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卷154 志一百二十九 邦交二 英吉利

Volume 154 Treatises 129: Foreign Relations 2, Britain

Chapter 154 of 清史稿 · Draft History of Qing
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1
西
Britain lies in the northwestern part of Europe. After the Qing set up the Dinghai customs house, the English began to trade, though they could not manage to come every year. When they came to eastern Guangdong, their cargoes were lead, foreign silver, feather satin, woolens, baize, and similar goods; they soon sailed away again. In the seventh year, continuous trade was finally established. In the eleventh winter month, a British patrol vessel was caught in a storm and driven to Macao in Guangdong; Governor Celen ordered local officials to provide funds and provisions, repair the ship, and send them on their way. In the twentieth year, they came to Ningbo to trade. British merchant ships then unloaded at Dinghai and carried goods on to Ningbo; within a year several more ships were added. Soon entry into Zhejiang was banned, and the export of raw silk overseas was forbidden as well. In the twenty-fourth year, the British merchant Flint and his interpreter James Flint sought to open trade at Ningbo. Denied permission, they sailed to Tianjin, again petitioning for trade at Ningbo while accusing the Guangdong customs of gross abuses. In the seventh month, the Fuzhou general was sent to Guangdong to investigate; collusion with the Huizhou merchant Wang Shengyi was proved, Wang was punished, and James Flint was thrown into prison. He was released soon afterward. In the fifth summer month of the twenty-seventh year, British merchants including Danqin, finding silk exports banned and their goods hard to finish, again petitioned to trade. Guangdong Governor Su Chang reported the request and trade was allowed, but each ship might buy only five thousand jin of native silk and three thousand jin of double-cocoon lake silk; first-cocoon lake silk and woven silks remained banned.
2
使
In the fifty-eighth year, King George III sent Lord Macartney and others on a tribute mission, asking to station envoys in the capital, open trade at Ningbo, Zhushan, Tianjin, Guangdong, and elsewhere, and reduce customs duties; all were denied. In the sixtieth year they presented tribute again, stating that when the Qing general had marched on Nepal two years before, Britain had sent troops to assist. "Demi" here means Gurkha Nepal. When the memorial arrived, an imperial letter and gifts were granted as usual.
3
使 使 使使 使 殿使使使使 使 使使使
In the sixth summer month of the twenty-first year, Britain sent Lord Gower to Guangdong with a letter: the prince regent had ruled four years, mindful of the late emperor's grace, and was dispatching envoys with tribute gifts via Zhoushan and Tianjin to the capital, asking the governor-general to memorialize in advance. Governor-General Jiang Yougui was then in Beijing; Governor Dong Jiaozeng acted in his place and agreed to an audience on the usual terms for receiving Siamese and other tribute missions. Gower refused, haggling repeatedly over ceremony until Jiaozeng reluctantly yielded. That day the governor-general, the general, two vice commanders, and the customs superintendent sat in the ceremonial hall with full guard. Gower paid his respects bareheaded; through an interpreter he spoke with Jiaozeng, who rose to reply and promised to report to the court, whereupon Gower withdrew. Before Jiaozeng's memorial arrived in Beijing, Lord Amherst and Deputy Envoy Morrison had already reached Tianjin with five tribute vessels. The emperor ordered Ministers Heshengtai and Suleng'e to Tianjin to escort the envoys to Beijing with Salt Commissioner Guanghui; they raced to the Yuanming Garden in a day and a night, jolted along bad roads while their court dress lagged behind. At dawn the emperor took the audience, but the chief envoy was ill and the deputy said their court dress had not arrived. Fearful of blame, Heshengtai falsely reported both envoys sick; their tribute was refused and Guanghui was sent to escort them back to Guangdong. When the envoys first presented their memorial, the emperor found its tone insolently equal and the Court of Colonial Affairs had botched the reception; suspecting deliberate disrespect, he broke off all contact. After the envoys left Beijing, the truth reached the emperor; he sent gifts after them as far as Liangxiang, accepted part of the tribute, and sent curios to the king with orders to blame the envoys for breach of ceremony. The British mission withdrew in ill humor. In the seventh month Suleng'e, Heshengtai, Guanghui, and others were demoted in varying degrees.
4
In the sixteenth year, penalties for smoking opium were established. From this time the English privately maintained a dozen or more opium storage ships called "receiver ships," and wholesale buyers in the provincial capital known as "kiln mouths." Kiln mouths paid silver at the English factory, which issued receipts for collection from the receiver ships. Armed escort boats called "fast crabs" shuttled back and forth, fully mounted with guns. Xu Naiji of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices, noting annual silver exports above ten million taels, urged relaxing the ban: opium should be taxed as medicine, traded only by barter after entry, and not bought with silver as a check on outflow. Approval had been granted, but frontier officials soon demanded harsher penalties up to death for sale and use; smuggling and smoking continued unchanged. In the eighteenth year Huang Juezi of the Court of State Ceremonial urged severe penalties for smokers with baojia collective responsibility, declaring the harm worse than flood or wild beasts. The memorial went up and was referred to every province; memorials calling for prohibition multiplied.
5
使
Huguang Governor-General Lin Zexu wrote with especial force: "Unless opium is utterly banned, the state grows poorer and the people weaker daily; within a decade there will be neither revenue to levy nor soldiers fit to fight." The emperor strongly agreed, summoned him to Beijing, and as Minister of War commissioned him with the imperial commissioner's seal to investigate in Guangdong. The next spring he reached Guangdong, joined Deng Tingzhen in enforcing the ban, and issued new law: smokers faced strangulation and traffickers decapitation after eighteen months' grace. As arrests intensified, foreign receiver ships at Lintin prepared to flee; Lin ordered the navy to block every route and required opium surrendered before any ship might open its holds. He summoned the Thirteen Hong merchants to report stored opium and demanded Dent and Jardine, long-time traffickers; Dent escaped. Charles Elliot pleaded business and withdrew to Macao. As pressure mounted Lin cut supplies by land and sea; Elliot then had merchants surrender 20,283 chests, which Lin burned, paying five jin of tea per chest and requiring bonds never to deal in opium again. The opium traders suffered heavy losses and resentment grew.
6
貿 使
Humiliated, Elliot roused his compatriots and hoped the king would intervene. The king consulted Parliament; both houses agreed the trade violated Chinese law and Britain was in the wrong. Lord Shaftesbury then petitioned for prohibition and an end to cultivation in India. Dwarkanath Tagore wrote on opium's evils: it corrupted Chinese morals, bred suspicion of Britain, and harmed legitimate trade. But when news of the burning reached abroad, tea and silk prices soared and silver profits grew; Elliot concluded opium's fate was a matter of national prosperity.
7
Lin ordered every foreign ship to anchor offshore for inspection; only vessels proved opium-free might enter and unload. Merchants of every nation complied. Elliot alone refused, insisting entry await royal instructions, and asked that British ships anchor near Macao instead of Whampoa. Lin rejected the request and cut off provisions to Macao. Elliot moved his family from Macao to a merchant ship at Kowloon, secretly summoned two warships, armed cargo vessels, and under pretense of seeking food attacked Kowloon Hill. Assistant Commander Lai Enjue sank one brig with gunfire; the navy destroyed the rest at Hankou. Elliot asked Macao intermediaries to mediate, agreeing to obey the new rules but refusing to surrender the men who had killed villagers; he also wrote asking that ships at Kowloon not be expelled and that action await orders from London. Naval Commander Guan Tianpei returned the letter unread because the culprits were not handed over. In the tenth winter month Guan Tianpei routed the British and Elliot fled. In the eleventh month British trade was suspended and more than thirty British merchantmen were barred from port. Spy boats were hunted down in several captures a day. British merchants blamed Elliot; he sent another plea begging to be allowed back to Macao. Lin, bound by fresh imperial orders, rebuked him again and broke off contact. British ships lingered off Lao Wan Shan, bribing fishermen and Tanka boats for provisions while trading opium on the side. That month Guangdong strengthened coastal defenses.
8
In the first spring month of the twentieth year Commander Banger Maxin burned more than twenty opium supply ships bound for the British. In the fifth summer month Lin again sent troops to drive the British from Modaomen. Elliot had returned home for reinforcements; Britain sent Bremer with a dozen warships and twenty Indian vessels to Guangdong, anchoring at Golden Star Gate. Lin sent fire ships downwind to attack; the British squadron slipped away. Finding Guangdong too strong, the British turned on Fujian and were beaten at Xiamen. In the sixth month they took Dinghai and killed Magistrate Yao Huaixiang and others. On report of the disaster, Yilibu, governor-general of Liangjiang, was appointed imperial commissioner to command in Zhejiang. In the seventh month Lin sent Chen Liansheng and Banger Maxin with five ships against Admiral Smith at Modaomen. Banger Maxin's lead ship closed under wind and shot Smith's vessel to pieces.
9
滿
In the eighth month Elliot came to Tianjin demanding peace talks. Grand Secretary Qishan was then Zhili governor-general; Elliot sent Parliament's note to the Chinese premier at Dagu with many demands: first, indemnity for seized goods; second, trading ports at Guangzhou, Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Dinghai; third, diplomatic equality; fourth, war expenses; fifth, that shore merchants not be liable for opium ships at sea; sixth, abolition of all customary fees on foreign trade. Qishan pressed for negotiation, entertained twenty British officers, and promised to memorialize the throne. He then went to Beijing to report in person. The imperial commissioner's seal was issued and Qishan was sent to Guangdong. That month Zhejiang Governor Wuerhong'e was dismissed for losing the coast and refusing British correspondence. Sailing south Elliot passed Shandong; Governor Tuohunbu entertained him and memorialized that Elliot was submissive and grateful for the imperial commissioner sent to Guangdong. Lin Zexu was dismissed from the Liangguang post with a sharp imperial rebuke; Yiliang acted temporarily as governor-general. Elliot sailed south past Suzhou but secretly made for Zhenhai. Yilibu in Zhejiang, on Qishan's word of peace talks, sent his servant Zhang Xi with gifts to the British fleet. Bremer had held Dinghai for months; hearing peace was agreed, he let his squadron cruise freely. Off Yuyao locals lured a five-masted ship aground and captured dozens of British sailors. Yilibu hurriedly ordered Yuyao to entertain them and sent escorts to conduct them to Guangdong.
10
沿 椿 貿
In the tenth winter month Qishan reached Guangzhou and was soon made governor-general of Liangguang. Elliot asked that coastal defenses be dismantled. Humen guarded the approach to Guangzhou, where the naval commander was posted. The outer batteries at Dajiao and Shajiao had been reinforced after the opium burning. War junks, fire ships, Tanka craft, and escort boats had lined the channel with hidden stakes; now nearly all were withdrawn. Elliot meanwhile built up his fleet and siege gear night and day; first demanding opium indemnity, then Hong Kong, while pressing Qishan for a quick answer. On the fifth of the twelfth month they stormed Shajiao Fort; Chen Liansheng's men could not hold and all perished when it fell. Steamers and longboats then entered Sanmenkou, burned a dozen Chinese warships, and the fleet broke. Pressing their advantage, British forces stormed the Tayou battery. Company Officer Li Zhi'an was wounded; his men tipped guns into the water as they fought out of the encirclement, but the fort was lost. They recovered every gun from the water, posted detachments to hold the positions, and the situation at Humen turned critical. Naval commander Guan Tianpei, regional commander Li Tingyu, Mobile Corps Commander Ban Ge'er Maxin, and others held the Jingyuan and Weiyuan forts with only a few hundred men. Repeated urgent appeals through subordinates went unanswered. Li Tingyu came to the provincial seat in tears, pleading for reinforcements to shore up the capital's outer defenses. Qishan, fearing reinforcements would derail peace talks, refused. Only after the entire civil and military staff pressed the point did he agree to send five hundred men. Elliot continued to use military pressure to demand both an opium indemnity and the cession of Hong Kong. In the first month of spring, year 21 of the Daoguang reign, Qishan secretly promised Hong Kong to Britain without daring to report it to the throne. Instead he returned British prisoners captured in Zhejiang in exchange for the recovery of Dinghai. Elliot first sent envoys to Zhejiang to hand back Dinghai, then asked that the Shajiao and Tayou forts be surrendered in return. Qishan and Elliot set a date to meet at Lianhua City. Elliot presented his drafted commercial regulations and handed over all of Hong Kong Island on the Macao model—all concessions Qishan made on his own authority.
11
使 退 貿 退
When Qishan finally submitted Elliot's letter to the court, the Emperor was furious and rejected the terms. Qishan and Yilibu were removed from office. The imperial clansman Yishan was appointed Pacification General, with Long Wen, a minister of state, and Yang Fang, Hunan provincial military commander, as grand commissioners to prosecute the war in Guangdong. Meanwhile Elliot proclaimed throughout Hong Kong that Qishan's pledge made it a British possession. He also sent a formal notice to the Dapeng deputy commander ordering the removal of frontier garrison posts. When Guangdong governor Yiliang learned of this, he was horrified and immediately reported it to Beijing. The Emperor flew into a rage and ordered the confiscation of all of Qishan's property. An edict was then promulgated denouncing British crimes and ordering Yishan and the other commanders to hurry south while troops on every front moved to attack. Yu Qian, governor-general of Jiangsu and Jiangxi, was shortly afterward appointed imperial commissioner to take command in Zhejiang. British vessels were then ranging from Dinghai to Zhenhai and beyond. Yu Qian sent troops in successive operations to burn and harry them, and put one British officer to death. In the second month the British assaulted Humen, and naval commander Guan Tianpei was killed in the fighting. Victorious, they pressed on toward Wuyong, throwing the provincial capital into panic. On the thirteenth Yang Fang reached Canton, but the relief armies had not yet assembled and the entire fleet at Humen had already been destroyed. Yang Fang decided on a strategy of containment, posting Regional Commander Duan Yongfu with a thousand men at Dongsheng Temple and land-route commander Changchun with a thousand at the Fenghuang Gang waterway. British columns closed in. They were briefly driven back at Fenghuang Gang, but then exploited the rising tide to push upstream under concentrated barrages of artillery and rockets. The American consul intervened, arguing that fighting was blocking merchant shipping. He asked that Huangpu be opened for trade and offered to mediate, claiming the British would restore Dinghai in return for trade on the old terms. He showed a letter from Elliot stating that Britain wanted only normal commerce and would accept confiscation of any cargo carrying contraband. A British squadron from Dinghai had also reached Canton. Hoping to use the mediation to gain time, Yang Fang joined Yiliang in a joint memorial asking permission to negotiate. The Emperor saw this as the same old appeasement playbook and issued a stern rebuke refusing any negotiation. In the third month Lin Zexu was recalled to assist with military affairs in Zhejiang, only to be exiled to Xinjiang again soon afterward.
12
In the fourth month Yishan launched a coordinated night assault with Yang Fang, Long Wen, and other columns. It failed. The British then pressed the attack on Canton itself. With no other choice, the Chinese side reopened negotiations. Elliot demanded twelve million taels as opium indemnity. American merchants brokered the talks, and the Chinese agreed to pay half. When terms were settled Yishan reported that Elliot had sued for peace, asked to resume trade under the old rules, pledged never again to deal in opium, and reframed the six million indemnity as recovery of debts owed to merchants. After the truce was agreed, British units withdrawing garrisons from outlying batteries marched toward Foshan by way of Nicheng and through Xiaoguan and Sanyuanli. Outraged villagers rallied militia from the surrounding townships and ambushed them on every side; over two hundred British troops were killed, and their commander Bremer was slain along with other officers. Elliot hurried reinforcements to the scene and was surrounded in turn. Elliot sent a messenger through the lines to beg Guangzhou prefect Yu Baochun for help. Yu rode out and dispersed the crowd so Elliot could reach his boats and escape. Around the same time villagers at Sanshan killed more than a hundred British troops. Foshan militia besieged British troops at Guigang battery, killing dozens and destroying the sampans sent to their relief. At Xin'an a fire attack destroyed one large British warship and the rest of the squadron withdrew. Elliot asked the governor-general to issue a proclamation, after which the militia stood down.
13
歿 谿
Stung by these defeats, Elliot eventually shifted operations to Fujian, captured Xiamen again, and pressed northward. He renewed the assault on Dinghai, where regional commander Ge Yunfei and other officers were killed. Yu Qian marched to Zhenhai with his force, but the British attacked from Jiaomen Island as soon as he arrived. Zhenhai's garrison numbered only four thousand men, split between commander Yu Buyun and regional commander Xie Chao'en. Bu Yun disobeyed Yu Qian's orders and fled without fighting. The British seized Zhaobaoshan, shelled Zhenhai from the heights, and took the city. Yu Qian drowned himself; Xie Chao'en also fell in battle. Victorious, the British occupied Ningbo. In the eighth month a British attack on Jilong was repulsed by Taiwan circuit intendant Yao Ying. In the ninth month the imperial clansman Yijing was named Campaigning General, with Vice Minister Wen Wei and banner vice commander Te Yishun as grand commissioners for Zhejiang, while Yiliang was sent as imperial commissioner to Fujian. In the first month of spring, year 22, the main force encamped at Shaoxing. Yijing and his commissioners resolved to strike Ningbo and Zhenhai simultaneously. The attack schedule leaked beforehand, and government forces took heavy casualties when the assault was launched. That same month Yao Ying again defeated the British at Da'an. In the second month the British attacked the camp at Cixi. Jinhua assistant regional commander Zhu Gui, his son the military licentiate Zhu Zhaonan, and acting magistrate Yan Lüjing, who oversaw grain supplies, were all killed. That month Yilibu was restored to office. Yilibu had earlier been dismissed, and his servant Zhang Xi was arrested and exiled to the capital with his household. Zhejiang governor Liu Yunqi now petitioned for his reinstatement, and the court agreed. Qiying was shortly appointed general at Hangzhou, and Taiwan's defenses were ordered strengthened.
14
退
In the fourth summer month the British attacked Zhapu. Vice banner commander Chang Xi, subprefect Wei Fengjia, and others were killed. Yilibu had by then reached Zhejiang. He sent his servant Zhang Xi to the British commander to say peace was assured, asked the fleet to withdraw to open water, and released the British prisoners. The British complied, and the court was memorialized that Zhapu had been recovered. The British took Baoshan and Shanghai in succession; Jiangnan commander Chen Huacheng and others were killed. They then overran Songjiang, captured Zhenjiang, and killed vice banner commander Hai Ling. Terrified Huai-Yang salt merchants bribed the British fleet to spare their region.
15
鹿
In the seventh autumn month they advanced on Nanjing. More than eighty British steam warships steamed up the Yangzi from Guanyin Gate to Xiaguan. Qiying was just leaving Zhejiang when Yilibu, summoned by edict, hurried to Nanjing and sent Zhang Xi to the British fleet to open talks. Britain's demands ran as follows: first, twenty-one million taels in indemnity for opium, merchant debts, and war costs; second, cession of Hong Kong as a treaty port and trade at Guangzhou, Fuzhou, Xiamen, Ningbo, and Shanghai; third, diplomatic equality between British and Chinese officials; further clauses covered customs offsets, release of Chinese collaborators, and similar points, ending with a demand that the national seal be affixed. When Qiying arrived he raised modest objections to several clauses. The British hoisted a red flag and warned that unless terms were settled that day they would assault the city at dawn. That night they sent back a written reply accepting exactly what had been demanded. The next day Attendant Xian Ling, provincial administration commissioner Huang Entong, and Ning-Shao-Tai circuit intendant Lu Zechang informed the British that every clause had been submitted for imperial approval and the treaty would be signed once the response arrived. The memorial reached the throne and was approved. With peace imminent, Qiying, Yilibu, and Niu Jian sent Zhang Xi and others to arrange a meeting. Morrison asked that the British be received with the ceremonial equality of their own country. Qiying and his party went aboard the British ships, exchanged salutes with Pottinger and his staff, feasted the fleet, and signed the agreement at Jinghai Temple—the Treaty of Nanjing. From that point the ban on opium was effectively abandoned. Britain still demanded punishment for the execution of prisoners in Taiwan and blamed regional commander Da Hong'a and circuit intendant Yao Ying, who were dismissed under pressure.
16
In the twelfth month Yilibu was appointed imperial commissioner to oversee trade in Guangdong. In the summer of year 23 Yilibu died, and Qiying was ordered to take his place. Guangzhou trade for Britain had already been authorized. Under the original Guangdong trade regulations, other nations had to register through Britain before paying duties. French and American merchants insisted they were not British subjects and refused; France and the United States were then allowed the same trading terms as Britain.
17
退 使 退
In year 24 the British began construction on Fuzhou's Wushi Hill. The consul asked Governor-General Liu Yunke of Zhejiang and Fujian for a commercial settlement and sought to erect foreign buildings from Nantai to Wushi Hill inside and outside the walled city; the request was refused. Under the Nanjing treaty outstanding payments were being settled; 2.5 million taels for the Jiachen year had been paid, and Zhoushan with Gulangyu were due to be returned to China. The British minister refused to return the islands, citing the refusal to allow construction inside Fuzhou. After prolonged argument he agreed to return Gulangyu but insisted on keeping the structures already built.
18
西
Having secured their points at Fuzhou, the British sought the right to reside inside Guangzhou's walls. Cantonese public opinion blocked the move; placards called for attacking the Thirteen Factories; the British chief fled, and the entry plan collapsed. In the seventh month of autumn, year 26, the British returned Zhoushan. In the twelfth month they asked to delimit borders and open trade with Tibet; the court refused because the treaty made no such provision. In year 28 British commissioner Wenhan again demanded entry into Guangzhou for trade; Governor-General Xu Guangjin refused. The next day British vessels forced their way up the provincial channel. Xu went out alone in a skiff to parley while militia on both banks roared their defiance. Wenhan asked to restore friendly relations and dropped the demand to enter the city.
19
In the ninth month of autumn, year 6, Harry Parkes wrote to Ye Mingchen asking entry to the city under the Nanjing treaty; Ye ignored the letter. British forces attacked Canton without success, then asked to lay down arms for an audience; that too was refused. In the tenth winter month they assaulted the Humen and Hengdang batteries but were driven off again by Canton militia, then hurried word home for reinforcements. The crown then dispatched Earl Elgin to China, intending to reach the capital via Canton while steam men-of-war took station at Macao and Hong Kong to await his orders. Elgin reached Canton and at once pressed to enter the walled city, but was refused. He negotiated terms with the admiral and consuls and notified Canton officials that he would await their reply before acting; Ye Mingchen ignored the messages entirely. In the twelfth month of winter, year 7, British forces allied with France, the United States, and Russia to storm the city; Canton fell and Ye Mingchen was taken prisoner. Elgin blamed the Canton authorities and memorialized Grand Secretary Yucheng to relay his grievances to the throne. Yucheng answered that he should return to Canton and treat with the new governor, Huang Zonghan; Elgin took no notice.
20
使 使 沿
In the fourth month of summer, year 8, allied fleets struck the Dagu forts and captured the outer batteries in succession. The emperor ordered Prince Sengge Rinchen of Khorchin to march on Tianjin with an army, and Beijing was placed under martial alert. He also sent Grand Secretaries Guiliang and Huashana, Minister of Personnel, to Tianjin to conduct talks, reappointing the veteran negotiator Qiying to accompany them. Qiying called on the British envoy but was refused an audience; he returned to Beijing without authorization and was ordered to take his own life. Among Elgin's staff was Horatio Nelson Lay, a native of Jiaying prefecture whose family had long lived on foreign employ; he served the envoy as camp adviser. When Guiliang arrived, Lay pressed the fifty-six draft articles and demanded immediate acceptance; Guiliang refused. Tianjin crowds, enraged, clashed with the British and seized Lay, nearly executing him on the spot. Fearing the negotiations would collapse, Guiliang and Tan Tingxiang hurriedly had Lay released and sent back to his ship. Officials bombarded the throne with pleas to abandon talks, but with the frontier crisis acute the court had no choice and finally ordered Guiliang to sign the fifty-six-article treaty. In the sixth month Guiliang and Huashana were sent to tour Jiangsu and draft a uniform tariff for foreign trade. By the tenth winter month the tariff schedule was settled. The treaty allowed new treaty ports on the Yangtze, and the British now wanted to reconnoiter the river before opening them. Soon after ratification naval officers and consuls steamed upriver to Hankou on a survey that lasted over a month.
21
椿 退 使使
That year the court turned to the routine business of treaty commerce. Foreign envoys arrived at Tianjin to exchange ratifications; following Guiliang's plan, all were to land at Beitang instead of Dagu. British vessels reached Tianjin first, Russians close behind, and both broke the agreement by forcing the Dagu passage. Governor-General Hengfu of Zhili sent envoys with the treaty to demand they change course; they refused. In the fifth month of summer, year 9, a dozen British ships anchored on the inner shoals of the Dagu bar. The next day they ran up a red battle flag, hauled away the harbor chains and piles, closed on the batteries, and opened a bombardment. Sengge Rinchen, commanding the coastal defense, replied in kind and sank several ships. A British landing force followed; they were beaten back again. In the sixth month of summer, year 10, the allies again assaulted the Tianjin approaches; provincial commander Le Shan held the north-bank batteries and was killed by shellfire. Sengge Rinchen still held the south bank. Fighting was halted in favor of peace talks; Qing forces withdrew from Tianjin to Zhangjiawan, and the British occupied the port city. Sengge Rinchen was soon ordered forward again to Tongzhou. The emperor again sent Grand Secretary Guiliang to Tianjin to negotiate. Guiliang reached Tianjin and proposed terms to the foreign ministers. Elgin and Parkes demanded increased indemnities, commercial rights at Tianjin, and that all ministers enter Beijing under arms to exchange ratifications. Guiliang reported the demands; the throne refused flatly and ordered Sengge Rinchen to hold Tongzhou.
22
使使
In the eighth month British forces advanced on Tongzhou, and Prince Zaiyuan was sent to negotiate. Guiliang and Grand Councillor Muyin were on hand when Elgin sent Parkes into the city to treat, asking to adhere to the Tianjin terms and arrange a joint conference with the French plenipotentiary. The next day a banquet was held at the Eastern Peak Temple. Parkes rose and said, "Today's pact requires an audience with the Emperor himself, that good faith may be plain for all to see." He added, "We have long admired the Middle Kingdom from afar and beg leave to enter the capital in martial array. Outraged at his insolence, the prince secretly arranged with Sengge Rinchen to seize Parkes and send him to Beijing; hostilities reopened at once. The emperor was away on the autumn hunt and from Rehe appointed Prince Gong full plenipotentiary to defend the capital, summoning southern troops to reinforce Beijing. Defense coordinators including Grand Secretary Zhou Zupei and Minister Chen Fuen organized militia and strengthened the city walls. Prince Gong and Guiliang remained outside the walls even as British columns reached the suburbs and burned the Old Summer Palace. The British asked that Anding Gate be opened so Prince Gong could treat with them in person; terms were set for the morrow, Parkes was released from prison, and Hengqi escorted him back to camp. In the ninth month peace was concluded: indemnities rose by eight million taels, Tianjin was opened to trade, and Kowloon was ceded. That year Horatio Nelson Lay was appointed to assist in customs administration.
23
使
In the second month of spring, year 11, treaty ports were opened at Hankou and Jiujiang, each with an Imperial Maritime Customs house. In the ninth month the Zongli Yamen provisionally agreed twelve articles on Yangtze trade and five on taxation with Minister Frederick Bruce. That month the British returned the walled city of Canton. Bruce took up residence in Beijing for the first time.
24
使 使 使 使
In the first month of spring, year 5 of the reign, regulations on recruiting contract laborers were negotiated with Britain. In the twelfth month, year 7, the British consul at Taiwan, Gibson, clashed over blocked camphor exports; foreign troops under a naval commander took over the yamen, killed Qing soldiers, burned the arsenal, and demanded indemnities. When word reached Beijing the British minister was pressed; only after prolonged diplomacy was Gibson recalled. Soon afterward British gunboats at Chaozhou burned houses and killed civilians, nearly sparking a riot. In the ninth month, year 8, a revised treaty was exchanged; Minister Rutherford Alcock asked for an audience and was refused. In year 9 they sought permission for telegraph lines and railways; the court refused. A later request to lay submarine cables between treaty ports was granted. In year 10 they asked to open Qiongzhou (Haikou) as a treaty port. Earlier, under the Tongzhi revision of year 7, Alcock had agreed to close Qiongzhou in exchange for Wenzhou. Now Wade, joined by the French, Russian, American, and Prussian ministers, asked again, and the court agreed to reopen Qiongzhou. In year 12 the Tongzhi Emperor assumed personal rule and foreign ministers were at last received in audience. For months the powers had haggled over court etiquette; Britain had been the most insistent. Now bowing replaced the kowtow, three bows becoming five in what was styled an "enhanced courtesy."
25
使 使 使使 使 使 沿沿沿 使西便 便 沿 使 使沿沿 使 西 使調 使調 使
In the fifth month, year 2, an edict declared that the Margary affair, long debated between senior ministers and Minister Wade without result, must now be settled by Li Hongzhang. In the sixth month Li was appointed plenipotentiary and went to Yantai; negotiations with Wade deadlocked for more than a month before terms were fixed. In the seventh month Li reported from Yantai that Wade insisted all witnesses be brought to Beijing for retrial, focusing above all on provincial governor Cen Yuying as the alleged mastermind. Li rebuffed him repeatedly. Envoys of Russia, Germany, the United States, France, Japan, and Austria—along with British and German admirals—were also at Yantai; on the emperor's birthday Li hosted a banquet for all the envoys and naval commanders, and the goodwill thus cultivated helped loosen the talks. The next day Wade agreed to an alternative procedure and submitted draft articles for Li's review. Six articles on exonerating officials in the Yunnan case had already been accepted by the Yamen; only the indemnity sum remained open. Three articles on diplomatic privileges followed: first, uniform etiquette when Chinese and foreign officials met inside and outside the capital, to forestall disputes; second, joint trial of cases at treaty ports; third, the right of foreign observers at trials—the last two were to be read together. The observer principle had already been conceded in earlier eight-article negotiations. On commercial matters, seven original articles remained. First, delimit zones exempt from likin on foreign goods and open additional ports along the coast, rivers, and lakes; second, new ports in three tiers—Chongqing, Yichang, Wenzhou, Wuhu, and Beihai for consuls; Hukou, Shashi, and Shuidong for deputy commissioners of customs; and Anqing, Datong, Wuxue, Luxikou, Yuezhou, and Masi for steamers to land passengers and cargo; third, opium to pay duty and likin together at treaty customs houses; fourth, a uniform certificate for the transit duty on foreign goods, issuable to Chinese and foreign merchants alike, with agreed safeguards on foreign merchants exporting native goods; fifth, fixed validity periods for warehouse receipts when foreign goods were re-exported; sixth, revised regulations for revenue cruisers operating out of Hong Kong; seventh, further talks on concessions not yet demarcated at various ports. On these points, collecting opium likin at treaty customs would curb smuggling and allow rates to be raised when needed; tighter rules on native-goods transit passes would curb false reporting and smuggling; and a sound revenue regime for Hong Kong would still benefit the imperial treasury. The remaining clauses were consistent with existing treaties. Wade also sought passports for a survey mission to Tibet the following year; as this lay outside the Yunnan, diplomatic, and commercial sections, it was set out in a separate article. After prolonged debate over likin-free zones and new ports, the court conceded on boundaries—exempting foreign-goods likin only within concessions while reserving the right to tax both foreign and native goods elsewhere. Higher opium duties could offset revenue losses and seemed acceptable on balance. On new ports the Yamen had already approved Yichang, Wenzhou, and Beihai; Hart then secured approval for Wuhu as well. Li held to prior limits and approved four ports for consular residence. Chongqing, where an English officer might reside, had been conceded in the eight articles but could not yet be opened as a full port until steamers could reach it upstream. Steamers already stopped at will along the Yangtze to take on passengers and cargo; without clear rules the practice could not be stopped. Wade insisted on formal approval; Li argued the issue was not how many landing places existed but how clearly port limits were drawn inland. Li agreed that cargo must be transferred by native craft under inland rules: foreign goods with duty certificates would be likin-exempt, certificated native goods could be loaded but not sold ashore, and all other dues would be collected by local officials—matching existing likin practice, provided barrier staff enforced the rules. Wade had asked for nine stops including Hukou; Li barred Shuidong on the Guangdong coast and Yuezhou as too far inland, granting six Yangtze anchorages—Datong, Anqing, Hukou, Wuxue, Luxikou, and Shashi—subject to inland likin rules. Li also told the German minister Brandt that new ports in Germany's revised treaty would follow the British settlement. Wade asked that concession zones, likin exemptions, and combined opium duties take effect in six months after consultation with other powers; this was allowed as a separate clause. On the Tibet survey, the treaty already allowed travel and could not reasonably be blocked. The draft had left timing to the Yamen and the Tibetan resident minister; Li noted the Yamen would decide when the mission should proceed. Once the other points were settled, talks turned to the Margary indemnity. Wade said he had last winter sent four fast cruisers solely for this affair to protect merchants, at a cost approaching one million taels. Li replied that the two countries were not at war and that there was no precedent for paying military costs as indemnity, and asked Wade to state a definite sum. Wade said the Wusong Railway dispute was still contentious; if Li would mediate, Britain would cover that issue and hold to the original figure of two hundred thousand taels, and the indemnity was settled. On the twenty-sixth the negotiated articles were drawn up in four Chinese and four English copies, signed, sealed, and exchanged. On border trade with Yunnan, Wade said opening would be deferred for the time being and asked that the closing edict say so explicitly. The memorial was received and noted. Li Hongzhang then resumed his post as governor-general of Zhili. After ratification and exchange, the agreement became known as the Chefoo Convention. It had three sections: vindication in the Margary affair, diplomatic courtesies, and trade. A fourth separate article was added. That year Liu Xihong was sent to Britain as acting fifth-rank capital official with an imperial letter of regret over the Margary affair, as the treaty required.
26
西
In year 3 Britain cast its eyes on Kashgar, citing protection of Andijan. Zuo Zongtang, governor-general of Shaanxi and Gansu, refused. Britain asked China to delimit a border with Kashgar and sought permission to survey routes into Tibet; both requests were denied. That year China first posted a consul at Singapore in British territory. In the eighth month, year 4, Fujian locals razed the British church at Wushishan; Britain demanded compensation before it would drop the matter. In year 5 Britain pressed China to fix likin rates and exact figures. The Yamen proposed to keep Chefoo terms: customs duties on the old scale and likin under existing rules.
27
滿
In the tenth month, year 7, Li Hongzhang again negotiated with Wade over higher combined duties on imported opium. The idea of a combined opium duty had first come from Zuo Zongtang, who had proposed one hundred fifty taels per chest. Provincial governors debated the matter by correspondence, but no agreement was reached. During the Margary negotiations Li took up opium duties again with Wade. Wade insisted import and export tariffs be negotiated together, sought ten per cent ad valorem on imports, refused export increases on British merchants' plea, and wanted combined opium duties at treaty ports in exchange for abolishing inland likin. Li replied that a nationwide likin exemption would require one hundred twenty taels at the customs—three times the basic duty. Without likin exemption the rate need only be doubled, to sixty taels. Wade then received from London a draft opium tariff with several clauses: "First, combined duties raised to ninety taels; second, the basic duty raised to fifty taels, with port likin unchanged; third, China might monopolize Indian opium imports while India phased out cultivation over agreed years, with price, payment schedule, and settlement in Hong Kong or India left to bilateral terms and to official or merchant management; fourth, a British opium company would pay India a fixed sum per chest and China a fixed likin, after which opium would be duty-free inland, while India undertook to end exports over a set period." Wade had already accepted ten per cent on general imports, but reopened the question while opium duties remained unsettled. He also sought a likin-free belt of twenty or thirty li beyond each concession. Li objected that likin exemption within concessions was treaty-bound and long established and could not be widened. He refused. Wade also asked for a telegraph cable from Hong Kong to Guangdong, landing only near the Huangpu steamer anchorage as the provincial authorities might designate.
28
使 使 稿 退
In the third month, year 9, the throne ordered: "Combined opium duties were promised in the Chefoo Convention; the Yamen had repeatedly negotiated with Wade, who stalled by referring every point to London. Wade has now left China. Zeng Jiyang in London should settle the matter on Li Hongzhang's figure of one hundred ten taels, payable on import. Opium had poisoned the country for decades and ought to be curbed. Britain itself had a temperance movement that regarded the trade as a national disgrace. If Zeng could steer London toward a phased reduction of imports, that would strike at the root of the evil. He was told to explore that course as well. Zeng obeyed and bargained with the Foreign Office for three years before terms were fixed. In the sixth month, year 11, he reported: "As ordered, I negotiated with Foreign Secretary Earl Granville and Under-Secretaries Ponsonby and Clare, pressing hard on the sum until London accepted one hundred ten taels per chest. In the second month the Foreign Office agreed to my terms in a memorandum and proposed a separate article giving Britain the right to cancel the agreement if other treaty powers did not follow suit. I resisted that clause and they recorded it only in an exchange of notes. The memorandum was in effect the agreed text. Its opening language on "restriction and constraint" reflected the India Office's refusal of a fixed schedule of reductions. Under-Secretary Pauncefote told Macartney privately that the new duty already cost India over seven hundred thousand pounds a year; further cuts in imports could come only through higher taxes to discourage use, not through a treaty timetable with London. I did not press the point but asked that the opening clause state that the opium trade must be "restricted and constrained," reserving leverage for future tariff increases. Rules against evasion and a central collecting office were already required by section five of the Chefoo Convention's commercial articles. Article nine of the new protocol repeated that pledge; detailed regulations could be worked out later to stop smuggling. The other clauses matched the Yamen's standing instructions. The Yamen soon telegraphed approval to sign. Granville had just left office; Salisbury returned as prime minister and foreign secretary. On 3 June London set the signing for the seventh. On the appointed day I went to the Foreign Office with my staff and exchanged seals with Salisbury on two Chinese and two English copies of the supplementary articles. Besides fixing the combined duty at one hundred ten taels as ordered, article five preserved likin on opium broken bulk for inland retail, so inland taxation was not wholly surrendered. If China later raised duties on native opium to discourage use, foreign opium could be taxed proportionally. I left native-opium duties out of the protocol to keep that lever in Chinese hands. The memorial was approved. The two governments then exchanged ratifications—the Convention Supplementary to the Chefoo Convention.
29
西 使 西 退
In the eighth month Britain again pressed for trade with Tibet. That year Britain invaded Burma and took the capital. Yunnan governor Cen Yuying asked for defenses and sent regional commander Ding Huai to Tengyue with troops. China, treating Burma as a long-standing dependency, wired Zeng Jiyang to press London to preserve the dynasty and install a prince of the Meng family. The Foreign Office denied Chinese suzerainty but offered a Meng collateral as a religious king without political power. Zeng refused; after a change of foreign secretary even the religious-king proposal lapsed. Then chargé d'affaires O'Conor, citing the Chefoo clause on missions to Tibet, insisted it be carried out at once. Yamen ministers resisted on the ground that Tibetans would not admit Westerners. O'Conor then came to the Yamen on Burma, explaining that Britain had invaded because Burma had secretly allied with France. Restoring the Burmese king, he said, would leave the Franco-Burmese treaty in force and could not be done. He proposed instead the old decennial Burmese mission to Beijing, a Sino-Burmese boundary survey, and border trade to satisfy earlier commitments. Ministers argued that "dispatching staff" was not tribute until O'Conor agreed to the usual presentation of local products; boundary and trade terms stood as he asked. O'Conor then dropped the Tibet mission in return for a Chinese promise to consider Sino-Indian trade when circumstances allowed. The Yamen then signed a four-article draft convention with O'Conor, which the throne approved. In the ninth month, year 12, China asked Britain to leave Korea's Komundo (Giant Stone Island); Britain refused. In the tenth month the court debated which Qiongzhou port to open. The consul cited treaty language on Niuzhuang, Dengzhou, Taiwan, Chaozhou, and "Qiongzhou prefectural city and port" to claim both city and harbor were open ports; China replied that the Chefoo supplementary articles had closed the question for ports where concessions already existed. At Tianjin only the treaty port outside the city was open while Zizhulin held the concessions and the walled city was not a port; by that precedent Qiongzhou harbor was the port, not Qiongzhou city. In the seventh month, year 13, the Burma convention was exchanged in London.
30
使 使
In the spring of year 14 a British officer, Magalei, advanced into Tibet; Tibetans built blockhouses but were driven back by troops of British India. They then attacked Nathu La in what they held to be Sikkimese territory and were defeated again. Tibet had submitted in the early Qing; once Britain held India, Tibet faced the Raj along its southern marches. Under Qianlong the governor-general of India had asked the Panchen Lama for trade; the Lama said Beijing must decide, and talks lapsed. Sikkim lay between Tibet and India. In the Daoguang era Britain made it a protectorate of India. Tibetans, unaware of the Chefoo clause on surveys, fortified Lungdu Ridge beyond the border to stop British advance. Britain protested; the emperor ordered Liu Bingzhang of Sichuan to urge the Tibetan resident Wen Shuo and assistant Sheng Tai to tell all Tibetan officials to pull back their outposts at once. Sheng Tai had not yet arrived; Wen Shuo, inexperienced in diplomacy, reported that refusing the British was protecting Tibet. Beijing rebuked him severely and replaced him with Chang Geng. Another edict sent Sheng Tai to Tibet to tell the chiefs: "Last year's agreement with Britain deferred border trade while the court protected the Yellow Faith and Tibetan subjects—our plan for lasting security. Withdraw the outposts at once. The viceroy of India has pledged not to cross the Relabara ridge, the border between Tibet and China. No fighting had yet begun; whether the ground was Tibetan or Sikkimese could still be argued later." This was in the first month, year 14.
31
使退便
Before the order reached Tibet, British forces stormed Lungdu, destroyed the works, and the Tibetan troops scattered. Wen Shuo then urged using trade talks to slow the advance and allowed Tibetans to make a separate agreement with Britain and report it to court. On the dinghai day of the fourth month an edict declared: "India-Tibet trade was not to be pressed by Britain. This fighting had nothing to do with trade. Wen Shuo never grasped the stakes yet tried to trade concessions for peace, forgetting that Tibet is Chinese territory and cannot treaty with foreigners on its own. Sheng Tai and Wen Shuo were to tell the chiefs that any agreement must go through the resident minister and the Yamen for imperial approval." On the gengshen day of the fifth month another edict cited Minister Liu Ruifen's telegram: "The viceroy of India writes again that if Tibetans withdraw to their former line, relations may be restored and he has no wish to invade Tibet or disturb friendship between our countries. Tibetan affairs have always rested with the council of regents; the Ninth Pakpa Hutuktu's faction is moderate and capable, and now holds the council—the duty is theirs alone. On receiving the decree, Sheng Tai instructed Demu to settle the affair properly."
32
西 稿 西 調沿 便 使 西
Before long Sheng Tai reached his post and took up his duties. In the ninth month he memorialized: "The Tibetans courted unrest and opened hostilities. All the country north and south of Lungdu Ridge had always been Sikkimese. Britain counted it within the protectorate, yet Sikkim and Bhutan were dependencies of Tibet: at year's end both chiefs presented New Year memorials to the resident minister, who by custom granted them rewards. From the Dalai Lama down, Tibetans owed fixed gifts; the regency returned silk, silver, and tea, and draft replies to both states had to be approved by the resident minister before letters could be sent. Disputes between Sikkim and Bhutan were referred to Lhasa, which sent Chinese and Tibetan officers to adjudicate—proof that both were Tibetan dependencies in practice. In Guangxu 2 both chiefs had petitioned in Tibetan script that Britain eyed Tibetan soil and begged Beijing to act in time. Zhou Qin of Siwang Pass and Dai Biong had been sent with the lama Chidaje to negotiate, but secured only a hollow pledge from Sikkim, closed the file, and planned no follow-up—an error on the frontier from which the later trouble sprang. Seeing Tibet's shortsightedness, the Sikkimese then dealt chiefly with Britain, leased land for roads as far as Nianna—still called a concession—and Tibet thereby lost its buffer. Tibet failed to protect its dependencies: when Sikkim was bullied Lhasa did nothing, then seized Sikkimese land and accused the Sikkimese of siding with Britain—driving them closer to India and into war with Tibet. After their defeat on the thirteenth of the fourth month Tibetans made no peace but poured levies along hill paths toward Phari, plundering civilians along the way. Supply officers skimped on rations; the men grumbled and would not fight. Only Dai Biong's three thousand men and a few hundred from Gongbu were reliable; the rest were a mob. More than ten thousand men lay beyond Zhapa Pass with thousands more at each gap; a rout would turn the thousand-li of courier lines into bandit country—an internal peril. Persuasion failed because, at first contact with foreigners, the regency and the three great monasteries had sworn that no Tibetan man or woman would live with aliens on earth, and that whoever broke the oath betrayed the Yellow Hat faith and might be killed. Wicked men had framed the oath to rally resistance to the throne; the great monasteries used it to meddle in affairs of state. The crisis was acute and an imperial decree had reached Lhasa; even Demu was frightened. To break the original oath at once was to court death; even the trade ministers would be at risk, let alone the kalöns below them. They seemed to think only a desperate stand could change their fate. This was my reading of their private mind, not words the Tibetans themselves had used. Troops had not yet withdrawn, so commissioners could not safely proceed. Boundary talks required knowing which British officer would meet them; I asked that the minister in Beijing be consulted and the Yamen inform Tibet, lest we work at cross purposes. Tibetans had grown unusually truculent; having started war and shown no repentance, indulgence was hard to justify. Yet Tibet was far from Sichuan, short of pay and men—everything was a constraint. I dared act only with utmost care, hoping to ease the court's anxieties for the western marches."
33
西 使退 使
On the dingmao day of that month he memorialized again: "I reached Tibet on the twenty-sixth of the fifth month. Demu and Tibetan officials, clergy, and laity jointly petitioned that the border lay at Nathu La south of Lungdu, that their outposts were within Tibet, and that Britain had attacked without cause. Boundaries are vital to any province—surely there were old records. Staff searched the archives and found a Qianlong-era file by Helin and He Ying placing Tibet's inner border at the Yala and Zhimu ranges three stages from Phari, marked by obo cairns. Chumbi and Nathu La had lain on the Tibetan side, but in Qianlong 53, when Nepal invaded, Sikkim was driven beyond the Zangchu; the Dalai Lama then granted Nathu La to Sikkim. Commissioner Zhang Zhilin had reported clearly that Nathu La was not Tibet's border and that markers should stand only on Yala and Zhimu. That map is lost, but another old chart marks Nathang as Sikkimese frontier and draws Yala Peak on Tibet's southern line—proof that Yala was Tibet's southern limit. Lungdu Ridge, where Tibetans had built posts, does not appear on old maps. Britain placed Nathu La north of Lungdu; Tibet's new map drew it to the south—an invented stretch of "Tibetan" border. I gave the original dossier and old map to my commissioners for the Tibetans to read. They looked ashamed yet insisted Nathu La was Tibetan soil: though once granted to Sikkim, Sikkim was now under Britain and the tract should revert to Lhasa. A telegraphed decree arrived and I instructed Demu in person. I urged Demu to pull troops back to Phari and sent Sikkimese and Bhutanese chiefs to the British camp to explain that Tibet could not withdraw first while under pressure, but that Indian troops should keep their word and both sides retire on the same day; I would also write the British officer to hurry the withdrawal. Word then came that on the twenty-eighth of the sixth month Britain had sent nine hundred more men and six heavy guns. Demu reported that British forces were repeatedly assaulting our camps. The exiled Nepalese prince Gorzanian was also marching five hundred men from India to help Britain and was said to have passed Darjeeling—so we dared not withdraw. I begged the Yamen to tell the British minister, telegraph the viceroy to fix a withdrawal date, and forbid further Indian attacks."
34
退 西
The throne replied: "Sheng Tai's analysis goes to the heart of the matter. Liu Ruifen telegraphed on the twenty-eighth of the eighth month that near Jelep La Indian and Tibetan troops had fought, with hundreds of Tibetan casualties, and that Indian forces had pursued into the Zhengbi defile. On the fifteenth of the ninth month he reported that the Foreign Office had replied that General Graham, who attacked Nathang, obeyed India's order not to hold Tibetan soil and withdrew as soon as he entered Zhengbi. The viceroy also reported that the resident minister would leave Lhasa for the frontier on 3 October and had sent Political Officer Paul to meet him. Sheng Tai has presumably met Paul by now. The Tibet-Sikkim line should be settled; the viceroy had also said he wished a quick end. Deliberate carefully and conclude the affair."
35
使 退 退便 貿 退 使
Sheng Tai first sent Xiao Zhanxian, garrison commander at Gyangzê, to reason with them, then the magistrate Xiuyin. After the Tibetan defeat British troops pursued to Renjing Ridge and were about to burn every house on the slope. Zhanxian arrived, argued with the British commander, and induced them to fall back to Doklam while pressing Sheng Tai to come to talks. Days later they advanced again and occupied Gubu. Sheng Tai came in the eleventh month and met Paul at Doklam; a month of talks failed. He reported that Britain, flush with victory, would not withdraw until every point was settled. Sikkim alone was debated ten times: Paul demanded treaty language making it British territory and a border on Jelep La—the Rela Bara of earlier memorials. I cited the viceroy's pledge that if Tibetans returned to their old line and left Lungdu unmanned, matters could proceed as before and India would not cross into Tibet; Paul said that applied only before war—after hostilities, terms must change. On trade, Britain's draft articles aimed at commerce inside Tibet. After long argument they agreed to limit trade to Gyangzê. When I refused that too, they turned to Phari. Phari was Tibet's southern gate; the choke point was Glingka on the slope. Phari Dre lay on the plateau where Nepal, Sikkim, and Bhutan met. To win Tibetan consent, trade had to lie beyond the border. I stood firm; Paul was openly angry. I could only negotiate calmly, hoping to relieve the immediate crisis." That year Britain set limits on Chinese labor emigration to Australia. Queen Victoria's Golden Jubilee was marked by a Chinese mission of congratulation.
36
使 西
In year 15 Sheng Tai reopened talks on trade and boundaries, still without result. In the second month of year 16 the court sent James Hart, brother of Inspector General Robert Hart, to Tibet to help negotiate the Tibet-India settlement. Sheng Tai reported that Tibetans would obey orders on withdrawal, but boundary and trade remained the hard questions. At the frontier the Sikkimese chief's mother came with kinsmen and headmen to petition: "When Britain first treated with us, we agreed they must not cross the Rishi Chu by a single step. Sikkim leased land to Britain for twelve thousand dollars a year, yet not a cent had been paid. This war has ruined us; we will not again be British subjects." Sikkim is a small, remote state. This year's fighting let Britain seize the whole country, move the raja to Kalimpong, and garrison Gangtok, his former capital. Dispossessed and exiled, their plight deserved pity. At the talks I could grant only protection, but had to insist on the phrase "as before," lest Tibet accuse me of losing a dependency and to keep Bhutan in hand. Bhutan is larger, richer, and warlike—several times Sikkim's size and Tibet's shield to the south; Westerners call it Bhutan. It had sent tribute last year, though its chief held no seal or title. When I arrived its chief sent seventeen hundred men to serve in camp. I was disbanding Tibetan levies and could not keep so large a foreign force on the field. I rewarded them, urged duty, sent them home, and promised to seek imperial favor later. They left rejoicing."
37
使使 使 使 使
Once James Hart arrived, Sheng Tai resumed talks with Paul, who was India's commissioner but could decide nothing without Calcutta. Tibetans refused a frontier with Britain and demanded Sikkim stand between. Britain had interned the Sikkimese raja at Kalimpong and aimed to annex his state, which inflamed Tibetan opinion. Sheng Tai forbade Tibetan clergy and officials to meddle in Sikkim and had Hart urge the British not to replace the raja and give Lhasa a pretext. The old Tibet-Sikkim line ran between Yala and Zhimu; traders later opened the Jelep route, a spur of Jelep La. Sheng Tai proposed marking the Tibet-Sikkim border on Jelep La, leaving the India-Sikkim line on the Rishi Chu as before, and writing both into treaty. Tibetans resisted trade, first naming Doklam, then accepting Yatung in southern Tibet with a customs post under Chinese officers. Tibetans had barely consented when British officers stalled again. Sheng Tai begged the Yamen to press the British minister for a speedy settlement. Minister Wang of the Yamen drafted four points and bargained with Minister Walsham until eight articles were fixed. The Yamen memorialized: "Article 1: Tibet and Sikkim shall take the crest of Jelep La as the boundary; Article 2: Sikkim shall remain under British protection; Article 3: neither side shall cross the border; the rest to be discussed later. Remaining details might be settled gradually by commissioners on both sides. It asked that Sheng Tai be named plenipotentiary to initial the agreement with the British commissioner. The throne assented. That autumn Minister Xue Fucheng exchanged ratifications in London with the Foreign Office, completing the Anglo-Chinese Convention on Tibet and Sikkim.
38
使 使
The same year marked Guangxu's imperial wedding. Britain sent Minister Walsham with Queen Victoria's letter of congratulation and a chiming clock inscribed: "Sun and moon share their light, marking every hour with good fortune; heaven and earth in harmony, celebrating endless years of wealth, honor, longevity, and peace." The court then had Minister Xue Fucheng call on the Foreign Office to convey thanks and present China's letter of credence. That year Britain secured the opening of Chongqing to foreign trade.
39
滿 貿 使 貿 滿 滿
In the first month of Guangxu 17, as the deadline for exchanging supplementary terms arrived, Sheng Tai sent Huang Shaoxun, Zhang Fang, and James Hart to Darjeeling to meet Paul, Lansdowne's commissioner. Each side put forward its proposals. Paul wanted trade opened at Phari Town, more than 150 li inside Tibet beyond Renqing Pass ( that is, Phari). A customs post would be established there, with import duties fixed only after ten years. Sheng Tai clung to the twelve-year-old wording that border trade was for China to arrange as circumstances allowed, and months of argument produced no agreement. In the sixth month of Guangxu 18 they agreed with Paul on nine trade regulations and two supplements, placing the British mart in Yadong below Jelep La. Tibetan merchant elites again objected, insisting Article Two state that traders "must not enter the interior without permission" and demanding a ban on Indian tea imports. They argued repeatedly with Minister Walsham, but the matter remained unsettled. In the fifth month of Guangxu 19 the Yamen reported: "Hart advises that India has revised the nine regulations. The crucial change to Article Two limits British trade at Yadong to the stretch from the frontier to the town itself; Article Four postpones fixing import and export duties for five years; Indian tea may not enter Tibet at once but only after five years, and its tax may not exceed that levied on Chinese tea in Britain; all other clauses follow Sheng Tai's proposals." We find that under the Sino-British tariff Chinese tea pays 2.5 taels per hundred jin at home, whereas Chinese tea in Britain pays 10 taels per hundred jin. Indian tea entering Tibet was set at the same 10 taels per hundred jin as Chinese tea in Britain—terms that took a year of negotiation to secure. The three remaining issues on Tibet had been debated since Guangxu 17—three years in all—until India and Tibet finally agreed. The Yamen urged closing the matter to secure the border. These were the Supplementary Regulations to the Anglo-Chinese Convention on Tibet and Sikkim. Ratifications were exchanged at Darjeeling that October.
40
Britain and China next turned to the Yunnan–Burma boundary. Earlier, in talks with Zeng Jiyang, Britain had agreed in principle to extend China's frontier east of the Salween in the Zomia and Jingpo hill country. Zeng Jiyang later demanded Bhamo itself, and London refused. Under-Secretary Clare replied that London had ordered its Burma officer to survey a site where China might open a customs station, with talk of an alternative spot east of old Bhamo. Zeng Jiyang exchanged memoranda with the Foreign Office and shelved the issue. He was soon replaced and returned home.
41
使 西
Envoy Xue Fucheng then saw Britain demarcating territory with Siam and heard of a planned railway to the Yunnan border. He warned that delay on boundaries and trade would cost China dearly. He memorialized urging immediate talks with Britain. When Xue pressed Britain to honor prior understandings, London cited international law: "Under Western public law, agreements made after a treaty is signed must be kept; agreements made before a treaty is signed cannot bind either party." Britain thus repudiated earlier concessions on extending the frontier, sharing the Jinsha River, surveying near Bhamo, and allowing a Chinese customs station.
42
綿 西
With Britain having gone back on its word, Xue Fucheng argued that the wild hill tracts beyond Burma stretched for thousands of li and asked the Foreign Ministry to take the Jinsha River as the border, assigning everything east of it to Yunnan. The Viceroy of India refused and sent troops from Hsima beyond Tengyue to raid hill tribes, signaling that he would not yield territory. He also tried to use the unrest as grounds to suspend the whole commercial treaty. Xue Fucheng nevertheless pressed for a quick settlement. After prolonged delay Britain agreed to restore Hanlong and Tianma, passes long under Burmese control. Much later it also yielded Tiebi Pass. Huju Pass alone was withheld on the ground that it lay seventy or eighty li inside Burmese territory near Bhamo. Britain was especially adamant against a customs station. Xue argued that if Britain would not yield territory, the concessions China had granted Britain should be void as well. After months of deadlock Britain conceded Kokang southwest of Mengding and Ganlanba, and drew a straight line from beyond Mengmao—including Hanlong Pass—east to the Salween opposite Maliba, ceding roughly eight hundred square miles to China. Zhenbian, long under dual Cheli and Menglian jurisdiction, was ceded outright, as was Hsima in the adjoining hill country. The boundary dispute was thus closed. On trade, however, Britain still refused navigation on the Jinsha and a customs station at Bhamo. Xue wrangled for months until Britain added a separate navigation clause excluding other powers, but would not budge on customs. Britain accepted Chinese limits on Burmese salt, deferred British customs duties, capped consular posts, restricted trade routes, and barred new treaty ports without protest. On the twenty-fourth day of the first month of Guangxu 20 a twenty-article treaty was signed in London. Articles 1–4 defined the boundary in sections; Article 5 relinquished China's claims to vacant lands beyond Yongchang and Tengyue while Britain ceded North Theinni, Kokang, Menglian, and Chiang Hung, neither to be alienated before ratification; Article 8 listed taxable and exempt goods; Articles 10 and 11 specified permitted and prohibited goods; Article 13 placed a Chinese consul at Rangoon and a British consul at Manwun; Article 15 covered extradition; Article 17 granted reciprocal most-favored-nation treatment; and a special clause limited the treaty to the designated territories of each side. This was the Anglo-Chinese Convention Relating to Burma and Yunnan.
43
使西 西 西 西
That year Britain and China also agreed on a land telegraph linking the Yunnan–Burma frontier. Talks on Tibet and India were reopened shortly afterward. In the summer of Guangxu 21, after peace with Japan, France demanded Mengwu and Wude beyond Pu'er. Minister O'Conor claimed the districts were Burmese Chiang Hung, charged China with breach of treaty, and demanded the hill tract north of Bhamo from Sabaping to Zhedao, down the Namwan and Ruili rivers to Mengmao, and south through Gonglong, Baguan, and Kokang. Beijing refused. Britain then offered West River trade in exchange for reopening the hill-country issue, and China agreed. London also sought consulates at Zhaoqing, Wuzhou, Guilin, Xunzhou, and Nanning and steamers at Foshan, Gaoyao, Fengchuan, and Nanxinxu, entering via Guangzhou and Macao. Beijing replied that the hill cession was minor but the port demands excessive; Guilin lies north of the Bei River and Xunzhou and Nanning on upstream tributaries, not the West River, and could not be forced open. China resisted. The Foreign Office claimed North Theinni and Kokang had been wrongly assigned to China in Xue Fucheng's boundary settlement and demanded their return; it sought consulates at Tengyue, Shunning, and Simao; and connection of Burmese railways, present and future, to China; and, citing Russian and French treaty privileges, consulates in Xinjiang. After repeated argument Beijing deleted the Xinjiang ports and the most-favored-nation clause; the railway article was limited to connection once Chinese lines reached the border; the Yunnan consulate issue was settled by relocating Manwun to Shunning or Tengyue, with Simao governed by equal-benefits precedent; and the hill boundary was revised to a permanent lease of Nankan only, with the rest to be surveyed jointly. West River trade alone was conceded as far as Wuzhou, with only Sanshui and Jianggenxu beyond, entered via Modaomen; the Hong Kong–Guangzhou route remained limited to Jiangmen, Ganzhu, Zhaoqing, and Deqing. A supplementary Sino-Burmese treaty was signed. That was in the first month of Guangxu 23. That year, Victoria's Diamond Jubilee, Zhang Yinhuan was sent to offer congratulations.
44
使 沿
In the fourth month of Guangxu 24 Hong Kong's bounds were extended to Kowloon City for ninety-nine years. In the fifth month Britain leased Weihaiwei. Weihai was initially held by Japan. Britain wrote to Prime Minister Ito offering to pay China's indemnity if Japanese troops withdrew promptly. Once China finished paying indemnities, Beiyang officials took possession; Minister MacDonald then sought a lease. Prince Qing (Yikuang) and Minister Liao Shouheng signed a treaty leasing Liugong Island, the islands of Weihai Bay, and ten miles of shoreline to Britain while Weihaiwei city itself remained under Chinese administration. Chinese warships might still use the leased waters inside and outside the bay. A separate note added that as China rebuilt its navy its ships might anchor in the harbor and requested British training assistance.
45
使
That month, citing the Shashi outrage, the British consul demanded treaty ports in Hunan. Zhang Zhidong replied that Yuezhou's opening still required study and asked the Yamen to negotiate a postponement. The Yamen offered a two-year delay; the British minister refused. The Yamen insisted Hunan was a self-opened port unlike treaty ports and refused to tie it to Shashi. The dispute dragged on. In the fifth month of Guangxu 25 Hankou's British consul notified Zhang Zhidong that a Commander Ba wished to send a small gunboat up the Dongting region—to Yuezhou, Xiangyin, Changsha, and then the Yuan, Longyang, Changde, and Anxiang. Zhang blocked the move, noting that no treaty allowed gunboats inland. In the twelfth month Counselor Bland planned to go from Changsha through Changde and Yongshun into Sichuan via Youyang to Chongqing. Zhang Zhidong again refused. He was later allowed to enter Sichuan via Yichang instead.
46
西 西
In Guangxu 26 the Boxer movement erupted. In the fifth month Hankou consul Fraser told Zhang Zhidong that Lord Salisbury had wired: "If the Yangtze region needs policing, Britain will help with warships." Zhang replied that he and Liu Kunyi would keep order themselves and firmly refused foreign help. Britain had already sent Admiral Seymour up the Yangtze to "protect" southeastern trade. On the twentieth day of the seventh month allied forces entered Beijing; British troops came through Guangqu Gate and each power took its sector. In the eighth month Britain and Germany agreed on protecting Chinese commerce and territory, then offered to manage Chinese finances and training; Beijing refused. Seymour wanted gunboats on the Han River to survey channels; Zhang Zhidong again refused. Talks resumed over the missionary disturbance at Quzhou in Zhejiang. The Hunan incident was still open when Britain again sought to send warships; Beijing repeatedly refused. That year Queen Victoria died. China sent a letter of condolence, and the Empress Dowager cabled her own message of sympathy.
47
西 沿
In 1901, once the twelve-point Boxer settlement had been agreed with the powers, Britain asked in the fourth month that examinations be suspended in Zhili and Shanxi. Zhang Zhidong argued at length that the request violated Article 10 of the settlement; agreement was reached only in the seventh month. In the eighth month Archibald Little sought to run steamers on Sichuan waterways, bought land at seven riverside sites, and asked local officials to register the purchases. The British consul's note reached Hubei, but officials refused: these were not treaty ports, and no treaty clause allowed foreigners to buy land or buildings.
48
使 使稿 貿 使 使
In the eleventh month Minister Mackay went to Jiangsu and Hubei to negotiate likin abolition with Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong. They replied that Hart had already agreed in Beijing to combine import duty and likin on foreign goods, and that likin could be abolished only once the tariff reached 2.5 per cent ad valorem. Mackay accepted a higher import tariff but resisted a large increase. The court then named Lü Haihuan commissioner for the commercial treaty, with Sheng Xuanhuai as deputy, and ordered Liu Kunyi and Zhang Zhidong to join the talks. After months of negotiation Lü Haihuan and his colleagues jointly reported: "We were ordered to negotiate the commercial treaty. Minister Mackay submitted a draft of twenty-four articles, and we met more than sixty times. The tariff increase and likin abolition clause has already been approved as requested. We reported each of the other articles to the throne as negotiations proceeded. Article 10 on inland steam navigation was later settled by separate regulations. On Article 11, treaty-port privileges, we drafted three clauses, which Mackay himself asked to drop. Of the twenty-four articles requested, seven were rejected outright: foreign salt imports; inland residence and trade; postal and telegraph rights; maritime law courts; reform of the Shanghai Mixed Court; boundaries for likin exemption at ports; and exemption from re-import duty for goods carried on the same river. One clause was agreed and then struck: treaty-port privileges, which were to be folded into the tariff-and-likin article. Five were held back as bargaining chips: new treaty ports; lower export duties; triplicate certificates; transit passes; and placing native customs under maritime-customs control. Eleven were negotiated into acceptable form: deposit receipts; national currency; uniform taxes on Guangdong junks and steamers; Sino-foreign joint ventures; regulation of the Pearl and Sichuan rivers; bonded warehouses; trademark protection; tariff increase and likin abolition; mining regulations; inland steam navigation; and the grain-export ban. This is how Mackay's original articles were classified, revised, and consolidated. Zhang Zhidong and others pressed Mackay further, and he agreed to three additional clauses: extraterritorial jurisdiction; consultation on missionary cases; and a ban on morphine. Each addressed urgent needs of state finance and public welfare; securing them within the treaty is a real gain. After the main terms were settled Mackay added two requests: revision of the tariff revision period, and English as the authentic treaty text. Both follow established treaty practice and are standard treaty provisions. Sixteen articles in all. Mackay's tariff clause was meant to ensure the increase could not cover foreign indemnity beyond the original five million taels of likin, nor be diverted elsewhere, and to prevent provinces from levying new transit charges on goods. We have already reported this to the throne. Signing was set for the second day of the eighth month, but Mackay then received a telegram from London insisting on fuller wording to reassure foreign merchants backing the tariff increase. Minister Zhang Deyi in London reported that the Foreign Office required an edict assigning the new revenue to provincial governors, otherwise Britain would not sign—suggesting London feared higher tariffs without real likin abolition. On close review, although Britain asked that the full sum go to the provinces, the text still required remittances to Beijing and foreign-debt payments in full. We replied by note that allocated sums would remain at customs pending settlement between the Board of Revenue and the provinces. How the Board of Revenue would later allocate and offset those funds would remain entirely under our control, without foreign interference. Moreover, talks were already turning indemnity payments from gold to silver on grounds of China's financial exhaustion. Stating that the tariff increase would only offset likin abolition and not touch indemnity shows there would be no surplus—blocking other powers from making further claims. After many days' delay, the treaty was signed and sealed with Minister Mackay in Shanghai on the fourth day of the eighth month, late in the evening. The memorial was received and noted.
49
西 使 使
At the same time the inland steam-navigation regulations were revised in ten articles. Beyond the Shanghai–Suzhou, Shanghai–Hangzhou, and Suzhou–Hangzhou routes, Jiangsu gained the Haimen line ( from Shanghai northeast to Haimen) , the Suzhou–Zhenjiang line ( from Suzhou to Zhenjiang) , the Zhenjiang–Nanjing line ( from Zhenjiang to Nanjing) , the Zhenjiang–Qingjiang line ( from Zhenjiang to Qingjiang) Zhejiang had the Yuyao line ( from Ningbo to Yuyao) , the Zhoushan line ( from Ningbo to Zhoushan) , the Haimen line ( from Ningbo to Haimen in Taizhou) Anhui had the Luzhou line ( from Wuhu to Luzhou) Jiangxi had the Nanchang line ( from Jiujiang to Nanchang) Hubei had the Wuxue line ( from Hankou to Wuxue) , the Han River line ( from Hankou to Xiantao) , the Yuezhou line ( from Hankou to Yuezhou in Hunan) Hunan had the Xiangtan line ( from Yuezhou to Xiangtan) , the Changde line ( from Yuezhou to Changde) Fujian also had the Shuikou and Meihua lines ( both starting from Fuzhou). They also settled the case of the British missionary killed at Chenzhou in Hunan. That month Britain returned the railways in North China. That year King Edward VII was to be crowned, and Prince Zaizhen was appointed special envoy to attend. He presented his letter of credence in advance. By precedent envoys waited for a joint audience with all delegations assembled, but Edward arranged a separate audience first for the Chinese mission. At the ceremony they exchanged bows; the King returned the courtesy, and each side delivered its congratulatory address and reply.
50
便便 滿 西 調
In the second month of 1903 China signed the Shanghai–Nanjing Railway loan agreement with Britain. Britain had first sought to take the Shanghai–Nanjing line and assigned it to Jardine Matheson. A draft agreement had been negotiated, then set aside by the Boxer uprising. Years later terms were fixed: a loan of £3.25 million at five per cent annual interest. Zhang Zhidong then reported: "The loan is £3.25 million sterling, issued at ninety per cent of face value, at five per cent interest for fifty years, with permission to issue bonds in installments. If the state advanced funds or Chinese investors bought bonds back, the loan total would be reduced accordingly. After repaying the Wusong–Shanghai section, the completed line and the full Shanghai–Nanjing railway would serve as collateral. Of net profits the bank would receive one-fifth, matching its bond share, with separate profit coupons; after twelve and a half years an extra £2.5 per £100 would be paid. Bonds could be redeemed at any time; after twenty-five years at face value without premium. When profit coupons expired, surplus-profit payments would cease and the coupons would not be redeemed. During construction interest would be paid on principal; after completion bond redemption and principal would come from railway revenue. The full line was to be completed within five years. If completion slipped without cause, the bank would forfeit all surplus profit for five years. A headquarters would be set up in Shanghai. The provincial governor and the supervising minister would each appoint a general manager to oversee construction with British engineers, and the Nanyang minister would appoint an official of equal rank to audit accounts and report to the governors. Foreign engineers would manage construction only and could not interfere in local administration. All construction was to respect Chinese views and Chinese officials. No special railway tax would be levied during the loan period. If China later introduced general taxes such as stamp duties, the Shanghai–Nanjing line would be taxed on the same basis. The line would be double-tracked throughout. Land would be supplied by a land company, with advances from the bank. Extra land beyond the survey line could be bought for future development, funded by additional bonds of up to £250,000 at six per cent, paid from China's share of surplus profit rather than railway revenue. These land-purchase bonds had no fixed term and could be redeemed at any time. Materials bought for construction would carry a five per cent commission under Western practice, with no other markup. Materials from the Hanyang Iron Works were to be bought first when available. Troop movements, arms transport, and famine relief would travel at half fare with priority loading. Nothing infringing Chinese sovereignty might use the line. The formal agreement was signed and the draft superseded. If construction did not begin within twelve months, the formal agreement would be voided. China recognized only the British banking company and forbade transfer of the concession to any other state or its nationals. The terms were reported and approved. In the tenth month, China and Britain also signed a contract governing the handover of the Shanghai–Nanjing railway telegraph line.
51
In the fourth month of the thirtieth year (1904), Britain's newly appointed naval commander-in-chief arrived at Shanghai with ten warships of various sizes, intending to sail up the Yangtze. Zhang Zhidong learned of this and telegraphed to block the move. The British admiral sent only four vessels upriver, and they went no farther than Jiangning. That year China and Britain concluded a treaty on the protection of Chinese labourers abroad. Britain then wished to recruit Chinese workers for mining in its new South African possessions. The Qing government, invoking the Convention of 1860, negotiated a special agreement. When the treaty was concluded, consuls were posted to the districts where Chinese workers lived to ensure their proper treatment. In the fourth month of the thirty-first year (1905), China and Britain renewed the articles governing the Yunnan–Burma telegraph line. Britain appointed Billington of the Indian Telegraph Department as its treaty commissioner. Yuan Shikai, the telegraph minister, commissioned the intendant Zhu BaoKui to negotiate on China's behalf. Billington also asked to add a branch line from Jiangtong to Simao, but the request was denied. The parties then settled the terms and signed the agreement.
52
使 使 西 使
China and Britain also concluded a loan and operating contract for the Daoqing Railway. Initially the British minister asked the Zongli Yamen to let British firms build five railways, but the request was refused. Britain then cited the mining agreement, which allowed a railway from the mines to a river port on the Yangtze, and pressed to build the Ze–Xiang line. When the Xiangyang–Hankou waterway proved impracticable, they sought a Zezhou line instead, proposing to join the Beijing–Hankou railway at Huaiqing in Henan; then, after crossing the Yellow River, turning through Zhengyang Pass in Anhui to Pukou in Jiangsu and renaming the project the Huai–Pu Railway. The Yamen held that although the line was styled a branch, the Huai–Pu route would cut diagonally across Henan and Anhui and in effect create another north–south trunk, interfering with the Beijing–Hankou railway, and again refused. The British minister then asked to build the line from Zezhou to Daokou, and this was approved. Railway Minister Sheng Xuanhuai and others negotiated the loan in twenty-one articles, including ten on operation: £700,000 at five per cent interest, paid at ninety per cent of face value, yielding £630,000 net. At the same time draft agreements were made for a Shanxi smelting works and joint mining ventures, and Britain again sought permission to build the Guangzhou–Kowloon Railway. The British minister further insisted that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs register the loan contract by imperial rescript and diplomatic note before he would sign; China agreed.
53
使 稿 西使 使稿
In the fourth month of the thirty-second year (1906), China and Britain concluded the renewed Tibet–India convention. China had earlier concluded Tibet–India agreements with Britain in 1890 and 1893, but boundary markers between Tibet and Bhutan had never been set up, and the rules governing British access to Tibet had long remained unsettled. In the twenty-ninth year (1903) the governor-general of India sent troops into Tibet. The following spring they crossed from Darjeeling and seized Gyantse; and that summer they entered Lhasa. By the time the Dalai Lama had privately signed a treaty with Britain and Resident Commissioner You Tai reported the fact to Beijing, the Anglo-Tibetan agreement was already a fait accompli. The court ordered You Tai to negotiate the annulment of the treaty with Britain, but the effort failed. The court then appointed Tang Shaoyi, vice minister of foreign affairs, plenipotentiary commissioner, and sent him to India to negotiate with the British special envoy S. M. Fraser. Fraser demanded Chinese recognition of the new Anglo-Tibetan treaty before he would agree to revisions. Tang refused, and the British side threatened to break off talks. Tang, left with little choice, negotiated a six-article draft with him. Senior ministers at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs regarded the phrase in Article One—"the British Government recognizes China as the superior state of Tibet"—as crucial and telegraphed Tang to change "superior state" to "sovereign state." Fraser refused. The treaty remained unsettled for a long time. In the ninth month Tang was recalled to Beijing and Counsellor Zhang Yintang was appointed commissioner to continue the negotiations. The ministry negotiated with the British minister Satow to delete the first article of the draft; London agreed, but would allow no further changes to the remaining articles. Fraser, however, still held to his original terms and repeatedly pressed Zhang to sign, refusing even a single word's change to Article One. Zhang firmly resisted. When a new British cabinet took office, the incoming government ordered Satow to resume negotiations in Beijing. Only after prolonged talks was the formal five-article convention finally agreed.
54
使 貿 便
Before long the Pianma boundary dispute flared up again. Pianma lay on the Yunnan–Burma frontier within Tengyue district. After Britain annexed Burma, the two countries undertook a joint boundary survey. Near Pianma each side claimed the territory as its own, and the dispute dragged on unresolved. Britain then wished to send engineers to survey the route between Tengyue and Dali and asked China to provide protection. Yunnan Governor Ding Zhenduo notified the British consul that the province had memorialized to build the line through its own company and that conditions differed from those of the earlier survey, and he asked that no engineers be sent. The British minister Jordan then notified the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: "Your note of the seventh day of the second month states that Britain has the right to build the railway from Hsinching to Tengyue. The British Government cannot regard this shorter line as equivalent to the concession granted in March 1898 to France or to French firms designated by France to build the Laokai–Yunnan railway." The ministry replied, citing the supplementary Sino-Burmese treaty: "Article Twelve provides that China will consider in future whether railways in Yunnan would benefit trade and, if built, will allow connection with the Burmese railway. Railways within Chinese territory there are therefore for China itself to decide. On the nineteenth day of the ninth month, the sixteenth day of the tenth month, and on other dates, this ministry replied repeatedly to former Minister Satow's notes, holding firm to this position and stating that the French line from the Yunnan frontier to Kunming was authorized under a separate treaty and was not comparable to the Yunnan–Burma agreement. Each negotiation rests on its own treaty and the two cannot be equated. On the third day of the second month of the twenty-eighth year (1902) this ministry acknowledged former Minister Satow's note stating that Acting Consul Litton of Tengyue would soon visit Kunming to discuss railway and boundary matters with the governor. Connecting the Yunnan and Burmese railways would promote trade, and any benefit granted in Yunnan to French merchants should be granted equally to British merchants. This ministry understood the original note's references to discussing railways and boundaries and to connecting the Yunnan and Burmese lines—whether "boundary" or "connection"—as grounded in the original treaty, and on the seventh day of that month so informed the Yunnan governor. Later, in the first month of this year, the ministry received the Yunnan governor's report citing a note from the British consul and a telegram from Consul Litton: the Burmese government proposed building a railway from Hsinching to Tengyue for commercial transport, first sending a company to survey feasibility and then negotiating terms. The reply stipulated joint survey, separate construction of each section, and separate funding. The exchanges between Yunnan and the British consul therefore adhered strictly to the treaty's language on railway connection, without contradiction. In the fifth month of this year the Yunnan governor memorialized to build the short Tengyue line with provincial funds. The throne approved, expecting that China would construct its Yunnan sections in stages in accordance with the right to connect with the Burmese railway. Your Excellency's note now claims that the British Government has the right to build the Hsinching–Tengyue railway, citing the document of the third day of the second month of the twenty-eighth year and equating it with benefits granted to French merchants. This does not accord with the supplementary Sino-Burmese treaty or with the repeated notes of this ministry." In effect, China denied Britain any right to build the Tengyue railway.
55
仿 滿
In the first month of the thirty-third year (1907), China and Britain signed the formal loan contract for the Guangzhou–Kowloon Railway. Once Britain had obtained Kowloon, it had immediately sought permission to build the railway from Guangzhou to Kowloon. The Yamen ordered Railway Superintendent Sheng Xuanhuai to negotiate with Jardine Matheson. A five-article draft was signed, but the project was soon shelved. Britain now renewed the request. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs telegraphed Guangdong Governor Cen Chunxuan that although the draft was said to follow the Shanghai–Nanjing model, the Guangzhou–Kowloon line was shorter and cheaper and the circumstances differed. He should review Article Two, weigh the pros and cons carefully, and send officers to negotiate with the Sino-British company in keeping with the original understanding. In the fourth month negotiations were held with the company's agents Ross and Bland. Cen Chunxuan wished to follow the Tianjin–Yulin railway model. Bland refused, citing a prior agreement, and came from Guangdong to Beijing to continue talks with Tang Shaoyi and others. After prolonged negotiation the agreement was reached: a loan of £1,500,000 at ninety-four per cent of face value and five per cent annual interest, secured on the railway, with a thirty-year term and principal repayments in installments after twelve and a half years according to schedule. Before the twenty-fifth year, any principal repaid above the scheduled amount would carry a premium of £2 10s. per £100. The Sino-British company would place the loan bonds. The bonds would state their value in pounds sterling as agreed between China's minister in London and the company. All construction and engineering would be supervised by the Guangdong governor. Important posts were to be held by Chinese. When construction began, a headquarters would be established in Guangzhou to oversee building and operation. The governor would appoint a Chinese general superintendent, assisted by a British chief engineer and chief accountant, all subject to gubernatorial approval. The British company would receive £35,000 in remuneration for its services, paid in two installments, covering all expenses and fees. The contract also declared the railway to be Chinese property. If construction had not begun within eight months of signing, the contract would be void. None of the rights granted might be transferred to another state, nor might China build a competing line that would diminish this railway's profits. The contract was then signed.
56
使 西 西 西 使 滿 使 使西 鹿 使西西 西便 使西 仿 使 使 西西西 沿西西
In the sixth month the government ordered Hunan Governor Cen Chunming to investigate the loss of territory in the Sino-British boundary demarcation in Yunnan. Earlier Yunnan–Guizhou Governor-General Ding Zhenduo had commissioned Expectant Prefect Shi Hongshao and British Consul Litton to survey the boundary north of Jian'gao Mountain on Tengyue's northern sector, running north from that peak across the Gaoligong range to the jurisdiction of Lijiang Prefecture. Litton insisted on Dayakou as the boundary line; Shi Hongshao insisted on the Little River. Guizhou Education Commissioner Chen Rongchang memorialized accusing Shi Hongshao of ceding territory in the demarcation. The government ordered Cen Chunming to investigate. Cen dispatched Expectant Circuit Intendant Shen Zuyan to review the survey. Shen soon reported: "Consul Litton's proposed line runs from Jian'gao Mountain east to Zuzha Mountain, passing Langya Mountain, the Moshi River head, Banwa Pass, Sister Mountains, Dayakou, Cizhu Pass, and Pianma Pass, then north along the Gaoligong range toward Tibet. Dayakou is the watershed between the Enmai River and the Salween (Lujiang). In his note to Prefect Shi he proposed running from the Mingguang River head to the summit of the Gaoligong range, then north toward Tibet, assigning to Burma all watersheds draining into the Jinsha River. If this line were accepted, the territory ceded from Yunnan through Sichuan into Tibet would amount to thousands of li. This was precisely what the Ministry of Foreign Affairs had called "outright partition of Chinese territory—absolutely unacceptable and not open to discussion." Prefect Shi's proposed line along the Little River would run from Jian'gao Mountain up from the Moshi River head to Waitou Mountain, cross the Fei River, pass Zhangjiapo, ascend Gaoliangong Mountain, reach Jiujiaotang River, follow the Little River, then branch off crosswise to the river's source and end at Banchang Mountain. Even this line would abandon much territory under the native officials of Tengyue, Baoshan, Yunlong, and Longling—lands that had acknowledged Chinese suzerainty for centuries. He argued that for the northern sector the proper line was that proposed by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs: from Jian'gao Mountain to the stretch between the Shiwo and Dumu rivers, then along the Enmai River to the watershed east of the Enmai where it meets the Little River. This ridge should be the Tagajia range—the most equitable boundary. The British minister had originally proposed the watershed east of the Little River (the Enmai) as the boundary and had spoken of a natural line along the divide of streams flowing east into the Enmai—language that matched this proposal exactly. For this survey, following the Enmai River to its junction with the Little River would be fully satisfactory. Moreover, the northern Yunnan–Burma sector under survey concerned only the boundary between Tengyue and the Wild Headmen Hills. The line must therefore be drawn at the limit of Tengyue's native jurisdictions and the Wild Headmen Hills—a principle that could not be altered. The watershed east of the Little River (the Enmai) and the divide of streams flowing east into the Enmai also correspond in position with the Enmai watershed shown on the English map signed by Minister Xue Fucheng in 1894. Prefect Shi had failed to examine the boundary carefully and had yielded at every turn, causing these errors—an outcome no one could have foreseen. The British minister had specified the watershed east of the Little River (the Enmai) and the divide of streams flowing east into the Enmai—clearly stating "east" and "flowing in from the east." Why then did Consul Litton confuse east- and west-flowing streams and survey north as far as Langya Mountain and Dayakou? This was his first error. The ministry's reply had also cited the phrase "each side guarding its own boundary," arising from the attacks at Ganbai, Cizhu, and Pailai. The territory each side was to guard lay precisely here. Why did Shi fail to hold to the Little River boundary, but instead, after following the Little River downstream, turn eastward in a contrary direction—calling a stag a horse—and seek another headwater of the Little River up to Banchang Mountain? This was his second error. The natural boundary the British minister described was the divide of streams flowing east into the Enmai (the Little River). Consul Litton instead surveyed the watershed between the Enmai and the Salween (Long River), assigning streams east of the ridge to the Mingguang–Salween system and streams west to the Enmai and Jinsha, and taking the east–west divide of that ridge as the Sino-Burmese boundary. Prefect Shi failed to rebut Litton's line by citing the eastward flow of the Little River and instead answered vaguely that "such is the lay of the mountains and waters," allowing the consul to fix the boundary wherever he chose, east or west at his convenience. This was his third error. Even on Britain's own watershed claim between the Nmaikha and the Nu, the line is Dayakou and should end at Pianmayakou to the west—so why did Consul Litton climb Gaoligong with Surveyor Wang and run the line all the way to Lanzhou in Lijiang before turning back? That was the fourth mistake. Beyond the Little River, villages like Shiga fell under Tengyue's Cizhu and Datang chiefs, and Longbang under Baoshan's Denggeng chief—well documented in the records. Yet Litton's note quoted Shi as saying the villages were "beyond the pale," and Shi's own reply repeated that they had "long been outside Chinese administration." Shi was charged with demarcation yet failed to argue from evidence and instead volunteered that the land had "long been beyond the pale"—inexplicable conduct. That was the fifth mistake. Villages like Maogong had always belonged to Diantan's native chief on old Chinese soil; British troops had only passed through and levied gate taxes—there was no occupation and no Chinese acknowledgment in writing. Shi merely noted that Britain had "already handled the matter" and abandoned administration, offering no rebuttal. That was the sixth mistake. Beyond Dayakou, at Ganbaindi and similar places, Litton wanted a perpetual lease on the model of the Kowloon Walled City triangle. Seeking a lease was itself an admission of Chinese sovereignty—a point that should have been pressed until Britain had no reply. Eighteen villages lay beyond Dayakou over a wide tract—how could such territory be surrendered lightly? Once lease was admitted, the massacre of 114 people by Cizhu and Pailai clearly happened inside China—a charge Britain could not evade; why did Shi never raise it? That was the seventh mistake. The Langsu region, also called Langsong, was vast. The Dali Prefecture Gazetteer places Echang between Langsong, Caojian, and Ganmasa and records Daoguang 18 approval putting those villages under Yunlong—proof Langsu belonged to Dali. Shi's line from a different Little River headwater to Banchang Mountain would cast out the eighteen villages and abandon the entire Langsu region. That was the eighth mistake. Serious as these eight errors were, the damage was still confined to Yunnan. Worse errors would breed lasting trouble: abandoning Langsu opened the Nu country to the north, commanding the upper Salween and Mekong, linking Weixi and Zhongdian to Lijiang, touching Batang and Litang in Sichuan, and opening routes northwest into Tibet; second, letting Litton survey Gaoligong at will—if Beijing yielded, Britain could march north from the ridge along the Salween and Yangtze headwaters, stripping most Nu and Qiu lands and seizing Pulalong and Tsawarong; how could the territorial loss even be counted?" Cen Chunming received Shen's report and memorialized the throne. The court ordered Shi Hongshao dismissed, but the proposal was not approved.
57
西 西
Merchants in Zhili, Shandong, and Jiangsu sought to cancel the Tianjin–Pukou railway loan; Britain refused abrogation but agreed to revised terms. Germany took the same position as Britain. Britain also offered China a loan for the Guangzhou–Hankou and Sichuan–Hankou railways in Hubei; Beijing declined. That year Shanxi's Bureau of Commerce and the British Pekin Syndicate agreed terms to buy back the mining and iron contract. Shanxi mines had first been contracted between local merchants and Rossi of the Pekin Syndicate. In Guangxu 24 the bureau and company rewrote a twenty-article loan charter. In year 31 Sheng Xuanhuai added a four-article agreement. The dispute had dragged on for years. Representatives met in Beijing and signed twelve articles to redeem the concession for 2.75 million taels sycee, payable on schedule by the Shanxi Bureau of Commerce.
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使
In the second month of year 34 China signed the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Ningbo railway loan with Britain. A prior draft had four points: regulations mirroring the Shanghai–Nanjing line; second, the formal treaty to match whatever Shanghai–Nanjing terms were later approved; third, prompt surveying; fourth, correct local obstacles and memorialize jointly once the formal treaty was ready. Zhejiang gentry then sought to cancel the earlier agreement and run the line themselves. The British minister refused; Wang Daxie and others renegotiated with the company for months without result. Liang Dunyan was sent to split construction and finance: China would build the railway, supplementing Chinese capital with a £1.5 million loan from the British firm at 93 percent of par, five percent interest, thirty years; shortfalls would be covered from surplus profits on other national railways; the Ministry of Posts and Communications would control all disbursements; construction and management remained entirely Chinese; the British company would procure foreign materials for £35,000 commission, silver costs included; one British chief engineer might be hired but would answer to the Chinese director. Terms were finally settled. In the ninth month Britain and China signed Tibet–India trade regulations. That year loans from HSBC and the Banque de l'Indochine bought back the Beijing–Hankou railway.
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