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列傳一百四十三
Biographies 143
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洪亮吉管世銘谷際岐李仲昭石承藻
Hong Liangji, Guan Shiming, Gu Jiqi, Li Zhongzhao, and Shi Chengzao
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洪亮吉,字稚存,江蘇陽湖人。 少孤貧,力學,孝事寡母。 初佐安徽學政硃筠校文,繼入陝西巡撫畢沅幕,為校刊古書。 詞章考據,著於一時,尤精揅輿地。 乾隆五十五年,成一甲第二名進士,授翰林院編修,年已四十有五。 長身火色,性豪邁,喜論當世事。 未散館,分校順天鄉試。 督貴州學政,以古學教士,地僻無書籍,購經、史、通典、文選置各府書院,黔士始治經史。 為詩古文有法。 任滿還京,入直上書房,授皇曾孫奕純讀。 嘉慶三年,大考翰詹,試徵邪教疏,亮吉力陳內外弊政數千言,為時所忌。 以弟喪陳情歸。
Hong Liangji, whose style was Zhicun, came from Yanghu in Jiangsu. Orphaned early and raised in poverty, he threw himself into study and cared devotedly for his widowed mother. He first helped Zhu Yun, the Anhui education commissioner, review examination essays, then joined Bi Yuan's staff in Shaanxi to edit and publish classical texts. His literary work and philological scholarship made him famous in his time, above all his expertise in historical geography. In 1790 he took second place in the top tier of the palace examination and was made a Hanlin compiler at the age of forty-five. Tall and ruddy-faced, he had a bold temperament and loved to debate current affairs. Before finishing his Hanlin probation, he was put on the board that graded the Shuntian provincial examination. As Guizhou education commissioner he taught the classics. The province was remote and bookless, so he bought standard works—the Classics, histories, the Tongdian, and the Wenxuan—for every prefectural academy, and Guizhou scholars at last began serious study of the canon. His poetry and prose were composed with real craft. When his term ended he returned to Beijing, entered the Imperial Study, and tutored the emperor's great-grandson Yi Chun. In 1798, at the triennial Hanlin examination, candidates were asked to draft a memorial on sectarian rebellion. Liangji poured thousands of words into a blunt catalogue of abuses at court and in the provinces, and made powerful enemies. He pleaded a brother's death and went home.
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四年,高宗崩,仁宗始親政。 大學士硃珪書起之,供職,與修高宗實錄,第一次稿本成,意有不樂。 將告歸,上書軍機王大臣言事,略曰:「今天子求治之心急矣,天下望治之心孔迫矣,而機局未轉者,推原其故,蓋有數端。 亮吉以為勵精圖治,當一法祖宗初政之勤,而尚未盡法也。 用人行政,當一改權臣當國之時,而尚未盡改也。 風俗則日趨卑下,賞罰則仍不嚴明,言路則似通而未通,吏治則欲肅而未肅。 何以言勵精圖治尚未盡法也? 自三四月以來,視朝稍晏,竊恐退朝之後,俳優近習之人,熒惑聖聽者不少。 此親臣大臣啟沃君心者之過也。 蓋犯顏極諫,雖非親臣大臣之事,然不可使國家無嚴憚之人。 乾隆初年,純皇帝宵旰不遑,勤求至治,其時如鄂文端、硃文端、張文和、孫文定等,皆侃侃以老成師傅自居。 亮吉恭修實錄,見一日中硃筆細書,折成方寸,或詢張、鄂,或詢孫、硃,曰某人賢否,某事當否,日或十馀次。 諸臣亦皆隨時隨事奏片,質語直陳,是上下無隱情。 純皇帝固聖不可及,而亦眾正盈朝,前後左右皆嚴憚之人故也。 今一則處事太緩,自乾隆五十五年以後,權私蒙蔽,事事不得其平者,不知凡幾矣。 千百中無有一二能上達者,即能上達,未必即能見之施行也。 如江南洋盜一案,參將楊天相有功駢戮,洋盜某漏網安居,皆由署總督蘇凌阿昏憒糊塗,貪贓玩法,舉世知其冤,而洋盜公然上岸無所顧忌,皆此一事釀成。 況蘇凌阿權相私人,朝廷必無所顧惜,而至今尚擁巨貲,厚自頤養。 江南查辦此案,始則有心為承審官開釋,繼則並聞以不冤覆奏。 夫以聖天子赫然獨斷,欲平反一事而尚如此,則此外沉冤何自而雪乎? 一則集思廣益之法未備。 堯、舜之主,亦必詢四岳,詢群牧。 蓋恐一人之聰明有限,必博收眾採,庶無失事。 請自今凡召見大小臣工,必詢問人材,詢問利弊。 所言可採,則存檔冊以記之。 倘所舉非人,所言失實,則治其失言之罪。 然寄耳目於左右近習,不可也; 詢人之功過於其黨類,亦不可也。 蓋人材至今日,銷磨殆盡矣。 以模棱為曉事,以軟弱為良圖,以鑽營為取進之階,以苟且為服官之計。 由此道者,無不各得其所欲而去,衣缽相承,牢結而不可解。 夫此模棱、軟弱、鑽營、苟且之人,國家無事,以之備班列可也; 適有緩急,而慾望其奮身為國,不顧利害,不計夷險,不瞻徇情面,不顧惜身家,不可得也。 至於利弊之不講,又非一日。 在內部院諸臣,事本不多,而常若猝猝不暇,汲汲顧影,皆云多一事不如少一事。 在外督撫諸臣,其賢者斤斤自守,不肖者亟亟營私。 國計民生,非所計也,救目前而已; 官方吏治,非所急也,保本任而已。 慮久遠者,以為過憂; 事興革者,以為生事。 此又豈國家求治之本意乎? 二則進賢退不肖似尚游移。 夫邪教之起,由於激變。 原任達州知州戴如煌,罪不容逭矣。 幸有一眾口交譽之劉清,百姓服之,教匪亦服之。 此時正當用明效大驗之人。 聞劉清尚為州牧,僅從司道之後辦事,似不足盡其長矣。 亮吉以為川省多事,經略縱極嚴明,勦賊匪用之,撫難民用之,整飭官方辦理地方之事又用之,此不能分身者也。 何如擇此方賢吏如劉清者,崇其官爵,假以事權,使之一意招徠撫綏,以分督撫之權,以蕆國家之事。 有明中葉以來,鄖陽多事,則別設鄖陽巡撫; 偏沅多事,則別設偏沅巡撫。 事竣則撤之,此不可拘拘於成例者也。 夫設官以待賢能,人果賢能,似不必過循資格。 如劉清者,進而尚未進也。 戴如煌雖以別案解任,然尚安處川中。 聞教匪甘心欲食其肉,知其所在,即極力焚劫。 是以數月必移一處,教匪亦必隨而蹟之。 近在川東與一道員聯姻,恃以無恐。 是救一有罪之人,反殺千百無罪之人,其理尚可恕乎? 純皇帝大事之時,即明發諭旨數和珅之罪,並一一指其私人,天下快心。 乃未幾而又起吳省蘭矣,召見之時,又聞其為吳省欽辨冤矣。 夫二吳之為和珅私人,與之交通貨賄,人人所知。 故曹錫寶之糾和珅家人劉全也,以同鄉素好,先以摺稿示二吳,二吳即袖其走權門,藉為進身之地。 今二吳可雪,不幾與褒贈曹錫寶之明旨相戾乎? 夫吳省欽之傾險,秉文衡,尹京兆,無不聲名狼藉,則革職不足蔽辜矣。 吳省蘭先為和珅教習師,後反稱和珅為老師,大考則第一矣,視學典試不絕矣,非和珅之力而誰力乎? 則降官亦不足蔽辜矣。 是退而尚未退也。 何以言用人行政未盡改也? 蓋其人雖已致法,而十馀年來,其更變祖宗成例,汲引一己私人,猶未嘗平心討論。 內閣、六部各衙門,何為國家之成法,何為和珅所更張,誰為國家自用之人,誰為和珅所引進,以及隨同受賄舞弊之人,皇上縱極仁慈,縱慾寬脅從,又因人數甚廣,不能一切屏除。 然竊以為實有真知灼見者,自不究其從前,亦當籍其姓名,於升遷調補之時,微示以善惡勸懲之法,使人人知聖天子雖不為已甚,而是非邪正之辨,未嘗不洞悉,未嘗不區別。 如是而夙昔之為私人者,尚可革面革心而為國家之人。 否則,朝廷常若今日清明可也,萬一他日復有效權臣所為者,而諸臣又群起而集其門矣。 何以言風俗日趨卑下也? 士大夫漸不顧廉恥,百姓則不顧綱常。 然此不當責之百姓,仍當責之士大夫也。 以亮吉所見,十馀年來,有尚書、侍郎甘為宰相屈膝者矣; 有大學士、七卿之長,且年長以倍,而求拜門生,求為私人者矣; 有交宰相之僮隸,並樂與抗禮者矣。 太學三館,風氣之所由出也。 今則有昏夜乞憐,以求署祭酒者矣; 有人前長跪,以求講官者矣。 翰林大考,國家所據以升黜詞臣者也。 今則有先走軍機章京之門,求認師生,以探取御製詩韻者矣; 行賄於門闌侍衛,以求傳遞代倩,藏捲而去,制就而入者矣。 及人人各得所欲,則居然自以為得計。 夫大考如此,何以責鄉會試之懷挾替代? 士大夫之行如此,何以責小民之誇詐夤緣? 輦轂之下如此,何以責四海九州之營私舞弊? 純皇帝因內閣學士許玉猷為同姓石工護喪,諭廷臣曰:'諸臣縱不自愛,如國體何? '是知國體之尊,在諸臣各知廉恥。 夫下之化上,猶影響也。 士氣必待在上者振作之,風節必待在上者獎成之。 舉一廉樸之吏,則貪欺者庶可自愧矣; 進一恬退之流,則奔競者庶可稍改矣; 拔一特立獨行、敦品勵節之士,則如脂如韋、依附朋比之風或可漸革矣。 而亮吉更有所慮者,前之所言,皆士大夫之不務名節者耳。 幸有矯矯自好者,類皆惑於因果,遁入虛無,以蔬食為家規,以談禪為國政。 一二人倡於前,千百人和於後。 甚有出則官服,入則僧衣。 惑智驚愚,駭人觀聽。 亮吉前在內廷,執事曾告之曰:『某等親王十人,施齋戒殺者已十居六七,羊豕鵝鴨皆不入門。』 及此回入都,而士大夫持齋戒殺又十居六七矣。 深恐西晉祖尚玄虛之習复見於今,則所關世道人心非小也。 何以言賞罰仍不嚴明也? 自徵苗匪、教匪以來,福康安、和琳、孫士毅則蒙蔽欺妄於前,宜綿、惠齡、福寧則喪師失律於後,又益以景安、秦承恩之因循畏葸,而川、陝、楚、豫之民,遭劫者不知幾百萬矣。 已死諸臣姑置勿論,其現在者未嘗不議罪也。 然重者不過新疆換班,輕者不過大營轉餉; 甚至拏解來京之秦承恩,則又給還家產,有意復用矣; 屢奉嚴旨之惠齡,則又起補侍郎。 夫蒙蔽欺妄之殺人,與喪師失律以及因循畏葸之殺人無異也,而猶邀寬典異數,亦從前所未有也。 故近日經略以下、領隊以上,類皆不以賊匪之多寡、地方之蹂躪掛懷。 彼其心未始不自計曰:『即使萬不可解,而新疆換班,大營轉餉,亦尚有成例可援,退步可守。』 國法之寬,及諸臣之不畏國法,未有如今日之甚者。 純皇帝之用兵金川、緬甸,訥親僨事,則殺訥親; 額爾登額僨事,則殺額爾登額; 將軍、提、鎮之類,伏失律之誅者,不知凡幾。 是以萬里之外,得一廷寄,皆震懼失色,則馭軍之道得也。 今自乙卯以迄己未,首尾五年,僨事者屢矣。 提、鎮、副都統、偏裨之將,有一膺失律之誅者乎? 而欲諸臣之不玩寇、不殃民得乎? 夫以純皇帝之聖武,又豈見不及此? 蓋以歸政在即,欲留待皇上蒞政之初,神武獨斷,一新天下之耳目耳。 倘蕩平尚無期日,而國帑日見銷磨,萬一支絀偶形,司農告匱。 言念及此,可為寒心,此尤宜急加之意者也。 何以言言路似通而未通也? 九卿臺諫之臣,類皆毛舉細故,不切政要。 否則發人之陰私,快己之恩怨。 十件之中,幸有一二可行者,發部議矣,而部臣與建言諸臣,又各存意見,無不議駁,並無不通駁,則又豈國家詢及芻蕘、詢及瞽史之初意乎? 然或因其所言瑣碎,或輕重失倫,或虛實不審,而一概留中,則又不可。 其法莫如隨閱隨發,面諭廷臣,或特頒諭旨,皆隨其事之可行不可行,明白曉示之。 即或彈劾不避權貴,在諸臣一心為國,本不必避嫌怨。 以近事論,錢灃、初彭齡皆常彈及大僚矣,未聞大僚敢與之為仇也。 若其不知國體,不識政要,冒昧立言,或攻發人之陰私,則亦不妨使眾共知之,以著其非而懲其後。 蓋諸臣既敢挾私而不為國,更可無煩君上之回護矣。 何以言吏治欲肅而未肅也? 未欲吏治之肅,則督、撫、籓、臬其標準矣。 十馀年來,督、撫、籓、臬之貪欺害政,比比皆是。 幸而皇上親政以來,李奉翰已自斃,鄭元鸘已被糾,富綱已遭憂,江蘭已內改。 此外,官大省、據方面者如故也,出巡則有站規、有門包,常時則有節禮、生日禮,按年則又有幫費。 升遷調補之私相餽謝者,尚未在此數也。 以上諸項,無不取之於州縣,州縣則無不取之於民。 錢糧漕米,前數年尚不過加倍,近則加倍不止。 督、撫、籓、臬以及所屬之道、府,無不明知故縱,否則門包、站規、節禮、生日禮、幫費無所出也。 州縣明言於人曰:『我之所以加倍加數倍者,實層層衙門用度,日甚一日,年甚一年。』 究之州縣,亦恃督、撫、籓、臬、道、府之威勢以取於民,上司得其半,州縣之入己者亦半。 初行尚有畏忌,至一年二年,則成為舊例,牢不可破矣。 訴之督、撫、籓、臬、道、府,皆不問也。 千萬人中,或有不甘冤抑,赴京控告者,不過發督撫審究而已,派欽差就訊而已。 試思百姓告官之案,千百中有一二得直者乎? 即欽差上司稍有良心者,不過設為調停之法,使兩無所大損而已。 若欽差一出,則又必派及通省,派及百姓,必使之滿載而歸而心始安,而可以無後患。 是以州縣亦熟知百姓之技倆不過如此,百姓亦習知上控必不能自直,是以往往至於激變。 湖北之當陽,四川之達州,其明效大驗也。 亮吉以為今日皇上當法憲皇帝之嚴明,使吏治肅而民樂生; 然後法仁皇帝之寬仁,以轉移風俗,則文武一張一弛之道也。」
In 1799 the Qianlong emperor died and the Jiaqing emperor took the reins himself. Grand Secretary Zhu Gui recalled him by letter. He resumed office and worked on the Qianlong Veritable Records, but when the first draft was done he was deeply dissatisfied. On the eve of resigning he sent a long letter to Grand Councilor Wang. It began: "The emperor's hunger for reform is keen and the empire's longing for order still keener, yet the machinery of government has barely moved. The reasons, I believe, are several. Liangji argued that reviving government should mean matching the diligence of the dynasty's early reigns—and that standard had not yet been met. Appointments and policy ought to break decisively with the era of domineering ministers—and that break was still incomplete. Morals were sinking day by day; rewards and punishments remained lax; the path of candid counsel looked open but was not; and the bureaucracy was meant to be tightened but was not. Why had revival of government not yet been achieved? Since spring, audiences had been held later and later. I feared that after court, actors and favored attendants were misleading the emperor in no small number. That was the fault of the intimate ministers who were supposed to guide the ruler's mind. Blunt remonstrance at the risk of one's life was not their special duty, yet the state could not afford to lack men whom others deeply feared. In the early Qianlong years the emperor labored from dawn to midnight in pursuit of perfect government. Men such as E Zhun, Zhu Shi, Zhang Tingyu, and Sun Jiagan spoke plainly and styled themselves seasoned mentors of the throne. While helping compile the Veritable Records, Liangji saw how in a single day the emperor's vermilion brush would jot tiny folded notes—now asking Zhang or E, now Sun or Zhu, whether so-and-so was fit for office or whether such-and-such ought to be done—sometimes a dozen times in one day. Ministers likewise filed timely memorial slips in plain, direct language, so that nothing was hidden between throne and officials. The emperor's sagacity was beyond compare, but it also helped that upright men filled the court and that everyone around him was someone to be feared. Today, first, business moved too slowly. Since 1790 private interests had clouded judgment, and wrongs left unsettled were beyond counting. Of hundreds of grievances scarcely one or two reached the throne, and even then they might never be acted on. Consider the Jiangnan pirate case: Battalion Commander Yang Tianxiang, a man with real merit, was executed in a mass killing while a pirate went free—all because Acting Governor Su Ling'a was muddled, greedy, and lawless. Everyone knew Yang had been wronged, yet pirates now landed openly without fear. One botched case had taught them they could. Worse, Su Ling'a was a creature of the late power-holder; the court owed him no tenderness, yet he still sat on a fortune and lived in comfort. The Jiangnan inquiry first seemed bent on excusing the presiding judge; later word came that the court had been told there was no injustice at all. If even when the sage emperor himself intervened to right one case the outcome was still such, how were all the other buried wrongs ever to be cleared? Second, the methods for pooling counsel had not been put in place. Even rulers as great as Yao and Shun questioned the Four Peaks and the regional lords. One man's wit is limited; only by gathering many voices could mistakes be avoided. Henceforth, whenever officials of any rank were received in audience, let the emperor ask about talent and about what policies helped or harmed the realm. Sound advice should be entered in the archives. If a man recommended proved unfit or his report false, let him be punished for misleading the throne. Yet one must not rely on intimate attendants for one's eyes and ears; nor ask a man's clique about his merits and faults. Talent, by now, had been ground nearly away. Men took equivocation for wisdom, timidity for prudence, intrigue for the path to promotion, and muddling through for the art of office. All who lived by that code left with what they wanted; the habit passed from hand to hand like a master's robe and bowl, knotted tight beyond undoing. In quiet times such equivocators, weaklings, schemers, and temporizers might suffice to fill the ranks; but in crisis one could not expect them to throw themselves into the state's service heedless of gain or loss, ease or danger, favor or family. The refusal to weigh policy's costs and benefits was nothing new either. Inside the capital boards, business was not heavy, yet ministers acted perpetually rushed and anxious, all chanting that one trouble spared was better than one taken on. Among provincial governors, the worthy clung narrowly to their own integrity while the unworthy scrambled for private profit. National finances and people's livelihoods were not their concern—only the crisis of the moment; official discipline was not urgent—only keeping their own posts. Anyone who looked ahead was called an alarmist; anyone who pushed reform was called a troublemaker. Was that what the state meant by seeking good government? Second, promoting the worthy and removing the unworthy still seemed hesitant and half-hearted. Sectarian rebellion arose from official cruelty and provocation. The former prefect of Dazhou, Dai Ruhuang, deserved no mercy. Fortunately there was Liu Qing, praised on every side—trusted by the people and even by the rebels. This was the moment to use men whose merit had already been proved in plain sight. Yet Liu Qing was still only a prefect, working behind his superiors—hardly enough to use his full capacity. Sichuan was in turmoil. However able the commissioner-general, he needed himself to fight rebels, pacify the people, and straighten out local government—one man could not do everything. Why not pick proven local men like Liu Qing, raise their rank, give them real authority, and let them win people back while sharing the governors' burden and finishing the state's work? In mid-Ming times, when Yunyang was troubled, a separate Yunyang governor was appointed; when the Hunan frontier was troubled, a separate Pian-Yuan governor was appointed. When the crisis ended the post was abolished. One must not be slaves to precedent. Posts exist to employ talent; where talent is real, seniority need not rule. Men like Liu Qing ought to rise—and had not. Dai Ruhuang had been removed on another charge, yet still lived comfortably in Sichuan. Rebels were said to long to devour him alive; wherever he was found they burned and looted with all their might. So every few months he had to move, and the rebels tracked him wherever he went. Lately in eastern Sichuan he had married into a circuit intendant's family and felt secure. To spare one guilty man while thousands of innocents died for it—could that be justified? At the Qianlong emperor's death the throne had openly listed Heshen's crimes and named his creatures one by one, to the nation's relief. Yet soon Wu Shenglan was back in favor, and at his audience he was said to be pleading his brother Wu Shengqin's innocence. Everyone knew the two Wu were Heshen's men and had traded in bribes with him. When Cao Xibao impeached Heshen's servant Liu Quan, he showed the draft first to the two Wu as fellow townsmen; they tucked it away and rushed to the power-holders, turning betrayal into advancement. If the two Wu were now cleared, would that not flatly contradict the edict that had honored Cao Xibao? Wu Shengqin's treachery had left his name in ruins whether as chief examiner or as Jingzhao intendant; dismissal alone could not answer for his crimes. Wu Shenglan had once been Heshen's tutor, then called Heshen his teacher; he took first in the Hanlin examination and kept receiving education and examination posts—whose power was that if not Heshen's? Demotion in rank was likewise too light a penalty. So the unworthy were meant to go—and had not truly gone. Why had appointments and policy not yet been fully reformed? Though Heshen himself had been punished, more than ten years of his changes to ancestral precedent and packing of offices with his creatures had never been calmly reviewed. In the Grand Secretariat, the Six Ministries, and every yamen—which rules were the state's and which Heshen's, who had been the court's own men and who Heshen's creatures, who had shared in bribery and fraud—the emperor might be merciful and wish to spare the coerced, and the numbers were too vast to purge everyone at once. Yet for men of real insight, even without prosecuting the past, their names should be recorded; at every promotion or transfer let a quiet signal show reward and punishment, so all would know that though the emperor would not go to extremes, he still saw clearly who was upright and who was not. Then even former creatures of the faction might turn anew and serve the state in earnest. Otherwise the court might stay clear for a day, but if another power-holder rose tomorrow the officials would flock to his gate again. Why did he say morals were sinking day by day? Scholar-officials no longer cared for integrity, and the people no longer cared for the moral order. But the blame lay not with the people—it lay with the scholar-official class. In Liangji's own observation over more than ten years, ministers and vice-ministers had willingly knelt to the chief minister; grand secretaries and heads of the chief ministries, though twice the minister's age, who sought to enroll as his disciples and become his creatures; men who socialized with the minister's page boys and treated them as equals with pleasure. The Imperial University and the Three Academies were where public tone was formed. Now men begged by night for acting appointment as university chancellor; and prostrated themselves in public to win lectureship posts. The Hanlin great examination was how the state promoted and demoted its literary officers. Now candidates ran first to Grand Council clerks, claimed them as teachers, and tried to learn the rhyme schemes of the emperor's examination poems in advance; bribed gate guards to carry papers out and back, hid their booklets while answers were written for them, and re-entered with finished compositions. Once everyone got what he wanted, he calmly assumed he had found a winning scheme. If the Hanlin great examination was like this, how could one condemn the provincial and metropolitan exams for smuggling in crib sheets and stand-ins? If the conduct of the literati was like this, how could one blame commoners for boastful fraud and backdoor dealings? If things were like this at the capital itself, how could one blame the provinces for private profiteering and fraud? The late emperor, learning that Grand Secretariat academician Xu Yuyou had a stonemason of the same surname attend his mourning, told the court: 'Even if you ministers care nothing for yourselves, what of the dignity of the state?' Thus one sees that the honor of the state rests on every minister knowing shame and integrity. The lower orders take their cue from above as surely as a body casts a shadow. Scholarly morale must be revived from above; moral integrity must be fostered and rewarded from above. Promote one honest, unassuming official, and the greedy and deceitful might feel ashamed; advance one who is content to stand aside, and the office-seekers might mend their ways a little; raise up a man of independent conduct who cultivates character and integrity, and the fashion for slick flattery and cliquish dependence might slowly change. Yet Liangji has a further worry: what I have described so far concerns only those literati who neglect reputation and integrity. There are also men of proud independence—but most of them are lost in doctrines of karma, retreat into empty speculation, make vegetarianism a household rule, and treat Chan meditation as statecraft. One or two take the lead, and hundreds and thousands follow. Some even wear official robes abroad and monastic robes at home. They bewilder the learned, alarm the simple, and shock all who see and hear them. When I was in the inner court, a colleague told me: 'Of us ten princes, six or seven already keep vegetarian fasts and abstain from killing—sheep, pigs, geese, and ducks never enter our doors.' Now that I am back in the capital, six or seven out of ten literati keep vegetarian fasts and abstain from killing as well. I deeply fear that the Western Jin fashion for empty speculation may reappear today; what is at stake in the spirit of the age and the hearts of the people is no small matter. Why do I say that rewards and punishments are still not strict and clear? Since the campaigns against the Miao and the sect rebels, Fu Kang'an, He Lin, and Sun Shiyi deceived and concealed at the outset; Yi Mian, Hui Ling, and Fu Ning lost armies and violated discipline later on; to these were added Jing'an and Qin Cheng'en's procrastination and timidity—and the people of Sichuan, Shaanxi, Hubei, and Henan who suffered devastation must number several millions. The ministers who are already dead may be set aside; those still living have not escaped censure. Yet the heaviest penalty has been no more than rotation to Xinjiang; the lightest no more than supplying the main camp; even Qin Cheng'en, who was brought to the capital under arrest, had his family property restored and is evidently to be employed again; Hui Ling, who had repeatedly received stern edicts, has been reappointed Vice Minister. Deception and concealment that cost lives are no different from losing armies, violating discipline, or dithering in fear that cost lives—yet these men still receive lenient and extraordinary treatment, something never seen before. Hence commissioners and column leaders alike generally pay no heed to how many rebels remain or how badly the countryside is ravaged. In their hearts they tell themselves: 'Even if all else fails, rotation to Xinjiang and supply duty at the main camp still offer precedents to cite and a line of retreat to hold.' Never has the law been so lax, or ministers so unafraid of the law, as today. When the late emperor campaigned in Jinchuan and Burma, Neqin failed and was executed; E'erdeng'e failed and was executed; generals, provincial commanders, and garrison commanders who suffered death for breach of discipline were beyond counting. Ten thousand li away, a single dispatch from court made every commander tremble and turn pale—such was the right way to command armies. From 1795 to 1799, a full five years, failures have been repeated. Has a single provincial commander, garrison commander, deputy commandant, or field officer suffered death for breach of discipline? How then can one expect officials not to trifle with the enemy and not bring disaster on the people? With the late emperor's sacred martial prowess, could his vision have failed to reach this far? Presumably because abdication was near, he wished to leave this for Your Majesty's first days in power—to decide with your own sacred resolve and renew the eyes and ears of the empire. If pacification still has no end in sight while the treasury is worn down day by day, a sudden shortfall may leave the Minister of Revenue reporting empty coffers. To reflect on this is chilling; this above all deserves your urgent attention. Why do I say the avenue of remonstrance seems open yet is not truly open? The Nine Chief Offices and the censorate mostly nitpick trifles and never touch what matters in government. Otherwise they expose private scandals to settle personal scores. Of ten proposals, perhaps one or two are feasible and are sent to the ministries for deliberation—yet ministry officials and the memorialists again take opposing sides, debate everything, and rebut everything. How is this the state's original intent in seeking counsel from the humblest and the lowliest? Yet to retain every memorial at court because it is trivial, disproportionate, or unverified would also be wrong. The better course is to read and respond as each memorial arrives—to instruct the court in person or issue a special edict, plainly stating whether the proposal is feasible or not. Even when impeachment does not spare the powerful, ministers who serve the state with one heart need not fear personal resentment. In recent years Qian Feng and Chu Pengling often impeached high officials, yet no senior minister dared treat them as enemies. If a memorialist does not understand the dignity of the state or the essentials of policy, speaks rashly, or attacks private scandals, let the court know openly—expose the fault and warn those who follow. When ministers dare to serve private ends rather than the state, Your Majesty need not shield them at all. Why do I say that official administration is meant to be rectified yet has not been rectified? If official administration is to be rectified, governors-general, governors, and provincial commissioners are the standard. For more than ten years, greedy and corrupt governors and provincial commissioners have been everywhere. Fortunately since Your Majesty took personal rule, Li Fenghan has died, Zheng Yuanhong has been impeached, Fu Gang has left office in mourning, and Jiang Lan has been transferred inland. Beyond them, the great provincial officers remain as before: on tour they collect station fees and gate packets; in ordinary times festival gifts and birthday gifts; each year support fees as well. The private gifts exchanged at promotions and transfers are not even included in this tally. Every item above is drawn from the prefectures and counties, and they in turn draw it all from the people. Land tax and transport grain, which a few years ago were merely doubled, are now more than doubled. Governors, provincial commissioners, and their circuit and prefectural subordinates all knowingly condone this—otherwise their gate packets, station fees, festival gifts, birthday gifts, and support fees would have no source. Prefectural and county magistrates tell the people plainly: 'The reason I double and redouble levies is that expenses at every level of government grow worse day by day and year by year.' In the end the magistrates too rely on the power of governors and commissioners to squeeze the people: half goes to their superiors, half they keep. At first they still had some scruples; within a year or two it became fixed custom, impossible to break. Appeals to governors, commissioners, circuits, and prefectures go unanswered. Of millions of people, a few who cannot bear injustice may go to the capital to complain—but the outcome is only an order for the provincial authorities to investigate, or an imperial commissioner sent to inquire. Consider: of a thousand cases in which commoners sue officials, do one or two obtain justice? Even an imperial commissioner or superior with some conscience merely arranges a compromise so that neither side suffers too greatly. Once an imperial commissioner is dispatched, he assesses the whole province and the common people alike, and will not rest until he returns with his pockets full and no fear of later trouble. Magistrates know the people's remedies go no further than this; the people know appeals to the capital never bring justice—so matters often end in violent upheaval. Dangyang in Hubei and Dazhou in Sichuan are glaring proof. Liangji believes that today Your Majesty should follow the strict clarity of the Manifest Emperor, rectify official administration, and let the people live in peace; then follow the generous benevolence of the Benevolent Emperor to transform customs—such is the civil and martial way of tension and release." Thus ended the memorial.
5
書達成親王,以上聞,上怒其語戇,落職下廷臣會鞫,面諭勿加刑,亮吉感泣引罪,擬大辟,免死遣戍伊犁。 明年,京師旱,上禱雨未應,命清獄囚,釋久戍。 未及期,詔曰:「罪亮吉後,言事者日少。 即有,亦論官吏常事,於君德民隱休戚相關之實,絕無言者。 豈非因亮吉獲罪,鉗口不复敢言? 朕不聞過,下情复壅,為害甚鉅。 亮吉所論,實足啟沃朕心,故銘諸座右,時常觀覽,勤政遠佞,警省朕躬。 今特宣示亮吉原書,使內外諸臣,知朕非拒諫飾非之主,實為可與言之君。 諸臣遇可與言之君而不與言,負朕求治苦心。」 即傳諭伊犁將軍,釋亮吉回籍。 詔下而雨,御製詩紀事,注謂:「本日親書諭旨,夜子時甘霖大沛。 天鑑捷於呼吸,益可感畏。」 亮吉至戍甫百日而赦還,自號更生居士。 後十年,卒於家。 所著書多行世。
The memorial reached the Prince of Cheng and was reported to the throne. The emperor was angered by its blunt tone, stripped Hong of office, and referred him to a joint inquiry by the court. He personally instructed that no torture be applied. Hong wept, accepted guilt, and was sentenced to decapitation; the death penalty was remitted and he was exiled to Yili. The following year the capital suffered drought. The emperor prayed for rain without result and ordered prisons cleared and long-term exiles released. Before the term expired, an edict said: 'Since Liangji was punished, memorialists have grown fewer day by day. When they do speak, it is only on routine official business; no one addresses what truly touches Your Majesty's virtue and the people's hidden suffering. Is this not because Liangji's punishment has silenced them and they no longer dare speak? I hear no report of my faults, and the people's grievances are again blocked—a very great harm. What Liangji wrote truly enlightens my mind. I have inscribed it beside my seat and read it often—to govern diligently, keep flatterers at a distance, and examine myself. I now publish Liangji's original text so that all officials within and without may know I am not a ruler who rejects counsel and covers faults, but one to whom they may speak frankly. If officials meet a ruler willing to hear them yet remain silent, they betray my earnest desire for good government.' He immediately ordered the Yili general to release Liangji and send him home. Rain fell as soon as the edict was issued. The emperor composed a poem on the event, noting: 'I wrote the edict myself today; at midnight a great sweet rain poured down. Heaven's response was swifter than a breath—how much more to be revered in awe.' Hong had been at his post of exile only a hundred days when he was pardoned and returned; he styled himself Layman Born Again. Ten years later he died at home. Many of his writings remain in circulation.
6
管世銘,字緘若,與亮吉同里。 乾隆四十三年進士,授戶部主事。 累遷郎中,充軍機章京。 深通律令,凡讞牘多世銘主奏。 屢從大臣赴浙江、湖北、吉林、山東按事,大學士阿桂尤善之,倚如左右手。 時和珅用事,世銘憂憤,與同官論前代輔臣賢否,語譏切無所避。 會遷御史,則大喜,夜起傍徨,草疏將劾之,詔仍留軍機處。 故事,御史留直者,儀注仍視郎官,不得專達封事。 世銘自言愧負此官,阿桂慰之曰:「報稱有日,何必急以言自見。」 蓋留直阿桂所請,隱全之,使有待。 嘉慶三年,卒。
Guan Shiming, style name Jianruo, was a fellow townsman of Hong Liangji. He passed the jinshi examination in 1778 and was appointed a principal clerk in the Ministry of Revenue. He rose through the ranks to director and served as a Grand Council clerk. He was deeply versed in law; most judicial memorials were drafted under his direction. He repeatedly accompanied senior ministers on investigations in Zhejiang, Hubei, Jilin, and Shandong. Grand Secretary A Gui favored him especially and relied on him as on his own hands. At the time Heshen held power. Guan was troubled and angry; with colleagues he discussed whether chief ministers of past dynasties had been worthy, speaking with biting sarcasm and holding nothing back. When he was due for promotion to censor he was overjoyed, rose at night in agitation, and drafted a memorial to impeach Heshen—but an edict kept him at the Grand Council instead. By precedent, a censor who remained on Grand Council duty was still treated ceremonially as a director and could not submit sealed memorials on his own. Guan said he had failed the office. A Gui comforted him: 'Your day to repay the appointment will come—why must you hurry to make yourself known through words.' A Gui had requested that he remain on duty, secretly protecting him and bidding him wait. He died in 1798.
7
谷際岐,字西阿,雲南趙州人。 乾隆四十年進士,選庶吉士,授編修,與校四庫全書。 充會試同考官,所拔多知名士。 乞養歸,主講五華書院,教士有法。 連丁父母憂,服闋,起原官。
Gu Jiqi, style name Xi'a, was a native of Zhaozhou, Yunnan. He passed the jinshi examination in 1775, was selected as a Hanlin bachelor, appointed compiler, and helped collate the Complete Library of the Four Treasuries. He served as associate examiner for the metropolitan examination and selected many men who later won renown. He asked leave to care for his parents and went home to head the Wuhua Academy, where he taught with real discipline. He mourned both parents in succession; when the mourning period ended, he was restored to his former post.
8
嘉慶三年,遷御史。 時教匪擾數省,師久無功,際岐遍訪人士來京者,具得其狀。 四年春,上疏,略曰:「竊見三年以來,先帝頒師征討邪教,川、陝責之總督宜綿,巡撫惠齡、秦承恩; 楚北責之總督畢沅、巡撫汪新。 諸臣釀釁於先,藏身於後,止以重兵自衛,裨弁奮勇者,無調度接應,由是兵無鬥志。 川、楚傳言云:'賊來不見官兵面,賊去官兵才出現。 '又云:'賊去兵無影,兵來賊沒踪。 可憐兵與賊,何日得相逢? '前年總督勒保至川,大張告示,痛責前任之失,是其明證。 畢沅、汪新相繼殂逝,景安繼為總督。 今宜綿、惠齡、秦承恩縱慢於左,景安怯玩於右,勒保縱能實力剿捕,陝、楚賊多,起滅無時,則勒保終將掣肘。 欽惟先帝昔徵緬甸,見楊應琚挑撥掩覆之罪,立予拿問。 今宜綿等曠玩三年之久,幸荷寬典,而轉益懷安,任賊越入河南盧氏、魯山等縣。 景安雖無吞餉聲名,而罔昧自甘,近亦有賊焚掠襄、光各境,均為法所不容。 況今軍營副封私札,商同軍機大臣改壓軍報。 供據已破,雖由內臣聲勢,而彼等掩覆僨事,情更顯然。 請旨懲究,另選能臣,與勒保會同各清本境,則軍令風行,賊必授首。 比年發餉至數千萬,軍中子女玉帛奇寶錯陳,而兵食反致有虧。 載贓而歸,風盈道路,嘲之者有'與其請餉,不如書會票'之語。 先帝嚴究軍需局,察出四川漢州知州與德楞泰互爭報銷,及湖北道員胡齊崙侵餉數十萬,一則追賠,一則拿究。 他屬類此者必多,尤宜急易新手清釐。 則侵盜之跡,必能破露,不但兵餉與善後事宜均得充裕,銷算亦不敢牽混矣。」
In 1798 he was transferred to the censorate. Sectarian rebels were ravaging several provinces and the campaigns dragged on without victory. Jiqi questioned every traveler who came to Beijing until he had the full picture. In the spring of 1799 he submitted a memorial that began: "For three years now the late emperor has sent armies against the sectarians. Sichuan and Shaanxi fall to Governor-General Yi Mian and Grand Coordinators Hui Ling and Qin Cheng'en; Hubei and northern Huguang to Governor-General Bi Yuan and Grand Coordinator Wang Xin. These ministers provoked the trouble up front and hid in the rear, guarding only themselves with heavy forces. Brave subordinate officers received no coordination or relief—and so the men lost heart for battle. Sichuan and Hubei had a saying: "When the rebels come you never see a government soldier's face; when the rebels leave, the troops finally show up." Another line ran: "The rebels are gone and the troops vanish; the troops arrive and the rebels disappear." Poor soldiers and poor rebels—when will they ever meet? The year before, when Governor-General Le Bao reached Sichuan, he put up broad proclamations bitterly condemning his predecessors' failures—that itself was proof enough. Bi Yuan and Wang Xin died in succession, and Jing An succeeded as governor-general. Yi Mian, Hui Ling, and Qin Cheng'en are slack and negligent on one flank; Jing An is timid and indifferent on the other. Even if Le Bao fights in earnest, rebels in Shaanxi and Hubei rise and fall without end, and Le Bao will in the end be hamstrung. Consider how the late emperor, campaigning in Burma, found Yang Yingju guilty of provocation and concealment and had him seized at once for trial. Yi Mian and the rest have been negligent for three full years, spared by imperial leniency only to grow more complacent, and allowed rebels to push into Lushi, Lushan, and other counties in Henan. Jing An may not have a reputation for swallowing army funds, but he is willfully obtuse; of late rebels have burned and pillaged through Xiangyang and Guanghua—and all of this the law cannot abide. Moreover, sealed private letters are now coming from military camps, and officials are conspiring with Grand Council ministers to tamper with and suppress battle reports. The evidence is already exposed. Even if inner eunuchs lent their influence, these men's concealment and bungling are plainer still. I beg Your Majesty to punish and investigate, choose other able men, and send them with Le Bao to pacify each province in its own territory. Then army orders will run like the wind, and the rebels will surely lose their heads. In recent years pay has run to tens of millions, while camps teem with women, jade, silk, and curios—yet the soldiers' rations themselves fall short. Men return laden with plunder and the roads buzz with gossip. Mockers say it is easier to draw up a draft at the money-shop than to beg the army for pay. The late emperor cracked down on the military supplies bureau, found the Hanzhou prefect in Sichuan disputing accounts with Degengtai, and Hubei circuit intendant Hu Qilun embezzling hundreds of thousands in pay—one ordered to repay, the other seized for trial. Many other districts surely have like cases, and new men ought to be put in charge at once to audit the books. Embezzlement will then come to light; army funds and postwar relief will both be ample, and no one will dare doctor the accounts. Thus he closed the memorial.
9
間又上疏曰:「教匪滋擾,始於湖北宜都聶傑人,實自武昌府同知常丹葵苛虐逼迫而起。 當教匪齊麟等正法於襄陽,匪徒各皆斂戢。 常丹葵素以虐民喜事為能,乾隆六十年,委查宜都縣境,哧詐富家無算,赤貧者按名取結,納錢釋放。 少得供據,立與慘刑,至以鐵釘釘人壁上,或鐵鎚排擊多人。 情介疑似,則解省城,每船載一二百人,飢寒就斃,浮屍於江。 歿獄中者,亦無棺殮。 聶傑人號首富,屢索不厭,村黨結連拒捕。 宜昌鎮總兵突入遇害,由是宜都、枝江兩縣同變。 襄陽之齊王氏、姚之富,長陽之覃加耀、張正謨等,聞風並起,遂延及河南、陝西。 此臣所聞官逼民反之最先最甚者也。 臣思教匪之在今日,自應盡黨梟磔。 而其始猶是百數十年安居樂業人民,何求何憾,甘心棄身家、捐性命,鋌而走險耶? 臣聞賊當流竄時,猶哭念皇帝天恩,殊無一言怨及朝廷。 向使地方官仰體皇仁,察教於平日,撫弭於臨時,何至如此? 臣為此奏,固為官吏指事聲罪,亦欲使萬禩子孫知我朝無叛民,而後見恩德入人,天道人心,協應長久,昭昭不爽也。 常丹葵逞虐一時,上廑聖仁,下殃良善,罪豈容誅? 應請飭經略勒保嚴察奏辦。 又現奉恩旨,凡受撫來歸者,令勒保傳喚同知劉清,同川省素有清名之州縣,妥議安插。 楚地曾經滋擾者,亦應安集。 臣聞被擾州縣,逃散各戶之田廬婦女,多歸官吏壓賣分肥。 是始不顧其反,終不原其歸。 不知民何負於官,而效尤靦忍至於此極? 若得懲一儆眾,自可群知洗濯。 宣奉德意,所關於國家苞桑之計匪細也。」 兩疏上,仁宗並嘉納施行。 尋遷給事中,稽察南新倉,巡視中城。
He soon submitted another memorial: "The sectarian turmoil began with Nie Jieren of Yidu in Hubei—yet it truly arose because Wuchang subprefect Chang Dankui drove the people with cruelty. When sectarian leaders such as Qi Lin were lawfully executed at Xiangyang, the outlaws all quieted down. Chang Dankui had long made a name for tormenting the people and manufacturing cases. In 1795 he was sent to investigate Yidu county, intimidated and shook down countless wealthy families, and even extorted the destitute by name, releasing them only after they paid. On the slightest evidence he tortured at once—nailing men to walls with iron spikes or lining up crowds to be beaten with iron hammers. When a case was even slightly doubtful, he shipped prisoners to the provincial capital—two hundred to a boat—until hunger and cold killed them and corpses floated down the river. Those who died in prison were not even given coffins. Nie Jieren was the district's wealthiest man; Chang squeezed him without end until the villages banded together to resist arrest. The Yichang brigade commander stormed in and was killed, and Yidu and Zhijiang counties rose together. Lady Qi of Wang, Yao Zhifu at Xiangyang, Tan Jiayao and Zhang Zhengmo at Changyang, and others took up arms on the news, and the revolt spread into Henan and Shaanxi. This is the earliest and gravest case I know of officials driving the people to rebel. Today the sectarian rebels must of course be exterminated to the last. Yet at first they were people who had lived in peace for generations—what did they lack, what grievance drove them to abandon home and life and take desperate risks? I hear that even in flight the rebels wept over the emperor's grace and never spoke a word of blame against the throne. Had local officials embodied the throne's benevolence, watched sects in peacetime, and soothed trouble when it arose, how could matters have come to this? I submit this memorial to name the guilty officials, but also so that ten thousand generations may know our dynasty has no rebellious people—that imperial grace reaches men's hearts, and that heaven and human will together sustain the realm, clear and sure. Chang Dankui tyrannized for a season, affronting the throne's benevolence and harming the innocent—how can his crime go unpunished? I ask that Grand Coordinator Le Bao be ordered to investigate strictly and report for punishment. An imperial decree now orders Le Bao to summon Subprefect Liu Qing and Sichuan officials of long-standing clean reputation to settle all who accept pacification and return. Regions in Huguang that were once disturbed should be settled as well. I hear that in ravaged districts the fields, homes, and women of fleeing households were mostly seized by officials, sold under pressure, and the profits divided among them. At first they did not care that the people rebelled; in the end they would not forgive their return. What had the people done to officials that they copied such shameless cruelty to the utmost? Punish one to warn the rest, and the whole body of officials will know to reform. To proclaim and uphold imperial grace touches the nation's very roots—it is no small matter. Both memorials were submitted, and the Jiaqing Emperor praised and put them into effect. He was soon made supervising secretary, assigned to inspect the Nanxin granary and patrol the central city.
10
雲南鹽法,官運官銷,日久因緣為奸,按口比銷,民不堪命; 又威遠調取民夫,按名折銀,折後又徵實夫,迤西道屬數十州縣,同時閧變,解散後不以實聞,官吏骫法如故。 際岐上疏痛陳其害,下雲南督撫察治。 總督富綱請改鹽法以便民,巡撫江蘭方內召,欲沮其事,際岐复疏爭。 初彭齡繼為巡撫,際岐門下士也,熟聞其事,始疏請鹽由灶煎灶賣,民運民銷,一祛積弊,民大便。 語詳鹽法志。
Yunnan's salt monopoly used official transport and official sale; over time it bred corruption, sales were apportioned per capita, and the people could not endure it; Weiyuan also conscripted laborers, commuted names to cash, then levied real labor again; dozens of counties under the Yixi circuit rioted together, and after the crowds dispersed officials reported falsely and bent the law as before. Jiqi memorialized bitterly on the harm, and the throne ordered Yunnan's governor-general and grand coordinator to investigate. Governor-General Fu Gang asked to reform the salt law for the people's sake; Grand Coordinator Jiang Lan, newly summoned to court, tried to block it, and Jiqi memorialized again in protest. Chu Pengling, Jiqi's student, succeeded as grand coordinator, knew the affair well, and at last memorialized that salt be boiled and sold at the furnaces and carried and sold by the people, sweeping away old abuses—the people were greatly relieved. The full account appears in the Monograph on Salt Administration.
11
蔡永清者,總督陳輝祖家奴,擁厚貲居京師,以助賑敘五品職銜,出入輿馬,揖讓公卿間。 際岐疏劾,自大學士慶桂、硃珪以下,多所指斥,下刑部鞫訊,褫永清職銜,際岐坐論奏未盡實,降授刑部主事。 累遷郎中。 以老乞休,貧不能歸,主講揚州孝廉堂垂十年,卒。
Cai Yongqing was a household slave of Governor-General Chen Huizu who amassed great wealth in the capital, bought a fifth-rank title by aiding famine relief, rode in carriages, and mingled bowing with grandees and ministers. Jiqi impeached him, naming many from Grand Secretaries Qing Gui and Zhu Gui downward; the Ministry of Punishments tried the case, stripped Yongqing's title, and demoted Jiqi to a clerk in that ministry for memorializing without full substantiation. He was promoted in due course to director. He retired on grounds of age, too poor to go home, and lectured at Yangzhou's Xiaoliang Hall for nearly ten years until he died.
12
自乾隆末,雲南之官於朝以直言著者,尹壯圖、錢灃,時以際岐並稱焉。
From the late Qianlong era, Yunnan men at court famed for blunt speech were Yin Zhuangtu and Qian Feng; Jiqi was ranked with them.
13
李仲昭,字次卿,廣東嘉應人。 嘉慶七年進士,選庶吉士,授編修,遷御史。 長蘆鹽商偽造加重法馬,每引浮百斤,損課滯銷。 商人查有圻家鉅富,交通朝貴。 自給事中花傑劾蘆鹽加價,連及大學士戴衢亨,不得直,且被譴,遂無敢言者。 仲昭疏劾之,戶部猶袒商,或騰蜚語,謂仲昭索賄不遂。 仁宗方幸熱河,命留京王大臣同鞫,得舞弊狀,有圻論如律,在事降革有差,人咸側目。 仲昭又劾吏部京察不公,亦鞫實。 既而赴戶部點卯,杖責書吏,戶部摭其事奏劾,下吏部議。 群欲以傾仲昭,侍郎初彭齡號剛正,以妻喪在告,語人曰:「諸人欲報怨,加以莫須有之罪。 李御史有言膽,台中何可無此人?」 部員聞彭齡言,遽議降四級,甫兩日而奏上,仲昭竟黜。
Li Zhongzhao, style name Ciqing, was a native of Jiaying, Guangdong. He passed the jinshi examination in 1802, was selected as a Hanlin bachelor, appointed compiler, and transferred to the censorate. Changlu salt merchants forged heavier standard weights, padding each quota by a hundred jin, cutting revenue and slowing sales. The merchant Zha Youqi's family was immensely wealthy and cultivated ties with court nobles. After Supervising Secretary Hua Jie impeached the Changlu salt price hike and implicated Grand Secretary Dai Yuheng, he failed to obtain justice and was rebuked, and thereafter no one dared speak. Zhongzhao impeached them, but the Board of Revenue still shielded the merchants, and some spread rumors that he had sought bribes in vain. The Jiaqing Emperor was at Rehe and ordered princes and ministers in the capital to try the case jointly. Fraud was proved; Youqi was sentenced by law; those involved were demoted or dismissed in varying degrees, and all looked on in awe. Zhongzhao again impeached the Board of Civil Office for unfair capital evaluation, and that too was proved true. Soon afterward he went to the Board of Revenue for roll call and beat the clerks; the board seized on the affair to impeach him, and the case went to the Board of Civil Office for deliberation. Many wished to ruin Zhongzhao; Vice Minister Chu Pengling, known for integrity, was on leave for his wife's mourning and told others: "These men wish to settle scores and invent a crime out of nothing. Censor Li has the courage to speak—how can the censorate do without such a man?" Board members heard Pengling's words, hurriedly voted a four-rank demotion, and within two days the memorial went up—Zhongzhao was dismissed after all.
14
石承藻,字黼庭,湖南湘潭人。 嘉慶十三年一甲三名進士,授編修。 遷御史、給事中,敢言有聲。 王樹勳者,江都人,乾隆末入京應試不售,乃於廣慧寺為僧,名曰明心。 開堂說法,假扶乩卜筮,探刺士大夫陰私,揚言於外,人益崇信。 達官顯宦,每有皈依受戒為弟子者。 硃珪正人負重望,亦與交接。 時和珅為步軍統領,訪捕治罪,以賄得末減,勒令還俗,遂遊蕩江湖。 值川、楚匪亂,投效松筠軍中,以談禪投所好,使易裝入賊寨說降,獎予七品官銜,洊擢襄陽知府。 數年,入覲京師,不改故態。 刑部尚書金光悌延醫子病,怵以禍福,光悌長跪請命,為時所嗤。 嘉慶二十年,承藻疏請澄清流品,劾樹勳,下刑部鞫實,褫職,枷號兩月,發黑龍江充當苦差。 仁宗獎承藻曰:「真御史也!」 詔斥被惑諸臣,有玷官箴。 其已故者免議,侍郎蔣予蒲、宋鎔以下,黜降有差。
Shi Chengzao, style name Futing, was a native of Xiangtan, Hunan. In 1808 he took third place in the first class of the jinshi examination and was appointed compiler. He was transferred to the censorate and made supervising secretary, winning renown for bold speech. Wang Shuxun was from Jiangdu; at the end of the Qianlong reign he came to the capital to sit for examinations without success, then became a monk at Guanghui Temple under the name Mingxin. He opened a preaching hall, feigned spirit-writing and divination, pried into officials' private affairs, and spread the secrets abroad—so people revered him all the more. High officials and eminent ministers often took refuge, received precepts, and became his disciples. Zhu Gui, an upright man of great standing, also associated with him. Heshen, then metropolitan infantry commander, hunted him down; he bribed his way to a lighter sentence, was forced back to lay life, and wandered the country. When rebellion broke out in Sichuan and Hubei, he joined Songyun's army, won favor by preaching Chan, was sent in disguise into rebel camps to negotiate surrender, was given a seventh-rank title, and rose in succession to prefect of Xiangyang. After several years he came to the capital for audience and did not change his old ways. Minister of Punishments Jin Guangti invited him to treat his son's illness; he threatened him with fortune and disaster; Guangti knelt long to beg his counsel, and the age mocked him. In 1815 Chengzao memorialized to clarify official ranks and impeached Shuxun; the Ministry of Punishments tried the case, stripped his office, cangued him for two months, and sent him to Heilongjiang for hard labor. The Jiaqing Emperor praised Chengzao: "A true censor!" An edict rebuked the deluded ministers for staining the official rule. Those already dead were spared further inquiry; Vice Ministers Jiang Yupu, Song Rong, and others below them were dismissed or demoted in varying degrees.
15
二十四年,湘潭有土、客械鬥之獄,侍郎週系英與巡撫吳邦慶互劾。 承藻適在籍,系英子汝楨致書承藻詢其事,為邦慶所發,承藻牽連降秩。 久之不復遷,終光祿寺署正。
In 1819 Xiangtan saw armed fighting between native and migrant communities; Vice Minister Zhou Xiying and Grand Coordinator Wu Bangqing impeached each other. Chengzao happened to be home on leave; Xiying's son Ruzhen wrote to ask him about the affair; Bangqing exposed the letter, and Chengzao was implicated and demoted. He was not promoted again for a long time and ended his career as acting director of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices.
16
論曰:仁宗詔求直言,下至末吏平民,皆得封章上達,言路大開。 科道中竭誠獻納,如衛謀論福康安貪婪,不宜配享太廟。 馬履泰論景安畏縮偷安,老師糜餉,及教匪宜除,難民宜撫; 又論百齡舉劾失當。 張鵬展論金光悌專擅刑部,戀司職不去。 週栻論疆臣參劾屬員,不舉劣跡,恐悃愊無華者以失歡被劾; 又論硃珪以肩輿擅入禁門,無無君之心,而有無君之跡。 沈琨論宜興庇護屬員,致興株系諸生大獄; 又諫阻東巡。 蕭芝論端正風俗,宜崇醇樸。 王寧煒論用人宜習其素,不可因保舉遽加升用; 又論督撫壅蔽之習,及士民捐輸之累,州縣折收之患。 遊光繹論大臣未盡和衷,武備未盡整飭,原效魏元成十思疏以裨治化。 諸人所言,雖有用有不用,當時皆推讜直。 又龔鏜當鬆筠因諫東巡獲罪,密疏复陳,自庀身後事而後上,卒蒙寬宥。 其章疏多不傳,稽之史牒,旁見紀載,謇諤盈廷,稱盛事焉。 洪亮吉諸人身雖遭黜,言多見採,可以無憾。 或猶以時方清明,目亮吉之效痛哭流涕者為多事,過矣。
The appraisal says: The Jiaqing Emperor called for blunt speech; from the lowest clerks to common people, all could submit sealed memorials to the throne, and the path of remonstrance stood wide open. Censors and supervising secretaries offered counsel with full sincerity, as when Wei Mou argued that Fukang'an was greedy and unfit to share sacrifice in the Imperial Ancestral Temple. Ma Lvtai argued that Jing An was timid and indifferent, that armies wasted rations in stalemate, that sectarian rebels must be eliminated, and that refugees must be comforted; He also argued that Bai Ling's recommendations and impeachments were improper. Zhang Pengzhan argued that Jin Guangti monopolized the Ministry of Punishments and clung to his post. Zhou Shi argued that frontier governors impeaching subordinates cited no misdeeds, lest honest and unadorned men be punished merely for falling from favor; He also argued that Zhu Gui, entering the forbidden gate by sedan chair without leave, had no disloyal intent but left the appearance of disloyalty. Shen Kun argued that sheltering subordinates in Yixing had led to a great case in which many students were swept up and punished; He also remonstrated against the eastern tour. Xiao Zhi argued that to rectify public morals the court should honor plain and unadorned ways. Wang Ningwei argued that appointments should rest on long knowledge of a man's character, not hasty promotion on recommendation alone; He also spoke of governors' habit of concealing reports, the burden of gentry donations, and the harm of prefectural surcharge collection. You Guangyi argued that ministers still lacked harmony, military readiness was still incomplete, and offered to follow the model of Wei Zheng's Ten Reflections to aid governance. Not every word was acted on, but at the time all were praised as candid and upright. When Gong Fu saw Songyun punished for opposing the eastern tour, he drafted a secret memorial, settled his affairs, and only then submitted it—and in the end was pardoned. Most of their memorials do not survive, yet historical records mention them in passing—frank speech filled the court, and the age was called a great one for remonstrance. Hong Liangji and the others were punished, yet much of what they said was heeded—they had little to regret. Some, thinking the times already clear, called Liangji's tearful remonstrance excessive—but they were wrong.