Though my virtue is insufficient and brought this calamity, it was also fated—beyond human control. Lu Zhi again enumerated the crimes of Lu Qi and the others. The emperor seemed to agree but was inwardly displeased. Wu Tongwei and his brothers served in the Hanlin and also enjoyed Dezong's favor, though their literary talent did not match Lu Zhi's. But they cultivated connections with the powerful and slandered Lu Zhi before the emperor. Therefore Liu Congyi and Jiang Gongfu rose from humble posts amid the crisis to become chief ministers. Lu Zhi, squeezed out by faction and envied by colleagues, and because his memorials were blunt and often displeased the emperor, was long passed over for the chancellorship. In debate and reply he grasped principle with luminous clarity, unfolding arguments with penetrating analysis and writing as if divinely inspired. Every eminent man of the age held him in the highest regard.

貞元初，李抱真入朝，從容奏曰：「陛下幸奉天、山南時，赦書至山東，宣諭之時，士卒無不感泣。臣即時見人情如此，知賊不足平也。」

Early in the Zhenyuan era, Li Baozhen came to court and said calmly to the emperor: "When Your Majesty took refuge at Fengtian and in the south, the amnesty edict reached Shandong. When it was read aloud, not a soldier failed to weep. I saw the people's hearts at once and knew the rebels could not be easily crushed."

時贄母韋氏在江東，上遣中使迎至京師，搢紳榮之。俄丁母憂，東歸洛陽，寓居嵩山豐樂寺。籓鎮賻贈及別陳餉遺，一無所取。與韋臯布衣時相善，唯西川致遺，奏而受之。贄父初葬蘇州，至是欲合葬。上遣中使護其柩車至洛，其禮遇如此。免喪，權知兵部侍郎，依前充學士。申謝日，贄伏地而泣，德宗為之改容敘慰。恩遇既隆，中外屬意為輔弼，而宰相竇參素忌贄，贄亦短參之所為，言參黷貨，由是與參不平。

Lu Zhi's mother, Lady Wei, was then in Jiangdong. The emperor sent a palace envoy to bring her to the capital, to the admiration of the court. Soon afterward he entered mourning for his mother, returned east to Luoyang, and took lodging at Fengle Temple on Mount Song. He accepted none of the condolence gifts sent by regional commanders or the private offerings they pressed upon him. He and Wei Gao had been friends since their days as commoners. Only gifts from Wei in the west were accepted—and then only after Lu Zhi had memorialized the court and received permission. His father had first been buried in Suzhou; Lu Zhi now wished to move the grave for a joint burial with his mother. The emperor sent a palace envoy to escort the coffin to Luoyang—a mark of the honor shown him. When mourning ended he was appointed acting Vice Minister of War while retaining his post as Hanlin academician. When he presented his thanks, Lu Zhi prostrated himself and wept. Dezong's expression softened and he spoke to comfort him. With favor so high, the court expected him to become chief minister. But Chief Minister Dou Can had long resented him, and Lu Zhi in turn attacked Dou's conduct, accusing him of corrupt gain. From that point the two were at odds.

七年，罷學士，正拜兵部侍郎，知貢舉。時崔元翰、梁肅文藝冠時，贄輸心於肅。肅與元翰推薦藝實之士，升第之日，雖眾望不愜，然一歲選士，才十四五，數年之內，居臺省清近者十余人。

In the seventh year he left the Hanlin Academy, was formally appointed Vice Minister of War, and put in charge of the civil service examinations. Cui Yuanhan and Liang Su were then the leading literary figures of the age, and Lu Zhi put his full trust in Liang Su. Liang Su and Cui Yuanhan recommended men of genuine talent. When the successful candidates were announced, public opinion was not wholly satisfied—yet in a single year's selection only fourteen or fifteen passed, and within a few years more than ten held prestigious posts in the central boards and departments.

八年四月，竇參得罪，以贄為中書侍郎、門下同平章事。贄久為邪黨所擠，困而得位，意在不負恩獎，悉心報國，以天下事為己任。上即位之初，用楊炎、盧杞秉政，樹立朋黨，排擯良善，卒致天下沸騰，鑾輿奔播。懲是之失，貞元已後，雖立輔臣，至於小官除擬，上必再三詳問，久之方下。及贄知政事，請許臺省長官自薦屬官，仍保任之，事有曠敗，兼坐舉主。上許之，俄又宣旨曰：「外議云：『諸司所舉，多引用親黨，兼通賂遺，不得實才。』此法行之非便，今後卿等宜自選擇，勿用諸司延薦。」贄論奏曰：

In the fourth month of the eighth year Dou Can fell from power, and Lu Zhi was appointed Vice Director of the Secretariat and Grand Councillor. Long blocked by faction, Lu Zhi had at last won the post through hardship. He meant to repay the emperor's kindness, devote himself to the state, and take the affairs of the empire as his own responsibility. At the start of his reign the emperor had put Yang Yan and Lu Qi in power. They built factions, drove out the worthy, and in the end threw the realm into turmoil and forced the emperor himself into flight. Chastened by that failure, after the Zhenyuan era the emperor, even after appointing chief ministers, would repeatedly question every minor appointment in detail and delay issuing orders for a long time. When Lu Zhi took charge of government, he asked that heads of the central boards and departments be allowed to recommend their own subordinates and guarantee their conduct, with the recommender held jointly liable if a nominee failed in office. The emperor agreed, but soon issued another edict: "Outside opinion says the offices mostly recommend relatives and allies, pass bribes, and fail to produce truly capable men. This policy is awkward in practice. Hereafter you ministers should choose men yourselves and not rely on recommendations from the offices. Lu Zhi submitted a reasoned memorial, saying:

臣實頑鄙，一無所堪，猥蒙任使，待罪宰相。雖懷竊位之懼，且乏知人之明，自揣庸虛，終難上報。唯知廣求才之路，使賢者各以匯征；啟至公之門，令職司皆得自達。既蒙允許，即宜宣行。南宮舉人，才至十數，或非臺省舊吏，則是使府佐僚，累經薦延，多歷事任。論其資望，既不愧於班行；考其行能，又未聞於闕敗。遽以騰口，上煩聖聰，道之難行，亦可知矣！

Your servant is truly dull and unworthy, fit for nothing, yet undeservedly raised to the chancellorship to serve at risk of fault. Though I fear I hold a post beyond my desert, and though I lack the discernment to know men well, I know myself to be mediocre and can scarcely hope to repay Your Majesty's grace. I know only that the path to talent must be widened so that the worthy may each be summoned forth together. Open the gate of perfect fairness so that every office may make itself known. Having received Your Majesty's approval, the policy ought at once to be proclaimed and put into effect. The recent examination passers numbered only a dozen or so. Some were not former clerks of the central boards and departments but staff of commissioner offices, repeatedly recommended and long experienced in office. In seniority and reputation they were fit for their ranks. In conduct and ability none had yet been found deficient. Yet at once the mouths of rumor stir, troubling Your Majesty's ear. How difficult it is to put sound policy into practice is plain enough!

陛下勤求理道，務徇物情，因謂舉薦非宜，復委宰臣揀擇。其為崇任輔弼，博采輿詞，可謂聖德之盛者。然於委任責成之道，聽言考實之方，閑邪存誠，猶恐有闕。陛下既納臣言而用之，旋聞橫議而止之，於臣謀不責成，於橫議不考實，此乃謀失者得以辭其罪，議曲者得以肆其誣。率是而行，觸類而長，固無必定之計，亦無必實之言。計不定則理道難成，言不實則小人得誌。國家之病，常必由之。昔齊桓公問管仲害霸之事，對曰：「得賢不能任，害霸也；用而不能終，害霸也；與賢人謀事，而與小人議之，害霸也。」為小人者，不必悉懷險诐，故覆邦家。蓋以其意性回邪，趣向狹促，以沮議為出眾，以自異為不群，趨近利而昧遠圖，效小信而傷大道，況又言行難保，恣其非心者乎！

Your Majesty earnestly seeks good government and attends to public feeling, and for that reason you hold that recommendation is unsuitable and again leave selection to the chief ministers. In honoring your ministers and heeding public opinion, this shows the greatness of your sage virtue. Yet in entrusting responsibility, testing speech against fact, and keeping out evil while holding to sincerity, I fear something is still lacking. Your Majesty accepted my proposal and put it into effect, then at once halted it on hearing reckless criticism. You hold me to no account for the plan's failure, yet you do not test the reckless critics' claims. Thus those whose counsel fails may excuse their fault, and those who speak crookedly may slander at will. If this pattern continues and spreads by analogy, there will be no settled policy and no speech that can be trusted as true. Without settled plans good government cannot be achieved; without truthful speech petty men get their way. The state's afflictions commonly spring from this. Formerly Duke Huan of Qi asked Guan Zhong what harmed hegemony. He answered: "To gain worthy men yet fail to employ them harms hegemony; To employ them yet fail to see the appointment through harms hegemony; To plan with worthy men yet debate the plan with petty men harms hegemony." Petty men need not all harbor treacherous intent in order to ruin state and family. Their minds are crooked and their outlook cramped. They treat obstruction as distinction, eccentricity as independence, near gain as wisdom and far design as folly, small shows of trustworthiness as virtue and the great Way as expendable—and all the more so when their words and deeds cannot be trusted and they indulge their private malice!

伏以宰輔，常制不過數人，人之所知，固有限極，不有遍諳諸士，備閱群才。若令悉命群官，理須展轉詢訪，是則變公舉為私薦，易明易攵為暗投。儻如議者之言，所舉多有情故，舉於君上，且未絕私；薦於宰臣，安肯無詐！失人之弊，必又甚焉。所以承前命官，罕有不涉私謗，雖則秉鈞不一，或自行情，亦由私訪所親，轉為所賣。其弊非遠，聖鑒明知。今又將徇浮言，專任宰臣除吏，宰臣不遍諳識，踵前須訪於人。若訪親朋，則是悔其覆車，不易故轍；若訪於朝列，則是求其私薦，不如公舉之愈也。二者利害，惟陛下更詳擇焉。恐不如委任長官，慎揀僚屬，所揀既少，所求亦精，得賢有鑒識之名，失實當暗謬之責。人之常性，莫不愛身，況於臺省長官，皆是當朝華選，孰肯徇私妄舉，以傷名取責者耶！所謂臺省長官，即僕射、尚書、左右丞、侍郎及御史大夫、中丞是也。陛下比擇輔相，多亦出於其中。今之宰臣，則往日臺省長官也；今之臺省長官，乃將來之宰臣也，但是職名暫異，固非行業頓殊。豈有為長官之時不能舉一二屬吏，居宰臣之位則可擇千百具僚，物議悠悠，其惑斯甚。

Chief ministers, by custom, number only a few. What any man can know is necessarily limited; they cannot know every scholar or review every talent in the realm. If the chief ministers must appoint every official themselves, they can only do so by making round after round of private inquiry—turning public recommendation into private patronage and open selection into back-room nomination. If the critics are right that recommendations are mostly made through personal ties, then even when names are sent to Your Majesty private favor is not eliminated; when names are sent to the chief ministers, how can fraud be avoided! The loss of capable men will be even worse. That is why past appointments were rarely free of private complaint. Even when chief ministers differed in judgment and some acted from personal inclination, they still relied on private inquiries among their intimates—and were in turn betrayed by them. This evil is not remote; Your Majesty knows it well. Now, yielding again to loose talk, you would leave appointment entirely to the chief ministers. They cannot know everyone themselves and, as before, must ask others. If they ask kin and friends, they repeat the old mistake and change nothing; if they ask colleagues at court, they solicit private recommendations—which is no better than open recommendation. Between the two courses, may Your Majesty weigh the benefit and harm. Better, I fear, to entrust department chiefs to choose their subordinates carefully. Fewer men would be chosen, but the search would be sharper. Success would bring them credit for discernment; failure would bring blame for error. Human nature being what it is, every man protects his own reputation—how much more the heads of the central boards and departments, all chosen from the finest of the court. Who among them would risk his name by recommending unworthy men for private reasons! By Board and Department chiefs I mean the Grand Masters, Ministers, Left and Right Vice Directors, Vice Ministers, Censor-in-Chief, and Vice Censor-in-Chief. Many of the chief ministers Your Majesty has lately chosen came from among them. Today's chief ministers were yesterday's board and department heads; and today's board and department heads are tomorrow's chief ministers. Only the titles differ for a time; their character and capacity are not suddenly transformed. How can the same men who, as department heads, could not be trusted to recommend one or two subordinates suddenly, as chief ministers, be expected to choose hundreds and thousands of officials? Public opinion is baffled indeed.

夫求才貴廣，考課貴精。求廣在於各舉所知，長吏之薦擇是也；貴精在於按名責實，宰臣之序進是也。往者則天太后踐祚臨朝，欲收人心，尤務拔擢，弘委任之意，開汲引之門，進用不疑，求訪無倦，非但人得薦士，亦許自舉其才。所薦必行，所舉輒試，其於選士之道，豈不傷於容易哉！而課責既嚴，進退皆速，不肖者旋黜，才能者驟升，是以當代謂知人之明，累朝賴多士之用。此乃近於求才貴廣，考課貴精之效也。

In seeking talent breadth matters; in judging performance precision matters. Breadth lies in each man recommending those he knows—the department chiefs' selections serve this purpose; precision lies in matching names to reality and holding men accountable—the chief ministers' review serves this purpose. When Empress Wu Zetian came to the throne she sought to win hearts and made promotion her chief task. She opened wide the gate of appointment, advanced men without hesitation, and searched tirelessly. Not only could officials recommend others; they might even recommend themselves. Every recommendation was acted on and every nominee promptly tested. By the standards of selecting scholars, was this not dangerously easy! Yet because examination was strict and promotion and dismissal swift, the unworthy were quickly removed and the capable rapidly advanced. The age was praised for knowing men, and later reigns benefited from the abundance of talent. This was nearly the perfect balance of breadth in seeking talent and precision in judging performance.

陛下誕膺寶歷，思致理平，雖好賢之心，有逾於前哲，而得人之盛，未迨於往時。蓋由賞鑒獨任於聖聰，搜擇頗難於公舉，仍啟登延之路，罕施練核之方。遂使先進者漸益雕訛，後來者不相接續，施一令則謗沮互起，用一人則瘡磐立成。此乃失於選才太精，制法不一之患也。則天舉用之法，傷易而得人；陛下慎揀之規，太精而失士。陛下選任宰相，必異於庶官；精擇長官，必愈於末品。及至宰相獻規，長吏薦士，陛下即但納橫議，不稽始謀。是乃任以重者輕其言，待以輕者重其事，且又不辨所毀之虛實，不校所試之短長。人之多言，何所不至，是將使人無所措其手足，豈獨選任之道失其端而已乎！

Your Majesty, born to the throne and intent on bringing order, loves worthy men even more than the sages of old—yet the harvest of talent has not matched earlier times. This is because judgment rests solely with Your Majesty, open recommendation is difficult, the gate of appointment remains open, and rigorous testing is rarely applied. The result is that senior men grow ever more compromised, successors fail to follow them, every decree provokes a chorus of slander, and every appointment leaves fresh scars. This is the harm of selecting talent too narrowly and keeping policy unsettled. Empress Wu's method erred on the side of ease, yet she obtained men; Your Majesty's rule errs on the side of strictness, and scholars are lost. Your Majesty rightly treats the choice of chief ministers differently from lesser appointments; and rightly applies stricter scrutiny to department heads than to low ranks. Yet when chief ministers offer policy and department heads recommend talent, Your Majesty hears only reckless criticism and does not examine the original proposal. This is to treat grave counsel lightly and petty rumor seriously—not to test what is slandered for truth or falsehood, nor to judge nominees by their actual merits and faults. When men talk freely, nothing is spared. People will no longer know where to turn—not in selection alone, but in every affair of state!

上雖嘉其所陳，長官薦士之詔，竟追寢之。

Though the emperor praised what Lu Zhi had said, the edict allowing department heads to recommend subordinates was in the end withdrawn.

國朝舊制，吏部選人，每年調集。自乾元已後，屬宿兵於野。歲或兇荒，遂三年一置選。由是選人停擁，其數猥多，文書不接，真偽難辨，吏緣為奸，註授乖濫，而有十年不得調者。贄奏吏部分內外官員為三分，計闕集人，每年置選。故選司之弊，十去七八，天下稱之。

Under the old system of the dynasty, the Ministry of Personnel gathered candidates for appointment every year. After the Qianyuan era troops remained encamped in the field. In years of famine the examinations were held only once every three years. Candidates therefore piled up in great numbers. Records no longer matched, truth and fraud were hard to tell apart, clerks turned the confusion to profit, and appointments became chaotic. Some men waited ten years without receiving a post. Lu Zhi proposed dividing the Ministry's inner and outer appointments into three groups, tallying vacancies and candidates, and holding selection every year. The abuses of the Selection Office were thereby reduced by seven or eight tenths, and the realm praised the reform.

贄與賈耽、盧邁、趙憬同知政事，百司有所申覆，皆更讓不言可否。舊例，宰臣當旬，秉筆決事，每十日一易，贄請準故事，令秉筆者以應之。又以河隴陷蕃已來，西北邊常以重兵守備，謂之防秋，皆河南、江淮諸鎮之軍也，更番往來，疲於戍役。贄以中原之兵，不習邊事，及扞虜戰賊，多有敗衄，又苦邊將名目太多，諸軍統制不一，緩急無以應敵，乃上疏論其事曰：

Lu Zhi served with Jia Dan, Lu Mai, and Zhao Jing as joint chief ministers. When offices submitted business for decision, each man deferred to the others and none would say yes or no. By old precedent the chief ministers took turns holding the brush and deciding affairs, rotating every ten days. Lu Zhi asked that this precedent be restored so that the man holding the brush would answer when called upon. Since Hexi and Longyou had fallen to Tibet, the northwest frontier had been held by heavy forces in what was called autumn defense—troops from the Henan, Jianghuai, and other commands rotating in turn, worn out by garrison duty. Lu Zhi held that the armies of the central plains were unused to frontier warfare and suffered many defeats against barbarians and rebels; that there were too many frontier commanders and no unified command; and that in crisis the forces could not respond effectively. He therefore submitted a memorial on the matter, saying:

臣歷觀前代書史，皆謂鎮撫四夷，宰相之任，不揆闇劣，屢敢上言。誠以備邊禦戎，國家之重事；理兵足食，備禦之大經。兵不治則無可用之師，食不足則無可固之地。理兵在制置得所，足食在斂導有方。陛下幸聽愚言，先務積谷，人無加賦，官不費財，坐致邊儲，數逾百萬。諸鎮收糴，今已向終，分貯軍城，用防艱急，縱有寇戎之患，必無乏絕之憂。守此成規，以為永制，常收冗費，益贍邊農，則更經二年，可積十萬人三歲之糧矣。足食之原粗立，理兵之術未精，敢議籌量，庶備采擇。

Your servant has read the histories of former ages and finds that pacifying the four quarters is the chief minister's duty. Ignorant though I am, I have repeatedly ventured to speak. For frontier defense is a weighty affair of state; and ordering the armies and filling the granaries is the great foundation of defense. Without well-ordered troops there is no army fit for use; without sufficient grain no land can be held. Ordering troops depends on proper disposition; filling granaries depends on sound collection and distribution. Your Majesty has graciously heeded my counsel and made grain accumulation the first task. Without adding to the people's taxes or wasting public funds, frontier stores now exceed a million. The commands' grain purchases are nearly complete, stored in garrison cities against emergency. Even if bandits or barbarians strike, there need be no fear of shortage. If this rule is kept as a permanent system, surplus funds redirected to support frontier farming, then in two more years there could be three years' grain for a hundred thousand men. The foundation of adequate supply is roughly in place; the art of ordering troops is not yet perfected. I venture to offer further plans for Your Majesty's consideration.

伏以戎狄為患，自古有之，其於制禦之方，得失之論，備存史籍，可得而言。大抵尊即序者，則曰「非德無以化要荒」，曾莫知威不立，則德不能馴也。樂武威者，則曰「非兵無以服兇獷」，曾莫知德不修，則兵不可恃也。務和親者，則曰「要結可以睦鄰好」，曾莫知我結之而彼復解也。美長城者，則曰「設險可以固邦國而扞寇仇」，曾莫知力不足，兵不堪，則險之不能有也。尚薄伐者，則曰「驅遏可以禁侵暴而省征徭，」曾莫知兵不銳，壘不完，則遏之不能勝，驅之不能去也。議邊之要，略盡於斯，雖互相譏評，然各有偏駁。聽一家之說，則例理可征；考歷代所行，則成敗異效。是由執常理以禦其不常之勢，徇所見而昧於所遇之時。

Respectfully, the threat posed by the Rong and Di is as old as history itself. The methods for controlling and defending against them, and the debates over what succeeded and what failed, are all fully recorded in the chronicles—and can be examined at length. Those who prize the approach of bringing the frontier peoples into ritual order declare that "only virtue can transform the remote borderlands"—yet they never grasp that unless authority is first established, virtue alone cannot make them submit. Those who delight in martial power insist that "only force can tame the violent and intractable"—yet they never see that without moral cultivation, military might is not something one can trust. Those devoted to alliance through marriage say that "binding ties can preserve neighborly goodwill"—yet they never see that the moment we forge such bonds, our counterparts may break them again. Those who praise the Great Wall claim that "fortifying strategic passes can secure the realm and ward off enemy raids"—yet they never see that when one's strength is inadequate and one's armies insufficient, no fortification can be held. Those who favor limited border campaigns argue that "driving the enemy back and blocking incursions can end pillaging and lighten the burden of corvée and levies"—yet they never see that when troops are dull and defenses incomplete, blocking cannot win and driving cannot dislodge the foe. The main points debated in discussions of border policy are largely covered by these positions. Though advocates mock one another, each approach is one-sided and flawed in its own way. Heed any single school of thought alone, and its logic seems persuasive enough; but examine what successive dynasties actually put into practice, and the outcomes vary from success to failure. This is what happens when one clings to fixed principles to meet ever-changing circumstances, and pursues one's own preconceptions while failing to read the times.

夫中夏有盛衰，夷狄有強弱，事機有利害，措置有安危，故無必定之規，亦無長勝之法。夏後以序戎而聖化茂，古公以避狄而王業興；周城朔方而獫狁攘，秦築臨洮而宗社覆；漢武討匈奴而貽悔，太宗征突厥而致安；文、景約和親而不能弭患於當年，宣、元弘撫納而足以保寧於累葉。蓋以中夏之盛衰異勢，夷狄之強弱異時，事機之利害異情，措置之安危異便。知其事而不度其時則敗，附其時而不失其稱則成。形變不同，胡可專一！

The Central Realm waxes and wanes; the frontier peoples grow strong and grow weak; circumstances offer both advantage and harm; and any given policy may bring safety or peril. Thus there is no fixed formula, and no strategy that always wins. Yu of Xia brought the Rong into order, and sage rule flourished; Lord Danfu fled the Di, and a royal dynasty was born; the Zhou fortified Shuofang, yet the Xianyun raided all the more; Qin built fortifications at Lintao, yet the dynasty itself was destroyed; Emperor Wu of Han campaigned against the Xiongnu and left posterity with regret; Emperor Taizong campaigned against the Turks and brought peace; Emperors Wen and Jing negotiated marriage alliances but could not end the troubles of their day; Emperors Xuan and Yuan pursued a policy of conciliation and were able to secure peace for generation after generation. For the rise and fall of the Central Realm follows one set of circumstances, the strength and weakness of the frontier peoples another; the benefits and harms of any given situation another still; and the safety or peril of any given policy depends on what the moment requires. To understand the problem but misread the times is to fail; to follow the demands of the moment without abandoning what is appropriate is to succeed. Circumstances change—how can one cling to a single method!

夫以中國強盛，夷狄衰微，而能屈膝稱臣，歸心受制，拒之則阻其向化，威之則類於殺降，安得不存而撫之，即而序之也？又如中國強盛，夷狄衰微，而尚棄信奸盟，蔑恩肆毒，諭之不變，責之不懲，安得不取亂推亡，息人固境也？其有遇中國喪亡之弊，當夷狄強盛之時，圖之則彼釁未萌，禦之則我力不足，安得不卑詞降禮，約好通和，啖之以親，紓其交禍？縱不必信，且無大侵，雖非禦戎之善經，蓋時事亦有不得已也。儻或夷夏之勢，強弱適同，撫之不寧，威之不靖；力足以自保，不足以出攻，得不設險以固軍，訓師以待寇，來則薄伐以遏其深入，去則攘斥而戒於遠追？雖為安邊之令圖，蓋勢力亦有不得不然也。故夏之即序，周之於攘，太宗之翦亂，皆乘其時而善用其勢也。古公之避狄，文、景之和親，神堯之降禮，皆順其時而不失其稱也。秦皇之長城，漢武之窮討，皆知其事而不度其時者也。向若遇孔熾之勢，行即序之方，則見侮而不從矣！乘可取之資，懷畏避之誌，則失機而養寇矣！有攘卻之力，用和親之謀，則示弱而勞費矣！當降屈之時，務翦伐之略，則召禍而危殆矣！故曰：知其事而不度其時則敗，附其時而不失其稱則成。是無必定之規，亦無長勝之法，得失著效，不其然歟！至於察安危之大情，計成敗之大數，百代之不變易者，蓋有之矣。其要在於失人肆欲則必蹶，任人從眾則必全，此乃古今所同，而物理之所壹也。

When China is strong and the frontier peoples weak, and they come kneeling as subjects, their hearts turned toward obedience—to reject them would block their turning toward civilization; to threaten them would be little better than slaughtering men who have surrendered. How can the court do anything but protect and conciliate them, draw them close, and bring them into proper order? Or again: when China is strong and the frontier peoples weak, yet they betray their oaths, break alliances in bad faith, spurn kindness and unleash violence, and neither persuasion nor reproach can move them—how can the court do anything but seize on their disorder to bring about their downfall, spare its own people, and secure the borders? When China is in decline and the frontier peoples are ascendant—plot against them and no provocation has yet arisen; try to resist and one's strength is not enough—how can the court do anything but speak humbly, lower its ceremonial demeanor, seek treaties of friendship, appease them with conciliatory overtures, and avert the disaster of open conflict? Even if such agreements cannot be fully trusted, and even if no major invasion follows, this may not be the ideal long-term policy for managing the frontier—yet there are times when circumstances leave no alternative. Should the power of the frontier peoples and the Central Realm be evenly matched—so that conciliation cannot secure peace and intimidation cannot restore calm— and one's strength is enough to defend but not enough to take the offensive—must one not fortify strategic positions, drill the army to await attack, meet incursions with limited counter-raids to check deep penetration, and when the enemy withdraws, drive them off without pursuing too far? Though this is the soundest plan for securing the borders, the balance of power may also leave no other choice. Thus Yu's bringing the Rong into order, the Zhou's repelling of invaders, and Taizong's suppression of rebellion—all seized the moment and made the best use of prevailing conditions. Lord Danfu's flight from the Di, the heqin policies of Emperors Wen and Jing, and Emperor Gaozu's lowered ceremonial demeanor—all conformed to the times without sacrificing what was appropriate. Qin Shihuang's Great Wall and Emperor Wu's endless campaigns both understood the problem but failed to read the times. Had one pursued a policy of orderly submission in a moment of overwhelming enemy strength, one would only be mocked—and they would refuse to obey! To hold the advantage for decisive action yet shrink back in fear is to miss one's chance and feed the enemy's strength! To have the power to drive the enemy back yet resort to marriage alliances is to show weakness and squander resources! To pursue aggressive campaigns when one ought to submit is to invite disaster and court destruction! Thus it is said: to understand the problem but misread the times is to fail; to follow the demands of the moment without abandoning what is appropriate is to succeed. There is no fixed formula and no strategy that always wins—the gains and losses speak for themselves. Is it not so? Yet in discerning the great principle of safety and peril, and calculating the great pattern of success and failure, there are truths that hold across a hundred generations. The crux is this: to alienate the people through indulgence of one's desires is to invite collapse; to employ the worthy and heed the consensus is to preserve the state. This has been true in every age—it is the one constant principle of nature.

國家自祿山構亂、河隴用兵以來，肅宗中興，撤邊備以靖中邦，借外威以寧內難。於是吐蕃乘釁，吞噬無厭；回紇矜功，憑陵亦甚。中國不遑振旅，四十余年。使傷耗遺氓，竭力蠶織，西輸賄幣，北償馬資，尚不足塞其煩言，滿其驕誌。復乃遠征士馬，列戍疆陲，猶不能遏其奔沖，止其侵侮。小入則驅略黎庶，深入則震驚邦畿。時有議安邊策者，多務於所難而忽於所易，勉於所短而略於所長。遂使所易所長者，行之而其要不精；所難所短者，圖之而其功靡就。憂患未弭，職斯之由。

Since An Lushan's rebellion and the campaigns in Hexi and Longyou, the dynasty—when Emperor Suzong restored order—withdrew frontier defenses to pacify the Central Plain and borrowed foreign military power to quell internal strife. Thereupon Tibet seized the opportunity and swallowed territory without end; the Uyghurs flaunted their contributions and grew ever more overbearing. For more than forty years China had no leisure to rebuild its armies. The surviving populace was worn down, straining at sericulture and weaving to send tribute westward and pay for horses northward—yet still could not satisfy their endless demands or their proud ambitions. Even when troops were sent on distant campaigns and garrisons lined the frontiers, their wild charges could not be checked nor their raids stopped. Small raids plundered the common people; deep incursions shook the capital itself. When border policies were debated, most devoted themselves to what was difficult and neglected what was easy, strained at their weaknesses and overlooked their strengths. Thus what was easy and within their strength was pursued without mastering its essentials; while what was difficult and beyond their strength was attempted without ever achieving success. That calamities remain unabated is precisely for this reason.

夫制敵行師，必量事勢，勢有難易，事有先後。力大而敵脆，則先其所難，是謂奪人之心，暫勞而永逸者也；力寡而敵堅，則先其所易，是謂固國之本，觀釁而後動者也。頃屬多故，人勞未瘳，而欲廣發師徒，深踐寇境，復其侵地，攻其堅城，前有勝負未必之虞，後有饋運不繼之患。儻或撓敗，適所以啟戎心而挫國威，以此為安邊之謀，可謂不量事勢而務於所難矣！

In controlling enemies and deploying armies, one must weigh the circumstances; circumstances differ in difficulty, and affairs have their proper sequence. When one's strength is great and the enemy weak, strike first at what is difficult—this is called seizing the enemy's will: temporary hardship for lasting peace; When one's strength is slight and the enemy strong, strike first at what is easy—this is called securing the foundation of the state: watch for provocation before acting. Recently, amid many troubles, with the people's exhaustion not yet healed, some wish to dispatch armies in force, penetrate deep into enemy territory, recover lost lands, and assault fortified cities—facing uncertainty of victory ahead and the peril of broken supply lines behind. If defeated, this would only embolden the barbarians and damage national prestige. To take such a course as a border policy is truly to ignore the circumstances and devote oneself to what is hardest!

天之授者，有分事，無全功；地之產者，有物宜，無兼利。是以五方之俗，長短各殊。長者不可逾，短者不可企；勉所短而敵其所長必殆，用所長而乘其所短必安。強者，乃以水草為邑居，以射獵供飲茹，多馬而尤便馳突，輕生而不恥敗亡，此戎狄之所長也。戎狄之所長，乃中國之所短；而欲益兵蒐乘，角力爭驅，交鋒原野之間，決命尋常之內，以此為禦寇之術，可謂勉所短而校其所長矣！務所難，勉所短，勞費百倍，終於無成。雖果成之，不挫則廢，豈不以越天授而違地產，虧時勢以反物宜者哉！

What Heaven bestows comes with divided tasks, not complete mastery of all; what Earth produces suits each thing in its own way, not every advantage at once. Thus the customs of the five directions each have their own strengths and weaknesses. Strengths cannot be surpassed by force of will; weaknesses cannot be wished away; to strain at one's weaknesses and contest the enemy's strengths is to court disaster; to employ one's strengths and exploit the enemy's weaknesses is to secure safety. The strong dwell by water and grass, live by hunting, keep many horses and excel at swift cavalry charges, hold life lightly and do not fear defeat or death—this is what the Rong and Di do best. What the Rong and Di do best is precisely what China does worst; yet to mass troops and chariots, contest strength in open pursuit, and decide life and death on the plain—to take this as the method of repelling raiders is truly to strain at one's weaknesses and measure oneself against the enemy's strengths! To devote oneself to what is difficult and strain at what is weak costs a hundredfold in labor and expense, and ends in failure. Even if one succeeded, the effort could not be sustained without ruin—is this not because one transgresses Heaven's allotment, violates Earth's natural suitability, and works against the demands of the times!

將欲去危就安，息費從省，在慎守所易，精用所長而已。若乃擇將吏以撫寧眾庶，修紀律以訓齊師徒，耀德以佐威，能邇以柔遠；禁侵抄之暴以彰吾信，抑攻取之議以安戎心；彼求和則善待而勿與結盟，彼為寇則嚴備而不務報復，此當今之所易也。賤力而貴智，惡殺而好生，輕利而重人，忍小以全大，安其居而後動，俟其時而後行。是以修封疆，守要害，塹蹊隧，壘軍營，謹禁防，明斥候，務農以足食，練卒以蓄威，非萬全不謀，非百克不鬥。寇小至則張聲勢以遏其入，寇大至則謀其人以邀其歸；據險以乘之，多方以誤之。使其勇無所加，眾無所用；掠則靡獲，攻則不能；進有腹背受敵之虞，退有首尾難救之患，所謂乘其弊，不戰而屈人之兵，此中國之所長也。我之所長，乃戎狄之所短；我之所易，乃戎狄之所難。以長制短，則用力寡而見功多；以易敵難，則財不匱而事速就。舍此不務，而反為所乘，斯謂倒持戈矛，以钅尊授寇者也！今則皆務之矣，猶且守封未固，寇戎未懲者，其病在於謀無定用，眾無適從。所任不必才，才者不必任；所聞不必實，實者不必聞；所信不必誠，誠者不必信；所行不必當，當者未必行。故令措置乖方，課責虧度；財匱於兵眾，力分於將多，怨生於不均，機失於遙制。臣請為陛下粗陳六者之失，惟明主慎聽而熟察之：

To leave peril for safety, and end waste through economy, one need only carefully hold to what is easy and skillfully employ what one does best. Select capable generals and officials to pacify the people; refine discipline to train the troops; let displayed virtue support authority, and let competence at home soften those abroad; forbid the violence of border raids to demonstrate good faith, and suppress proposals for offensive seizure to reassure the barbarians; When they seek peace, treat them well but do not bind them in formal alliance; when they raid, prepare strictly but do not pursue revenge—this is what is easy in the present age. Value wisdom over brute force; hate killing and cherish life; hold profit lightly and people dearly; endure small losses to preserve the greater good; settle one's position before acting, and wait for the right moment before moving. Thus repair the borders, hold strategic passes, trench roads and tunnels, fortify camps, guard defenses strictly, post scouts clearly, devote to farming to fill the granaries, and drill soldiers to store up strength—do not plan without perfect readiness, and do not fight without assurance of overwhelming victory. When raiders come in small numbers, display force to block their entry; when they come in force, plot against their leaders to cut off their retreat; Hold the terrain and turn it against them; use many stratagems to confuse them. Render their courage useless and their numbers impotent; when they plunder they gain nothing; when they attack they cannot prevail; advancing they face enemies before and behind; retreating they find rescue impossible—what is called exploiting their weakness and subduing the enemy without battle. This is what China does best. What we do best is precisely what the Rong and Di do worst; what is easy for us is precisely what is hard for them. Use strength against weakness, and little effort yields great results; use the easy against the hard, and resources are not exhausted while success comes quickly. To abandon this and instead be exploited by the enemy is what is called holding one's weapons reversed and handing the hilt to the raider! Yet though all now profess to pursue this course, the borders remain unsecured and the raiders undeterred—the flaw lies in plans without fixed application and the multitude without clear direction. Those appointed are not necessarily capable; the capable are not necessarily appointed; what is heard is not necessarily true; what is true is not necessarily heard; what is trusted is not necessarily sincere; the sincere are not necessarily trusted; what is done is not necessarily right; what is right is not necessarily done. Thus policy is misdirected and accountability falls short; Treasury depleted by excessive troops, strength divided among too many generals, resentment born of inequity, opportunity lost through remote control. Your servant requests to outline for Your Majesty the faults in these six areas—may the enlightened ruler listen carefully and examine them closely:

臣聞工欲善其事，必先利其器；武欲勝其敵，必先練其兵。練兵之中，所用復異。用之於救急，則權以紓難；用之於暫敵，則緩以應機。故事有便宜，而不拘常制；謀有奇詭，而不徇眾情。進退死生，唯將所命，此所謂攻討之兵也！用之於屯戍，則事資可久；勢異從權，非物理所愜不寧，非人情所欲不固。夫人情者，利焉則勸，習焉則安，保親戚則樂生，顧家業則忘死，故可以理術馭，不可以法制驅，此所謂鎮守之兵也。夫欲備封疆，禦戎狄，非一朝一夕之事，固當選鎮守之兵以置焉。古之善選置者，必量其性習，辨其土宜，察其伎能，知其欲惡。用其力而不違其性，齊其俗而不易其宜；引其善而不責其所不能，禁其非而不處其所不欲。而又類其紀伍，安其室家，然後能使之樂其居，定其誌，奮其氣勢，結其恩情。撫之以惠，則感而不驕；臨之以威，則肅而不怨。靡督課而人自為用，弛禁防而眾自不攜。故出則足兵，居則足食，守則固，戰則強。其術無他，便於人情而已矣！今者散征士卒，分戍邊陲，更代往來，以為守備。是則不量性習，不辨土宜，邀其所不能，強其所不欲。求廣其數而不考其用，將致其力而不察其情，斯可以為羽衛之儀，而無益於備禦之實也。何者？窮邊之地，千里蕭條，寒風裂膚，驚沙慘目；與豺狼為鄰伍，以戰鬥為嬉遊；晝則荷戈而耕，夜則倚烽而覘；日有剽害之慮，永無休暇之娛，地惡人勤，於斯為甚！自非生於其域，習於其風，幼而睹焉，長而安焉，不見樂土而遷焉，則罕能寧其居而狎其敵也。關東之地，百物阜殷，從軍之徒，尤被優養。慣於溫飽，狎於歡康，比諸邊隅，若異天地。聞絕塞荒陬之苦，則辛酸動容；聆強蕃勁虜之名，則懾駭奪氣。而乃使之去親族，舍園廬，甘其所辛酸，抗其所懾駭，將冀為用，不亦疏乎！矧又有休代之期，無統帥之馭，資奉若驕子，姑息如倩人，進不邀之以成功，退不處之以嚴憲。其來也鹹負得色，其止也莫有固心，屈指計歸，張頤待飼。僥倖者猶患還期之賒緩，常念戎醜之充斥；王師挫傷，則將乘其亂離，布路東潰，情誌且爾，得之奚為？平居則殫耗資儲以奉浮冗之眾，臨難則拔棄城鎮以搖遠近之心，其弊豈惟無益哉！固亦將有所撓也。復有抵犯刑禁，謫徙軍城，意欲增戶實邊，兼令展效自贖。既是無良之類，且加懷土之情，思亂幸災，又甚戍卒。適足煩於防衛，諒無望於功庸，雖前代時或行之，固非良算之可遵者也。復有擁旄之帥，身不臨邊，但分偏師，俾守疆場。大抵軍中壯銳，元戎例選自隨，委其疲羸，乃配諸鎮。節將既居內地，精兵祗備紀綱，遂令守要禦沖，常在寡弱之輩。寇戎每至，乃勢不支，入壘者才足閉關，在野者悉遭劫執，恣其芟蹂，盡其搜驅。比及都府聞知，虜已克獲旋返。且安邊之本，所切在兵，理兵若斯，可謂措置乖方矣！

Your servant has heard that if a craftsman wishes to do his work well, he must first sharpen his tools; if a warrior wishes to defeat his enemy, he must first drill his troops. Yet among methods of drilling troops, what is employed also differs. Employed for emergency relief, troops are used flexibly to ease crisis; employed for temporary engagement with the enemy, they are deployed flexibly to seize opportunity. Thus affairs have their expedients, unconstrained by regular regulations; and plans have their stratagems, unconstrained by popular sentiment. Advance, retreat, life and death—all at the general's command. These are what are called offensive campaigning troops! Employed for garrison duty, affairs depend on what can endure; circumstances differ, so one follows expedient measures—unless natural conditions are satisfied there is no peace, unless human sentiment is accommodated there is no stability. Human sentiment responds to profit with effort, to habit with ease; men who protect their kin love life, and men who look to their families forget death. Such troops can be governed by reason but cannot be driven by regulation alone. These are what are called garrison defensive troops. To prepare the borders and defend against the Rong and Di is not work of a single day—it is right to select garrison troops and station them accordingly. Those skilled in selection and stationing in antiquity gauged men's natures and habits, distinguished regional suitability, observed their skills, and knew their desires and aversions. They employed men's strength without violating their nature, and aligned their customs without forcing them against their proper place. They drew out men's strengths without demanding what they could not give, and checked their faults without posting them where they did not wish to be. They organized their ranks, settled their families—and only then could men be made content where they lived, steady in purpose, bold in spirit, and bound to one another in loyalty. Treat them with kindness and they respond with gratitude, not arrogance; confront them with authority and they stand in awe without resentment. Without heavy supervision men applied themselves; with lighter restrictions the troops did not turn disloyal. Deployed abroad they were sufficient in numbers; at rest they had enough food; in defense they stood firm; in battle they fought strong. The method was nothing more than this: accommodate human nature! Today soldiers are conscripted from scattered sources, posted in rotation to the frontier marches, and sent back and forth in turn—all this passes for border defense. This is to ignore men's natures and habits, disregard regional suitability, demand what they cannot give, and force what they do not wish. The state seeks to swell head counts without examining utility, and expects men's exertions without understanding their hearts. Such an army may look the part of a royal guard, but it does nothing for real border defense. Why is this so? The remote frontier is desolate for a thousand li; cold wind splits the skin and blinding sand stings the eyes; men live among wolves and jackals and treat battle as sport; by day they plow with weapons on their backs, by night they lean on beacon towers to keep watch; each day brings fear of raid and slaughter, never a moment's rest for pleasure—the land is harsh and the labor crushing, nowhere more so than here! Unless a man is born there, raised in its ways, accustomed from childhood and settled in adulthood, never having known a gentler land to move to—rarely can he live content on the frontier or grow familiar with the enemy. East of the pass the land is rich in every commodity, and those who join the army are especially well cared for. Accustomed to warmth and full bellies, to ease and comfort—they might as well live in another world from the borderlands. Hear of the bitter hardships of the far frontier and their faces twist with anguish; hear the names of powerful barbarian tribes and fierce enemies and terror steals their breath. Yet you would have them leave their kin, abandon their homes, accept those bitter hardships, and stand against what fills them with terror—and still expect them to be useful? How far-fetched! Moreover they serve on fixed rotations under no commanding general's firm hand; rations and pay are lavished on them like spoiled children, indulgence extended like hired laborers; on advance they are not pressed toward victory, on retreat they are not held to strict discipline. When they arrive, all wear the look of men who have gained something; once posted, none has a steadfast heart. They count on their fingers the days till rotation, mouths open awaiting rations. Even the fortunate still worry that rotation will be delayed, constantly mindful that enemy raiders fill the land; If the imperial armies suffer defeat, they will seize the disorder to scatter eastward along every road—their hearts and wills being thus, what use is there in having them? In ordinary times they drain stores and resources to support this idle, redundant host; in crisis they abandon towns and forts and shake the hearts of near and far—the harm is not merely that they are useless! They will also undermine our position. There are also criminals exiled to garrison towns—the intent being to increase households and populate the border, and also to let them redeem themselves through service. They are already worthless men, and with their attachment to home they long for disorder and hope for disaster—they are worse than ordinary garrison soldiers. They merely add to the burden of defense, with no hope of achievement; though former dynasties sometimes employed this policy, it is certainly not a sound plan to follow. There are also commanders bearing banners and staffs who never go to the border themselves, but only assign detached units to guard the frontier. As a rule the supreme commander keeps the army's strongest and sharpest troops for himself and consigns the worn and weak to the garrisons. Since frontier commissioners remain in the interior and elite troops are kept only for discipline and order, those who hold key passes and guard approaches are constantly the weak and few. Each time raiders arrive the garrisons cannot hold; those who reach the ramparts barely manage to shut the gates; those in the open country are all seized. The enemy ravages at will and drives off everything they can find. By the time the regional headquarters learn of it, the enemy has already taken their plunder and returned. The foundation of securing the border lies above all in the army—to manage troops in this fashion is what I call misplaced arrangements!

夫賞以存勸，罰以示懲，勸以懋有庸，懲以威不恪。故賞罰之於馭眾也，猶繩墨之於曲直，權衡之揣重輕，輗軏之所以行車，銜勒之所以服馬也。馭眾而不用賞罰，則善惡相混而能否莫殊；用之而不當功過，則奸妄寵榮而忠實擯抑。夫如是，若聰明可衒，律度無章，則用與不用，其弊一也。自頃權移於下，柄失於朝，將之號令，既鮮克行之於軍，國之典章，又不能施之於將，務相遵養，茍度歲時。欲賞一有功，翻慮無功者反側；欲罰一有罪，復慮同惡者憂虞。罪以隱忍而不彰，功以嫌疑而不賞，姑息之道，乃至於斯。故使忘身效節者，獲誚於等夷；率眾先登者，取怨於士卒；僨軍蹙國者，不懷於愧畏；緩救失期者，自以為智能。褒貶既闕而不行，稱毀復紛然相亂，人雖欲善，誰為言之？況又公忠者，直己而不求於人，反罹困厄；敗撓者，行私而茍媚於眾，例獲優崇。此義士所以痛心，勇夫所以解體也。又有遇敵而所守不固，陳謀而其效靡成；將帥則以資糧不足為詞，有司復以供給無闕為解。既相執證，理合辨明，朝廷每為含糊，未嘗窮究曲直。措理者吞聲而靡訴，誣善者罔上而不慚。馭眾若斯，可謂課責虧度矣！

Rewards exist to preserve encouragement; punishments to show chastisement; encouragement to promote achievement; chastisement to awe the undisciplined. Thus rewards and punishments in governing troops are like the carpenter's line for straight and crooked, the balance for weighing heavy and light, the yoke-bar that makes the cart go, the bit and reins that make the horse obey. Governing troops without rewards and punishments mixes good and evil until the capable and incapable cannot be told apart; using them but not matching them to merit and fault favors the treacherous and arrogant while pushing aside the loyal and honest. If matters stand thus—even if one has brilliance to display, if laws and standards are without rule, then using or not using rewards and punishments, the harm is the same. Recently authority has shifted downward and control been lost at court; commanders' orders rarely prevail in the army, and the state's statutes cannot be enforced upon generals—they merely watch over one another indulgently, passing the years as they may. Wishing to reward one who has merit, one instead worries that the meritless will grow restless; wishing to punish one who is guilty, one again worries that fellow evildoers will be anxious. Crimes are hidden and tolerated rather than exposed; merit is left unrewarded through suspicion—the way of indulgence has reached this point. Thus those who forget themselves in loyal service are mocked by their peers; those who lead the ranks in the first assault earn the soldiers' resentment; those who fail the army and distress the state feel no shame or fear; those who delay relief and miss their deadlines consider themselves clever. With praise and blame absent and unenforced, slander and praise swirl in confusion—though men wish to do good, who will speak for them? Moreover the fair and loyal, upright in themselves and not seeking from others, instead suffer hardship; failures and shirkers, pursuing private ends and fawning on the masses, routinely receive preferment and honor. This is why men of principle are heartbroken and brave men lose their fighting spirit. There are also cases of encountering the enemy but failing to hold what was defended, of laying plans yet achieving no result; The generals cite insufficient supplies as their excuse, while the responsible offices reply that provisions were delivered without shortage. Since each side holds to its proof, the truth ought to be sorted out—yet the court habitually responds with evasion and never thoroughly investigates right and wrong. Those who have managed affairs swallow their words and cannot appeal; those who slander the good deceive their superiors without shame. To govern troops in this fashion is what I call deficient accountability!

課責虧度，措置乖方，將不得竭其材，卒不得盡其力，屯集雖眾，戰陣莫前。虜每越境橫行，若涉無人之地；遞相推倚，無敢誰何，虛張賊勢上聞，則曰兵少不敵。朝廷莫之省察，惟務征發益師，無裨備禦之功，重增供億之弊。閭井日耗，征求日繁，以編戶傾家破產之資，兼有司榷鹽稅酒之利，總其所入，半以事邊，制用若斯，可謂財匱於兵眾矣！

With deficient accountability and misplaced arrangements, generals cannot exhaust their talents and soldiers cannot give their full strength—though gathered in great numbers, none advance in battle. The enemy crosses the border and rampages at will, as if walking through unoccupied land; Each shifts blame to the next, none dares act—and when they falsely inflate the enemy's strength in reports to the throne, they say their troops are too few to resist. The court does not examine this, but only presses conscription and reinforcements—adding nothing to border defense, only multiplying the burden of supply. Registered households dwindle day by day and levies grow ever more oppressive—drawing on resources that ruin families and drain estates, together with monopoly profits on salt, wine, and taxes. Of total revenue, half goes to the border. To manage resources thus is what I call resources exhausted by the multitude of troops!

今四夷之最強盛為中國甚患者，莫大於吐蕃，舉國勝兵之徒，才當中國十數大郡而已。其於內虞外備，亦與中國不殊，所能寇邊，數則蓋寡。且又器非犀利，甲不堅完，識迷韜鈐，藝乏趫敏。動則中國畏其眾而不敢抗，靜則中國憚其強而不敢侵，厥理何哉？良以中國之節制多門，蕃醜之統帥專一故也。夫統帥專則人心不分，人心不分則號令不貳，號令不貳則進退可齊，進退可齊則疾徐如意，疾徐如意則機會靡愆，機會靡愆則氣勢自壯！斯乃以少為眾，以弱為強，變化翕辟，在於反掌之內。是猶臂之使指，心之制形，若所任得人，則何敵之有！夫節制多門則人心不一，人心不一則號令不行，號令不行則進退難必，進退難必則疾徐失宜，疾徐失宜則機會不及，機會不及則氣勢自衰！斯乃勇廢為尪，眾散為弱，逗撓離析，兆乎戰陣之前。是猶一國三公，十羊九牧，欲令齊肅，其可得乎？開元、天寶之間，控禦西北兩蕃，唯朔方、河西、隴右三節度而已，猶慮權分勢散，或使兼而領之。中興已來，未遑外討，僑隸四鎮於安定，權附隴右於扶風，所當西北兩蕃，亦朔方、涇原、隴右、河東節度而已，關東戍卒，至則屬焉。雖委任未盡得人，而措置尚存典制。自頃逆泚誘涇、隴之眾叛，懷光汙朔方之軍，割裂誅鋤，所余無幾。而又分朔方之地，建牙擁節者，凡三使焉。其余鎮軍，數且四十，皆承特詔委寄，各降中貴監臨，人得抗衡，莫相稟屬。每俟邊書告急，方令計會用兵，既無軍法下臨，唯以客禮相待。是乃從容拯溺，揖讓救焚，冀無阽危，固亦難矣！夫兵，以氣勢為用者也，氣聚則盛，散則消；勢合則威，析則弱。今之邊備，勢弱氣消，建軍若斯，可謂力分於將多矣。

Among the four barbarians, the strongest and greatest threat to China is none greater than Tibet—their entire nation of able fighters amounts only to a dozen or so large commanderies of China. In internal worries and external defenses they differ little from China; the forces they can send to raid the border are surely few in number. Moreover their weapons are not sharp, their armor not solid and complete; their understanding of military arts is confused, their skills lack agility. When they move, China fears their numbers and dares not resist; when they rest, China dreads their strength and dares not attack—what is the reason for this? Truly because China's command structure has many gates, while the barbarian chieftains' command is unified. When command is unified, hearts are not divided; when hearts are not divided, orders are not twofold; when orders are not twofold, advance and retreat can be aligned; when advance and retreat can be aligned, speed and pause obey the will; when speed and pause obey the will, opportunities are not missed; when opportunities are not missed, martial spirit naturally grows strong! Thus with few they become many, with weak they become strong; transformation expanding and contracting lies within the turn of the palm. It is like the arm commanding the fingers, the heart governing the body—if the right men are appointed, what enemy could there be! When command has many gates, hearts are not united; when hearts are not united, orders are not carried out; when orders are not carried out, advance and retreat cannot be assured; when advance and retreat cannot be assured, speed and pause fall out of alignment; when speed and pause fall out of alignment, opportunities are not seized; when opportunities are not seized, martial spirit naturally wanes! Thus courage collapses into weakness, the multitude scatters into feebleness—hesitation and dissolution show themselves before the battle line. It is like three dukes in one state, nine herdsmen for ten sheep—wishing to make them uniformly disciplined, how could it be achieved? Between the Kaiyuan and Tianbao eras, controlling the two northwestern barbarian peoples required only the three frontier commissions of Shuofang, Hexi, and Longyou—and even then there was concern that divided authority would scatter strength, so sometimes one man was made to command them jointly. Since the restoration, with no leisure for external campaigns, the Four Garrisons were provisionally attached at Anding and Longyou provisionally subordinated at Fufeng. Against the two northwestern barbarian peoples there were again only the Shuofang, Jingyuan, Longyou, and Hedong commissions; garrison soldiers from east of the pass, when they arrived, fell under their authority. Though appointments did not always find the right men, the arrangements still preserved the proper institutions. Recently the rebel Zhu Ci induced the armies of Jing and Long to defect; Huai'guang corrupted the Shuofang army—after partition and purges, little remained. Moreover Shuofang's territory was divided—those who established headquarters and bore commander's staffs numbered three in all. The remaining garrison armies number nearly forty—all commissioned by special edict, each supervised by a palace eunuch envoy; men are equals to one another, none subordinate to another. Only when frontier dispatches report emergency are orders given to coordinate troops—and with no military law descending from above, they are treated only with the courtesy due guests. This is to save the drowning at leisure and fight the fire with bows and courtesies—to hope for no peril on the brink, how difficult that surely is! Warfare relies on martial spirit—when spirit gathers it flourishes, when it scatters it dissipates; When force combines it is formidable, when divided it is weak. Today's border defenses are weak in force and dissipated in spirit—to establish armies thus is what I call strength divided among too many generals!

理戎之要，最在均齊，故軍法無貴賤之差，軍實無多少之異，是將所以同其誌而盡其力也。如或誘其誌意，勉其藝能，則當閱其材，程其勇，校其勞逸，度其安危，明申練覆優劣之科，以為衣食等級之制。使能者企及，否者息心，雖有薄厚之殊，而無觖望之釁。蓋所謂日省月試，餼稟均事，如權量之無情於物，萬人莫不安其分而服其平也。今者窮邊之地，長鎮之兵，皆百戰傷夷之余，終年勤苦之劇，角其所能則練習，度其所處則孤危，考其服役則勞，察其臨敵則勇。然衣糧所給，唯止當身，例為妻子所分，常有凍餒之色。而關東戍卒，歲月踐更，不安危城，不習戎備，怯於應敵，懈於服勞。然衣糧所頒，厚逾數等，繼以茶藥之饋，益以蔬醬之資。豐約相形，懸絕斯甚。又有素非禁旅，本是邊軍，將校詭為媚詞，因請遙隸神策，不離舊所，唯改虛名，其於稟賜之饒，遂有三倍之益。此儔類所以忿恨，忠良所以憂嗟，疲人所以流亡，經費所以褊匱。夫事業未異，而給養有殊，人情之所不能甘也，況乎矯佞行而稟賜厚，績藝劣而衣食優，茍未忘懷，能無慍怒！不為戎首，則已可嘉，而欲使其協力同心，以攘寇難，雖有韓、白、孫、吳之將，臣知其必不能焉。養士若斯，可謂怨生於不均矣！

The crux of managing the frontier lies above all in equality and balance—thus military law makes no distinction of high and low rank, military provisions no difference of more and less. This is how generals unite men's resolve and exhaust their strength. If one would draw out their resolve and encourage their skills, one should assess their talent, measure their courage, compare their toil and rest, gauge their peril and safety—clearly establishing categories for training review and merit, to serve as the system of graded food and clothing. Let the capable strive to catch up, the incapable lay aside ambition—though there be differences of more and less, there will be no cause for discontent. This is what is meant by daily review and monthly testing, rations distributed with equal fairness—like the balance scale indifferent to objects; ten thousand men none failing to rest content in their station and submit to its fairness. Now on the remote frontier, the long-garrisoned troops are all survivors of a hundred battles and wounds, enduring year-round the severest toil. Matched against their abilities they are practiced; measured against their situation they stand alone and in peril; examined for their service they are worn with labor; observed facing the enemy they are brave. Yet the clothing and grain provided reach only their own bodies, and as a rule are divided among wives and children—they constantly wear the look of cold and hunger. Yet garrison soldiers from east of the pass, rotating through by month and year, are untested in perilous fortresses, unpracticed in military readiness, timid in facing the enemy, and slack in bearing labor. Yet the clothing and grain they receive is generous by several grades, followed by gifts of tea and medicine, supplemented with vegetables and sauces. Abundance and want set side by side—the gap is vast. There are also men who were never of the imperial guard but were originally frontier troops—officers craftily using flattery petition to be nominally attached to the Shence Army from afar, never leaving their old posts, changing only an empty title—yet their rations and gifts become three times richer. This is why such comrades boil with resentment, loyal men sigh with worry, the worn-out flee into exile, and military funds run thin. When the service is no different yet sustenance is unequal—this human nature cannot accept. How much less when sycophancy wins rich rations while poor merit receives fine food and clothing—if one has not forgotten self, how could there be no anger! For them not to lead the barbarians' charge would already be praiseworthy—and to expect them to unite in heart and strength to repel the enemy, even with generals like Han Xin, Bai Qi, Sun Wu, and Wu Qi, I know it cannot be done. To sustain troops thus is what I call resentment born of inequality!

凡欲選任將帥，必先考察行能，然後指以所授之方，語以所委之事，令其自揣可否，自陳規模。須某色甲兵，藉某人參佐，要若干士馬，用若干資糧，某處置軍，某時成績，始終要領，悉俾經綸，於是觀其計謀，校其聲實。若謂材無足取，言不可行，則當退之於初，不宜貽慮於其後也。若謂志氣足任，方略可施，則當要之於終，不宜掣肘於其間也。夫如是，則疑者不使，使者不疑；勞神於選才，端拱於委任。既委其事，既足其求，然後可以核其否臧，行其賞罰。受賞者不以為濫，當罰者無得而辭，付授之柄既專，茍且之心自息。是以古之遣將帥者，君親推轂而命之曰：「自閫以外，將軍裁之。」又賜鈇鉞，示令專斷。故軍容不入國，國容不入軍，將在軍，君命有所不受。誠謂機宜不可以遠決，號令不可以兩從，未有委任不專，而望其克敵成功者也。自頃邊軍去就，裁斷多出宸衷，選置戎臣，先求易制，多其部以分其力，輕其任以弱其心，雖有所懲，亦有所失。遂令分閫責成之義廢，死綏任咎之誌衰，一則聽命，二亦聽命，爽於軍情亦聽命，乖於事宜亦聽命。若所置將帥，必取於承順無違，則如斯可矣；若有意平兇靖難，則不可。夫兩境相接，兩軍相持，事機之來，間不容息，蓄謀而俟，猶恐失之，臨時始謀，固已疏矣。況乎千里之遠，九重之深，陳述之難明，聽覽之不一，欲其事無遺策，雖聖者亦有所不能焉。設使謀慮能周，其如權變無及！戎虜馳突，迅如風飈，驛書上聞，旬月方報。守土者以兵寡不敢抗敵，分鎮者以無詔不肯出師，逗留之間，寇已奔逼，托於救援未至，各且閉壘自全。牧馬屯牛，鞠為椎剽；穡夫樵婦，罄作俘囚。雖詔諸鎮發兵，唯以虛聲應援，互相瞻顧，莫敢遮邀，賊既縱掠退歸，此乃陳功告捷。其敗喪則減百而為一，其捃獲則張百而成千。將帥既幸於總制在朝，不憂於罪累；陛下又以為大權由己，不究事情。用師若斯，可謂機失於遙制矣！

Whenever one wishes to select and appoint generals, one must first examine conduct and ability, then point out the region to be entrusted and explain the duties assigned, letting them judge for themselves whether they can do it and state their own plans. Specify the armor and troops required, the aides to be relied upon, the number of soldiers and horses needed, the provisions and grain to be supplied, where to deploy the army, and when results are expected. Entrust the essentials from start to finish to their planning, then observe their stratagems and weigh name against reality. If his talent is deemed unworthy and his proposals unworkable, dismiss him at the outset; do not let doubts linger afterward. If his resolve is judged sufficient and his strategy workable, hold him to the end; do not hamstring him midway. Thus the doubtful are not employed, and those employed are not doubted; Exert effort only in selecting talent, then sit back in dignified repose to delegate authority. Once the task is entrusted and their requests fully met, then one may judge success or failure and apply rewards and punishments. The rewarded will not deem it excessive; the deserving of punishment will have no recourse. With authority fully delegated, the impulse to cut corners naturally dies away. Hence when ancient rulers dispatched generals, the ruler in person would push the chariot wheel and say: "Beyond the frontier gate, the general decides. He also bestowed the axe and halberd, signaling authority for independent judgment. Thus military protocol does not enter the court, nor court protocol the army. When the general is in the field, he may sometimes refuse the ruler's orders. Truly, opportune action cannot be decided from afar, nor commands obey two masters. No one whose authority was divided has ever been expected to defeat the enemy and succeed. Recently the border armies' movements have mostly been decided from the throne itself. In appointing military officials, easy control comes first: many subordinates to divide their strength, lighter duties to weaken their resolve. Though some good may come of this, much is also lost. Thus the principle of entrusting a sector with full responsibility is abandoned, and the resolve to die at one's post and bear blame fades. First one takes orders, then another takes orders; at odds with military conditions—take orders; contrary to the situation—take orders. If the generals appointed must be those who comply without dissent, then such a course might suffice; But if one intends to pacify the violent and settle turmoil, it cannot be done. When two borders meet and two armies face each other, opportunity brooks no pause—even plans prepared in advance may still be missed; to plan only when crisis strikes is already far too late. How much worse when a thousand li lie between and the palace depths are impenetrable—reports hard to make clear, imperial attention inconsistent. To expect that nothing be overlooked is beyond even a sage. Even if deliberation could be thorough, what of timely adaptation when there is no time! The barbarian foe charges as swiftly as a wind-gust. Memorials by post reach the throne, and a reply may come only after ten days or a month. Local defenders, finding their troops too few, dare not resist. Sector commanders, lacking an edict, refuse to march out. While they delay, the raiders are already upon them. Pleading that relief has not arrived, each closes his fort and saves himself. Horses in pasture and cattle in pens become the spoil of raids; Farmers and wood-gathering women are taken wholesale as captives. Though edicts order the various sectors to mobilize, they respond with only a hollow show of support, watching one another, none daring to intercept the enemy. Once the raiders have finished plundering and withdrawn, they report merit and proclaim victory. Defeats and losses are reported at one-hundredth of their true scale; booty seized is inflated from hundreds into thousands. The generals, fortunate that overall control rests at court, need not fear blame; Your Majesty, believing supreme authority rests with yourself, does not investigate the actual facts. To use troops thus is what I call losing opportunity through remote control!

理兵而措置乖方，馭將而賞罰虧度，制用而財匱，建兵而力分，養士而怨生，用師而機失，此六者，疆場之蟊賊，軍旅之膏肓也。蟊賊不除，而但滋之以糞溉，膏肓不療，而唯啖之以滑甘，適足以養其害，速其災，欲求稼穡豐登，膚革充美，固不可得也。

Deploying troops with misplaced arrangements, governing generals with deficient rewards and punishments, controlling expenditures until funds run short, raising armies while strength is divided, sustaining soldiers until resentment arises, using troops while opportunity is lost—these six are the crop pests of the frontier and the deep-rooted ailment of the army. If crop pests are not removed but only fed with fertilizer, if the deep ailment is not treated but only pampered with sweet delicacies, this merely nurtures the harm and hastens disaster. To hope for rich harvests and a strong, healthy people is surely impossible.

臣愚謂宜罷諸道將士番替防秋之制，率因舊數而三分之：其一分委本道節度使募少壯願住邊城者以徙焉；其一分則本道但供衣糧，委關內、河東諸軍州募蕃、漢子弟願傅邊軍者以給焉；又一分亦令本道但出衣糧，加給應募之人，以資新徙之業。又令度支散於諸道和市耕牛，兼雇召工人，就諸軍城繕造器具。募人至者，每家給耕牛一頭，又給田農水火之器，皆令充備。初到之歲，與家口二人糧，並賜種子，勸之播植，待經一稔，俾自給家。若有余糧，官為收糴，各酬倍價，務獎營田。既息踐更征發之煩，且無幸災茍免之弊。寇至則人自為戰，時至則家自力農。是乃兵不得不強，食不得不足，與夫倏來忽往，豈可同等而論哉！

I hold that the system of rotating troops from all circuits for autumn border defense should be abolished, and the existing quotas divided into three. One part should be entrusted to each circuit's military commissioner to recruit able-bodied young men willing to settle in border towns. For another part, the circuit would supply only clothing and grain, while districts and armies within the passes and in Hedong would recruit tribal and Han youth willing to join the border forces. For a third part, the circuit would again supply only clothing and grain, with extra pay to recruits to support the livelihood of the newly resettled. Further, the Office of Revenue should purchase plow oxen throughout the circuits and hire workers to make and repair implements at the various military posts. When recruits arrive, each household should receive one plow ox and a full set of farming implements for field work and household use. In their first year, provide grain for two family members and grant seed, encouraging them to plant. After one harvest, they should be able to support their own households. If there is surplus grain, the government should buy it at double the market price, vigorously encouraging border farming. This would end the troubles of rotating service and conscription, and remove the abuse of hoping for disaster as a way to escape duty. When raiders come, each man will fight on his own; when the season comes, each household will farm on its own. Thus the army cannot but grow strong and provisions cannot but suffice—how can this be compared with troops who come suddenly and depart just as quickly!

臣又謂宜擇文武能臣一人為隴右元帥，應涇、隴、鳳翔、長武城、山南西道等節度管內兵馬，悉以屬焉；又擇一人為朔方元帥，應鄜坊、邠寧、靈夏等節度管內兵馬，悉以屬焉；又擇一人為河東元帥，河東、振武等節度管內兵馬，悉以屬焉。三帥各選臨邊要會之州以為理所，見置節度，有非要者，隨所便近而並之。唯元帥得置統軍，余並停罷。其三帥部內太原、鳳翔等府及諸郡戶口稍多者，慎揀良吏以為尹守，外奉師律，內課農桑，俾為軍糧，以壯戎府。理兵之宜既得，選帥之授既明，然後減奸濫虛浮之費以豐財，定衣糧等級之制以和眾，弘委任之道以宣其用，懸賞罰之典以考其成。而又慎守中國之所長，謹行當今之所易，則八利可致，六失可除。如是而戎狄不威懷，疆場不寧謐者，未之有也。諸侯軌道，庶類服從。如是而教令不行，天下不理者，亦未之有也。以陛下之英鑒，民心之思安，四方之小休，兩寇之方靜，加以頻年豐稔，所在積糧，此皆天贊國家，可以立制垂統之時也。時不久居，事不常兼，已過而追，雖悔無及。明主者，不以言為罪，不以人廢言，罄陳狂愚，惟所省擇。

I further hold that one capable civil and military official should be chosen as Commander of the Right of Longyou, placing all troops under the Jing, Long, Fengxiang, Changwucheng, and Shannan West circuit commands under his authority. Choose another as Commander of Shuofang, placing all troops under the Fufang, Binning, Lingxia, and related commands under his authority. Choose another as Commander of Hedong, placing all troops under the Hedong and Zhenwu commands under his authority. Each of the three commanders should establish headquarters at a strategic border prefecture. Among existing military commissions, nonessential ones should be merged according to convenience and proximity. Only the commanders-in-chief may appoint army overseers; all other such posts should be abolished. Within the three commanders' territories, for Taiyuan, Fengxiang, and other prefectures with relatively large populations, carefully select good officials as governors. Outwardly they should observe military discipline; inwardly they should encourage agriculture and sericulture, supplying army grain to strengthen the military posts. Once troop deployment is rightly ordered and commanders clearly appointed, reduce corrupt and wasteful expenditures to enrich the treasury, fix grades for clothing and grain to harmonize the ranks, broaden delegation to put talent to use, and publish standards of reward and punishment to assess achievement. Moreover, carefully hold to China's strengths and diligently practice what is feasible today, and the eight benefits can be attained and the six failures removed. If this is done and yet the barbarians are neither awed nor reconciled, and the frontier is not settled—there has never been such a case. The regional lords would follow the correct path, and the people would submit. If this is done and yet edicts do not prevail and the realm is not well governed—that too has never happened. With Your Majesty's keen insight, the people's longing for peace, a brief respite in the four quarters, the two enemy peoples just quieting down, and years of abundant harvest with grain stored everywhere—all this is Heaven aiding the state. It is a time to establish institutions and leave a lasting legacy. Time does not long remain, and favorable conditions do not often coincide. Once the moment has passed, regret comes too late. A wise ruler does not punish for words spoken or discard counsel because of the speaker. I lay out my foolishness fully and leave all to Your careful judgment.

德宗極深嘉納，優詔褒獎之。

Emperor Dezong greatly approved and accepted the memorial, issuing a gracious edict to praise and reward him.

贄在中書，政不便於時者，多所條奏。德宗雖不能皆可，而心頗重之。初，竇參既貶郴州，節度使劉士寧餉參絹數千匹。湖南觀察使李巽與參有隙，具事奏聞，德宗不悅。會右庶子姜公輔於上前聞奏，稱「竇參嘗語臣云：陛下怒臣未已」，德宗怒，再貶參，竟殺之。時議雲公輔奏竇參語得之於贄，雲參之死，贄有力焉。又素惡於公異、於邵，既輔政而逐之，談者亦以為厄。

While Zhi served at the Secretariat, he submitted many detailed memorials on matters of government ill-suited to the times. Though Emperor Dezong could not approve them all, he highly valued him at heart. Earlier, after Dou Can was demoted to Chenzhou, Military Commissioner Liu Shining sent him several thousand bolts of silk. Hunan Observation Commissioner Li Xun, who bore a grudge against Can, reported the full matter to the throne. Emperor Dezong was displeased. It happened that Right Counseled Instructor Jiang Gongfu heard the report at court and said, "Dou Can once told me, 'Your Majesty's anger at me is not yet spent.'" Emperor Dezong grew angry, demoted Can again, and ultimately had him executed. Contemporary opinion held that Gongfu's report of Dou Can's words came from Zhi, and that Zhi had a hand in Can's death. He had also long been at odds with Gong Yi and Yu Shao; once he became chief minister he drove them out, and gossips likewise regarded this as an ill omen.

戶部侍郎、判度支裴延齡，奸宄用事，天下嫉之如仇。以得幸於天子，無敢言者。贄獨以身當之，屢於延英面陳其不可，累上疏極言其弊。延齡日加譖毀。十年十二月，除太子賓客，罷知政事。贄性畏慎，及策免私居，朝謁之外，不通賓客，無所過從。十一年春，旱，邊軍芻粟不給，具事論訴；延齡言贄與張滂、李充等搖動軍情，語在《延齡傳》。德宗怒，將誅贄等四人，會諫議大夫陽城等極言論奏，乃貶贄為忠州別駕。

Vice Minister of Revenue and Acting Director of the Office of Revenue Pei Yanling, a villain in power, was hated throughout the realm like a mortal enemy. Because he had won the emperor's favor, no one dared speak against him. Zhi alone stood in the breach, repeatedly arguing face to face in the Yanying Hall that Yanling's course was wrong, and submitting memorial after memorial forcefully declaring his abuses. Yanling daily increased his slander against him. In the twelfth month of the tenth year of the Zhenyuan reign, he was appointed Guest of the Heir Apparent and dismissed from participating in governance. Zhi was cautious by nature. Once dismissed and living in private retirement, beyond attending court audiences he received no guests and kept no company. In the spring of the eleventh year, drought struck. The border armies lacked fodder and grain and petitioned with full accounts of their grievances. Yanling claimed that Zhi, together with Zhang Pang, Li Chong, and others, had stirred up military sentiment—the account is given in the Biography of Yanling. Emperor Dezong grew angry and was about to execute Zhi and the other three men, but Remonstrating Censor Yang Cheng and others remonstrated forcefully, and Zhi was demoted to Assistant Administrator of Zhongzhou.

贄初入翰林，特承德宗異顧，歌詩戲狎，朝夕陪遊。及出居艱阻之中，雖有宰臣，而謀猷參決，多出於贄，故當時目為「內相」。從幸山南，道途艱險，扈從不及，與帝相失，一夕不至，上喻軍士曰：「得贄者賞千金。」翌日贄謁見，上喜形顏色，其寵待如此。既與二吳不協，漸加浸潤，恩禮稍薄；及通玄敗，上知誣枉，遂復見用。贄以受人主殊遇，不敢愛身，事有不可，極言無隱。朋友規之，以為太峻，贄曰：「吾上不負天子，下不負吾所學，不恤其他。」精於吏事，斟酌決斷，不失錙銖。嘗以「詞詔所出，中書舍人之職，軍興之際，促迫應務，權令學士代之；朝野乂寧，合歸職分，其命將相制詔，卻付中書行譴。」又言「學士私臣，玄宗初令待詔，止於唱和文章而已」。物議是之。德宗以贄指斥通微、通玄，故不可其奏。

When Zhi first entered the Hanlin Academy, he received Emperor Dezong's special favor—singing poems in playful intimacy and accompanying him morning and evening on his outings. When the court fell into hardship and peril, though chief ministers remained, deliberation and decision mostly came from Zhi—hence people of the time called him the "Inner Chancellor." Accompanying the emperor to Shannan, the road was treacherous. The escort could not keep up, and he lost contact with the emperor. After one night without arrival, the emperor told the soldiers, "Whoever finds Zhi will be rewarded with a thousand gold. The next day Zhi came to audience. The emperor's delight showed plainly on his face—such was the favor he received. Once he fell out with the two Wus, slander gradually seeped in, and imperial favor and courtesy grew somewhat thin. When Wu Tongxuan fell, the emperor knew Zhi had been slandered and unjustly treated, and employed him again. Having received the ruler's extraordinary favor, Zhi did not spare himself. When matters were wrong, he spoke out fully without concealment. Friends admonished him, thinking him too harsh. Zhi said, "Above, I do not fail the Son of Heaven; below, I do not fail what I have learned. I care nothing for the rest. He was skilled in administrative affairs, weighing and deciding without missing so much as a mite. He once argued that "edicts and decrees belong to the Secretariat Drafters. In times of military emergency, pressed by urgent tasks, it was permitted to have Hanlin academicians substitute; When court and realm are at peace, duties should return to their proper offices. Commands appointing generals and chancellors and the drafting of edicts should be turned back to the Secretariat for issuance. He also said, "Academicians are the ruler's private retainers. When Emperor Xuanzong first had them await edicts, it was only for composing matching verses and essays." Public opinion approved this view. Emperor Dezong, because Zhi's argument implicitly censured Wu Tongwei and Wu Tongxuan, did not approve his memorial.

贄在忠州十年，常閉關靜處，人不識其面，復避謗，不著書。家居瘴鄉，人多癘疫，乃抄撮方書，為《陸氏集驗方》五十卷，行於代。初，贄秉政，貶駕部員外郎李吉甫為明州長史，量移忠州刺史。贄在忠州，與吉甫相遇，昆弟、門人鹹為贄憂，而吉甫忻然厚禮，都不銜前事，以宰相禮事之，猶恐其未信不安，日與贄相狎，若平生交契者。贄初猶慚懼，後乃深交。時論以吉甫為長者。後有薛延者，代吉甫為刺史，延朝辭日，德宗令宣旨慰安。而韋臯累上表請以贄代己。順宗即位，與陽城、鄭余慶同詔征還。詔未至而贄卒，時年五十二，贈兵部尚書，謚曰宣。

Zhi spent ten years in Zhongzhou, usually secluding himself in quiet retreat so that people scarcely knew his face. He also avoided slander and wrote no books. Living in a malarial region where many suffered pestilence, he copied and compiled medical prescription books into fifty scrolls of the Collected Verified Prescriptions of Master Lu, which circulated widely in his time. Earlier, when Zhi held power, he had demoted Supervising Secretary of the Transport Office Li Jifu to Senior Administrator of Mingzhou, later transferring him to Prefect of Zhongzhou. When Zhi was in Zhongzhou and met Jifu, his brothers and disciples all worried for him. But Jifu gladly treated him with great courtesy, harboring no resentment over past matters and serving him with the etiquette due a chief minister. Still fearing that Zhi might not trust him and feel uneasy, he kept close company with Zhi daily, as if they had been intimate friends all their lives. At first Zhi was still ashamed and afraid; afterward they became close friends. Contemporary opinion regarded Jifu as a man of magnanimity. Later a man named Xue Yan replaced Jifu as prefect. On the day Yan took leave at court, Emperor Dezong ordered an edict of consolation and reassurance delivered to Zhi. Meanwhile Wei Gao repeatedly submitted memorials asking that Zhi replace him as his successor. When Emperor Shunzong ascended the throne, an edict summoned him back together with Yang Cheng and Zheng Yuqing. Before the edict arrived, Zhi died at the age of fifty-two. He was posthumously granted Minister of War, with the posthumous title Xuan ("Declarer").

子簡禮，登進士第，累辟使府。

His son Jianli passed the jinshi examination and was repeatedly invited to serve in commissioner staffs.

史臣曰：近代論陸宣公，比漢之賈誼，而高邁之行，剛正之節，經國成務之要，激切仗義之心，初蒙天子重知，末塗淪躓，皆相類也。而誼止中大夫，贄及臺鉉，不為不遇矣。昔公孫鞅挾三策說秦王，淳于髡以隱語見齊君，從古以還，正言不易。昔周昭戒急論議，正為此也。贄居珥筆之列，調飪之地，欲以片心除眾弊，獨手遏群邪，君上不亮其誠，群小共攻其短，欲無放逐，其可得乎！《詩》稱「其維哲人，告之話言」，又有「誨爾」、「聽我」之恨，此皆賢人君子，嘆言不見用也。故堯咨禹拜，千載一時，攜手提耳，豈容易哉！

The historian says: Recent commentators compare Lu the Duke of Xuan to Jia Yi of Han. In lofty conduct, upright integrity, mastery of statecraft, and impassioned devotion to righteousness—first receiving the emperor's deep trust, then stumbling at the end—the parallels are striking. Yet Jia Yi reached only Grand Master of the Palace, while Zhi attained the chief ministry—hardly a case of being unappreciated. In old times Shang Yang brought three stratagems to persuade the King of Qin; Chunyu Kun used riddling speech to gain audience with the ruler of Qi. From antiquity onward, straight speech has never been easy. Formerly Duke Zhao of Zhou warned against hasty disputation—precisely for this reason. Zhi stood among the brush-wearers in the place where words are seasoned, wishing with a single heart to remove myriad abuses and with one hand to check the multitude of wicked. The ruler did not recognize his sincerity; petty men together attacked his faults. To expect no banishment—how could that be? The Book of Odes says, "How is he not a wise man! I tell him all my plans," and also records the regret of "I instruct you" and "Listen to me"—all alike are worthy men lamenting that their counsel went unheeded. When Yao consulted and Yu bowed in reply, it was a moment that comes once in a thousand years. To take a man by the hand and speak into his ear—is that easily achieved?

贊曰：良臣悟主，我有嘉猷。多僻之君，為善不周。忠言救失，啟沃曰讎。勿貽天問，蒼昊悠悠。

In praise: A worthy minister enlightens his sovereign; I have excellent counsel to offer. A ruler prone to perversity does good without completing it. Loyal words correct error, yet daily counsel is met with hostility. Do not invite Heaven's rebuke; the azure sky stretches on without end.

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