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卷八十 志第五十六 食貨四

Volume 80 Treatises 56: Finance and Economics 4

Chapter 80 of 明史 · History of Ming
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1
Salt Law and Tea Law
2
使 西
The revenue from sea-salt production had been a government monopoly in every dynasty. As soon as the founding emperor rose to power, he established a salt monopoly, set up offices and officials, and allowed merchants to retail salt on the condition that one part in twenty was levied to fund the army. The rate was soon doubled, but on the advice of Hu Shen the original levy was restored. In the bingwu year, salt officials for the Two Huai regions were first appointed. In the first year of the Wu reign, the Two Zhe salt administration was set up. Early in the Hongwu reign, officials were appointed one after another at every salt-producing district. There were six chief salt transport commissioner offices: Lianghuai, Liangzhe, Changlu, Shandong, Fujian, and Hedong. There were seven salt revenue intendant offices: Guangdong, Haibei, Sichuan, and Yunnan; Yunnan had four such offices, for Heiyan Well, Baiyan Well, Anning Salt Well, and Wujing. There was also one salt revenue office at Lingzhou in Shaanxi.
3
西 西 西 祿
Lianghuai had three branch offices, at Taizhou, Huai'an, and Tongzhou; two inspection stations, at Yizhen and Huai'an; thirty salt fields, each with its own salt revenue office. Under Hongwu, the annual quota was more than 352,000 large salt certificates. Under Hongzhi, the quota was reckoned in small certificates, which doubled the figure. The Wanli reign followed the same practice. Its salt was sold in the nine Zhili prefectures of Yingtian, Ningguo, Taiping, Yangzhou, Fengyang, Luzhou, Anqing, Chizhou, and Huai'an, in Chuzhou and Hezhou, throughout Jiangxi and Huguang, and in the Henan prefectures of Henan, Runing, and Nanyang, as well as Chenzhou. During the Zhengtong reign, Guizhou was also supplied with Lianghuai salt. In the eighteenth year of Chenghua, Hengzhou and Yongzhou in Huguang were switched to Haibei salt. In the second year of Zhengde, Ganzhou, Nan'an, and Ji'an in Jiangxi were switched to Guangdong salt. Salt was shipped to the frontier at Gansu, Yansui, Ningxia, Xuanfu, Datong, Liaodong, Guyuan, and the Shanxi forts including Shenchi. It was also supplied to the Court of Imperial Entertainments, the Directorate of Palace Ceremonial, and the Directorate of Palace Eunuchs. Surplus salt revenue remitted to the Taicang treasury came to 600,000 taels a year.
4
西 西
Liangzhe had four branch offices, at Jiaxing, Songjiang, Ningbo-Shaoxing, and Wenzhou-Taizhou; four inspection stations, at Hangzhou, Shaoxing, Jiaxing, and Wenzhou; thirty-five salt fields, each with its own salt revenue office. Under Hongwu, the annual quota was more than 220,400 large salt certificates. Under Hongzhi, the quota was reckoned in small certificates, which doubled the figure. The Wanli reign followed the same practice. Its salt was sold in Zhejiang, in the five Zhili prefectures of Songjiang, Suzhou, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, and Huizhou, in Guangde prefecture, and in Guangxin prefecture in Jiangxi. Salt was shipped to the frontier at Gansu, Yansui, Ningxia, Guyuan, and the Shanxi forts including Shenchi. Surplus salt revenue remitted to the Taicang treasury came to 140,000 taels a year.
5
Early in the dynasty a salt transport office was set up at Hejian in Beiping, later renamed the Hejian-Changlu office. It had two branch offices, at Cangzhou and Qingzhou; two inspection stations, at Changlu and Xiaozhigu; twenty-four salt fields, each with its own salt revenue office. Under Hongwu, the annual quota was more than 63,100 large salt certificates. Under Hongzhi, the quota was more than 180,800 small salt certificates. The Wanli reign followed the same practice. Its salt was sold in northern Zhili and in the Henan prefectures of Zhangde and Weihui. Salt was shipped to the frontier at Xuanfu, Datong, and Jizhou. It was also supplied for suburban and temple sacrifices, for the palace kitchens, and for the use of officials throughout the government. Surplus salt revenue remitted to the Taicang treasury came to 120,000 taels a year.
6
宿 西
Shandong had two branch offices, at Jiaolai and Binle; one inspection station, at Luokou; nineteen salt fields, each with its own salt revenue office. Under Hongwu, the annual quota was more than 143,300 large salt certificates. Under Hongzhi, the quota was reckoned in small certificates, which doubled the figure. Under Wanli the quota was more than 96,100 certificates. Its salt was sold in Shandong, in the Zhili prefectures of Xu, Pi, and Su, and in Kaifeng prefecture in Henan, though Kaifeng was later switched to Hedong salt. Salt was shipped to Liaodong and to the Shanxi forts including Shenchi. Surplus salt revenue remitted to the Taicang treasury came to 50,000 taels a year.
7
Fujian had seven salt fields, each with its own salt revenue office. Under Hongwu, the annual quota was more than 104,500 large salt certificates. Under Hongzhi the quota rose by more than 700 certificates. Under Wanli it was cut by 1,000 certificates. Its certificates were of two kinds, called "mountain-dependent" and "coast-attached." Mountain-dependent certificates were paid in commuted silver. Coast-attached certificates were delivered in kind until the Shenzong reign, when they too were commuted to silver. Its salt was sold only within the province. Revenue remitted to the Taicang treasury came to more than 22,000 taels a year.
8
西 西 西西西 祿西
Hedong administered Jie salt. An eastern field branch was first set up at Anyi; under the Chengzu emperor a western field was added at Jiezhou, but it was soon merged back into the eastern field. In the sixth year of Zhengtong the western field branch was restored. In the second year of Hongzhi a central field branch was added. Under Hongwu the annual quota was 304,000 small salt certificates. Under Hongzhi 10,000 certificates were added to the quota. During the Wanli reign another 200,000 certificates were added. Its salt was sold in the four Shaanxi prefectures of Xi'an, Hanzhong, Yan'an, and Fengxiang; in the five Henan prefectures of Guide, Huaqing, Henan, Runing, and Nanyang, and in Ruzhou; and in the two Shanxi prefectures of Pingyang and Lu'an, together with Ze, Qin, and Liao prefectures. Where a district appeared on more than one list, salt from either source could be sold there. During the Longqing reign Yan'an was switched to salt from the Lingzhou pools. During the Chongzhen reign Fengxiang and Hanzhong were also switched to Lingzhou salt. Only a little more than 4,000 taels a year went to the Taicang treasury; the rest, totaling more than 190,000 taels, funded stipends for the Xuanfu garrison and the princely establishment at Datong and offset civilian grain payments in Shanxi.
9
西西 西 西
Lingzhou in Shaanxi had large and small salt pools, as well as salt wells in Zhang county and Xihe. Under Hongwu the annual output was more than 131,500 jin at Xihe, more than 515,600 jin at Zhang county, and more than 2,867,400 jin at Lingzhou. The Hongzhi reign kept the same quotas. Under Wanli the three sites together produced more than 12,537,600 jin. Its salt was sold in the Shaanxi prefectures of Gongchang and Lintao and in Hezhou. Each year more than 36,000 taels in frontier provisions were sent to Ningxia, Yansui, and Guyuan.
10
西
Guangdong had fourteen salt fields and Haibei fifteen, each field with its own salt revenue office. Under Hongwu the annual quotas were more than 46,800 large certificates for Guangdong and more than 27,000 for Haibei. Under Hongzhi Guangdong remained unchanged, while Haibei was set at more than 19,400 certificates. Under Wanli Guangdong produced more than 30,200 small certificates of raw salt and more than 34,600 of cured salt; Haibei produced more than 12,400 small certificates counting standard and surplus salt together. Salt was classified as raw or cured, with cured salt priced higher than raw. Guangdong salt was sold in the six prefectures of Guangzhou, Zhaoqing, Huizhou, Shaozhou, Nanxiong, and Chaozhou. Haibei salt was sold in the four Guangdong prefectures of Leizhou, Gaozhou, Lianzhou, and Qiongzhou; in Guiyang and Chen prefectures in Huguang; and in ten Guangxi prefectures—Guilin, Liuzhou, Wuzhou, Xunzhou, Qingyuan, Nanning, Pingle, Taiping, Siming, and Zhen'an—together with Tian, Long, Sicheng, Fengyi, and Li prefectures. Salt revenue remitted to the Taicang treasury came to more than 11,000 taels a year.
11
西
Sichuan's salt wells were administered through seventeen salt revenue offices. Under Hongwu the annual output was more than 10,127,000 jin. Under Hongzhi the quota rose to more than 20,176,000 jin. During the Wanli reign output was more than 9,861,000 jin. Its salt was sold in the five Sichuan prefectures of Chengdu, Xuzhou, Shunqing, Baoning, and Kuizhou, and in Tongchuan, Jiading, Guang'an, Ya, and Guangyuan. Each year more than 71,000 taels in salt revenue were sent to the Shaanxi frontier garrison.
12
Heiyan Well in Yunnan had three salt revenue offices; Baiyan Well and Anning Salt Well each had one; and Wujing had seven. Under Hongwu the annual quota was more than 17,800 large salt certificates. Under Hongzhi the quotas differed from well to well. Under Wanli the totals matched those of Hongwu. Its salt was sold only within the province. Salt revenue remitted to the Taicang treasury came to more than 35,000 taels a year.
13
Under the Chengzu emperor an intendant office was once set up in Jiaozhi, but it was abolished after the province was lost. Liaodong salt fields had no government offices; military dependents produced the salt, and merchants were summoned to trade grain for it to supply the troops. A large certificate was for 400 jin and a small certificate for 200 jin.
14
Salt was produced in different ways: Jiezhou salt formed naturally from wind and water; Ningxia salt was scraped from the ground; Huai and Zhe salt was boiled from seawater; Sichuan and Yunnan salt was drawn from wells; Fujian and Guangdong salt came from accumulated brine; Huainan salt was boiled and Huaibei salt sun-dried; Shandong had both boiling and sun-drying—in broad outline, these were the methods.
15
西
Of all Ming salt policies, none worked better than the kaizhong system. In the third year of Hongwu the Shanxi provincial administration reported: "Grain for Datong is hauled from Ling county to Taihe Ridge, a long haul that is costly and burdensome. We ask that merchants who deliver one shi of rice to the Datong granary, or one shi and three dou to the Taiyuan granary, be granted one small Lianghuai salt certificate. After selling the salt, the merchant would return the original certificate to the local office. In this way transport costs would be saved and frontier granaries filled. The emperor approved the proposal. Summoning merchants to deliver grain in exchange for salt was called kaizhong. Thereafter frontier provinces widely used merchant tenders for salt to build up military grain reserves. Salt policy and frontier finance thus worked hand in hand.
16
簿 簿
In the fourth year the salt-tender quotas were fixed for granaries at Linhao, Kaifeng, Chenqiao, Xiangyang, Anlu, Jingzhou, Guizhou, Datong, Taiyuan, Mengjin, Beiping, Henan prefecture, Chenzhou, and North Tongzhou, with required deliveries ranging from five shi to one shi according to distance. Rates were adjusted repeatedly, so the rules were never uniform and generally followed the urgency of the moment, grain prices, and whether tendering was profitable. Where routes were long and terrain difficult, the required delivery was reduced. Verification tallies and master registers were compiled and issued to provincial administrations, regional commands, and guard posts. After delivering grain, the merchant recorded the amount delivered and the salt due, then presented the document at the transport or intendant office to receive the allotted salt. The transport offices checked their master registers, and when the tally matched, salt was issued in full. Salt could be sold only at designated places, as engraved on bronze plates; private salt dealing was punishable by death, as was forging certificates, and salt sold without its certificate was treated as contraband.
17
When the Renzong emperor came to the throne, paper money had ceased to circulate, and officials debated how to recall it. Minister of Revenue Xia Yuanji proposed letting holders of paper notes tender for salt, and fixed the rates at 300 guan per certificate at Cangzhou, half that at Hedong and Shandong, and 100 guan at Fujian and Guangdong. In the first year of Xuande the paper-note tender was abolished. In the third year Yuanji reported that provisions for Beijing officials, troops, and artisans were running short and proposed emergency measures: "The old salt-tender rates are too high and merchants seldom come; we ask that they be revised. The rate was then set between two dou five sheng and one dou five sheng per certificate, and merchants were summoned to deliver rice to Beijing. Minister of Revenue Guo Dun said: "Although tender rates have been cut, few merchants are coming. We propose dividing salt ten ways: six parts for those delivering rice to Beijing granaries and four for those who have already delivered rice at Liaodong, Yongping, Shanhai, Gansu, Datong, Xuanfu, and Wansai. Tendering at all other locations should be suspended. He also said: "Under Hongwu, many merchants who tendered for salt have died over the years, and many substitute claims are fraudulent. We ask that ten ingots of paper money be paid per outstanding certificate." The emperor approved all these proposals and ordered double payment in paper money. Because Gansu, Ningxia, Datong, Xuanfu, Dushi, and Yongping were remote and hazardous, few merchants tendered there, so resident officials and military dependents with grain were allowed to deliver rice and beans in exchange for salt.
18
祿
In the third year of Zhengtong, Ningxia commander Shi Zhao reported that frontier troops lacked horses while many were raised by officials, soldiers, and civilians in Yanqing and Pingliang, and asked that horses be accepted in exchange for salt. A top-grade horse earned 100 salt certificates and a second-grade horse 80. Guards in the Dingbian area soon received an additional 20 certificates per horse. Later at Hezhou a top-grade horse earned 25 certificates and a second-grade horse five fewer; at Songpan a top-grade horse earned 35 certificates and a second-grade horse five fewer. In time the original rates were restored. At first horses were inspected before salt was issued, but soon silver was paid to the government to buy horses instead. The silver passed through the provincial treasury and was spent on princely stipends, garrison grain, border repairs, and relief until it was gone, yet the horses never came—and frontier reserves were exhausted as well. Merchants were then summoned to tender Lianghuai, Liangzhe, and Changlu salt for delivery to Gansu, in a ratio of seventeen parts Huai salt to thirteen parts Zhe salt. Huai tenders accepted only rice and wheat, while Zhe tenders also accepted peas and highland barley. Because Huai salt was more valuable, merchants preferred it, so Huai and Zhe tenders were combined.
19
Early Ming followed Song and Yuan practice and treated salt-makers generously: they were given pasture for fuel, allowed to reclaim arable land, exempted from miscellaneous corvée, and granted one shi of production-cost rice per certificate. Granaries were set up at the salt fields, supplied each year from nearby county stores and surplus transport grain, with cash and paper notes paid according to the price of rice. Cash payments were then fixed at 2 guan 500 wen per certificate for Huai and Zhe and 2 guan for Hejian, Guangdong, Haibei, Shandong, Fujian, and Sichuan. Salt-makers guilty of capital crimes short of murder were punished only with beating and allowed to redeem the sentence by boiling salt for a set number of days. Later general collectors were appointed, and they often squeezed the salt-makers. By the Zhengtong reign salt-makers were impoverished, many fled, and the Songjiang office alone was more than 600,000 units in arrears. The people petitioned the throne, and Grand Coordinator Zhou Chen of Zhili was ordered to take charge of salt revenue as well. Chen proposed four measures—casting iron kettles, relief for brine workers, careful selection of collectors, and strict suppression of private trade—and asked that arrears be collected in addition to the annual quota. The emperor approved his request. Arrears were to be divided into six installments and collected over six years.
20
仿
At this time some merchants had been waiting for salt since the Yongle reign, with generations passing without ever receiving it. It was proposed to follow the Hongwu precedent of paying compensation in paper money, while those who preferred to keep waiting for salt could do so. Because merchants had waited so long that even reduced kaizhong rates drew few deliveries, other salt offices kept the old system, but for Huai, Zhe, and Changlu salt was divided ten ways: eight parts went to waiting merchants as the regular allotment, and two parts were held by the government as reserve stock to be tendered only when the frontier was threatened. The terms changgu and cunji date from this reform. Tendering for the regular allotment was cheap and for reserve stock expensive, but merchants hated the long wait and rushed to reserve stock, leaving the regular allotment unsold. Under the Jingdi emperor, with frequent frontier emergencies, the reserve share was raised to six tenths. Frontier tenders accepted grain, hay, and autumn grazing fodder, with three parts of autumn fodder counting as two of hay.
21
西
Guangdong salt was not supposed to leave the province, but merchants usually bribed border guards and smuggled it into Guangxi. Grand Coordinator Ye Sheng argued that tolerating the trade would void the law but banning it would ruin merchants, and proposed allowing export if merchants delivered grain to the frontier—a compromise that benefited both state and trade. Early in Chenghua, after repeated crop failures left the capital short of grain, merchants were summoned to tender for salt at riverside granaries in Huai, Xu, and Dezhou.
22
貿
Under the old rules, the Ministry of Revenue posted public notices to summon merchants for salt tenders; no one was to petition directly. Wealthy men such as Lü Ming used powerful patrons to petition for Lianghuai reserve salt, and an imperial rescript approved. Minister of Revenue Ma Ang failed to uphold the rules, and the breakdown of salt policy began here. Powerful families crowded into tenders, merchants lost money, and troops and civilians in north and south built armed ocean-going ships to smuggle salt. Harsh penalties followed: private dealing and harboring were capital crimes, families were exiled to frontier guards, and smuggling across borders was punished by military service. Yet smuggling could not be stopped. In the nineteenth year the reserve share was cut so that the regular allotment was seven tenths and reserve stock three. Merchants preferred salt they could receive at once, however, and rushed to tender for reserve stock, so the reserve share was raised again to six tenths. Even Huai and Zhe salt could not meet demand, so Changlu and Shandong salt was allotted to make up the shortfall. When one merchant held certificates from several regions and could not travel to each in person, frontier merchants sold their certificates to local wealthy men. From this arose the distinction between frontier merchants and interior merchants. Interior merchants could not get salt quickly, frontier merchants would not sell certificates cheaply, tenders dwindled, and reserve stock piled up like the regular allotment. Late in the Xianzong reign eunuchs seized power and obtained limitless grants of Huai and Zhe salt; Lianghuai fell more than five million certificates in arrears and merchant certificates piled up unsold.
23
Under the Xiaozong emperor the policy of purchasing surplus salt to supplement official quotas was introduced. Surplus salt was whatever salt-makers produced beyond their official quota.
24
Under the early Hongwu rules, merchants received salt only at designated fields and were forbidden to buy supplements elsewhere; diligent salt-makers who had surplus salt delivered it to the field office, 200 jin counting as one certificate, and received one shi of rice. That salt was opened to merchant tenders without regard to priority. After Chenghua merchants were required to buy it, and were urged to lend rice and wheat to relieve impoverished salt-makers. When Lianghuai salt policy was reformed, Vice Minister Li Si proposed that merchants buy surplus salt to fill official certificates, ending forced loans to salt-makers and suspending frontier kaizhong until arrears were cleared. The government would then sell salt, applying three parts of the proceeds: two for frontier stores and one to cover merchants' unpaid salt prices. Surplus salt thus supplemented the regular quota, marking a minor shift in salt policy.
25
Early in the dynasty frontier merchants who tendered for salt recruited settlers, built fortified farms, and kept grain cheap on the border. During Chenghua silver payments began to appear, but they were never formally codified. In the fifth year of Hongzhi, with merchants exhausted by long waits, Minister of Revenue Ye Qi proposed that they pay silver to transport offices, which would remit it to Taicang for distribution to the frontiers. Merchants paid three or four qian of silver per certificate—roughly double the early grain equivalent—and were freed from waiting, while Taicang silver reserves briefly exceeded one million taels. Yet frontier kaizhong was abandoned, merchant colonies were abandoned, grain prices soared, and frontier reserves dwindled daily.
26
Early in the Wuzong reign, as salt policy deteriorated, ministers Wang Qiong and Zhang Xian were sent to investigate by separate routes, while the Marquis of Qingyun Zhou Shou and the Marquis of Shouning Zhang He had their retainers petition to buy Changlu and Lianghuai salt certificates. Minister of Revenue Han Wen objected, but an imperial rescript approved the purchases. Weaving supervisor eunuch Cui Gao also petitioned for 12,000 Changlu certificates, and the ministry granted half. The emperor wanted to grant the full amount, but Grand Secretaries Liu Jian and others protested vigorously, Li Dongyang most sharply of all. The emperor was displeased. Liu Jian and the others protested again in memorials, and the emperor accepted the ministry's proposal. With powerful families dominating tenders and surplus salt sales allowed, a single certificate could remain in use for more than ten years. In the second year of Zhengde old certificates were ordered cut and recovered within a deadline, with added fees for paper costs and relief grain per certificate. Certificate fees rose, yet revenue remained blocked as before.
27
Earlier, early in Chenghua, Censor-in-Chief Han Yong set up salt levy stations at Zhaoqing, Wuzhou, Qingyuan, and Nanxiong: five fen of silver per official certificate and one qian per surplus certificate, with up to four surplus certificates allowed. Censor-in-Chief Qin Hong allowed six surplus certificates and a levy of six qian. The levy was now raised to nine qian, but official certificates were no longer taxed. Certificates piled up and private salt flourished, so on the proposal of Ministry Director Ding Zhixiang, Hong's old method was restored. Elsewhere merchants who carried surplus salt paid a cut fee, and only loads exceeding 300 jin were punished.
28
使 便
For Huai, Zhe, and Changlu certificate salt, four tenths were the regular allotment, set aside to meet frontier garrison pay and relief for corvée labor. Six tenths were reserve stock, which was never opened without cause except for major state affairs or frontier alarms. Opening reserve stock required a frontier official's petition and ministry approval; merchants were never allowed to request tenders on their own or to demand Huai salt exclusively. During the Hongzhi reign, reserve stock salt accumulated in great quantities. Under Zhengde, court favorites memorialized to open remnant salt, reclassified both reserve stock and the regular allotment as standard quota, and converted all payments to silver. Frontier officials had no reserves for emergencies, while the powerful monopolized tenders and sold franchise rights at several times the normal price. Merchants paying eight qian per certificate made no profit, so many refused to tender, and revenue dwindled day by day. Crafty men smuggled salt by concealment and fraudulent reporting, and abuses multiplied on every side. Salt officials, acting on instructions from palace eunuchs, again invented categories such as remnant salt and office salt as pretexts for abuse. The Jiajing Emperor's accession edict ordered these practices abolished as its first reform. Before long, merchants such as Lu Jun curried favor with the Emperor's intimates and, under the pretext of raising prices, memorialized to purchase remnant and surplus salt. Minister of Revenue Qin Jin refused to approve, but the Emperor specially ordered three hundred thousand Lianghuai quota certificates tendered at Xuanfu. Qin Jin said, "Wicked men monopolize Huai salt tenders and sell franchise rights for profit, leaving Shandong and Changlu salt with no matching allotment and piling up unused. It drains state revenue and undermines frontier stores—nothing could be more damaging. Censor Gao Shikui also argued against the plan. An edict cut the Huai allocation by one hundred thousand certificates and made up the difference with Liangzhe and Changlu salt. Qin Jin again said, "Xuanfu and Datong are both major garrisons. Wicked merchants should not be allowed to choose whichever post suits them; tenders should go to Xuanfu alone. The Emperor approved. Before long, Lu Jun and his associates asked for one hundred sixty thousand certificates at Xuanfu and one hundred ten thousand at Datong, and in the end their request was granted.
29
In the fifth year of Jiajing, on the memorial of Supervising Secretary Guan Lu, the four-six split between the regular allotment and reserve stock was restored. Yet by then surplus salt had become widespread: official salt required long waits for disbursement, and few merchants were willing to tender for it; surplus salt required only a tally for immediate disbursement and sale, and many merchants were eager to tender for it. Since Hongzhi, surplus salt had supplemented the official quota—first to repay arrears, and later by requiring merchants to pay a fee remitted to the ministry to support the frontier. By the Jiajing reign, campaigns in Yansui and pay shortages in Liaodong led the court to release all seventy-nine thousand-odd Lianghuai surplus certificates for kaizhong on both frontiers. From that point surplus salt became standard practice. At first there was still no fixed quota, but before long Lianghuai added more than 1.4 million certificates, with an extra 265 jin of surplus salt per certificate. Certificate fees were set at 1.9 liang of silver south of the Huai and 1.5 liang north of it, while new categories of administrative penalties and fines were imposed to squeeze merchants ever harder. Official salt had not yet been allocated when surplus salt was assessed first, leaving both merchants and salt-makers in distress. Crafty men used the official purchase of surplus salt as a cover to smuggle privately boiled salt. The law could no longer be enforced, and the salt system collapsed.
30
使
In the thirteenth year, Supervising Secretary Guan Huaili said, "The salt system has broken down, and the abuses are six in number. Kaizhong was opened irregularly while grain prices soared, making it hard to summon grain deliveries. Powerful great families monopolized the profits, making it hard to report successful tenders. Official penalties and clerk extortion made payment difficult. Waiting at the salt yard for weighing often took years, making disbursement unbearably slow. Fixed prices were too high for profit to cover costs, so merchants could scarcely earn anything. Private salt flooded the market while official salt would not move, making trade impossible. Because of these six difficulties the official quota was blocked, so revenue officials introduced surplus salt to shore it up. Surplus salt was highly profitable and merchants were glad to buy it, yet it was remitted to the ministry rather than used for frontier kaizhong, so even revenues in the tens of thousands did nothing for military supply. I have looked back to the founding era, when merchants paid very little to tender for salt while salt-makers received generous production subsidies. Today salt prices are ten times what they were, yet production support is less than a tenth of what it was—how can private salt be kept off the market? To restore the salt system, surplus salt must be dealt with first; and to deal with surplus salt, the official price must be cut sharply. In general, when official salt is cheap, private smuggling dies away on its own. Prices should now be fixed at five qian of silver per official certificate and two qian five fen for surplus salt. Neither need be sent to Taicang; both should be disbursed through kaizhong at the frontier, with surplus salt collected in full. Lower official salt prices would benefit merchants; and collecting all surplus salt would benefit the salt-makers as well. When merchants and salt-makers both prosper, state revenue has never failed to be met. The proposal was referred to the responsible offices. The Ministry of Revenue replied that surplus salt silver should still be remitted to the ministry as before, and frontier pay grew ever more depleted. By the twentieth year, the Emperor held surplus salt responsible for wrecking the salt system and ordered it abolished. Huai, Zhe, and Changlu all returned to the old rules; smuggled salt was confiscated for the state, and salt slated for sale was priced by current market valuation. Censor Wu Qiong also requested that all frontier kaizhong tenderers deliver grain and fodder in kind. Hardly had the order been issued when Minister of Personnel Xu Zan asked to reopen surplus salt to meet frontier needs. The Ministry of Revenue agreed, and surplus salt was put back into circulation.
31
Earlier, in the sixteenth year, remote counties in Liangzhe where official merchants did not operate were allowed mountain merchants to pay eight fen of silver per hundred jin and receive tickets to sell salt. Later they encroached heavily on official certificates, official merchant revenue fell short, two million certificates piled up, and waiting for weighing took five or six years. Rules were therefore introduced for advance collection, offset holding, and seasonal weighing. Advance collection meant paying revenue ahead of schedule, with no private discretion over timing. Offset holding meant presenting the current salt transport permit and using one certificate to offset another. Seasonal weighing set the order by time of payment: spring could not be delayed into summer, nor summer advanced ahead of spring. Ticket merchants, however, paid tax and sold at once, so the advance-collection rules only burdened certificate merchants. At the Lingzhou salt ponds, after Shi Zhao's horse-tender proposal took effect frontier pay fell short and Gansu rice reached five liang of silver per shi. The Ministry therefore memorialized to stop horse tenders and summon merchants to deliver grain in exchange for salt certificates.
32
In the twenty-seventh year, kaizhong tenderers were ordered to deliver only grain and fodder in kind. In the thirty-second year, Hedong was given a quota of 620,000 certificates, official and surplus salt were merged into one category, and the surplus salt designation was abolished. Censor-in-Chief Wang Shen and Censor Huang Guoyong then proposed that for Lianghuai salt-makers' surplus salt the government pay two qian per certificate as production cost, and that 350,000 additional certificates be levied under the name production-cost salt. Merchants were to tender for two quota certificates and one production-cost certificate together, covering the standing army's annual quota of more than 176,000 liang. The request was granted.
33
西
Initially Huai salt yielded 705,000 certificates a year, with frontier kaizhong tenders counted as official salt; later surplus salt fees in silver were added and remitted to the ministry. The total quota now reached 1.5 million certificates including earlier allotments, an increase of one third. After several years salt piled up unsold and the system ceased to function. Memorialists repeatedly argued that production-cost salt was a useless growth on the salt system. The Ministry of Revenue, finding state revenue already strained and no other source for the annual quota, left the policy unchanged. Jiangxi had originally sold 390,000 Huai certificates, but later Nan'an, Ganzhou, and Ji'an switched to Guang salt, leaving only the Nanchang prefectures on 270,000 Huai certificates. Before long private trade flourished: Yuanzhou, Linjiang, and Ruizhou consumed Guang salt illicitly, while Fuzhou and Jianchang consumed Fu salt. Huai salt sales in the province fell to only 160,000 certificates. Within a few years state revenue suffered a major shortfall. Grand Coordinator Ma Sen memorialized the damage and asked to build a bridge and customs post at Xiajiang county to control the Fujian-Guangdong corridor, fully restore the Huai salt quota, and raise it slightly to 470,000 certificates. Before long the bridge was destroyed, and the added quota of 200,000 certificates was withdrawn.
34
滿
In the thirty-ninth year, wishing to reform the salt system, the Emperor appointed Vice Censor-in-Chief Yan Maoqing to oversee salt policy in Huai, Zhe, Shandong, and Changlu. Maoqing was a member of Yan Song's faction and accepted bribes without a day's interruption. Lianghuai quota salt had yielded a little over 610,000 liang of silver; production-cost salt added 900,000, and Maoqing raised it further until the total reached one million. It was remitted to the capital every half year. He also seized remnant salt from the four salt offices, raising nearly two million liang of silver, which was briefly hailed as a remarkable achievement. He then imposed quota enforcement: each patrolman had a fixed amount of private salt to seize each season; and if he fell short, his hired-service pay was cut. Some patrolmen went a full year without receiving a single qian, then turned to smuggling together for great profit, even robbing merchant vessels and falsely arresting them as salt pirates, until the abuse spread along the entire coast. After Yan Song fell from power, salt censor Xu Huang said, "The Lianghuai salt system comprised the regular allotment, reserve stock, and water-district categories, totaling a little over 700,000 certificates. Each certificate was for 200 jin and required eight fen of silver. After Yongle, each certificate required 2.5 dou of grain, salt was disbursed at the yard and sold widely, and merchants still cleared a profit of about fifteen percent. In recent years surplus salt was added on top of official salt; on top of surplus salt came production-cost salt; when production-cost salt was not enough, there were supplementary tickets; and when supplementary tickets were not enough, still more certificates were added. Maoqing chased immediate profit without regard for consequences—the worst kind of policy that misleads the state and wrecks governance. Disasters and famine are reported one after another and salt fields are flooded; if the goal is still to collect a full million, people will flee. The bowstring is stretched to the breaking point—nothing is more urgent than this. All of Maoqing's increases were then abolished.
35
In the forty-fourth year, salt censor Zhu Bingru memorialized to abolish Lianghuai production-cost salt. Since Ye Qi's reform, frontier stores had often run short. After the eighth year of Jiajing, kaizhong was partly restored: frontier merchants tendered for certificates and interior merchants waited to receive salt. In the late Jiajing years production-cost salt was in force; some interior merchants waited years without weighing, grew unwilling to buy certificates, and frontier merchants, hard pressed, petitioned to weigh Hedong salt instead. Hedong salt did not pass through granary stores but could be weighed and taken directly on the river route, making disbursement easy and profit swift. Once Hedong salt was in circulation, merchants waiting for reserve-stock disbursement waited even longer, interior merchants were squeezed harder, and certificate prices sank lower still. Schemers then made a specialty of buying up frontier certificates. Known as hoarders, they petitioned for the right to weigh Hedong salt, intending to reap large profits. Officials again debated allowing surplus salt to be bundled with regular salt to cover production costs. Hoarders could then sell surplus salt cheaply and regular salt at high prices, deepening the distress of frontier and interior merchants alike. In the second year of Longqing, salt censor Pang Shangpeng memorialized: "Frontier merchants tender certificates and interior merchants wait for disbursement; the two sides fundamentally depend on each other. Yet interior merchants sat at ease while frontier merchants hauled grain from afar, so the burden was uneven. Weighing Hedong salt was meant to favor frontier merchants. Yet once Hedong salt circulated, Huai salt was bound to pile up; if interior merchants saw no profit, frontier merchants could not sell their certificates. The court should now halt Hedong salt weighing and instead set separate prices for frontier certificates, graded in three tiers from presentation of the certificate through paper initiation, transport clearance, and office verification, each with a fixed silver rate. Once a frontier merchant's warehouse receipt had arrived, interior merchants must not delay disbursement. Stopping Hedong salt would let Huai salt move quickly again; fixing certificate prices would revive kaizhong tenders; frontier and interior merchants would each get what they wanted. The emperor approved the proposal. In the fourth year, censor Li Xueshi proposed abolishing the government purchase of surplus salt. Approval was granted.
36
西
At this time Gutian in Guangxi had been pacified, and grand coordinator Yin Zhengmao proposed that the government invest capital to buy Guangdong salt and sell it at Guilin, yielding a profit of a little over twenty-two thousand taels on more than seventy thousand packages. The proposal was approved.
37
簿 西
From the early Jiajing reign the four-six split between the regular allotment and reserve stock was restored. Later, with frequent emergencies on the frontiers, both the regular allotment and reserve stock were opened; the Huai quota stood at a little over 705,000 certificates a year, with another 200,000 new frontier certificates added annually. Under Wanli, major construction projects prompted a search that turned up more than 600,000 long-lapsed, confiscated, and voided certificates, all outside the official quota; with no regular salt available, merchants were told only to buy surplus salt to make up the shortfall. Once surplus salt was exhausted, the government merely levied by certificate weight, added extra boiling quotas, and imposed arbitrary surcharges. Lianghuai surplus silver on certificate prices rose from a little over 1.2 million taels to 1.45 million; new certificates multiplied while regular certificates piled up unsold. Company commander Yin Ying proposed selling off confiscated salt by allotment, which he said would yield 60,000 taels of silver. Grand Secretaries Zhang Wei and others objected. In the twenty-sixth year, on a memorial from Honglu Temple registrar Tian Yingbi, the emperor ordered the eunuch Lu Bao to sell Lianghuai's confiscated surplus salt. Supervising Secretary Bao Jianjie laid out the full costs and benefits in strong terms. The emperor refused to heed him. Once Lu Bao took up his post, he proposed opening reserve-stock salt. Minister of Revenue Yang Junmin said, "The clear imperial order was to audit confiscated salt, but reserve stock is not confiscated property. Any increase beyond the quota must come at the expense of regular revenue. Lu Bao's proposal should not be adopted. Censor Ma Congcheng objected as well. The emperor refused all objections. Lu Bao then opened 80,000 reserve-stock certificates of 570 jin each, weighed them out of turn ahead of regular stock, and blocked regular salt from circulating. Merchants and common people were thrown into turmoil, and schemers swarmed forth. Dong Lian, Wu Yingqi, and others competed to tout the profits to be made from salt. Tax commissioners in Shanxi and Fujian all took charge of salt revenues as well. Company commander Gao Shixia memorialized that surplus salt in Zhejiang and Fujian could be sold annually for 300,000 taels; grand coordinator Jin Xue investigated and reported that the claim was entirely false. The memorial was submitted but drew no response. Thereupon Fujian delivered a little over 13,000 taels and Zhejiang a little over 37,000, levied under pretexts of harsh exaction; merchants were hard pressed and certificates piled up unsold. Minister of Revenue Zhao Shiqing traced the harm to Lu Bao and said, "Every extra levy beyond the quota reduces regular revenue by the same amount and leaves the state treasury ever shorter; I ask that all unscheduled floating levies be abolished. No reply was given. From the summer of the thirty-fourth year to the following spring, arrears on the regular quota exceeded a million taels; Lu Bao, now alarmed, asked to abolish reserve-stock certificate salt. Lu Bao soon died. An edict abolished the practice, but the increased weight per certificate could not be rolled back.
38
After Empress Dowager Li died, the emperor used her testamentary edict to remit the floating levies of every transport office; merchant distress eased somewhat, but old certificates remained blocked. The Ministry of Revenue submitted ten proposals on salt law: current certificates were to circulate first, with accumulated old certificates cleared alongside them, so as to unblock the system. Salt censor Long Yuqi established a gang system for salt administration, attaching old certificates to current ones for circulation: south of the Huai was organized into ten gangs and north of the Huai into fourteen, so that within a little over ten years all old certificates would be cleared. The proposal was approved. Under the Tianqi emperor, profit-seekers scraped and levied at will, striving to increase certificates and rush them through weighing out of turn. Wei Zhongxian's followers Guo Xingzhi, Cui Chengxiu, and others devised new pretexts to extract revenue, and the sums they collected were beyond reckoning. Commentators compared the practice to draining a stream to catch its fish. In the Chongzhen reign, supervising secretary Huang Chenghao submitted a detailed plan for salt administration and sought substantial reforms. Military pay was severely short at the time, and the reforms could not be carried out.
39
At first, princely establishments drew salt from nearby depots, while officials and commoners paid paper notes per capita for household salt and collected it themselves. Officials and clerks often inflated their household counts; one official might draw more than 2,000 jin and one clerk more than 500. Limits were then set: clerical staff could claim no more than ten mouths, and civil and military officials no more than thirty; a large mouth received twelve jin of salt for twelve guan in paper notes, and a small mouth half that amount. In the third year of Jingtai, salt was first used in lieu of officials' grain salaries, with 140 jin taken as equivalent to one shi of rice. Capital officials sent clerks down to the salt fields every year to squeeze illicit profits. Clerks of the Brocade Guard were especially brazen, linking great ships to smuggle salt privately, and local officials could not stop them. The salt censor then fixed each office's salt allotment, bundled it for delivery to clerks, and forbade sending men down to the salt fields. With no way to cover the cost of paper notes and hired transport, many clerks simply disappeared. During Jiajing, Ministry of Personnel director Lu Guangzu spoke with Minister Yan Ne and memorialized to abolish the practice. Thereafter every office stopped drawing salt except the Ministry of Revenue and the censors of the thirteen circuits, who continued to receive their annual allotments as before. Where soldiers and civilians paid per capita in paper notes, Zhejiang required three sheng of rice a month and sold one jin of salt; yet when merchants brought salt to the government for distribution, collection was pursued more ruthlessly than land tax. In the Zhengtong reign, on the advice of supervising secretary Bao Hui, people were allowed to buy salt directly from merchants, the rice-payment order was abolished, and sales under ten jin were not treated as private salt, though salt paper notes were not abolished. Later, when the single-whip tax reform took effect, the charge was folded into the regular land tax.
40
使
Salt inspectors: in the Hongwu and Yongle reigns, censors were once or twice ordered to oversee salt revenues. In the first year of Zhengtong, Vice Ministers He Wenyuan and Wang Zuo and Vice Censor-in-Chief Zhu Yuyan were first appointed to supervise salt revenues in Lianghuai, Changlu, and Liangzhe, with eunuchs and censors sent along with them. Before long, once the salt system had been straightened out, an edict recalled them. Censors were later put in charge of salt inspection on the model of circuit inspection, with annual rotation becoming the rule. In the eleventh year, Shandong's salt fields were placed under the Changlu salt censor. In the fourteenth year, Vice Censor-in-Chief Geng Jiuchou was ordered to rectify the Lianghuai salt system. During Chenghua, the eunuch Wang Yunzhong and Vice Censor-in-Chief Gao Ming were specially dispatched to reorganize Lianghuai salt policy. Gao Ming requested one additional vice commissioner and two magistrate assistants. Early in the Xiaozong reign the salt system had broken down; Minister of Revenue Li Min asked that a senior integrity official be chosen to set it right, and Vice Ministers Li Si and Peng Shao were sent to Lianghuai and Liangzhe respectively, each concurrently serving as censor-in-chief with an imperial commission. In the fourteenth year of Hongzhi, Vice Censor-in-Chief Wang Jing supervised Lianghuai salt policy. In the second year of Zhengde, Lianghuai was overseen by Vice Censor-in-Chief Wang Qiong and Fujian-Zhejiang by Vice Censor-in-Chief Zhang Xian. Later only Lianghuai bore a heavy levy, and senior ministers were periodically dispatched there. In the tenth year it was Vice Minister Lan Zhang. In the seventh year of Jiajing, Vice Censor-in-Chief Huang Chen. In the thirty-second year, Vice Censor-in-Chief Wang Shen. By the thirty-ninth year, Vice Censor-in-Chief Yan Maoqing was specially appointed to oversee all four transport offices, with authority heavier than ever. From the second year of Longqing, after Vice Censor-in-Chief Pang Shangpeng had overseen the three transport offices of Lianghuai, Changlu, and Shandong, no senior minister was specially dispatched again.
41
Frontier peoples lived on dairy foods, and without tea they grew sick with deprivation. From Tang and Song times onward the tea-for-horses system had been used to control the Qiang and Rong peoples, and under the Ming it was enforced with especial rigor. There was official tea and merchant tea, both stored on the frontier to be traded for horses. Official tea was occasionally taxed in paper notes, while merchant tea paid levies much like the salt system.
42
At first the Taizu emperor ordered merchants to buy tea in producing regions, pay a fee, and obtain a certificate. A full certificate covered one hundred jin of tea for a payment of two hundred cash; amounts below a full certificate, called odd lots, were issued separate slips. Anyone lacking a slip or certificate, or carrying tea apart from its certificate, could be reported and arrested. Tea bureaus and inspection stations were set up; if the weighed tea did not match the certificate, it was treated as private tea. Violators of the private-tea ban were punished like private-salt smugglers. Smuggling private tea beyond the frontier, and pass officials who failed to inspect it, were both punishable by death. Later a tea certificate was fixed at one thousand cash for one hundred jin of tea; and a tea slip at six hundred cash for sixty jin. Payment was later changed to paper notes, one guan per certificate or slip.
43
西西 西 西
Early in Hongwu a rule was set that wherever tea was sold, the local Revenue Promotion Office should take one part in thirty. In the fourth year the Ministry reported: "In Hanzhong, Jinzhou, Shiquan, Hanyin, Pingli, and Xixiang in Shaanxi there are forty-five qing of tea gardens with more than 860,000 tea plants. In Sichuan, 315 Ba-tea households tend more than 2.38 million plants. It is appropriate to fix a rule that the government take one plant in ten. In ownerless tea gardens, soldiers were to harvest the crop, keeping eight plants in ten to trade for frontier horses. The emperor approved the proposal. Tea Tax Offices were then established in every tea-producing region, with fixed quotas of a little over 26,000 jin for Shaanxi and one million jin for Sichuan. Tea and Horse Offices were set up at Qin, Tao, He, and Yazhu, and tea was carried more than five thousand li from Diaomen, Li, and Ya westward as far as Do-kham and U-Tsang. From the Guide prefectures beyond the mountains to the western tribes, all came to sell horses.
44
西 使 便
Tea from Diaomen, Yongning, Jun, and Lian, known as Scissors Coarse Leaf, was used only by western tribes, and merchants had never before exported it across the border. The Sichuan Commissioner of Tea and Salt reported: "Separate tea bureaus should be established to levy taxes and trade for red tassels, felt jackets, rice, cloth, pepper, and wax to supply state revenue. Tea gathered by local residents should be sold under the Jiangnan system of issued permits, benefiting both public revenue and private trade. Yongning, Chengdu, Jun, and Lian accordingly all gained tea bureaus.
45
Sichuan people had long traded tea for felt cloth, felt tassels, and the like to meet their tea tax obligations. Once quotas were fixed and warehouses set up to store tea solely for horse purchases, the people dared not pick tea privately; quotas were often unmet, and many had to pay make-up levies. When the Sichuan Provincial Administration Commission raised the matter, the people were allowed to harvest tea and trade with the frontier tribes. An edict also exempted the people of the Six Fan Offices of Tianquan from corvée and ordered them to devote themselves to steaming black tea for the horse trade.
46
西
Under the original arrangement, merchants from Chang River West and other tribes brought horses to Yazhou to trade for tea, entering Lizhou only after passing through Yanzhou Guard in Sichuan. The Tea and Horse Office set the rate at 1,800 jin of tea per horse, issued from the Diaomen Tea Tax Office. Tribal merchants had to travel a long roundabout route, and received far too much tea. Yanzhou Guard petitioned to place a Tea and Horse Office at Yanzhou, relocate the tea stored at Diaomen there, and set the tea allowance according to the quality of the horses. An edict kept the Tea and Horse Office where it was but set new rates: 120 jin for a superior horse, 70 for a medium one, and 50 for a foal.
47
西 西 椿 使
In the thirtieth year the Qinzhou Tea and Horse Office was moved to Xining. The emperor instructed the Right Military Governor: "Private tea has lately been smuggled across the border, few come to the official markets, horses grow costlier while tea grows cheaper, and this invites contempt from the frontier tribes. Send orders to the Qin and Shu regional commands to deploy troops to Songpan, Diaomen, Li, Ya, Hezhou, Lintao, and the passes into the western tribes to patrol and stop illicit tea from leaving the border. The Prince Consort Commandant Xie Da was also sent to admonish Prince Chun of Shu: "The state's tea monopoly exists chiefly to supply the horse trade. Border officials have failed to keep watch; smugglers send tea abroad only to trade for red tassels and petty goods. The tribes reap the profit effortlessly while few horses reach China — how can this restrain the frontier peoples! You must instruct the Provincial Administration Commission and Regional Command to enforce strict prohibitions and not allow the state to suffer this loss."
48
西 西 西
At this time the emperor was deeply attentive to frontier defense: trading tea for horses both won over the tribes and strengthened the realm. He once told Minister of Revenue Yu Xin: "Three million jin of Hanzhong tea in Shaanxi could bring thirty thousand horses; tea from Song and Mao in Sichuan would yield the same. The ban on private sale must be enforced without laxity. Accordingly he dispatched Assistant Censor-in-Chief Deng Wenkeng and others to investigate illicit tea in Sichuan and Shaanxi; Prince Consort Commandant Ouyang Lun was executed for smuggling tea. Gold credential plaques were also issued, and Duke of Cao Li Jinglong was ordered to carry them into the frontier and covenant with the tribes. The inscriptions read "By Imperial Decree" on the top, "Due Tribute Required" on the left, and "Disobedience Punished by Death" on the right. There were forty-one plaques in all: for the Huobacang, Sinangri, and other tribes of Taozhou, four plaques requiring 3,050 horses; for the twenty-nine western tribes of Bili Guard in Hezhou, twenty-one plaques requiring 7,755 horses; and for the four guards of Quxian, Aduan, Handong, and Anding at Xining, together with the Bawa, Shenzhong, Shencang, and other tribes, sixteen plaques requiring 3,050 horses. The lower halves were issued to the tribes and the upper halves kept in the palace as proof; every three years an official was sent to verify that the halves matched. There were two routes, one through Hezhou and one through Diaomen; more than 500,000 jin of tea were shipped, and 13,800 horses were obtained. Such was how Taizu managed the frontier tribes.
49
西 西
Under Yongle the emperor sought to conciliate distant peoples and repeatedly raised the amount of tea offered. More came to trade horses, but tea ran short. The tea ban also grew slack, and much tea was smuggled across the border. At the Diaomen Tea and Horse Office more than 80,000 jin of tea bought only seventy horses, many of them weak and emaciated. The tea ban was then tightened, a Tea and Horse Office was set up at Taozhou, and another at Gansu within the Shaanxi military region. In the thirteenth year three censors were specially sent to oversee the tea-and-horse trade in Shaanxi.
50
To stop private tea, Taizu from the third to the ninth month sent four envoys each month to inspect Hezhou, Lintao, Diaomen, Li, and Ya. Within half a year twenty-four envoys were sent back and forth in constant rotation. In the tenth year of Xuande this was fixed at one dispatch every third month. The gold plaques had been suspended since Yongle; they were now issued again. Before long the tribes, harried by northern raiders, moved inward and the plaques were scattered and lost. The Tea Office, finding tea scarce, traded only Hanzhong tea for horses, issued no plaques, and simply allowed the tribes to present horses as tribute.
51
西
Earlier, at the end of Hongwu, four tea warehouses were established at Chengdu, Chongqing, Baoning, and Bozhou, allowing merchants to pay grain for tea certificates. Under Xuande it was fixed that for every one hundred jin of official tea, a ten-percent allowance for wastage was added. Certificate holders sent their own men to Ganzhou and Xining and drew salt in Huai and Zhe to cover costs. Merchants used their documents to smuggle tea freely, and state revenue went uncollected for years. Early in Zhengtong, Censor-in-Chief Luo Hengxin described these abuses, and the rule allowing transport of tea in exchange for salt was abolished; official transport was restored under a capital official's supervision.
52
西
Under Jingtai the envoys were withdrawn. In the third year of Chenghua censors were ordered to inspect tea in Shaanxi. The tribes resented the censors, and fewer horses arrived each day. The censors were recalled, envoys were sent out again, and the Surveillance Commission was also ordered to inspect. When inspection became unfocused, the Ministry of War pointed out the harm, censors were sent again on annual rotation, and this was made permanent regulation. Famine relief also led to renewed merchant grain payments for tea certificates, with tea taxed at five qian of silver per hundred jin. From this date merchant taxes could be paid in silver instead of goods.
53
西 西西 西
In the third year of Hongzhi, Censor Li Luan reported: "Stores at the Tea and Horse Offices are dwindling, frontier horses are scarce, yet Shaanxi's prefectures enjoy good harvests and have no need to trade grain. He asked that merchants be summoned to the three offices at Xining, Hexi, and Taozhou to buy certificates — no more than one hundred jin per permit or thirty permits per merchant — with the state taking four-tenths and the remainder sold privately, yielding 400,000 jin of tea to buy four thousand horses, stopping when the quota was met. The emperor approved the proposal. In the twelfth year, Censor Wang Xian again reported: "Since the tea-certificate ban was relaxed, private tea has become unstoppable and the horse trade has suffered. He requested that the grain-for-tea regulation be suspended. If war or famine should arise later, the matter can be reconsidered then. The ministry replied and approved his request. The Sichuan Tea Tax Office had formerly levied several hundred thousand jin for horse trade. After Yongle, tribal horses all came via the Shaanxi route, and much Sichuan tea soaked and rotted. It was then ordered that of every three parts, one be collected in kind and two converted to silver; the grain-for-tea system was suspended for two years. When Yanbian suffered famine, merchants were again summoned to pay grain and fodder for certificates totaling four million jin. Soon, on Censor Wang Shao's recommendation, the practice was again prohibited, and the rule of summoning merchants beyond the regular quota for open certificates was abolished.
54
貿 西
In the sixteenth year the censor was recalled, and Censor-in-Chief Yang Yiqing, overseer of horse administration, was given concurrent charge of tea affairs. Yiqing again proposed reviving open certificates, saying: "Summon merchants to buy tea; the government shall purchase one-third. Each year five or six hundred thousand jin of tea could bring ten thousand horses. The emperor approved the request. In the first year of Zhengde, Yiqing proposed again that merchants unwilling to receive payment in cash be given half the tea to sell themselves. This was then fixed as a permanent regulation. Yiqing also said the gold-plaque credential system should be restored and requested that tea-patrol censors be reinstated with concurrent charge of horse administration. Censors were again dispatched, but the gold plaques had long been abandoned. In the end they could not be restored. Later, when Wuzong favored tribal monks, Western Regions people were permitted to carry private tea as an exception. From this the tea law collapsed.
55
When tribes traded horses they could not use standard weights and measures, and fixed only the number of bamboo tea baskets per horse. If the baskets were large, the government lost on the exchange; if they were small, merchants suffered from the burden. In the tenth year Tea Patrol Censor Wang Ruzhou set a middle standard of three hundred thirty baskets per thousand jin.
56
In the third year of Jiajing, Censor Chen Jiang, because merchant tea was inferior and spurious, levied only black tea; as local production was limited, tea was ranked in upper and middle grades, stamped on the baskets, with merchant names written for inspection. Sichuan tea permits were soon fixed at fifty thousand certificates: twenty-six thousand as interior permits and twenty-four thousand as border permits. Bud-tea permits cost three qian; leaf-tea permits cost two qian. Tea certificates were capped at eight hundred thousand jin and were not to be issued too freely.
57
西 使 使使
In the fifteenth year, Censor Liu Liangqing said: "The statute reads: 'Those who smuggle private tea across the border and pass officials who fail to detect it shall both be executed by lingering death. For the western frontier barrier, nothing is more urgent than the frontier tribes. The tribes rely on tea to live; therefore strict laws prohibit it and horses are exchanged to reward them, to control the tribes' very livelihood, strengthen China's frontier barrier, and sever the Xiongnu's right arm — this cannot be judged by ordinary law. An early Hongwu regulation held that private tea storage must not exceed one month's supply. Under Hongzhi, merchants were summoned to buy tea certificates, sometimes for famine relief or frontier stores, yet the people of the interior were never forbidden to drink tea. Now the offense of trading with the tribes has been reduced to military exile alone. Tea in the interior is prohibited so people cannot consume it, and merchants' private duty tea is all gathered at the three Tea and Horse Offices. The tea offices border the tribes, so private trade passes easily, yet the ban is stricter than in interior commanderies — this drives the people into smuggling and hands them the means.
58
西 西
Thus great villains slip through and escape the net, while common people carrying sheng and dou of tea fall under the law. Counting stores at the three Tea and Horse Offices today: Tao-He has enough for three years, Xining for two, yet merchant, private, and duty tea keep increasing daily, piling up until they rot with no use. Such are the abuses of the tea law. The tribes have horses in abundance but no market for them, while our tea is barred from trade — inevitably the two sides will seek each other out, and the power to regulate that exchange rests in our hands. Today the residents around the tea offices quietly buy tribal horses in advance for private resale, keeping busy year-round — so that by the time the official exchange season arrives, the supply of horses has already been drained. He asked that the three Tea and Horse Offices be ordered to hold no more than a two-year reserve and to fix the number of horses traded each year. Nothing beyond the official quota tea may be included — not even the smallest amount. Let tea prices rise steeply so the tribes depend on us, and good horses will flow in beyond what we can use. At the same time, open up merchant tea for sale throughout the interior, with the government levying half the proceeds for military supplies, while places near the tribes — He, Lan, Jie, and Min — would remain under the old bans on tea sales and face even harsher penalties for unauthorized frontier trade. Tao, Min, and He would fall under the frontier defense circuit; Lintao and Lanzhou under the Longyou sub-circuit censor; and Xining under the military defense commissioner — each charged with posting officials to guard against smuggling. Officials who failed to detect violations would be dismissed for incompetence. The memorial was submitted and approved. The tea regulations were partly restored to order.
59
Censor Liu Lun, Grand Coordinator Wang Yiqi, and others asked that the gold-plaque credentials be issued again to the frontier tribes. The Ministry of War argued that the tribes were treacherous and unpredictable, that northern raiders never stopped, and that gold plaques were lost as fast as they were issued — all of which shamed the state. The tribes brought horses because they wanted tea; tighten the ban on smuggling and they would come willingly — horses could be collected even without restoring the gold plaques. But if smuggling flourished, we would lose all leverage over them; even with gold plaques, no horses would come. In the end they agreed to issue verification tallies instead.
60
西 使
Later, when famine struck Shaanxi, tea growers had no livelihood and fell far behind on their tax payments. In the thirty-sixth year the Ministry of Revenue reported that earthquakes and disaster had ravaged Shaanxi, frontier supplies were critically low, and the treasury was severely overextended: "In earlier times, besides the regular tea quota traded for horses, additional certificate openings had supplemented government revenues — in some years reaching five million jin. Recently Censor Liu Liangqing had opened certificates for another million jin, but the quota had since been cut to eight hundred thousand jin of regular tea, with duty and private tea bringing the total to barely nine hundred thousand jin. The ministry urged sending the matter to the tea-patrol censor and summoning merchants to tender for additional certificates. Censor Yang Meiyi replied: "In a famine year the people are destitute — even the regular quota falls short. Where is there any surplus? For now we should simply adhere to the rule of nine hundred thousand jin per year for trading with the tribes. Proposals to open interior trade to curb smuggling and to increase certificate openings for famine relief should all be dropped, so that tea revenue is not diverted from the horse trade. The Ministry of Revenue, citing the depleted treasury, asked that — following the Hongzhi sixth-year precedent — an additional million jin of certificates be opened beyond the horse-trade quota, with proceeds sent to frontier garrisons for military pay. The emperor approved. Near the end of the reign, Censor Pan Yigui reported that the expanded merchant tea certificates were backing up badly and should be cut by fourteen or fifteen percent. He also argued that because Songpan lay close to Tao and He, smuggled tea often leaked through there — Songpan's certificate quota should be suspended and the ban on tea entering tribal territory tightened. Both proposals were approved.
61
In Sichuan, tea certificates were split between frontier and interior regions — frontier allotments were small and sold readily, while interior allotments were large and often went unsold. In Longqing 3 the quota was cut by twelve thousand certificates: thirty thousand went to Li and Ya prefectures, four thousand to Songpan and other frontier posts, and four thousand to the interior — yielding over fourteen thousand taels of tax silver remitted annually to the ministry for frontier aid.
62
仿西
In the fifth year Ganzhou was ordered to adopt the same system as Tao, He, and Xining — opening certificates each June and completing tenders for eight hundred horses within two months. Rewards and penalties were set: merchants who cleared their certificates within one or two years received graded rewards; those who took more than three years were penalized and any extra tea they carried was confiscated.
63
西
In Wanli 5 Altan Khan submitted to the dynasty and asked for a tea market to be opened. Censor Li Shicheng warned: "Tea is life itself for the tribes. If the northern steppe peoples gained access to it, they could use tea to dominate the tribes, who would then align with the northerners — the consequences would be grave. The ministry agreed to grant a little over a hundred baskets of tea as tribute but refused to allow open trading. After Liu Liangqing had rushed to ban interior tea sales, Yang Meiyi objected — and the ban was eventually reimposed. In the thirteenth year, because Xi'an, Fengxiang, and Hanzhong did not border tribal territory, the bans there were lifted — merchants were recruited, certificates issued, with one part in thirteen taken for the government and the rest free to sell. Censor Zhong Huamin, noting how much smuggled tea was getting through, asked that enforcement duties be divided and officials held accountable. In Shaanxi's Hanzhong, the Guannan circuit would oversee enforcement, with one assistant prefect permanently posted at Yuduba Pass; In Sichuan's Baoning, the Chuanbei circuit would take charge, with one assistant prefect stationed at Jihouba Pass. They would command local troops and officials to guard the passes. The proposal was approved.
64
Certificate tenders for tea-and-horse exchange were accepted only at Hanzhong and Baoning, but Hunan produced cheap tea and merchants routinely smuggled it across the border — so only ten or twenty certificates a year were tendered at Hanzhong and Baoning. Tea growers trying to meet their tax obligations smuggled tea to the frontier, where tribes favored the cheap contraband and stopped offering horses to the official markets. In the twenty-third year Censor Li Nan asked to ban Hunan tea, arguing that its spread was ruining both the tea monopoly and horse policy: the tea-patrol censor should summon merchants and issue certificates to those willing to trade through Hanzhong, Xing'an, Baoning, and Kuizhou. Anyone who crossed the border to sell in Hunan should be barred. Hunan also produced much adulterated tea that burned the mouth and upset the stomach — harming the tribes as well. Censor Xu Qiao countered: "Hanzhong and Sichuan teas are scarce and costly, while Hunan tea is abundant and cheap. Hunan tea posed no threat to Hanzhong's market. Han tea was sweet and mild, Hunan tea bitter — better suited to buttered tea and beneficial to the tribes as well. But strict inspection laws were needed to stop adulterated tea. The Ministry of Revenue split the difference, making Hanzhong tea primary and Hunan tea supplementary. Merchants tendering for certificates would receive Hanzhong and Sichuan allotments first; Hunan allotments came only after those were filled. If Hanzhong certificates ran short, Hunan certificates would make up the difference. The compromise was approved.
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In the twenty-ninth year Shaanxi touring censor Bi Sancai reported that duty tea payments were fixed at an annual quota. Because surplus tea had piled up and growers struggled to deliver their quotas in kind, the levy had been converted to cash payments. Now no merchants came at all, and the tea stores at the five offices stood empty. He asked that the five Hanzhong prefectures and counties resume delivery in kind, and that five hundred certificates be opened each year — enough to bring in over eleven thousand nine hundred horses. The ministry settled on nine thousand six hundred horses per year across the six tea offices at Xining, He, Tao, Min, Gan, and Zhuanglang, and made that the standing quota. During the Tianqi reign the horse quota was raised by another twenty-four hundred.
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The dynasty had strictly banned smuggling at the outset, but abuses multiplied over the years. By the dynasty's final years, merchants received extra reward passes beyond their regular certificates, allowing them to trade tea privately. The finest tribal horses all went to corrupt private traders, leaving only mediocre stock for the official tea offices. Once the tribes had tea, they submitted or rebelled as they pleased; Officers and officials substituted their own horses for tribal horses and fraudulently claimed top-grade tea in exchange. The tea law, horse policy, and frontier defense all collapsed together.
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西 西
Elsewhere, tea was grown in Nanzhili (Changzhou, Luzhou, Chizhou, Huizhou), Zhejiang (Huzhou, Yanzhou, Quzhou, Shaoxing), Jiangxi (Nanchang, Raozhou, Nankang, Jiujiang, Ji'an), Huguang (Wuchang, Jingzhou, Changsha, Baoqing), and Sichuan (Chengdu, Chongqing, Jiading, Kuizhou, Luzhou). Merchants tendered for certificates at inspection stations in Yingtian, Yixing, and Hangzhou, while tea duties were collected at Jiangdong Guabu in Yingtian. Suzhou, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, Huizhou, Guangde, Zhejiang, Henan, Guangxi, and Guizhou all collected duty in paper notes, while Yunnan collected silver.
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Imperial tribute tea totaled a little over four thousand jin nationwide. The finest came from Jianning in Fujian, graded as Pluck-Spring, Prior-Spring, Next-Spring, Purple Bud, and Fresh Tribute, among other labels. Formerly the leaves were picked, ground, and pressed with silver plates into large and small "dragon" tea cakes. The founding emperor abolished cake-making as too burdensome and required only fresh tea buds as tribute, restoring five hundred dedicated tribute households. All other tribute teas were supplied according to their quotas and are not listed here in detail.
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