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卷七十九 志第五十五 食貨三

Volume 79 Treatises 55: Finance and Economics 3

Chapter 79 of 明史 · History of Ming
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1
Grain Transport and Warehouses
2
From dynasty to dynasty, grain transported by the canal was stored at relay depots to supply government granaries, with provisions scaled to the distance of each leg of the route. When the Hongwu Emperor established his capital at Nanjing, tribute and taxes from every region reached the capital by the Yangtze, a route that was short and straightforward. After the Yongle Emperor moved the capital to Beijing, the haul became vastly longer, and the transport system was reorganized three times. The system began with relay transport, then combined exchange and relay transport, until relay transport was entirely replaced by long-distance transport and the regulations were set in their final form.
3
西 調
Once the Huitong Canal had been dredged, the emperor ordered Regional Commander Jia Yi and Minister Song Li to move grain by fleet. Song Li found that thousand-picul seagoing ships were shoddily built and kept breaking apart, so he built five hundred shallow-draft boats and moved a million piculs of grain from the Huai, Yang, Xu, and Yan regions to replace the volume formerly carried by sea. Pingjiang Earl Chen Xuan took over from him and expanded the fleet to more than three thousand vessels. At that time there were warehouses at Huai'an, Xuzhou, Linqing, and Dezhou. Peasants from Jiangxi, Huguang, and Zhejiang delivered grain to the Huai'an depot, and government troops were assigned in relays to haul it onward from each stage. Troops from Zhejiang and the metropolitan region hauled grain from Huai'an to Xuzhou; capital garrison troops from Xuzhou to Dezhou; and Shandong and Henan troops from Dezhou to Tongzhou. Grain moved in relays along the route, with four runs each year totaling more than three million piculs; this was called relay transport. Under relay transport, the troops who hauled grain did not have to draw on the tribute grain the peasants delivered in that same year; and those who delivered grain did not have to supply the haul required of the troops in that same year. Accounts were balanced over several years so that the regular quota was met without requiring exact annual matching. Sea and overland transport were both discontinued; only escort vessels for coastal runs remained. Each year at landings in Henan, Shandong, Xiaotan, and elsewhere, three hundred thousand piculs were exchanged—one hundred twenty thousand piculs to Tianjin and one hundred eighty thousand piculs shipped from Zhigu by sea to Jizhou. Within a few years many transport troops were reassigned to other duties, civilian haulage was restored, and because the routes were so long deliveries often missed their deadlines.
4
西
In Xuande 4, Chen Xuan and Minister Huang Fu jointly proposed restoring relay transport. Peasants from Jiangxi, Huguang, and Zhejiang were to deliver 1.5 million piculs to Huai'an; those from Suzhou, Songjiang, Ningguo, Chizhou, Luzhou, Anqing, and Guangde 2.74 million piculs to Xuzhou; and those from Yingtian, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, Huai'an, Yangzhou, Fengyang, Taiping, Chuzhou, Hezhou, and Xuzhou 2.2 million piculs to Linqing, with transport troops relaying the grain into the Beijing and Tongzhou depots. Because peasants now delivered grain to nearby depots, their labor was greatly reduced. The state then assessed distance and volume and requisitioned one boat in eleven, thirteen, or fifteen from civilian fleets to supply the transport troops. Only Shandong, Henan, and North Zhili delivered grain straight to the capital depots without relay transport. Soon afterward grain from Nanyang, Huaqing, and Runing was routed to Linqing; grain from Kaifeng, Zhangde, and Weihui to Dezhou; and eventually all Shandong and Henan grain went to Dezhou.
5
便 西
In the sixth year Chen Xuan said: "When Jiangnan peasants haul grain to the various depots, the round trip takes nearly a year and ruins the farming season. Let peasants deliver only as far as Huai'an and Guazhou and hand the grain over to the guard units there. Government troops will carry it north in return for travel expenses and surplus allowances, benefiting both soldiers and civilians." This became known as exchange transport. The emperor ordered a council of ministers. Jian Yi of the Ministry of Personnel and others submitted graded surplus-allowance rates for grain that troops exchanged from civilians, scaled by distance. Per picul the allowance was eight dou for Huguang, seven for Jiangxi and Zhejiang, six for South Zhili, and five for North Zhili. Peasants who delivered to Huai'an and exchanged with transport troops received only a four-dou surplus. Any grain not covered by exchange was still hauled by civilians to the depots, and those who declined to exchange could continue hauling on their own. Troops welcomed the work because they received surplus grain, light-cargo silver for locks and transshipment, and permission to carry other goods on the side, while civilians increasingly found long-distance hauling burdensome. Exchange transport therefore grew common while relay transport declined. When troops exchanged grain with civilians, they often used their power to extort extra payments. Aware of the abuse, the emperor ordered the Ministry of Revenue to send supervising officials and forbid private exchanges. Surplus allowances were later cut substantially—to six dou at most for distant routes and as little as two dou five sheng for nearby ones. Of each allowance, two-thirds was paid in grain and one-third commuted in other goods. Principal grain was measured heaped in the bushel, while surplus grain was measured level. Of the four million piculs transported, fourteen parts went to the capital depot and sixteen to Tongzhou. Censors were assigned to supervise receipts at the Linqing, Xuzhou, and Huai'an depots.
6
便
Early in the Zhengtong reign the transport quota was 4.5 million piculs, of which more than 2.8 million moved by exchange transport; relay hauls through Huai'an, Xuzhou, Linqing, and Dezhou made up only three or four tenths. After the Tumu debacle, Shandong and Zhili transport troops were again kept entirely for training and defense. Grain hauling in Suzhou, Songjiang, and neighboring prefectures again fell to civilians. In Jingtai 6, after the Oirats sent tribute missions, military transport was restored. Late in the Tianshun reign, after exchange transport had been in place for years, warehouse clerks coveted surplus allowances, routinely measured incoming grain by the heaped exchange bushel, and demanded extra levies, leaving transport troops in severe distress. When Emperor Xianzong acceded, Assistant Commander Yuan You of the grain transport service submitted practical reforms. The emperor said: "The statutes clearly require delivering households to level the measure themselves, and surplus allowances must not exceed five sheng per picul. That transport troops now plead for open surplus allowances shows how badly warehouse clerks have been overcharging them. Henceforth troops shall level the measure themselves, with five sheng surplus per picul and no more; extortionists will be punished." Later, at the urging of the eunuchs who supervised the depots, the surplus allowance was raised to eight sheng. Before long over-collection resumed as before, and repeated prohibitions failed to stop it.
7
西
Initially grain shipments to the capital had no fixed quota. In Chenghua 8 the quota was fixed at four million piculs and thereafter treated as the standard. Northern grain totaled 755,600 piculs and southern grain 3,244,400 piculs; of this, 3.3 million piculs moved by exchange transport and 700,000 piculs were converted from relay to exchange. Of the exchange transport total, Huguang, Shandong, and Henan commuted 177,700 piculs to silver payments. Counting exchange transport, converted exchange, and surplus grain together, 5,189,700 piculs entered the Beijing and Tongzhou depots. South Zhili alone supplied 1.8 million piculs of principal grain and Jizhou prefecture seventy thousand, not counting surplus allowances. Zhejiang's tax quota was tens of thousands of piculs below Suzhou's. Jiangxi and Huguang were lower still. Tianjin, Suzhou, Miyun, and Changping together received more than 640,000 piculs, all drawn from exchange-transport stocks. The Linqing and Dezhou depots held more than 190,000 piculs of reserve grain, supplied from converted-exchange grain in Shandong and Henan. After disasters or crop failures, grain from the two depots was drawn to keep transport at the four-million-picul quota without shortfall.
8
By Chenghua 7 the proposal for converted exchange had emerged. At that time Yingtian Grand Coordinator Teng Zhao ordered transport troops to collect grain at Jiangnan landings; beyond surplus allowances, they added one dou per picul as a Yangtze crossing fee. Several years later the emperor ordered the seven hundred thousand piculs hauled by relay through Huai'an, Xuzhou, Linqing, and Dezhou all converted to landing-side exchange. Everything was thereby converted to landing-side exchange, and long-distance haulage by government troops became the permanent system. Yet warehouse officials mostly exacted harsh fees, sometimes imposing extra fines, and transport troops borrowed repeatedly and still could not pay. In Hongzhi 1, Censor-in-Chief Ma Wensheng memorialized on the transport troops' hardships, saying: "Transport vessels in every province are priced by the Ministry of Works and built under local supervision. Recently the grain-transport commander, because funds were not paid on schedule, asked to receive the money and build the boats himself. Ministry officials, fearing troops would not maintain new boats, proposed that the ministry supply materials for four-tenths of the cost, guard units three-tenths, and old boats count for three-tenths. Guard units could not raise their share; soldiers sold property and even sold children to pay for it—such was the burden of building transport boats. Many principal soldiers deserted while quotas stayed unchanged, so surplus males filled the rolls and one household might have three or four men on transport duty. They exchanged grain in spring and returned in autumn, enduring every kind of hardship. At Zhangjiawan they hired carts for transshipment and often borrowed money to cover costs—another hardship of the round trip. Transport officials then preyed on those loans, demanding repayment at double interest. Soldiers who carried local goods to trade for fuel and grain were blocked by prohibitions and often robbed. Boat-building subsidies should be raised by twenty taels of silver per vessel, and transport officials and local offices forbidden from levies, harassment, and abusive searches, so troops might gain some relief." The emperor approved his proposal. In the fifth year Minister Ye Qi said: "Suzhou, Songjiang, and neighboring prefectures have suffered successive crop failures; peasants who buy transport grain pay two taels of silver per picul. North Zhili, Shandong, and Henan annually supply grain and fodder to the Xuan and Da frontier zones at one tael of silver per picul as well. Last year Suzhou already commuted five hundred thousand piculs of exchange transport at one tael per picul. I propose extending this to all prefectures with slightly varied rates. Where disaster was severe, seven qian per picul; where lighter, one tael per picul. Silver would go to the ministry for forwarding to the frontiers, offsetting the annual grain supply from the three North Zhili regions, while those regions paid grain in kind to the capital depot—saving expense and simplifying collection." The proposal was approved. Afterward, in famine years the state routinely commuted grain to silver, filling quotas with relay grain from landing depots at rates of six or seven qian per picul, never again reaching one tael.
9
西 便
Earlier, during the Chenghua reign, long-distance transport had been introduced. Jiangnan counties delivered grain to Nanjing and had troops collect it at landings; savings on surplus allowances and relay costs yielded more than a hundred thousand piculs of surplus grain, stored in reserve depots for emergencies. The grand coordinator then argued that landing-side exchange was prone to abuse and asked to restore the old rule of storing grain in the warehouse before release. The Ministry of Revenue replied: "Landing-side exchange works well and must not be changed." The emperor sided with the ministry and stored the surplus in guard depots for regular disbursement. Following the ministry again, ninety thousand piculs of Shandong converted-exchange grain could still be hauled by civilians to Linqing and Dezhou for relay by transport troops. In Zhengde 2 grain-transport officials proposed clearing landing depots, noting: "Peasants once delivered to Huai'an, Xuzhou, Linqing, and Dezhou to await guard relay hauls, but nearby counties were later switched to landing-side exchange. Then the seven hundred thousand piculs of relay transport were also ordered converted to exchange. Beyond those seven hundred thousand piculs, grain still not exchanged at landings was hauled to the four depots, where it sat undisbursed until it spoiled. They proposed commuting three hundred fifty thousand piculs of principal exchange grain from Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Huguang to silver for Beijing, while guard troops from those provinces relayed an equal volume from Linqing and Dezhou. Depot grain would not spoil, and transport troops from the three provinces could relay hauls more easily. Beyond the annual quota, another three hundred fifty thousand piculs would be commuted to silver—several benefits in one stroke." The emperor ordered the ministries to deliberate and approved the request. In the sixth year Vice Minister Shao Bao, citing transport delays, asked to restore relay transport. The ministry ruled that relay transport had been abandoned too long to restore abruptly, and the proposal lapsed.
10
The Linqing and Dezhou depots held one hundred ninety thousand piculs; over ten years that would reach one million nine hundred thousand. From the start of the Jiajing reign, disaster-relief allocations mounted, and Shandong and Henan—repeatedly hit by bad harvests—kept requesting lighter quotas; meanwhile much of the grain stored in the two warehouses was rotting away. Proposals to commute grain payments to silver came up again and again, and depot stocks steadily shrank. In Jiajing 1, grain transport commander Yang Hong proposed letting transport officers disburse light-cargo silver along the route for hiring boats and carts, without sealed packets or formal accounting of surplus allowances—a move meant to squeeze grain transport troops. Supervising secretaries and censorial officials joined in opposing the proposal. The Ministry of Revenue replied: "The censorate's focus on preventing fraud is right. But light-cargo silver was meant to cover relay transport costs; if officials, fearing waste by grain transport troops, seized every surplus allowance for the Taicang Depot, hauling fees would effectively become principal grain—far from what the law intended." They then proposed that at Tongzhou, depot inspectors would verify disbursements, pay out only what was actually needed, and fix the rule permanently. Surplus allowances would stay out of Taicang and go toward boat repairs instead, with heavy penalties for officials and bannermen caught profiteering. Light-cargo silver dated from the Chenghua reign, when converted exchange at the warehouses introduced travel allowances and loss grain for each shipment; Exchange-transport grain was measured both level and heaped, creating the so-called heaped surplus; Beyond four dou allotted per shi aboard each vessel, the rest was commuted to silver—this was light-cargo silver. The total came to more than 445,000 taels. In time, much of it was diverted into Taicang anyway. During the Longqing reign, transport conditions worsened, and some officials proposed reopening the Jiao-Lai Canal to revive sea transport. The route would run from Huai'an's Qingjiangpu, through Xingba and Majiahao to Haicang, then straight to Zhigu along sheltered coastal waters rather than the open ocean. After the memorial reached court, surveyors reported too much water and sandy shoals, and the plan was dropped.
11
During the Wanli reign, grain transport grand coordinator Shu Yinglong wrote: "With two capitals, Huai'an, Xuzhou, Linqing, and Dezhou are the vital junction between north and south. Exchange transport had long been standard: Linqing and Dezhou still accumulated grain each year, but the Huai'an and Xuzhou depots stood empty. He proposed that whenever Shandong and Henan enjoyed full harvests, grain in kind should be collected in full and delivered to the warehouses. Once Linqing and De held more than five hundred thousand shi, deliveries to the Huai and Xu depots should likewise be capped at five hundred thousand shi." The proposal was approved. By then, more and more grain was being commuted to silver. In Wanli 30, only about 1.38 million shi of transport grain reached the capital. A grand coordinator then proposed diverting loaded transport grain to river works, but Depot Vice Minister Zhao Shiqing protested: "Grain must not leave Taicang once it arrives; in two years the armies and the people will be waiting on the next transport to eat, and if delivery slips, Beijing itself will be gone." Silver commutation for disaster years was originally meant to replace transport grain that paid the capital garrisons' monthly rations. Instead the funds were being mixed into frontier pay, draining both silver and grain—hence Shiqing's protest. Depot stocks kept shrinking after that, and transport administration grew ever laxer. By the Tianqi and Chongzhen reigns, the empire was drained by rising costs and annual supplies could barely be met.
12
From Yongle through Jingtai, transport fleets had no fixed size and reached their peak. After Tianshun the fleet was fixed at 11,770 vessels crewed by 120,000 government troops. Troops were allowed to carry local goods as side cargo, tax-free. Hongzhi capped side cargo at ten shi; by Wanli the limit had risen to sixty.
13
西 西
Chenghua set arrival deadlines: North Zhili, Henan, and Shandong by the first day of the fifth month; South Zhili by the seventh month; Yangtze-crossing branch exchange one month later; Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Huguang by the ninth month. Performance was judged on three-year cycles, and officers who missed deadlines faced demotion or fines. Zhengde introduced route ledgers recording daily stops; late grain was held at Dezhou and other depots as temporary holding storage. Jiajing set Huai crossing deadlines: north-of-the-river fleets by the twelfth month, Jiangnan by the first, Huguang-Zhejiang-Jiangxi by the third (later moved to the second under Wanli). Capital arrival dates in May were pulled forward one month; July-through-September deadlines were pulled forward two. Later every deadline was tightened by another month. Early in Wanli the schedule was fixed: warehouses opened in the tenth month and exchange finished in the eleventh; large counties had ten days after boats arrived, small counties five. Convoys launched in the twelfth month, crossed the Huai by the second month, and cleared Hongze into the locks by the third. Counties sent sample grain to the ministry in advance; incoming shipments were accepted only after matching the sample.
14
Disaster-relief requests to commute grain to silver could not be filed after the seventh month. Late or hastily revised memorials were logged once and exempt from further review. Drift losses were covered with replacement rice from depots. Losses on the Yangtze counted as major; canal losses as minor; Losses above two hundred shi were major; two hundred shi or below, minor. Squad leaders reported minor losses; major ones went to the throne—until eventually every loss, large or small, required a memorial.
15
沿
Early boats were built of nanmu and fir; cheaper ones of pine. They received minor repairs every three years, overhauls every six, and full rebuilds every ten. Each vessel was rated for 472 shi of principal and allowance grain. As the fleet shrank, individual boats were loaded with seven or eight hundred shi. Side cargo and smuggled goods piled up, causing delays and missed deadlines everywhere. Every river breach brought drift losses—and opportunities for grain transport troops to cheat. Troops shaved grain at landing depots, stole along the route, invented flood and fire losses, and some even scuttled their own boats.
16
使
Early Ming put military officers in charge of sea transport and briefly created a grain-transport commissioner post, then abolished it. After Yongle came censors, then vice ministers and censor-in-chiefs to press the work, section chiefs to divide duties, and principal clerks to supervise exchange—arrangements shifted repeatedly. Jingtai 2 created the grain transport grand coordinator at Huai'an, who shared transport duties with the commander and vice commanders. The transport office ran twelve squadrons totaling 120,000 grain transport troops, matching the capital's twelve drill regiments. Xuande required the transport commander, grand coordinators, and vice ministers to meet in Beijing each eighth month to plan the next year's transport; once the grand coordinator post existed, he joined them. The annual Beijing meeting was not dropped until after Wanli 18. Each first month the grand coordinator toured Yangzhou and managed lock passage at Guazhou and Huai'an. The commander held Xu and Pi, supervising Hongze lock passage; the transport vice commissioner escorted convoys toward the capital. Censors and section chiefs handled convoy assembly; vice commissioners escorted shipments; principal clerks oversaw exchange, discipline, Hongze, shipyards, locks, springs, and depots; Qingjiang and the Wei Canal had their own superintendents. After exchange and Huai-Hongze passage, grand coordinators, transport officials, and canal officers each reported within their jurisdictions. Late grain, missing boats, or missed Huai deadlines fell on the grand coordinator. If grain and boats were ready but inspection was delayed, or convoys were held without cause, causing missed Hongze deadlines and drift or freeze losses, the transport office was blamed. If schedules were met but silted channels, failed dredging, or mistimed locks blocked Hongze passage, canal officials bore the blame.
17
Early Ming showed transport special favor: Renzong and Xuanzong forbade impressing transport boats and pardoned late convoys. Under Yingzong ration cuts and shared levies began, and grain transport troops increasingly abused civilians. Transport discipline kept slipping; grain transport troops traded allowance grain for private goods, peddled along the route, and missed deadlines. By the time they arrived they had to buy depot grain to make quota, often coming up short. Grain chiefs routinely adulterated rice with sand and water—worst in Henan and Shandong—leaving shipments soggy, moldy, and inedible. Power brokers lent to grain transport troops at usurious rates, even asking customs revenue be earmarked for boat funds they could seize back. Transport squad leaders usually bought their posts. Depot officials levied extra exactions totaling 140,000 taels per year. Jiajing's early reforms cleared many abuses, but drift losses and missed deadlines kept growing worse. By mid-dynasty the corruption was beyond remedy.
18
祿 便
Apart from canal grain, Suzhou, Songjiang, Changzhou, Jiaxing, and Huzhou sent 170,040 shi of polished palace rice (8,000 shi commuted) plus 44,000 shi of coarse rice per prefecture (8,800 shi commuted)—all moved by civilians. These were the white-grain convoys. Long-distance transport put canal grain under military haulage, but white grain stayed on civilian transport. During Longqing, Lu Shude wrote: "Military transport fills army stores; civilian transport pays official salaries. Everyone knows how hard military transport is; few realize civilian transport is worse. Boat owners' shakedowns, troop bullying, waiting at Hongze locks, and entry into Beijing and the depots spawned endless abuses. Early Jiajing still had civilian haulers who kept their households intact; within a decade every one was ruined. Putting white grain on military convoys would be far simpler." The memorial went to the ministries for review. The proposal was rejected.
19
使
Each depot owed fixed deliveries; when quotas were shifted to other garrisons, troops assigned to receive exchange grain at landing depots paid the price while county officials sent cart contractors to distant depots—or paid troops to draw at the gate. All this was called direct-assignment transport. Frontier grain mostly moved by cart—Kaiping in Xuande followed the same pattern—but Lanzhou, Gansu, and Songpan often used human porters. Under Yongle Guangdong once sea-transported 200,000 shi to Jiaozhi as well.
20
西 西 沿 西
Early Ming capital garrisons maintained army grain depots. Hongwu 3 expanded them to twenty sites and built Linhuo and Linqing depots for relay hauls. Every province kept depots that supplied officials' salaries. Frontier garrisons kept depots fed by military colony harvests. Counties and prefectures maintained reserve depots in all directions to relieve famine. Paper currency reduced the need for many of these depots. Year 24 stored 160,000 shi at Linqing for drill cavalry. Year 28 added depots at the imperial city's four gates for the defensive garrisons. Capital garrison depots were expanded to forty-one. Depots at Beiping, Miyun, and other counties stockpiled grain for northern campaigns. Under Yongle the court opened depots at Tianjin and the Tongzhou Left Guard post and established thirty-seven garrison grain stores across Beijing. It also ordered prefectures and counties empire-wide to expand storage, moving reserve granaries that had stood in outlying villages into county seats. Once the Hui Tong Canal opened, depots went up at Xuzhou, Huai'an, and Dezhou; Linqing kept its Hongwu-era site; with Tianjin that made five landing depots to feed grain transport. The Dezhou depot was later relocated to Yongqing Dam near Linqing; Wuqing Guard got a depot at Hexiwu and Tongzhou Guard one at Zhangjiawan. Xuande expanded the Linqing depot to hold three million shi. More depots were added in Beijing and Tongzhou. Capital granaries were inspected in quarterly rotation by censors, Revenue officials, and Jinyi guard officers of thousand- and hundred-man rank. Outlying depots came under the joint seals of provincial governors, surveillance commissioners, and regional military commanders. Each depot gate was held by two retired officers commanding ten veteran and junior soldiers, rotated every six months. Early in Yingzong's reign the throne ordered a court conference: wherever a prefecture or county already had granaries, nearby guard-post stores were placed under it; where none existed, guard posts were reassigned accordingly. Liaodong, Gansu, Ningxia, Wanquan, and coastal guard posts without county administration kept the old arrangement. Zhengtong added seven capital garrison depots. Once exchange transport prevailed, relay hauls through transit depots dwindled while Beijing and Tongzhou still lacked space; a third of the Linqing, Dezhou, and Hexiwu stores was torn down and rebuilt as capital depots. Jingtai moved the Wuqing Guard depots to Tongzhou. Chenghua closed the Linqing and Dezhou reserve granaries outside the walls and filled vacant city silos with emergency rice. The Linqing store was renamed Changying ("Ever Full") and the Dezhou store Changfeng ("Ever Plentiful"). Beijing had fifty-six granaries and Tongzhou sixteen. Every province, princely estate, frontier pass, station, and garrison maintained its own stores—anywhere from one or two to as many as twenty or thirty.
21
西 滿殿 調 仿 沿
When reserve granaries were first created, Hongwu picked respected elders to deliver cash and buy grain for famine relief, putting them in charge on the spot. Counties once kept substantial reserves, but the practice gradually lapsed. As grand coordinator of Henan and Shanxi, Yu Qian revived it. Zhou Chen, coordinating the Southern Capital region, set up separate relief-farming granaries. Few others matched their success. Zhengtong made embezzlement a capital offense—even the thief's wife could be impressed for military service. Donors of 1,500 shi earned an imperial commendation as "righteous commoners" and exemption from miscellaneous corvee. Every shi lent for famine relief was repaid after a good harvest at two shi five dou of unmilled grain. Hongzhi 3 fixed reserve targets: counties within ten li had to stock 15,000 shi; within twenty li, 20,000 shi; Thousand-man guard posts 15,000 shi, hundred-man posts 300 shi. At term's end officials were ranked according to how much they had stocked. Falling three-tenths short cost an official his salary; six-tenths or more brought demotion. Year eighteen required all fines and forfeits to be paid as grain into reserve stores. Zhengde allowed paper penalties to be commuted: eighty percent paid as grain. Delinquent officers could buy off punishment with grain donations counted as merit. Reserve granaries had once had dedicated clerks, but that post was abolished and county magistrates plus grain officers took over. Early in Jiajing, Tutor Gu Dingchen said: "Under Chenghua and Hongzhi, surplus rice was set aside each year for reserve granaries, so emergencies could be met. Now autumn tribute barely covers exchange transport, and the reserves hold not a grain of rice. At the first sign of disaster, officials merely memorialized to hold back other grain and urge the wealthy to lend—going through the motions of old precedent. I beg that reserve stocks be restored at once to relieve the people. The emperor then ordered local officials to stockpile grain by the ancient ever-normal method: lend to the poor in spring, collect repayment after harvest, and charge no interest. Targets were 10,000 shi for prefectures, four or five thousand for subprefectures, and two or three thousand for counties. Later quotas scaled by distance: 15,000 shi within ten li, rising in steps to 190,000 shi within eight hundred li. Soon the stockpiles were sold off at fair price to aid the poor, and reserves steadily shrank. By Longqing even major prefectures held no more than 6,000 shi and small counties only 1,000. Over time stocks fell further and penalties for failure grew lighter. Under Wanli major prefectures topped out at 3,000 shi and some small counties held barely 100. Officials treated the quotas as empty paperwork; repeated edicts changed nothing—they reported fictitious totals.
22
西
Under Hongzhi, Jiangxi grand coordinator Lin Jun proposed ever-normal and community granaries. Jiajing 8 ordered every grand coordinator and surveillance commissioner to establish community granaries. Households were grouped in communities of twenty or thirty; each chose a wealthy and upright head, a fair-minded director, and a literate deputy who could keep accounts. They met at every new and full moon, ranked members upper, middle, or lower, and collected from four dou down to one dou per household according to rank, adding five ge of wastage per dou; upper households ran the operation. In famine years the well-off lent to those in need; after a good harvest the grain was returned to the community store. Middle and lower households received relief as needed, with no repayment required. Local officials kept registers for the coordinators and surveillance commissioners, who audited them once a year. If a store ran empty, the community head paid a fine of one year's rice. The scheme was sound, but in time no one had the means to carry it out.
23
祿
The Two Capitals built their treasuries in stages, on broadly similar lines. The inner palace maintained ten treasuries. The Inner Reception Treasury held silk, gold, silver, jade, ivory, horns, and feathers; flower-pattern silver was the largest item, with annual intake exceeding one million taels. The Broad Accumulation Treasury held sulfur and saltpeter. The Jia-shaped archive stored cloth and pigments. The Yi-shaped archive held padded jackets, battle shoes, and soldiers' fur caps. The Bing-shaped archive held cotton and silk floss. The Ding-shaped archive held copper, iron, hides, and sappanwood. The Wu-shaped archive held armor and weapons. The Forfeiture Treasury held confiscated goods. The Broad Benefit Treasury held paper money. The Broad Surplus Treasury held ramie silk, gauze, brocade, and silk fabrics. Six treasuries fell under Revenue; the Yi-shaped archive under War; and the Wu-shaped, Broad Accumulation, and Broad Surplus treasuries under Works. There was also the Heavenly Wealth Treasury, or Key Treasury, which held keys from every office as well as paper money. The Supply Treasury held glutinous rice, prepared rice, and items for imperial tribute. All of these were known collectively as the inner treasuries. Inside the palace itself were the Inner Eastern Abundance Treasury and the Treasure Treasury—the so-called inner-inner treasuries. The inner-inner treasuries lay outside regular official oversight. Treasuries east of Huigui and Baoshan Gates and the southern city's porcelain stores were called the outer treasuries. Inner palace directorates and bureaus, the Music Hall, Sacrifice Office, Court of Imperial Sacrifices, Court of Imperial Entertainments, and Imperial Academy each kept stores for their own needs. The Imperial Stud received horse-price silver. Early Ming established circulation treasuries in the capital and across the provinces to swap out worn paper notes. Renzong abolished them.
24
祿 祿 綿 便 祿 祿
Under Yingzong the Taicang Treasury was first established. At first annual levies brought in no gold or silver; only mining taxes did, and those went to the Inner Reception Treasury. When tribute was occasionally commuted to gold or silver, it all went to Nanjing for military stipends. Frontier emergencies were also met from those funds. Zhengtong 1 commuted canal tribute to silver at one million taels a year, all routed to the Inner Reception Treasury instead of Nanjing. Aside from roughly 100,000 taels for military pay, the rest went to the imperial household. This was flower-pattern silver. Year seven saw the creation of the Ministry of Revenue's Taicang Treasury. Provincial surplus grain, silk and cloth from the ten treasuries, horse fodder, salt levies, customs duties—every silver commutation flowed into Taicang. Confiscated estates, sold property, recovered shop debts, and precedent contributions all went there as well. Dedicated to silver alone, it was also called the silver treasury. Under Hongzhi the inner palace's demands multiplied, and Taicang silver was repeatedly siphoned into the inner treasuries. A Nanjing silver treasury was added as well. Under Zhengde, Inner Reception eunuchs repeatedly complained that palace funds were insufficient and petitioned to draw on Taicang silver. The Ministry of Revenue protested in memorials but could not stop it. Early Jiajing palace spending matched Hongzhi levels; later it doubled. At first Taicang's central vault held more than eight million taels; new receipts went to side wings for easier disbursement. The central vault stayed untouched and became the old vault; the side wings served as the outer vault. By then the old vault held only 1.2 million taels. Year twenty-two ordered flower-pattern and grain-tax silver destined for the inner treasuries sent to Taicang for frontier use instead—but the flow soon reversed. Year thirty-seven added reserve silver for imperial withdrawal on top of the million taels sent yearly to the inner treasuries; later four hundred thousand taels of confiscated silver followed. Under Longqing Taicang silver was repeatedly drained into the inner treasuries; Reception eunuchs even sent blank vouchers to Revenue to collect it. Court ministers remonstrated in memorials; the throne paid no heed. Silver from the Court of Imperial Entertainments and the Imperial Stud was seized repeatedly as well; Works Minister Zhu Heng protested fiercely, to no avail. Early in the Jiajing reign, Taicang Treasury receipts totaled a little over two million taels. By Wanli 6 under Emperor Shenzong, Taicang's annual intake exceeded 4.5 million taels; beyond the inner treasury's regular flower-pattern silver, another two hundred thousand taels for palace purchases became fixed, and later more than seventy thousand taels for inner-guard horse fodder was added. Over time silver from Taicang, the Court of Imperial Entertainments, and the Court of the Imperial Stud was drained almost completely. Frontier rewards for first merit in battle, once paid from the inner treasury, were now drawn from the Imperial Stud as well.
25
The Jia-form storehouses were inspected jointly by section chiefs and censorate officials. The Taicang Treasury was managed by vice directors and section chiefs under the oversight of supervising secretaries. During Jiajing, receipts and disbursements were first reported every two months. The old Ministry of Works storehouse was then repaired and renamed the Frugal-Care Treasury to hold mining silver. Minister Wen Ming spent it on construction wages; the emperor rebuked him and ordered repayment from other funds, after which the treasury was reserved solely for palace use.
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Across the provinces, every administration commission, regional command, prefecture, county, and guard maintained storehouses for gold, silver, paper notes, silk, fines, and confiscated goods. Touring censors audited them every three years. Every salt transport commission kept a silver treasury inspected at year-end by officials delegated by the salt-circuit censor. For tax offices, commercial-tax bureaus, and fishing stations in every prefecture and county—annual levies, commercial taxes, fish taxes, licenses, and deed fees—the Hongwu Emperor required remittance up through county and provincial offices to the ministry, which sealed receipts in the treasury and released nothing without authorization. Under Yongle, inspection was required first; only after approval could remittances begin; and at the ministry they were verified again before final acceptance. In Jiajing an inspection hall was built; approved goods received submission certificates and were held in the treasury. On every ninth day of the month, censorate treasury inspectors assembled, entered the storehouses to accept goods, and rejected substandard items for replacement. In Zhengtong 10 the Tongji Treasury was established at Tongzhou. It was abolished under Emperor Jiajing. Early in Longqing, Miyun, Jizhou, Changping, and other garrisons established treasuries for annual host-and-guest quotas, military-gate funds, pacification rewards, and frontier-repair silver.
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No one harmed granaries and treasuries more than palace eunuchs. Supervisors at inner-palace treasuries extorted without limit. Under Zhengde, Taizhou Guard Commander Chen Liang delivered military equipment that was held eight years—until he was reduced to begging in the streets. When the inner palace received grain, surplus allowances often ran several times the statutory rate—such was the abuse. Granaries initially had no eunuch supervisors; late in Xuande a supervising eunuch was placed over the Beijing and Tong depots, and later Huai'an, Xuzhou, Linqing, and Dezhou depots received them as well, to the harm of transport troops and civilians. Emperor Jiajing, following Sun Jiao and Zhang Fuling's advice, abolished most eunuch posts but left warehouse supervisors in place. Eventually, at Supervising Secretary Guan Huaili's urging, those posts were abolished as well.
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Initially every prefectural treasury kept its own reserves; frontier funds were not borrowed from the inner court, and the capital did not drain provincial treasuries. Under Chenghua, Salt-Circuit Censor Yang Cheng first proposed sending fine and confiscation silver from salt intendant offices to the capital treasury. Under Hongzhi, Supervising Secretary Zeng Ang proposed remitting all surplus levy silver accumulated in provincial public treasuries to Taicang. Minister Zhou Jing argued forcefully that shortfalls came from commemorative casting, rewards, fasting rites, and construction—not from provincial reserves—and that draining every treasury in the realm betrayed the principle of keeping wealth among the people. When Liu Jin seized power, he ordered every provincial treasury to remit all holdings to the capital. Under Jiajing, Fujian and Guangdong presented surplus tribute; the Ministry of Revenue then required touring censors in every province to submit similar annual offerings. The Taicang vaults were relocated and filled with eight hundred thousand taels transferred from the Nanjing Ministry of Revenue treasury. The ministry also submitted fiscal regulations recording two hundred thousand taels accumulated at Linqing and Dezhou and remitted to Taicang. Early in Longqing four censors were sent across the empire to sweep up treasury silver. Under Shenzong, Censor Xiao Chongwang proposed auditing annual silver remittances from prefectures and counties to the ministry; the memorial went unanswered. Thousand-household Officer He Qixian petitioned for a palace eunuch to supervise collections with him; the emperor agreed, and provincial reserves dwindled daily thereafter. By the Tianqi reign, following Yangtze-defense Grand Coordinator Fan Jishi's plan, an edict ordered supervised annual submissions until nothing remained uncollected. The Nanjing inner treasury held considerable gold, silver, and treasures; Wei Zhongxian forged an edict to seize them, and they were stolen clean. With inner and outer treasuries exhausted, the dynasty fell.
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