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卷423 列傳二百十 宗稷辰 尹耕雲 王拯 穆缉香阿 游百川 沈淮

Volume 423 Biographies 210: Zong Jichen, Yin Gengyun, Wang Zheng, Mu Jixianga, You Baichuan, Shen Huai

Chapter 423 of 清史稿 · Draft History of Qing
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Chapter 423
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Zong Jichen. Zong Jichen, style name Difu, came from Kuaiji in Zhejiang. He earned his juren degree in the first year of Daoguang (1821), received appointment as a Grand Secretariat secretary, and served on the Grand Council staff. He was then moved to the Office of the Diarist as a director, and later promoted again to assistant department director in the Ministry of Revenue. In the first year of Xianfeng (1851) he was promoted to censor. He submitted a memorial calling on the provinces to enforce the baojia system in earnest, arguing in brief that magistrates should hold office long enough to see results, that deadlines should be realistic, that door-plate registers must be checked carefully, that clerks must not pad fees at the people's expense, that deputy magistrates and registrars could assist, that large lineages should be enrolled first to bind neighborhoods together, and that public reading of the law could be combined with militia drill and community granaries for mutual benefit. The throne ordered the governors of the metropolitan provinces to investigate local conditions and implement the plan as they saw fit. In another memorial on balancing income and expenditure he urged honesty over window-dressing and singled out three measures—audits, voluntary contributions, and interest-bearing reserves; and he asked that tax-collection districts be redrawn where needed and that prefects and magistrates be ordered, under threat of disciplinary liability, to press collection vigorously. The Board of Revenue was instructed to review the proposal. In the fifth year (1855), when word spread that the emperor would soon visit the tombs though no formal notice had been issued, Jichen memorialized that the counties south of the capital had been flooded, that years of war had only just eased, and that the people needed rest—he begged a one-year postponement. The emperor replied that the annual tomb visit was a ritual obligation, but that if the capital region could not bear the burden, the court would weigh the times and defer the ceremony. This time no edict had even fixed a date for the visit; Zong Jichen had merely guessed and spoken up, winning a reputation for bold remonstrance without any real grounds. Such posturing must not be encouraged! The case was sent to the appropriate ministry for disciplinary action. He soon memorialized again: "Since the Taiping rebels seized the Yangtze, able commanders—civil or military—have been scarce for years. Generals like Ulanga, Taqibu, and Jiang Zhongyuan were irreplaceable, yet the court often failed to use them fully, and they died in the field. Sheng Bao, Zhang Liangji, and Yuan Jiasan were all willing to take responsibility, yet they too were underused and removed on criminal charges. Lately the two Hu provinces have been held up chiefly by a few scholar-officials—Hu Linyi and Luo Zinan—who drilled their men in courage and led from the front. Both owed their start to Zeng Guofan's example. Opening a civil-military examination track now would truly meet the emergency, yet officials hesitate to recommend talent—fearing blame if the nominee proves mediocre, and futility if fortune turns against him. In a crisis that should wring every brow, they cling to routine; at every defeat they blame empty coffers. Funds must be found, but without capable commanders a million in silver is worthless as dust. My own horizon is limited and I cannot know every worthy man in the empire, but in Hunan there is Zuo Zongtang—flexible, decisive, and already indispensable to provincial governors. Given an independent command he would rank with Hu Linyi and Luo Zinan. Repeatedly recommended yet reluctant to push forward, Yao Chengyu of Huzhou combines moral courage with classical learning and is genuinely employable. Men of deep strategic insight include Zhou Tenghu and Guan Yan of Changzhou and Tang Qihua of Guilin—all engaged with public affairs, yet still living in obscurity on their farms. If the court would break precedent and recruit such men in clusters, one worthy could pacify several prefectures and a handful could secure an entire war zone. Even with the Yangtze in rebel hands, divided campaigns could still win the day and bring the rebellion to a swift end. I beg Your Majesty to order every official, inside and outside the capital, to nominate men he knows—serving or not—who truly combine civil and military gifts, and to summon them to office. In that way the court could gather every capable man in the land. When the memorial arrived, the throne ordered the governors to examine Zuo Zongtang and the others and send them to the capital for audience. Zuo Zongtang was thus brought to the court's attention, and contemporaries praised Jichen for recognizing talent. He was promoted to supervising secretary. Large-denomination cash was then in circulation in the capital, to the merchants' and people's distress. Jichen memorialized to restore standard copper coinage under the name "ancestral cash," while large coins would be cast in iron only, with both kinds circulating side by side. The relevant ministry deliberated, but the proposal was rejected. He also memorialized for emergency relief when the capital region flooded, and the court agreed. He was soon appointed intendant of the Shandong grain-transport circuit. When Nian rebels crossed the border he built fortified walls along the Niutou River at Jining—6,300 zhang on the north bank and 8,600 on the south—which held the line. For this service he received the brevet rank of salt-transport commissioner. In the sixth year of Tongzhi (1867) he retired on grounds of illness and died soon after. Jichen's father Peizheng had been magistrate of Lingling in Hunan and died leaving nothing beyond an honest name. Jichen was devoted to his mother. In scholarship he followed Wang Yangming and Liu Zongzhou. After leaving office he directed the Longshan Academy in Yuyao and the Jishan Academy in Shanyin. While at court he petitioned for a shrine to Brigadier Ge Yunfei in Ge's home district; and in Shandong he had Fang Xiaoru's shrine restored and the Correct Learning collection carved for printing—typical of his efforts to uphold moral culture. Yin Gengyun. Yin Gengyun, style name Xingnong, came from Taoyuan in Jiangsu. He passed the jinshi examination in the thirtieth year of Daoguang (1850), entered the Ministry of Rites as a director, and was later promoted to bureau director. In the fifth year of Xianfeng (1855), when Taiping forces threatened the capital region, Prince Hui Mianyu was named commander-in-chief with Sengge Rinchen as his deputy. Gengyun joined the staff, wrote on defense, and won the attention of the Xianfeng Emperor. In the eighth year (1858) he was appointed Huguang circuit censor and acted as supervising secretary of the Revenue Section. Troubled times kept him submitting several memorials a month. Zhili governor-general Ne'erjing'e had been dismissed for losing the frontier, then was brought back to office. Gengyun memorialized: "Ne'erjing'e's failures are notorious, and no one understands why he has been reappointed. With war still raging along the Yangtze, Huai, Chu, and Yu fronts, field commanders are everywhere. They risk their lives because they are loyal—but also because the dynasty's record of reward and punishment commands their respect. If others follow his example and the armies lose heart, the consequences are unthinkable. Under the Daoguang Emperor, Qishan had been reappointed but was dismissed after Chen Qingyong remonstrated. I beg Your Majesty to follow that precedent and revoke the appointment." When the Taiping forces again threatened Wuhan, Gengyun wrote that Wuhan commanded the upper Yangtze—overlooking Shaanxi to the north, menacing Hunan and Hubei to the south, threatening Jiangsu and Zhejiang to the east, and holding Sichuan to the west—and that every north-south war in history had been fought to the death for this position. The rebels now probed northern Hubei, raided Guangji and Huanggang, and closed on the provincial capital. Governor Hu Linyi had only a few thousand men—far too few—and could not cover the long river line at once. Vice President Zeng Guofan is loyal, brave, and steadfast; he should be named imperial commissioner to lead his own troops to relieve Hubei—no other choice would achieve so much so quickly." When the rebels took Dingyuan, Gengyun warned that the Taiping and Nian armies had joined forces and would surely drive north, using Shandong as their shield. Governor Chong'en was lucky the rebels had not slaughtered officials or held the city; when they withdrew he filed false victory reports and papered over the truth to deceive his superiors; outwardly he squeezed the people dry. I beg Your Majesty to remember how vital this frontier province is, dismiss Chong'en at once, and send a senior replacement. Recruit more river forces at Hong Lake, and order Fu Zhenbang's entire army to garrison Guzhen and Lingbi in hopes of recovering northern Anhui and securing Shandong." When Luzhou fell as well, he memorialized again that the province had once been seated at Anqing, forming a triangle with Jiujiang and Nanjing to control the Yangtze. Moving the seat to Luzhou last year had already sacrificed the strategic advantage; now even Luzhou was lost. While Hu Linyi pressed Jiujiang from Wuhan, Anhui rebels might strike into Hubei from Yingshan and Huoshan to tie down the upper river, or raid western Zhejiang from Huizhou and Shexian to threaten the interior. Our armies were scattered on rescue missions and exhausted from constant marching. The rebels could move in every direction while we could not close three sides of them; capturing a city a day would do little good. Governor Fuji's repeated defeats had ruined his authority; Yuan Jiasan, an expectant capital official, enjoyed the people's trust and would throw himself into service if appointed governor." When Zeng Guofan marched, Gengyun wrote that since the war began half the empire had been mobilized and tens of millions spent, yet the rebel leadership remained at large—chiefly because the court had repeatedly been late and lost its chances. Now Zeng Guofan had trained elite troops and was winning wherever he fought. Chen Yucheng and Zhang Luoxing had massed hundreds of thousands of hardened rebels at Qianshan and Taihu—ten times Zeng's numbers. The slightest mistake would be catastrophic. Rebel forces at Luzhou, Fengyang, and Liuhe must now be thin. Order Yuan Jiasan and Zhang Guoliang to strike their bases on a fixed schedule, forcing them to turn back, or send them by side routes to support Zeng's army—either move would break the rebels' nerve." In another memorial he impeached Grand Canal director-general Gengchang and asked that Yuan Jiasan hold the post concurrently; he argued that pacification alone would not suffice against the Yunnan Hui rebels; he laid out a comprehensive capital relief program covering fair-price grain sales, procurement, relief, and reserves; and he exposed long-standing abuses in the currency system. Most of these proposals were adopted. When British and French forces attacked Tianjin together, Gengyun filed seven solo memorials and joined two joint ones, all urging war to the finish. The emperor convened the princes and senior ministers to deliberate. He clashed with Prince Zheng Duanhua and the peace party, argued fiercely, wept, and the council adjourned without agreement. Gengyun had once been valued by Sushun in the Ministry of Rites; for that very reason Sushun now turned against him. In the ninth year (1859) the examination scandal broke. Censors faced disciplinary review for failing to investigate, but Gengyun alone was heavily punished for having served as palace examiner—demoted two ranks and transferred. In the tenth year (1860), with the capital under martial law and the emperor preparing to flee to Rehe, Gengyun drafted a remonstrance for the defense commissioner and wrote personally to Sushun, but neither appeal was heard. Vice President Wenxiang, commanding the Nine Gates, met Gengyun in the eastern city. They embraced and wept, and Gengyun outlined plans for holding Beijing during the emperor's absence. Hu Linyi memorialized that Gengyun had real strategic talent and asked that he be recalled to service. Vice Censor-in-chief Mao Changxi, organizing Henan militia, then requested Gengyun's transfer to his staff. In the first year of Tongzhi (1862) he led five thousand men with Sengge Rinchen against the sect rebels at Jinlou Stockade, then with Brigadier Zhang Yao captured the Nian base at Zhanggang. He was noted for promotion to intendant and awarded the peacock feather. In the third year (1864) he served as acting intendant of the Henan-Shaanxi-Ru circuit. The western expedition bought grain at Shanzhou, but when local measures fell short the counties were forced to make up millions of jin in grain. Gengyun had every such levy cancelled. He executed guest troops who broke the law as a public warning. Banditry was rife in his jurisdiction. Granted command over Henan and Shaanxi troops and paying rations on time, he brought the soldiers firmly under control. In the fourth year (1865), when Zhang Zongyu raided the capital region, Gengyun marched with Governor Li Henian to Cizhou and proposed a long encirclement to cut off the rebels' retreat. Twice acting as grain-and-salt intendant, he helped manage postwar recovery, dredged the Huiji River, and sealed river breaches. For this he received the brevet rank of provincial administration commissioner. In the thirteenth year (1874) he received regular appointment to the Henan-Shaanxi-Ru intendant post. Corvée in Henan and Shaanxi weighed almost as heavily as regular taxes. Gengyun fixed the regulations, enforced audits strictly, and the people found some relief. In the third year of Guangxu (1877), during a severe drought, he submitted seven famine-relief measures, but died in office before they could be implemented. Gengyun was famed for blunt memorials as a censor. As a provincial official, Governors Zhang Zhiwan and Li Henian relied on him heavily for military planning. After his death, Governor Li Qing'ao was impeached over famine relief and implicated in false military-pay claims that touched Gengyun's name, but Gengyun was eventually cleared. Wang Zheng. Wang Zheng, originally named Xizhen, style name Dingfu, came from Maping in Guangxi. He passed the jinshi examination in the twenty-first year of Daoguang (1841), entered the Ministry of Revenue as a director, and served on the Grand Council staff. When Grand Secretary Sai Shang'a took command in Guangxi, Zheng accompanied him and, stirred by the crisis, resolved to speak out. During the Xianfeng reign he rose from bureau director to vice president of the Court of Judicial Review. In the second year of Tongzhi (1863), the surrendered Nian leader Song Jingshi came back from Shaanxi to raid Zhili and Shandong. Zheng wrote that Jingshi's fortified stockade at Gangtun was a rebel stronghold in all but name, that his following since returning from Shaanxi numbered only a few hundred, yet Chonghou and others had repeatedly indulged him until his coerced following swelled past ten thousand. Lately in Changyi, Shen, Liaocheng, and Linqing he had villages split their wheat harvests with tenants and send the grain to Gangtun. Though nominally surrendered, his actions grew ever more defiant. I beg a secret order to Zhili governor Liu Changyou to lure him to camp, expose his crimes, and put him to death. If he refuses, Zhili troops can still cross the border to attack him. Once Jingshi is gone, ringleaders such as Yang Pengling and Cheng Shunshu can be executed together, removing the chief menace and securing the capital region." The memorial was received but not acted on. Jingshi was eventually executed for rebellion. While the war continued, Zeng Guofan proposed raising funds in Guangdong; Lao Chongguang introduced the lijin transit tax, and abuses multiplied. Zheng memorialized that the two Guang provinces, where the rebellion had begun, still saw Cenxi and Rongxian held by rebels for years on end. Chen Jingang of Xinyi was the worst of them; the rebel bands acted as one and spread in ways hard to suppress. Lao Chongguang's lijin scheme typically forced gentry and merchants to contract and advance payments—a desperate expedient that could not last. After Chongguang left office, collections fell sharply. Lately lijin commissioners had been beaten by mobs or put in the cangue by villagers. The people were unruly, but the officials' conduct spoke for itself. In a province long torn by war, with rebels still entrenched, squeezing every source of revenue by a hundred means may yield ten parts of profit and a hundred parts of harm. If the two Guang provinces collapsed again, the court would not know where to turn—let alone collect lijin." He recommended Guangdong circuit intendant Tang Qiyin, Lianghuai grain commissioner Guo Songtao, and Zhejiang grain commissioner Cheng Sunyi. Guo Songtao was soon appointed to supervise Guangdong lijin on the strength of Zheng's memorial. In the third year (1864) he was promoted to president of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices and acted as left vice censor-in-chief. He wrote that the ministers in charge of foreign affairs—Chonglun, Hengqi, Dong Xun, and Xue Huan—were petty and contemptible, as everyone knew. Foreign powers might conclude that China's senior officials were no better, to the dynasty's shame. Even if talent were scarce and the Zongli Yamen needed staff, the emperor should curb such men—assign sinecures or empty titles—so foreign powers would respect China's standards of rank. The empire would then understand that the court meant to embrace all parties while keeping foreigners on a leash." He was soon promoted to commissioner of the Transmission Office while continuing to act as left vice censor-in-chief. He memorialized that Suzhou and Hangzhou had fallen in turn and that Zhili and the east were pacified. Enterprises nearing success, I observe, are never settled without utmost caution. Jinling might fall within three or four months, but Danyang and Changzhou supported each other, and veterans like Li Xiucheng massed there for a last stand. With Hangzhou and Jiaxing taken, the remnants concentrated at Huzhou. Rebels fleeing southern Anhui into Jiangxi spread across two or three hundred li around Yushan, Qianshan, Jinxi, and Jianchang—eighty or ninety thousand by report—with some crossing into Fujian. Li Shixian was said to be leading a large force through Chun'an and Suian. Zeng Guofan and Zuo Zongtang had long urged patience, yet on the Anhui-Zhejiang border they disagreed: Zeng wanted separate garrisons at Huizhou and Ningguo, while Zuo preferred a combined strike on Guangde to block the rebels' escape. Before the two plans could be settled, the rebels had already broken from Anhui into Jiangxi. Long accustomed to guerrilla war and too numerous to encircle, the rebels often could not be destroyed wholesale without letting some escape. Because they were numerous and aggressive, they drove forward relentlessly—before one column could be crushed, another followed. If they penetrated deep into Jiangxi, dying embers could flare again into a prairie fire. From Jiangxi through Fujian they could reach Tingzhou and Chaozhou by a route rebels had used for years. Huang Wenjin had come this way; Shi Dakai had gone this way—a lesson the court should heed. Imperial orders had repeatedly warned Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang, Li Hongzhang, Shen Baozhen, and the Fujian and Guangdong governors to stand ready. With final victory near, all commanders must act as one—blocking ahead and pursuing behind—so that fleeing bands are battered wherever they go, grow weaker daily, and cannot regroup into a new catastrophe. I would add that the Anhui and Zhejiang armies have fought a long war; Zeng and Zuo have each raised funds in the Yangtze and Chu provinces. Zeng had established a central lijin office in Jiangsu, dedicating that province's levies to feeding his hundred thousand Anhui troops. Zhejiang's army could spare nothing; even Zeng's monthly pay was said to be issued only in part. Guangdong lijin was sought in desperation but could not be collected quickly. It is human nature that people think locally and act for themselves. Guangdong feels this way; would Jiangxi be any different? Shen Baozhen had recently asked that Jiangxi keep its tea tax and broker lijin; the ministry allowed half to remain in the province—a concession Zeng would surely accept. But troops at the front, fighting in hope of victory, might lose heart if pay were cut—how could they fight on full stomachs and high spirits? I propose ordering the governors of Jiangxi, Anhui, Hunan-Hubei, and Guangdong that, urgent as the moment is, they must strain every resource and cooperate wholeheartedly. Hui unrest in Gansu was not yet settled; Nian remnants lingered in the central provinces; Chen Daxi of Runan had fled into Hubei and threatened Xiangyang and Fancheng from Suizhou and Zaoyang; Zhang Zongyu had broken from the Nantai mountains into Henan and Zhejiang, with fear they might join forces; while Hanzhong rebels had poured into Ningxia, Shaanxi, and Shangzhou and were said to be massing at Xiangyang and Fancheng to relieve Jinling—a threat not to be ignored. Shaanxi's war effort was fragmented. Li Yunlin had pursued rebels in Shangyu, then marched west; at Xing'an he failed to stop their escape; at Hanyin he avoided battle while his men looted. He should be reined in. Liu Rong was a scholar of real ambition charged with Hanzhong, yet rebels ranged everywhere. He must vow to destroy them or fail his charge. Duo Long'a had enjoyed the highest reputation as China's foremost general, yet lately his standing had slipped; the court should issue a stern reminder. Lei Zhengwan won wherever he fought and could hold an independent command, but he lacked upright officials in Gansu to support him. Lanzhou and Qingyang were now cut off. Enlin held the governor's seal in proxy—a man fit only for errands, with poor judgment; while Xilin held Qingyang and Ningxia but was misled by Qingyun's repeated blunders. I urge the prompt appointment of a capable, upright minister to restore order. Peace across the empire is not yet at hand, but as north and south quiet down, settling the west would bring a broad measure of order. The court is the root of the realm: clarity and discipline at the center resonate with vigor in the field. The tide is turning, yet grave difficulties remain. Some may prematurely declare the times settled and secure. People love novelty yet cling to habit, fear hardship yet chase gain—only the sincere statesman who grasps the moment can see this clearly and warn against it. Zhuge Liang was the greatest man since antiquity, yet history praised him above all for caution. Zhu Xi warned Emperor Xiaozong of Song: 'If the poison of ease and comfort grows day by day, the resolve to sleep on brushwood and taste gall will fade and be forgotten. I cannot restrain my private anxiety and venture these views too freely." The memorial was received and acknowledged. He soon retired and died. Mu Jixianga. Mu Jixianga, style name Junan, was a Manchu of the Bordered Red Banner. He rose from director in the Ministry of Works to bureau director. In the fourth year of Tongzhi (1865) he was appointed Shandong circuit censor. He memorialized for careful selection of eunuchs, noting that the emperor had come to the throne young, that his learning advanced daily, and that attendants at his side should be chosen with care lest they later mislead him. From the late Han through the Ming, half the court's failures had come from eunuchs. Eunuchs begin with petty loyalty and quick flattery, all to secure favor and advancement. Once their factions formed, they grew arrogant and controlled their superiors; even enlightened rulers sometimes could not remove them. Officials and people gnashed their teeth in hatred yet could do nothing. Our dynasty's emperors, surpassing all predecessors, forbade eunuchs not only from politics but even from familiar speech in daily attendance, blocking slander and flattery at the source. For more than two hundred years they had never been a scourge. Yet even such strict guard could not banish every fear. Even in the Jiaqing palace attack of 1813 some eunuchs had aided rebels—proof of their treachery. The empress dowager now ruled from behind the curtain, understood these abuses, and guarded against petty men who might mislead the court. She knew men and used them well; the court was orderly and clean. When the emperor takes power in a few years he will surely not favor them to the ruin of state affairs—why must officials fret so anxiously? Yet my earnest concern could not be suppressed. This is a time when the emperor's learning is expanding; though officials serve him well, eunuchs especially require careful choice. Eunuchs exist only to run errands and take orders; young, quick-witted men must never attend the emperor constantly. I beg the empress dowager to choose loyal, upright, mature men to attend the emperor day and night, so that when he rules in person he will not be misled—and his boundless virtue will rest on this foundation!" In the fifth year (1866) he memorialized that Grand Secretary Zeng Guofan's Nian campaign had dragged on without success and asked that Zeng be censured. The emperor noted that Zeng had repeatedly accepted blame and was ordered back to supply duty; though he had not finished the campaign, he had not ruined the war effort. The memorial was dismissed as excessive. He was sent out as prefect of Puzhou in Shanxi and died soon after. Mu Jixianga was deeply versed in state affairs; his family held court gazettes from the dynasty's founding in near-complete runs. You Baichuan. You Baichuan, style name Huidong, came from Binzhou in Shandong. He passed the jinshi examination in the first year of Tongzhi (1862), entered the Hanlin Academy, and was appointed compiler. In the sixth year (1867) he was promoted to censor and patrolled the western city. Imperial clansmen such as Kuanhe had acted lawlessly; he impeached them, and for a time the privileged elite held their tongues. In the seventh year (1868), when Nian rebels fled from Shandong into Zhili, Baichuan urged swift suppression and a ban on opium cultivation in every province. The emperor adopted both proposals. He exposed long-standing abuses by clerks in government offices, and the throne ordered a strict ban empire-wide. He added that eliminating clerk abuses required purifying official conduct and, above all, reviving the morale of the scholar-official class. He asked ministry chiefs to select several able men in each bureau, give them real authority, and hold them accountable. If clerks were found corrupt, they should report the facts; merit should still be judged by diligence or sloth. With clear rewards and punishments, capable men would rise of themselves. Provincial officials already had power to punish clerks; governors must be ordered to match men to posts, not trial men in unsuitable places. Recommend the worthy and impeach the unworthy; appoint upright inspectors to tour on schedule and memorialize on every corrupt official or predatory clerk they find. The Yellow River had shifted north, and Shandong prefectures and counties suffered repeated flooding. Baichuan memorialized for relief. River director Wenbin and Governor Ding Baozhen asked to restore the old Huai–Xu channel, and the court ordered a ministerial debate. Baichuan wrote that the Yellow River might flow south or north, but the court must settle on one coherent policy. If the old course were restored, three questions could not be rushed: using the Daqing River as the main channel would require widening the bed beyond what the old course could hold—how would farmland and homes be moved and resettled? Land surveys must come first; even widened, the channel might not suffice, and branch streams such as Tuhai, Mabang, Goupan, and Gejin would likely be needed—each opening must be weighed for benefit and harm; northward diversion would be unprecedented; mishandling it could stir public unrest and fierce debate—timing must be handled with care. He asked that a senior minister survey the entire river course before any final decision." In the twelfth year (1886) the emperor assumed personal rule and ordered repairs to the Old Summer Palace for the empress dowager's residence. Censor Shen Huai asked to defer repairs. The emperor proclaimed his filial duty to both palaces: only the Palace of Imperial Peace would be restored for ancestral portraits and the empress dowager's residence and offices, with strict economy and no extravagance elsewhere. Baichuan remonstrated again. Summoned and rebuked by the emperor, he spoke frankly without yielding. The emperor was moved, and his reputation for bold remonstrance spread through the court. He soon went home for mourning; after the mourning period he returned to office and was promoted to supervising secretary. In the fifth year of Guangxu (1879) he became Hunan's Heng-Yong-Chen-Gui intendant, then Sichuan provincial judge, then metropolitan prefect of Shuntian, then vice president of the Granary and Storage Board. In the ninth year (1883) a Shandong river breach flooded dozens of counties. Baichuan was sent to join Governor Chen Shijie in relief and repair work. Baichuan rode through Henan's north and south banks and the river's upper and lower reaches, distributing emergency relief first. They jointly proposed outer dikes on both banks and inner thread dikes within them to contain the Yellow River; and dredging the Xiaoqing River to divert Yellow River water to the sea. The court approved. Back in the capital, he was dismissed after the granaries burned. He lived in retirement several years and died. (Supplement) Shen Huai. Shen Huai, style name Dongchuan, came from Yin county in Zhejiang. He earned his juren degree in the twenty-ninth year of Daoguang (1849), entered the Grand Secretariat as a secretary, and served on the Grand Council staff. In the tenth year of Xianfeng (1860), when the Xianfeng Emperor fled to Rehe, Huai could not accompany him and wept so bitterly he tried to throw himself into a well; his family stopped him. He rose through the Ministry of Justice to assistant department director and was appointed Shaanxi circuit censor. He impeached Revenue director Yang Hongdian for grasping power and taking bribes. The case went to the Ministry of Justice, but Yang was only lightly demoted until Yan Jingming became minister and secured his dismissal. When palace repairs began, Huai filed the first remonstrance and was famed alongside Baichuan. In the first year of Guangxu (1875) he supervised the Shuntian provincial examination despite illness and died soon after leaving the examination compound. His family had been comfortably off, but he sold nearly everything he owned during his years in the capital. People admired his integrity all the more. Commentary: In wartime opportunities shift constantly; capital officials who argue from rumor often miss the mark. Zong Jichen stressed finding the right men; Yin Gengyun judged generals' failures; Wang Zheng urged frontier officials to cooperate and focus on defeating rebels—they saw the larger picture. Zheng was the most thorough, for he sat on the Grand Council and read military reports rather than rumor. Mu Jixianga urged careful choice of eunuchs; You Baichuan and others blocked Old Summer Palace repairs. Their reputations for blunt remonstrance were well earned.
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