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卷383 列傳一百七十 张文浩 严烺 张井 吴邦庆 栗毓美 麟庆 潘锡恩子:骏文

Volume 383 Biographies 170: Zhang Wenhao, Yan Lang, Zhang Jing, Wu Bangqing, Li Yu Mei, Lin Qing, Pan Xien son: Jun Wen

Chapter 383 of 清史稿 · Draft History of Qing
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Chapter 383
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1
Biography 170
2
Zhang Wenhao, Yan Lang, Zhang Jing, Wu Bangqing, and Li Yumei
3
駿
Lin Qing, Pan Xien, and his son Junwen
4
調 調
Zhang Wenhao came from Daxing in the Shuntian metropolitan district. He bought his way into office as secretary to a provincial administration commissioner, then offered his services on the Eastern River project; when that work was finished he was posted to the Southern River. In the tenth year of the Jiaqing reign (1805) he was appointed subprefect in charge of the outer Yellow River section at Shanqing. Floods cost him his post more than once, but he was soon reinstated and then assigned as subprefect on the south bank of the outer river. In the nineteenth year (1814) River Commissioner Wu Jin had him transferred to the Sui River works, and he was promoted to acting intendant of the Huai-Hai circuit. In the twenty-fourth year (1819) flooding at Yifeng broke the Maying Dam at Wuzhi again. Zhang was put in charge of repairing it; when the work was done he received the peacock feather insignia. The Yifeng breach was still open. Emperor Renzong, finding Wu Jin too old for the task, made Wenhao acting governor-general of the Eastern River and ordered him to stay on site at the works. In a memorial he estimated 4.5 million taels for dam construction and river dredging; the court approved the plan. After the project was finished he was promoted to a second-rank cap button and given the concurrent nominal title of vice minister of war. In the spring of Daoguang 1 (1821) the Directorate of Astronomy reported a comet at the Eastern Wall asterism, whose terrestrial correlate was the Wei region—an omen of major flooding—and the emperor ordered Wenhao to guard against it. Vice Minister Wu Xuan proposed raising the river embankments. Wenhao replied in a memorial: "The river flats vary in elevation; along more than a thousand li of main dike a uniform raise is impossible—I ask instead to add subsidiary embankments two or three feet high." The court agreed. He was then given the substantive post of governor-general of river works. In the third year (1823) he went into mourning for his mother. Before his mourning term ended, repeated flooding in the metropolitan region led the court to appoint him acting vice minister of works and send him with third-rank secretary Jichang to inspect overflows on the north–south Grand Canal and the Yongding River. The emperor ordered Jichang back to the capital. Wenhao stayed on site to oversee the work. When the project ended he and Governor-General Jiang Youqian submitted a joint memorial: "Floodwater in the Zhili waterways has not yet drained, so we cannot survey them properly; every dike and spur we have asked about is choked with silt, broken down, or neglected. Construction can start only in the second month and must halt by the fifth; with so much to do and so little time, we cannot possibly tackle everything at once. We ask that next spring, once the ice thaws, officials make a full on-site survey and draw up cost estimates ranked by urgency." They added: "The Yongding River floods not only because the lower outlet cannot run freely, but also because the upper course has nowhere to spill excess water. We propose repairing the Chongmen Sluice and adding flood-relief dams. In recent years the current has often struck the north bank; we should build outer dikes as an additional line of defense."
5
In the spring of the fourth year (1824) he was made governor-general of the Jiangnan river works. That autumn returning grain barges found the Yellow River higher than the canal’s clear water and were stuck north of the crossing for months. The emperor rebuked him sharply, reduced his cap button to third rank, and ordered him to store enough clear water to float the fleet through. Not until the eleventh month did the entire fleet finally cross the Yellow River. Meanwhile floodwater on Hongze Lake had not yet fallen. The dike at Gaoyan’s thirteen forts burst along more than eleven thousand zhang; at Shanxu, Zhouqiao, and Xilang'an the water stood eight or nine feet deep, and every dam spilled over. Emperor Xuanzong was furious, removed Wenhao from office, and dispatched Ministers Wen Fu and Wang Tingzhen to investigate on the spot. They impeached him for leaving the Yellow River control dam shut when it should have been opened, keeping the five outlet dams closed when they should have been opened, and hoarding clear water until the embankment gave way. He was made to wear the cangue at the worksite for a month, then exiled to Xinjiang. When fighting broke out in the Western Regions he served with the troops. After peace returned he asked to be released and sent home, but the court refused. In the sixteenth year (1836) he died in exile.
6
使 仿仿 使便
Yan Lang, whose style was Xiaonong, came from Renhe in Zhejiang. Under Jiaqing he bought office as subprefect and was posted to the Southern River, rising step by step to intendant of Xuzhou before going into mourning for his mother. When his mourning ended in Daoguang 1 (1821) he was appointed intendant of the Henan north-bank circuit. He was soon made acting governor-general of the Eastern River with a third-rank cap button. After three flood seasons passed without disaster he received the full appointment. Once the Wen River breach was sealed he wrote: "On the canal’s northern route the key is to impound Wen River water to counter the Wei. The Wen must be raised stage by stage before it can stand against the Wei. He proposed raising the brick sluice at Linqingkou to hold more water back." The court agreed. Li Shixu had long relied on rubble stone on the Southern River and urged the Eastern River to do the same. Lang took up the idea and asked to build a spur dike on the north bank at Maying, casting rubble as on the Southern River, at an estimated cost of one hundred thousand taels. Provincial treasurer Cheng Hanzhang and governor Yao Zutong both objected that the plan was impractical. After Maying had silted up and the current in front of the dam had slackened, Lang still asked to cast rubble at the tail where the Qin River fed in, and the court agreed.
7
調 便
In the fourth year (1824) the Gaojia Embankment on the Southern River burst, and Lang was transferred to governor-general of the Jiangnan river works. In the fifth year (1825) he joined Ministers Wen Fu and Wang Tingzhen in a memorial: "Holding clear water to push back the Yellow River is the single most important principle of river control. Clear water depends entirely on the lake embankments. Once they break the lake drains dry, and when the grain fleet arrives there is no water left to float the barges. We propose to follow the old practice of borrowing Yellow River water to serve the canal. The canal is narrow and the Yellow current fierce—too much water will not fit, too little will leave the channel shoaled and unnavigable. We propose building three dams outside the Yellow River control dam to pinch the current and keep it under control. We would also build towpaths to confine the water and allow tracking. On the long canal reaches under the Li and Yang offices we would dredge shoals, strengthen the dikes, stock materials in advance, and build temporary dams whenever needed to drive the current and scour silt away. Before the Yellow River control dam opens, we would first dredge the Gaoyan diversion to send clear water into the canal; and just before opening it we would seal off the clear water tightly to keep Yellow River water out of the lake. Lake embankments must be repaired in cold weather when the water is low and earth easier to dig. We would gather materials nearby and, before the main flood season, raise the masonry ten courses high in readiness for the lake’s rise. The whole plan would cost three million taels from the treasury." They also answered Vice Minister Zhu Shiyan’s proposals on the Southern River, in brief: "When rebuilding the Gaojia Embankment, build an outer dam first to give workers footing, and cast a rubble slope outside the stone dike so the structure need never collapse again. We would also strengthen dikes and revetments on the salt river inside the Wangjiaba relief dam and add stone roller dams at the old Ren, Yi, and Li dam sites to guard against sudden surges." The court approved and carried out the plan. He then worked with Sun Yuting and others to oversee the main grain transport. By the fifth month, even after the Yellow River control dam opened, the channel remained shallow and slow and grain barges still could not get through. Transshipment at nearby dams could not keep pace. Yuting was severely punished, and Lang was demoted several ranks but kept in his post.
8
西 仿
Lang could not leave the transport crisis to tour the works, and Governor-General Qishan of the Two Jiangs complained. The court ordered him to make a full inspection tour while still telling him to store enough clear water for next year’s plan to use it against the Yellow River and float the grain fleet. Lang wrote: "In the past the Yellow River bed was deep. A few feet of stored lake water was enough to pour out and scour it, and the dikes did not bear much pressure. Today the lake must be held to two zhang before the water can pour down with enough force to scour the Yellow River. Four hundred li of open lake water cannot safely rest behind a single narrow dike; a west wind will surely burst it. We propose the established remedy of a rubble slope outside the dike. Once the embankment is secure, the lake can hold water again." He and Qishan added in a memorial: "Scouring the Yellow River requires two zhang of lake water. Last year the lake stood barely one zhang seven chi, and disaster followed immediately. At present we can hardly store enough clear water; we must pursue both storing clear water and reducing the Yellow River at once. Rubble slopes protect the dikes so we can store clear water; relocating the river mouth is how we reduce the Yellow River’s force." The emperor ordered a thorough plan submitted in writing. Soon they reported jointly: "From the Wangying relief dam to the Guanhe estuary the Yellow River could be guided to the sea. But the seashore beyond Guanhe mouth slopes upward, which makes that route uncertain. Only rubble slopes can gradually restore the benefits of storing clear water and scouring the Yellow River. The cost would exceed six million taels and should be spread over several years."
9
調 西
In the sixth year (1826) the Hongze Lake stonework was finished. Lang knew it was not sound enough to trust, yet he still pushed rubble stone works, casting three hundred thousand cubic feet of stone a year until the eighth year, when the project was declared done. Emperor Xuanzong lashed out: "Since Lang took this post he has achieved nothing. The Yellow River control dam still cannot be opened. His management has been poor. Remembering that his work on the Eastern River had not yet failed outright, the court reduced his cap button to third rank." He was appointed acting governor-general of the Eastern River; in the seventh year (1827) he received the full appointment and regained his second-rank cap button. The northwest crown of the Lanyang timber dam was taking the main current. Earlier rubble casting had helped, but the summer and autumn floods still strained the site, and he asked to widen the slope. In the eighth year (1828) he asked to keep casting rubble in the Xiabei and Lanyi offices and to stock stone at critical points on the Middle and Xiang rivers for emergencies. In the eleventh year (1831) Vice Minister Zhong Chang inspected Eastern River material piles and found those at Xianghe and Cao-Kao hollow, loose, and rotten. Lang was faulted for poor oversight, reduced to a third-rank cap button, and demoted four ranks but kept in post. He soon asked to resign on grounds of illness.
10
In the thirteenth year (1833), recovered and back in the capital, he memorialized on Zhejiang’s seawalls. In the fourteenth year (1834) he was sent with Vice Minister Zhao Shengkui to inspect the coast. He asked that work be ranked by urgency, timber revetments rebuilt to protect the seawall foot, and fifty thousand taels set aside each year for repairs. The court agreed. He was soon told he need not stay on site to supervise. He again asked to go home on grounds of illness. In the fifteenth year (1835) Eastern River governor-general Wu Bangqing accused Lang of padding rubble reports and taking red-seal gifts and entertainment fees. He was demoted to transport subprefect. In the twentieth year (1840) he died.
11
西 調
Zhang Jing, whose style was Jiehang, came from Fushi in Shaanxi. He passed the jinshi examination in Jiaqing 6 (1801), served as a Secretariat drafter, then became a magistrate and was assigned to Lehui in Guangdong. At his audience the emperor specially reassigned him to Zhengyang in Henan, then to Xiangfu, and later made him magistrate of Xuzhou direct prefecture. He helped manage the major Maying Dam project, received the nominal rank of prefect, and served as acting prefect of Runing. In Daoguang 4 (1824) he was promoted to intendant of the Kai-Gui-Chen-Xu circuit. He was soon made acting governor-general of the Eastern River with a third-rank cap button. In the fifth year (1825), after the autumn floods passed without incident, he received the full appointment. He raised the Yellow River dikes on both banks, repaired the Quan River embankments, and dredged lake outlet channels. In a memorial on long-term river policy he wrote, in brief: "Today’s Yellow River is only defended, not truly governed. Every summer and autumn flood season river officials rush from crisis to crisis, exhausted day after day with never enough time. Once the water falls and frost sets in, they decide the river is safe for now and stop looking for ways to dredge and scour the channel. The bed rises, clear water cannot run out freely, and the grain transport suffers as well. Transshipment, lighterage, and sea transport added further costs—all because for decades officials have poured effort into dikes and revetments, treating flood defense as river control without ever grasping what real control requires. Until the bed can be dredged we are stuck with the old rule of confining water behind dikes. That water cannot scour sand, so the channel silts higher every day. Only a way to scour it deep can restore the river’s natural downward flow." The emperor endorsed his view and told him to plan with Governor-General Qishan, Southern River governor-general Yan Lang, and Henan governor Cheng Zuluo. He then went south for a joint inspection.
12
滿 仿使 調
In the sixth year he wrote: "The Yellow River is sick because its middle is too high and silt too deep. We must guide it where the terrain allows. Following Grand Secretary Agui’s old method of shifting the channel to avoid danger, we would route the river around the high silt bar, build a new dike north of Andong’s east gate, turn the north dike into the south dike, and dredge a diversion between them parallel to the old course. Below Siwangbin it would rejoin the estuary without silt bars in the way and could run smoothly east to the sea. A clear outlet would draw down upstream silt. Once Yellow and clear water stood level, we could open the control dam, force clear water out, and scour the Yellow River with rooftop force." The emperor praised his insight, made him Jiangnan river governor-general, and ordered him to confer with Qishan and vice commissioner Pan Xien. Shifting the channel to avoid silt ran into rubble at the mouth and other obstacles, so he asked to open the Wangying relief dam to lower the Yellow River and scour the bed. The court agreed.
13
Supervising secretary Yang Xuan then warned that opening the relief dam would pour a fierce Yellow current the salt river could not hold and invite abuse, pointing to two Jiaqing-era overflows as proof. The court ordered another full review. Zhang Jing replied that Yang Xuan had searched the records but did not seem to grasp how things differed then and now. Past overflows had happened when the dam opened in May. This year it would open only after frost, so upstream flows were unlikely to keep surging. Yet commissioners now reported the outlet still blocked, so Yang Xuan was not entirely wrong. Opening might ease the flow for a time, but once the breach was sealed the whole channel would rise again. That would deepen the suffering in four counties while leaving the river's root sickness untouched. I ask that we return to shifting the channel to avoid silt." The emperor called Zhang Jing's position wavering and rejected it. That autumn the relief dam opened and closed on schedule, and he was rewarded. In the seventh year spring floods sent Yellow water backing up above the clear channel, and the control dam could not be opened in time. Grain boats had to haul water from ponds to keep moving. He asked to be punished and was stripped to third-rank insignia. Grand Secretary Jiang Youqian and Minister Mu Zhang'a were sent to inspect. Yellow water then fell, the control dam opened, and the fleet barely got through. The court scolded Zhang Jing for chasing credit and clinging to old models, stripped him of rank but left him in post to prove himself.
14
沿 滿
In the eighth year he proposed four main projects: extend the Yellow River's sea-mouth dike and build more revetment dams downstream to scour and draw silt; add rolling dams on Hongze Lake and widen its dikes; relocate the Zhaoguan dam on the Southern Grand Canal and strengthen both tow-path dikes; and on the Northern Grand Canal restore the stone rolling dam at Liulaojian and repair the south bank tow-path dike. Yinghe and Jiang Youqian were told to inspect. Extra revetments would not clear the built-up silt, so the sea-mouth dike could wait; the rest would proceed as planned. In the ninth year, after two calm seasons, he regained second-rank insignia and was told to restore the old river and lake regime when conditions allowed. He wrote: "The Southern River's fate hangs on Qingjiang. Only if clear water runs out freely and scours Yellow silt can both the river and the grain route be saved. Yellow silt meant clear water had to stand several chi higher, and the dam had to stay open longer than it stayed shut, before the current could scour freely. Clear water now escaped only enough to stop backflow and keep grain moving; real scouring was still out of reach." In the twelfth year crowds in Taoyuan secretly dug the official dike to bleed the current and caused a breach. He was dismissed but kept on temporarily to serve out his duty. Censor Bao Wenchun and Imperial Clan vice director Pan Xien warned that Yellow water in the lake could block the canal. Mu Zhang'a and Tao Shu were sent to inspect and plan. He argued that once Yellow water entered the lake it rejoined the Yellow River through Wucheng's seven forts, silting only the dikes and not the lake itself or the Shuqing dam, so the canal would not suffer. With the main channel dry, we could dredge heavily between the Taonan and Taobei offices and cure the raised bed." In the thirteenth year the Yujiawan breach was sealed and he received fourth-rank insignia. He soon pleaded illness and went home. He died at home in the fifteenth year.
15
Zhang Jing oversaw both river systems for ten years in all. He began on the Southern River with fierce energy, but major works swallowed more than three million taels without real gain. He fell back on stopgaps; pond irrigation for transport was safer than drawing on the Yellow River. Diligent in upkeep, his peers ranked him just below Li Shixu.
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西使調 調 使 調
Wu Bangqing, styled Jifeng, came from Bazhou in Shuntian. A tribute graduate, he served as instructor at Changli. In Jiaqing 1 he passed the jinshi, entered the Hanlin Academy as a bachelor, became a compiler, and moved to the Censorate. While inspecting eastern grain transport he asked to re-dredge the canal and restore Shandong's old spring exchange and spring opening rules. He spoke often on rivers and transport, and much of what he said was taken up. In the nineteenth year he rose to vice minister of Honglu Temple and was paired with Mu Zhang'a to oversee dredging of the Northern Grand Canal. He rose to become a Grand Secretariat reader. In the twentieth year he became Shanxi fiscal commissioner, moved to Henan, and served as acting governor. In the twenty-third year he was made Hunan governor and reassigned to Fujian, but before he took up the post natives and settlers in Xiangtan rioted and many were killed or wounded. Vice Minister Zhou Xiying told the throne that his account differed from Bangqing's memorial, and Governor Qingbao was sent to investigate. Bangqing also leaked Xiying's private letters, and Xiying was censured; Bangqing was demoted to third rank, given a capital post, and made chief of transmission. In the twenty-fifth year he became vice minister of War, moved to Justice, and soon took charge as Anhui governor.
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使 沿 調西
Yellow water flooded the Huai, Feng and Ying suffered, and southern Anhui baked in drought. He went in person to the stricken districts to relieve them. When Xu Feilong of Jing county died of his wounds, Bangqing wrongly believed the investigating officer that Xu Xiaofang had faked his injuries to extort money. He ordered an arrest, and the crowd rose to resist. Governor-General Sun Yuting was told to try the case and learned the truth. The court scolded Bangqing for nearly framing an innocent man; the ministry wanted him dismissed, but he was given a compiler post instead. He rose to junior tutor of the Heir Apparent. In Daoguang 10 he was named Guizhou judicial commissioner, but before he could take the post he received third-rank minister rank, served as acting grain-transport governor-general, and was confirmed in the post. He banned grain boats from hauling reed salt and asked for raids on riverside hoarding dens. In the eleventh year he became Jiangxi governor.
18
使 椿
In the twelfth year he was made Eastern River governor-general. He pleaded ignorance of river work and was refused. Earlier, as Eastern River chief Yan Lang had leaned on rubble revetments; year after year the materials budget never shrank, until the throne ordered a review and cuts. Bangqing proposed: "Revise the old rules so forty percent of annual defense funds buy straw and sixty percent buy stone. The Lanyi, Shangyu, and Xiabei offices, where the work is most dangerous, should still get rubble by special petition. Stockpile the sixty-percent stone over several years until each office holds two thousand units; then emergencies will be covered and special rubble orders can taper off." The court agreed. Locals had built and kept up the Wuzhi Yellow River blocking weir; later it passed to bureau control and the managed stretches grew every year. In the thirteenth year he set boundaries with marker stones, split upkeep between officials and locals, and ruled that new revetments would be funded on loan and repaid by levy across the three Hebei prefectures. The Shandong canal depended entirely on spring water, so he asked to restore the Quanhe intendant to hold sole responsibility. Below the Shoudong rolling dam stood an old earth weir that stored Wen water to protect transport. In big floods villagers opened it illegally and trouble followed, so he asked for fixed boundary stakes. Transport water would be held to seven chi; once the heavy grain fleet passed, the weir would open for farmland. The plan was approved.
19
調
Bangqing had once published a water-conservancy series on the capital region. In office he mined Henan's provincial gazetteers for irrigated districts, listed how their water rose and fell and how much land they watered, and wrote a treatise on canal fields. Between repair duties he had the circuit and bureaus fund water wheels and trial reclamation on more than seven thousand mu of flooded land north of Maying dam and at Caijialou hollow. Bangqing had earlier impeached Yan Lang over rubble works and got him dismissed. Supervising secretary Jin Yinglin then accused Bangqing of reckless promotions and excessive fund draws. In the fifteenth year Wen Fu and Shandong governor Zhong Xiang investigated. He was found to have improperly redirected local staff to river work, used subordinates as private secretaries, and ignored bureau officials' gift silver. He was dismissed. The edict also scolded him for waiting three years to impeach Yan Lang, calling it a cheap trick, but granted him compiler rank again for three calm seasons in office. At seventy he retired. He died in the twenty-eighth year.
20
西 西 調 使使
Li Yumei, styled Puyuan, came from Hunyuan in Shanxi. Under Jiaqing he passed the tribute examination for an appointment to You county and was posted to Henan. He acted as magistrate in Wen, Meng, Anyang, Henei, and Xihua, then took Ningling, and made a mark everywhere he served. He went home for his father's mourning. In early Daoguang, when the mourning ended, he was posted to Wuzhi. He became prefect of Guangzhou, rose to Runing prefect, and moved to Kaifeng. He served as grain-and-salt intendant, Kai-Gui-Chen-Xu intendant, Hubei judicial commissioner, and Henan fiscal commissioner, and acted as governor. In the fifteenth year he became Eastern River governor-general.
21
Even as a county magistrate he had handled Yellow and Qin dike work and the Maying dam himself, and kept at river affairs with fierce diligence. Serial gullies had long plagued the river. These cut channels between dike and mainstream began as stagnant pools, then took river water at the head and fed back at the tail until they became branch streams. Rivers once ten li from the dike drew near the embankment and often burst through. On taking office Yumei toured both banks by small boat. On the north bank at Yuanwu station a serial gully already took three hundred zhang of water, ran more than forty li to Yangwu, and poured back into the main channel; Qin River water and floods from the Wuzhi and Rongze shoals all poured against the dike base. Neither station had materials or straw on hand, and water on both sides of the stone dikes left no dry ground to build earth dams. Yumei bought up local bricks and built several dozen brick dams. The work had barely finished when storms hit. The branch stream tore open dozens of zhang at both ends, yet the dike held, and brick dams proved their worth. He reported what he had done and submitted illustrated plans.
22
沿
He soon wrote again: "The intake at Wangwuzhuang is more than a hundred zhang wider than before. The main shoal keeps silting southward, so the current slackens in the south and runs harder in the north. The south branch of the main channel had become a backwater, while the north branch poured like water off a rooftop. Old shoals a thousand zhang wide in front of Guangwu Mountain had collapsed. The current ran to the mountain base, hit the slope, bent back northeast, and a new shoal rose in the main channel. The inlet was scouring wider every day; a lean estimate put the cost at more than one hundred thousand taels. Along the Yuanyang dikes on both banks, brick blocks cast along the slope gave the toe solid protection. The Yueshi dam was closed, raised, and widened. Downstream at Yangcun and Fengqiu shoals had stopped building up, and more than seventy villages below the dam lived in safety. But the serial gullies splitting the current touched the whole north bank and could not wait until next year; funds had already been borrowed and earmarked for the work." The court approved. That branch-stream project was perilous; brick works alone turned the crisis into a stable channel.
23
He soon inspected with Governor Gui Liang and reported: "Six-tenths of the flow already splits through the old channel. Wangwuzhuang mouth is wide and the current runs smoothly, but neither brick nor earth dams can be trusted for long. Yuanwu's sixteen forts take the full force of the current, while shoal water at Qinjiachang and Yandianzhuang feeds in through serial gullies. All seventeen forts at the branch stream tail are critical points; we ask to buy materials now and guard against trouble before it comes." The court approved and carried out the plan. In the sixteenth year he dredged and rebuilt critical sections of the Yutai station embankments and placed private weirs under the Grand Canal bureau. In the eighteenth year drought stalled the grain fleet. He dredged spring sources and lake inflow channels and tightened control over every sluice gate. He also dredged the Caozhou and Jining canal reaches. In the nineteenth year he set rules for Weishan Lake holding transport water: whenever storage stayed within one zhang three chi, dams would be built to impound it and Daicun Dam raised to stop side leakage.
24
便 沿 便 使
Early on, with brick works proving their worth again and again, Yumei asked permission to set up official kilns. Censor Li Chun objected that the plan was impractical. Minister Jing Zheng was sent to inspect and still recommended switching to rubble stone and shutting down the kilns. Yumei answered in a memorial: "Every breach in Henan has come at stretches with no permanent works. The embankment runs a thousand li, and we cannot fortify every foot of it. When the river suddenly changes course and storms hit, crews are left scrambling. Even when emergency repairs hold and the line stabilizes, fascine work already devours enormous sums. Drawing the current with inset fascines and thereby creating new critical points has long been taboo among river engineers, yet the uninformed insist there is no other remedy. The north bank carries the transport route. When Yuanyang once split the current it nearly dragged the whole river with it; without brick cast for protection, the cost would have been beyond reckoning. Today at Xiangfu lower station and Chenliu station shoal water pours in through serial gullies, and the toe of the dike faces the same danger as on the north bank. Riverside gentry and commoners have petitioned repeatedly for brick, having seen how well it works and how urgently they need to protect fields and homes. What truly helps the people cannot fail to help the state. Because the method is still new, gossip is inevitable. When the Southern River first turned to stone, critics were loud— mainly because steady works and lower material use kept suppliers from cornering the market. With simpler works and less busywork, travelers and clerks lost side income from the project, and rumor flourished. Only the emperor's firm order to trial the method on the Eastern River brought Yongqing lasting peace. Since relying on rubble stone alone, requests had run to nearly seven hundred thousand taels; even after cutting the mix to sixty percent rubble, stone remained hard to buy, fascine sections grew deeper and longer, and costs still could not be trimmed. After trial brick dams, no new emergency works arose in three years, and three hundred sixty thousand taels were saved compared with the previous three. Henan is not Jiangnan: stone comes only from Jiyuan and Gongxian, and getting it out and hauling it is painfully hard. Along the river private kilns number several dozen at least, so brick can be supplied on the spot and on schedule without missing the moment. Stone is slick and rolls in the current; brick is rough and grips the soil. Cast as a gentle slope it naturally pulls the main stream away. A square of brick blocks costs six taels, while stone ranges from five or six taels to more than ten. Rubble comes in uneven sizes, and half of any pile is empty space. One thousand one-foot bricks make a square; laid flat and counted, the pile is solid all the way through. A square of stone weighs five or six thousand jin against ninety-odd jin for brick: one square of stone money buys two squares of brick, and one square of cast brick does the work of two squares of stone. Some claim brick cracks once buried, not knowing it hardens in water; cast into a brick dam and packed with silt, it sets like rock; Others say brick dams mean fighting the river for every inch of ground— yet inch by inch before the dike is ground we must win. The old fascine method required dozens of zhang of earth dam in front of the dike before inset fascines could go in; a brick dam needs no fascines at all. Take the principle of the earth dam without copying every step: cast a gentle slope and the main current moves outward by itself. Anywhere an earth dam can stand, a brick dam can stand. Last year's flood ran harder even than those of the second and twelfth years, yet every brick dam held firm. At the Yisui and Zhonghe bureaus, as the river unloaded silt, banks caved in and shoals piled up. Emergency fascine sections washed away immediately, but brick casting held the line. Using brick to rush critical repairs is faster and surer than inset fascines. The Heng works failed when the shoal sank too far to inset fascines; the Ma works failed because repairs could not get rubble stone in time. Had they understood that fascines are weaker than brick and brick easier to haul than stone, they would have spent less and built something that lasted. Today every bureau still has unprotected stretches where serial gullies lurk; we must prepare before the rains come. Stockpiling brick blocks in south Henan below the Yellow and Qin rivers would leave us ready when trouble strikes. Stored brick should still be bought from local kilns, not fired by bureau staff— and beyond that there is no room for abuse." The court finally adopted his plan in full. He then proposed diverting forty percent of the straw-fascine budget to brick blocks.
25
In another memorial he wrote: "River work once relied on rolled fascines, bamboo cages, wooden cribs, brick and stone, and willow and reed. Once inset fascines and straw fascines became the standard, danger shifted everywhere and no permanent fix remained. Inset fascines rise too steeply and easily provoke the current. Where water was only a few feet deep, a few inset fascine sections drew the current down several zhang and turned routine stretches into emergencies. When the current climbs, more fascines must be added; when it drops, the line must be extended downstream. Each extension makes the line harder to hold. Fresh emergencies multiply labor and cost. Because fascine work cannot be cut, officials trim earth work and buy less rubble stone— stopgaps that only postpone disaster. Since we began trial brick dams, whether to block new emergencies or shield old works, every case has paid off. Brick lasts, and stockpiles need not fear wind or fire. With works secure and the river quiet, we can rebuild earth embankments and spend on fundamentals— preventing both overflow and breach." Emperor Xuanzong warmly approved. When Governor Niu Jian came to court, he was told Yumei's river policy was working and warned not to interfere. In the twentieth year he received a special merit rating at the capital evaluation. He died soon after. The throne mourned him in a gracious edict, posthumously made him Grand Guardian of the Heir Apparent, granted condolence payments on the governor-general scale, awarded his son Yao the jinshi degree, gave him the posthumous name Gongqin, and enshrined him in the local worthies temple.
26
歿
Yumei met every storm and hazard in person, reading each bend, grade, and bank facing before the water arrived. He would say: "The water will hit such-and-such a point— get ready now." Others called it fussy and costly. Yumei replied: "Knowing when spending saves money is the only way to spend wisely." When the flood arrived, they were convinced. During five years in office the river never broke out. After his death officials and commoners missed him; a temple raised him to divine status, miracles were reported, honors multiplied, and he entered the state sacrificial rolls.
27
滿 調 使使 仿
Lin Qing, styled Jianting, of the Wanyan clan, was a Manchu of the Bordered Yellow Banner. A jinshi of Jiaqing 14, he entered the Secretariat as a drafter, rose to a clerkship in the Ministry of War, and then became a censor-in-waiting. In Daoguang 3 he became Huizhou prefect in Anhui, moved to Yingzhou, and was promoted to Henan's Kai-Gui-Chen-Xu intendant. He served as Henan judicial commissioner, Guizhou fiscal commissioner, and acting governor. In the thirteenth year he became governor of Hubei. He was soon named Southern River governor-general; after his mother's death he served in an acting post, and received the full appointment once mourning ended. In a memorial on Southern River policy he wrote: "River and lake alike have declined. Restoring the old order comes down to storing clear water to scour the Yellow River. The ancients sent clear water three parts to the canal and seven to scour the Yellow River, relying above all on the Millstone fascines. After it was abandoned river work slid downhill; I propose restoring the Millstone fascines. Hongze Lake spreads wide and the Gaojia Embankment is treacherous. Most dams are packed with brush and earth to hold water; opening them in flood season wrecks the foundations and wastes fortunes. We should follow relief-dam practice: raise the stone bed to the height needed for storage. Shanwei's five dams and downstream structures such as Chexiang in Yanghe should open only to the memorialized levels and be closed again as soon as the water drops. On the Yellow River itself we should weigh safe against dangerous points, defer nonessential fascine work, and concentrate on critical earth repairs. Dredging gear should be reserved for the Grand Canal alone. Silt on the Yellow River bed cannot be scoured away by manpower alone. We can only stock materials and crews, rush repairs when danger appears, and treat prevention as policy— but success depends on having the right officials. Reeds are indispensable to the works, yet the Right Garrison shoals lie idle and supply is short; he asked to build polders to store water and restore reed farming." The throne praised the memorial as sound and urged him to proceed carefully.
28
西西便 使
In the fourteenth year he built a stone dam northwest of Laozi Mountain on Hongze Lake and raised east and west sand paths with rubble stone above lake level so patrol boats and merchant craft could moor. He asked the Huai-Hai, Chang-Zhen, and other circuits to fund it separately. The throne rebuked him sharply: the Southern River had stayed calm for years, yet costs kept climbing. In the nineteenth year he repaired the Huiji main sluice and the Fuxing oversluice. When lake and river rose together and emergencies multiplied, he requested an exceptional five hundred thousand taels. The court granted it but warned against citing the case again. He acted as governor-general of the Two Jiangs. In the twenty-first year the river broke at Xiangfu and Yellow River water flooded into Hongze Lake, yet the Southern River held. The throne praised him for turning danger into safety and granted a merit rating. In the twenty-second year British warships entered the Yangzi. Ordered to organize Huai-Yang defenses for the transport route, he put Salt Transport Commissioner Dan Minglun in charge at Yangzhou with Qingjiang as a fallback and had the bandit Chen Sanhu and his followers captured and executed. That autumn the river broke at Cuizhen station north of Taobei while the grain fleet was returning empty. He shifted traffic through the middle route and filled ponds to keep boats moving without delay. The throne acknowledged his defense and transport work, removed him from office, and spared further punishment. In the twenty-third year he was sent to atone through service at Zhongmou on the Eastern River; when the work ended he awaited appointment as a fourth-rank capital official. He was soon made a second-rank imperial guardsman and named Kuren commissioner, but pleaded illness and never took up the post. After he recovered he was again listed as a fourth-rank capital official. He died soon after. He wrote Illustrated Accounts of the Yellow and Transport River Mouths, Ancient and Modern, and Illustrated Accounts of River-Engineering Implements. His sons Chongshi and Chonghou are each treated in separate biographies.
29
使 滿 祿 調 穿 宿 西 沿
Pan Xien, styled Yunge, came from Jing County in Anhui. Named jinshi in Jiaqing 16, he entered the Hanlin Academy as a probationary academician and became a compiling editor. He placed first in the palace examination and was promoted directly to reader-in-waiting. In Daoguang 4 he again ranked first in the palace examination and was made a reader of the Secretariat. With the river in crisis, Xien submitted a detailed memorial on river policy. In essence: "Holding clear water to counter Yellow water is the method handed down through generations. When the great flood season nears, seal the Yellow-blocking dam at once so the Yellow River can run east unimpeded. This year the grain fleet crossed early, but because the Yellow-blocking dam was closed late, backflow and silt deposits piled up into a major disaster. If we mean to relieve pressure, that should happen downstream— yet the Xiangfu spillway was opened again and again to divert Yellow water into the lake. Water poured in below at the dam and above at the spillway until the Yellow River had nowhere to go and the lake bottom silted up to extraordinary heights. If we also draw Yellow water into the Grand Canal, the channel will choke with silt, overflows will break out everywhere, and breaches will follow." The Daoguang Emperor endorsed his analysis. In the fifth year he was sent to the Southern River as a circuit intendant and appointed to the Huai-Yang circuit. In the sixth year he received third-rank insignia and was made vice commissioner of the Southern River. In the ninth year he resigned for his mother's mourning. After the mourning period he became minister of the Court of Imperial Entertainments. He served as vice director of the Imperial Clan Court and left vice censor-in-chief, and supervised as Shuntian education commissioner. Promoted to vice minister of War and transferred to Personnel, he kept the education commissionership. In the nineteenth year the eunuch Di Wenxue came to Xien's home after his nephew failed the examination, claiming most successful candidates owed their places to favor-seeking and trying to extort him. Xien reported the matter, and an imperial edict condemned Wenxue to death. In the twenty-second year he wrote: "The Yellow River broke north of Cuizhen station at Taobei and north of Xiajiazhuang, cut through the Grand Canal, destroyed the outer embankment, and poured east into the Liutang River. The main channel below the Yangzhou works ran dry some sixty or seventy li short of Qingkou, and returning empty grain barges were stuck above Suqian. When I was Huai-Yang intendant I worked out a pond-filling method to lift water for boats. We used it for more than ten years without disaster. Build a clamping dam outside the west mouth of the middle channel and add brush spillways to control Yellow water; turn Yangjia Dam into a clear-water weir to control the clear flow. Treat the middle route as one long pond. The longer the reach, the more boats it holds; two rounds of opening and closing would carry the entire grain fleet across. Yellow water has already flooded the Grand Canal, the main channel is silted, and the narrow banks may have breached; dredging is urgent, but the cost should not be large. That would allow the returning fleet to pass now. Next year's northbound grain could follow, and the Xiaozhuang breach could wait. If we cannot finish that plan in time, we must fall back on drawing Yellow water to aid transport. Build matching Yellow-facing clamping dams and brush spillways, let Yellow water into the pond to float the boats, and erect opposing small dams along the route to force the current and scour the channel deep, avoiding silt buildup. Once boats pass Yangzhuang and meet the Qing River, they can be towed south. The south bank cannot use Yellow water because it would silt both lake and canal. The Yellow water we propose would leave at Yangzhuang, rejoin the old channel, and be scoured clean with water from Qingkou; it should leave no lasting damage." He submitted illustrated plans as well, and the memorial went to river governor Lin Qing, who approved it for action. Lin Qing also advocated pond irrigation for transport and agreed with Xien; Xien soon replaced him as Jiangnan river governor-general.
30
西
The Yangzhou works were overflowing. Minister Jingzheng and others surveyed the site: blocking the breach, cutting diversion channels, and dredging the long channel would cost more than 5.7 million taels. Censor Lei Yixin argued the breach should not be closed— turn the old channel into a branch to serve transport and save money. The court referred the matter to Xien. Xien replied: "Guankou cannot carry a river, and there is no sound way to reroute on the north bank. The breach should still be closed. Returning grain barges should still pass through the middle route by pond filling." Vice Minister Cheng Gang and Prefect Li Bin were sent to the site to supervise the work with Xien. In the twenty-third year more than 41,900 zhang of channel below Fugong was dredged. When the work ended the boundary dam was removed and water ran freely. When the river broke at Zhongmou in Henan and Yellow water flooded the lake, he asked to open the Shan-Xu dams to release lake water, channel it from Fugong into the middle route, and temporarily sustain salt and firewood transport. Upstream water had fallen sharply and silt had begun to collect again; he asked to revise estimates for undredged work below Xiaogong and rebuild stretches where the main dike was thin and low. That autumn the lake kept rising. More than 4,000 zhang of stone work on the high weir gave way, but emergency repairs held the line. In the twenty-fourth year the Yellow River had not returned to its old channel. To sustain transport and drain the lake, he asked to open Shunqing River under the Outer South bureau and channel it to the sea. Military boats would cross as soon as they reached the dam; north of Outer South an earthen clamping dam would be built on the old Yellow-blocking site to hold back water. He soon reported: "In June upstream Yellow River levels surged more than a zhang. The Linjia West dam at Shan-Xu, the Old Yihe straight dam, and the middle weir on the Renyi River all partly failed; repairs made them sound again. The Li, He, and Yang bureaus take Hong Lake water. Narrow banks that once had fascine protection had scoured badly; critical stretches were reinforced." In the twenty-fifth year the Zhongmou project closed. The Southern River stayed free of crisis for years on end.
31
西
In the twenty-eighth year he retired because of illness. During the Xianfeng reign he was ordered to organize donations and local militia at home. In the eighth year former Jiangxi governor Zhang Fu impeached him for misconduct in soliciting donations, and he was dismissed. In Tongzhi 3 he donated grain cash for the Beijing granaries, had his original rank restored, and was sent to Luzhou in Anhui to help organize donations and local defense. In the fifth year, on the anniversary of his provincial examination success, he received the title Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent. He died in the sixth year. Grain Transport Governor-General Zhang Zhiwan memorialized Xien's record in office. The court granted funeral honors, gave the posthumous name Wenshen, and enshrined him in the local worthies hall.
32
駿 駿 使 調 調西 西使使
His son Junwen bought an appointment as a director in the Ministry of Justice and later became prefect of Shandong. Late in the Xianfeng reign Nian bandits threatened the provincial capital. Junwen led local militia against them at Duandian and drove them off. While acting at Qingzhou he suppressed bandits on Fenghuang Mountain in Zichuan and was promoted to circuit intendant. During the Tongzhi reign both Governors Yan Jingming and Ding Baozhen leaned heavily on him. Serving under Baozhen against the Nian, he blocked the river at Houjialin and won especially high credit; he was made Yan-Yi-Cao intendant. Under Guangxu he became judicial commissioner. After a demotion for misconduct he stayed in Shandong because of his river expertise. He handled critical works up and down the river, then went to the Zhengzhou project in Henan in charge of the west dam. When the closure ran late he was dismissed but kept on site; when the work ended his rank was restored. He became Shanxi judicial commissioner and acting governor, then moved to Fujian as fiscal commissioner. He died in office in the nineteenth year. Shandong scholars and commoners asked for a shrine in his honor for his river work.
33
The historians observe: By the Daoguang reign river crisis had grown acute. The Southern River, chained to the grain transport, only deteriorated under repeated repairs. Since Zhang Wenhao's policy of holding clear water set disaster in motion, the Gaoya breach had blocked the transport route. Yan Lang vacillated at every turn and mastered neither lake nor river. Zhang Jing proposed rerouting the river but would not accept responsibility; the plan came to nothing. Pond irrigation for transport alone kept the system patched together. Lin Qing and Pan Xien followed that established practice and were lucky to avoid outright catastrophe— and nothing more. Wu Bangqing studied water management but achieved nothing conspicuous in river work. Li Yumei worked with genuine dedication and stood head and shoulders above the river officials of his day—not only for inventing brick works. After Yumei on the Eastern River came Zhu Xiang, Zhong Xiang, and Wen Chong in turn. Breaks at Xiangfu and Zhongmou followed one another, and the Eastern River grew steadily more dangerous.
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