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卷153 志一百二十八 邦交一 俄罗斯

Volume 153 Treatises 128: Foreign Relations 1, Russia

Chapter 153 of 清史稿 · Draft History of Qing
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Chapter 153
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1
貿 西 西西 輿
China has long placed great weight on interstate relations. At the height of Qing power, every state that sent tribute missions was received with full ceremonial honor. Once maritime routes opened wide, the entire strategic landscape shifted. At first Portugal, the Netherlands, and others took a small foothold, settled to trade, and shuttled along the Guangdong coast; Then Britain, France, the United States, Germany, and other major powers arrived in concert, crowding the coast; even they sought only commercial access. In the jihai year of Daoguang the opium crisis erupted; China accepted a treaty in haste, ceded Hong Kong to Britain, and opened five treaty ports. France, the United States, Sweden, and Norway soon followed with treaties of their own, and Germany, the Netherlands, Spain, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Portugal, and Belgium all took the Anglo-French model; the coast thereafter knew little peace. Russia signed its treaty before any other power; Japan signed last, in the ninth year of Tongzhi. Pressed on every side by strong neighbors, China suffered the heaviest losses. Peru, Brazil, the Congo, Mexico, and other minor states merely trailed the great powers and harbored no further ambitions. In the gengshen crisis of Xianfeng allied troops entered Beijing and the court fled; Britain and France piled on demands, and the ministers in charge dared not change a word of them. Supplementary treaties followed, and the damage deepened by the day. The Treaty of Shimonoseki in the jiawu year of Guangxu cost armies and territory; peace was bought in humiliation, and the powers, citing most-favored-nation clauses, pressed new demands until every strategic position was gone. Worst of all were clauses forbidding China to cede certain regions to any other power — as if Chinese soil were already theirs. No insult could be greater. In the Boxer crisis of gengzi both empresses fled the capital while eight allied armies advanced together; the state could scarcely hold. Its survival was luck alone.
2
西
China's domain exceeds any earlier age in extent; from Youling and Jiaozhi to the drifting sands and Panmu, peoples once came to the passes with tribute and stood within the imperial map. Yet what Kangxi and Qianlong had conquered and governed was allowed to be eaten away: Kokand and Badakhshan in the west to Russia, Vietnam and Burma in the south to Britain and France, Ryukyu and Korea in the east to Japan, and on the northern marches boundary settlements cost nearly ten thousand li of land. What became of guarding the frontier? This is what wounds the heart most deeply. The present account records how relations with each state began and ended, for later readers to weigh and judge.
3
退
Russia spans the northern reaches of both Asia and Europe. In the early Qing, Russians—known as Luocha—came from the Pacific coast collecting fur and mineral tribute, reached the north bank of the Heilongjiang, seized Albazin and Nerchinsk, built wooden forts, and raided neighboring peoples. They then crossed the Greater Khingan southward and raided the four banners of the Buryat Uriankhai. In Chongde 4 the Qing army again secured the Heilongjiang and destroyed the Russian posts; when the troops withdrew, the Russians rebuilt them.
4
貿
Under Shunzhi troops were repeatedly sent to expel them, but each campaign withdrew when supplies ran short. In Shunzhi 12 and 17 the Russian tsar twice sent trade envoys to Beijing with memorials, but raised no border issues.
5
使 滿 貿使
In the twelfth month of Kangxi 28 China fixed the Heilongjiang border with Russia in a seven-article treaty. Earlier the Russian envoy Golovin and his party had traveled overland to Khalkha Tüsheet Khan territory, exchanging documents back and forth. They then met with Grand Secretary Songgotu on the Heilongjiang. First article: from the stone Greater Khingan at the upper Gorbitsa near the Wurenmu River to the sea, every stream south of the range flowing into the Heilongjiang would belong to China and every stream north of it to Russia. Second: the Argun River where it enters the Heilongjiang would form the boundary—the south bank entirely China's, the north bank Russia's. Albazin and Nerchinsk were restored to China. Trade was fixed at Khuree in eastern Khalkha. Boundary stones were set on both banks of the Heilongjiang, the agreed articles carved in Manchu, Chinese, Latin, Mongolian, and Russian. This was the Nerchinsk Treaty. Thereafter trade missions arrived every other year without once breaching the rules.
6
使 使 使
In Kangxi 33 Russia sent a tribute mission. Two fugitives had fled into Russia; Russia returned them, the Lifan Yuan sent a letter of praise, and another tribute mission followed. The emperor read their memorial and told the grand secretaries: 'Tribute from outer domains is a grand occasion, yet later ages may well see trouble arise from it. In short, when China is at peace, external troubles do not arise; cultivating the nation's strength must therefore be the root policy.' In Kangxi 39 an envoy arrived bearing a memorial.
7
西 使 使
Earlier Muravyov had gone to Moscow to discuss the new eastern territories, arguing that Siberia's wealth could be opened only by using the Heilongjiang water route; to secure that route, the river mouth and nearby coast must become Russian territory, with naval support. The tsar then sent Rear Admiral Nevelskoy, captain of the Baikal, to survey Kamchatka and the Sea of Okhotsk and to explore the Heilongjiang. He entered the Heilongjiang with Muravyov by ship, sailed down the Songhua, and asked to negotiate on the Songhua. Talks opened in the eighth month with three demands. Pointing to a map, they claimed everything from the Gorbitsa to every river on the southern face of the Khingan for Russia and asked that the left banks of the Heilongjiang and Songhua and the river mouth be ceded; they cited defense against Britain and France, landed artillery, and forced frontier settlers to move. Yishan and Jingchun argued with them repeatedly but could reach no settlement. In the fourth month of Xianfeng 6 the Russians again brought a fleet up the Heilongjiang. In Xianfeng 7 Muravyov returned to Irkutsk.
8
使 使 使 使使 使 滿
While Britain and France were at war with China, Russia seized on Britain's initiative and sent Putyatin as minister to negotiate borders and trade. China refused to receive him. Putyatin descended the Heilongjiang, reached Guangdong by sea, and with the British, French, and American ministers wrote jointly to Grand Secretary Yu Cheng asking China to send plenipotentiaries to Shanghai. China replied that affairs with Britain, France, and America were for the governor-general of Guangdong, and Russian affairs for the Heilongjiang commissioner. Putyatin then proceeded to Shanghai with the three ministers. Muravyov meanwhile expanded holdings on the left bank of the Heilongjiang and built barracks widely. When China sent envoys to protest, the reply was that the matter would be settled with the Russian minister in Shanghai. Soon word came to Heilongjiang General Yishan that borders would be negotiated at Aigun. Yishan then received Muravyov at Aigun for talks. Muravyov demanded the Heilongjiang as the national boundary and laid out his terms. In the fourth month of the following year the Aigun Treaty was signed. The eastern border was drawn so that the left banks of the Heilongjiang and Songhua from the Argun to the Songhua mouth became Russia's, and China's boundary ran along the right bank to the Ussuri; the territory from the Ussuri to the sea where both states bordered was placed under joint administration. Maps and records were drawn up and boundary markers set in Manchu, Chinese, and Russian.
9
調 使 調 沿西 西西西 貿 貿 貿
By then the allies had taken the Dagu forts. Russia and the United States, claiming to mediate, followed Guiliang's Anglo-French treaties and added seven treaty ports on the same terms. Sino-Russian contact had long been handled by Lifan Yuan documents; henceforth exchanges used the ceremonial forms reserved for equal states, and earlier restrictions were dropped. That year the five-year-old case of Russian goods burned at Tarbagatai was closed; Russia had demanded compensation repeatedly, and restitution was finally made in tea chests. In the fifth month of Xianfeng 9 Russia sent Ignatiev as minister resident in Beijing. In the autumn of Xianfeng 10 war with Britain and France resumed; allied troops took Beijing, the emperor fled to Rehe, and Prince Gong was ordered to negotiate. Ignatiev offered mediation, and Prince Gong concluded the Beijing treaties with Britain and France. Ignatiev demanded that China cede the jointly administered territory east of the Ussuri to the sea as his reward. In the tenth month the supplementary Beijing treaty was signed. Key provisions: first, the border would follow the Ussuri, Songacha, Lake Khanka, Belyanka, Hunchun, Hun-chun, and Tumen rivers—east to Russia, west to China; second, the unsurveyed western border would follow ridges, major rivers, and China's permanent border posts, from the Sabin-Abagay marker of Yongzheng 5 west to Lake Zaysan, then southwest along Lake Temurtu on the Tianshan to the Kokand frontier; third, Russian merchants traveling from Kyakhta to Beijing via Khuree and Zhangjiakou might trade in small lots, and one consul would be stationed at Khuree; fourth, China allowed trial trade at Kashgar. In the fifth month of Xianfeng 11 Censor Cheng Qi and Russian officials surveyed the eastern Heilongjiang border. In the seventh month Russia opened a consulate at Hanyang. In the eighth month Russians imported firearms and artillery. That year Russia asked to trade in Beijing and was refused; later citing the Anglo-French precedent, they moved trade to Tianjin.
10
使西
Russians had secretly set up posts in the Manitu district under Ili, blocking China's route to Lebuchi; at the Saratoro Sea frontier they stopped Chinese inspectors, claimed the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz as subjects, and piled cairns beyond every post. Urga General Mingyi and others protested, but Russia paid no heed. In the eighth month Mingyi met with Russian officials to discuss the border. The Russian envoy treated the supplementary treaty's second article—'the western border not yet fixed, hereafter to follow ridges, great rivers, and China's permanent border posts'—as final authority, and produced a colored map claiming all land beyond the posts for Russia. Mingyi replied that the treaty named a border from Sabin-Abagay to Kokand—ten thousand li long—yet named only three places and gave no segment-by-segment line. Moreover the treaty said 'China's permanent border posts and the like' without calling them the boundary—no ground for Russia's claim. They argued repeatedly, but Russia would not yield. Suddenly several hundred armed men with gun carriages appeared near Ili posts cutting timber and causing trouble. That month Russia asked to send warships to Shanghai to help suppress the Taiping rebels, and permission was granted. In the tenth month Russians again imported firearms and artillery. That year Russians crossed the border to farm on the right bank of the Heilongjiang, and China protested.
11
退 沿 使 西西 使
In the fourth month of Tongzhi 2 the Russian official Busey sent men from Hailanpao to Qiqihar to borrow relay horses, seek trade, and ask passage through Jilin to return home via the Songhua. Heilongjiang General Tepuqin refused on the grounds that the treaty did not allow it. That month Russia again sent several hundred troops to pasture at the Baketu post of Tarbagatai. China ordered them withdrawn; they refused. They sent detachments to Ili and Kobdo, dispatched thousands to farm and build at Zaysan and elsewhere, and secretly piled stone ramparts across the frontier to stake claims for future negotiations. Mingyi planned defenses and negotiated again, without result. In the fifth month Russia used Kazakh troops against the Bolohujir post of Ili; they withdrew only after Chinese forces struck back. In the sixth month they attacked frontier posts again and were repelled again. In the seventh month the Russian envoy submitted a negotiation memorandum, still insisting on the second article of the treaty. He claimed the treaty's 'due west' was a misprint for 'southwest' and insisted the border follow the memorandum's place-names without change. China then agreed to exchange treaties on the memorandum's terms. Urga General Mingyi then memorialized: 'Ratifying the memorandum will harm the livelihoods of the Uriankhai Mongols, the Kazakhs and Kyrgyz under Qing rule, and the four Solon banners near Ili posts. Please plan resettlement for all these peoples and their means of living.' The court ordered further talks requiring Russia to yield land for resettlement and allow Chinese subjects to pasture as before. Russia still refused.
12
使 西西西 西西沿西沿 西西西西 西西
In the eighth month of autumn of Tongzhi 3, Russia again sent troops to threaten the Ili border posts. In the ninth month the Russian envoy Zhakharov came to Tarbagatai to meet Mingyi, still insisting on the memorandum. Muslim unrest in Xinjiang was then at its height; fearing renewed border conflict, the court ratified the treaty on the memorandum's terms. Taken together, the border treaty falls into several segments. First, Urga's territory—the eight markers of the Urga border agreement—runs from Sabin-Abagay southwest along the Sayan ridge to the western end of Tangnu-uradaba, then southwest to Bogusuk Mountain on the Sailugem ridge; Russia takes the right of the ridge, China the left. Second, Kobdo's territory—the twenty markers of the Kobdo agreement—runs from Bogusuk Mountain southwest along the Sailugem ridge to Kuitun-ora, then west along the Great Altai to the mountain between the Khailurtu rivers, southwest along that ridge to Chakilmos-ora, then southeast along Lake Zaysan and the Kara-Irtysh to the Manitou-gatulegan post. Third, Tarbagatai's territory runs from the Manitou-gatulegan post southeast, then southwest along the Tarbagatai ridge to Khabar-su, then southwest along Tarbagatai's southwestern posts to the Altan-tobshi ridge; the northwest belongs to Russia, the southeast to China. Fourth, Ili's territory: north and slightly west of the Altan-tobshi ridge goes to Russia; then from Ili's western posts to Lake Temurtu, from the Kashgar frontier along the Tianshan crest to the Pamirs, with Kokand as the limit—demarcation was to follow the next year. The Muslim rebellion then intensified, communications between China and Russia were cut, and the markers were never erected.
13
滿 使西
In Tongzhi 4, Ili General Mingxu, facing the Muslim rebellion, asked to borrow Russian troops temporarily for suppression; the request was granted. Russia delayed sending troops, agreeing only to forward supplies through its border and to lend grain, firearms, and gunpowder. In the first month of Tongzhi 5, Ili city fell; Russia promised troops but again failed to send them. In the third month China negotiated with Russia to revise the overland trade regulations. Russia wanted unrestricted trade at Zhangjiakou and deletion of the 'small-scale livelihood' clause and Tianjin transit-duty exemption. China replied that Zhangjiakou lay near the capital and could not be treated like a frontier post without restriction. Removing 'small-scale livelihood' would leave no means to inspect Russian merchants' goods and personnel. Exemption from Tianjin transit duties alone matched other powers' practice of paying only one regular duty on native goods exported; that exemption was agreed. Unrestricted trade at Zhangjiakou and deletion of 'small-scale livelihood' were both put off for later talks. In the fifth month Russia asked to trade in the Heilongjiang interior; China refused. That month Russia seized the north bank of the Bukhturma River in Kobdo territory. In the sixth month of Tongzhi 6 the Russian envoy Iarlygarei wrote the Zongli Yamen to protest, citing unrest in the west and disrupted trade. That month Russia occupied Kobdo's Honi-Merakhu post and Ukkogol in Honi-yin-dabhan under Urga. Protests brought no response.
14
In the second month of Tongzhi 7 Russians crossed into Khuree territory to mine gold at places such as the Uyalaga Hadangsu River; when stopped, they refused, calling it Russian pasture and denying both the Yongzheng 5 boundary and the Jiaqing 23 map line. China protested repeatedly without result. No markers or obos yet stood along Xinjiang's Russian frontier; Urga General Linxing and others asked that senior officials be dispatched to fix the line jointly, and the request was approved. The survey was long delayed and never carried out. Russians also felled timber illegally and marked off encroached Khuree lands. They also built houses across the river from Kyonghung in Korea; the Korean king, alarmed, asked China to investigate. In the seventh month Russians again entered Hulun Buir to cut timber illegally; when stopped, they refused.
15
西 西西 西西西西 西
In the third month of spring of Tongzhi 8 China renewed the overland trade treaty with Russia. In the fifth month Rongquan met Russian border commissioner Babkov to erect markers and obos. At Sailugem in Urga, Russian officials cited Article Six of the original treaty to claim the line was not at a water source; after three days of debate they followed the red-line treaty and set markers at Bogusuk Pass and Taskile Mountain. The route from Lake Zhuru to Sabin-Abagay on the original map was rugged and impracticable. Russian officials then wanted to detour north from Lake Zhuru for several tens of li along Tangnu Mountain to Chabyaqi Pass, then strike northwest in a loop to Sabin-Abagay. The throne refused; a third marker was set instead on Mount Kharga, some ten-odd li southeast of Lake Zhuru. A fourth marker was set on Chabyaqi Pass, about two hundred li north of Lake Zhuru and south of Tangnu Mountain. Under the original red line, Lake Zhuru was enclosed as Russian land; east of Mount Kharga and north of Chabyaqi Pass remained Chinese. Then west along the line north of Lake Zhuru and south of Tangnu Mountain to the lake's end, turning north and east—all Altan-nur Uriankhai land outside the red line already ceded to Russia—to Kusuer Pass at the northwestern edge of Tangnu Uriankhai, where a fifth marker was erected. Westward there was no passable route; they descended northeast into Tangnu Uriankhai, then turned west and north to the end of Tangnu-uradaba. A stream flowing west—the Chulacha River—also lay outside the red line and had been ceded to Russia; the sixth marker was set there. Southeast lay the Tangnu Uriankhai frontier; northwest, Russian territory. From the Chulacha River the line followed Mount Saretastai to Suer Pass, where the seventh marker was set. From that pass the line ran straight to the Sabin-Abagay range in one continuous thread; markers of both states already stood there. Because it joined this pass, no new marker was erected. Rongquan still wanted additional markers; the Russian official agreed to a written pledge allowing China to set them on its own, and Rongquan sent men to do so.
16
使
In the eighth month Kobdo Assistant Commander Kuichang again negotiated with Russian officials over Russian-side markers; they still insisted on mountain forms and water courses. Kuichang insisted markers be set only along the original map route; they were erected from Bogusuk Ridge at Kobdo's northeastern edge to Manitou-gatulegan, to Tarbagatai's Burultokhai boundary. Tarbagatai had not yet been recovered and routes were blocked, so China could not yet proceed. Russian envoys abruptly wanted to erect obos first from the north between Manitou-gatulegan and Khabar-su in Tarbagatai, claiming they could do so even without Chinese officials. China replied that borders concerned both states and could not be surveyed unilaterally; it agreed to send officials for a joint survey after the thaw the next spring. That year Russian steamships reached the Hulan estuary via the Songhua and asked to trade in the Heilongjiang interior. Heilongjiang General Deying reported the request; the throne refused on the grounds that the treaty did not allow it.
17
In the first month of Tongzhi 9 Russia reported that the Khabar-su marker had been erected unilaterally the previous autumn. China protested that this violated the joint-survey agreement and ordered Kobdo Minister Kuichang to inspect against the map. In the second month Russia again asked to send officials to Qiqihar and Jilin to discuss border affairs with the generals; China ordered them blocked. In the eighth month Kuichang reached the Manitou-gatulegan post in Tarbagatai and jointly surveyed Russia's unilateral markers with border commissioner Murumtsev; China also set markers within those Russian markers. They then surveyed the Tarbagatai ridge and other sites as far as Khabar-su, erecting ten markers in all. Demarcation was completed at last. In the tenth month Khuree Commissioner Zhang Tingyue and others, with Urga fallen and the Uriankhai frontier adjoining Russia, asked for measures against encroachment.
18
貿 退
In the fifth month of summer of Tongzhi 10 Russia seized Ili and sought to press on to Urumqi. The emperor ordered the general and assistant commanders to halt the advance; Russia ignored the order. Russia then sent two thousand more troops to attack the Manas rebels, citing harm to its trade. China ordered Rongquan, Kuichang, Liu Mingchuan, and others to recover Urumqi and plan the retaking of Ili. After taking Ili, Russia ordered the Solon garrison at Turghen to move to Samarkand. They built at Jinding Temple and billeted Han and Muslim residents separately at Suiding, Qingshuihe, and elsewhere. They again sent men to Karashar and Jinghe to urge the Torghut to submit. They also urged the Manas rebels to surrender. On report of this, orders were issued to block such efforts. In the twelfth month Russia asked to trade at Qiongzhou on the same terms as other powers; permission was granted. That year Russian troops entered Kobdo territory. An edict ordered withdrawal; they left only after a long delay.
19
In the fourth month of Tongzhi 11 Ili General Rongquan met Russian official Bogolepov at Sertogol in Russia to discuss the return of Ili. The Russian official ignored Ili and spoke only of pacifying Xinjiang and sending aid; he demanded trade and consuls at Kobdo, Urga, Urumqi, Hami, Aksu, Kashgar, and elsewhere, compensation for the Tarbagatai merchant compound and for officials such as Konsul-guan Panglin who had been killed, and asked that Kobdo's Kara-Irtysh and the Ermi River where the Eleuth pastured be ceded to Russia. Rongquan and his party refused. Bogolepov then dropped the question of Ili entirely. He then abruptly wrote the Beijing Zongli Yamen asking to resume talks with Rongquan. Bogolepov then suddenly departed for home. Recovery of Ili was delayed once more.
20
貿 西 西沿西 西西西使 貿 貿
In the eighth month Russians brought goods to Santanghu in Urumqi territory and asked to trade at Barkul, Hami, and elsewhere. When stopped, they refused. Hearing then that Muslim rebels were fleeing east from Hami toward Chahan Chuangu, they turned back. A Russian official then wrote that Torghut pastoralists of Ili at Xihu, Jinghe, and Dayanzi had all submitted to Russia and that Chinese troops must not enter the Xihu villages. China replied that the original border lay west of Ili and knew no place called Xihu; Xihu was garrisoned from Urumqi under an understanding reached between the Zongli Yamen and the Russian envoy—how could access be denied? China refused. Rongquan was then preparing to lead troops from Tarbagatai to Ili to establish relay stations; Russia refused, claiming he would cross land held by Russian troops. Russia also blocked Rongquan's delivery of silver pay to the Xibo. In the tenth month more than fifty Russian merchants were killed or wounded en route to trade at Manas. In the fourth month of Tongzhi 12 Russia suddenly entered Torghut pasture at Jinghe with troops and Kazakhs, Han, and Muslims, seeking horses taken by Kazakhs; they seized the beile and gushan dabao Lailuomu and others, repaired the Guozigou road east of Ili, replaced Xibo officials, prepared an eastern advance, and posted troops at Tarbagatai's Chahan Obo pass to interrogate travelers. In the eighth month of Tongzhi 13 Russians trading from Khuree into Urga built houses; when protested as unauthorized by treaty, they ignored China. Zuo Zongtang, Governor-General of Shaanxi and Gansu, was then ordered to direct Xinjiang military affairs.
21
使貿 西
In Guangxu 3 the overland trade regulations were revised in negotiation. Russian envoy Butse wanted trade opened on all routes before Ili was restored. China refused, allowing only the western route and insisting that Ili's return and commercial talks proceed together. Russia also cited Rongquan's proclamations rousing Ili's people against Russian orders, Urga officials' unauthorized punishment of Russians, the customs intendant's detention of Russian ships, Yinglian's unauthorized killing of the Kazakh Chelong, and levies on Russian goods as treaty breaches, insisting all must be settled first. After the great southern Xinjiang victory recovered the cities and rebels such as Bai Yanhu fled into Russia, China invoked Article Eight of the Russian treaty and asked for their surrender. Repeated negotiations brought no settlement.
22
使 西貿 貿 西 便 便 便 滿使
In the fifth month of Guangxu 4 Left Vice Minister Chung-hou was sent to Russia to negotiate the return of Ili and the extradition of Bai Yanhu and others. He reached Russia in the twelfth month. In the second month of Guangxu 5 talks opened with Giers, Russia's Minister of Foreign Affairs. Giers proposed three topics: trade, demarcation, and indemnity. Trade and demarcation were each subdivided into three parts. On trade: first, from Jiayuguan to Hankou—the 'western provinces' of China—trade was to be allowed; second, at Urumqi, Tarbagatai, Ili, Kashgar, and elsewhere—the routes north and south of the Tianshan—trade regulations were to be negotiated; third, at Urga, Kobdo, and elsewhere—called Mongol territory—and in the western provinces named above, consuls were to be established. On demarcation: first, expand the Ili frontier to facilitate control of the Muslim territories; second, redraw the Tarbagatai frontier to allow Kazakh winter and summer grazing; third, newly fix the boundary south of the Tianshan so that Russian Kokand might obtain a clear line with China. Chung-hou agreed to all of this, but the indemnity sum was not yet settled. Chung-hou reported back, and Xi Lun, the Tarbagatai Assistant Commissioner, was ordered to take over Ili and all boundary affairs. Once five million rubles in indemnity had been agreed, Russia also sent Gaufman and others as special envoys to restore Ili.
23
西 西 貿 使 西 沿 西 使 使使
Chung-hou was about to go to the Black Sea to sign the Livadia Treaty and return, but Prince Gong Yixin and others argued that Chung-hou's terms entailed enormous losses and asked that Li Hongzhang, Zuo Zongtang, Shen Baozhen, Jin Shun, Xi Lun, and others be ordered to review each article separately and submit secret reports. Thereupon Li Hongzhang and other officials of the day submitted impeachments in succession, and Censor Zhang Zhidong protested with especial force. He wrote in summary: "Of the new treaty's eighteen articles, the most outrageous include overland trade from Jiayuguan through Xi'an and Hanzhong straight to Hankou—the strategic passes of Qin and Long and the upper Yangtze would lie wholly exposed to Russian scrutiny. This cannot be permitted—the first objection. The three eastern provinces are the nation's foundation; Boteney is the jewel of Jilin. If Russia is allowed to sail there, it would be no different from letting them roam freely through the three provinces—a gratuitous surrender of two thousand li west of the Suifen River; Moreover, inland navigation is what every power has sought for years without success; grant it to Russia once, and others will follow in succession. This cannot be permitted—the second objection. The court does not haggle over revenue, but it must protect merchants. If in the Muslim territories and Mongol leagues alike Russians may trade wholly tax-free, Chinese merchants will grow daily poorer; and if trading houses are opened inland at Zhangjiakou and elsewhere and gradually extended, hostile designs may be roused—within ten thousand li, front and rear would connect. This cannot be permitted—the third objection. China's shield lies wholly in Inner and Outer Mongolia; ten thousand li of desert are what Heaven fixed to restrain the barbarians. If every Mongol post station is placed at Russia's service, once trouble arises communication will be easy—they will remove the barrier and serve as guides. This cannot be permitted—the fourth objection. The treaty allows Russia to build thirty-six border posts over vast stretches; in peace merchants come and go beyond all scrutiny; in war soldiers arrive beyond all defense. This cannot be permitted—the fifth objection. Merchants of every nation have never been allowed to carry arms. Why declare without cause that a man may carry one gun? What is the purpose? This cannot be permitted—the sixth objection. Russian commercial taxes are full of evasions; if other nations hope for equal benefit, maritime customs revenues must fall short by millions each year. This cannot be permitted—the seventh objection. Boundaries already fixed for Xinjiang in Tongzhi 3 are now to be encroached upon inward, cutting off our route into the cities. Xinjiang's strategic situation: the northern route is desolate, the southern cities rich. To wrangle over barren land and abandon fertile soil is to seek empty fame while suffering real harm. This cannot be permitted—the eighth objection. Consuls are permitted at Ili, Tarbagatai, Kobdo, Urga, Kashgar, Urumqi, Gucheng, Hami, Jiayuguan, and elsewhere—the whole western frontier would lie wholly open to Russian coming and going. By universal practice, only coastal ports permit foreign consuls. If at Urga and elsewhere—our own borderlands—Russia takes the lead today and other nations cite precedent, how shall we respond? This cannot be permitted—the ninth objection. It is called returning Ili, yet beyond the inner passes of the three provinces Russians remain encamped as before; west of the Khorgos River and north of Koktal are ceded, and the Jinding Temple has become a Russian market. The treaty stipulates that Russian property shall not be surrendered—every strategic advantage is lost. This cannot be permitted—the tenth objection." He also wrote on revision: "First, punish Chung-hou for disobeying instructions and exceeding his authority; second, request an edict proclaiming at home and abroad why Russia's unfairness and the public judgment of officials and people cannot be forgiven, and send dispatches to every nation so they may judge right and wrong; third, argue forcefully on principle so that Russia knows an envoy's signature, without imperial approval and reply, cannot stand as binding; fourth, establish defenses in Xinjiang, Jilin, and Tianjin as war preparation." When the memorial arrived, it was ordered that those submitted by Compiler Wang Renkan and Commoner Licentiate Sheng Yu be debated together by the Grand Secretaries, and Chung-hou's crime was also prosecuted.
24
使 西
In the first month of Guangxu 6 Zeng Jize, Vice Director of the Court of Judicial Review, was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to Russia to continue negotiating the various articles. At the time most court officials favored abrogating the treaty. Zeng Jize held that abrogation required weighing priorities, and submitted a memorial: "The Ili affair has three main points: demarcation, trade, and indemnity. Of the three, indemnity is certainly the least important. Even trade is somewhat less weighty than demarcation. Western treaty practice has two forms: permanent observance, and revision at fixed intervals. What must be permanently observed is demarcation. Demarcation cannot satisfy both sides; where one gains, the other loses—hence treaty-making demands utmost caution and difficulty. What may be revised is trade. Trade's gains and losses cannot be foreseen at once; some matters reveal their drift only once opened, others only after long operation show benefit or harm—hence treaties must fix a term for revision, to preserve advantage and remove harm. The Livadia Treaty was fixed through Chung-hou's negotiations; China truly suffered loss. Yet if we insist on overturning everything at once without offering some path to turn affairs, it seems hard for Russia to lower its pride and comply. Your servant holds that since demarcation is permanent, we should maintain steadfast resolve, undeterred by repeated setbacks. As for trade articles, only the most excessive should be suitably altered; the rest may be allowed from expedience."
25
使使 使
At the time Russia, because China was prosecuting Chung-hou, increased troops and defenses, deeming this deliberate provocation, and wished to refuse Zeng Jize negotiation. The British and French ministers, each under orders from their governments, also held it improper to punish an envoy for concluding a treaty, and interceded for leniency. China, having no choice, agreed to reduce Chung-hou's punishment; an edict still ordered him kept under detention. Thereafter border demarcation cases were first settled with Russian envoy Koyander.
26
In the seventh month of Guangxu 6, when Zeng Jize reached Russia, Vice Minister Guo Songtao memorialized asking that international law be applied to lift Chung-hou's guilt; Zeng Jize also requested his release, and this was granted. When Zeng Jize first arrived in Russia, Giers, Butse, and others all held that he was not a minister of first rank with full powers and wished not to negotiate, sending Butse to Beijing to negotiate the treaty. Butse had already set out when the court's directive insisted that agreement must be reached in Russia; Zeng Jize was ordered to request again of Russia, and only then was Butse recalled. Zeng Jize's position in negotiations was to abrogate the treaty. Russians, holding to the Livadia Treaty, repeatedly clashed with him. Zeng Jize, having no alternative, followed the Zongli Yamen's telegram saying Ili might be sought slowly and the old treaty entirely abrogated. Soon a Russian dispatch arrived permitting return of the Tekes Valley; the rest would not be discussed. Butse also wanted Russian merchants to rent warehouses at Tongzhou for goods storage, and to tow cargo at Tianjin with small steamers. Zeng Jize refused, as these were not in the treaty. Yet revision of the treaty remained deadlocked.
27
西 貿 仿西 貿 貿 貿 西 使
In the eleventh month Russia dispatched to China agreeing to revise the articles; the main points were seven: first, return Ili; second, Kashgar boundary affairs; third, Tarbagatai boundary affairs; fourth, trade at Jiayuguan, permitting Russian merchants to travel via Xi'an and Hanzhong straight to Hankou; fifth, navigation on the Songhua River to Boteney; sixth, additional consuls; seventh, taxation on trade north and south of the Tianshan. When Zeng Jize received the dispatch, since Russia had agreed to concessions, the plan to seek Ili slowly need no longer be discussed. Negotiations under the treaty then followed: on Ili, the southern frontier was recovered; on Kashgar, demarcation was to follow lands presently administered by both countries, with commissioners sent to survey anew; on Tarbagatai, a middle line was to be fixed between the boundaries Chung-hou and Mingyi had drawn; on Jiayuguan trade, handling was to follow Tianjin practice; the routes via Xi'an and Hanzhong and the character for Hankou were all deleted; on Songhua navigation, because the Aigun Treaty had mistakenly identified the Songhua as the Hun Tong Jiang and no signed Chinese text existed for reference, Russians had cited this as pretext for years; only after long debate was the special article abolished, with a statement that how the old Aigun treaty should be implemented would be agreed anew; on additional consuls, Russians requested one at Urumqi; the Zongli Yamen ordered further negotiation, and Urumqi was changed to Turpan, the rest to be discussed when trade flourished; on taxation for trade north and south of the Tianshan, the original "wholly tax-free" was changed to "temporarily tax-free, with tariff regulations to be fixed when trade flourishes." Besides this, on indemnity: Chung-hou's Livadia Treaty provided five million rubles; Russia, since the southern Ili border had been returned, wished to double the sum; only after long debate was it reduced and fixed at nine million rubles. Zeng Jize also held that since this revision had not employed military force, the label of military expenses could absolutely not be acknowledged. Thereupon 109 outstanding cases along the frontier and in the interior with Russia, whether requiring compensation or condolence payments, were folded in as full settlement. Further additions and deletions were made to certain clauses in Chung-hou's original Russian text. For example, Article 3 deleted the paragraph permitting persons of Ili who had entered Russian subjecthood to trade and travel in China enjoying Russian subject benefits; Article 4: Russian subjects' landholdings in Ili were to be administered as before, with a statement that persons who left Ili could not cite this as precedent, and that since Russian holdings lay outside the trade zone they should pay taxes and dues like Chinese subjects; Article 7 on resettlement of emigrants on Ili's western border stated that these were persons who had abandoned land upon entering Russian subjecthood; Article 6 spelled out all prior cases; Article 10 stated that Turpan, not being a treaty port, yet having a consul, and Article 13 that Zhangjiakou had trading houses without a consul—all stated that other places could not cite these as precedent; Article 15 on revision periods changed five years to ten. Article 2 of the regulations, under goods and packages, added the word livestock; unauthorized merchants without licenses, originally to be punished according to precedent, were changed to severe punishment; Under Article 8, below penalties for cartmen and carriers who detoured by shortcuts to evade customs inspection, with owners ignorant thereof, a statement was added that treaty ports and the interior could not cite this as precedent. This was the Treaty for the Recovery of Ili. Simultaneously an overland trade regulation was also concluded with Russia. In the first month of Guangxu 7, with Giers, Minister of Foreign Affairs, and Butse, former minister resident at Beijing, signatures and seals were affixed in the Russian capital; approval and exchange of ratifications followed. In the seventh month, congratulations were sent on the Russian sovereign's accession, with credentials delivered. Rebel offenders such as Bai Yanhu were demanded; Russia replied that offenses such as Bai Yanhu's were public crimes not within the treaty's scope—surrender was refused, but strict prohibition was promised.
28
西西
Shortly afterward, General Jin Shun of Ili and Staff Advisor Sheng Tai were ordered to take possession of Ili. In the second month of Guangxu 8, the handover was completed. Jin Shun moved in and established his headquarters at Suide City. Sheng Tai worked with Russian officials to survey and fix the boundary. Chang Shun, the Hami assistant commissioner, was assigned to handle northwestern boundary matters, and Shakdolin Zhabu, the Barkul commanding officer, to handle southwestern boundary matters. In the fourth month, Russian troops secretly entered the Haba River area under Kobdo's jurisdiction. Qing An and others reported the incident. They reported that the terrain at Kuindong Mountain, the Black Irtysh River, Sawur Ridge, and other sites depicted on the maps did not accord with accumulated old and new survey maps from recent years. The court ordered them to argue forcefully at every point that should be surveyed according to the original maps and to fix a new boundary accordingly.
29
In the eleventh month, Boundary Commissioners Chang Shun and others, together with the Russian official Frid, surveyed and demarcated the middle section of the Ili frontier. Earlier, on Geden Mountain, more than a hundred li northeast of Nalin, stood the stele commemorating the Qianlong Emperor's pacification of Dzungaria. In Tongzhi 3 it had been marked as Russian territory; now it was reclaimed through negotiation, and three boundary articles were drawn up.
30
使
In Guangxu 9, Liu Jintang, the commissioner general for Xinjiang military affairs, argued that Gunguruk near Wushi on the southern frontier was a crucial junction between north and south and asked that it be recovered under the treaty. Under the earlier treaty, the southern boundary of Ili had been defined as the summit of Gunguruk Mountain. The year before, Shakdolin Zhabu and the Russian envoy had demarcated the southern frontier, running border posts from Gunguruk along the mountain's foot to Biedielida Pass and encroaching as far as the source of the Bidir River. This was why Jintang raised the issue. The court ordered Chang Shun and others to press their case on the merits. Shakdolin Zhabu then surveyed the southern Ili frontier with the Russian official Medensg. The Russians insisted on Sawa Baqi as the boundary, but he held that Sawa Baqi lay on the southern face of the Tianshan, still far from the range's central ridge, and refused. The central ridge of the Tianshan was set as the boundary. Boundary markers were also erected at Biedielida Pass. This became the Kashgar boundary agreement.
31
使退西 使退 西 使 使
In the seventh month, Boundary Commissioners Sheng Tai and others, with the Russian officials Babuofu and others, demarcated the Kobdo and Tarbagatai frontier. Babuofu and others wanted to follow the straight line on the map and make the Haba River the boundary. Sheng Tai and others argued that the Haba River lay upstream and served as the gateway to Kobdo and the outer defense of Tarbagatai. If it were ceded to Russia, not only would long-resident Kazakhs, Mongols, and civilians have nowhere to resettle, but pasture lands of the Uriankhai under Kobdo and the Torgut under Tarbagatai would also be squeezed. With the frontier drawn so close, disputes would surely multiply. They refused. The Russian envoy then agreed to draw the line at the Birik River, about eighty li west of the Haba River. Sheng Tai and others pointed out that the Birik was a minor stream not shown on the original map. Demarcating there would still leave the upper Haba River in Russian hands, and they pressed the case again. The Russian envoy then agreed to withdraw another fifty li. The boundary was fixed at the Alakabeke River—more than 130 li from the Haba River to the straight line—the small stream marked beside the yellow line on the original map. The rest was demarcated according to the positions marked by the yellow line. Kazakhs originally subject to Russia would remain with Russia; those originally subject to China would remain with China. Where persons came under China but property lay in Russia, or vice versa, the Ili arrangements applied. From the date of ratification of the newly agreed boundary, they were given one year to relocate. Once the agreement was settled, they demarcated the still undivided southwestern Tarbagatai frontier with the Russian official Frid. The Russian envoy sought a larger share. Sheng Tai replied that Article 7 of the new treaty had already defined this section according to the old Tongzhi 3 Tarbagatai boundary—specifically the route of border posts at Erge-tu Barchuk, Modo Barchuk, and elsewhere named in Article 2 of the original treaty. Existing map lines and treaty language applied here, unlike other sections still open to negotiation. He refused. The Russian envoy noted that Kazakhs grazing within the Barluq Mountains had long submitted to Russia and would have to relocate once the boundary was fixed. He asked for leased land for resettlement, and the request was granted. Citing Article 10 of the old treaty on residents of Tarbagatai's original small-water districts, they were allowed up to ten years before relocation, and boundary markers were erected.
32
西 貿
In the ninth month, Boundary Commissioners Erqing'e and others demarcated the Kobdo frontier with the Russian official Pefesuofu. From the Kalasubyegekuma ridge at the mouth of the Alakabeke River to Tamutakasis, four boundary markers were erected, with another at the source of the Akhaba River. Earlier, Chang Shun and the Russians had demarcated Kashgar's western frontier at Yierkechitamu. Zhang Yao, assistant commissioner for military affairs and Guangdong land-route commander, believed this was wrong and asked for a fresh review. Chang Shun replied that demarcation followed the red line. Yierkechitamu was absent from the old map but fell squarely within the red-line boundary on the new one; there could be no mistake. The Zongli Yamen then noted the treaty's phrase "territory presently administered as the boundary." They understood that when Zeng Jize negotiated the treaty, the new map had arguably been drawn too narrowly, and that Zuo Zongtang's report on recovering Kashgar mentioned capturing abandoned Andijan lands and widening the frontier—hence the added phrase. Since administration on the ground was to govern, the red line no longer strictly applied, and Chang Shun was ordered to press the case again. The Russians argued that although Kara Dobai, Tielek Dawan, and Tunmulun were under Chinese administration, each lay more than a hundred li beyond the mapped line and refused to yield. The survey still followed the red line from Kakshan Mountain to Wusibie Mountain, setting up twenty-two markers, seven along mountain crests, and the matter was settled. This became the Supplementary Kashgar Boundary Agreement. That year, Staff Advisor Xilun of Tarbagatai met with the Russians to discuss the site of a new trading quarter for Russian merchants.
33
滿 使
In the third month of Guangxu 10, Staff Advisor Xilun of Tarbagatai and the Russians concluded a treaty on Kazakh allegiance. All large and small otoks of Kazakhs living within Tarbagatai—the Tiersaileke, Baijigete, Saibolat, Tuoletuole, Manbite, Keleiyi, and Tumatai clans, roughly five thousand households—except those originally resettled in Russia, the 1,800 households originally under China would remain under Chinese jurisdiction, with governing articles also drawn up. In the seventh month, with France and China at war over Vietnam, France asked Russia to protect its travelers, missionaries, and all interests in China. The Russian minister agreed and notified China.
34
沿 西
In the third month of Guangxu 11, the Zongli Yamen reported numerous errors in Jilin's eastern boundary markers, long unrepaired, and asked that a senior official be appointed to resurvey and restore markers under the treaty. Earlier, Russia had encroached on the Hunchun frontier, treating more than a hundred li along the Tumen's east bank as Russian territory, establishing a border post at Heidingzi and attracting Korean refugees to farm the land. Wu Dacheng, formerly commissioner for Ningguta affairs, asked that an inquiry be ordered and the territory returned by Russia. The court then appointed Wu Dacheng and others as imperial commissioners to schedule a joint survey with Russia. Wu Dacheng noted that boundary markers under the Xianfeng 10 Beijing Treaty along Russia's eastern frontier—from the Amur through the Ussuri to the Tumen mouth—used a full set of Russian initial letters, while Cheng Qi's survey map of year 11 still listed twelve. Why did the official boundary record contain only eight? The map and treaty did not agree. Wooden markers could not last; they asked that they be replaced with stone and that missing markers be restored. The Heidingzi tract seized by Russia lay within the "Tu" marker sector—an especially important point. From the Hunchun River's source to the Tumen mouth—a stretch of more than five hundred li bordering Russia—there was not a single boundary marker. Of the eight markers Cheng Qi had set up, only one bore "Tu"—there was also one bearing "Wu." Under the boundary record, the Tumen's left bank lay only twenty li from the sea, with a single marker bearing the Russian initial "Tu." The "Tu" marker thus marked the boundary's outer limit, leaving no place for a supplementary "Wu" marker. One of the two records must be wrong. In restoring markers, whether "Wu" or "Tu," the decisive point was the site on the Tumen's left bank twenty li from the sea. In the summer of Guangxu 12, Wu Dacheng traveled to the Yanzhu River in Russian territory to negotiate the frontier with Balanov and other Russian commissioners. Wu Dacheng first proposed restoring the "Tu" marker, since the Xianfeng 11 "Tu" marker had not been placed according to the treaty's rule that the river mouth and the sea were twenty li apart. Wu Dacheng contested this. The Russians held that twenty li of tidal flat—they called it the "sea river"—had to be excluded before one reached the true river mouth. Wu Dacheng replied that river mouth and sea mouth were the same, that twenty Chinese li equaled ten Russian versts, and that the "Tu" marker at Shacao Peak already violated the treaty—it should be corrected immediately. Balanov still invoked the old map's red line. After prolonged negotiation, the Russians agreed to place the "Tu" marker south of Shacao Peak, descending the ridge to the terrace's end; to add a "Ma" marker between the old "La" and "Na" markers, and "La" and "Sa" markers between the treaty's "Pa" and "Tu" markers—all in stone. Where markers were widely spaced, they also erected cairns or dug trenches as supplementary marks. Russia also agreed to return the Heidingzi tract. Wu Dacheng also argued that the "Wo" and "Na" markers in Ningguta did not match the records and asked for correction. The "Wo" marker had originally stood at the Hubutu River mouth; when floodwaters rose, the wooden marker was easily lost, and it had been temporarily moved to Little Solitary Mountain, far from the river. Wu Dacheng argued that if the marker's location defined the border, the stretch from east of Little Solitary Mountain to the Hubutu River mouth would again be lost to Russia. They agreed with Balanov to relocate the stone "Wo" marker to the high slope at the Hubutu River mouth. The "Na" marker at Hengshan Junction, more than a hundred li from the Hubutu mouth, was reduced to a rotten wooden stump two chi long; it was replaced in stone and left at Hengshan Junction. To the west lay where the Xiaosuifen headwaters flowed south, and copper pillars were added at the boundary. This became the Sino-Russian Hunchun Eastern Boundary Agreement.
35
貿 使
That year, a Russian merchant from Moscow sought to trade at Kobdo, Hami, Suzhou, Ganzhou, Liangzhou, Lanzhou, and elsewhere. China replied that Kobdo, Hami, and Suzhou were treaty ports and travel was permitted; Ganzhou, Liangzhou, and Lanzhou lay in the interior, were not named in the treaty, and were refused. In Guangxu 14, Russians in Uriankhai territory mined gold, cleared land, and built houses. China objected, but they refused to stop. In Guangxu 15, Russians crossed into Heilongjiang territory under the pretense of cutting hay, erecting sheds and seizing land. The Zongli Yamen consulted Li Hongzhang, the Beiyang minister. He recommended allowing hay-cutting only, not sheds, with strict stipulations to limit encroachment. The proposal was adopted. In Guangxu 16, Russian merchants asked to ship goods home through Kobdo as the treaty allowed. Permission was granted. Originally, overland shipments by Russian merchants could use only the Kyakhta route. The revised treaty of Guangxu 7 allowed goods to pass via Nerchinsk and Kobdo. Passage via Kobdo was now authorized, with license inspection delegated to officials appointed by the Kobdo staff advisor. That year, Envoy Hong Jun, learning that Russians were tunnel-mining in Kyakhta territory, asked to open China's own mining operations. The request failed. Russians were also cultivating Tibetan border tribes through private gifts. In Guangxu 17, Russia sent troops to Vladivostok to begin building a railway. That year, the Russian crown prince visited China, and Li Hongzhang was sent to Yantai to receive him. Russia had first asked that a prince of the blood receive him; when China refused, Hongzhang was dispatched instead with heightened ceremony.
36
使
In Guangxu 18, China negotiated linking overland telegraph lines at Hunchun and Blagoveshchensk with Russia. China's overland telegraph dated from Guangxu 6. The Danish Great Northern Telegraph Company's submarine cable, laid in Tongzhi 10 from Hong Kong and Xiamen to Shanghai, ran one route through Singapore and Penang to Europe—the southern line; another through Vladivostok and Russia's trans-Asian land line to Europe—the northern line. Russia and Denmark had long agreed to link their lines. Denmark later co-operated submarine cables with Britain. As provinces built their own land lines, the British and Danish land cables in Shanghai and Guangdong were dismantled. Once Jilin and Heilongjiang lines were complete, they lay close to Russia's networks along the eastern seaboard. The Great Northern Telegraph Company feared Sino-Russian connection would cut into its profits and repeatedly objected. Li Hongzhang was ordered to negotiate with Minister Kakhini. Where Shanghai, Fuzhou, Xiamen, and Hong Kong had submarine cables, rates would not be contested; at other ports, submarine companies would not be allowed to undercut rates. An agreement was reached. This became the Sino-Russian Treaty on Connecting Boundary Land Telegraph Lines.
37
西 使 使 使 西 仿 使
That year, Russian forces entered the Pamirs. The Pamir plateau lay beyond China's Xinjiang frontier and had long been under Chinese sovereignty. After Anglo-Russian rivalry began, the north and west gradually fell to Russia and a small southern portion to British Afghanistan, while the eastern and central routes had long acknowledged China and still did so. Russia sought the Pamirs as a route toward India. Britain resisted, citing the need to clarify Afghanistan's frontier, and urged China to reassert control over the central Pamirs and fix the boundary. Russia also wanted to demarcate the frontier with China alone, excluding Britain. Russian troops entered the Pamirs. British Consul Pellew cited the earlier Anglo-Russian treaty stating no Russian territory lay between Kashgar and Afghanistan, offered testimony, and used his own maps to rebut Russia's claims forcefully. Russia ignored this, proposed Langkurlangli Lake as the boundary, moved troops south, and prepared to seize Sarikol. Sarikol lay within Yarkand's jurisdiction, bringing Russia ever closer to Xinjiang's southern border. Governor-General Yang Changjun of Shaanxi-Gansu asked to mount defenses. Permission was granted. Because Envoy Hong Jun's map was mistaken, Li Hongzhang, citing a map from Xue Fucheng, argued: "The Kashgar treaty defined territory south of Wusibie as Chinese. The boundary must follow the word 'southward.' To insert 'turning east' without basis would confuse a thousand li; Wusibie is a spur of the Pamirs. To follow ridgelines as 'natural boundaries' and overturn a straight southern line would abandon both Pamirs, strip Kashgar of its shield, and leave Yarkand and Tibet undefended. Worse, it would invite future claims that borders always follow crest lines—a vaguer formula still harder to fix. This cannot be accepted." If they invoke the Kashgar treaty's vagueness, we should adopt the Anglo-American practice in North America of fixing borders by latitude and longitude: the meridian of Wusibie Pass, running due south from that pass to Sarikur Lake on the Afghan frontier. Only then would the line match the meridian. Under this scheme, China would keep most of Great Pamir and all of Little Pamir within the line—a simpler, more precise boundary than nature itself, and consistent with the original draft agreement. Alternatively, the Alichur Mountains ring the area on three sides, touching Kashgar territory only on the east—a natural boundary in its own right. Why should they discard the outer ridges and insist on inner ones merely to expand their claim? Talks dragged on without resolution. That year Russian tea was destroyed in the Gobi. Russia demanded compensation. Carriers who had contracted the shipment would share the cost—but when the Russian envoy asked the state to pay on their behalf, China refused.
38
滿 滿
In the fourth month of Guangxu 19 (1893), talks began on recovering land Russia had borrowed. Russia had earlier borrowed Barluq Mountain in Tarbagatai's jurisdiction for Kazakh herdsmen under its control, with a ten-year limit before return. When the term expired, Ili General Chang Geng asked to send negotiators. Russia sought a ten-year extension. China refused. After prolonged talks Russia agreed to return the land and resettle the herdsmen. They exchanged mountain-surrender documents stipulating that anyone still on the land when the term ended would revert with it—people follow territory. A supplementary agreement addressed unfinished business from the handover, settling Kazakh debts on both sides and claims over stolen livestock.
39
使 西 西西 使使
In Guangxu 20 (1894), China and Russia reopened talks on the Pamir frontier. Russia first tried to hold Langkuli and Aktash. Envoy Xu Jingcheng insisted they were Chinese and refused to yield. Russia then proposed fixing the line west of the Sarikol ridge and asked China to name concessions. China held to Wuzibie–Sarikur Lake. Russia rejected that line. The Zongli Yamen proposed a riverine boundary: the Akbaitar, south across the Aksu, southeast to Aktash flats, then southwest along the Ysyktik to Sarikur Lake, with every stream named in detail. Still no agreement. That year Russia's new emperor succeeded to the throne. Intendant Wang Zhichun was sent as congratulatory envoy.
40
調 使退
The following spring China made peace with Japan, ceding Taiwan and territory south of the Liao River. Russia, France, and Germany pressed Japan to renounce the Liaodong cession. Japan refused. Russia suddenly sent warships to Yantai. Japan agreed to return Liaodong—but only for an extra indemnity on top of the two hundred million taels. The tsar ordered Finance Minister Witte to tell Envoy Xu Jingcheng that Russia would arrange a large loan so Japan could withdraw its troops sooner. Xu Jingcheng reported this to Beijing. The Zongli Yamen ordered negotiations. China borrowed four hundred million French francs, customs revenue as security, at four percent interest, payable in installments. This became the Sino-Russian Four Percent Loan Agreement.
41
滿 使退 使使
In the ninth month Russian teams fanned out across Manchuria to survey railway routes. Russia was building the Trans-Siberian Railway and wanted leased land in Manchuria to link the line eastward. The Zongli Yamen held that once the line crossed into China, China would build it. In the tenth month Russia asked to winter its fleet in Jiaozhou Bay, Shandong. Permission was granted. Governor Li Bingheng of Shandong wrote: "Yantai's Zhifu Island could serve as well; Jiaozhou is no treaty port. Once Russia anchors there, it must leave by a fixed date." The court approved. In the twelfth month Envoy Kakhini and the French and German ministers received the First Class Third Grade Precious Star.
42
使使 使 使使
In the fourth month of Guangxu 22 (1896), for Nicholas II's coronation, Li Hongzhang was appointed chief envoy and Wang Zhichun his deputy. They presented the First Class First Grade Precious Star to the tsar. In the ninth month China and Russia signed a new treaty. Li Hongzhang had not yet returned home. Minister Kakhini pressed a secret treaty on the Zongli Yamen and asked for imperial approval by memorial. After the treaty was signed, the Russian noble Udoumousiki arrived in Beijing to thank the coronation mission. They agreed to establish a Sino-Russian bank. Xu Jingcheng was ordered to sign the Russo-Chinese Bank charter; China put up five million taels in capital in a joint venture with Russia. They also created the Chinese Eastern Railway Company and nine chapters of bylaws. Chapter Two, Banking Operations, Item Ten, defined the bank's China business: first, collecting domestic taxes; second, managing local and treasury-related projects; third, minting currency with the Qing government's permission; fourth, servicing interest on Qing government bonds; fifth, building railways and telegraph lines in China, including the Eastern Qing Railway charter, with construction and operations wholly entrusted to the bank.
43
西 使 便 西
In the eleventh month of Guangxu 23 (1897), citing Germany's seizure of Jiaozhou Bay, Russia sent the Siberian fleet into Port Arthur, demanded leases on Port Arthur and Dalian, and sought the right to build a railway from Harbin to Port Arthur. In the twelfth month Russian troops entered Jinzhou to collect taxes. China protested. They ignored it. Villagers rose in resistance. At Pikou the Russians shot dozens of Chinese dead. General Yiketang'a of Fengtian reported the outrage. Envoy Yang Ru was ordered to negotiate at once. Talks stalled. The tsar told Xu Jingcheng: "Our ships are here for three reasons: Jiaozhou, winter quarters, and helping China keep other powers out." Xu Jingcheng tried again. Russia would not answer. In the second month of Guangxu 24 (1898), Xu Jingcheng was told to settle the Port Arthur–Dalian anchorage and the Yellow Sea railway. Russia replied that with Germany in Jiaozhou and every power grabbing concessions, it could hardly refuse a lease of its own. On the railway, Russia wanted the Eastern Railway Company to pick a link point between the Yalu and Niuzhuang by water. Sign by the sixth of the third month—or Russia would act alone. The tone was absolute. Then the Russian admiral landed troops, posted takeover notices at Port Arthur and Dalian, and demanded that Chinese officials surrender Jinzhou. China protested again. Russia agreed only to keep troops outside the walls. A treaty followed, leasing Port Arthur, Dalian Bay, and adjacent waters to Russia. After initialing, survey teams went out. General Yiketang'a wired the Zongli Yamen: the word "adjacent" was far too broad. Islands ten to forty li off Jinzhou might qualify—but the seven Miaodao Islands south of Suoshan, some forty li away and others more than two hundred li off Shandong's Deng-Lai coast, were not Liaodong territory and were not "adjacent" at all. After repeated protests Russia proposed making the Miaodao Islands a neutral zone barred to other powers. The Zongli Yamen replied that China could pledge not to lease the islands or their trade to others—but not declare them neutral territory, which would compromise sovereignty. Russia also wanted a written pledge that no forts would be built and no troops stationed there. The Yamen pushed back again. Russia ignored them. Eventually Russia accepted China's language, striking "neutral zone" and "no forts"; a special clause added "not within the leased territory" for the Miaodao group, while Haiyang and Wumang Islands east of Jinzhou remained in the lease.
44
使 沿便 沿 滿 便貿
In the seventh month Envoys Xu Jingcheng and Yang Ru signed a supplementary contract with the Eastern Railway Company. The earlier Sino-Russian treaty had allowed the company a branch from a main-line station to Dalian Bay, or optionally to a convenient point on the Liaodong coast between Yingkou and the Yalu. It had never been built. Now Xu Jingcheng and the Russian Foreign Ministry fixed the branch terminus at Dalian Bay—not elsewhere on the Liaodong coast—and put that in a special clause. Russia then sought temporary branch lines and shipping rights to move materiel to the port, as the original contract had allowed for overland haulage—and permission to open coal mines and cut timber on its own. Xu Jingcheng objected: Article One allowed one-third tariff reductions at railway junctions on land routes. With Dalian Bay now a port, inland-bound cargo claimed the same discount—likely crippling customs at Niuzhuang and Jinhai. The inland–lease boundary was not the same as the national frontier, they argued; customs posts would need different placement. They drafted a special revision. Russia wanted rights to every mine. China refused and negotiated limits on haulage and extraction. They also extended the full-line completion deadline so temporary spurs would be torn up on schedule. Seven articles followed. First: the spur would be called the Southern Manchuria Branch of the Eastern Railway. Second: the company could use company-flag steamers on the Liao and its tributaries, and at Yingkou and neutral ports, to carry and unload materials. Third: for materiel and fodder the company could build temporary spurs south to Yingkou and neutral ports—but must remove them within eight years of the main line's completion. Fourth: the company could cut state timber at fees set by the chief engineer and local officials—but not imperial preserves at Mukden or sites affecting feng shui. Coal along the route could be mined, taxed by weight under the same arrangement. Fifth: Russia could set its own tariff in the lease. China would collect standard import-export duties on goods crossing into or out of the lease. Russia could open customs at Dalian Bay, with the company collecting and a Qing civil officer as commissioner. Sixth: the company could run its own merchant steamers under ordinary treaty rules. Losses would not be China's concern, per Article Twelve on purchase and return. Seventh: the chief engineer would survey and fix the route in consultation with the company—or its Beijing office—and headquarters. Where the line crossed Mukden it must bypass the imperial tombs. Russia agreed to a thirty-li detour. The contract was initialed.
45
西 輿西 西 西 西 使 使 使 調
In Guangxu 25 (1899), Mukden Governor Wen Xing sent Prefect Fu Pei and Sub-prefect Tu Jingtao with Russian officers Vogelge, Irliansky, and others to demarcate the Port Arthur–Dalian lease. The Russians wanted to start on the western shore of the northern boundary at Adam Bay. Fu Pei replied that Chinese maps had no "Adam Bay." Per the Yamen's telegram, Adam was another name for Pulandian. The line should start at Tiger Island in Pulandian's western bay. The Russians cited the supplementary treaty: "from Adam Bay on the west, northward"—no Pulandian. They refused to budge. Surveying began from the western shore of the north boundary. They set thirty-one markers to the sea—Chinese on the north face, Cyrillic on the south. Eight smaller numbered markers were added. The line ran west to east, ninety-eight li and ninety-four bu long. With the line fixed, they negotiated a demarcation annex, labeled the map in Chinese and Russian, initialed and sealed copies, and submitted them to the Russian minister and the Zongli Yamen for ratification. Li Hongzhang and Zhang Yin-huan had signed the treaty in Beijing with Minister Pavlov. Now Wang Wenshao and Xu Jingcheng were told to countersign. China meanwhile planned a Shanhaiguan–Yingkou branch—and Britain wanted to invest. The Russian minister protested to the Zongli Yamen that foreign capital violated the supplementary treaty. With Eastern Railway construction beginning, Russia proposed a Russian-language school in Beijing to train Chinese students for the line. Permission was granted. That year Russia renamed the Liaodong lease the "Kwantung Province."
46
退 使 稿
In Guangxu 26 (1900), the Boxers rebelled, allied armies marched on Beijing, and Russia used the chaos to occupy all of Manchuria—ostensibly to suppress brigands and protect the railway. First Fengtian bandits attacked Russian railway guards. Mutinous troops burned Catholic churches, tore up the Tieling line, and looted foreign depots; then struck the Liaoyang railway. Russian railway staff fled. In Heilongjiang, too, Qing forces shelled Russian vessels. Russia sent columns from Aihun, Sansing, Ningguta, and Hunchun and seized Fengtian. General Zeng Qi was forced toward a Fengtian handover treaty that would put all three provinces under Russian administration, troops, and tax collection. The court named Prince Qing and Li Hongzhang plenipotentiaries to settle with the powers—and Envoy Yang Ru in Russia to recover Manchuria. Yang Ru fought the terms for months before Russia agreed to void the agreement. Russia then tabled a new draft and pressed for signature. Zhang Zhidong and others wired fierce protests. Talks paused.
47
使
In the seventh month of Guangxu 27 (1901), after the general settlement with the powers, Li Hongzhang drafted four demands: first, return the land; second, withdraw the troops; third, no further Russian troop buildup in Manchuria outside railway zones; fourth, return the railway in exchange for compensation. Negotiations opened with the Russian minister in Beijing. Before terms were settled Li Hongzhang died. Wang Wenshao took his place. In the third month of Guangxu 28 (1902), the two sides signed a four-article agreement.
48
退西 退使使 使
In the fourth month Russia forcibly occupied the Arasak Bek River in Kobdo territory. Counselor Rui Xun reported it. The Foreign Ministry was ordered to negotiate—and got nowhere. In the seventh month the railway company signed loan and operating agreements with the Russo-Chinese Bank for the Zhengtai line and renewed connection and extension contracts with Russia. In the ninth month the railway beyond the passes was restored and Russian troops left southwestern Jinzhou on the Liao River—the first stage of withdrawal. In the second phase the next March, Russian troops at Jinzhou, Niuzhuang, Liaoyang, Fengtian, Tieling, Kaiyuan, Changchun, Jilin, Ningguta, Hunchun, Alachuka, and Harbin still failed to withdraw on time. Acting minister Bramsleff submitted seven new demands to the Foreign Ministry; China refused, and he withdrew them. When Minister Lessar returned he proposed five new articles, insisting that withdrawal from Manchuria could not be unconditional and that Russia would not hesitate to fight Japan over it.
49
In Guangxu 30 Japan and Russia went to war, and China remained neutral. That year Russia finished the Manchurian railway and revised the Sino-Russian connection treaty, agreeing to lower rates in line with the London Universal Postal Union rules. In Guangxu 31 Japan won the war; the Port Arthur and Dalian leases went to Japan, and Russia focused on the Chinese Eastern Railway. This led to disputes over administrative authority in Harbin. Harbin was the hub of the Chinese Eastern Railway and at first was settled only by Russians. From Guangxu 31 it was opened as a treaty port; consuls followed, and under the rules applied at China's treaty ports, China retained administrative authority. Russia claimed Harbin's administration should belong to the Chinese Eastern Railway Company; China refused. Russian consul Khvostov then imposed the railway's municipal regulations, taxing all Chinese and foreign residents in Harbin. Governor-General Xu Shichang of the Three Eastern Provinces was ordered to negotiate with Russia, without success. In Xuantong 1 the Russian consul negotiated in Beijing with Foreign Minister Liang Dunyan and Khvostov, agreeing to an autonomous council within the railway zone that would preserve Chinese sovereignty without breaching the railway treaties. Disputes over Songhua navigation rights then arose again.
50
貿 滿 滿 滿 滿
Originally the Songhua in Sino-Russian treaties meant the lower Heilongjiang; inland Songhua navigation was not allowed. Russia argued that the treaties of Xianfeng 8 and Guangxu 7 covered the entire Songhua. Binjiang customs intendant Shi Zhaoji was ordered to negotiate with the Russian consul; Russia still cited the old treaties. China replied that the Treaty of Portsmouth had surrendered the exclusive Sino-Russian navigation rights on the Songhua, rendering the old treaties obsolete. Debate continued without resolution. Russia then sought to interfere in China's management of vessels, quarantine, and special permits, and was refused again. Russia still demanded free trade on the whole river, denied treaty-port and interior distinctions, and treated river routes like land routes rather than sea routes; only after prolonged talks did it yield. The next year a treaty was signed: first, the Songhua within Manchuria was opened to free navigation by all nations; second, anchorage dues would be charged by cargo weight; third, consumer goods within one hundred li on each side of the border were tax-free; fourth, grain duties were cut by one-third; fifth, goods exported from the interior paid duties at Songhua customs as usual. Once this treaty was signed, all nations could sail the inland Songhua, and northern Manchuria's strategic landscape shifted entirely. China and Russia were then drafting the Eastern Provinces Railway council charter. Russia argued that treaty ports differed from the Chinese Eastern Railway zone, which possessed full administrative authority, and intended to govern within the railway zone. The government refused firmly as an encroachment on sovereignty. It also notified all powers: 'The railway contract's opening clause states that the Chinese government and the Russo-Chinese Bank jointly opened a business—clearly commercial in nature, with no permission to encroach on administrative authority. Russia cited article six, claiming 'managed entirely by the company' meant full administration—but that phrase covered only land genuinely needed for railway works, and company authority could not extend beyond railway business or become administrative power. Moreover articles one through five of the Xuantong 1 council charter for the railway zone all declare that Chinese sovereignty there must not suffer the slightest loss. Moreover the Russo-Japanese treaty concluded in America in Guangxu 31, article three, restores to China full sovereign authority over all Manchuria. Russia also declared it held no local interests, preferences, or exclusive grants in Manchuria that would infringe Chinese sovereignty or violate the Open Door. How could Russia stretch a commercial contract, rely on words China never formally accepted, and set aside solemn bilateral treaties?' Russia yielded to the argument and terms were settled.
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:貿 : :貿 :
First: within one hundred li on each side of the border, Russia's border tariff rates would not be restricted, and products and manufactures in both territories would trade duty-free; second: lawsuits involving Russians in China would be tried entirely by Russian officials; mixed cases would be tried jointly; third: in Mongolia and both routes north and south of the Tianshan, Russians might reside freely and trade duty-free; fourth: Russia might post consuls at Ili, Tarbagatai, Khuree, Urga, Kashgar, Urumqi, Kobdo, Hami, Gucheng, Zhangjiakou, and elsewhere, with the right to buy land and erect buildings.
52
使:貿 : :貿 :貿
After long delay China finally replied to the Russian minister: first, within one hundred li of the border China would honor free trade and would not restrict Russia's border tariff rates; second: mixed lawsuits should follow the old treaties; third: tariffs in Mongolia and Xinjiang were to be set once commerce flourished, as originally agreed; fourth: at Kobdo, Hami, and Gucheng, now recognized as thriving in trade, if China granted consuls as Russia requested, Russia should likewise allow China to set customs duties under the original treaties.
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使
The minister reported home; Russia argued customs duties should not be linked to new consulates, pressed China further, and moved Turkestan troops to the Ili border—whereupon China agreed. Russia also stationed troops at Khuree and asked the Foreign Ministry for priority mining rights; China refused. Then the revolution erupted, Khuree declared independence, and affairs passed beyond any further reckoning.
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