Volume 422 Biographies 209: Wang Maoyin, Song Jin, Yuan Xizu, Wen Rui, Yu Lu, Xu Jishe, Wang Fagui, Lian Zhaolun, Lei Yixian, Tao Liang, Wu Cunyi, Yin Zhaoyong

=王茂廕=王茂廕，字椿年，安徽歙縣人。道光十二年進士，授戶部主事，升員外郎。咸豐元年，遷御史。疏請振獎人才，鄉會試務覈實，殿試、朝考重文義，造就宗室、八旗人才，以有裨實用為貴。戶部議開捐納舉人、生員例，茂廕疏爭，且言：「籌餉之法，不徒在開源，而在於善用。委諸盜賊之手，靡諸老弱之兵，銷諸不肖之員弁，雖日言推廣捐輸，何濟？」又極論：「銀票虧商，銀號虧國。經國謀猷，下同商賈，體至褻而利實至微。初時虧不能見，及虧折已甚，雖重治其罪，亦復奚補！」其言皆驗。

Wang Maoyin, whose courtesy name was Chunnian, came from She County in Anhui Province. He passed the jinshi examination in 1832, was appointed a principal clerk in the Ministry of Revenue, and later rose to assistant department director. In 1851 he was transferred to the post of censor. He submitted a memorial urging the court to reward talent, to make provincial and metropolitan examinations test real ability, to weigh substance in the palace and court examinations, and to train useful men among the imperial clan and the Eight Banners rather than mere book learning. When the Ministry of Revenue proposed selling juren and licentiate degrees for cash, Maoyin protested in a memorial, arguing that raising revenue depended not only on finding new income but on spending it wisely. If funds are handed to bandits, wasted on decrepit troops, or swallowed by incompetent officers, no amount of talk about expanding donations will help." He went on to argue forcefully that bank drafts injured merchants while private banking houses injured the state. To place national policy on the same footing as shopkeepers debased the state while yielding almost no real benefit. Losses are invisible at first; by the time they are grave, even harsh punishment cannot repair the damage." Events proved him right on every count.

二年，粵匪自長沙趨岳州，茂廕疏言：「安徽防務，以宿松為要衝，小孤山為鎖鑰。設險非難，得人為難。請起前署廣西巡撫週天爵幫辦防堵，扼要駐守陸路，令府縣勸諭紳民團練守助，用明金聲禦流賊保鄉里之法，最為簡易。」武昌既陷，茂廕又疏言：「賊勢猖獗，宜急收人心，籌儲積，講訓練，求人才。」三年，戶部奏試行鈔法，上命左都御史花沙納與茂廕會議，奏行簡要章程，並繪鈔式以進。疏言：「皖北蒙、亳，捻匪蜂起，萬一粵賊勾結，更為心腹巨患。夫欲平盜賊，尤在守令得人。廬、鳳、潁諸郡，守令貪鄙者，實繁有徒。請嚴飭大吏從嚴劾汰，以治賊之源。」又曰：「兩湖、江、皖處處言防，而處處不守。請嚴飭各督撫專主剿辦，一處賊平，則他處之賊不敢復起；鄰省賊滅，則本省之賊無自而來。是不言防而防自固也。」三月，揚州陷，茂廕疏言：「寇氛將偪山東，巡撫以勦賊出省，籓臬漫無佈置，城內團丁不滿七百。乞特簡重臣防守，以固畿南屏蔽。」又言：「陝西設防，兵為民害，請諭飭按治。」茂廕屢上疏，言事侃侃，文宗頗鄉用。擢太常寺卿，遷太僕寺卿。

In 1852, as the Taiping forces advanced from Changsha toward Yuezhou, Maoyin wrote that Susong was the critical point in Anhui's defenses and Little Gushan the key to holding them. It is easy to fortify positions; the hard part is finding men who can hold them. He asked that Zhou Tianjue, former acting governor of Guangxi, be brought back to organize the blockade, garrison the strategic land routes, and have local officials rally gentry militia along the lines of Jin Sheng's Ming-dynasty defense of home districts against roving rebels—the simplest and most effective method." After Wuchang fell, he urged the court to rally popular support, build up reserves, drill troops, and recruit capable men while the rebellion still raged." In 1853 the Ministry of Revenue proposed a trial of paper money. The emperor ordered Hua Shana, left censor-in-chief, and Maoyin to draft regulations together; they submitted simplified rules and sample designs for the notes. He warned that Nian rebels were rising in Mengcheng and Bozhou in northern Anhui, and that an alliance with the Taiping forces would pose a grave threat to the interior. Suppressing banditry depends above all on appointing capable prefects and magistrates. In Luzhou, Fengyang, Yingzhou, and neighboring districts, corrupt and incompetent local officials were legion. He asked that provincial authorities be ordered to investigate and dismiss them rigorously, attacking the root cause of the disorder." He added that Hunan, Hubei, Jiangsu, and Anhui all talked of defense but failed to hold their ground anywhere. He urged that every governor focus on active suppression: once rebels were crushed in one sector, others would not dare rise; and when a neighboring province was cleared, one's own province would not be overrun from outside. That was how defenses would hold firm without endless talk of merely holding positions." When Yangzhou fell in the third month, he warned that the rebels would soon threaten Shandong: the governor had marched out to fight them, the provincial staff had made no dispositions, and fewer than seven hundred militiamen remained in the city. He asked that a senior minister be appointed at once to hold the line and shield the approaches to the capital." He also reported that troops raised for defense in Shaanxi were oppressing the people and asked that the court order an investigation." Maoyin memorialized repeatedly and spoke with frank conviction; Emperor Wenzong took his counsel seriously. He was promoted to director of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices and then transferred to director of the Court of the Imperial Stud.

粵匪犯畿輔，參贊大臣科爾沁親王僧格林沁駐師涿州，諸軍咸觀望不肯前。茂廕疏言：「賊既渡滹沱而北，迴翔於深、晉之郊，而不遽北犯者，懼吾兵出也。吾兵出而遷延不進，賊有以知我之勇怯矣。臣竊謂賊自桂林北竄，諸帥喪師左次，皆為一守字所誤。賊屯一日，可資休息；我屯一日，銳氣日隳。賊所過劫掠，行不裹糧；我軍坐食縣官，日需鉅餉。相持數月，餉絕兵匱，不待交綏而勝負已判。請密飭王大臣等明發號令，按兵拒守，而陰選健將率死士數千，潛師出彼不意，麾兵急擊，一鼓可殲。如此，則大河以南，諸賊心怵膽落，不敢复圖北犯矣。」

When the Taiping forces threatened the capital region, Prince Sengge Rinchen of Horqin encamped at Zhuozhou as assisting grand minister, while the other armies hung back and refused to advance. Maoyin wrote that after crossing the Hutuo River the rebels were circling the Shenzhou and Jizhou area yet hesitated to push north because they feared an imperial sortie. If our armies march out but linger without attacking, the enemy will learn exactly how bold or timid we are. I believe that ever since the rebels fled north from Guilin, commanders who lost battles while merely holding their ground were all misled by obsession with defense. Each day the rebels camp, they rest and recover; each day we stand idle, our troops' morale decays further. They live off plunder wherever they march and carry no rations; while our armies sit in camp at public expense and consume vast sums every day. After months of stalemate, funds run out and troops are exhausted; the outcome is decided before a battle is even fought. He proposed that senior princes and ministers issue public orders to hold the line while secretly choosing bold generals to lead a few thousand picked men in a surprise strike that could wipe out the enemy in a single assault. That would break the rebels' nerve south of the Yellow River and deter any further move toward the north."

尋命會辦京城團防保甲，擢戶部侍郎，兼管錢法堂。戶部奏鑄當十、堂五十大錢，王大臣又請增鑄當百、當千，謂之四項大錢。當千者，以二兩為率，餘遞減。茂廕上疏爭之曰：「大錢之鑄，意在節省，由漢訖明，行之屢矣。不久即廢，未能有經久者。今行大錢，頗見便利，蓋喜新厭故，人情一概。及不旋踵，棄如敝屣。稽諸往事，莫非如是。錢法過繁，市肆必擾，折當過重，廢罷必速，此人事物理之自然。論者謂國家此制，當十則十，當千則千，孰敢有違？不知官能定錢直而不能定物直，錢當千，民不敢以為百；物直百，民不難以為千。自來大錢之廢，多由私鑄繁興，物價騰踴。宋沈畸之言曰：'當十錢鑄，召禍導姦，遊手之徒，爭先私鑄。無故而有數倍之息，雖日斬之，勢不可遏。 '張方平之議曰：'奸人盜鑄，大錢之用日輕。比年以來，虛高物估，增直於下，取償於上，有折當之虛名，罹虧損之實害。 '大觀錢鑄自蔡京，而其子絛作國史補敘：'始之得息流通，繼之盜鑄多弊，終之改當折閱。 '事皆目睹，尤為詳盡。古所不能行，而謂可通行於今乎？信者國之寶。大錢鈔票，皆屬權宜之計，全在持之以信，庶可冀數年之利。今大錢輕重程式，甫經頒行，未及數月，忽盡更變。商民惶恐，群疑朝廷為不可信，此非細故也。或慮銅短停鑄，故須及時變通，顧變通欲其能行，不行則亦與不鑄等。逆賊一平，不患無銅，若賊不能平，銅不能運，雖侭現有之銅，悉鑄當千，恐亦無濟，可慮者不僅停鑄而已。」上命王大臣及戶部秉公定議，王大臣終執原議。

He was soon assigned to organize capital militia and household defense, promoted to vice minister of revenue, and put in charge of the Bureau of Currency. The Ministry of Revenue proposed casting ten- and fifty-cash large coins; senior princes and ministers then asked to add hundred- and thousand-cash pieces—the so-called four denominations of large cash. The thousand-cash coin was to contain two taels of metal by standard, with lower denominations scaled down accordingly. Maoyin protested in a memorial: "Large coins are meant to save copper; dynasties from Han through Ming have tried them again and again. None lasted; every experiment was soon abandoned. New large coins always seem convenient at first, for people tire of the old and flock to novelty. Almost at once they are cast aside like worn-out shoes. History shows the same pattern every time. Overly complex coinage disrupts trade; excessive face values lead to swift abolition—that is simply how markets and human nature work. Supporters argue that under state authority a ten-cash coin must count as ten and a thousand-cash as a thousand—who would dare refuse? They forget that government can fix nominal coin values but not prices: people will not treat a thousand-cash coin as worth a hundred; but merchants will readily price a hundred-worth of goods at a thousand. Large coins have usually been abandoned because counterfeiting spread and prices soared. The Song official Shen Qi wrote that casting ten-cash coins 'invites calamity and encourages crime, as idlers rush to counterfeit them.' When effortless profit runs to several times the cost, daily executions cannot stop it. Zhang Fangping argued that counterfeiters debased large coins day by day. In recent years prices were inflated on paper while merchants passed losses upward—nominal exchange rates masked real damage. Cai Jing introduced the Daguang coins; his son Cai Tao recorded in a history supplement how they first circulated profitably, then succumbed to counterfeiting, and finally had to be revalued downward. He had seen it all firsthand, and his account is especially telling. If it failed in antiquity, how can it work today? Credibility is the state's greatest asset. Large coins and paper notes are expedients that succeed only if the government keeps faith—then they might yield a few years' benefit. The weight and standards for large coins had only just been issued; within months everything was changed again. Merchants are alarmed and doubt whether the court can be trusted—this is no trifling matter. Some argue that copper shortages require prompt adjustment—but adjustment only matters if it works; otherwise it is no better than stopping the mint altogether. Once the rebels are crushed, copper will not be lacking; if they are not crushed and copper cannot be moved, casting every available ingot into thousand-cash coins will not help—the problem is not merely a halt in minting." The emperor ordered senior princes and the Ministry of Revenue to decide fairly, but the princes held to their original plan.

四年，戶部會奏推廣大錢辦法，茂廕复疏爭曰：「臣疏陳大錢利弊，未奉諭旨，臣職司錢法，夙夜思維，實覺難行。當百以上大錢，與原行當五十者無甚分別，此何以貴，彼何以賤，難一；以易市物，則難分折，以易制錢，莫與兌換，難二；大錢雖準交官項，然準交五成者，已有寶鈔官票，大錢何能並搭？難三。此猶其小者耳，最大之患，莫如私鑄。奸人以銅四兩鑄大錢兩枚，即抵交官銀一兩，是病國也。蓋行制錢，每千重百二十兩，鎔之可得六十兩，以鑄當十錢可得三十千。設奸人日銷制錢以鑄大錢，民間將無制錢可用，是病民也。寶鈔官票，其省遠過大錢，果能推行盡利，裨益亦非淺鮮，大錢之行，似可已也。」疏入，仍不報。其後大錢終廢，如茂廕言。

In 1854 the Ministry of Revenue memorialized jointly to expand large-coin policy; Maoyin protested again: "I have already explained the pros and cons of large coins without receiving a reply. As the official responsible for currency, I have thought on this day and night and find the policy unworkable. Hundred-cash and higher denominations differ little from the existing fifty-cash coins—why should one be prized and the other cheap? That is the first difficulty; they are awkward in trade and cannot be exchanged for standard cash—the second difficulty; although large coins may pay certain official dues, treasury notes already cover the fifty-percent quota—how can large coins be piled on top? That is the third difficulty. The third difficulty. These are minor problems beside the greatest danger: counterfeiting. Counterfeiters can cast two large coins from four taels of copper and tender them as one tael of official silver—a direct injury to the state. A thousand standard cash coins weigh 120 taels; melted down they yield 60 taels of copper, which counterfeiters can turn into 30,000 cash worth of ten-cash coins. If counterfeiters daily melt standard cash into large coins, the people will be left without usable small change—that harms the populace. Treasury notes save far more than large coins; if they are fully implemented the benefit will be great, and large coins might well be discontinued." The memorial went in, but again there was no reply. Large coins were eventually abolished, just as Maoyin had predicted.

又疏論鈔法利病，略曰：「上年初用銀鈔，雖未暢行，亦未滋累。及臘月行錢鈔，至今已發百數十萬，為累頗多。向來鈔法，唐、宋之飛錢、交子、會子，皆有實以運之。元廢銀錢不用而專用鈔，上下通行，為能以虛運實。明專以虛責民，以實歸上，勢遂不行。臣元年所奏，皆以實運虛之法。今時勢所迫，前法不行，議者雖專於收鈔時設法，然京師放多收少，軍營有放無收，直省州縣有收無放，非有商人運於其間，則皆不行。非與商人以可運之方、能運之利，亦仍不能行。」因擬上四事，務在通商情，利轉運。奏入，上斥其為商人指使，不關心於國是，命恭親王奕訢、定郡王載銓覈議。議上，謂茂廕所論，窒礙難行，嚴旨切責。尋調兵部。

He also memorialized on paper currency, noting that when silver notes were first introduced the previous year they had not circulated widely but had not yet caused serious harm. After cash notes were issued in the twelfth month, more than a million had already been put out, with troubling consequences. Earlier note systems—from Tang and Song flying money, jiaozi, and huizi—were all backed by real reserves. The Yuan abolished silver and coin in favor of notes alone; because they circulated throughout society, the insubstantial could mobilize the substantial. The Ming used paper to burden the people while hoarding metal for the state, and the system therefore failed. What I proposed in the first year of the reign was precisely the method of backing notes with real assets. Circumstances now forbid the old approach; though reformers focus on collection rules, Beijing issues more than it takes in, camps pay out without recalling notes, and provinces collect without paying out—without merchants to move notes between them, nothing works. Unless merchants are given both a practical way to move notes and a profit in doing so, the system will still fail." He therefore proposed four measures designed to align with commercial practice and facilitate circulation. The emperor rejected the memorial as merchant-driven and indifferent to state policy, and ordered Prince Gong Yixin and Prince Ding Zaiquan to review it. Their report declared Maoyin's proposals impracticable, and the emperor issued a stern rebuke. He was soon transferred to the Ministry of War.

粵匪踞池州、太平，皖南隔絕，茂廕奏請以徽州暫歸浙江統轄，上命浙江巡撫黃宗漢體察酌行。初，茂廕疏言：「賊脅良民，驅為前鋒。請特降諭旨，自拔來歸，均從寬貸。殺賊來獻，均加爵賞。」京師久不雨，上命清釐庶獄，減免情節可矜者，茂廕又疏言：「可矜者莫如賊中逃出之難民，各處捕獲難民，指為形跡可疑，嚴訊楚毒。此輩於法不為無罪，於情實有可矜，請敕暫緩定擬。皇上御極以來，屢詔求言，言或無當，奉旨明斥；斥其無當，非禁使不言也，然言者即因以見少。即如諸路僨軍失地之將帥，未敗之始，其措置乖方，人言藉藉；而無敢為皇上言者，或慮無實據也，或雖有實據而慮查辦時化為子虛也，或慮不用而徒招怨也，或謂聖心自有權衡也，是以皆不敢言。至用人進退之際，臣子每不敢盡言，淺者懼幹聖怒而見斥，深者懼激上意而難回。皇上披覽奏章，纖悉必邀批示，勤亦至矣。臣以為精神貴於不紛，原務其遠者大者，捨其近者小者。明主勞於求賢，而逸於任人。今天下人才不足，此誠可憂。雖然，非無才也。如羅澤南，人無不知為將材矣，初不過一貢生耳。湖南一省，既有江忠源兄弟，又有羅澤南諸人，則他省可知。惟賢知賢，惟才愛才，是在聖心之誠求耳。方今武昌未下，江西又復危急，兩省之民，向也與賊為仇，今乃竟有從逆者。此中轉移之故，宜深思也。列聖仁漸德被，人心斷不能忘。然此時不亟維繫，使賊得徐出假仁假義以為市，恐民心將為所搖而難挽矣。」奏入，上嘉納之。

With Taiping forces holding Chizhou and Taiping and southern Anhui cut off, Maoyin asked that Huizhou be temporarily placed under Zhejiang; the emperor told Governor Huang Zonghan of Zhejiang to investigate and decide. Earlier he had written that the rebels coerced ordinary people and drove them as front-line fodder. He asked for an edict promising leniency to anyone who deserted and came over voluntarily. Those who killed rebels and defected should receive titles and rewards." During a prolonged drought in the capital, the emperor ordered a review of ordinary prisons and clemency for deserving cases; Maoyin wrote that the most deserving were refugees who had fled the rebels, yet captives everywhere were tortured on suspicion. They were not legally innocent, yet morally deserving of mercy; he asked that sentencing be postponed. Since Your Majesty's accession you have repeatedly called for frank counsel; when advice missed the mark, edicts rebuked it plainly; rebuking bad advice was not forbidding speech, yet memorialists grew scarce nonetheless. Consider the generals who squandered armies and lost territory: long before defeat their conduct was widely criticized; yet no one dared tell the emperor: some feared lacking proof, others that investigations would erase the facts, others that speaking would invite resentment without effect, and still others that the emperor already knew—so all held their tongues. On appointments and dismissals, officials rarely speak plainly: the timid fear imperial wrath, the thoughtful fear provoking a decision that cannot be reversed. Your Majesty reads every memorial in detail and marks every point—no ruler could be more diligent. I believe the sovereign's attention should not be scattered on trifles but reserved for great matters of long-term consequence. A wise ruler labors to find talent and then trusts it to work. The empire today lacks capable men, and that is a genuine cause for alarm. Yet talent is not truly absent. Take Luo Zexian: everyone recognized his military gifts, yet he began as nothing more than a tribute student. Hunan alone produced the Jiang brothers and men like Luo Zexian; other provinces surely hold similar men. Only the worthy recognize worth, and only talent cherishes talent—the question is whether the throne seeks them sincerely. Wuchang remains untaken and Jiangxi is again in peril; people who once hated the rebels are now joining them. The reasons for this reversal deserve deep reflection. The benevolence of successive emperors has long won the people's hearts, and they cannot have forgotten it. Yet unless we act now, the rebels may win people over with sham benevolence—and popular loyalty may slip beyond recovery." The emperor welcomed the memorial and approved its advice.

八年，病免。十一年，穆宗即位，以茂廕忠直，命俟病痊聽候簡用。同治元年，上疏陳時政，言：「天象示警，宜廑修省。議政王責任重大，宜專心機務，餘事綜其大綱。言官宜加優容。順天府事繁，府尹石贊清不宜兼部。各國通商事務衙門司員甫及一年，即得優保，恐各衙門人員皆以營求保送為得計，宜防其漸。」署左副都御史，命偕兵部尚書愛仁往山西按事。授工部侍郎。二年，調吏部。丁繼母憂，歸。四年，卒於家。

In 1858 he retired because of illness. In 1861, when Emperor Tongzhi ascended the throne, Maoyin was ordered to await appointment once he recovered, in recognition of his integrity. In 1862 he memorialized on state affairs, urging that heavenly warnings called for moral self-scrutiny at court. The Prince Regent should focus on major policy and leave lesser matters to subordinates. Memorialists and censors should be treated with greater tolerance. Shuntian prefecture is overburdened; Prefect Shi Zanqing should not also hold a ministry appointment. Clerks in the foreign affairs yamen were promoted after only a year; if every office follows that path, merit will give way to patronage." He was appointed acting left vice censor-in-chief and sent with Minister of War Airen to investigate affairs in Shanxi. He was appointed vice minister of works. In 1863 he was transferred to the Ministry of Personnel. After his stepmother died he returned home to observe mourning. He died at home in 1865.

=宋晉=宋晉，字錫蕃，江蘇溧陽人。道光二十四年進士，選庶吉士，授編修。二十七年，大考二等，擢中允。二十九年，典河南鄉試，因命題錯誤議處，諭不得更與考試差。咸豐二年，大考二等，擢侍讀學士，遷光祿寺卿。三年，命會辦京城團防保甲，署禮部侍郎。四年正月，疏言：「去冬圜丘大祭，適值聖體違和，禮臣以登降繁縟，於親詣壇位及奠帛後諸儀節，更加酌定，奏請允行，旋以遣親王恭代而止。惟詳稽典禮，祀天鉅典，尤為慎重。偶遇服色不宜，興居未適，有遣代，無議減。現值祈年大祀，伏原皇上飭停新議，仍遵成憲。」五年，遷宗人府丞。

Song Jin, whose courtesy name was Xifan, came from Liyang in Jiangsu. He passed the jinshi examination in 1844, entered the Hanlin Academy as a bachelor, and was appointed a compiler. In 1847 he placed second class in the palace examination and was promoted to palace expositor. In 1849 he served as chief examiner for Henan but was punished for an erroneous examination topic and barred from future examining posts. In 1852 he again placed second class in the palace examination, was promoted to Hanlin reader, and then became director of the Court of Imperial Entertainments. In 1853 he was assigned to help organize capital militia and household defense and served as acting vice minister of rites. In early 1854 he memorialized that during the previous winter's Round Mound sacrifice the emperor had been unwell; ritual officials had simplified several steps and sought approval, but in the end a prince substituted for the emperor. Canonical ritual shows that sacrifice to Heaven is the gravest ceremony of all. When dress or condition is unsuitable, emperors send substitutes—but they do not reduce the rite. With the annual prayer-for-harvest sacrifice approaching, he begged the emperor to abandon the new proposals and follow established ritual." In 1855 he was transferred to vice director of the Imperial Clan Court.

六年，疏言：「自江寧失陷，上自九江，下及鎮江、瓜洲，寇勢水陸相援。現聞向榮兵力不支，情形危急，今即分路赴援，仍恐緩不濟事。請飭江督、浙撫，僱用輪船載兵，由圌山關入江，焚攻金、焦賊船。再由儀徵溯浦口，與六合諸軍相為犄角，則江寧、鎮江對岸之賊，節節防我，必不敢離巢東竄。是不特解江南之急，即江北亦愈寧謐。又聞廣東新至紅單船二十餘艘，請飭德興阿、向榮將紅單船並歸一處，力扼蕪湖江面。如能克復蕪湖，則拊賊之背，寧國不攻自下。」薦道員繆梓、楊裕深、金安清通達治體，洞悉夷情，請以僱船籌費諸事責成辦理。疏上，諭兩江總督怡良與向榮、德興阿酌行。

In 1856 he wrote that since Nanjing fell, rebels controlled the Yangzi from Jiujiang to Zhenjiang and Guazhou by land and water. He reported that Xiang Rong's forces were failing and the situation desperate; divided relief columns would arrive too late. He proposed that Jiangsu and Zhejiang hire steamers to carry troops through Tushan Pass and burn rebel vessels at Jinshan and Jiaoshan. From Yizheng they could move upriver to Pukou and coordinate with Luhe forces, pinning rebels on the north bank and preventing an eastward breakout. That would ease the crisis in Jiangnan and stabilize the north bank as well. He also asked that twenty-odd foreign steamers newly arrived from Guangdong be concentrated under De Xing'a and Xiang Rong to block the river at Wuhu. Recovering Wuhu would strike the rebels from behind and bring Ningguo without a siege." He recommended circuit officials Miu Zi, Yang Yushen, and Jin Anqing as men who understood governance and foreign affairs, and asked that hiring ships and raising funds be entrusted to them. The emperor ordered Governor-General Yi Liang to consult Xiang Rong and De Xing'a and act accordingly.

宣宗實錄告成，敘勞，擢內閣學士，迭署戶、工二部侍郎。八年，授工部侍郎。文宗頻歲抱病，未能親行祀典，十年，晉疏言：「近年郊壇大祀，聖躬以步履失常，偶緩親行，而於遣恭代外，仍先期躬詣皇乾殿拈香，仰見寅畏深衷。惟每屆大祀，皇上於前一日辰巳間躬詣拈香，即在齋宮祇宿。今則先期即如臨事，請於前一日寅卯間先行詣殿拈香，然後還宮辦事。臣尤原慎攝聖躬，養元氣，節峻伐之味，復健行之常，於下屆郊祀大典照常親行。」上嘉納之。

When the Veritable Records of Emperor Daoguang were completed, he was promoted to grand secretary and served acting terms in the Ministries of Revenue and Works. In 1858 he was appointed vice minister of works. Emperor Xianfeng had been ill for years and could not attend sacrifices in person; in 1860 Song Jin noted that though princes often substituted, the emperor still went in person to offer incense at Huangqian Hall beforehand, showing deep reverence. Previously, on the eve of each great sacrifice, the emperor offered incense between mid-morning and noon and stayed in the fasting palace. Now the emperor was treating the eve like the day itself; he proposed incense between early morning hours, then a return to the palace. He also urged the emperor to conserve his health, moderate harsh medicines, regain strength, and personally attend the next suburban sacrifice." The emperor approved his advice.

十一年，疏言：「江寧失陷已將十載，總督曾國籓經營防剿，與官文、胡林翼會合攻復安慶，惟所部不足二萬人。若合四川、湖北、湖南、江西、安徽五省歲入，養兵勇十三萬人，以七萬分駐防剿，六萬大舉東征，餉足兵增，庶可一舉集事。」又言：「江西首當賊衝，巡撫毓科、布政使慶善皆失人望，請以太常寺卿左宗棠簡署巡撫，而於督糧道李桓、前廣饒道沈葆楨、浙江道員史致諤三人中簡擇擢授籓司。」又請以曾國籓總統四川、湖北、湖南、江西、安徽五省督辦東征軍務。上以所籌不為無見，下官文、國籓等議奏。又疏言：「慕陵規制，儉約樸實，萬世可法。定陵工程請仿行勿改。」格於部議，不行。

In 1861 he wrote that Nanjing had been lost nearly ten years; Zeng Guofan had recovered Anqing with Guan Wen and Hu Linyi but commanded fewer than twenty thousand men. He proposed funding 130,000 troops from five provinces—70,000 for garrison duty and 60,000 for a major eastern campaign—so that adequate pay might finish the war in one stroke." He urged replacing the discredited Jiangxi governor and administration commissioner with Zuo Zongtang as acting governor and selecting a strong provincial administration commissioner from Li Huan, Shen Baozhen, or Shi Zhiyu." He also asked that Zeng Guofan be given overall command of the eastern campaign across those five provinces. The emperor found merit in the plan and ordered Guan Wen, Zeng Guofan, and others to report jointly. He also urged that the Mu Mausoleum's frugal design should remain the eternal model. The Ding Mausoleum should follow the same restrained design." The ministries rejected the proposal.

同治元年，調倉場侍郎。南漕初改海運，歲額三百萬石，自天津運京倉，偷漏飛灑，歲損米綦鉅。迨軍興，江、浙郡邑淪陷，南漕起運才二十餘萬石，而偷漏飛灑如故。十年以來，侍郎及監督官凡數易。晉受事，深悉其弊，因循未奏舉。六年，事發，左遷內閣學士，償米二萬石。十二年，遷戶部侍郎。十三年，卒。

In 1862 he was transferred to vice minister of grain transport. When southern grain tribute shifted to sea transport, three million shi were due annually, yet enormous quantities were lost to theft and spillage between Tianjin and Beijing. After Jiangsu and Zhejiang fell in the war, only about 200,000 shi were shipped, while losses continued unchanged. Over more than ten years, the responsible vice ministers and supervisors changed repeatedly. Jin understood the abuses well but, following precedent, did not report them. In 1867 the scandal broke; he was demoted to grand secretary and ordered to compensate 20,000 shi of grain. In 1873 he was transferred to vice minister of revenue. He died in 1874.

=袁希祖=袁希祖，字荀陔，湖北漢陽人，原籍浙江上虞。道光二十七年進士，選庶吉士，授編修。咸豐二年，大考二等，擢侍講。三遷侍講學士。八年，超擢內閣學士。迭署禮、工、刑諸部侍郎。九年，疏言：「咸豐初以道梗銅少，改鑄大錢，未幾，當百、當五皆不行，惟當十行之。始直制錢三五，近則以十當一。銀直增貴，百物騰踴，民間重困。旗餉月三兩，改折錢十五千，致無以自活。向日制錢重一錢二分，大錢重四錢八分，以之當十，贏五錢四分。今以十當一，是反以四錢八分銅作一錢二分用也。民間私鎔改鑄，百弊叢生。今天下皆用制錢，獨京師一隅用大錢，事不畫一。請悉復舊規，俾小民易於得食，盜源亦以稍弭。」

Yuan Xizu, whose courtesy name was Xungai, was registered in Hanyang, Hubei, though his ancestral home was Shangyu in Zhejiang. He passed the jinshi in 1847, entered the Hanlin Academy, and became a compiler. In 1852 he placed second class in the palace examination and was promoted to Hanlin expositor. He rose through three promotions to Hanlin reader. In 1858 he was exceptionally promoted to grand secretary. He served acting terms as vice minister of rites, works, and punishment. In 1859 he wrote that early Xianfeng coinage had introduced large coins; hundred- and five-cash pieces failed, leaving only ten-cash coins in use. At first a ten-cash coin traded for three to five standard cash; now ten are needed for one. Silver rose in price, goods soared, and the people were crushed. Bannermen's monthly three-tael stipends were paid in cash at a rate of 15,000 cash, leaving them unable to live. Standard cash weighed 1.2 mace; large coins weighed 4.8 mace—using them as ten-cash yielded 5.4 mace profit. Now ten-for-one exchange means 4.8 mace of copper does the work of 1.2 mace. Private melting and recasting bred countless abuses. The empire uses standard cash, but Beijing alone still uses large coins—a harmful inconsistency. He asked that old regulations be restored so common people could afford food and the roots of disorder somewhat checked."

十年，疏言軍事，略謂：「數年以來，地方軍事所謂失守，無所為守也，但聽其失。即坐以罪，僅革職留營而已。所謂收復，不見其收，自然而复。俟賊自去，即虛報克捷，上狀列保，以樹植私人。似此用兵，安有成功之一日？臣愚以為今雖敗裂，機尚可轉。賊窺蘇、常久，一旦得之，子女玉帛，其意已饜，不特金陵老賊全股爭趨，即天長、六合之賊，亦涎其利。宜乘彼勢方散緩，請特選重臣駐清、淮要地，統籌全局。頃諭旨令曾國籓赴兩江署任，規復甦、常，自寧國進兵，前後受敵，非萬全之計。莫如令胡林翼自江北進攻，牽制安慶；令楊載福以水師直下大江，互相策應；令李若珠力攻天長、六合，以出江浦，遙立聲援。密飭國籓潛引銳兵，倍道以取金陵，方為上策。今日勞師糜餉，勢無窮已，兼各路統帥散而無紀，其賢者往往深入援絕，血戰殞身；其不肖者坐擁厚兵，遇敵輒避；必得重臣領兵統馭，積弊既除，精神乃奮，此轉移之機也。」尋署戶部侍郎。

In 1860 he memorialized on military affairs: local 'defeats' were defenses that did nothing but watch places fall. Punishment meant only dismissal while remaining in camp. So-called 'recoveries' were not recoveries at all—places fell back when rebels left. When rebels withdrew, commanders filed false victory reports and promoted their own clients. With such warfare, how could success ever come? Yet I believe that even now the tide can still be turned. Rebels had long coveted Suzhou and Changzhou; once they took those rich cities, veterans from Nanjing and bands from Tianchang and Luhe would all rush in. While their forces were still scattered and slack, he proposed stationing a senior minister on the Qing-Huai line to coordinate the whole theater. A recent edict sending Zeng Guofan to the two Jiangs to recover Suzhou and Changzhou by advancing from Ningguo would expose him to attack from two sides—not a safe plan. Better to have Hu Linyi advance from the north bank and pin down Anqing; have Yang Zaifu drive the fleet down the Yangzi in coordination; and Li Ruozhu press Tianchang and Luhe and threaten Jiangpu from afar; while Zeng Guofan secretly led elite troops by forced march to take Nanjing—that would be the true strategy. Today armies exhaust the treasury without end; commanders act without coordination, and the brave often fight to the death with no support; The unworthy commanders hoard large forces yet flee at the first sign of the enemy; Only if a senior minister takes command can entrenched corruption be cleared and morale revived—that is the key to changing the situation." He was soon appointed acting Vice Minister of Revenue.

時各直省行團練，分遣大臣督辦，希祖疏言：「團者一時可集，練非經久不能。即云團練，非五六千人不可。計口授食，費已不貲。即使練成，而此五六千人制敵不足，騷動有餘，坐食貲詘，終虞譁潰。且遴往大臣，萬一與有司齟《齒吾》，必至互為水火，轉貽大局之憂。請頒明諭，使知團練乃以自衛鄉閭，並不以此科斂，亦不必日給口糧，坐守困耗。否則用多費溢，正供無可挹注，不得不取諸民。輕則聚眾，重則返戈，大可慮也。」

When every province raised local militias under dispatched ministers, Xizu memorialized: "A militia can be assembled quickly, but proper training takes sustained effort. Even the minimum for militia training requires five or six thousand men. Feeding that many men would cost an enormous sum. Even if trained, five or six thousand men would be too weak to fight effectively yet strong enough to cause trouble—they would consume funds idly and might eventually riot and scatter. Moreover, if dispatched ministers clash with local officials, they will become bitter enemies and create grave problems for the overall situation. Please issue a clear edict stating that militia drilling is for local self-defense only—not for tax levies or daily rations while men sit idle and drain resources. Otherwise costs would spiral, regular revenue would be insufficient, and the burden would fall on the people. At best they would gather in mobs; at worst they would turn their weapons against the government—a serious danger."

英、法、俄、美四國合軍內犯，天津不守，希祖請暫就和議，遷延旬日，俾部署得以周詳。僧格林沁獲英官巴夏裡，希祖疏請殺之。未幾，敵軍深入，上巡幸熱河。希祖屢疏諫，不報，屢北望痛哭，遂得疾。已而和議成，兼署兵部侍郎。尋卒。

When the allied armies of Britain, France, Russia, and the United States invaded and Tianjin fell, Xizu urged a temporary truce of ten days to allow time for thorough preparations. After Sengge Rinchen captured the British official Harry Parkes, Xizu memorialized urging his execution. Soon the enemy advanced deep into the country, and the emperor fled to Rehe. Xizu remonstrated repeatedly without reply, often gazing north in tears until he fell ill. When peace was concluded, he was also appointed acting Vice Minister of War. He died soon after.

=文瑞=文瑞，字叔安，烏蘇氏，滿洲鑲紅旗人。道光二十一年進士，選庶吉士，授編修。擢侍講，五遷至左副都御史。文宗即位求言，文瑞疏陳四事，請選賢才，明賞罰，廣聽納，謹調攝，並錄乾隆元年左都御史孫家淦三習一弊疏以進，上嘉之。咸豐三年，粵匪陷武昌東下，疏請於上海、鎮江僱用廣東紅單船，擇員統帶，以防江面；並密察京師流言，以消逆萌、靖畿輔。上命諸大臣集議增兵籌餉，文瑞疏言：「兵餉為國家大政，遵旨會議，乃大學士等絕無一語及公，言笑晏晏，不知內閣何地，不詢會議何事。臣臚舉搘持之策，尚書孫瑞珍竟閒辭支吾，自述家私，形同市井。大臣如此，深堪悼嘆。」又言：「二月朔為領俸定期，戶部款絀，早應籌畫。乃於是日清晨請旨，冀以停俸上諉朝廷。又議行鈔法，並徵鋪稅，商民驚懼。請發帑三十萬支放春俸，暫可流通，俾商民安業，鈔法鋪稅，暫從緩議。」從之。又疏言：「鈔法之弊，放多收少，半為廢紙。放少收多，民間鈔無從得。若收放必均，是與之甲而取之乙，徒擾無益，非易銀鈔為錢票不可。擬就道光年間所設官號錢鋪五處，分儲戶、工兩局卯錢。京師俸餉，照公費發票之案，按數支給，以錢代銀。」並具條目六事。疏入，議行。

Wen Rui, courtesy name Shuan, of the Usu clan, was a Manchu of the Bordered Red Banner. He became a jinshi in 1841, entered the Hanlin Academy, and was appointed a compiler. He rose through five promotions from expositor to Left Vice Censor-in-Chief. When the Xianfeng Emperor ascended the throne and sought advice, Wen Rui proposed four reforms—selecting talent, clarifying rewards and punishments, welcoming counsel, and careful governance—and submitted Sun Jiagan's famous "Three Habits and One Abuse" memorial from 1736, which the emperor commended. In 1853, after rebels took Wuchang and marched east, he proposed hiring Guangdong red-flag ships at Shanghai and Zhenjiang under chosen commanders to defend the waterways; and also proposed monitoring capital rumors to suppress subversive sentiment and stabilize the metropolitan region. When the emperor ordered ministers to discuss troop increases and military funding, Wen Rui protested: "Military finance is a matter of national importance, yet at the ordered conference the grand secretaries said nothing about the public interest—chatting casually as if unaware they were in the Grand Secretariat or what they had been called to discuss. When I proposed ways to sustain the government, Minister Sun Ruizhen evaded with idle talk about private family matters, behaving like a common tradesman. For senior ministers to behave this way is deeply lamentable." He also wrote: "The first of the second month is payday, and the Ministry of Revenue's shortfall should have been addressed well in advance. Instead they waited until payday morning to seek instructions, hoping to blame the court for any salary suspension. They also proposed paper currency and shop taxes, alarming merchants and the public. I urge disbursing three hundred thousand taels for spring salaries to restore circulation and calm merchants and the public, while deferring paper currency and shop taxes." The court agreed. He also explained: "Paper currency fails when more is issued than accepted, reducing much of it to worthless paper. When less is issued than accepted, the public cannot obtain notes at all. Requiring equal receipt and issue only takes from one group to give to another, causing disruption without benefit; silver notes must be replaced with cash vouchers. He proposed using five government cash shops established under Daoguang, storing monthly coin reserves from the Revenue and Works bureaus. Capital salaries should be paid in cash rather than silver, following the precedent for public expense vouchers." He submitted six detailed proposals. The memorial was submitted and adopted.

尋兼署大理寺卿，以天變奏請修省，上嘉納之。刑部罪人劉秋貴死於獄，文瑞奏：「秋貴無病，一夕而死。刑部後四日入奏，改易日期，塗飾操縱，請嚴飭根究。」山西崞縣民婦王劉氏拒姦死，罪人從輕比，刑部題駮，文瑞復奏：「原擬知州失出，請飭山西巡撫嚴劾。」上並從之。

He was soon appointed acting Chief Judge of the Court of Judicial Review and, citing a celestial anomaly, urged the court to examine itself, which the emperor commended. When convict Liu Qiugui died in prison, Wen Rui reported: "Qiugui had no illness but died overnight. The Ministry of Justice reported four days later with altered dates—please order a strict investigation of this cover-up." When Wang Liushi of Guo County, Shanxi, died resisting rape and the assailant received a lenient sentence, Wen Rui urged strict investigation of the prefect who had been too lenient." The emperor approved both proposals.

粵匪入山西境，陷平陽等處，文瑞奏請飭督兵大臣嚴防入直隸要路。尋自臨洺關竄逼天津，命文瑞率兵駐通州。奏言：「通州城垣樓櫓損壞，請集款建复。」諭：「此守土之責，統兵大臣不必兼轄。」擢刑部右侍郎。四年，以病乞罷。

When rebels entered Shanxi and captured Pingyang, Wen Rui urged military supervisors to block their advance into Zhili. When rebels broke toward Tianjin from Linming Pass, Wen Rui was ordered to garrison Tongzhou. He reported: "Tongzhou's walls and towers are damaged; please allocate funds for repairs." The court replied: "That is the local officials' responsibility; the commanding general need not take it on." He was promoted to Right Vice Minister of Justice. In the fourth year he retired due to illness.

先是文瑞偕克勤郡王慶惠請捐銅鑄四項大錢濟兵餉，上從其請。及還京，病痊，命仍與慶惠董其事，設局開爐。上命尚書阿靈阿、御史范承典往銅廠查驗，文瑞奏劾阿靈阿等擅開爐房，恐有偷漏，上斥其負氣任性，降二級調用。同治元年，卒。

Earlier Wen Rui and Prince Keqin Qinghui had proposed casting four denominations of large copper coins to fund the military, and the emperor approved. When he returned to Beijing recovered, he was ordered to continue supervising the project with Qinghui and establish minting operations. When the emperor sent Minister A Ling'a and Censor Fan Chengdian to inspect the copper works, Wen Rui impeached them for unauthorized smelting; the emperor rebuked his arrogance and demoted him two ranks. He died in 1862.

=毓祿=毓祿，字曉山，舒穆魯氏，滿洲正白旗人。道光二十一年進士，授刑部主事。累升郎中，遷御史。軍興，安徽、江蘇、山東諸省皆暫停秋審。毓祿奏言：「寇踪所至，每先釋獄囚，脫其死而置之生，自必原為賊用。雖有投首減罪之例，而愚頑類多不知大義。聞直隸近因賊擾，將秋審諸囚，酌覈情罪，其謀、故、兇、盜、拒捕、殺人重囚，立即正法。其情有可矜及例應緩決諸囚，即予減等發配，誠為權宜變通之道。現有軍務省分，應令一體遵辦。」

Yu Lu, courtesy name Xiaoshan, of the Shumulu clan, was a Manchu of the Plain White Banner. He became a jinshi in 1841 and was appointed a chief clerk in the Ministry of Justice. He rose to director and then censor. With the outbreak of war, Anhui, Jiangsu, Shandong, and other provinces suspended autumn assizes. Yu Lu wrote: "Wherever rebels go, they first release prisoners—freed from death, these men naturally join the enemy. Although surrender can reduce punishment, most common criminals lack moral understanding. I hear Zhili recently reviewed autumn-assize prisoners under rebel pressure: serious offenders in plotting, murder, robbery, and resisting arrest were executed immediately. Prisoners whose cases warranted mercy or deferred execution were reduced in rank and exiled—an appropriate expedient. All war-affected provinces should follow this practice."

京師行用大錢，當百、當五十二種壅滯不行，毓祿疏請商民應納旗租、地丁、關稅，於例定收鈔五成數內專收當百、當五十大錢二成，部收捐項應交錢票，亦一律納大錢。七年，擢工科給事中，歷內閣侍讀學士、太僕寺少卿、通政司副使、內閣學士。同治三年，擢工部侍郎，兼管錢法堂。五年，奏言：「寶源局鑄當十錢，向系滇省解銅，以銅七鉛三配鑄。近因滇銅久未解局，市銅低雜，致錢文輕小，例定每錢應重三錢二分。請每屆收錢，以三錢為率，不及者即飭改鑄。」上斥寶泉、寶源二局不職之兩侍郎監督，並下吏議。

When hundred- and fifty-cash large coins stagnated in Beijing, Yu Lu proposed accepting them for twenty percent of merchant payments for rents, land tax, and customs within the statutory fifty-percent note quota, and for ministry donations as well. In the seventh year he became Supervising Secretary of Works and subsequently served as Associate Reader, Vice Minister of the Imperial Stud, Vice Commissioner of Transmission, and Grand Secretariat Academician. In 1864 he became Vice Minister of Works and concurrently oversaw the Bureau of Currency. In the fifth year he reported: "The Baoyuan Bureau mints ten-cash coins from Yunnan copper in a seven-to-three copper-lead ratio. Recently, with no Yunnan copper arriving, inferior market copper has made coins too light; each should weigh 3.2 mace. I urge that each coin-collection period enforce a minimum weight of three mace, with substandard coins ordered recast." The emperor rebuked the incompetent supervisors of the Baoquan and Baoyuan mints and ordered disciplinary proceedings.

=徐繼畬=徐繼畬，字松龕，山西五台人。進士，選庶吉士，授編修，遷御史。迭疏劾忻州知州史夢蛟、保德知州林樹雲營求升遷，登州知府英文諱災催徵，榮河知縣武履中藉事科斂。又疏請除大臣回護調停積習。

Xu Jishe, courtesy name Songkan, came from Wutai in Shanxi. A jinshi, he entered the Hanlin Academy as a compiler and later became a censor. He repeatedly impeached Xinzhou Prefect Shi Mengjiao and Baode Prefect Lin Shuyun for seeking promotion through patronage, Dengzhou Prefect Ying Wen for concealing disasters to press tax collection, and Ronghe Magistrate Wu Lüzhong for exploiting official business to levy fees. He also urged an end to the habit of senior ministers shielding one another through mediation.

又疏陳政體宜崇簡要，略謂：「皇上廣開言路，諸臣條奏苟有可取，無不通行訓諭，惟是積習疲玩已久，煌煌聖諭，漠不經意，輕褻甚矣。臣以為諸臣條奏，或非大體所關，或非時務所急，原不必悉見明文。若事關切要，聖慮折中，期於必行者，即降諭旨，宜重考成。度其事之難易，限年興革。如仍前玩視，於本案外重治以違旨之罪。此教令之宜簡也。六部則例日增，律不足，求之例；例不足，求之案：陳陳相因，棼亂如絲。論者謂六部之權，全歸書吏。非書吏之有權，條例之煩多使然也。臣以為當就現行事例，精審詳定，取切於事理者，事省十之五，文省十之七，名曰簡明事例，使當事各官得以知其梗概，庶不至聽命於書吏。此則例之宜簡也。考功、職方，議功議過，使百僚知勸懲也。現行之條，苦於太繁太密，不得大體。嘗見各直省州縣有蒞任不及一年，而罰俸至數年十數年者，左牽右掣，動輒得咎。且議處愈增愈密，規避亦愈出愈奇，彼此相遁，上下相詭，非所以清治道也。臣以為各官處分，凡關於國計民生，官箴品行，不妨從重從嚴；其事涉細微，無關治體，與夫苛責太深，情勢所難者，當準情酌理，大加刪削。此處分之宜簡也。」疏入，上嘉納。旋召入對，論時事至為流涕。

He also argued that government should be simpler, writing: "Although the emperor welcomes memorials and issues edicts whenever proposals have merit, officials have long treated even solemn imperial decrees with indifference and disrespect. I believe not every memorial touches fundamental policy or urgent affairs, and not all need formal written response. When the emperor decides a matter must be carried out, the edict should come with strict accountability. Set deadlines according to difficulty for implementation or reform. Officials who continue to neglect such orders should face additional punishment for disobedience. This is how imperial instructions should be simplified. The Six Ministries accumulate precedents daily—when the code is insufficient, officials turn to precedents; when precedents fail, they turn to case records—layer upon layer until the tangle is like silk threads. Critics say the Six Ministries' real power lies entirely with clerks. This is not because clerks are powerful but because regulations have become too numerous. I propose reviewing existing precedents, keeping only what is essential—cutting matters by half and text by seventy percent—into a "Simplified Essential Precedents" so officials need not rely on clerks. This is how precedents should be simplified. The bureaus of personnel evaluation and appointments assess merit and fault so officials understand reward and punishment. Current regulations are too numerous and detailed to serve their larger purpose. I have seen officials in office less than a year fined several or even ten years' salary, tripped up at every turn. As disciplinary rules multiply, so do evasions—officials deceiving one another at every level—which does not clarify governance. I believe punishments should remain strict for matters affecting public finance, people's livelihood, and official integrity; but trivial matters, cases irrelevant to governance, and excessively harsh demands should be greatly reduced after weighing circumstances. This is how disciplinary measures should be simplified." The emperor commended and accepted the memorial. He was soon summoned for audience and wept while discussing current affairs.

十六年，出為廣西潯州知府，擢福建延邵道，調署汀漳龍道。海疆事起，敵艦聚廈門，與漳州隔一水，居民日數驚。繼畬處以鎮定，民賴以安。二十二年，遷兩廣鹽運使，旬日擢廣東按察使。二十三年，遷福建布政使。二十六年，授廣西巡撫，未赴官，調福建。閩浙總督劉韻珂以病乞假，繼畬暫兼署總督。福州初通商，英吉利人僦居會城烏石山神光寺，士民大譁，言路以入告，上命韻珂、繼畬令其遷徙，久之乃移居道山觀。士民以繼畬初不力拒，終不慊，言者屢論劾。繼畬初入覲，宣宗詢各國風土形勢，奏對甚悉，退遂編次為書曰瀛寰志略，未進呈而宣宗崩，言者抨擊及之。

In the sixteenth year he became Prefect of Xunzhou in Guangxi, was promoted to Intendant of Yan-Shao in Fujian, and served as acting Intendant of Ting-Zhang-Long Circuit. When hostilities erupted along the coast, enemy ships gathered at Xiamen across the water from Zhangzhou, alarming residents daily. Jishe maintained calm, and the people found security in his leadership. In the twenty-second year he became Salt Transport Commissioner of the Two Guangs and within ten days was promoted to Surveillance Commissioner of Guangdong. In the twenty-third year he became Provincial Administration Commissioner of Fujian. In the twenty-sixth year he was named Governor of Guangxi but was transferred to Fujian before taking up the post. When Governor-General Liu Yunke of Fujian and Zhejiang took sick leave, Jishe served temporarily as acting governor-general. When Fuzhou first opened to foreign trade, Englishmen leased the Shenguang Temple on Wushi Mountain in the capital, provoking a public outcry that reached the throne. The emperor ordered Yunke and Jishe to have them relocated; only after considerable delay did they move to the Daoshan Daoist abbey. The local gentry and populace, resentful that Jishe had not resisted the foreigners forcefully enough, kept submitting impeachments against him. On his first audience with the Daoguang Emperor, Jishe answered thoroughly on the customs and geography of foreign nations. He later compiled his notes into Yinghuan Zhilue, but the emperor died before he could present it, and critics seized on the work to attack him.

繼畬父潤第，治陸王之學。繼畬承其教，務博覽，通時事。在閩、粵久，熟外情，務持重，以恩信約束。在官廉謹。罷歸，主平遙書院以自給。尋卒。

Jishe's father Run Di was a scholar of the Lu-Wang school of Neo-Confucianism. He carried on his father's learning, reading widely and keeping abreast of current affairs. Long service in Fujian and Guangdong gave him deep knowledge of foreign affairs; he governed with steady restraint, relying on kindness and credibility. He was incorrupt and conscientious in office. After leaving office he returned home and supported himself as head of the Pingyao Academy. He died soon afterward.

=王發桂=王發桂，字笑山，直隸清苑人。道光十六年進士，授禮部主事，充軍機章京，累遷郎中。咸豐三年，上疏言軍事，被嘉納。尋遷御史。

Wang Fagui, whose courtesy name was Xiaoshan, came from Qingyuan in Zhili Province. A jinshi of 1836, he became a principal clerk in the Ministry of Rites, served as a Grand Council secretarial clerk, and rose to bureau director. In 1853 he memorialized on military affairs and received the emperor's approval. He was soon promoted to censor.

洪秀全既踞江寧，分兵北犯，發桂疏言：「順德、正定地當衝要，請屯兵扼隘。」併條列六事，曰：謹偵報，嚴催儹，慎查勘，明曉諭，廣撫卹，籌協濟。又疏薦貴州道員胡林翼知兵能勝重任，請超擢，俾任軍旅，上命林翼留湖北襄軍事。迭疏請令各省汰舊伍，練新兵，設鄉團，值有事則新軍進戰，鄉團設防，以明戚繼光紀效新書、練兵實紀訓練將士。賊渡河偪近畿輔，疏請蒐簡軍實，選精銳為後備，並蠲貧民房稅，撫流亡以安人心，下所司議行。疏言：「軍興以來，大臣獲罪，多以從軍自效，位崇性驕，不可任使，坐耗糧糈，無裨軍政。且主將曲庇，輒請起用，有罪幾同無罪，圖功適以冒功。頃副都統達洪阿退縮失律，致知縣謝子澄、副都統佟鑑同時死寇。欽差大臣勝保賜以神雀刀，原令便宜行事，乃自入直境，未戮一人；而於獲戾大臣，多所論薦，以私廢公，抑阻士氣。請按治達洪阿以下，行軍法。紀律既嚴，軍威自振。」並被採納。累遷給事中、鴻臚寺卿。

After Hong Xiuquan seized Nanjing and sent armies north, Fagui urged that troops be posted at the strategic passes around Shunde and Zhengding." He further set out six measures: careful intelligence work, strict logistics, thorough field inspection, clear public notice, expanded relief, and coordinated mutual aid. He also recommended Hu Linyi, circuit intendant of Guizhou, as a proven military man fit for high command and asked for his rapid promotion; the emperor ordered Hu to stay in Hubei to manage military affairs. In successive memorials he urged provinces to replace old troops with newly drilled armies and local militia—new armies for the field, militia for defense—following Qi Jiguang's military manuals for training. As rebels crossed the river and threatened the capital region, he asked for a review of military resources, selection of elite reserves, tax relief for the poor, and resettlement of refugees to calm public anxiety; the court referred the proposals for implementation. He wrote: "Since the war began, disgraced senior officials have often sought redemption on campaign—too proud and too senior to be useful, yet still consuming rations without helping the war effort. Commanders protect their favorites and push for their reinstatement, so punishment means little and claimed victories become false credit. Recently Vice Commander-in-Chief Da Hong'a broke discipline in retreat, leaving Magistrate Xie Zicheng and Vice Commander-in-Chief Tong Jian to die fighting the rebels. Imperial Commissioner Senggebao was given the spirit-hawk sword and discretionary powers, yet since entering Zhili he had killed no enemy; while repeatedly recommending disgraced officials for reuse, putting personal favor ahead of duty and dampening morale. He asked that Da Hong'a and others be punished under military law. Strict discipline, he argued, would restore the army's fighting spirit." The court accepted these recommendations. He rose through the posts of supervising secretary and director of the Court of Imperial Entertainments.

八年，复疏論時事，言：「宜上廉恥，重訓練，以求將帥之才。李續賓、唐訓方起自末僚，能自張一軍，轉戰千里。敦樸廉潔，勇往任事之人，隨地而有，請飭督撫採訪奏聞。物力艱窘，莫甚於湖南；軍餉糜費，莫甚於江蘇。自湖南得左宗棠，江蘇得王有齡，而餉源日裕。夫興利莫如去★L2，今司計者日言捐餉，而鹽、漕、糧稅，凡國家自然之利，一任廢弛。請下所司議整飭。兩廣總督黃宗漢赴粵，遷延六月，遲不之官。城淪於敵，巡撫柏貴莫知為計。城東居民殺敵數百，柏貴輒為懸賞緝殺人者。貴州巡撫蔣霨遠當叛苗、教匪日久鴟張，未聞有所措施。此皆才力不逮，遂使一方塗炭。聖主恩威並用，尤所仰望。」

In the eighth year he again addressed current affairs: "The court should cultivate integrity, emphasize training, and seek out real commanders. Men like Li Xubin and Tang Xunfang rose from humble ranks to lead independent armies across vast distances. Honest, capable men willing to take responsibility can be found everywhere; he asked governors to seek them out and report them. No province was more strapped for resources than Hunan; and none squandered military funds more than Jiangsu. Once Hunan had Zuo Zongtang and Jiangsu had Wang Youling, revenue recovered steadily. To increase revenue, nothing works better than removing abuses; yet officials talked only of soliciting contributions while letting salt, transport, and tax revenues—the state's natural income—lapse. He asked the relevant offices to deliberate on reforms. Governor-General Huang Zonghan delayed six months before taking up his post in Guangdong. When the city fell, Governor Bo Gui was at a loss. When eastern residents killed hundreds of enemy soldiers, Bo Gui posted bounties for their arrest instead. In Guizhou, Governor Jiang Yuyuan presided over prolonged Miao and sectarian rebellions without taking effective action. Such failures of capacity had left whole regions in ruin. He placed his hope in the emperor's balanced use of grace and force."

歷太僕寺卿、通政使、左副都御史。同治二年，署工部侍郎。疏薦戶部郎中王正誼守潔才優，以忤肅順得罪，請復其官，報可。授禮部侍郎，調刑部，又調工部。五年，以疾乞免。九年，卒。

He held the posts of director of the Court of the Imperial Stud, transmission commissioner, and left vice censor-in-chief. In 1863 he served as acting Vice Minister of Works. He recommended Wang Zhengyi of the Ministry of Revenue—a man of integrity wrongly punished for opposing Su Shun—and the court restored him. He became Vice Minister of Rites, then transferred to Punishments and later to Works. In 1866 he asked to retire because of illness. He died in 1870.

=廉兆綸=廉兆綸，初名師敏，字葆醇，順天寧河人。道光二十年進士，選庶吉士，授編修。宣宗知其賢，將擢用，以父憂歸，遺命諸臣可大用者，兆綸與焉。咸豐元年，服除。二年，大考二等。三年，直南書房。四年，授右贊善，超擢翰林院侍講學士，督江西學政，轉侍讀學士，再擢內閣學士。五年，授工部侍郎。

Lian Zhaolun, originally named Shimmin and courtesy name Baochun, came from Ninghe in Shuntian. A jinshi of 1840, he entered the Hanlin as a bachelor and became a compiler. The Daoguang Emperor had intended to promote him when he left for mourning; on his deathbed the emperor named Zhaolun among officials fit for high office. When the mourning period ended in 1851, he returned to service. In 1852 he scored second rank in the triennial evaluation. In 1853 he served in the Southern Library. In 1854 he became right tutor, was rapidly promoted through Hanlin expositor and reader to grand secretary while serving as Jiangxi education commissioner. In 1855 he became Vice Minister of Works.

時粵匪石達開擾江西，侍郎曾國籓率師御之，寇張甚，陷州縣五十餘，逼會城。上命兆綸幫辦廣信、饒州防剿，兆綸奏言：「江西通省募勇計一萬五六千人，各不相統屬。地方有警，勝則互訐以競功，敗則爭潰而不相救。甚且擾民冒餉，乘便營私，其弊不勝枚舉。今賊勢日張，瑞州、臨江相繼失守，設有倉卒，以此散而無紀者當之，何恃不恐？惟有將所募之勇，裁去一切名號，並為三四軍，每軍得四五千人，統以監司方面素有威望者，庶可責成功。」

When Shi Dakai's rebels overran Jiangxi, Zeng Guofan marched against them; the rebels seized more than fifty counties and threatened the provincial capital. The emperor put Zhaolun in charge of defense at Guangxin and Raozhou; he reported that Jiangxi's fifteen or sixteen thousand militiamen answered to no unified command. In action they competed for credit when winning and fled separately when losing, refusing to help one another. They even extorted civilians, padded rations, and used the chaos for private gain—abuses too many to count. With rebels growing stronger and Ruizhou and Linjiang already fallen, how could scattered, undisciplined troops meet a sudden crisis? He proposed merging the militia into three or four armies of four to five thousand men each under respected provincial officials who could be held accountable."

六年三月，兆綸按試廣信，賊陷吉安、撫州，進據安仁，兆綸上疏請援，並以練勇千守貴溪。賊竄德興，陷建昌，廣信勢益孤，兆綸督諸生集鄉團，與廣信知府沈葆楨、上饒知縣楊昇籌防禦。遣上饒諸生郭守謙率鄉勇三百夜襲金谿，諸生曾守誠奮勇先入城，賊不虞兵至，奪西南門逸，克其城。乘勝會攻建昌，而饒州又陷，官軍敗績，廣信益危。兆綸與國籓等合疏請截留閩兵一千六百專攻建昌，分檄守謙與在籍道員石景芬防剿。六月，國籓遣都司畢金科复饒州，兆綸飭景芬、守謙等馳攻撫州。會賊連陷廣昌、南豐、新城、瀘溪四縣，八月，守謙軍撫州張家橋，三接皆捷，窮追遇伏，力戰死。時兆綸方赴鉛山，道梗，諮衢州鎮總兵饒廷選乞援。廷選率兵二千一百至，兆綸冒雨穿敵壘，復入廣信，共謀守禦，寇屢攻不下。凡七戰，捕斬其渠六，斬六千餘級。廷選與游擊穆隆阿、都司賴高翔等又屢擊破之。賊走玉山，廣信始解嚴。兆綸防守危城，盡出俸銀餉軍，貧困至不能自給，尋以病告歸。

In March 1856, while examining candidates at Guangxin, he learned that rebels had taken Ji'an and Fuzhou and occupied Anren; he asked for reinforcements and posted a thousand militiamen at Guixi. As rebels raided Dexing and took Jianchang, leaving Guangxin isolated, Zhaolun rallied students into militia and coordinated defenses with Shen Baozhen and Magistrate Yang Sheng. He sent Guo Shouqian with three hundred militiamen on a night raid on Jinxi; Zeng Shoucheng broke in first, and the surprised rebels fled through the southwest gate as the city fell. Pressing the advantage against Jianchang, they learned Raozhou had fallen and government forces had been routed, leaving Guangxin in graver danger. Zhaolun and Zeng Guofan jointly asked that 1,600 Fujian troops be kept to retake Jianchang and ordered Shouqian and resident official Shi Jingfen to carry on defense. In the sixth month Zeng Guofan sent Bi Jinke to retake Raozhou while Zhaolun ordered Jingfen and Shouqian to strike at Fuzhou. As rebels seized four counties, Shouqian won three battles at Zhangjiaqiao in August but was killed in an ambush during the pursuit. En route to Qianshan with roads blocked, Zhaolun appealed to Brigadier Rao Tingxuan of Quzhou for help. Rao arrived with 2,100 men; Zhaolun cut through enemy lines in the rain to re-enter Guangxin, and together they held the city against repeated assaults. In seven battles they killed six rebel leaders and more than six thousand men. Rao Tingxuan, Mu Long'a, Lai Gaoxiang, and others repeatedly routed the rebels thereafter. The rebels withdrew toward Yushan and the emergency at Guangxin ended. Defending the besieged city, Zhaolun spent his entire salary on the troops until he could barely support himself, then retired on grounds of illness.

七年，病痊，仍直南書房，署工部侍郎。八年，授戶部侍郎，調倉場侍郎。時軍事方急，兆綸疏請責成督撫辦賊，略曰：「今於督撫外另設統兵大員，其本省督撫雖有會剿之名，其實專為籌餉之事。統兵者往往以呼應不靈，餉糈不給，漸至遷延；而督撫又往往以事權不一，供億不貲，各生意見。及至城池失守，統兵者無地方之責，或邀寬大之恩，而並未帶兵之督撫，轉受其咎。名實不符，事多掣肘，賊氛之熾，職此之由。臣惟督撫大吏，類皆朝廷簡拔之人，設其人未盡知兵，不妨擇統兵大員，畀以督撫之任，使之各清各省，而責其成功。方今川、黔、閩、廣，並未另派統兵大員，而本境漸就肅清。湖南北之專任督撫討賊者，轉有餘力助剿鄰境。至於江蘇一省，統兵者不一而足，而潰敗糜爛至今。平心而論，統兵大員中，豈乏公忠體國之臣？所以然者，抑其所處之地不同，用情亦異，此其故不可不深長思也。清、淮一帶，實為南北要衝，漕運總督不兼管地方，宜此時權設江北巡撫，抑或將漕運總督權改斯缺，所有江北各路軍務，悉歸統制，庶可控扼江、淮，聲援汝、潁。不惟江南群逆絕其覬覦之心，即豫東會、捻各匪出沒之區，亦可斷其一臂矣。」疏上，不報。

Recovered in 1857, he returned to the Southern Library and served as acting Vice Minister of Works. In 1858 he became Vice Minister of Revenue and was transferred to the granary depot. With the war still urgent, Zhaolun argued that governors should be held responsible for suppressing rebels: "Separate supreme commanders now shadow provincial governors, who nominally join campaigns but in practice handle only supplies. Supreme commanders delay when coordination fails and rations run short; while governors withhold support because their authority is divided and costs are unsustainable. When cities fall, commanders without local responsibility may plead for leniency while governors who never led troops take the blame. This mismatch of name and responsibility, he argued, was why rebel power kept growing. Since governors are men the court chooses itself, he proposed giving proven commanders gubernatorial authority so each province could be cleared and its leaders held accountable. Sichuan, Guizhou, Fujian, and Guangdong had no separate supreme commanders yet were gradually pacified. Hunan and northern Hubei, where governors alone fought rebels, even had strength to aid neighboring provinces. Jiangsu, by contrast, had more than enough supreme commanders yet remained in ruins. Many supreme commanders were loyal and public-spirited, he conceded. But their assignments and incentives differed—a point, he insisted, worth serious reflection. The Qing-Huai corridor was the strategic hinge between north and south; he proposed a Jiangbei governor or expanded grain-transport authority to unify northern military command and secure the Yangtze-Huai and Run-Ying regions. That would not only check Jiangnan rebels but also weaken the Nian bands roaming eastern Henan." The memorial was ignored.

九年，英吉利兵北犯，疏請以戰為和。十年，英兵掠豐益倉，兆綸疏自劾，上寬之。又疏言：「軍興以來，各省兵不足，因招募鄉勇。比來兵日少，勇日增，不可不預為之計。此後勇丁如有技藝精嫺，戰陣得力者，請令統兵督撫大臣，即於存營缺額挑選充補。軍事既定，原歸農者遣散，原效力者分隸各標，序補額兵。」上韙之。兆綸以交河糧商囤積穀秕，遣勇目捕治，糧商訴勇目索詐，辭連兆綸，事上聞，命刑部逮問。同治元年，京察休致。二年，諭責兆綸在任用人不當，奪職銜。

In 1859, as British forces marched north, he argued that only fighting could secure peace. In 1860, after British troops looted the Fengyi Granary, Zhaolun submitted a self-impeachment that the emperor declined to accept. He also wrote: "Since the war began, regular troops proved insufficient and provinces turned to militia. Regular troops were shrinking while militia grew—a trend that needed planning. He asked that skilled militiamen who proved themselves in battle be recruited into regular army vacancies. When peace returned, farmers went home, remaining fighters were assigned to regular units, and vacant army posts were filled in order." The emperor approved. Zhaolun sent a militia officer to punish Jiaohe grain merchants hoarding bad grain; they claimed extortion and implicated him, prompting an imperial order for the Ministry of Punishments to investigate. In 1862 he retired after the metropolitan officials' review. In 1863 an edict censured him for poor appointments and stripped his honorary ranks.

兆綸感知遇，遇事敢言，以是多齟《齒吾》。罷官歸，讓產諸弟，主問津書院，以修脯自給。六年，卒。

Grateful for imperial trust, he spoke out freely—and often found himself at odds with colleagues. Back home after dismissal, he gave his estate to his brothers, ran the Wenjin Academy, and lived on lecture fees. He died in 1867.

=雷以諴=雷以諴，字鶴皋，湖北咸寧人。道光三年進士，授刑部主事，洊升郎中。遷御史、給事中，擢內閣侍讀學士，三遷奉天府府丞。咸豐元年，應詔陳言，請任賢能，覈名實。二年，复授太常寺少卿，屢上疏陳軍事。三年，遷左副都御史，命會同河道總督楊以增巡視黃河口岸，迭疏請撫卹茌平、東平、東阿、汶上饑民，撤山東防河兵，省各渡口冗費，皆報可。

Lei Yixian, whose courtesy name was He Gao, came from Xianning in Hubei Province. A jinshi of 1823, he entered the Ministry of Punishments and rose to bureau director. He served as censor and supervising secretary, became a reader-in-waiting of the Grand Secretariat, and after three promotions was vice prefect of Shuntian. In 1851 he memorialized urging appointment of the capable and verification of official merit. In 1852 he returned as vice director of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices and often wrote on military matters. Promoted to vice censor-in-chief in 1853, he inspected Yellow River ports with Yang Yizeng, secured relief for famine counties, cut Shandong river-defense troops and ferry expenses—all approved.

粵匪陷揚州，以諴自請討賊，募勇屯萬福橋，扼揚州東南。賊窺裡下河，以諴屢擊走之，通、泰十餘城賴以保全。授刑部侍郎，幫辦軍務。與琦善、陳金綬會攻揚州，以諴分兵駐守要隘，焚浦口賊舟。屢會諸軍擊賊，而揚州久攻不能下，諸將以總兵瞿騰龍最勇敢足恃，詔命援安徽。以諴疏言：「臨陣易將，兵家所忌。」琦善亦以為言，乃留勿遣。其冬，賊陷儀徵，偪運河西岸，官軍屢擊走之。以諴與浙閩總督慧成合駐軍灣頭六徬，未幾，賊援至，鄉勇潰散，琦善奏劾，奪官留軍自效。嗣琦善請移灣頭大營，以諴與慧成力爭，琦善复劾以諴諱飾。上責琦善諉過，飭以諴仍守灣頭及萬福橋諸隘。賊既自揚州退瓜洲，時來攻，以諴與陳金綬合擊敗之，加三品頂戴。尋授江蘇布政使，屢督砲船渡江會剿，攻北固山，破其土城，乘勝逐至金山，敗之。

After rebels took Yangzhou, Yixian volunteered to fight, raised militia at Wanfu Bridge, and held the city's southeast flank. He repeatedly repelled rebel probes of the inner lower river area, saving more than ten cities in Tongzhou and Taizhou. He was made vice minister of punishments and helped handle military affairs. With Qi Shan and Chen Jinshou he besieged Yangzhou, garrisoned key passes, and burned rebel boats at Pukou. Repeated assaults failed to take Yangzhou; the generals trusted brigade commander Qu Tenglong most, and the court ordered him to Anhui. Yixian wrote: "Replacing a commander in the middle of battle is a classic military mistake." Qi Shan agreed, and Qu was kept from going. That winter rebels took Yizheng and pressed the canal's west bank until driven back repeatedly. Yixian and Governor-General Huicheng camped at Wantou Liubang; when reinforcements routed the militia, Qi Shan impeached him, stripped his rank, and kept him in the field to redeem himself. When Qi Shan wanted to move the main camp, Yixian and Huicheng objected fiercely; Qi Shan impeached Yixian again for covering up failures. The emperor rebuked Qi Shan for blame-shifting and ordered Yixian to keep defending Wantou and Wanfu Bridge. When rebels retreating to Guazhou raided repeatedly, he and Chen Jinshou defeated them and he received a third-rank top button. Soon made Jiangsu financial commissioner, he led gunboats across the river, took Beigu Mountain's earthen wall, pursued to Jinshan, and won.

六年，托明阿兵潰瓜洲，揚州复陷，詔責以諴等擁兵不援。又疏辨冒功，為德興阿所劾，褫職戍新疆。以諴在戍所，呈請將軍扎拉芬代奏，言江北軍事。尋赦還，賜四品頂戴，授陝西按察使。遷布政使，入為光祿寺卿。同治元年，京察，休致。光緒五年，以重宴鹿鳴還原銜。八年，又以重宴恩榮，加頭品頂戴。十年，卒，年七十九。

In 1856, after Tuoming'a's rout at Guazhou and Yangzhou's fall, an edict blamed Yixian for failing to reinforce. Defending himself against charges of false credit, he was impeached by Dexing'a, dismissed, and sent to Xinjiang. From exile he had General Zhalafen relay memorials on Jiangbei military affairs. Soon pardoned, he received a fourth-rank top button and became Shaanxi surveillance commissioner. He became financial commissioner and then director of the Court of Imperial Entertainments in the capital. In 1862 he retired after the metropolitan review. In 1879 a second Deer Cry banquet for his cohort restored his original ranks. In 1882 another grace banquet earned him a first-rank top button. He died in 1884, aged seventy-nine.

以諴在江北，用幕客錢江策，創收釐捐。錢江者，浙江長興諸生，嘗以策幹揚威將軍奕經，不能用。林則徐戍伊犁，從之出關，以是知名。謁以諴於邵伯，留佐幕，餉絀，江獻策，遣官吏分駐水陸要衝，設局卡，行商經過，視貨值高下定稅率，千取其一，名曰「釐捐」，亦並徵坐賈，歲得錢數千萬緡。江與同幕五人赴下河督勸，不從者脅以兵，民間目為「五虎」。江自以為功，累保獎至道員，氣矜益盛，以諴不能堪。會飲，江使酒罵坐，以諴執而殺之，以跋扈狂肆、謀不軌聞。後各省皆仿其例以濟軍需，為歲入大宗焉。

In Jiangbei, Yixian adopted staff member Qian Jiang's plan and pioneered the likin tax. Qian Jiang, a Changxing licentiate, had once offered strategy to General Yijing without success. He followed Lin Zexu into exile at Ili and gained renown. At Shaobo he joined Yixian's staff; when funds ran out he proposed likin—checkpoints on land and water taxed merchants one-thousandth of goods' value, plus stationary shops, yielding tens of millions of strings of cash yearly. Jiang and five staffmates enforced collection in the lower river area, threatening recalcitrants with troops; locals called them the "Five Tigers." He took full credit, rose by recommendation to circuit intendant, and grew insufferably arrogant—more than Yixian could bear. At a banquet the drunk Jiang abused the company; Yixian had him seized and killed, amid reports of arrogance and sedition. Later provinces copied the model to fund armies, making likin a major revenue source.

=陶樑=陶樑，字鳧薌，江蘇長洲人。嘉慶十三年進士，選庶吉士，授編修，纂修皇清文穎。十九年，林清之變，逆黨闌入禁城，樑方在館修書，其僕駱升聞警，匿樑於書櫥，自當戶立，賊刃之，僕，越日事定，樑出，救之甦。仁宗回鑾聞之，召樑問狀，曰：「義僕也！」賜之金。

Tao Liang, whose courtesy name was Fuxiang, came from Changzhou in Jiangsu. A jinshi of 1808, he entered the Hanlin, became a compiler, and worked on the Imperial Qing Literary Exemplars. During the 1813 Lin Qing raid, his servant Luo Sheng hid him in a bookcase, stood guard at the door, and was stabbed; Liang revived him after the attack. On returning to the capital the Jiaqing Emperor summoned Liang and said: "A loyal servant! The emperor rewarded him with gold.

二十一年，以知府發直隸，補永平，調正定。道光四年，擢清河道，署按察使。新城縣失過境餉鞘，歸罪外委白勤，逮訊，死於刑。上遣尚書松筠、侍郎白鎔按治，察其枉，樑坐降四級，捐复知府，留直隸。十二年，補大名知府。十八年，遷湖北荊宜施道，萬城堤決，樑复坐降調，捐复。二十二年，補湖南糧儲道，調湖北漢黃德道。二十八年，遷甘肅按察使，調山西。二十九年，遷江西布政使。入覲，授太常寺卿。

In 1816 he went to Zhili as prefect, serving Yongping and then Zhengding. In 1824 he became director of the Qinghe Route and acting surveillance commissioner. After Xincheng lost a silver convoy, sub-official Bai Qin was blamed, arrested, and died under interrogation. Songyun and Bai Rong found Bai Qin innocent; Liang was demoted four ranks, bought back his prefect post, and stayed in Zhili. In 1832 he became prefect of Daming. In 1838 he took the Jing-Yi-Shi circuit in Hubei; the Wancheng dike breach cost him another demotion, which he bought back. In 1842 he became Hunan grain intendant, then Hubei's Han-Huang-De intendant. In 1848 he became Gansu surveillance commissioner, then moved to Shanxi. In 1849 he became Jiangxi financial commissioner. After an audience he became director of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices.

文宗即位，樑疏言：「宣宗成皇帝天錫智勇，嘉慶十九年八月之變，當時但傳發槍斃賊，不知首逆林清姓名地址，亦由宮中訊得，立時遣捕，故渠魁不致遠颺，餘孽不致滋蔓。請敕載入實錄，以揚聖武。」上從之。咸豐二年，擢內閣學士。四年，遷禮部侍郎。六年，以病乞罷。七年，卒，年八十六。

At Xianfeng's accession Liang wrote: "Heaven gave the Daoguang Emperor wisdom and courage; in the 1813 crisis only gunfire was reported until palace interrogation revealed Lin Qing's identity and troops captured him before the rebellion spread. He asked that this be recorded in the Veritable Records to honor imperial martial virtue." The emperor assented. In 1852 he became a Grand Secretariat secretary. In 1854 he became vice minister of rites. In 1856 ill health prompted his retirement request. He died in 1857, aged eighty-six.

樑早有文名，曾從侍郎王昶助其纂述。歷官所至，提倡風雅，賓接才俊，輯畿輔詩傳行世。晚登朝右，時值軍興，耆舊凋落，其猶見乾、嘉文物之盛者，惟大學士祁藻與樑二人，為士林所歸仰雲。

He was known early for letters and once assisted Wang Chang's editorial work. In every post he fostered literary culture, patronized talent, and published a collection of metropolitan poetry. Late in a career that reached the highest ranks, as war thinned the older generation, he and Grand Secretary Qi Zao were the last witnesses to Qianlong-Jiaqing culture whom scholars revered.

=吳存義=吳存義，字和甫，江蘇泰興人。道光十八年進士，選庶吉士，授編修。二十二年，督雲南學政。邊徼士風敦樸，存義力為提倡，文風改觀。回民煽亂，存義按試永昌竟，出郭數里，城中火起，待學使去而始發也。二十八年，丁母憂歸。會江北大水洊飢，存義議賑，躬詣富室勸捐，多感其誠，出貲購米穀。存義棹小舟散給饑民，全活甚眾。服闋，直南書房，擢侍講。咸豐五年，典試雲南，复留督學政，士益親之。回亂益棘，圍會城，城中兵閧，掠官署民居，獨未入學政廨，民間婦孺匿考院避難者千人。存義在雲南久，習知民情，比復命奏對，陳變亂始末甚詳。累遷侍讀學士，署順天府丞。

Wu Cunyi, whose courtesy name was Hefu, came from Taixing in Jiangsu. A jinshi of 1838, he entered the Hanlin as a compiler. In 1842 he became Yunnan's education commissioner. On the frontier he vigorously promoted plain, solid scholarship and changed local literary culture. During a Hui uprising he finished exams at Yongchang and left the city; fires broke out only after the commissioner had gone several li beyond the walls. In 1848 he went home to mourn his mother. During Jiangbei flood famine he organized relief, personally soliciting wealthy donors who responded with grain and rice. He poled a small boat distributing food and saved many lives. After mourning he joined the Southern Studio and became an expositor. In 1855 he examined Yunnan again, stayed on as education commissioner, and won still greater affection from scholars. As the Hui crisis worsened and besieged the capital, mutinous troops looted the city but spared the education office; a thousand civilians sheltered in the exam hall. Long familiar with Yunnan, he gave the throne a detailed account of the rebellion when he reported back. He rose to reader-in-waiting and acted as vice prefect of Shuntian.

十年，英法聯軍入京師，上幸熱河，京朝官多挈家出走，存義屬疾，語家人毋隨人妄動。事定，敘城守勞，將入存義名，存義聞之，力疾起，署牘曰：「府丞吳存義抱病家居，幹掫詰姦皆無與。今病未癒，不敢冒受賞。」

In 1860 when allied forces entered Beijing and the court fled to Rehe, he feigned illness and told his family not to join the exodus. When rewards for city defense were listed, he forced himself up and signed a statement: "Vice Prefect Wu Cunyi lay ill at home and took no part in patrol or arrest duties. I am still ill and dare not accept reward I do not deserve."

未幾，擢太僕寺卿，遷通政使，署禮部侍郎。存義以文廟從祀位次多舛，奏請審定，繪圖頒行。又以諸儒增祀既繁，漸失世用其書、垂諸國冑之義，奏飭中外臣工不得濫請。署刑部侍郎。

Soon he became director of the Court of Imperial Stud, transmission commissioner, and acting vice minister of rites. Finding Confucian temple enshrinement orders wrong, he had them audited and published in charts. He also argued that proliferating enshrinements betrayed the purpose of honoring scholars whose books served the state and instructed officials to stop indiscriminate requests. He served as acting vice minister of punishments.

同治二年，署工部侍郎，迭署禮、戶二部。出督浙江學政，軍事甫定，人士離散初歸，存義寬大拊循，歲考既週，秀良者始奮於學，乃導以經、史、小學，文風復興。三年，調吏部，留學政任。六年，任滿，以病乞歸。七年，卒。

In 1863 he acted as vice minister of works and successively of rites and revenue. As Zhejiang education commissioner after the war, he gently rebuilt schools; after a year of exams able students returned to classical, historical, and philological study. In 1864 he moved to the Ministry of Personnel but kept his education post. In 1867 his term ended and illness prompted his retirement. He died in 1868.

=殷兆鏞=殷兆鏞，字譜經，江蘇吳江人。道光二十年進士，選庶吉士，授編修。咸豐四年，遷侍講，直上書房，授惠親王子奕詳等讀。擢侍講學士，命授孚郡王奕硉讀，累遷大理寺少卿。八年，英吉利兵犯天津，兆鏞力主戰，疏請黜邪謀，決不計，詆斥主和諸臣甚力，擢詹事。九年，署兵部侍郎。詔江蘇諸省治團練，兆鏞疏言其弊，舉四害，言甚切。上海欲借英、法人助戰，兆鏞亦以為不可。

Yin Zhaoyong, whose courtesy name was Pujing, came from Wujiang in Jiangsu. A jinshi of 1840, he entered the Hanlin as a compiler. In 1854 he became expositor in the Upper Study, tutoring Prince Yi's son Yixin and others. Promoted to expositor-in-waiting, he tutored Prince Fu Yi Lu and rose to vice director of the Court of Judicial Review. In 1858 when British forces threatened Tianjin, he argued fiercely for war, denounced peace advocates, and was promoted to court tutor. In 1859 he served as acting vice minister of war. When the court ordered Jiangsu to organize militia training, Zhaoyong memorialized against it, listing four harms in sharp terms. Shanghai proposed enlisting British and French troops; Zhaoyong opposed that too.

十一年，丁本生母憂，同治元年，服除，仍直上書房。疏言：「江、皖軍威既震，大局漸有轉機。臣來自災區，敢就見聞真切關係重大者為皇上陳之：一，宜飭戎行。上海兵勇號稱四萬，皆不堪用，何以今年經英、法人管帶，便成勁旅？華爾親兵六百，盡中國人，戰無不勝。無他，挑選慎，約束嚴，器械精，賞罰信耳。請敕將帥講求武備，漸事安攘。提鎮中如曾秉忠水師通賊焚掠；馬德昭掠蘇州、上海；李定泰掠湖州、嘉興；向奎每戰輒敗，敗輒行劫；馮日坤部兵掠婦女。李恆嵩兵不行劫，已共推良將。竊謂行師首禁焚掠，克城先謀戍守，否則旋得旋失，民間無孑遺矣。一，宜澄吏治。上海諸官吏，惟劉郇膏得民心，已蒙特簡。薛煥統馭無能；吳煦精心計，在上海設銀號，繳捐者非所出銀票不收；新授糧儲道楊坊，由洋行擔水夫致巨富，為洋人所鄙；浙江布政使林福祥，杭州破後降賊，送王有齡、張錫庚柩至上海。臣意此等悖員，宜分別懲創，稍申憲典。一，宜清釐餉款。上海左近官卡、賊卡、槍船卡林立，卡稅之外，釐捐、月捐、船捐、畝捐、房捐日增月益，臣聞官吏紳商皆云日可收銀二萬，月得六十萬。兵勇四萬人，日餉三錢，月止三十六萬，而當局猶入不敷出。請敕曾國籓、李鴻章嚴密清釐。蘇、松、嘉、湖賦額甲天下，近三十年，年年蠲緩，官民交欠，賦成虛額。現經大亂，田荒戶絕，可否俟軍務大定，敕督撫覈計，酌留商稅，核減農賦，以羨補不足，勿逾定則。一，宜撫卹遺民。江、浙交界莠民設槍船，所至焚掠，此輩視官兵盛衰以為向背，克復時必為內應。請敕督撫從宜處置，或令歸農，或籍為兵，勿貽後患。至失守郡縣，陷賊士民商賈，苟非出自甘心，僅止偷生畏死，可否援脅從罔治之義，乞恩原宥。一，宜防維外人。上海孤城克保，不得謂非外人之力。自經助剿，所向無前，或云實出義舉，或云欲通商販，或云日後恃功索償，臣俱不敢逆億。各處通商，尊奉外人太過。猶幸我國新政清明，未萌覬覦。日久相習，利權盡歸，人情益附，而謂狼子必無野心，實難深信。撫禦得體，尤在博知外情。請敕各口通商衙門，譯述各國新聞有關時事者，書記大則奏聞，藉資豫備。」上以所陳不為無見，下國籓、鴻章等籌畫，並將福祥等察劾按治。尋授詹事，遷內閣學士，迭署兵、禮諸部侍郎。

In 1861 he mourned his birth mother; when mourning ended in 1862 he returned to the Upper Study. He wrote: "With Jiangsu and Anhui armies regaining their edge, the larger struggle is slowly turning. Having come from the stricken region, I venture to report what I have seen that matters most: first, the army must be brought to order. Shanghai claims forty thousand troops, yet none fight well—how did British and French officers this year turn them into a crack force? Ward's six hundred personal guards were all Chinese and won every battle. Nothing else—strict selection, tight discipline, good arms, and reliable reward and punishment. Order commanders to train properly and pacify the region step by step. Among brigade and regional commanders, Zeng Bingzhong's fleet colludes with rebels in looting; Ma Dezhao raids Suzhou and Shanghai; Li Dingtai raids Huzhou and Jiaxing; Xiang Kui loses every battle and loots after each defeat; Feng Rikun's men abduct women. Li Hengsong's troops do not loot, and all hail him as a capable commander. Campaigns must forbid looting first; taking a city means garrisoning it—or gains slip away at once and civilians are wiped out. Second, clean up local governance. Of Shanghai officials, only Liu Genggao enjoys popular trust and has already received imperial appointment. Xue Huan commands fecklessly; Wu Xu schemes craftily, runs a bank in Shanghai, and accepts donations only in his own notes; Yang Fang, newly made grain commissioner, grew rich from carrying water for foreign firms and is despised even by foreigners; Zhejiang treasurer Lin Fuxiang surrendered after Hangzhou fell and sent Wang Youling's and Zhang Xigeng's coffins to Shanghai. Such wayward officials should be punished by degree to uphold the law. Third, audit military funds. Checkpoints—official, rebel, and gunboat—crowd Shanghai's approaches; on top of tolls, lijin and levies on boats, land, and houses grow monthly. Officials and merchants say receipts reach twenty thousand taels a day, six hundred thousand a month. Forty thousand troops at three cash a day need only three hundred sixty thousand taels monthly—yet authorities still run deficits. Order Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang to audit accounts strictly. Suzhou, Songjiang, Jiaxing, and Huzhou once led the empire in land tax, but thirty years of remissions left officials and people in mutual arrears and quotas hollow. After such devastation, could governors wait until order returns, then trim farm levies, keep commercial taxes, cover gaps from surpluses, and stay within fixed quotas? Fourth, succor the survivors. Ruffians on the Jiangsu-Zhejiang border run gunboats and loot wherever they sail; they will switch sides with military fortunes and aid rebels when cities fall. Let governors resettle them as farmers or enroll them as soldiers before they become a lasting threat. For civilians and merchants trapped in fallen counties who obeyed rebels only to survive, invoke the rule that coercion excuses guilt and grant mercy. Fifth, guard against foreign influence. Shanghai's survival owes much to foreigners. Since they joined the fight they have swept all before them—some call it charity, some trade, some a future bill for services—I dare not presume which. Every treaty port defers to foreigners too readily. Fortunate still that clear governance has not yet stirred their covetousness. Over time profit and loyalty shift their way; to believe the wolf's cub lacks ambition is hard indeed. Proper handling depends above all on understanding foreign conditions. Order treaty ports to translate foreign news on current affairs and report weighty items to the throne for preparedness." The emperor found merit in the memorial, ordered Guofan and Hongzhang to act, and directed investigation of Fuxiang and others. He soon became court tutor and Grand Secretariat secretary, acting in turn as vice minister of war and rites.

四年，編修蔡壽祺疏劾恭親王，命大學士倭仁等察奏。兆鏞與左都御史潘祖廕疏言：「恭親王輔政以來，功過久蒙睿照，重臣進退，關係安危。尚祈持平用中，熟思審處，察其悔過，予以轉圜。庶無紊黜陟大綱，滋天下後世之惑。」上納其言。六年，督安徽學政。七年，授禮部侍郎，任滿，仍直上書房，迭署兵、工二部侍郎。尋授吏部侍郎，調戶部，再調禮部。光緒七年，以病乞罷。九年，卒。

In 1865 compiler Cai Shouqi impeached Prince Gong; the emperor ordered Woren and others to investigate. Zhaoyong and Pan Zuyin wrote: "Prince Gong's record under regency has long enjoyed imperial scrutiny; dismissing a great minister touches the dynasty's safety. We pray Your Majesty will weigh the matter evenly, consider carefully, note his repentance, and give him room to make amends. So the principles of appointment will not be unsettled nor future ages left bewildered." The emperor took their advice. In 1867 he became Anhui education commissioner. In 1868 he became vice minister of rites; when his term ended he returned to the Upper Study and acted as vice minister of war and works in turn. He soon became vice minister of personnel, then revenue, then rites again. In 1881 ill health prompted his retirement. He died in 1883.

=【論】=論曰：咸豐中四方多故，文宗悒悒，恆抱疾。京師用不足，大錢鈔票，法立弊滋。王茂廕屢進讜言，均中利害，清直為一時之最，宋晉亦其次也。袁希祖、文瑞皆有所論列，而徐繼畬直箴君德，所舉三防，陳義尤高，發桂言軍事亦有識。廉兆綸助守江西，雷以諴分防江北，並著事功。陶樑為文學老宿，吳存義、殷兆鏞並侍從清望，存義視學滇、浙，能得士心，兆鏞慷慨論事，於鄉邦疾苦冀有補苴，何言之深也！

Commentary: Under Xianfeng troubles rose everywhere; Emperor Wenzong was melancholy and often ill. Capital funds ran short; large coins and paper notes bred new abuses as soon as they were introduced. Wang Maoyin's blunt memorials always hit the mark; none was more upright in his day, with Song Jin close behind. Yuan Xizu and Wen Rui also remonstrated; Xu Jiyu admonished imperial conduct with lofty "three guard" principles, and Fa Gui showed sound judgment on military affairs. Lian Zhaolun aided Jiangxi's defense and Lei Yixian guarded northern Jiangsu; both won distinction. Tao Liang was a literary elder; Wu Cunyì and Yin Zhaoyong both held standing at court—Cunyì won scholars' hearts inspecting Yunnan and Zhejiang; Zhaoyong spoke boldly on public affairs, hoping to relieve his homeland's woes—what depth of feeling!

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