1
自西人輪船之制興，有兵輪，有商輪。 其始僅往來東西洋各國口岸而已。 中國自開埠通商而後，與英吉利訂江寧條約，而外輪得行駛海上矣。 續與訂天津條約，而外輪得行駛長江矣。 商旅樂其利便，趨之若鶩。 於時內江外海之利盡為所佔。
Once the Western system of steam navigation took hold, there came to be warships and merchant steamers alike. At first they plied only between the ports of the various countries of East and West. After China opened its treaty ports to trade, it signed the Treaty of Nanking with Britain, and foreign steamers were allowed to sail the open sea. Under the later Treaty of Tientsin, foreign steamers were also permitted to navigate the Yangtze. Merchants and travelers welcomed the convenience and flocked to the steamers in droves. Before long the profits of China's inland waterways and coastal trade had all been seized by foreign operators.
2
同治十一年，直隸總督李鴻章建議設輪船招商局，論者謂妨河船生計。 鴻章謂當咸豐間河船三千餘艘，今僅存四百艘。 及今不圖，將利權盡失。 請破群議力行之。 十三年，鴻章又疏言：「同治間曾國籓、丁日昌在江蘇督、撫任，迭據道員許道身、同知容閎創議華商造船章程，分運漕米，兼攬客貨。 曾經寄請總理衙門核准，飭由江海關道曉諭各口商人試辦。 日久因循，未有成局。 同治七年，僅借用夾板船運米一次，旋又中止。 本年夏間，臣於驗收海運之暇，遵照總理衙門函示，商令浙局總辦海運委員知府硃其昂酌擬輪船章程。 嗣以現在官造輪船內並無商船可領，各省在滬殷商，或自置輪船行駛各埠，或挾資本依附西商之籍。 若中國自立招商局，則各商所有輪船股本必漸歸官局，似足順商情而強國體。 擬請先行試辦招商，為官商浹洽地步。 俟商船造成，即可隨時添補，推廣通行。 又海運米石，本屆江浙沙寧船不敷，應請以商船分運，以補沙寧之不足。 將來米數愈增，可無缺船之患。 請照戶部核准練餉制錢借給蘇、浙典章，准商等借領二十萬緡，以作設局商本，仍預繳息錢助賑。 所有盈虧，全歸商認，與官無涉。 當令硃其昂回滬設局招商。 商人爭先入股，現已購集堅捷輪船三艘。 經臣咨商浙江督撫臣飭撥明年漕米二十萬石，由招商輪船運津，其水腳耗米等項，悉照沙寧船定章。 至攬載貨物，報關納稅，仍照新關章程，以免藉口。 若從此輪船暢行，庶使我內江外海之利不致為洋人佔盡，其關於國計民生者實非淺鮮。」 疏入，報可。
In 1872, Li Hongzhang, governor-general of Zhili, proposed founding the China Merchants Steam Navigation Company, but critics argued that it would ruin the livelihood of the native river-boat trade. Hongzhang replied that in the Xianfeng era there had been more than three thousand river craft, whereas only four hundred now survived. Unless action were taken now, every remaining commercial advantage would be lost for good. He urged that popular objections be set aside and the plan pushed through resolutely. In 1874 he memorialized again: 'During the Tongzhi reign, while Zeng Guofan and Ding Richang held the posts of governor-general and governor of Jiangsu, they repeatedly received from Circuit Intendant Xu Daoshen and Subprefect Rong Hong draft regulations for Chinese merchants to build steamers, carry tribute grain in allotments, and take general and passenger freight as well. The plan had been referred to the Zongli Yamen for approval, with orders that the Jiangsu customs intendant notify merchants at the various ports to undertake a trial. Months and years of delay followed, and nothing ever came of it. In 1868 a schooner was borrowed for a single grain shipment, and even that experiment was soon abandoned. This past summer, while inspecting the receipt of the sea-transport tribute, I followed instructions from the Zongli Yamen and directed Prefect Zhu Qiang, the Zhejiang bureau's chief commissioner for sea transport, to draft regulations for steam navigation. It emerged, however, that none of the government-built steamers then available were suitable merchant vessels, while wealthy merchants from the provinces at Shanghai were either buying their own steamers for inter-port service or investing their capital under foreign firms' registry. If China were to establish its own merchant steamship company, the capital invested in privately owned steamers would gradually be drawn into the official bureau—a move that would satisfy merchant sentiment while strengthening the national interest. I propose that merchant recruitment be tried first, as a step toward bringing official and private interests into alignment. Once merchant vessels were built, they could be added at will and the service expanded. As for this year's sea transport of tribute grain, the Sha-Ning junks of Jiangsu and Zhejiang cannot meet demand; merchant steamers should be enlisted to share the haul and make up the shortfall. As tribute volumes grew in future years, the shortage of shipping would no longer be a problem. I ask that merchants be allowed to borrow two hundred thousand strings of cash under the same arrangement by which the Board of Revenue had approved lending training-pay funds to Jiangsu and Zhejiang pawnshops—serving as the company's founding capital, with interest prepaid as a contribution to famine relief. All profits and losses would be borne entirely by the merchants, with no liability falling on the government. Zhu Qiang should be sent back to Shanghai to set up the bureau and recruit merchant investors. Merchants rushed to buy shares, and three fast, sturdy steamers have already been acquired. I have consulted the Zhejiang governor-general and governor, who have agreed to allocate two million shi of next year's tribute grain for transport to Tianjin by the new company's steamers, with freight charges, wastage allowances, and other terms to follow the established Sha-Ning regulations. General cargo would be carried, declared, and taxed under the new customs regulations, leaving no room for complaint. If steam navigation could be made to flourish, the profits of China's inland waterways and coastal trade need not be monopolized by foreigners—a matter of no small consequence for state finance and public welfare.' The memorial was received and approved.
3
先是閩廠專為製造兵輪而設。 學士宋晉言糜款過鉅，議請罷之。 事下，鴻章力持不可。 略言：「歐洲諸國闖入中國邊界腹地，無不款關而求互市。 海外之險，有兵船巡防，而我與彼可共分之。 長江及各海口之利，有輪船轉運，而我與彼亦共分之。 或不至讓洋人獨擅其利與險，而浸至反客為主也。」 又言：「沿江沿海各省，不準另行購雇西洋輪船。 若有所需，令其自向閩、滬兩廠商撥訂製。 至載貨輪船，與兵船規制迥異。 閩廠現造之船，商船皆不合用。 曾國籓前飭滬廠造兵船外，另造商船四五艘。 閩廠似亦可間造商船，以資華商雇領。 現與曾國籓籌議，中國殷商每不原與官交涉，且各口岸生意已被洋商佔盡。 華商領官船，另樹一幟，洋人勢必挾重貲以傾奪，則須華商自立公司，自建行棧，自籌保險，本鉅用繁，初辦恐亦無利可圖。 若行之既久，添造與租領稍多，乃有利益。 聞華商原領者，必准其兼運漕糧，方有專門生意，不至為洋商排擠。 將來各廠商船造有成數，再請敕下總理衙門，商飭各省籌辦。」 疏上，下所司議行。
The Fujian Arsenal had originally been founded solely to build warships. Academician Song Jin argued that it squandered too much money and urged that it be shut down. When the proposal was referred for action, Hongzhang vigorously opposed closure. He wrote in summary: 'The European powers have penetrated China's borders and interior, and every one of them has sought trade at our gates. The dangers of the open ocean can be met with warships on patrol, which China and the foreign powers might share. The profits of the Yangtze and the coastal ports can be shared through steam transport as well. Only then might foreigners be prevented from monopolizing both the profits and the risks, until the guest came to rule the host.' He added: 'The riverine and coastal provinces must not purchase or charter Western steamers on their own. Any province in need should place orders with the Fujian and Shanghai arsenals. Cargo steamers, however, are built to specifications entirely different from warships. None of the vessels currently produced at the Fujian yard were fit for merchant service. Zeng Guofan had earlier directed the Shanghai yard to build four or five merchant steamers in addition to its warships. The Fujian yard might likewise build merchant vessels from time to time for Chinese merchants to charter. In discussions with Zeng Guofan, it was noted that wealthy Chinese merchants were generally reluctant to deal with officials, and that foreign firms had already captured trade at every port. If Chinese merchants were to operate government vessels under a separate flag, foreigners would surely deploy heavy capital to drive them out; merchants would need their own company, their own warehouses, and their own insurance—with enormous capital outlays and running costs, early operations would likely show no profit at all. Only after long operation, with more vessels built or chartered, would returns appear. Merchants who took over official vessels would need permission to carry tribute grain as well, giving them a protected line of business and some defense against foreign competition. Once the arsenals had built a sufficient number of merchant vessels, an imperial order should direct the Zongli Yamen to coordinate provincial participation.' The memorial was submitted and referred to the appropriate offices for implementation.
4
是年冬，招商局成立，以知府硃其昂主其事，道員盛宣懷佐之。 其昂以道員胡光墉、李振玉等招徠商股，入貲者極為踴躍，宣懷亦援粵人唐廷樞、徐潤董局事。 購船、設械、立埠，次第經營，悉屬商本，規模觕具。 光緒元年，鴻章奏獎其昂等有差。 三年，增購旗昌船艦，始假用直隸、江蘇、江西、湖北、東海關官款百九十萬兩有奇。 初擬購旗昌輪船，宣懷持之最力，需銀二百數十萬兩。 商本無幾，不足以應。 宣懷以國防大計、江海利源之說，力陳於江督沈葆楨。 葆楨為所動，撥銀百萬以濟，論者咸謂是舉為失計，至以「旗昌棄垂敝之裘，得值另制新衣，期於適體」為喻。 事後募集商股，應者寥寥，僅得銀四萬者以此也。 御史董俊翰言：「招商局每月虧至五六萬兩。 致虧之由，因置船過多，輪車行駛，經費過鉅，必須一船得一船之用，方可無虞折耗。 聞商局各船攬載之資，不敷經費，船多貨少。 刻下既未能遽赴外洋各國，以廣收貿易之利，祗宜量為變置，使所出之數不至浮於所入也。」 六年，祭酒王先謙請整頓招商局務，語涉宣懷。 疏下江督劉坤一，言宣懷於購旗昌輪船時，聲言有商款百餘萬，實無所有，有意欺謾，冀獲酬金，請奪宣懷職。 復請以官款概作官股，以其贏餘作海防經費。 疏入，均不報。
That winter the company was formally established, with Prefect Zhu Qiang in charge and Circuit Intendant Sheng Xuanhuai as his deputy. Zhu enlisted Circuit Intendant Hu Guangyong, Li Zhenyu, and others to solicit merchant investment, which met an enthusiastic response; Sheng brought in the Cantonese merchants Tang Jingsu and Xu Run to manage company affairs. Ships were purchased, equipment installed, and branch offices opened in turn, all funded by merchant capital, until a rough framework was in place. In 1875 Li Hongzhang memorialized for rewards to Zhu Qiang and his colleagues. In 1877, to finance the purchase of the Russell & Company fleet, the company first borrowed more than 1.9 million taels in official funds from Zhili, Jiangsu, Jiangxi, Hubei, and the Eastern Sea Customs. Sheng Xuanhuai had been the strongest advocate of buying the Russell fleet, which would cost more than two million taels. Merchant capital alone was far too small to cover the price. Sheng pressed the case on Governor-General Shen Baozhen of Jiangsu with arguments about national defense and control of river and sea commerce. Shen was persuaded and allocated one million taels; critics widely called the purchase a blunder, likening it to Russell's selling a threadbare coat for a good price while China paid to have a new one tailored that might not even fit. When shares were offered afterward, subscribers were few—only forty thousand taels were raised, which critics took as proof of their judgment. Censor Dong Junhan reported: 'The China Merchants Company is losing fifty or sixty thousand taels every month. The losses arose from owning too many vessels: operating costs were enormous, and each ship had to earn its keep before depreciation could be avoided. Freight income from the company's vessels reportedly failed to cover operating costs—too many ships chasing too little cargo. Since the company could not yet sail to foreign countries to expand trade, some vessels should be sold off so that expenses would not exceed revenue.' In 1880 Libationer Wang Xianqian memorialized for a thorough overhaul of the company's affairs, with remarks aimed at Sheng Xuanhuai. The memorial was sent to Governor-General Liu Kunyi of Jiangsu, who charged that Sheng had claimed more than a million taels in merchant funds when buying the Russell fleet when none existed—a deliberate deception aimed at securing a commission—and asked that Sheng be dismissed. He further proposed converting all official loans into government shares and applying any surplus to coastal defense. None of these memorials received a substantive reply.
5
招商局所假官帑，至光緒六年，應分期拔還。 乃償已逾半，復假洋債。 鴻章言兼籌並顧，招商局力有未逮，請先償洋債，後及官帑，格於部議。 嗣以遞年清還，而商股尚達四百萬兩焉。 當招商開辦之初，僅輪船三艘。 嗣承領閩、滬兩廠，購之英國，增至十二艘。 迨購入旗昌輪船十八艘，遂與英商太古、怡和並稱三公司。 貲本過鉅，收入轉微。
The official loans taken by the company were due for installment repayment by 1880. Although more than half had been repaid, the company took on new foreign loans. Li Hongzhang argued that the company could not manage both obligations at once and asked to repay foreign debt before official loans, but the proposal was rejected by the Board of Revenue. Repayment continued year by year, and merchant share capital eventually reached four million taels. When the company first opened, it owned only three steamers. It later took over vessels from the Fujian and Shanghai arsenals and bought others in Britain, bringing the fleet to twelve. After acquiring Russell's eighteen steamers, it ranked alongside Butterfield & Swire and Jardine Matheson as one of the 'Big Three' shipping firms. Capital costs soared while returns dwindled.
6
是年，以言官劾奏招商局辦理毫無實濟，請飭認真整頓，諭李鴻章及江督吳元炳澈查。 鴻章等奏言：「輪船招商局之設，乃各商集股，自行經理，已於創辦之初奏明，盈虧全歸商認，與官無涉。 輪船商務牽涉洋務，更不便由官任之，與他項設立官局開支公款者，迥不相同。 惟此舉為收回中國利權，事體重大，故須官為扶持，並酌借官帑，以助商力之不足。 光緒三年冬曾將商局事宜籌畫整頓復奏，並飭江海、津海兩關道，於每年結帳，就近分赴滬洋各局清查帳目，如有隱冒，據實奏請參賠。 數年以來，雖有英商太古、怡和洋行極力傾擠，而局事尚足相持，官帑漸可拔還。 復先承運京倉漕米、各省賑糧，不下數百萬石，徵兵調餉、解送官物軍械者，源源不絕，豈得謂於國事毫無實濟？ 其攬載客貨，以及出入款目，責成素習商業之道員唐廷樞、徐潤總理其事，每年結帳後，分晰開列清冊，悉聽入本各商閱看稽查。 若局中稍有弊端，則眾商不待官查，必已相率追控。 而自開辦至今，並無入股商人控告者。 現值漕運攬載吃緊之時，若紛紛調簿清查，不特市面徒滋搖惑，生意難以招徠； 且洋商嫉忌方深，更必乘機傾擠，冀遂其把持專利之謀，殊於中國商務大局有礙。 總之，商局關係國課最重，而各關各納稅課，絲毫無虧，所借官款由商局運漕水腳分年扣還，公款已歸有着，其各商股本盈虧，應如前奏，全歸商認，與官無涉。 應俟每年結帳時，照案由滬、津兩關道就近清查，以符定章。」 疏入，報聞。
That year, after memorialists charged that the company's operations had accomplished nothing and demanded a thorough overhaul, an edict directed Li Hongzhang and Governor Wu Yuanbing of Jiangsu to conduct a full investigation. Li Hongzhang and his colleagues replied: 'The China Merchants Steam Navigation Company was founded as a merchant joint-stock enterprise under merchant management, as stated at the outset: all profits and losses are borne by the shareholders, with no government liability. Steam shipping touches foreign relations and is even less suited to direct official management than ordinary government bureaus funded from the public purse. Because the venture aimed to recover China's commercial rights—a matter of national importance—the government had provided support and modest official loans to supplement insufficient merchant capital. In the winter of 1877 we had memorialized again on reorganizing the company and ordered the Jiangsu and Tianjin customs intendants to audit accounts at the Shanghai and Tianjin offices each year, with any fraud to be reported for disciplinary action. In the years since, despite fierce competition from Butterfield & Swire and Jardine Matheson, the company had held its own and official loans were gradually being repaid. It had carried tribute grain to the capital granaries and relief grain for the provinces—many millions of shi in all—and had continuously transported troops, pay, official goods, and military equipment. How could this be called of no practical benefit to the state? Passenger and general cargo, together with all receipts and expenditures, were managed by Tang Jingsu and Xu Run, experienced merchants holding official rank; after each year's closing, detailed accounts were opened to all shareholders for inspection. Any malpractice within the company would be pursued by the shareholders themselves without waiting for an official inquiry. Since founding, not a single shareholder had filed a complaint. At the critical season for tribute transport, a disruptive audit would unsettle the market and make it harder to attract business; and foreign rivals, already hostile, would seize the chance to drive the company out and secure their monopoly—seriously damaging China's commercial interests. In short, the company was vital to state revenue: customs duties were paid in full, official loans were being repaid from tribute-transport freight deductions, and shareholder profits and losses remained entirely a private matter as originally stipulated. Annual audits by the Shanghai and Tianjin customs intendants at closing time, as already ordered, would suffice.' The memorial was received and noted.
7
十一月，學士梅啟照言：「招商局自歸併旗昌輪船，各國輪船之利漸減，然祗在香港、福州、寧波、上海、天津、牛庄、長江等處碼頭，不如推廣，竟令其赴東西洋各國。 請飭南北洋大臣，督令局員，酌派豐順、保大等船，先赴東洋試行。 行之有效，漸及於西洋，則貿遷有無之利，中外分之。」 明年，祭酒王先謙亦以為言。 均下所司核議。 先是招商局船駛往新嘉坡、小呂宋、日本等處，不足與外輪競利，尋即停罷。 嗣遣和眾船往夏威仁國之檀香山、美之舊金山兩埠，華人麕集，航業頗振。 因復遣美富船往。 而各國商業，英為巨擘。 七年，粵人梁雲漢等設肇興公司於倫敦，船政大臣黎兆棠實倡斯議。 鴻章疏言：「西洋富強之策，商務與船政互相表裡。 以兵船之力衛商船，必先以商船之稅養兵船，則整頓尤為急務。 邇者各國商船爭赴中國，計每年進出口貨價約銀二萬萬兩以外。 洋商所逐什一之利，已不下數千萬兩，以十年計之，則數萬萬兩。 此皆中國之利，有往無來者也。 故當商務未興之前，各國原可閉關自治。 逮風氣大開，既不能拒之使不來，惟有自擴利源，勸令華商出洋貿易，庶土貨可暢銷，洋商可少至，而中國利權亦可逐漸收回。 前此招商局輪船嘗駛往新嘉坡、小呂宋、越南等埠攬載。 近年和眾、美富等船分駛夏威仁國之檀香山、美國之舊金山，載運客貨，究止小試其端，尚未厚集其力。 英國倫敦為通商第一都會，並無華商前往。 黎兆棠志在匡時，久有創立公司之議，盡心提倡，力為其難。 現既粗定規模，自當因勢利導，期於必成。」 報聞。
In the eleventh month Academician Mei Qizhao wrote: 'Since the company absorbed the Russell fleet, foreign steamers' profits have declined, but its service is limited to wharves at Hong Kong, Fuzhou, Ningbo, Shanghai, Tianjin, Niuzhuang, and along the Yangtze; it should be expanded to send vessels to countries in the East and West. He asked that the northern and southern commissioners supervise dispatch of vessels such as the Fengshun and Baoda on a trial run to Japan first. If the trial succeeded, service could gradually extend to the West, and the profits of long-distance trade would be shared between China and foreign powers.' The following year Libationer Wang Xianqian made the same proposal. Both proposals were referred to the appropriate offices for review. The company had earlier sent ships to Singapore, the Philippines, and Japan but could not compete with foreign lines and soon withdrew. It later sent the Hezhong to Honolulu and San Francisco, where large Chinese communities made the routes profitable. The Meifu was then added to the Pacific service. Among foreign commercial powers, Britain remained dominant. In 1881 Cantonese merchants led by Liang Yunhan founded the Zhaoxing Company in London, at the instigation of Minister of Naval Affairs Li Zhaotang. Li Hongzhang wrote: 'The Western path to wealth and power rests on commerce and naval shipping as mutually supporting pillars. To protect merchant shipping with naval force, merchant revenues must first sustain the navy—making thorough reform all the more urgent. Foreign merchant vessels now flock to China in such numbers that annual import and export trade exceeds two hundred million taels. The ten-percent margin foreign merchants capture amounts to tens of millions of taels a year—hundreds of millions over a decade. All of this represents Chinese wealth flowing out with nothing returning. Before the rise of maritime trade, nations could still close their borders and govern themselves in isolation. Once the ports were opened, foreigners could not be kept out; China had only to expand its own commercial reach by encouraging Chinese merchants to trade abroad, so that native goods might find markets, foreign competition might be reduced, and China's commercial rights gradually recovered. The company's steamers had earlier sailed to Singapore, the Philippines, Vietnam, and other ports for freight. In recent years the Hezhong, Meifu, and other vessels had served Honolulu and San Francisco, but these remained tentative ventures with resources not yet fully committed. London, Britain's premier trading city, had seen no Chinese merchant presence at all. Li Zhaotang, devoted to national renewal, had long advocated founding a company and worked tirelessly to overcome the obstacles. Now that a basic framework was in place, the government should guide the venture to success.' The memorial was received and noted.
8
十年，法人來擾，海疆不靖，股商洶懼，局船慮為劫奪，以銀五百二十五萬兩暫售之旗昌行主。 事平收回，復增置江新、新昌、新康、新銘各艦。 而沈沒朽敝者，不一而足，其後共達二十九艘雲。 十二年，鄂督張之洞遣總兵王榮和至南洋，籌辦捐船護商事項。 宣統三年，設商船學校於吳淞。 凡此皆為擴充航業之張本，而局船行駛外洋之利，終不能與各國爭衡也。
In 1884, when French aggression unsettled the coast, shareholders panicked and the fleet was temporarily sold for 5.25 million taels to the head of Russell & Company for fear of seizure. After peace was restored the ships were bought back, and new vessels—the Jiangxin, Xinchang, Xinkang, and Xinming—were added to the fleet. Sunken and worn-out vessels were numerous; the fleet eventually totaled twenty-nine ships. In 1886 Governor-General Zhang Zhidong of Hubei sent Major-General Wang Ronghe to Southeast Asia to organize ship donations for maritime protection. In 1911 a merchant marine school was founded at Wusong. All these measures laid groundwork for expanding shipping, yet the company's overseas routes never could truly compete with foreign lines.
9
招商局之設，本為挽回江海已失航利。 開辦之始，即知為洋商所嫉，而彌補之策，首在分運蘇、浙漕米，嗣更推之鄂、贛、江、安。 而滇之銅斤，蜀之燈木，江、浙之採辦官物，直、晉之賑糧，胥由局船經營其事。 光緒十一年，道員葉廷眷復條上扶持商局運鄂茶、鄂鹽，增加運漕水腳諸策。 事下直督李鴻章。 先是局船運漕，石銀五錢有奇。 嗣英、美人攬運，故廉其值，商局運費因之減少，勢益不支。 鴻章請稍增益之，格部議，不果行。 蓋招商局自開辦以來，局中之侵蝕與局外之傾擠，所有資力頗虞虧耗。 商股不足，貸及官款，繼以洋債。 當事者日言維持補救之策，裨益實鮮，而以用款浮濫，復屢為言官所劾。 至是部臣疏言：「三代之治法，貴本而抑末，重農而賤商，從古商務未嘗議於朝廷。 海上互市以來，論者乃競言商政。 竊謂商者逐什一之利，以厚居積、權子母為事者也。 厚居積，必月計之有餘； 權子母，必求倍入之息。 若計存本則日虧，問子母則無著，甚且稱貸乞假以補不足，猶號於眾曰『此吾致富之術也』，有是理乎？ 嘗見富商大賈，必擇忠信之人以主會計。 其入有經，其出有節。 守餘一餘三之法，核實厚積，乃能久遠。 若主計不得其人，生之者寡，食之者眾，取之無度，用之無節，不旋踵而終窶。 用人理財之道，與政通矣。 前者李鴻章、沈葆楨創立此局，謀深慮遠，實為經國宏謀，固為收江海之利，與洋商爭衡，轉貧為富、轉弱為強之機，盡在此舉。 乃招商局十餘年來，不特本息不增，而官款、洋債，欠負累累，豈謀之不臧哉？ 稽之案牘，證之人言，知所謂利權，上不在國，下不在商，盡歸於中飽之員紳。 如唐廷樞、硃其昂之被參於前，徐潤、張鴻祿之敗露於後，皆其明證。 主計之不得其人，出入之經，不能講求撙節，又安得以局本虧折，諉之於海上用兵耶？ 商局既撥有官款，又津貼以漕運水腳，減免於貨稅，其歲入歲出之款，即應官為稽察。 請飭下南北洋大臣，將局中現存江海輪若干只，碼頭幾處，委員商董銜名，及運腳支銷，分別造報。 此後總辦如非其人，原保大臣應即議處。」 報可。 然管理招商局之權，始終屬之直隸總督，部臣無從過問。 迨三十三年，商局與英商怡和、太古訂利益均享之約，始免互相傾擠，而其利漸著。 此招商局辦理之大略情形也。
The China Merchants Company had been founded to recover China's lost shipping profits on river and sea. From the outset it was known that foreign merchants would resent the venture; the primary remedy was to allot tribute-grain transport from Jiangsu and Zhejiang, later extended to Hubei, Jiangxi, Jiangsu, and Anhui. Yunnan copper, Sichuan lampwood, official procurements from Jiangsu and Zhejiang, and relief grain from Zhili and Shanxi were all carried by company vessels. In 1885 Circuit Intendant Ye Tingjuan memorialized with further proposals to support the company in carrying Hubei tea and salt and to raise tribute-transport freight rates. The matter was referred to Li Hongzhang as governor-general of Zhili. The company had originally charged slightly more than five qian of silver per shi for tribute transport. British and American competitors then undercut the rates, forcing the company to lower its freight charges until operations became increasingly untenable. Li Hongzhang asked for a modest increase, but the Board of Revenue rejected the proposal. Since its founding, internal embezzlement and external competition had steadily eroded the company's financial strength. Insufficient merchant capital led to official loans and then to foreign debt. Officials daily spoke of rescue measures that accomplished little, while profligate spending drew repeated impeachment from memorialist censors. At this point a minister of the Board memorialized: 'The governments of the Three Dynasties honored the fundamental and restrained the peripheral, prized agriculture and slighted commerce—never in antiquity was trade a matter of state deliberation. Only since maritime trade opened have officials competed to discourse on commercial policy. Merchants, I submit, seek a ten-percent return and make their business the accumulation of stock and the multiplication of capital. Heavy stockpiling requires a monthly surplus; and capital turnover must yield at least double the principal in returns. If principal dwindles daily and returns on capital cannot be found, yet the firm borrows to cover shortfalls and still proclaims to all, 'This is how we grow rich'—can such reasoning stand?' Great merchants always appoint loyal, trustworthy men to manage their accounts. Income follows a system; expenditure observes limits. By keeping one part in three as reserve, verifying accounts, and building substantial reserves, a firm can endure. With the wrong man in charge of accounts, few produce while many consume, income is taken without limit and spent without restraint—and ruin follows swiftly. The principles of appointing men and managing funds apply equally to government. When Li Hongzhang and Shen Baozhen founded this company, their far-sighted planning was truly a grand state strategy—the chance to recover maritime profits, compete with foreign merchants, and turn poverty into wealth and weakness into strength rested entirely on this venture. Yet after more than a decade the company had not increased its capital but had accumulated heavy arrears on official loans and foreign debt—was the plan itself at fault? Records and testimony show that the supposed commercial profits benefited neither the state above nor the merchants below, but went entirely to corrupt officials and gentry. The impeachment of Tang Jingsu and Zhu Qiang and the later exposure of Xu Run and Zhang Honglu offer clear proof. With incompetent accountants and no discipline over income and expenditure, how can losses be blamed on the war at sea? The company had received official allocations, tribute-transport subsidies, and tax reductions; its annual accounts ought therefore to be subject to official audit. The northern and southern commissioners should be ordered to report separately the number of river and sea steamers now in service, the wharves operated, the names and titles of commissioners and merchant directors, and all freight expenditures. If future managers prove unfit, the officials who recommended them should be held accountable.' The memorial was approved. Authority over the company nevertheless remained with the governor-general of Zhili, and the Board had no power to intervene. Not until 1907, when the company signed a profit-sharing agreement with Jardine Matheson and Butterfield & Swire, was destructive competition ended and returns gradually improved. Such was the general course of the China Merchants Company's operations.
10
招商輪船航行各埠，悉自滬始。 駛行長江者曰江輪，駛行海洋者曰海輪。 停泊口岸，大小不一，惟商務殷闐之所，設貨棧焉。 以故上海設總棧，而蘇之鎮江、南京，皖之蕪湖，贛之九江，鄂之漢口，浙之寧波、溫州，閩之福州、汕頭，粵之廣州、香港，魯之煙台，奉之營口，直之塘沽、天津，皆設行棧，而通州以漕運所關，亦設棧焉。 江輪、海輪，時統名之為大輪。 其與大輪並行於內江外海，或駛行大輪所不能達之處，則有小輪。 光緒初，商置小輪之行駛，僅限於通商口岸。 十年，明申禁令，小輪不得擅入內河。 官商僱用，須江海關給照乃可。 然祗限於蘇杭之間。 其輸運客貨、駛入江北內河者，皆在所禁。
The company's steamers served every port from a base at Shanghai. Vessels on the Yangtze were called river steamers; those on the open sea were sea steamers. Calling ports varied in size; cargo warehouses were established only at centers of active trade. Shanghai housed the main office; branch warehouses were opened at Zhenjiang and Nanjing in Jiangsu, Wuhu in Anhui, Jiujiang in Jiangxi, Hankou in Hubei, Ningbo and Wenzhou in Zhejiang, Fuzhou and Shantou in Fujian, Guangzhou and Hong Kong in Guangdong, Yantai in Shandong, Yingkou in Fengtian, and Tanggu and Tianjin in Zhili; Tongzhou also had a warehouse because of its role in tribute transport. River and sea steamers were together termed large steamers. Smaller steamers operated alongside the large vessels on inland waterways and coastal routes, or served places the large steamers could not reach. In the early Guangxu reign, privately owned small steamers were restricted to treaty ports. In 1884 the prohibition was explicitly renewed: small steamers were forbidden to enter inland rivers without permission. Official or private operators alike required a license from the Jiangsu customs. Even then, service was limited to the stretch between Suzhou and Hangzhou. Carrying passengers or freight into the inner rivers north of the Yangtze remained prohibited.
11
十六年，詹事志銳疏請各省試行小輪。 總署王大臣議以為不可。 護湘撫沈晉祥言：「湘民沿河居住，操舟為業者，實繁有徒。 自上海通商以後，僅有淮鹽一項，尚可往來裝運，其餘貨物，多由輪船載送，湘省民船祗能行抵江、漢而止，舵工水手失業者多。 今再加以小輪行駛內河，誠如總理衙門原奏所云，必至奪民船之利，有礙小民生計。」 江督劉坤一亦言小輪行駛內河，流弊滋多，礙民生，妨國課，病地方，請嚴禁之。 俱如所請。
In 1890 Household Administration Attendant Zhi Rui memorialized asking that various provinces trial small steamers. The grand ministers of the Zongli Yamen judged the proposal inadvisable. Acting Governor Shen Jinxiang of Hunan wrote: 'The people of Hunan live along the rivers, and those who make their living by boat are exceedingly numerous. Since Shanghai opened to trade, only Huai salt could still be carried on native craft; most other goods went by steamer, and Hunan boats could reach only the Yangtze and Han—leaving many boatmen and sailors unemployed. To allow small steamers on the inner rivers now, as the Zongli Yamen originally warned, would surely seize the livelihood of native boatmen and harm the common people.' Governor-General Liu Kunyi of Jiangsu likewise argued that small steamers on inner rivers would multiply abuses, harm livelihoods, reduce tax revenue, and injure local interests, and asked that they be strictly forbidden. Both requests were granted.
12
初，外輪行駛長江，由滬至漢口而止。 二十一年，馬關約成，許日輪一自漢口達宜昌，更溯江上至重慶，一自上海入運河以抵蘇、杭，於時朝旨始許華商小輪於蘇杭間行駛。 而江督張之洞更推廣其航行之路於鎮江、江寧、清江浦及贛之鄱陽。 二十四年，長江通商約成，而通州蘆涇港、泰興天星橋、湖北荊河口悉定為洋輪上下搭客處，而桂之西江、直之白河、沈之遼河、松花江，亦先後許外輪行駛。 迨中英馬凱約成，更及於粵之北江、東江。 與英、日訂內港行輪章程，凡內地水道，外輪悉攫得行駛之權，於是向之華商小輪不得行駛各地，始一律弛禁焉。 江、浙、閩、粵輪船公司次第設立，轉輸客貨，人稱便捷。 特以洋商創始於前，華商瞠乎其後，而跌價傾擠，時有所聞，欲求贏利，蓋綦難矣。
Initially foreign steamers on the Yangtze ran only from Shanghai to Hankou. Under the 1895 Treaty of Shimonoseki, Japanese steamers were allowed from Hankou to Yichang and upriver to Chongqing, and from Shanghai through the canal to Suzhou and Hangzhou; the court then first permitted Chinese-owned small steamers between Suzhou and Hangzhou. Governor-General Zhang Zhidong of Jiangsu further extended permitted routes to Zhenjiang, Nanjing, Qingjiangpu, and Poyang in Jiangxi. Under the 1898 Yangtze trade treaty, Lujing Port at Tongzhou, Tianxing Bridge at Taixing, and Jinghe mouth in Hubei were designated foreign steamer passenger stops; the West River in Guangxi, the Bai River in Zhili, the Liao in Fengtian, and the Songhua were also opened to foreign steamers in turn. The Sino-British Mackay Treaty of 1902 further opened Guangdong's North and East Rivers. Inland steamer regulations concluded with Britain and Japan gave foreign vessels sailing rights on virtually every inland waterway; Chinese small steamers, long barred from many routes, were then uniformly permitted throughout. Steamship companies were founded in succession in Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong, carrying passengers and freight with a reputation for convenience. Yet foreign firms had pioneered the trade while Chinese operators followed behind; price wars and predatory competition were common, and turning a profit proved exceedingly difficult.
13
三十年，商部參議王清穆言：「植商業之基礎，莫如內河航政一事。 凡鐵路之尚未通者，可藉航路控接之，凡軌路所不能達者，可由航路轉輸之。 江、鄂諸省，若漢湘，若九南，若鎮揚、鎮浦、蘇杭、蘇滬、常鎮各航路，四通八達，往往為外人所經營，其公司多不過數萬金，視軌路之動需千百萬者，難易迥殊，華商之力尚能興辦，洵為今日切要之舉。 請飭各省有航路處所，於華商輪船公司亟予保護。 未設者，提倡籌辦。」 報可。 自是小輪公司漸推漸廣，閩、粵濱海之區，輪檣如織，隨處可通。 直則有往來安東、天津、大連、營口、牛庄、煙台、龍口、義馬島、威海衛、海參崴之小輪，蘇則有往來鎮江、清江浦、通州、海門、上海、蘇、杭、江寧、揚州、六合之小輪，皖則有往來蕪湖、廬州、安慶、寧國、巢縣之小輪，贛則有往來南昌、九江、吳城、湖口、豐城、樟樹鎮、吉安、饒州之小輪，湘、鄂則有往來漢口、黃州、沙市、宜昌、武昌、嘉魚、長沙、株州、常德、咸寧、岳州、湘潭、益陽、仙桃鎮、老河口之小輪，桂則有往來梧州、南寧、貴縣、柳州之小輪，浙則有往來寧波、溫州、穿山、定海、象山、寧海、台州、海門、沈家門、普陀山、餘姚、西塢、瑞安、平望、震澤、南潯之小輪，川則有往來宜昌、重慶、嘉定、敘府之小輪，各公司盈虧不一，而航路四達，商旅便之，實與江海大輪有相輔而行之利。 此外則有各省官用小輪暨專用小輪，是又於商輪之外特設者也。
In 1904 Wang Qingmu, councillor of the Ministry of Commerce, wrote: 'Nothing lays a stronger foundation for commerce than inland river navigation. Where railways had not yet been built, shipping routes could link regions; where rails could not reach, water transport could carry goods. In Jiangsu, Hubei, and other provinces, routes such as Hankou–Xiangtan, Jiujiang–Nanchang, Zhenjiang–Yangzhou, Zhenjiang–Pukou, Suzhou–Hangzhou, Suzhou–Shanghai, and Changzhou–Zhenjiang run in all directions, yet are often operated by foreigners; such companies require only tens of thousands of taels, unlike railways that demand millions—Chinese merchants can still afford to establish them, and the effort is urgently needed today. Every province with navigable waterways should be ordered to protect Chinese steamship companies. Where none exist, they should be encouraged and organized.' The memorial was approved. Small steamer companies then spread gradually; along the Fujian and Guangdong coasts, vessels were thick as woven cloth and service reached everywhere. Zhili had small steamers on routes among Andong, Tianjin, Dalian, Yingkou, Niuzhuang, Yantai, Longkou, Yima Island, Weihaiwei, and Vladivostok; Jiangsu among Zhenjiang, Qingjiangpu, Tongzhou, Haimen, Shanghai, Suzhou, Hangzhou, Nanjing, Yangzhou, and Liuhe; Anhui among Wuhu, Hefei, Anqing, Ningguo, and Chaoxian; Jiangxi among Nanchang, Jiujiang, Wucheng, Hukou, Fengcheng, Zhangshu, Ji'an, and Raozhou; Hunan and Hubei among Hankou, Huangzhou, Shashi, Yichang, Wuchang, Jiayu, Changsha, Zhuzhou, Changde, Xianning, Yuezhou, Xiangtan, Yiyang, Xiantao, and Laohekou; Guangxi among Wuzhou, Nanning, Guixian, and Liuzhou; Zhejiang among Ningbo, Wenzhou, Chuanshan, Dinghai, Xiangshan, Ninghai, Taizhou, Haimen, Shenjiamen, Putuo, Yuyao, Xiwu, Ruian, Pingwang, Zhenze, and Nanxun; Sichuan among Yichang, Chongqing, Jiading, and Xufu. Profits varied by company, but routes reached in all directions and travelers found them convenient—genuinely complementing the large river and sea steamers. In addition, each province operated official small steamers and specialized vessels—a category apart from commercial lines.
14
三十一年，修撰張謇醵銀五十萬，設大達輪步公司於上海。 宣統三年，吉林巡撫陳昭常創辦吉林圖長航業公司，自滬越日本長崎達圖們江，以滬商硃江募貲為之。 此皆於招商局外別樹一幟者也。
In 1905 Compiler Zhang Jian raised five hundred thousand taels and founded the Dada Steamship and Wharf Company in Shanghai. In 1911 Governor Chen Zhaochang of Jilin founded the Jilin Tumen River Navigation Company, running from Shanghai via Nagasaki, Japan, to the Tumen River, with capital raised by the Shanghai merchant Zhu Jiang. All of these operated as independent ventures apart from the China Merchants Company.