Volume 149 Treatises 124: Transportation 1, Tie Lu

有清之世，歐洲諸國以製器相競致強富，路船郵電，因利乘權。道光朝五口通商，各國踵跡至。中外棣通，外舟侵入我江海置郵通商地。大北、大東兩公司海底電線貫太平洋、大西洋而來，亦駢集我海上，駸駸有返客為主之勢焉。李鴻章、郭嵩燾諸臣以國權、商務、戎機所關甚鉅，抗疏論列。其始也阻於眾咻，其繼也卒排群議而次第建設之，開我國數千年未有之奇局。於時鴻章總督直隸，領北洋通商大臣，忍詬負重，卒觀厥成。長江招商輪船局始於同治十三年。逮光緒三年，有唐山胥各庄鐵路之築。四年，設郵政局。五年，設電線於大沽、北塘海口砲台，西達天津。自時厥後，歲展月拓，分途並進。輪船則有官輪、商輪之別，鐵路則有官辦、商辦之別，電線則有部辦、省辦之別，郵政則有總局、分局之別。宣統初，郵傳部計路之通車者逾萬里，線之通電者九萬餘里，局之通郵者四千餘處。歲之所入，路約銀二千萬，電約一千萬，郵六百餘萬，而歲支外所盈無幾，無乃分其利者眾歟？昔者車行日不過百里，舟則視風勢水流為遲疾，廷寄軍書，驛人介馬俟，盡日夕行不過六七百里已耳。今則京漢之車，津滬之舟，計程各二三千里而遙，不出三日，郵之附舟車以達者如之。若以電線達者，數萬里外瞬息立至。民情慮始難，觀成易，故船、電、路皆有商辦名。顧言利之臣胥欲籠為國有，以加諸電商者加之川漢自辦之路，操之過激，商股抗議者輒罪之。淫刑而逞，以犯眾怒，黨人乘之，國本遂搖。孔子論治，以書同文、車同軌、行同倫為極盛。清之天下，可謂同文同軌矣，惟行殊焉，而理亂頓異。則知伏羲氏所謂通天下之志者，有形下之器，尤貴有形上之道以維繫之，未可重器而遺道也。撰〈交通志〉。

During the Qing dynasty, European powers competed in industrial manufacture to grow strong and rich, then used railways, steam navigation, postal service, and telegraphy to press their advantage whenever opportunity arose. After the five treaty ports opened under the Daoguang emperor, foreign powers arrived in succession. As contacts between China and the outside world grew, foreign ships entered Chinese rivers and seas and set up treaty-port posts and trading stations. Submarine telegraph cables laid by the Great Northern and Great Eastern companies spanned the Pacific and Atlantic to reach China, clustering along the coast until foreign operators seemed on the verge of turning from guests into masters. Li Hongzhang, Guo Songtao, and other officials repeatedly memorialized the throne, arguing that sovereignty, trade, and military readiness were at stake on a vast scale. At first public uproar blocked them, but they eventually pushed past collective opposition and built the new systems step by step, inaugurating a transformation China had not seen in millennia. Hongzhang was then governor-general of Zhili and superintendent of trade for the Northern Seas; though he bore ridicule and heavy responsibility, he lived to see the enterprise through. The China Merchants Steam Navigation Company on the Yangtze began in Tongzhi 13. In Guangxu 3 (1877) work began on the Tangshan–Xugezhuang railway. The next year the postal administration was founded. In Guangxu 5 telegraph wires linked the coastal forts at Dagu and Beitang westward to Tianjin. Thereafter the network spread month by month and year by year, with projects advancing on many fronts at once. Steam navigation split into official and merchant fleets; railways into government and private lines; telegraphy into central and provincial systems; and the post into head offices and branches. By the early Xuantong period the Ministry of Communications reported more than ten thousand li of railway in service, more than ninety thousand li of telegraph wire, and more than four thousand post offices. Annual revenue ran to some twenty million taels from railways, ten million from telegraphy, and six million from the post, yet expenses left little margin—perhaps because too many parties were dividing the profits. In earlier times carts covered scarcely a hundred li a day, and boats moved only as wind and current allowed; even urgent court and military dispatches by relay horse rarely exceeded six or seven hundred li in a full day and night. Today the Beijing–Hankou railway and Tianjin–Shanghai steamers, each spanning two or three thousand li, complete the journey in under three days, and mail carried on ship or train keeps the same pace. By telegraph a message tens of thousands of li distant arrives in an instant. The people dread novelty but readily accept what is already built, so steam navigation, telegraphy, and railways were all launched under merchant-management labels. Yet profit-minded officials sought to bring everything under state control; the pressure applied to telegraph companies was turned on the merchant-built Sichuan–Hankou railway as well, and shareholders who objected were prosecuted. Excessive punishment and high-handedness enraged the public; revolutionaries exploited the unrest, and the dynasty’s foundations trembled. Confucius described ideal governance as unified writing, uniform cart tracks, and shared moral standards. Under the Qing, script and railways were unified nationwide, yet customs diverged—and with them the difference between order and chaos. This shows that Fuxi’s aim of harmonizing the will of the empire requires not only material technology but the moral order that sustains it; tools alone, without principle, will not suffice. The compilers prepared the Treatise on Communications.

鐵路創始於英吉利，各國踵而行之。同治季年，海防議起，直督李鴻章數為執政者陳鐵路之利，不果行。

Railways began in England, and other countries soon followed. During the late Tongzhi period, as coastal defense was debated, Li Hongzhang, governor-general of Zhili, repeatedly urged the court to build railways, but without success.

光緒初，英人擅築上海鐵路達吳淞，命鴻章禁止，因偕江督沈葆楨，檄盛宣懷等與英人議，卒以銀二十八萬兩購回，廢置不用，識者惜之。

Early in Guangxu, British interests built a line from Shanghai to Wusong; the court directed Hongzhang to stop it, and with Jiangsu governor-general Shen Baozhen he had Sheng Xuanhuai negotiate a buyout for 280,000 taels, after which the track was dismantled and abandoned—a decision later lamented by informed observers.

三年，有商人築唐山至胥各庄鐵路八犬里，是為中國自築鐵路之始。

In Guangxu 3 merchants completed an eight-mile railway from Tangshan to Xugezhuang—the first line built by Chinese initiative.

六年，劉銘傳入覲，疏言：「自古敵國外患，未有如今日之多且強也。一國有事，各國環窺，而俄地橫亙東、西、北，與我壤界交錯，尤為心腹之憂。俄自歐洲起造鐵路，漸近浩罕，又將由海參崴開路以達琿春，此時之持滿不發者，以鐵路未成故也。不出十年，禍且不測。日本一彈丸國耳，師西人之長技，恃有鐵路，亦遇事與我為難。舍此不圖，自強恐無及矣。自強之道，練兵造器，固宜次第舉行。然其機括，則在於急造鐵路。鐵路之利，於漕務、賑務、商務、礦務、釐捐、行旅者，不可殫述，而於用兵尤不可緩。中國幅員遼闊，北邊綿亙萬里，毗連俄界；通商各海口，又與各國共之。畫疆而守，則防不勝防，馳逐往來，則鞭長莫及。惟鐵路一開，則東西南北呼吸相通，視敵所趨，相機策應，雖萬里之遙，數日可至，百萬之眾，一呼而集。且兵合則強，分則弱。以中國十八省計之，兵非不多，餉非不足，然此疆彼界，各具一心，遇有兵端，自顧不暇，徵餉調兵，無力承應。若鐵路告成，則聲勢聯絡，血脈貫通，裁兵節餉，並成勁旅，防邊防海，轉運槍砲，朝發夕至，駐防之兵即可為游擊之旅，十八省合為一氣，一兵可抵十數兵之用。將來兵權餉權，俱在朝廷，內重外輕，不為疆臣所牽制矣。方今國計絀於邊防，民生困於釐卡。各國通商，爭奪利權，財賦日竭，後患方殷。如有鐵路，收費足以養兵，則釐卡可以酌裁，裕國便民，無逾於此。今欲乘時立辦，莫如籌借洋債。中國要路有二：南路一由清江經山東，一由漢口經河南，俱達京師；北路由京師東通盛京，西達甘肅。若未能同時並舉，可先修清江至京一路，與本年擬修之電線相為表裡。」

In Guangxu 6 Liu Mingchuan presented himself at court and memorialized: “Never in history have foreign threats been so numerous and formidable as today. When trouble arises in one country, others watch from every side; Russia in particular spans east, west, and north and shares a long border with us, making it the gravest concern. Russia is extending railways from Europe toward Kokand and plans another from Vladivostok to Hunchun; it holds back only because the lines are unfinished. Within ten years catastrophe may strike without warning. Japan is a tiny archipelago, yet by adopting Western technology and railways it repeatedly challenges us. Unless we act now, self-strengthening may arrive too late. Self-strengthening requires training armies and manufacturing arms, and these should proceed in turn. But the decisive lever is rapid railway construction. Railways aid grain shipment, disaster relief, trade, mining, transit levies, and travel beyond counting, and are above all indispensable to the military. China is immense: the northern frontier runs thousands of li along the Russian border; every maritime treaty port is open to foreign powers as well. Fixed garrisons cannot guard every point, while rapid movement over such distances exceeds any commander’s reach. Once railways link the realm, troops and supplies move in every direction; commanders can shift forces to meet the enemy wherever he appears—distances of ten thousand li shrink to days, and armies of a million gather on command. Concentrated armies are strong; scattered ones are weak. The eighteen provinces have ample soldiers and revenue, yet each province thinks for itself; in war none can spare strength for another, and central orders for funds or troops go unanswered. With railways complete, the empire’s sinews knit together: forces can be trimmed yet made more effective, guns rushed to coast or border overnight, garrisons turned into mobile columns, and the eighteen provinces act as one—so that one soldier counts for ten. Military and fiscal power would return to the center, strengthening Beijing against the provinces and freeing the throne from dependence on regional strongmen. Today the treasury is drained by frontier defense while common people suffer under likin barriers. Foreign trade competition drains revenue, and the danger ahead grows worse. Railway tolls could support the army and allow likin to be cut—enriching the state and easing burdens on the people. The swiftest course is to borrow foreign capital now. Two trunk lines matter most: southward, one from Qingjiang via Shandong and one from Hankou via Henan, both to Beijing; northward, from Beijing east to Mukden and west to Gansu. If both cannot be built together, begin with Qingjiang to Beijing, paired with the telegraph line already planned.”

事下直督李鴻章、江督劉坤一議覆。鴻章言：「鐵路之設，關於國計、軍政、京畿、民生、轉運、郵政、礦務、招商、輪船、行旅者，其利甚溥。而借用洋債，外人於鐵路把持侵佔，與妨害國用諸端，亦不可不防。」坤一以妨兒民生、釐稅為言。學士張家驤言興修鐵路有三大弊。復下其疏於鴻章，鴻章力主銘傳言。會台官合疏力爭，侍講張楷言九不利，御史洪良品言五害，語尤激切。以廷臣諫止者多，詔罷其議。嗣是無復有言之者矣。

The memorial was referred to Li Hongzhang in Zhili and Liu Kunyi in Jiangsu for joint review. Hongzhang replied: "The establishment of railways touches state finance, military affairs, the capital region, livelihood, transport, postal administration, mining, commerce, steamships, and travel; its benefits are very broad. But if foreign loans are used, foreign control and occupation of railways, along with other harms to state finance, must also be guarded against." Kunyi argued that railways would harm livelihoods and likin revenue. Academician Zhang Jiaxiang listed three major evils in railway construction. The court forwarded Zhang’s memorial to Hongzhang, who again defended Mingchuan’s position. Taiwan officials memorialized en masse; expositor Zhang Kai cited nine drawbacks and censor Hong Liangpin five harms, all in fierce terms. So many officials opposed the plan that the throne ordered the project dropped. Thereafter the subject was not raised again for years.

十一年，既與法國議和，朝廷念海防不可弛，詔各臣工切籌善後。李鴻章言：「法事起後，借洋債累二千萬，十年分起籌還，更無力籌水師之歲需。開源之道，當效西法採煤鐵、造鐵路、興商政。礦藏固為美富，鐵路實有遠利。但招商集股，難遽踴躍，官又無可資助。若輕息假洋款為之，雖各國所恆有，乃群情所駭詫，非聖明主持於上，誰敢破眾議以冒不韙？」大學士左宗棠條上七事，一言宜仿造鐵路：「外國以經商為本，因商造路，因路治兵，轉運靈通，無往不利。其未建以前，阻撓固甚，一經告成，民因而富，國因而強，人物因而倍盛，有利無害，固有明徵。電報、輪船，中國所無，一旦有之，則為不可少之物。倘鐵路造成，其利尤溥。清江至通州宜先設立鐵路，以通南北之樞，一便於轉漕，而商務必有起色；一便於徵調，而額兵即可多裁。且為費僅數百萬，由官招商股試辦，即可舉行，且與地方民生並無妨礙。迨辦有成效，再添設分支。至推廣西北一路，尤為日後必然之勢。」疏下王大臣議，雖善其言而不能用也。是年冬，鴻章復言：「陶城、臨清間二百餘里，運道淤墊，請試辦鐵道，為南北大道樞紐。」上用漕督崧駿等言，格不行。

In Guangxu 11, after peace with France, the court ordered officials to plan seriously for coastal defense. Li Hongzhang said: "After the French affair began, foreign loans accumulated to twenty million taels, to be repaid in installments over ten years, leaving still less ability to fund the navy’s yearly needs. New revenue must come from Western-style coal and iron mining, railways, and commercial reform. Minerals are abundant, but railways promise the greater long-term gain. Merchant investment was slow to materialize, and the state could offer little support. If low-interest foreign loans were used for this, although every country commonly does so, public opinion would be shocked; unless the sagely and enlightened throne upheld it from above, who would dare break through public objections and risk universal disapproval?" Grand Secretary Zuo Zongtang submitted seven proposals, including railways: “Western nations rest on commerce; commerce builds railways, railways organize armies—flexible transport makes everything profitable. Opposition was fierce before construction, yet once lines opened, wealth and power followed—proof that railways help without harm. Telegraph and steamships were unknown in China until introduced; then they became indispensable. Railways would bring even greater benefit. He urged a line from Qingjiang to Tongzhou to join north and south—speeding grain transport and reviving trade; and speeding troop movement so standing armies could be cut. Costing only a few million taels, it could be tried with merchant shares without harming local livelihood. Branches could follow once the main line proved successful. As for extending a northwestern line, that is even more an inevitable future tendency." The throne referred the memorial to the grand council, which approved Zuo’s reasoning but took no action. That winter Hongzhang again said: "The two hundred-plus li between Taocheng and Linqing have a silted transport route. I request a trial railway there, to serve as the hinge of the great north-south road." The emperor sided with Grain Transport Superintendent Song Jun and others and refused.

初，法、越事起，以運輸不便，軍事幾敗。事平，執政者始知鐵路關係軍事至要。十三年春，海軍衙門王大臣奕枻等言：「鐵路之議，歷有年所，毀譽紛紜，莫衷一是。自經前歲戰事，始悉局外空談與局中實際，判然兩途。臣奕枻總理事務，見聞較切。臣曾紀澤出使八年，親見西洋各國輪車鐵路之益。現公同酌覈，調兵運械，貴在便捷，自當擇要而圖。據天津司道營員等稟，直隸海岸綿長，防守不易，轉運尤艱。請將開平至閻庄商辦鐵路，南接大沽北岸八十餘里，先行接造，再由大沽至天津百餘里，逐漸興修。津沽鐵路告成，續辦開平迤北至山海關，則提督周盛波所部萬人，馳騁援應，不啻數萬人之用。此項海防要工，集資不易，應以官款興辦，調兵勇協同工作，以期速成。如蒙俞允，即派員督率開平公司經理。」從之。明年，路成。總理衙門奏言：「新造津沽鐵路，自天津府城經塘沽、蘆台以至閻庄，長一百七十五里，其自閻庄至灤州之唐山，長八十里，為各商舊造鐵路。新舊鐵路首尾銜接，輪車通行快利，為輪船所不及。通塞之權，操之自我，斷無利器假人之慮。由此經營推廣，一遇徵兵運械，輓粟飛芻，咄嗟可致；商民貿遷，無遠弗屆，榛莽之地，可變通衢，洵為今日自強之急務。」

When the Sino-French war over Vietnam began, poor transport nearly cost the campaign. After peace, leaders finally grasped how critical railways were to war. In the spring of Guangxu 13, Prince Yikuang and the other ministers of the Naval Affairs Yamen said: "The railway question has gone on for years; praise and blame are confused, and no one agrees on one view. Combat had shown how empty outside opinion was compared with battlefield reality. Yi Kuang, overseeing affairs daily, had seen this firsthand. Zeng Jize, after eight years as envoy abroad, had seen Western railways at work. They agreed that moving troops and arms required speed and that priority projects should be chosen. Tianjin officials reported that Zhili’s long coastline was hard to defend and supply. They proposed linking the merchant Kaiping–Yanzhuang line south eighty-odd li to the north shore of Dagu, then building gradually from Dagu to Tianjin, another hundred-odd li. Completing Tianjin–Dagu and extending Kaiping north to Shanhaiguan would let General Zhou Shengbo’s ten thousand men respond with the effect of many times that number. Because coastal defense funds were scarce, official money and soldier labor should finish the line quickly. If approval is granted, officials will be sent to supervise the Kaiping company in managing it." The throne assented. The following year the railway opened. The Zongli Yamen memorialized: "The newly built Tianjin-Dagu railway runs from Tianjin prefectural city through Tanggu and Lutai to Yanzhuang, 175 li long; the section from Yanzhuang to Tangshan in Luanzhou, 80 li long, is the old railway built by the merchants. Linked end to end, trains ran faster than steamers could match. Control of traffic remained in Chinese hands, with no fear of giving a strategic weapon to foreigners. Extended in this way, the network could move troops and supplies at a word—grain and fodder arriving as if by magic; commerce would reach every corner, wasteland become highways, and self-strengthening gain its most urgent instrument.”

會粵商陳承德請接造天津至通州鐵路，略言：「現造鐵路，其所入不敷養路之用。如接造此路，既可抽還造路借本，並可報效海軍經費。」直督李鴻章以聞，已如所請矣；於時舉朝駭然，尚書翁同龢、奎潤，閣學文治，學士徐會灃，御史余聯沅、洪良品、屠仁守交章諫阻。其大端不外資敵、擾民、失業三者，亦有言宜於邊地及設於德州、濟寧以通河運者。命俱下海軍衙門。尋議上，略言：「原奏所慮各節，一在資敵。不知敵至而車已收回，豈有資敵之慮？一在擾民。建設鐵路，首在繞避民間廬舍丘墓，其萬難繞避者，亦給重價，諭令遷徙，可無擾民之事。一在失業。鐵路興而商業盛，謀生之途益廣，更鮮失業之虞。津通之路，非為富國，亦非利商，外助海軍相輔之需，內備徵兵入衛之用。乃議者不察底蘊，不相匡助，或竟道聽途說，或竟憑空結撰，連章論列，上瀆天聽。方今環球諸國，各治甲兵，其往也，非干羽所能格，其來也，非牛餼所能退，全視中華之強弱，為相安相擾之樞機。臣等創修鐵路本意，不在效外洋之到處皆設，而專主利於用兵。不僅修津通之路，而志期應援全局。誠能於江南、趙北、關東、隴西各設重兵，各安鐵路，則軍行萬里無胼胝之勞，糧運千倉有瞬息之效，零星隊伍可撤可並，浮濫餉乾或裁或節。此外如海防河運，裨益實多，而通貨物、銷礦產、利行旅、便工役、速郵遞，利之所興，難以枚舉。而事屬創辦，不厭求詳。請下沿江沿海各將軍督撫，各抒所見。」遂如所請，命各詳議以聞。

At this time Guangdong merchant Chen Chengde requested to extend the railway from Tianjin to Tongzhou, saying in brief: "The income from the railways now being built is insufficient for maintaining the lines. If this line is extended, it can repay the borrowed construction capital and also contribute funds to the navy." Li Hongzhang reported the request and the court had approved it; then the court erupted: Ministers Weng Tonghe and Kui Run, Hanlin academician Wen Zhi, academician Xu Huiyi, and censors Yu Lianyuan, Hong Liangpin, and Tu Renshou memorialized fiercely against it. Critics chiefly cited three evils—arming the enemy, harming the people, and destroying jobs—while others urged building only on the frontier or at Dezhou and Jining to serve the canal. All memorials were referred to the Naval Affairs Yamen. Soon a deliberation was submitted, saying in brief: "The various concerns in the original memorial are, first, aiding the enemy. But if trains were withdrawn when enemies approached, that fear vanished. Second, disturbing the people. Routes would avoid homes and graves wherever possible and compensate relocations generously. Third, loss of livelihood. Railways, they argued, would expand commerce and employment rather than destroy them. The Tianjin–Tongzhou line served naval defense and troop movement, not merchant profit or state revenue alone. Opponents, failing to grasp this, spread rumors and bombarded the throne with serial memorials. Nations arm themselves; ritual and tribute no longer deter them—only China’s strength decides whether they stay peaceful or press their advantage. The Yamen sought railways for military necessity, not to copy foreign models everywhere. The Tianjin–Tongzhou line was meant to serve the whole strategic picture. With railways in Jiangnan, Hebei, the northeast, and the northwest, armies could march ten thousand li without blistered feet, grain move from a thousand granaries in an instant, scattered units merge or disband, and wasteful pay be trimmed. Coastal defense, canal transport, trade, mining, travel, labor, and post would all gain benefits beyond counting. Because the project was unprecedented, they welcomed thorough discussion. We request that the generals, governors-general, and governors along the rivers and coasts be ordered to state their views." The throne agreed and ordered detailed reports.

台灣巡撫劉銘傳議由津沽造路至京師，護蘇撫黃彭年議先辦邊防、漕路，緩辦腹地及沿江沿海各省，而試行於津通。粵督張之洞請緩辦津通，改建腹省幹路，疏言：今日鐵路之用，以開通土貨為急。進口外貨，歲逾出口土貨二千萬兩。若聽其耗漏，以後萬不可支，惟有設法多出土貨、多銷土貨以濟之。有鐵路，則機器可入，笨貨可出，山鄉邊郡之產，悉可致諸江岸海壖，流行於九洲四瀛之外矣。而沿江沿海、遼東三省、秦隴沿邊，強鄰窺伺，防不勝防。若無鐵路應援赴敵，以靜待動，安得無數良將精兵利砲巨餉而守之？宜先擇四達之衢，首建幹路，為經營全局之計。至津通鐵路，則關係甚鉅，不便尤多。設此路創造之時，稍有紛擾，則習常蹈故者，益將執為口實，視為畏途。以後他處續造，集股之官商必裹足，疑沮之愚民必有辭，則鐵路之功終無由成，而鐵路之效終無由見矣。翁同龢請試行於邊地以便運兵，徐會灃等請改設於德州、濟寧以便運漕，均擬緩辦津通，為另闢一路之計。但邊地偏遠，無裨全局，效亦難見；且非商賈輻輳之所，鐵路費無所出，不足以自存。德濟一路，黃河岸闊沙松，工費太鉅。臣以為宜自京城外之盧溝橋起，經河南達於湖北漢口鎮。豫、鄂居天下之腹，中原綰轂，胥出其塗。鐵路取道，宜自保定、正定、磁州，歷彰、衛、懷等府，北岸在清化鎮以南，南岸在滎澤口以上，擇黃河上游灘窄岸堅經流不改之處，作橋以渡河，則三晉之轍下於井陘，關隴之驂交於洛口，西北聲息刻期可通。自河以南，則由鄭、許、信陽驛路以抵漢口，東引淮、吳，南通湘、蜀。語其便利，約有數事。內處腹地，不近海口，無引敵之慮，利一。南北三千餘里，原野廣漠，編戶散處，不似近郊之稠密，一屋一墳易於勘避，利二。幹路袤遠，廠盛站多，經路生理既繁，緯路枝流必旺。執鞭之徒，列肆之賈，生計甚寬，舍舊謀新，決無失所，利三。以一路控八九省之沖，人貨輻輳，貿易必旺。將來汴洛、荊襄、濟東、淮泗，經緯縱橫，各省旁通，四達不悖。豈惟有養路之資費，實可裕無窮之餉源，利四。近畿有事，三楚舊部，兩淮精兵，電檄一傳，不崇朝而雲集都下。或內地偶有土寇竊發，發兵征討，旬日立可蕩平。徵兵之道，莫此為便，利五。中國礦利，惟煤鐵最有把握。太行以北，煤鐵最旺而最精，而質最重、路最艱。既有鐵路，則輦機器以開採，用西法以煎鎔，礦產日多。大開三晉之利源，永塞中華之漏卮，利六。海上用兵，首慮梗漕。東南漕米百餘萬石，由鎮江輪船溯江而上，三日而抵漢口，又二日而達京城。由盧溝橋運赴京倉，道里與通縣相等，足以備河海之不虞，辟飛輓之坦道，而又省挑河剝運之浮糜。較之東道王家營一路礙於黃河下流者，辦理轉有把握，利七。若慮費鉅難成，則分北京至正定為首段，次至黃河北岸，又次至信陽州為二三段，次至漢口為末段。每里不過五六千金，每段不過四百萬內外，合計四段之工，須八年造成，款亦八年分籌。中國之大，每年籌二百萬之款，似尚不至無策。籌款之法，除由鐵路公司照常招股外，應酌擇各省口岸較盛、鹽課較旺之地，由籓運兩司、關道轉發印票股單，設法勸集。鐵料運自晉省，置爐鍊冶，以供取用，庶施工有序，而藏富在民。

Taiwan governor Liu Mingchuan wanted a line from Tianjin to Beijing; acting Jiangsu governor Huang Pengnian favored frontier and canal routes first and only a trial at Tianjin–Tongzhou inland. Guangdong Governor-General Zhang Zhidong requested that the Tianjin-Tongzhou line be delayed and that an interior provincial trunk line be built instead. He memorialized that, for the use of railways today, the urgent task was to open routes for native goods. Imported foreign goods exceeded exported native goods by more than twenty million taels each year. If this drain were allowed to continue, it would become utterly unsustainable; the only remedy was to devise ways to export and sell more native goods. With railways, machinery could enter and bulky goods could leave; the products of mountain villages and frontier commanderies could all be brought to riverbanks and seashores and circulate beyond the Nine Provinces and the four seas. Along the rivers and coasts, in the three Liaodong provinces, and along the Qin-Long frontier, powerful neighbors watched for openings, and defense was impossible to make complete. Without railways to send relief and meet the enemy, how could one merely wait passively and still find countless good generals, elite troops, sharp cannon, and vast funds to defend it all? He therefore proposed first choosing a route that connected in all directions and building a trunk line as the plan for managing the whole situation. As for the Tianjin-Tongzhou railway, its implications were very great and its inconveniences especially numerous. If, when this line was first built, there were the slightest disturbance, those accustomed to old ways would seize on it as an excuse and regard railways as a dangerous road. Thereafter, when building continued elsewhere, officials and merchants raising shares would hold back, and ignorant people inclined to suspicion would have words to use against it; the work of railways would never be completed, and their effect would never be seen. Weng Tonghe asked to test railways in frontier regions for troop transport, and Xu Huifeng and others asked to shift the line to Dezhou and Jining to aid grain transport; all proposed slowing the Tianjin-Tongzhou line and opening another route instead. But frontier regions were remote and would not help the whole situation, and results would be hard to see; moreover, since merchants did not gather there, there would be no source for railway expenses, and the line could not sustain itself. On the Dezhou-Jining route, the Yellow River’s banks were broad and sandy, and construction costs would be too great. He believed the line should begin at Lugou Bridge outside the capital, pass through Henan, and reach Hankou in Hubei. Henan and Hubei lay in the empire’s belly, and the routes controlling the Central Plain all issued from this path. The railway route should run from Baoding, Zhengding, and Cizhou through Zhangde, Weihui, Huaiqing, and other prefectures; on the north bank it should pass south of Qinghua town, and on the south bank above Xingze mouth, choosing a place on the upper Yellow River where the shoals were narrow, the banks firm, and the current did not shift, and building a bridge to cross the river. Then traffic from the Three Jin would descend through Jingxing, and traffic from Guanzhong and Long would meet at Luokou, so news from the northwest could be communicated on schedule. South of the river, it would follow the post road through Zhengzhou, Xuzhou, and Xinyang to reach Hankou, drawing in Huai and Wu to the east and connecting with Hunan and Sichuan to the south. Its advantages, he said, could be summarized in several points. It lay inland in the heartland and did not approach the seaports, so there was no worry that it would draw in enemies: this was the first advantage. For more than three thousand li north and south, the plains were broad and households scattered, unlike the dense suburbs; houses and graves could easily be surveyed and avoided: this was the second advantage. A long trunk line would have flourishing workshops and many stations; once livelihoods along the main route were numerous, branch lines and side streams would surely prosper. Carters, shopkeepers, and traders would find ample livelihoods, abandoning old occupations for new ones without losing their place: this was the third advantage. One line would control the thoroughfares of eight or nine provinces; people and goods would converge, and trade would surely flourish. In the future, Bian-Luo, Jing-Xiang, Jidong, and Huai-Si routes could run warp and weft, vertically and horizontally; each province would connect sideways, and all directions would be reached without conflict. It would not merely provide funds to maintain the railway; it could truly enrich an inexhaustible source of military revenue: this was the fourth advantage. If trouble arose near the capital, old units from the Three Chu and elite troops from the Two Huai could be summoned by telegram and gather below the capital before the next morning. If local bandits suddenly rose in the interior, troops could be sent to suppress them and the matter pacified within ten days. As a means of mustering troops, nothing was more convenient: this was the fifth advantage. Among China’s mineral profits, coal and iron were the most dependable. North of the Taihang, coal and iron were most abundant and finest, but their substance was heaviest and the roads most difficult. Once there were railways, machinery could be transported in for extraction, Western methods used for smelting, and mineral output would increase daily. This would greatly open the sources of profit in the Three Jin and permanently stop China’s leaking vessel: this was the sixth advantage. In maritime warfare, the first concern was interruption of grain transport. More than one million shi of tribute grain from the southeast could go upstream from Zhenjiang by steamer, reach Hankou in three days, and reach the capital two days later. Transport from Lugou Bridge to the capital granaries was the same distance as from Tong County, enough to guard against unexpected trouble on rivers or seas, open a level road for rapid transport, and save the waste of dredging canals and transshipment. Compared with the eastern Wangjiaying route, which was obstructed by the lower Yellow River, this was more reliable to manage: this was the seventh advantage. If the cost seemed too great to complete, the route could be divided into stages: Beijing to Zhengding first, then to the north bank of the Yellow River, then to Xinyang as the second and third stages, and finally to Hankou. Each li would cost no more than five or six thousand jin, and each stage no more than about four million; the four stages together would require eight years to complete, and the funds could likewise be raised over eight years. Given China’s size, raising two million each year should not be impossible. As for raising funds, besides having the railway company issue shares as usual, one should select provinces with more prosperous ports and stronger salt revenues, and have the provincial treasurer, salt commissioner, and customs circuit distribute stamped share certificates and find ways to encourage subscriptions. Iron materials should be shipped from Shanxi, furnaces set up for smelting, and supplies made available for use, so that construction would proceed in order and wealth would remain among the people.

奏上，仍下海軍衙門。尋復議上：「各國興辦鐵路，以幹路為經，以枝路為緯，有事則以路徵兵，無事則以商養路。就五大洲言之，宜於西洋，宜於東洋，豈其獨不宜於中國？就中國言之，或云宜於邊防，或云宜於腹地，豈其獨不宜於臣衙門所奏准之津通？津通，畿東南一正幹也。水路受沿海七省之委輸，陸路通關東三省之命脈。豫鄂則畿西南一正幹也，控荊襄，達關隴，以一道扼七八省之沖。初意徐議中原，而先以津沽便海防，繼以津通擴商利，區區二百里，其關係與豫鄂之千里略同。今張之洞亦設為津通五宜審之說，其中所慮各節，前奏固已剖析無遺。惟事關創始，擇善而從。津通鐵路應即暫從緩辦，而盧漢必以漢口至信陽為首段，層遞而北，並改為盧溝、漢口兩路分投試辦，綜計需銀三千萬兩，以商股、官帑、洋債三者為集款之法。」議上，詔旨允之。

His memorial went again to the Naval Affairs Yamen. Soon another deliberation was submitted: "When various countries build railways, they use trunk lines as the warp and branch lines as the weft; in times of trouble they use railways to muster troops, and in peaceful times they use commerce to support the railways. If railways suited Europe and Japan, why not China? If some said railways belonged on the frontier and others in the interior, why reject only the Yamen-approved Tianjin–Tongzhou line? Tianjin–Tongzhou was a main artery southeast of the capital. Its waterways fed seven coastal provinces; its land route linked the three eastern provinces. The Henan–Hubei corridor was another trunk controlling the middle Yangtze and northwest passes. They had meant to defer the central plain while using Tianjin first for coastal defense and Tianjin–Tongzhou for commerce—two hundred li as weighty as a thousand elsewhere. Zhang Zhidong’s five objections to Tianjin–Tongzhou had already been answered in the earlier memorial. Yet because the enterprise was new, the court would choose the better course. The Tianjin-Tongzhou railway should temporarily be delayed, while the Lugou-Hankou line must begin with the Hankou-Xinyang section and proceed north in stages; it should also be changed into two trial lines, one from Lugou and one from Hankou. Altogether it will require thirty million taels, raised through merchant shares, official funds, and foreign loans." The throne approved.

初，鴻章倡津通鐵路之議，舉朝以為不可，鴻章持之甚力。之洞特創盧漢幹路之說，調停其間，而醇親王奕枻復贊之於內，其事始定。然其時廷臣尚多不以盧漢造路為然，但無敢昌言者。故通政黃體芳謂鐵路不可借洋債以自累，而台臣亦有言黃河橋工難成者，以執政者堅持舉辦，久之浮議始息。鴻章與之洞書，謂局外議論紛歧，宜速開辦，免生枝節，之洞深然之。未幾，之洞總督湖廣。之洞既移鄂，益銳意興辦盧漢鐵路，其所經畫，曰儲材宜急，勘路宜緩，興工宜遲，竣工宜速。以商股難恃，請歲撥帑金二百萬兩以備路用。上如所請。

Hongzhang had long pushed Tianjin–Tongzhou against near-universal court opposition. Zhidong’s Lu-Han trunk proposal, with Prince Chun Yi Kuang’s backing, finally settled the dispute. Many officials still disliked Lu-Han but dared not say so openly. Censor Huang Tifang warned against foreign debt; Taiwan memorialists doubted bridging the Yellow River; only firm leadership quieted the uproar. Hongzhang urged Zhidong to build quickly before controversy grew; Zhidong agreed. Soon Zhidong became governor-general of Huguang. In Hubei he pressed Lu-Han with a maxim: stock materials quickly, survey slowly, start late, finish fast. With merchant capital unreliable, he sought two million taels yearly from the treasury. The throne agreed.

十六年，以東三省邊事亟，從海軍衙門王大臣及直督李鴻章言，命移盧漢路款先辦關東鐵路。擬由林西造幹路，出山海關至瀋陽達吉林，另由瀋陽造枝路以至牛庄、營口，計二千三百二十三里，年撥銀二百萬兩為關東造路專★，命李鴻章為督辦大臣，裕祿為會辦大臣，而盧漢路工因之延緩。蓋自光緒初年，內外臣工往往條陳鐵路，當國者亦欲試行以開風氣，而疆吏畏難因循，顧慮清議，莫敢為天下先。盧漢鐵路已定議矣，尋復中輟。至是年，國內鐵路，僅有唐山至閻庄八十五里，閻庄至林西鎮二百三十五里，又基隆至淡水六十里而已。

In Guangxu 16, border crises in the northeast led the court to divert Lu-Han funds to a Manchurian railway first. A 2,323-li trunk from Linxi through Shanhaiguan to Shenyang and Jilin, with branches to Niuzhuang and Yingkou, would receive two million taels yearly; Li Hongzhang and Yu Lu supervised, delaying Lu-Han. Since early Guangxu, memorials had urged railways, but officials feared pioneering amid censorial attack. Lu-Han was agreed, then halted again. By then China had only 85 li Tangshan–Yanzhuang, 235 li Yanzhuang–Linxi, and 60 li Keelung–Tamsui.

二十一年，命張之洞遴保人才，及籌議清江至京路事。之洞言鐵路以盧漢為要，江寧、蘇、杭次之，清江築路非宜。上韙其言。時之洞方督兩江，特命移鄂綜其事。以盧漢路長款鉅，諭有招股千萬者，許設公司自辦。粵人許應鏘、方培■J0等咸言集貲如額，遵旨承辦。直督王文韶與之洞言承辦各商舉不足恃，請以津海關道盛宣懷為督辦，允之，命以四品京堂督路事。宣懷條上四事，一請特設鐵路總公司，撥官款，募商股，借洋債。先辦盧漢，次第及於蘇滬、粵漢。上如所請。是年設總公司於上海，而盧漢之始基以立。

In Guangxu 21 the court ordered Zhang Zhidong to recommend talent and study the Qingjiang–Beijing line. Zhidong replied that Lu-Han mattered most, Nanjing–Suzhou–Hangzhou next, and Qingjiang was unsuitable. The emperor approved. Though then at Nanjing, he was transferred to Hubei to direct the work. The court offered a company charter to anyone raising ten million taels for Lu-Han. Cantonese promoters Xu Yingqiang, Fang Pei, and others claimed the full subscription. Wang Wenshao of Zhili doubted the merchants and proposed Sheng Xuanhuai as superintendent; the court agreed and appointed Sheng fourth-rank supervisor. Sheng memorialized four points: a national railway company, official funds, merchant shares, and foreign loans. Lu-Han would come first, then Suzhou–Shanghai and Guangdong–Hankou. The throne approved. That year the company opened in Shanghai, laying Lu-Han’s foundation.

自中日戰後，外人窺伺中國益亟，侵略之策，以攬辦鐵路為先。俄索接造西伯利亞幹路，橫貫黑、吉兩省，修枝路以達旅順、大連灣。英則請修五路：一蘇杭甬，自蘇州經杭州以達寧波；一廣九，自廣州以達九龍；一津鎮，自天津以達鎮江；一浦信，自浦口以達信陽；一自山西、河南以達長江。法自越南筑路以達雲南省，自龍州築路以達鎮南關。德踞膠州灣，築路以達濟南。葡據澳門，築路以達廣州。日本擅於新民廳築路達奉天，更獲有奉天至安東鐵道之權。此各國以鐵路侵略中國之大略也。

After defeat by Japan, foreign powers eyed China more keenly, and railway concessions headed their plans. Russia sought to extend the Trans-Siberian trunk through Heilongjiang and Jilin with branches to Lüshun and Dalian. Britain requested five lines: first, Suzhou–Hangzhou–Ningbo from Suzhou via Hangzhou to Ningbo; second, the Guangzhou–Kowloon line from Guangzhou to Kowloon; third, the Tianjin–Zhenjiang line from Tianjin to Zhenjiang; fourth, the Pukou–Xinyang line from Pukou to Xinyang; and Shanxi–Henan to the Yangtze. France built from Vietnam into Yunnan and from Longzhou to Zhennan Pass. Germany held Jiaozhou and built toward Jinan. Portugal held Macau and built toward Guangzhou. Japan built from Xinmin to Fengtian and gained the Fengtian–Andong line. Such was the broad foreign strategy of railway imperialism.

先是俄人陰結朝鮮窺奉天，建言者請急建關內外路以相鈐制，乃命順天府尹胡燏棻督辦津榆路事；後以續造吉林一路款絀中輟。二十四年，俄事急，燏棻請息借英款為之。疏言：「關外一路，初擬逕達吉林，以無款又落後著。迨歸併津盧，俄即起而爭執。近允其由俄邊直接大連灣，奉、吉兩省東北之利盡為所佔。計惟有由大凌河趕造至新民廳鐵路，以備聯絡瀋陽之路，並可兼護蒙古、熱河礦務。一面由營口至廣寧，庶中國海關不致為俄侵佔，尚可保全奉省西北之利。現東三省全局已在俄人掌握，幸留此一線之路，堪以設法抵禦。若坐失機宜，後悔何及。」從之。

Earlier, as Russia courted Korea and eyed Fengtian, memorialists urged a railway through the Pass; Shuntian prefect Hu Jia’en supervised the Tianjin–Yulin line; later the Jilin extension halted for lack of funds. In Guangxu 24, with Russia pressing, Hu Jia’en sought an English loan. He memorialized: "The line beyond the pass was originally planned to go directly to Jilin, but because there were no funds it has again fallen behind. merging it with Tianjin–Lushun had provoked Russian claims; Russia was now allowed a direct line to Dalian, dominating eastern Liaoning and Jilin; China must rush a line from Daling River to Xinmin to link Shenyang and guard Mongol and Rehe mining; and build Yingkou–Guangning so customs and northwestern Liaoning might be saved. The northeast was largely lost to Russia, but this slender railway might still resist; If the opportunity is lost by sitting still, how could regret later be enough?" The throne agreed.

初，英人圖粵路甚亟。王文韶、張之洞、盛宣懷合疏言：「粵漢南幹路，原擬稍緩續籌，無如時局日亟，刻不及待。群雄環伺，輒以交涉細故，兵輪互相馳騁，海洋通塞，靡有定期。今海軍既無力能興，設有外變，隔若異域，必內地造有鐵路，方可聯絡貫通。廣東財賦之區，南戒山河，未可遐棄，此粵漢南路當與北路並舉者也。」又疏言：「德國無理肇釁，占踞膠、墨要害，並獲承辦山東鐵路。俄已造路於黑龍江、吉林，為通奉天、旅順之謀。法已造路於廣西，以為割滇之計。獨英人窺伺最久，尚無所得。今年春，英商屢來攬辦粵路，堅持未允。其所擬急行者，在趕營中國中部，或廣東建築軌道。蓋英所欲者，一借款，一修路，一擬索香港對岸之深水埠，其為覬覦鐵路無疑。現在德已踞膠，俄已留旅，法已窺瓊，英有圖扼長江、吳淞之謀。是中國各海口幾盡為外國所佔，僅有內地尚可南北往來。若粵漢一線再假手英人，將來俄路南引，英軌北趨，惟有盧漢一路跼蹐其中，何能展布？甚或為英、俄之路所並。惟有趕將粵漢一路占定自辦，尚足補救萬一。」嘉納之。

Britain had long coveted the Guangdong railway. Wang Wenshao, Zhang Zhidong, and Sheng Xuanhuai jointly memorialized: "The southern trunk of the Guangdong-Hankou line was originally to be planned somewhat later, but the situation has grown daily more urgent and cannot wait a moment. powers circled China, warships prowled, and sea lanes were insecure; without a navy, only inland railways could connect the empire in crisis; Guangdong is a region of wealth and revenue, with mountains and rivers forming the southern defense; it cannot be abandoned as remote. This is why the southern Guangdong-Hankou line should be undertaken together with the northern line." They also memorialized: "Germany unreasonably created a provocation, occupied the strategic points of Jiaozhou and Jimo, and also obtained the right to undertake the Shandong railway. Russia was building through Heilongjiang and Jilin toward Fengtian and Lüshun; France was building in Guangxi toward Yunnan; only Britain had yet gained its prize. That spring British merchants repeatedly sought the Guangdong line and were refused. Britain now aimed at central China or Guangdong track. Britain wanted loans, railways, and a deep-water port opposite Hong Kong—clearly targeting rail rights. Germany held Jiaozhou, Russia Lüshun, France Hainan, while Britain eyed the Yangtze and Wusong. China's seaports were nearly all in foreign hands; only the interior still allowed north–south movement. If Britain built Guangdong–Hankou while Russia pushed south and Britain north, Lu-Han would be trapped between them. It might even be absorbed into Anglo-Russian lines. The only remaining remedy is to hurry and secure the Guangdong-Hankou line for Chinese self-management." The throne approved.

初，粵漢路議由鄂入贛達粵。嗣病其迂遠，改道湘之郴、永、衡、長。至是，定議三省紳商自辦，總公司綜其綱領。蓋各省幹路，以關東肇其端，盧漢、粵漢次之。此外則建天津至盧溝橋之津盧路，正定至太原之正太路，鄭州東至開封、西曆滎陽、汜水達洛陽之汴洛路，廣州至九龍之廣九路，上海至江寧之滬寧路，萍鄉至昭山之萍昭路，道口至清化鎮之道清路，京師至張家口之京張路，天津至浦口之津浦路，吉林、長春之吉長路，齊齊哈爾卜魁城至昂昂溪之齊昂路，此屬於官辦者也。若潮汕、新寧、川漢、同蒲、洛潼、西潼、廣廈、歸包、歸新、桂全、滇桂、滇蜀、騰越以及浙、蘇、皖、贛、滇、蜀諸省，咸請自修幹枝等路，悉如所請。至是建造鐵路之說，風行全國，自朝廷以逮士庶，咸以鐵路為當務之急。

The Guangdong–Hankou line was first planned from Hubei through Jiangxi to Guangdong. It was later rerouted through Chenzhou, Yongzhou, Hengyang, and Changsha in Hunan. The three provinces' gentry and merchants would build it under a parent company. Among trunk lines, the northeast came first, then Lu-Han and Guangdong–Hankou. Government-built lines included the Tianjin-to-Lugouqiao Jin-Lu line, the Zhengding-to-Taiyuan Zheng-Tai line, the Bian-Luo line from Zhengzhou east to Kaifeng and west through Xingyang and Sishui to Luoyang, the Guangzhou-to-Kowloon Guang-Jiu line, the Shanghai-to-Jiangning Hu-Ning line, the Pingxiang-to-Zhaoshan Ping-Zhao line, the Daokou-to-Qinghua Town Dao-Qing line, the capital-to-Zhangjiakou Jing-Zhang line, the Tianjin-to-Pukou Jin-Pu line, the Jilin-to-Changchun Ji-Chang line, and the Qiqihar Buque City-to-Angangxi Qi-Ang line. Requests to build local trunk and branch lines—Chao-Shan, Xinning, Chuan-Han, Tong-Pu, Luo-Tong, Xi-Tong, Guang-Xia, Gui-Bao, Gui-Xin, Gui-Quan, Dian-Gui, Dian-Shu, Tengyue, and lines in Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Yunnan, and Sichuan—were all approved as requested. Railway building became a national obsession from court to populace.

趨鄉既定，籌款與辦法最關緊要。籌款有官帑，有洋債，有民股。修路有官辦，有商辦，有官督商辦。自劉銘傳倡借債築路之議，為眾論所尼，借款修路，遂為當時所諱言。故盧漢建議之初，猶以部帑為請，未敢昌言借洋債也。借洋債自津盧、關內外鐵路始。迨盛宣懷督辦路事，首以三路分三國借款之策進。曰盧漢借比款，滬寧借英款，粵漢借美款。上俞其請。由是正太則借俄款，汴洛則借比款，廣九、蘇杭甬則借英款，津浦則借英、德款。貸之者，大率資金什予其九，息金二什而取其一；以路為質，或並及附路之產物。付息、還本、贖路，咸有定程，而還本、贖路未及其時，且勿許。購料、勘路、興工，多假外人為之。故外人多以款為餌，冀獲承辦之利。

Once routes were chosen, financing and management mattered most. Funding came from the treasury, foreign loans, or private shares. Construction could be official, private, or government-supervised private. After Liu Mingchuan's loan proposal was shouted down, foreign loans became politically toxic. Lu-Han initially sought only official funds, not foreign debt. Foreign railway loans began with Tianjin–Lushun and the Manchurian lines. Sheng Xuanhuai proposed borrowing from three countries for three lines. Lu-Han would take Belgian money, Hu-Ning British, Guangdong–Hankou American. The throne agreed. Zheng-Tai followed with Russian loans, Bian-Luo Belgian, Guang-Jiu and Su-Hang-Yong British, Jin-Pu Anglo-German. Lenders typically supplied nine-tenths of capital and charged interest of one part in twenty; the railway, or its ancillary assets, served as security. Interest, principal, and buyback followed fixed schedules with no early redemption. Materials, surveys, and construction were largely foreign-run. Foreigners used loans as bait for construction contracts.

盧漢路近三千里，費逾四千萬，黃河橋工糜款尤鉅，官帑僅資開辦而已。借款始擬美，以所望奢，改與比議。英、德、法諸國接踵而至。卒借比款一百十二兆五十萬佛郎。比小國，饒鋼鐵，嫺工事，於中國無大志。三十一年，續借一百二十五萬佛郎。逾年，路成。北端直抵京師，因易名京漢。京漢之枝路曰正太，曰汴洛。正太借款，始二十三年。俄璞科第與晉官紳議定而中止。二十八年，盛宣懷與議借款四千萬佛郎。約成，而俄人挨士巴尼忽索太原至榆次，至成都，至太谷，至西安，石庄至東光、微水、橫澗四岔道，及同蒲諸路。均格部議，而岔道卒如所請。三十三年秋，工竣。

Lu-Han, nearly three thousand li and over forty million taels, relied on official funds only to start; the Yellow River bridge consumed most. A U.S. loan was first sought but rejected as too costly; Belgium won the contract. Britain, Germany, and France also competed. Belgium lent 112,050,000 francs. Belgium, small but skilled in steel and engineering, seemed less threatening. In Guangxu 31 another 1,250,000 francs was borrowed. The line opened the following year. Its northern terminus reached Beijing, and it was renamed Jing-Han (Beijing–Hankou). Branches included Zheng-Tai and Bian-Luo. Zheng-Tai loans began in Guangxu 23. Russian agent Pokotdi negotiated with Shanxi elites, then stalled. In Guangxu 28 Sheng negotiated forty million francs. Once contracted, Russia demanded branches to Chengdu, Xi'an, and elsewhere, plus Tong-Pu lines. The ministry resisted, but branches were granted as Russia asked. Work finished in autumn of Guangxu 33.

自容閎倡辦津鎮，盛宣懷恐奪盧漢之利，因議辦汴洛、開濟以相鈐制。汴洛借款始於二十五年，至二十八年而約成，借比款二千五百萬佛郎。比人盧法爾主工事。嗣續借千六百萬佛郎。三十四年，路成。津沽用款百三十萬，官帑、商股兼備，以洋債補其不足。津盧假英金四十萬鎊。關內外路借英金二百三十萬鎊。本由商辦，迨胡燏棻為督辦，始官為之。拳匪亂起，關外路為俄踞，關內路為英踞。命袁世凱等與英使立約收回，英人遂攫有百里內不准他人承修之權。三十一年，全路告竣，是為京奉路。道清路為英商福公司所造，長九十里，利微費鉅。初，英商索澤襄、懷浦，俱不獲。遂以借款收回道清為言，內外臣工咸持不可，終借英金六十一萬四千六百鎊贖回。津浦路，因津鎮之議不果行，改議北起天津，南訖浦口，借英、德款五百萬鎊。尚書呂海寰主其事。宣統三年，工竣。

After Rong Hong's Jin-Zhen proposal, Sheng countered with Bian-Luo and Kaiji to protect Lu-Han. Bian-Luo loans began in Guangxu 25; the 25-million-franc contract closed in Guangxu 28. Belgian engineer Laffont directed construction. Another 16 million francs followed. The line opened in Guangxu 34. The Tianjin line cost 1.3 million, mixing official and merchant funds with foreign loans. Tianjin–Lushun borrowed £400,000. The Manchurian railway borrowed £2.3 million. It began as merchant-built; Hu Jia'en made it official. During the Boxer crisis Russia seized the outer line and Britain the inner. Yuan Shikai negotiated recovery, but Britain won a hundred-li monopoly on new construction. The full Jing-Feng (Beijing–Fengtian) line opened in Guangxu 31. The ninety-li Dao-Qing line, built by Britain's Fu Company, lost money heavily. Britain had earlier sought Ze-Xiang and Huai-Pu routes in vain. Britain offered to return Dao-Qing for a loan; officials resisted, but £614,600 redeemed it. Jin-Pu, replacing failed Jin-Zhen, ran Tianjin to Pukou on £5 million Anglo-German loans. Minister Lü Haihuan supervised it. It opened in Xuantong 3.

其促成各省鐵路自辦與拒絕外債之機者，則滬寧、蘇杭甬、粵漢借款所致也。滬寧築路，倡於盛宣懷，南北洋大臣據以入告，得請。方從事淞滬工作，而英聲請承辦，宣懷與訂草約。二十九年，正約成，借英金三百二十五萬鎊，五十年為期。商部以借款幾倍於原估之數詰之。而工未及半，款已告罄，復議續借百萬鎊。蘇人群起責難，並疏聞於上。命唐紹儀督辦滬寧、京漢，罷鐵路總公司。紹儀既任事，徇英工程司之請，復議售小票六十五萬鎊。疏言：「盛宣懷移交合同文卷及購地工程帳冊，支款浮濫，當經駁回。滬寧合同吃虧，比京漢幹路為甚。其最棘手者，在設立總管理處。華員二人，洋員三人，每會議時，彼眾我寡，已佔低著。議者有添舉監督之說。豈知權在總管理處，合同早已訂明，雖有監督，實不濟事。其尤棘手者，財政之權操于洋人掌握，用款雖由華員簽字，而司帳者為洋員也。分段司帳，其支發權仍在工程司也。購料事宜，向由怡和洋行經手。行車總管、材料總管，皆洋員專司也。本彼眾我寡之因，以成事事掣肘之果。挽回補救之術，惟有改訂總管理處章程，加派華員司帳，並分任各總管，現已分別辦理。至路款不敷，尚擬續售小票六十五萬鎊以資接濟。」下所司議行。方紹儀擬續借英款也，侍郎吳郁生上疏力爭，略言：「滬寧鐵路由英國銀公司要求承造，盛宣懷與之訂立合同。以長不逾六百里之路工，借款至三百五十萬鎊之鉅，估價多，必至浮濫。自合同宣布後，遠近駭然。上年奉嚴旨改派唐紹儀妥籌辦理。近聞滬寧工程司來京，又以工款不敷，有議續售小票七十萬鎊之說。此項路工，即就業經借定之三百五十萬鎊侭數開支，每里合銀三萬兩以上，視他路浮逾兩倍，公家受虧已多。今若再借鉅債，是唐紹儀接辦以來，於盛宣懷失算之處並無補救之方。請飭按照合同，嚴覈用款，一面自行籌款接濟。不可再令銀公司出售小票，致以九折虛數，受人盤剝。」疏上，下所司知之。而滬寧鐵路終以本息過鉅，收贖無期也。

Provincial self-build movements and anti-foreign-loan sentiment stemmed from Hu-Ning, Su-Hang-Yong, and Guangdong–Hankou loans. Sheng Xuanhuai proposed Hu-Ning; coastal governors secured approval. During Songhu construction Britain sought the contract; Sheng signed a draft. The formal contract in Guangxu 29 borrowed £3.25 million for fifty years. The Ministry of Commerce protested that the loan far exceeded estimates. Before half was built, funds ran out and another £1 million was sought. Jiangsu public outrage reached the throne. Tang Shaoyi replaced Sheng, supervising Hu-Ning and Jing-Han and dissolving the general company. Tang, pressed by British engineers, proposed £650,000 in new debentures. He memorialized: "The contracts and documents, land-purchase records, engineering accounts, and payment records handed over by Sheng Xuanhuai were excessive and wasteful, and I rejected them at once. The Hu-Ning contract was more ruinous than Jing-Han. Worst was the general management office. Two Chinese and three foreigners met; foreigners always outvoted Chinese. Some suggested adding supervisors. But the contract fixed power in the office; supervisors were powerless. Finance rested with foreign accountants despite Chinese signatures. Section accountants still answered to foreign chief engineers. Jardine Matheson monopolized materials. Operations and materials chiefs were foreigners. Foreign majorities produced constant obstruction. Remedies included revising regulations and appointing Chinese accountants. As for the railway funds being insufficient, he still proposes to sell another £650,000 in debentures to provide support." The memorial was referred to the relevant offices. When Tang Shaoyi proposed to continue borrowing British funds, Vice Minister Wu Yusheng submitted a memorial strongly objecting, saying in brief: "The Shanghai-Nanjing railway was requested for construction by a British banking company, and Sheng Xuanhuai concluded a contract with it. A line under six hundred li had borrowed £3.5 million—surely inflated. Public alarm followed the contract's announcement. The court had ordered Tang to fix the mess. Now the British engineer sought another £700,000 in debentures. Even the existing £3.5 million averaged over thirty thousand taels per li—more than double other lines. More debt would mean Tang had not corrected Sheng's errors. Wu urged strict audits and Chinese fundraising instead. The banking company must not again be allowed to sell debentures, causing us to suffer exploitation through a fictitious ninety-percent valuation." The throne noted Wu's memorial. Hu-Ning was never redeemed—interest and principal were too vast.

蘇杭甬鐵路，自二十四年許英商承辦。是年，盛宣懷與訂草約，大要悉本滬寧。約成而英人置之。三十一年，浙路自辦之局定，御史硃錫恩請廢前約，上命宣懷偕浙撫主其事。英人恃有前約，堅欲承辦，往復辨難要挾，久之不決。侍郎汪大燮與議，分修路、借款為二事。浙人以路股集有成數，一意拒款，聞之大譁，詆大燮甚力。大燮旋使英，以梁敦彥繼之。浙推孫廷翰、蘇推王同愈等議於京，終以成約難廢，由部借英款，貸之兩省而事息。

Su-Hang-Yong had been promised to Britain since Guangxu 24. Sheng's draft mirrored Hu-Ning's terms. Britain then ignored the contract. In Guangxu 31 Zhejiang chose self-build; Censor Zhu Xien sought to void the old contract; Sheng and the Zhe governor were assigned. Britain clung to the old contract; negotiations stalled for years. Vice Minister Wang Daxie split construction from borrowing in negotiations. Zhe investors, having subscribed shares, refused foreign loans; public outcry fiercely attacked Wang Daxie. Wang was sent to Britain; Liang Dunyan took over negotiations. Beijing talks failed to void the contract; the ministry borrowed British funds and lent them to Zhejiang and Jiangsu to settle the dispute.

粵漢借用美款，倡於盛宣懷。駐美使伍廷芳與合興公司議借美金四千萬，期以五年工竣。美以畢來斯司路事。起粵之三水，築路十五里，糜款逾二百萬。畢來斯歿，工事亦輟，而美股多售之比人。鄂督張之洞以比已承修盧漢，粵漢再假之比，兩路相合，非國之利，力倡廢美約之議，湘人助之。上用御史黃昌年言，命之洞妥籌辦理。之洞主廢約益力。宣懷不原，陰撓其事，詔宣懷不得干預。之洞復屬駐美使梁誠與合興公司議，年餘始定，借英金百十萬鎊贖回焉。

Sheng Xuanhuai pioneered the American loan for Guangdong–Hankou. Envoy Wu Tingfang negotiated a $40 million loan from the China Development Company for five years' construction. American engineer Bliss directed the project. From Sanshui in Guangdong they built fifteen li at a cost exceeding two million. After Bliss died work halted, and most American shares passed to Belgians. Zhang Zhidong argued that Belgian control of both Lu-Han and Guangdong–Hankou would harm China and led the drive to cancel the American contract, with Hunan backing him. The throne followed Censor Huang Changnian and ordered Zhang Zhidong to handle cancellation. Zhang pressed harder to void the American deal. Sheng resisted; the court forbade him from interfering. Zhang had Minister Liang Cheng negotiate over a year to buy out the contract for £1.1 million.

方之洞議借英款也，英人乘間請改訂廣九路約。廣九為英人請辦五路之一，二十五年簽訂草約，懸而未定者也。三十年，滬寧約成，英人索議未果。迨蘇杭甬事起，相持方急，部許英人先議廣九，以緩其事，而正約以成。至是議粵漢借款，英人復索合辦廣九全路，粵督持不可。旋索以粵鹽及路質借款，粵人亦不之許。終假英金百五十萬鎊而約成。之洞既借英款贖美約，一時議者以為以英易美，其害相埒，相與詬病。昌年復言路權至重，贖款難擔，亟宜興修，嚴杜干涉。詔以借款修路，流弊滋多，應由三省集股興修，以保利權。自明詔嚴禁借債修路，而商部復有限制借款之條。各省人士亦以外人謀我之亟，咸謀鐵路自辦，以杜外患，鑒外債受虧之鉅，爭欲招集股款，自保路權。此由官辦改為商辦之所由來也。

While Zhang arranged British funds, Britain demanded renegotiation of the Guangzhou–Kowloon line. Guang-Jiu was one of five British-requested lines; a draft signed in Guangxu 25 had lingered unsettled. In Guangxu 30, with Hu-Ning contracted, Britain again sought terms without success. During the Su-Hang-Yong deadlock the ministry let Britain settle Guang-Jiu first, and a formal contract followed. During Guangdong–Hankou loan talks Britain demanded joint control of all Guang-Jiu; the Guangdong governor refused. Britain then sought loans secured on Guangdong salt and the railway; locals again refused. A £1.5 million loan finally closed the Guang-Jiu contract. Critics said swapping American for British control was equally dangerous and denounced the policy. Huang Changnian urged rapid construction under strict Chinese control. The throne ordered the three provinces to fund the line with shares, not foreign loans, to protect sovereignty. Imperial bans on railway foreign debt were reinforced by commerce ministry limits on borrowing. Provinces rushed to build railways with native capital to block foreign encroachment and avoid repeating foreign-loan losses. Thus official railways gave way to merchant-managed lines.

商辦鐵路，始於唐山至閻庄，更自天津、大沽以達林西鎮，皆開平公司為之。嗣是武舉李福明請修京至西沽路，粵人許應鏘等請辦盧漢路，俱不獲，自此無復有言商辦者。二十九年，粵人張煜南請設公司承辦潮汕鐵路。既得請，而川漢繼之。川督錫良以英、美商人競涎川路，而美商班士復索灌縣富順枝路，奏准由川人籌款自辦。明年，贛人以李有棻總理江西鐵路，以南潯為幹路第一段。三十一年，編修陳榮昌等以法人已修滇越路，滇省內地應自行推廣，以杜口實，請辦滇蜀鐵路，滇督丁振鐸據以入告，報可。黔撫林紹年言黔路不通，滇亦少利，因並及黔。榮昌嗣請展修騰越，以編修吳琨總理其事。皖以李經方為總理，經始於蕪湖，以期北接盧漢、南通贛浙。閩以陳寶琛為總理，築路廈門。浙以湯壽潛為總理，幹路一自杭達蘇，一歷富陽達江西；枝路則南道江山以通閩，西道湖、長以通皖。新寧、廣廈鐵路，粵人陳宜禧、張振勛經辦。西潼路，近聯汴洛，遠達甘新，為西北緯幹之樞紐，陝撫曹鴻勛奏准。三十二年，蘇人以王清穆為總理，規畫江蘇全路，江南自上海經松江以達浙江，北自海州入徐以達豫。桂以于式枚為總理，擬自桂林築路至全州以達湘，經梧州以達粵。粵漢自美約廢后，三省公設路局於鄂，籌款築路，各自為之，不相攙越，先幹後枝，以為要約。湘以袁樹勛為總理，粵人內閣侍讀梁慶桂、道員黎國廉與粵督岑春煊爭粵路商辦，被劾奪官。上命往查，旋起二人原官，路由官督商辦，旬日集股數達四千萬元，以鄭官應為總理。

Merchant railways began with Kaiping's Tangshan–Yanzhuang line and extensions to Tianjin, Dagu, and Linxi. Later proposals by Li Fuming and Xu Yingqiang failed, and merchant initiative faded for years. In Guangxu 29 Zhang Yunan won approval for a Chao-Shan railway company. Sichuan–Hankou followed soon after. Governor Xi Liang, facing Anglo-American designs on Sichuan railways, won approval for provincial self-build. The following year Jiangxi appointed Li Youfen to begin the Nan-Xun trunk section. In Guangxu 31 Chen Rongchang urged a Yunnan–Sichuan line after the French Yunnan–Vietnam railway; Governor Ding Zhenduo secured approval. Guizhou Governor Lin Shaonian added Guizhou, arguing Yunnan needed connected lines. Chen later sought extension to Tengyue under Wu Kun. Anhui appointed Li Jingfang to start at Wuhu, linking north to Lu-Han and south to Jiangxi and Zhejiang. Fujian chose Chen Baochen to build from Xiamen. Zhejiang's Tang Shouqian planned trunks from Hangzhou to Suzhou and through Fuyang into Jiangxi; with branches south through Jiangshan to Fujian and west through Huzhou and Changxing to Anhui. Chen Yixi and Zhang Zhenxun managed Xinning and Guang-Xia lines in Guangdong. The Xi-Tong line, linking Bian-Luo to the northwest, was approved by Shaanxi Governor Cao Hongxun. In Guangxu 32 Jiangsu appointed Wang Qingmu to plan lines from Shanghai through Songjiang into Zhejiang and from Haizhou toward Henan. Guangxi's Yu Shimei planned lines from Guilin to Quanzhou and Wuzhou toward Guangdong. After canceling the American contract, Hubei, Hunan, and Guangdong set a joint bureau in Hubei to build separately without overlap, trunks before branches. Hunan chose Yuan Shuxun; Guangdong gentry battling Governor Cen Chunxuan over merchant control were impeached. After inquiry the gentry were restored; the line became government-supervised merchant-built; shares hit forty million yuan in ten days under Zheng Guanying.

當其時，以鐵路為救時要圖，凡有奏請，立予俞允。請辦幹、枝各路，經緯相屬，幾遍全國。其籌款，於招集民股外，大率不外開辦米穀、鹽、茶、房屋、彩券、土藥等捐，及銅元餘利、隨糧認股數者。而程功之速，事權之一，首推新寧。陳宜禧者，籍新寧，嫺鐵路學，眾相推戴，始終其事，故二年而路竣。次則潮汕，雖勘路招股，事變屢起，而卒底於成。總理張煜南，獎擢三品京堂。此外，以粵漢路粵人集股為最多，傾軋亦最劇。總理屢易，路工停滯。川省以租股為大宗，數達千餘萬元。浙、閩、皖、贛亦均次第興工。其餘各省，大都集股無多，有名鮮實。西潼一路，以商股難成，奏歸官辦，其見端也。

Railway memorials received swift approval as national rescue projects. Trunk and branch proposals crisscrossed the empire. Funding relied on levies on grain, salt, tea, housing, lotteries, opium, copper profits, and grain-tax share subscriptions. Xinning was fastest and most unified in authority. Chen Yixi of Xinning, expert in railways, led the line to completion in two years. Chao-Shan followed, despite repeated setbacks in survey and fundraising. Zhang Yunan was promoted to third-rank capital official. Guangdong–Hankou drew the most Cantonese capital—and the fiercest infighting. Leadership churn stalled construction. Sichuan raised over ten million yuan chiefly through land rent surcharges. Zhejiang, Fujian, Anhui, and Jiangxi also started in sequence. Other provinces raised little beyond nominal subscriptions. Xi-Tong reverted to official control when merchant shares failed.

三十四年，上用蘇撫陳啟泰言，以大學士張之洞督辦粵漢，冀以統一事權，亦無所濟。是年，詔以鐵路為交通大政，紳商集股，各設公司，奏辦有年，多無起色，命所司遴員分往查勘。尋奏上勘路查款辦法。時川漢已派員往查。其餘以洛潼、西潼、同蒲、江蘇、浙江最要，為一起；粵漢、潮汕、新寧、惠潮、廣西、福建次要，為一起；滇蜀、安徽、江西再次，為一起。擬先查洛潼、西潼、同蒲三路，報聞。宣統二年，川路司出納者，虧倒路股百九十餘萬，川人宦京者甘大璋等聞於上，查明飭追，徒託空言而已。

In Guangxu 34 the throne put Zhang Zhidong in charge of Guangdong–Hankou to unify authority, without success. An edict that year ordered inspections because share-funded companies had shown little progress. Investigation methods for routes and funds were submitted. Sichuan–Hankou was already under review. Priority group one: Luo-Tong, Xi-Tong, Tong-Pu, Jiangsu, and Zhejiang; group two: Guangdong–Hankou, Chao-Shan, Xinning, Hui-Chao, Guangxi, and Fujian; group three: Yunnan–Sichuan, Anhui, and Jiangxi. Luo-Tong, Xi-Tong, and Tong-Pu were to be inspected first. In Xuantong 2 a Sichuan railway cashier embezzled 1.9 million in shares; though Beijing Sichuan officials reported it, recovery proved hollow.

三年，給事中石長信言：「我國興造各省鐵路，事前並未謀定後動。今宜明定幹路、枝路辦法，使天下咸知國家鐵路政策之所在，此後有所遵循，不再如從前之群議龐雜，茫無主宰。當此時事日亟，邊防最要。國家若不趕將東西南北諸大幹路迅速次第興築，則強鄰四逼，無所措手。人民不足責，其如大局何。此中利害，間不容髮。惟有仰懇乾綱獨斷，不再游移。在德、奧、法、日本、墨西哥諸國，其鐵路均歸國有，而我分枝路與民，已為優異。況幹枝相輔，上下相維，於理尚順，於事稍易。此路政之大綱，亟宜明定辦法者一也。又東南幹路，以粵漢議辦為最早。光緒二十六年，督辦大臣會同湖廣總督等奏准借美款興造。當時訂定合同後，業已築成粵省之佛山三水鐵路一百餘里，廣州至英德幹路亦已購地開工。乃三十年春間，張之洞忽信王先謙等之言，不惜鉅資，經向美公司廢約，堅持固執，卒至停罷。廢約後，原欲集鄂、湘、粵三省之力以成此路。詎悠忽數年，粵則有款而紳士爭權，辦路甚少，湘、鄂則集款無著，徒糜局費。張之洞翻然悔悟，不護前非，仍擬借款築造，乃向英、德、法三國銀行訂定借款草合同，籤押後正欲入告，因美國援案插入，暫緩陳奏。張之洞旋即病故，此事遂一擱至今。計自廢約以來，已閱七載。倘若無此翻覆，粵漢早已告成，亦如京漢，已屆十年還本之期矣。至川漢集款，皆屬取諸田間，其款確有一千餘萬。紳士樹黨，各懷意見，上年始由宜昌開工至歸州以東，此五百里工程，尚不及十分之二三，不知何年方能告竣。而施典章擅將川路租股之所入，倒帳竟至數百萬之多。此又川、粵、漢幹路之潰敗延誤，亟宜查辦者又一也。近來雲貴督臣李經羲議造滇桂邊路，於國防尤有關係。然不有粵漢幹路自湖南之永興與廣西之全州相接，則滇桂路何能自守？今我粵漢直貫桂滇，川漢遠控西藏，實為國家應有兩大幹路，萬一有事，緩急可恃。故無論袤延數千里之幹路，斷非民間零星湊集之款所能圖成，即使遲以十年或二十年，造成之後，而各分畛域，倘於有事之際，命令不行，仍必如東西洋之議歸國家收買。此幹路之必歸國有者又一也。國家成法，待民寬厚，雖當財賦極困難之時，不肯加賦。四川、湖南現因興造鐵路，創為租股名目，每畝帶徵，以充路款。聞兩省農民，正深訾怨，偶遇荒年，追呼尤覺難堪。但路局以路亡地亡之說驚哧愚民，遂不得不從。川省民力較紓，尚能勉強擔負。湘民本非饒足，若數年之間，強逼百姓出此數千鉅萬之重貲，而路工一日不完，路利一日無著，深恐民窮財盡，欲圖富強而轉滋貧弱。是以幹路收歸國有，命下之日，薄海百姓，必無阻撓之慮。況留此民力以造枝路，其工易成，其資易集，其利易收。使其土貨得以暢行，民間漸資饒富，此枝路之可歸民有者又一也。」

In Xuantong 3, Supervising Secretary Shi Changxin said: "When our country built railways in the provinces, the plans were not settled beforehand before action was taken. He urged clear trunk and branch policies so the nation would know the railway program and end chaotic debate. With crises mounting, frontier defense was paramount. Without rapid trunk lines in every direction, encirclement by strong neighbors would leave China helpless. The people could not be blamed; the strategic stakes could not. The stakes admitted no delay. He begged the throne for decisive, unwavering action. Germany, Austria, France, Japan, and Mexico nationalized railways; China already privileged merchants with branches. Trunks and branches mutually supported one another—sound in theory and easier in practice. Clear railway policy was his first recommendation. The southeastern trunk, Guangdong–Hankou, had been debated earliest. In Guangxu 26 officials approved an American loan to build it. Under the contract, over a hundred li from Foshan to Sanshui were built and the Guangzhou–Yingde trunk had begun. Yet in Guangxu 30 spring Zhang Zhidong, heeding Wang Xianqian, spent heavily to cancel the American contract and halted work. Cancellation was meant to let Hubei, Hunan, and Guangdong finish the line together. Years passed: Guangdong had money but factional strife; Hunan and Hubei raised little and wasted bureau funds. Zhang repented and drafted loans with British, German, and French banks, but an American diplomatic case delayed submission. Zhang died before completing the plan, and the project languished. Seven years had passed since cancellation. Without the reversal, Guangdong–Hankou might have been finished like Jing-Han, already in its ten-year repayment period. Sichuan–Hankou funds, drawn from the countryside, truly exceeded ten million. Factional Sichuan gentry had begun only a fraction of the five hundred li east from Yichang toward Guizhou, with no end in sight. Official Shi Dianzhang had embezzled millions from Sichuan railway rent shares. The failure of the Sichuan, Guangdong, and Hankou trunks required investigation—his second point. Yunnan–Guizhou Governor Li Jingxi's proposed frontier line mattered greatly for defense. But without Guangdong–Hankou linking Hunan's Yongxing to Guangxi's Quanzhou, the frontier line could not stand alone. Guangdong–Hankou through Guangxi and Yunnan and Sichuan–Hankou toward Tibet were the two strategic trunks the state needed. Thousand-li trunks could not rely on scattered private funds; even if built slowly, divided control in crisis would force nationalization as in the West. Trunk lines must therefore be state-owned—his third point. State law treated the people generously and avoided new taxes even in fiscal crisis. Sichuan and Hunan now levied per-mu railway rent shares for construction funds. Farmers in both provinces deeply resented the surcharges, especially in famine years when collection became unbearable. Road bureaus terrified peasants with warnings that losing the railway meant losing the land, leaving no choice but compliance. Sichuan could still barely bear the burden. Hunan was poorer: forcing millions in payments while lines stayed unfinished would impoverish the people instead of strengthening the state. Nationalizing trunks would end popular resistance. Freed capital could build branches more easily, cheaply, and profitably. Branches could let local goods flow and enrich the people—his second reason for private branch lines."

疏上，下所司議行。詔曰：「中國幅員遼闊，邊疆袤延數萬里，程途動需數閱月之久，朝廷每念邊防，輒勞宵旰。欲資控御，惟有速造鐵路之一策。況憲政之諮謀，軍務之徵調，土產之運輸，胥賴交通便利，大局始有轉機。熟籌再四，國家必有縱橫四境諸大幹路，方足以資行政而握中央之樞紐。從前規畫未善，並無一定辦法，以致全國鐵路，錯亂紛歧，不分枝幹，不量民力，一紙呈請，輒行批准商辦。乃數年以來，粵則收股及半，造路無多；川則倒帳甚鉅，參追無著；湘、鄂則開局多年，徒資坐耗。竭萬民之脂膏，或以虛糜，或以侵蝕，恐曠時愈久，民累愈深，上下交受其害，貽誤何堪設想。用特明白曉諭，昭示天下，幹路均歸國有，定為政策。所有宣統三年以前，各省分設公司、集股商辦之幹路，延誤已久，應即由國家收回，趕緊興築。除枝路仍准商民量力酌行外，其從前批准幹路各案，一律取消。至應如何收回之詳細辦法，著度支部、郵傳部悉心籌畫，迅速請旨辦理。」

The memorial was referred to the relevant offices. The edict said: "China’s territory is vast, and the frontiers extend for tens of thousands of li; journeys often take several months, and whenever the court thinks of frontier defense it labors day and night. Only rapid railway construction could secure control. Constitutional government, military mobilization, and commerce all needed transport to improve. The state needed trunk lines in every direction to govern and hold the center. Past policy had approved merchant lines without distinguishing trunk from branch or measuring popular capacity, producing chaos. Guangdong raised only half its shares and built little; Sichuan suffered massive embezzlement without recovery; Hunan and Hubei bureaus consumed funds for years without progress. Popular wealth was wasted or stolen; delay would deepen misery for court and people alike. The throne proclaimed nationalization of trunk lines as fixed policy. Merchant trunk projects approved before Xuantong 3 would be nationalized and rushed to completion. Branches might still be built privately; prior trunk approvals were voided. The Ministries of Revenue and Communications were to plan recovery details."

度支部奏：「粵、川、湘、鄂四省所抽所招之公司股票，盡數收回，由度支、郵傳兩部特出國家鐵路股票，常年六釐給息。嗣後如有餘利，按股分給。倘原抽本，五年後亦可分十五年抽本。其不原換國家鐵路股票者，均准分別辦理，以昭平允。粵路全系商股，因路工停頓，糜費太甚，票價不及五成。現每股從優發給六成，其虧耗之四成，發給國家無利股票。路成獲利之日，准在本路餘利項下，分十年攤給。湘路商本，照本發還。其米捐、租股等款，准發給國家保利股本。鄂路商股，並准一律照本發還。其因路動用賑糶捐款，准照湖南米捐辦理。川路宜昌實用工料之款四百數十萬兩，准給國家保利股票。其現存七百餘萬兩，原否入股，或歸本省興辦實業，仍聽其便。」從之。詔停川、湘兩省租股。起端方以侍郎督辦粵漢、川漢鐵路。其粵漢、川漢，英、德、法三國借款，亦即簽訂。

The Ministry of Finance memorialized: "All company shares collected or subscribed in Guangdong, Sichuan, Hunan, and Hubei shall be bought back in full, and the Ministries of Finance and Posts and Communications shall specially issue national railway shares, paying six percent annual interest. Surplus profits would be divided among shareholders. Original principal could be withdrawn over fifteen years beginning after five years. Those refusing state bonds would receive separate fair terms. Guangdong shares, with construction stalled, traded below half face value. Holders would receive sixty percent cash and forty percent in non-interest state stock. The forty percent loss could be repaid from profits over ten years after completion. Hunan merchant principal would be repaid in full. Hunan rice levies and rent shares would become state guaranteed bonds. Hubei merchant shares would likewise be repaid at principal. Hubei relief grain funds used for the railway would follow Hunan rice-levy terms. Four million taels spent at Yichang would become state guaranteed bonds. As for the more than seven million taels now on hand, whether it is invested as shares or returned to the province to establish industry shall still be left to their convenience." The throne approved. Sichuan and Hunan rent-share levies were stopped. Vice Minister Duanfang was appointed to supervise Guangdong–Hankou and Sichuan–Hankou. Anglo-German-French loans for those lines were signed.

方幹路收歸國有之詔既頒，湘、粵人士群起譁譟，力謀抗拒，顧未久即定。護川督王人文代陳川諮議局請緩接收川路，詔旨斥之。川人羅綸等言：「部臣對待川民，均以威力從事，毫不持平。」人文復據以上聞，仍嚴斥之。未幾，以趙爾豐署四川總督。川人因路事持久不決，始以罷市、罷課，抗糧、抗捐，發布自保商榷書；繼則集眾圍攻督署，再攻省垣。遂命端方率軍入川。又以川事日棘，命前粵督岑春煊赴川辦理剿撫。春煊既受命，請以現金償川省路股，桂撫沈秉堃亦以為言，部議借英金三百萬鎊，不能決也。春煊至鄂，會成都圍解，稱疾不往。

Nationalization sparked uproar in Hunan and Guangdong but subsided quickly. Acting Governor Wang Renwen sought delay; the court rebuked him. Sichuan men such as Luo Lun said: "In dealing with the people of Sichuan, the ministry officials have all acted by force and have not been fair in the slightest." Wang reported again and was rebuked again. Zhao Erfeng became acting governor-general of Sichuan. Unresolved railway disputes led to market and school boycotts, tax resistance, and self-protection manifestos; then sieges of the governor's yamen and provincial capital. Duanfang was sent with troops into Sichuan. Cen Chunxuan was ordered to Sichuan to pacify the crisis. Cen sought cash repayment for Sichuan shares; the ministry debated a £3 million loan without resolution. Cen reached Hubei, then pleaded illness after Chengdu was relieved and never entered Sichuan.

御史陳善同上章，請罷斥郵傳大臣盛宣懷，以弭巨變。疏言：「竊維國以民為本，自古未有得民心而國不興者，即未有失民心而不危者。傳曰：『眾怒難犯。』書曰：『民可近，不可下。』此中消息至微。此次以鐵路幹線歸國有，政策本極相宜。比者屢詔蠲除各項雜捐，所以恤民者，固已仁至義盡。而湘、粵等省人心惶駭，擾擾不靖，川患且日以加劇者，則以郵傳大臣盛宣懷於此事之辦理實有未善也。各路商辦之局，其始皆歷奉先皇帝諭旨，根據大清商律。如欲改歸官辦，自應統籌全局，劃定年限，分期分段，量力遞收，於國於民，方為兩利。今盛宣懷事前毫無預備，徒仰仗借款，突然將批准各案奏請一律取消。各路以十餘年之經營，千數百萬之籌集，一旦盡取諸其懷而奪之。而所訂借款合同，利率之高，虛折之多，抵押之鉅，債權之重，又著著失敗，予人口實。各省人民，痛念前勞，怵心後禍，宜其奔走駭告，岌岌若不終日也。查給事中石長信之請定幹路、枝路辦法，在四月初七日；郵傳部之覆奏，宣布國有政策，在十一日；而借款合同之籤押，在二十二日。似政策之改定，實緣借款而發生也者。舉辦此等大事，乃平時漫無布置，出以猝遽如此，反使朝廷減輕民累之恉晦沒不彰。而復不能審慎臨機，強令宜歸工程每月工項仍由川款開支，實與五月二十一日上諭『川路仍存七百餘萬，原否入股，或辦實業，並聽其便』等語大相違背。必欲使我皇上體恤商民之恩，壅遏之不使下逮，陷朝廷以不信，示天下以可疑，群起抵抗，何怪其然。幸以國家三百年來深仁厚澤，淪浹人心，故雖眾怨交集於盛宣懷，終無敢有歸怨朝廷者。比聞川省風潮日烈，皆以盛宣懷喪權誤國，欲得而甘心。月餘以來，屢開全省股東大會，每次到者近萬人，誓與路為存亡，在場之人無不為之泣下。合十餘州縣地方，並相約不納錢糧，不上捐輸，學堂停課，商民罷市。各戶恭設先皇帝靈位，朝夕痛哭，人無樂生之心，士懷必死之志，愁慘蕭條，如經大劫，至可憐念。夫今日皇皇失所之窮民，皆國家{袁皿}々在疚之赤子，情形狼狽至此，我皇上聞之，必有惻然動念者。若不亟為拯救，萬一相持不解，稍延時日，或有不軌之徒，從中鼓煽，強者並命於尋仇，弱者絕望於逃死，眾志一睽，全體瓦解，終非國家福也。現在湘、鄂爭路，餘波尚未大熄，而雨水為災，幾近十省，盜匪成群，流亡遍野。若川省小有風鶴之警，恐由滇、藏以至沿江、沿海，必有起而應之者，其為患又豈止於路不能收而已。頃者我皇上諭派鄂、粵、川、湘等省督撫，令於所轄境內鐵路事宜各得會同辦理。盛宣懷剛愎自用，不洽輿情，已可概見，應如何懲處，以儆將來。至川民爭議，久懸不斷，終慮釀成鉅變。應責成督辦、會辦各大臣，酌度情形，妥速維持，以息眾喙。」時宣懷入為郵傳大臣，幹路收歸國有、及息借外債築路、處分四省路股，實主其事，故善同及之，語至切直。

Censor Chen Shantong demanded Sheng Xuanhuai's dismissal to avert catastrophe. He memorialized: "I humbly consider that the state takes the people as its foundation. Since antiquity there has never been one that won the people’s hearts and did not rise, nor one that lost the people’s hearts and was not endangered. The Changes says: 'Mass anger is dangerous to provoke.' The Documents say: 'The people must be approached, not despised.' The lesson was subtle but grave. Nationalizing trunks was sound policy in itself. Recent tax remissions had already shown imperial benevolence. Yet Hunan, Guangdong, and especially Sichuan grew turbulent because Sheng Xuanhuai handled the transition badly. Merchant railway companies had operated under imperial sanction and commercial law. Nationalization should have been gradual, staged, and fair to state and people alike. Sheng had prepared nothing, relied on foreign loans, and abruptly canceled all approvals. Decades of investment and hundreds of millions were seized overnight. Loan terms were ruinous: high interest, heavy discounts, vast collateral, and crushing creditor power. Provinces mourned past sacrifices and feared future loss, spreading panic. Shi Changxin had proposed trunk-branch policy on the fourth month's seventh day; the ministry announced nationalization on the eleventh; loan contracts were signed on the twenty-second. Nationalization appeared driven by borrowing, not planning. Haste and lack of planning obscured the court's intent to relieve the people. Forcing Sichuan funds to pay monthly engineering costs violated the May 21 edict leaving seven million taels to local choice. Blocking imperial mercy, breaking trust, and inviting suspicion made resistance inevitable. Three centuries of Qing benevolence kept blame on Sheng, not the throne. Sichuan unrest intensified; crowds blamed Sheng for betraying national rights. Shareholder meetings drew ten thousand who swore to live or die for the railway and wept. A dozen prefectures refused taxes and levies, closed schools, and shut markets. Households mourned the late emperor daily; despair spread like after a catastrophe. Today's desperate poor were the children the state was bound to cherish; the emperor must pity their plight. Without swift rescue, stalemate could let agitators turn protest into revolt and dissolve the realm. Hunan and Hubei unrest continued amid floods in ten provinces, banditry, and refugees. Sichuan unrest could spread from Yunnan and Tibet to the coast, far beyond railway policy. The throne had ordered multi-province cooperation on railway affairs. Sheng's obstinacy and popular hatred demanded punishment as a warning. Sichuan's unresolved railway fight threatened greater upheaval. The supervising and associate ministers should be held responsible, assess the circumstances, and maintain order properly and quickly, in order to quiet public criticism." Sheng, as minister, had driven nationalization, foreign loans, and share seizure—Chen's memorial named him directly.

疏入不省。而川省溫江等十餘州縣民團，每起數千或萬人，所至焚掠，勢極猖獗。大軍擊退之，旋據崇慶、新津、彭山，而嘉定、灌縣相繼失陷。邛州軍隊譁變，汶川縣署被毀，命湘、鄂、陝諸軍赴援。會鄂事起，川亂愈亟，以岑春煊為川督，而川省旋為民軍所據，端方、趙爾豐均及於難。乃罷盛宣懷以謝川人，而國事已不可為矣。

The memorial went unheeded. Sichuan militias of thousands burned and looted across Wenjiang and a dozen prefectures. Government troops retook some towns while Jiading and Guanxian fell. Mutiny at Qiongzhou and destruction in Wenchuan brought reinforcements from Hunan, Hubei, and Shaanxi. The Wuchang uprising worsened Sichuan; though Cen was appointed governor, revolutionaries seized the province and Duanfang and Zhao Erfeng perished. Sheng was dismissed to appease Sichuan, but the dynasty was already doomed.

蓋論辦路之優劣，官辦則籌款易、竣工速，自非商辦可及。而外債之虧耗，大權之旁落，弊害孔多，亦遠過於商路。惟京張鐵路，以京奉餘利舉辦，詹天佑躬親其役，絲毫不假外人，允為中國自辦之路。而鄂之鐵廠，制鋼軌以應全國造路之需，挽回大利，尤為不鮮。統計官辦之路：*京漢長二千六百三十里，資本金一萬萬零五百六十二萬八千餘元。 *京奉長二千二百四十六里，資本金五千零八十八萬四千餘元。 *津浦長一千八百六十三里，資本金八千零四十九萬餘元。 *京張長五百四十六里，資本金一千零三十二萬餘元。 *滬寧長七百二十五里，資本金三千六百五十三萬餘元。 *正太長六百二十三里，資本金二千三百十二萬六千餘元。 *汴洛長四百零二里，資本金二千零五十萬元。 *道清長三百三十里，資本金九百五十四萬九千餘元。 *廣九長三百零三里，資本金一千一百六十六萬二千餘元。 *吉長長一百四十里，資本金一百二十萬三千七百零四元。 *萍株長二百零五里，資本金四百六十一萬六千餘元。 *齊昂長五十六里，資本金四十八萬八千餘元。

Official railways raised funds and finished faster than merchant lines. But foreign loans cost more and surrendered more control than merchant projects. Only Jing-Zhang, funded from Jing-Feng profits under Zhan Tianyou without foreign help, was truly Chinese-built. Hubei's steel works supplying rails nationwide recovered major benefits. Jing-Han: 2,630 li, capital 105,628,000+ yuan. Jing-Feng: 2,246 li, capital 50,884,000+ yuan. Jin-Pu: 1,863 li, capital 80,490,000+ yuan. Jing-Zhang: 546 li, capital 10,320,000+ yuan. Hu-Ning: 725 li, capital 36,530,000+ yuan. Zheng-Tai: 623 li, capital 23,126,000+ yuan. Bian-Luo: 402 li, capital 20,500,000 yuan. Dao-Qing: 330 li, capital 9,549,000+ yuan. Guang-Jiu: 303 li, capital 11,662,000+ yuan. Ji-Chang: 140 li, capital 1,203,704 yuan. Ping-Zhu: 205 li, capital 4,616,000+ yuan. Qi-Ang: 56 li, capital 488,000+ yuan.

商辦之路：*浙江長三百四十二里，資本金一千二百七十八萬八千餘元。 *新寧長二百六十里，資本金四百零八萬九千餘元。 *南潯長七十七里，資本金三百五十萬六千餘元。 *福建長二十八里，資本金二百四十二萬八千餘元。 *潮汕長八十三里，資本金三百五十四萬六千餘元。

Merchant-built roads: Zhejiang: 342 li, capital 12,788,000+ yuan. Xinning: 260 li, capital 4,089,000+ yuan. Nan-Xun: 77 li, capital 3,506,000+ yuan. Fujian: 28 li, capital 2,428,000+ yuan. Chao-Shan: 83 li, capital 3,546,000+ yuan.

其借外債所築各路，惟京漢屆期贖歸我有，其他則尚未及雲。

Of foreign-loan railways, only Jing-Han was redeemed on schedule; the rest had not yet been recovered.

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