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=宗稷辰=宗稷辰,字滌甫,浙江會稽人。 道光元年舉人,授內閣中書,充軍機章京。 遷起居注主事,再遷戶部員外郎。 咸豐元年,遷御史。 疏請飭各省實行保甲,略言:「州縣宜久任,時日宜寬假,填寫門牌當詳細核對,董事胥役毋派費累民,酌用丞簿以為襄助,先編巨族以為聯屬,並可申明讀法之典,兼收團練、社倉之益。」 詔下直省督撫,各就地體察參酌行之。 又疏言通籌出入,宜崇實去偽,舉清查、報效、生息三端; 又疏請酌改經徵處,分令州縣戴罪嚴催:並下戶部覈議。 五年,聞上將謁陵,未有旨戒行,稷辰疏言:「畿南州縣被水,連歲用兵,民氣甫行休息,籥請展緩一年。」 上諭曰:「每歲謁陵,事同典禮,如果畿輔民力未逮,亦必權衡時勢,暫緩舉行。 今茲並未降旨何日謁陵,宗稷辰揣度陳奏,徒博敢諫之名而無其實。 此風不可長!」 下部議處。 尋又奏言:「自粵匪竄據長江,數年以來,文臣武將,能戰者稀。 如烏蘭泰、塔齊布、江忠源皆難得之將,而多不盡其用,且以死殉。 如勝保、張亮基、袁甲三皆勇於任事,而亦未盡其用,以罪罷去。 近日支持兩湖,賴有一二書生,如胡林翼、羅澤南,能以練膽為士卒先。 此二人者,實曾國籓有以開之。 此時若開文武兼資一科,誠足濟當時之急,而臣工多不敢薦舉者,一恐其才疏而得過,一恐其遇蹇而罔功。 處愁眉焚頂之時,守蹈常習故之轍,見有敗衄,動以餉匱為辭。 餉固不可不籌,試思用兵乏人,雖斂金百萬,棄如土苴,終歸無用。 臣聞見隘陋,非能盡識天下之才,所知湖南有左宗棠,通權達變,為疆吏所倚重,若使獨當一面,必不下於林翼、澤南。 其屢經論薦,難進易退,肝膽經術,實可取材者,有若湖州之姚承輿。 其策議深沉,才識過人者,有若常州之週騰虎、管晏,桂林之唐啟華,皆關心時務,今尚鬱鬱伏處田間。 誠能破格招賢,連茹並進,則得一人可以平數州,得數人可以清一路。 長江雖阻,當不難分道建功,剋日平定。 伏乞皇上命內外臣工各舉所知,無論已仕未仕,果能文武兼資,皆許徵起,必可網羅而盡得之。」 疏入,下各督撫,命以宗棠等加考送部引見。 宗棠自此膺簡拔,論者謂其知人。 遷給事中。 時京師行大錢,商民苦之。 稷辰上疏請復用制錢,號曰「祖錢」,而大錢改純用鐵鑄,兼行並用。 下部議,格不行。 又以畿輔水患,疏請急賑,從之。 尋授山東運河道,捻匪入境,於濟寧牛頭河濱築戰牆,北岸六千三百丈,南岸八千六百丈,賴以守禦。 以功加鹽運使銜。 同治六年,引疾歸,尋卒。 稷辰父霈正,官湖南零陵知縣,廉無餘貲。 稷辰事母孝。 為學宗王守仁、劉宗周。 罷官後,主餘姚龍山書院、山陰蕺山書院。 官京朝,請祀總兵葛雲飛本籍; 官山東,請修方孝孺祠,並刻正學集:其振勵風教多類此。 =尹耕雲=尹耕雲,字杏農,江蘇桃源人。 道光三十年進士,授禮部主事,再遷郎中。 咸豐五年,粵匪犯畿輔,惠親王綿愉為大將軍,僧格林沁參贊軍務,闢耕雲佐幕府,上書論防務,為文宗所知。 八年,授湖廣道監察御史,署戶科給事中。 時方多事,封章月數上。 直隸總督訥爾經額坐貽誤封疆罷,復起。 耕雲疏言:「訥爾經額之罪,天下共聞共見,未喻其復行起用之故。 方今江、淮、楚、豫軍務未靖,秉鉞之臣,星羅棋布,所以奮不顧身,必欲滅此朝食者,固由篤於忠義,亦以國家信賞必罰,有以畏服其心。 萬一效尤解體,患何可言? 昔宣宗起用琦善,以陳慶鏞之言而罷。 伏原紹述心傳,收回成命。」 時粵匪复窺武漢,耕雲疏言:「武漢地踞上游,北窺關陝,南脅湖湘,東撼吳越,西製巴蜀,自古南北用兵,皆出死力爭之。 今賊窺伺楚北,分擾廣濟、黃岡,逼近省城,撫臣胡林翼兵勇數千,眾寡懸絕,江路綿遠,首尾不能兼顧。 侍郎曾國籓忠勇樸誠,應請授為欽差大臣,率其所部援湖北,較諸他臣事半功倍。」 粵匪陷定遠,耕雲疏言:「定遠失守,粵、捻新合,必謀北竄,恃山東為之屏蔽。 撫臣崇恩幸其不戕官據城,於賊退後虛報勝仗,內則巧為彌縫,掩一人耳目; 外則恣其朘削,竭萬姓脂膏。 惟懇俯念籓籬重地,立予罷斥,簡大員往代。 於洪湖多募水師,兼飭傅振邦全軍移駐固鎮、靈壁,冀收皖北,以固山東。」 及廬州失守,又疏言:「昔人建省安慶,與九江、江寧為犄角,控扼長江。 上年徙治廬州,已失形勝,茲並廬州亦不能守。 胡林翼等自武漢進逼九江,而安徽之賊,或自英、霍走湖北,牽我上游,或自徽、歙擾浙西,窺我腹地。 我軍分道救援,罷於奔命。 賊有四達之路,我無三面之圍,雖日克一城,何益? 撫臣福濟屢挫損威,候補京堂袁甲三素得民心,如以為巡撫,必奮身圖報。」 及國籓進師,疏言:「軍興以來,徵調半天下,糜餉數千萬,卒未能掃穴擒渠,則以屢後時而數失機也。 今曾國籓蓄養精銳,所向克捷。 陳玉成、張洛行率悍賊數十萬,齊向潛山、太湖抗拒,眾寡之數,十倍於我,一有疏虞,關係甚重。 此時廬、鳳、六合賊勢必單,請飭袁甲三、張國樑刻期搗其巢穴,逼令反顧,或令間道為楚師聲援,亦足褫其狂魄。」 別疏劾河道總督庚長,請以甲三兼攝; 又論雲南迴匪不宜專意主撫; 又陳京師本計,平糶、採買、周恤、蓄積諸事宜並舉; 又言錢法積弊:諸疏多見採納。 英、法合軍犯天津,耕雲專疏者七,會疏者二,力主決戰,上命王大臣集議。 與鄭親王端華等議不合,耕云抗辯痛哭而罷。 耕云初在禮部,肅順頗重之,乃是為所憎。 九年,科場獄起,以科道失糾下吏議,而耕雲以充內監試譴獨重,鐫二級調用。 十年,京師戒嚴,上將幸熱河,耕雲代團防大臣草疏諫阻,復自以書抵肅順,卒不聽。 侍郎文祥提督九門,遇耕雲東城,相持哭,因為規畫留守諸事。 胡林翼疏薦耕雲胸有權略,請起用。 會副都御史毛昶熙治河南團練,疏調從軍。 同治元年,率部卒五千,從僧格林沁平金樓寨教匪,又偕提督張曜克張岡捻巢,以道員記名,賜花翎。 三年,署河陝汝道。 西征軍購糧陝州,市斛小,責屬縣償其不足,凡數百萬斤,耕雲悉請罷之。 客軍有不法者,斬以徇。 境多刀匪,請得節制河、陝兵,饋餉以時,兵咸用命。 四年,張總愚犯畿輔,耕雲從巡撫李鶴年進軍磁州,建策築長圍斷賊歸路。 兩署糧儲鹽法道,佐治善後事,濬惠濟河,塞河決,敘勞加布政使銜。 十三年,補河陝汝道。 河、陝徭役重,亞於常賦,耕雲立定制,嚴稽覈,民困稍甦。 光緒三年,大旱,條上救荒七事,未及行,卒於官。 耕雲在言路著直聲,出任監司,巡撫張之萬、李鶴年皆倚重之,軍事多所贊畫。 卒後,巡撫李慶翱以災荒被劾,牽及冒領兵餉事,辭連耕雲,後終得白云。 =王拯=王拯,初名錫振,字定甫,廣西馬平人。 道光二十一年進士,授戶部主事,充軍機章京。 大學士賽尚阿視師廣西,以拯從,拯感時多難,慷慨思有所建白。 咸豐間,自郎中累遷大理寺少卿。 同治二年,降捻宋景詩由陝西還擾直隸、山東,拯奏言:「景詩岡屯磚圩,儼然嵎固,自陝逸回,其黨不過數百。 崇厚等一再養癰,裹脅逾萬。 近复於昌邑、莘、聊城、臨清四州縣,令村莊將所獲麥與佃戶平分,運送岡屯,是其名為降伏,心跡轉益兇悖。 請密敕直隸督臣劉長佑計調來營,暴其罪而誅之。 若抗違不至,直隸官軍猶能越境進剿。 景詩既除,如楊蓬嶺、程順書等首惡,皆可駢誅,以除巨憝,以安畿輔。」 疏入,未行。 其後景詩卒以叛誅。 軍事未定,曾國籓議於廣東籌餉,勞崇光創辦釐金,諸弊叢起。 拯疏言:「兩粵為肇亂之區,岑溪、容縣,數載皆為賊踞。 信宜陳金缸尤為巨憝,群賊相為一氣,滋蔓難圖。 勞崇光舉辦釐金,率令紳商包充墊繳,燃眉剜肉,事何可常? 及崇光去任,徵收減少。 近乃有釐務委員,或為眾所毆傷,或為民間枷號,雖民情頑獷,而官吏惡劣亦可概見。 以積年久亂之地,有負嵎圜視之賊,當一切利孔、百方搜剔之時,臣竊恐利未十而害已百。 萬一兩粵复糜爛,更不知何所措手足,豈惟釐金不能辦而已?」 因薦廣東道員唐啟廕、兩淮運使郭嵩燾、浙江運使成孫詒。 旋用嵩燾督廣東釐金,自拯疏發之也。 三年,遷太常寺卿,署左副都御史。 疏論:「總理各國事務大臣侍郎崇綸、恆祺、董恂、薛煥委瑣齷齪,通國皆知,竊恐外邦輕侮,以為中朝卿貳之班,大都不過如若曹等,未免為中朝恥辱。 就令人材難得,或於總理衙門位置為宜,上應量為裁抑,或處以散職,或畀以虛銜,庶外邦服我旌別之嚴。 四方聞之,亦釋然於朝廷宥納群倫、羈縻彼族之意。」 尋遷通政使,仍署左副都御史。 疏言:「近日蘇、杭迭克,直、東肅清。 臣觀從來將興之業,垂成之功,未有不矢以小心,而始能底定者。 金陵賊窟雖計於三四月間可拔,而丹陽與常州犄角,百戰悍賊如李秀成等,麇集死守。 杭、嘉既克,餘黨歸併湖州。 其自皖南竄越江西之賊,蔓延玉山、鉛山、金谿、建昌二三百里,眾號八九萬,並有闌入福建境者。 又聞李世賢自率巨股由淳安、遂安接踵而至,曾國籓、左宗棠等用兵日久,前此屢陳不亟求功旦夕,同一老謀深計,獨於皖、浙毗境豫作防維之策,則國籓意在徽、寧各飭所部分防,宗棠以為不若並力取廣德扼賊竄路。 兩議未及定,賊已由皖竄贛。 賊又草竊已久,人數太眾,勢多不能聚殲而弗使一賊他遁。 臣則以此賊人多勢劇,一意奔突,前股未痛剿,後股又踵接。 萬一深入江西腹地,燼餘复熾,又至燎原。 且由贛逾閩,可以直走汀、潮,為數年來竄匪熟路。 黃文金由此而來,石達開由此而去,前事可為深警。 疊蒙諭旨,曾國籓、左宗棠、李鴻章、沈葆楨及閩、粵各督撫諄諄戒備。 當此大功將竟,惟當效力一心,互籌戰守,務將分竄諸賊,前截後追,必使所至創夷,日就衰殘零落,不得喙息,以成巨患。 臣尤有請者,皖、浙諸軍與賊相持不為不久,所需餉項,國籓、宗棠等各於江、楚等省自為籌畫。 國籓奏於江省設立總台,以一省捐釐之數,為皖軍十萬養命之源。 浙軍固不能分撥,即國籓所部月餉,傳聞亦祗放數成,不得已而籌及廣東釐捐,乃又不能遽辦。 夫民之不能見遠而各為其私者,情也。 廣東有之,江西豈獨不然? 日前沈葆楨奏請將江西茶稅、牙釐等款歸本省任收,旋用部議允留其半,在國籓等斷不至觖望。 惟軍前將卒,當枕戈喋血切望成功之時,忽聞軍餉來源將減,眾心或生疑懼,何以得飽騰而資鼓舞? 擬請飭贛、皖、楚、粵各疆臣,值此事機至緊,無論如何變通為難,總當殫竭血誠,同心共濟。 甘肅回氛未戢,中州餘捻尚存,汝南陳大喜等竄逸湖北,自隨、棗逼襄、樊; 張總愚自南台山中出竄內、淅,時虞合併; 漢中之賊,全竄寧、陝、商州一路,聞將會齊襄、樊回援金陵,誠亦未可輕忽。 目前陝省軍務,政出多門,李雲麟追賊商於,忽卷旆而西,其在興安,未能遏賊竄逸,其在漢陰,遇賊避匿,縱勇淫掠,宜量加裁抑。 劉蓉素嘗學問,懷負非常,漢中之賊,本所專辦,而竄擾四出,尤當誓志盪除,方為不負。 多隆阿聲望最優,眾口爭傳為第一名將,乃近日聲望漸損,宜申聖諭訓飭。 雷正綰所向克捷,諒足當一面之寄,顧全甘官吏,未有一二正人支持其間。 現聞蘭州與慶陽隔絕,恩麟權督印,不過使令便闢之材,識見陋劣; 熙麟坐守慶陽、寧夏一區,又為慶昀種種紕繆所誤。 臣愚以為亟宜遴簡公正有為之大臣,鎮撫整飭。 今之天下,何易遽言率土奠安,而南北軍務漸定,西事再能就緒,亦即為大致之澄清。 朝廷者天下之本,宮府清明嚴肅,與疆場奮迅振拔之氣,相感而自通。 天下大勢日轉,而亦正多難鉅之事,或遽以為時局清明,事機暢遂,若已治已安者然。 人情大抵喜新狃常,畏難而務獲,獨有當幾至誠君子,為能深察而切戒之。 昔諸葛亮為三代下一人,史獨稱之以謹慎。 硃子進戒宋孝宗曰:'使宴安酖毒之害,日滋而日長; 將臥薪嘗膽之志,日遠而日忘。 '臣不勝私憂過計,冒昧瀝陳。」 疏入,報聞。 尋告歸,卒。 =穆緝香阿=穆緝香阿,字居南,滿洲鑲紅旗人。 由工部主事再遷郎中。 同治四年,授山東道監察御史。 疏請慎擇宦寺,略言:「皇上沖齡御極,聖學日新,知識日開,左右侍從之輩,宜豫加慎選,勿使將來蠱惑聖聰。 溯自漢末及前明,朝政之失,半由宦寺。 蓋宦寺出身之始,每以小忠小信,便捷逢迎,無非售其固寵邀恩之計。 及黨與已成,則驕肆專橫,而箝制其上,雖英明之主,竟有百計不能除之者。 當時臣民,切齒痛恨,終歸無可如何。 我朝列聖相承,遠邁前代,不但不准此輩干預政事,雖應對進退間亦不假以辭色,使無由讒諂面諛,浸潤膚受。 是以二百餘年,從不為患。 雖然如此嚴防,尚有防不勝防之慮。 嘉慶癸酉之變,猶有通賊者,是此輩反覆已有明徵也。 今皇太后垂簾聽政,洞悉其弊,杜漸防微,有鑑於前,不使宵小蒙蔽。 所以知人善任,朝政肅清。 即數年後皇上親政,亦斷不致寵任此輩,貽誤事機,何待臣下鰓鰓過慮? 然獻曝之忱,有不能已者。 當此之時,正聖學擴充之際,雖臣工皆能盡心輔佐,而宦寺尤宜加意斟酌。 臣以為宦寺之設,無非效奔走、供指使而已,萬不可使年輕敏捷之人,常侍左右。 請皇太后選忠正老成者為我皇上朝夕侍從,庶將來親政,必不致受其欺矇蠱惑,而無疆之聖德,基於此矣!」 五年,疏論大學士曾國籓督師討捻,日久無功,請量加譴責。 上以國籓迭疏引咎,特命回任專辦餉糈,雖未蕆全功,非貽誤軍情者可比,斥所奏過當,置不議。 出為山西蒲州知府,尋卒。 穆緝香阿通知國故,家藏邸報,自國初以來幾備。 =遊百川=遊百川,字彙東,山東濱州人。 同治元年進士,選庶吉士,授編修。 六年,遷御史,巡西城。 宗室寬和等所行多不法,奏劾懲治,一時貴近斂跡。 七年,捻匪自山東竄直隸,百川奏請飭統兵大臣迅速剿辦,又請嚴禁各省栽種罌粟,上皆採納。 疏論內外官署胥吏積弊,詔通飭嚴禁。 復言:「除吏弊在肅官方,尤在揚士氣。 請飭部院堂官於每司中擇賢俊數員,付以事權,專其責任。 察有胥吏舞弊,據實上陳,仍以勤惰定功過。 賞罰既明,人才自奮。 至外省地方官,本有懲治胥吏之權,嚴飭各督撫為地擇人,毋以人試地。 舉賢劾不肖,再簡廉正大員,以時巡察,遇有貪官蠹吏,列狀奏聞。」 黃河北徙,山東郡邑屢被水。 百川疏請賑恤,河督文彬、巡撫丁寶楨請仍挽复淮、徐故道,命廷臣集議。 百川疏言:「黃水宜南宜北,必將折衷一是。 如議挽復故道,論工程,論經費,引黃濟運,有未可遽定者三端:如即以大清河為黃水經流,舊道斷不能容,河面必須加寬,民間田廬如何移徙,如何安置,則度地宜審也; 且即河面加寬,仍恐萬難容納,別開支河,勢不容已,徒駭、馬頰、鉤盤、鬲津猶可指名,可否開行,有無貽害,則分水宜權也; 黃水北行,其事為創,萬一不善料理,人情騷動,物議沸騰,則相機宜慎也。 請特派大臣履行上下游詳勘,然後定策。」 十二年,上親政,命葺治圓明園,奉皇太后駐蹕。 御史沈淮疏請暫緩修理,上特諭宣示孝養兩宮之意,專修安佑宮供奉列聖御容,暨皇太后駐蹕之所,治事之地,量從節儉,不事華靡,此外均不必興修。 百川繼疏申諫,上召入詰責,百川侃侃正言無所撓,上為動容,一時敢諫之名動朝野。 尋以憂歸,服除補官,遷給事中。 光緒五年,出為湖南衡永郴桂道,遷四川按察使,擢順天府尹,遷倉場侍郎。 九年,山東河決,被災者數十州縣,命百川往會巡撫陳士傑治工賑。 百川輕騎週曆河南北岸、上下游,先散急賑。 會奏請築兩岸遙堤,复於其內築縷堤,使黃水不致氾濫; 又奏請濬小清河,分黃水入海:如議行。 還京,以倉廒被火,罷歸。 居數年,卒。 (附)沈淮淮,字東川,浙江鄞縣人。 道光二十九年舉人,授內閣中書,充軍機章京。 咸豐十年,文宗狩熱河,淮不及從,慟哭欲投井,家人守之不得死。 遷刑部主事,進員外郎,授陝西道監察御史。 疏劾戶部主事楊鴻典攬權納賄,下刑部逮治,僅以小過議鐫級,及閻敬銘為尚書,始奏劾譴黜。 園工興,淮疏首上,當時與百川齊名。 光緒元年,充順天鄉試監試,力疾從事,出闈,旋卒。 家固中人產,官京師,斥賣殆盡,人尤服其清節。 =【論】論曰:用兵之際,事機千變,京朝官以傳聞有所論列,往往不能切中。 宗稷辰歸重得人,尹耕雲論諸將帥罪,王拯請調和疆吏,一意辦賊,為能見其大。 拯所言尤詳盡,蓋直樞廷,見軍報,較得諸傳聞者異矣。 穆緝香阿請慎選宦寺,遊百川等阻修圓明園,謇謇負直諫名,良不虛也。
Zong Jichen. Zong Jichen, style name Difu, came from Kuaiji in Zhejiang. He earned his juren degree in the first year of Daoguang (1821), received appointment as a Grand Secretariat secretary, and served on the Grand Council staff. He was then moved to the Office of the Diarist as a director, and later promoted again to assistant department director in the Ministry of Revenue. In the first year of Xianfeng (1851) he was promoted to censor. He submitted a memorial calling on the provinces to enforce the baojia system in earnest, arguing in brief that magistrates should hold office long enough to see results, that deadlines should be realistic, that door-plate registers must be checked carefully, that clerks must not pad fees at the people's expense, that deputy magistrates and registrars could assist, that large lineages should be enrolled first to bind neighborhoods together, and that public reading of the law could be combined with militia drill and community granaries for mutual benefit. The throne ordered the governors of the metropolitan provinces to investigate local conditions and implement the plan as they saw fit. In another memorial on balancing income and expenditure he urged honesty over window-dressing and singled out three measures—audits, voluntary contributions, and interest-bearing reserves; and he asked that tax-collection districts be redrawn where needed and that prefects and magistrates be ordered, under threat of disciplinary liability, to press collection vigorously. The Board of Revenue was instructed to review the proposal. In the fifth year (1855), when word spread that the emperor would soon visit the tombs though no formal notice had been issued, Jichen memorialized that the counties south of the capital had been flooded, that years of war had only just eased, and that the people needed rest—he begged a one-year postponement. The emperor replied that the annual tomb visit was a ritual obligation, but that if the capital region could not bear the burden, the court would weigh the times and defer the ceremony. This time no edict had even fixed a date for the visit; Zong Jichen had merely guessed and spoken up, winning a reputation for bold remonstrance without any real grounds. Such posturing must not be encouraged! The case was sent to the appropriate ministry for disciplinary action. He soon memorialized again: "Since the Taiping rebels seized the Yangtze, able commanders—civil or military—have been scarce for years. Generals like Ulanga, Taqibu, and Jiang Zhongyuan were irreplaceable, yet the court often failed to use them fully, and they died in the field. Sheng Bao, Zhang Liangji, and Yuan Jiasan were all willing to take responsibility, yet they too were underused and removed on criminal charges. Lately the two Hu provinces have been held up chiefly by a few scholar-officials—Hu Linyi and Luo Zinan—who drilled their men in courage and led from the front. Both owed their start to Zeng Guofan's example. Opening a civil-military examination track now would truly meet the emergency, yet officials hesitate to recommend talent—fearing blame if the nominee proves mediocre, and futility if fortune turns against him. In a crisis that should wring every brow, they cling to routine; at every defeat they blame empty coffers. Funds must be found, but without capable commanders a million in silver is worthless as dust. My own horizon is limited and I cannot know every worthy man in the empire, but in Hunan there is Zuo Zongtang—flexible, decisive, and already indispensable to provincial governors. Given an independent command he would rank with Hu Linyi and Luo Zinan. Repeatedly recommended yet reluctant to push forward, Yao Chengyu of Huzhou combines moral courage with classical learning and is genuinely employable. Men of deep strategic insight include Zhou Tenghu and Guan Yan of Changzhou and Tang Qihua of Guilin—all engaged with public affairs, yet still living in obscurity on their farms. If the court would break precedent and recruit such men in clusters, one worthy could pacify several prefectures and a handful could secure an entire war zone. Even with the Yangtze in rebel hands, divided campaigns could still win the day and bring the rebellion to a swift end. I beg Your Majesty to order every official, inside and outside the capital, to nominate men he knows—serving or not—who truly combine civil and military gifts, and to summon them to office. In that way the court could gather every capable man in the land. When the memorial arrived, the throne ordered the governors to examine Zuo Zongtang and the others and send them to the capital for audience. Zuo Zongtang was thus brought to the court's attention, and contemporaries praised Jichen for recognizing talent. He was promoted to supervising secretary. Large-denomination cash was then in circulation in the capital, to the merchants' and people's distress. Jichen memorialized to restore standard copper coinage under the name "ancestral cash," while large coins would be cast in iron only, with both kinds circulating side by side. The relevant ministry deliberated, but the proposal was rejected. He also memorialized for emergency relief when the capital region flooded, and the court agreed. He was soon appointed intendant of the Shandong grain-transport circuit. When Nian rebels crossed the border he built fortified walls along the Niutou River at Jining—6,300 zhang on the north bank and 8,600 on the south—which held the line. For this service he received the brevet rank of salt-transport commissioner. In the sixth year of Tongzhi (1867) he retired on grounds of illness and died soon after. Jichen's father Peizheng had been magistrate of Lingling in Hunan and died leaving nothing beyond an honest name. Jichen was devoted to his mother. In scholarship he followed Wang Yangming and Liu Zongzhou. After leaving office he directed the Longshan Academy in Yuyao and the Jishan Academy in Shanyin. While at court he petitioned for a shrine to Brigadier Ge Yunfei in Ge's home district; and in Shandong he had Fang Xiaoru's shrine restored and the Correct Learning collection carved for printing—typical of his efforts to uphold moral culture. Yin Gengyun. Yin Gengyun, style name Xingnong, came from Taoyuan in Jiangsu. He passed the jinshi examination in the thirtieth year of Daoguang (1850), entered the Ministry of Rites as a director, and was later promoted to bureau director. In the fifth year of Xianfeng (1855), when Taiping forces threatened the capital region, Prince Hui Mianyu was named commander-in-chief with Sengge Rinchen as his deputy. Gengyun joined the staff, wrote on defense, and won the attention of the Xianfeng Emperor. In the eighth year (1858) he was appointed Huguang circuit censor and acted as supervising secretary of the Revenue Section. Troubled times kept him submitting several memorials a month. Zhili governor-general Ne'erjing'e had been dismissed for losing the frontier, then was brought back to office. Gengyun memorialized: "Ne'erjing'e's failures are notorious, and no one understands why he has been reappointed. With war still raging along the Yangtze, Huai, Chu, and Yu fronts, field commanders are everywhere. They risk their lives because they are loyal—but also because the dynasty's record of reward and punishment commands their respect. If others follow his example and the armies lose heart, the consequences are unthinkable. Under the Daoguang Emperor, Qishan had been reappointed but was dismissed after Chen Qingyong remonstrated. I beg Your Majesty to follow that precedent and revoke the appointment." When the Taiping forces again threatened Wuhan, Gengyun wrote that Wuhan commanded the upper Yangtze—overlooking Shaanxi to the north, menacing Hunan and Hubei to the south, threatening Jiangsu and Zhejiang to the east, and holding Sichuan to the west—and that every north-south war in history had been fought to the death for this position. The rebels now probed northern Hubei, raided Guangji and Huanggang, and closed on the provincial capital. Governor Hu Linyi had only a few thousand men—far too few—and could not cover the long river line at once. Vice President Zeng Guofan is loyal, brave, and steadfast; he should be named imperial commissioner to lead his own troops to relieve Hubei—no other choice would achieve so much so quickly." When the rebels took Dingyuan, Gengyun warned that the Taiping and Nian armies had joined forces and would surely drive north, using Shandong as their shield. Governor Chong'en was lucky the rebels had not slaughtered officials or held the city; when they withdrew he filed false victory reports and papered over the truth to deceive his superiors; outwardly he squeezed the people dry. I beg Your Majesty to remember how vital this frontier province is, dismiss Chong'en at once, and send a senior replacement. Recruit more river forces at Hong Lake, and order Fu Zhenbang's entire army to garrison Guzhen and Lingbi in hopes of recovering northern Anhui and securing Shandong." When Luzhou fell as well, he memorialized again that the province had once been seated at Anqing, forming a triangle with Jiujiang and Nanjing to control the Yangtze. Moving the seat to Luzhou last year had already sacrificed the strategic advantage; now even Luzhou was lost. While Hu Linyi pressed Jiujiang from Wuhan, Anhui rebels might strike into Hubei from Yingshan and Huoshan to tie down the upper river, or raid western Zhejiang from Huizhou and Shexian to threaten the interior. Our armies were scattered on rescue missions and exhausted from constant marching. The rebels could move in every direction while we could not close three sides of them; capturing a city a day would do little good. Governor Fuji's repeated defeats had ruined his authority; Yuan Jiasan, an expectant capital official, enjoyed the people's trust and would throw himself into service if appointed governor." When Zeng Guofan marched, Gengyun wrote that since the war began half the empire had been mobilized and tens of millions spent, yet the rebel leadership remained at large—chiefly because the court had repeatedly been late and lost its chances. Now Zeng Guofan had trained elite troops and was winning wherever he fought. Chen Yucheng and Zhang Luoxing had massed hundreds of thousands of hardened rebels at Qianshan and Taihu—ten times Zeng's numbers. The slightest mistake would be catastrophic. Rebel forces at Luzhou, Fengyang, and Liuhe must now be thin. Order Yuan Jiasan and Zhang Guoliang to strike their bases on a fixed schedule, forcing them to turn back, or send them by side routes to support Zeng's army—either move would break the rebels' nerve." In another memorial he impeached Grand Canal director-general Gengchang and asked that Yuan Jiasan hold the post concurrently; he argued that pacification alone would not suffice against the Yunnan Hui rebels; he laid out a comprehensive capital relief program covering fair-price grain sales, procurement, relief, and reserves; and he exposed long-standing abuses in the currency system. Most of these proposals were adopted. When British and French forces attacked Tianjin together, Gengyun filed seven solo memorials and joined two joint ones, all urging war to the finish. The emperor convened the princes and senior ministers to deliberate. He clashed with Prince Zheng Duanhua and the peace party, argued fiercely, wept, and the council adjourned without agreement. Gengyun had once been valued by Sushun in the Ministry of Rites; for that very reason Sushun now turned against him. In the ninth year (1859) the examination scandal broke. Censors faced disciplinary review for failing to investigate, but Gengyun alone was heavily punished for having served as palace examiner—demoted two ranks and transferred. In the tenth year (1860), with the capital under martial law and the emperor preparing to flee to Rehe, Gengyun drafted a remonstrance for the defense commissioner and wrote personally to Sushun, but neither appeal was heard. Vice President Wenxiang, commanding the Nine Gates, met Gengyun in the eastern city. They embraced and wept, and Gengyun outlined plans for holding Beijing during the emperor's absence. Hu Linyi memorialized that Gengyun had real strategic talent and asked that he be recalled to service. Vice Censor-in-chief Mao Changxi, organizing Henan militia, then requested Gengyun's transfer to his staff. In the first year of Tongzhi (1862) he led five thousand men with Sengge Rinchen against the sect rebels at Jinlou Stockade, then with Brigadier Zhang Yao captured the Nian base at Zhanggang. He was noted for promotion to intendant and awarded the peacock feather. In the third year (1864) he served as acting intendant of the Henan-Shaanxi-Ru circuit. The western expedition bought grain at Shanzhou, but when local measures fell short the counties were forced to make up millions of jin in grain. Gengyun had every such levy cancelled. He executed guest troops who broke the law as a public warning. Banditry was rife in his jurisdiction. Granted command over Henan and Shaanxi troops and paying rations on time, he brought the soldiers firmly under control. In the fourth year (1865), when Zhang Zongyu raided the capital region, Gengyun marched with Governor Li Henian to Cizhou and proposed a long encirclement to cut off the rebels' retreat. Twice acting as grain-and-salt intendant, he helped manage postwar recovery, dredged the Huiji River, and sealed river breaches. For this he received the brevet rank of provincial administration commissioner. In the thirteenth year (1874) he received regular appointment to the Henan-Shaanxi-Ru intendant post. Corvée in Henan and Shaanxi weighed almost as heavily as regular taxes. Gengyun fixed the regulations, enforced audits strictly, and the people found some relief. In the third year of Guangxu (1877), during a severe drought, he submitted seven famine-relief measures, but died in office before they could be implemented. Gengyun was famed for blunt memorials as a censor. As a provincial official, Governors Zhang Zhiwan and Li Henian relied on him heavily for military planning. After his death, Governor Li Qing'ao was impeached over famine relief and implicated in false military-pay claims that touched Gengyun's name, but Gengyun was eventually cleared. Wang Zheng. Wang Zheng, originally named Xizhen, style name Dingfu, came from Maping in Guangxi. He passed the jinshi examination in the twenty-first year of Daoguang (1841), entered the Ministry of Revenue as a director, and served on the Grand Council staff. When Grand Secretary Sai Shang'a took command in Guangxi, Zheng accompanied him and, stirred by the crisis, resolved to speak out. During the Xianfeng reign he rose from bureau director to vice president of the Court of Judicial Review. In the second year of Tongzhi (1863), the surrendered Nian leader Song Jingshi came back from Shaanxi to raid Zhili and Shandong. Zheng wrote that Jingshi's fortified stockade at Gangtun was a rebel stronghold in all but name, that his following since returning from Shaanxi numbered only a few hundred, yet Chonghou and others had repeatedly indulged him until his coerced following swelled past ten thousand. Lately in Changyi, Shen, Liaocheng, and Linqing he had villages split their wheat harvests with tenants and send the grain to Gangtun. Though nominally surrendered, his actions grew ever more defiant. I beg a secret order to Zhili governor Liu Changyou to lure him to camp, expose his crimes, and put him to death. If he refuses, Zhili troops can still cross the border to attack him. Once Jingshi is gone, ringleaders such as Yang Pengling and Cheng Shunshu can be executed together, removing the chief menace and securing the capital region." The memorial was received but not acted on. Jingshi was eventually executed for rebellion. While the war continued, Zeng Guofan proposed raising funds in Guangdong; Lao Chongguang introduced the lijin transit tax, and abuses multiplied. Zheng memorialized that the two Guang provinces, where the rebellion had begun, still saw Cenxi and Rongxian held by rebels for years on end. Chen Jingang of Xinyi was the worst of them; the rebel bands acted as one and spread in ways hard to suppress. Lao Chongguang's lijin scheme typically forced gentry and merchants to contract and advance payments—a desperate expedient that could not last. After Chongguang left office, collections fell sharply. Lately lijin commissioners had been beaten by mobs or put in the cangue by villagers. The people were unruly, but the officials' conduct spoke for itself. In a province long torn by war, with rebels still entrenched, squeezing every source of revenue by a hundred means may yield ten parts of profit and a hundred parts of harm. If the two Guang provinces collapsed again, the court would not know where to turn—let alone collect lijin." He recommended Guangdong circuit intendant Tang Qiyin, Lianghuai grain commissioner Guo Songtao, and Zhejiang grain commissioner Cheng Sunyi. Guo Songtao was soon appointed to supervise Guangdong lijin on the strength of Zheng's memorial. In the third year (1864) he was promoted to president of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices and acted as left vice censor-in-chief. He wrote that the ministers in charge of foreign affairs—Chonglun, Hengqi, Dong Xun, and Xue Huan—were petty and contemptible, as everyone knew. Foreign powers might conclude that China's senior officials were no better, to the dynasty's shame. Even if talent were scarce and the Zongli Yamen needed staff, the emperor should curb such men—assign sinecures or empty titles—so foreign powers would respect China's standards of rank. The empire would then understand that the court meant to embrace all parties while keeping foreigners on a leash." He was soon promoted to commissioner of the Transmission Office while continuing to act as left vice censor-in-chief. He memorialized that Suzhou and Hangzhou had fallen in turn and that Zhili and the east were pacified. Enterprises nearing success, I observe, are never settled without utmost caution. Jinling might fall within three or four months, but Danyang and Changzhou supported each other, and veterans like Li Xiucheng massed there for a last stand. With Hangzhou and Jiaxing taken, the remnants concentrated at Huzhou. Rebels fleeing southern Anhui into Jiangxi spread across two or three hundred li around Yushan, Qianshan, Jinxi, and Jianchang—eighty or ninety thousand by report—with some crossing into Fujian. Li Shixian was said to be leading a large force through Chun'an and Suian. Zeng Guofan and Zuo Zongtang had long urged patience, yet on the Anhui-Zhejiang border they disagreed: Zeng wanted separate garrisons at Huizhou and Ningguo, while Zuo preferred a combined strike on Guangde to block the rebels' escape. Before the two plans could be settled, the rebels had already broken from Anhui into Jiangxi. Long accustomed to guerrilla war and too numerous to encircle, the rebels often could not be destroyed wholesale without letting some escape. Because they were numerous and aggressive, they drove forward relentlessly—before one column could be crushed, another followed. If they penetrated deep into Jiangxi, dying embers could flare again into a prairie fire. From Jiangxi through Fujian they could reach Tingzhou and Chaozhou by a route rebels had used for years. Huang Wenjin had come this way; Shi Dakai had gone this way—a lesson the court should heed. Imperial orders had repeatedly warned Zeng Guofan, Zuo Zongtang, Li Hongzhang, Shen Baozhen, and the Fujian and Guangdong governors to stand ready. With final victory near, all commanders must act as one—blocking ahead and pursuing behind—so that fleeing bands are battered wherever they go, grow weaker daily, and cannot regroup into a new catastrophe. I would add that the Anhui and Zhejiang armies have fought a long war; Zeng and Zuo have each raised funds in the Yangtze and Chu provinces. Zeng had established a central lijin office in Jiangsu, dedicating that province's levies to feeding his hundred thousand Anhui troops. Zhejiang's army could spare nothing; even Zeng's monthly pay was said to be issued only in part. Guangdong lijin was sought in desperation but could not be collected quickly. It is human nature that people think locally and act for themselves. Guangdong feels this way; would Jiangxi be any different? Shen Baozhen had recently asked that Jiangxi keep its tea tax and broker lijin; the ministry allowed half to remain in the province—a concession Zeng would surely accept. But troops at the front, fighting in hope of victory, might lose heart if pay were cut—how could they fight on full stomachs and high spirits? I propose ordering the governors of Jiangxi, Anhui, Hunan-Hubei, and Guangdong that, urgent as the moment is, they must strain every resource and cooperate wholeheartedly. Hui unrest in Gansu was not yet settled; Nian remnants lingered in the central provinces; Chen Daxi of Runan had fled into Hubei and threatened Xiangyang and Fancheng from Suizhou and Zaoyang; Zhang Zongyu had broken from the Nantai mountains into Henan and Zhejiang, with fear they might join forces; while Hanzhong rebels had poured into Ningxia, Shaanxi, and Shangzhou and were said to be massing at Xiangyang and Fancheng to relieve Jinling—a threat not to be ignored. Shaanxi's war effort was fragmented. Li Yunlin had pursued rebels in Shangyu, then marched west; at Xing'an he failed to stop their escape; at Hanyin he avoided battle while his men looted. He should be reined in. Liu Rong was a scholar of real ambition charged with Hanzhong, yet rebels ranged everywhere. He must vow to destroy them or fail his charge. Duo Long'a had enjoyed the highest reputation as China's foremost general, yet lately his standing had slipped; the court should issue a stern reminder. Lei Zhengwan won wherever he fought and could hold an independent command, but he lacked upright officials in Gansu to support him. Lanzhou and Qingyang were now cut off. Enlin held the governor's seal in proxy—a man fit only for errands, with poor judgment; while Xilin held Qingyang and Ningxia but was misled by Qingyun's repeated blunders. I urge the prompt appointment of a capable, upright minister to restore order. Peace across the empire is not yet at hand, but as north and south quiet down, settling the west would bring a broad measure of order. The court is the root of the realm: clarity and discipline at the center resonate with vigor in the field. The tide is turning, yet grave difficulties remain. Some may prematurely declare the times settled and secure. People love novelty yet cling to habit, fear hardship yet chase gain—only the sincere statesman who grasps the moment can see this clearly and warn against it. Zhuge Liang was the greatest man since antiquity, yet history praised him above all for caution. Zhu Xi warned Emperor Xiaozong of Song: 'If the poison of ease and comfort grows day by day, the resolve to sleep on brushwood and taste gall will fade and be forgotten. I cannot restrain my private anxiety and venture these views too freely." The memorial was received and acknowledged. He soon retired and died. Mu Jixianga. Mu Jixianga, style name Junan, was a Manchu of the Bordered Red Banner. He rose from director in the Ministry of Works to bureau director. In the fourth year of Tongzhi (1865) he was appointed Shandong circuit censor. He memorialized for careful selection of eunuchs, noting that the emperor had come to the throne young, that his learning advanced daily, and that attendants at his side should be chosen with care lest they later mislead him. From the late Han through the Ming, half the court's failures had come from eunuchs. Eunuchs begin with petty loyalty and quick flattery, all to secure favor and advancement. Once their factions formed, they grew arrogant and controlled their superiors; even enlightened rulers sometimes could not remove them. Officials and people gnashed their teeth in hatred yet could do nothing. Our dynasty's emperors, surpassing all predecessors, forbade eunuchs not only from politics but even from familiar speech in daily attendance, blocking slander and flattery at the source. For more than two hundred years they had never been a scourge. Yet even such strict guard could not banish every fear. Even in the Jiaqing palace attack of 1813 some eunuchs had aided rebels—proof of their treachery. The empress dowager now ruled from behind the curtain, understood these abuses, and guarded against petty men who might mislead the court. She knew men and used them well; the court was orderly and clean. When the emperor takes power in a few years he will surely not favor them to the ruin of state affairs—why must officials fret so anxiously? Yet my earnest concern could not be suppressed. This is a time when the emperor's learning is expanding; though officials serve him well, eunuchs especially require careful choice. Eunuchs exist only to run errands and take orders; young, quick-witted men must never attend the emperor constantly. I beg the empress dowager to choose loyal, upright, mature men to attend the emperor day and night, so that when he rules in person he will not be misled—and his boundless virtue will rest on this foundation!" In the fifth year (1866) he memorialized that Grand Secretary Zeng Guofan's Nian campaign had dragged on without success and asked that Zeng be censured. The emperor noted that Zeng had repeatedly accepted blame and was ordered back to supply duty; though he had not finished the campaign, he had not ruined the war effort. The memorial was dismissed as excessive. He was sent out as prefect of Puzhou in Shanxi and died soon after. Mu Jixianga was deeply versed in state affairs; his family held court gazettes from the dynasty's founding in near-complete runs. You Baichuan. You Baichuan, style name Huidong, came from Binzhou in Shandong. He passed the jinshi examination in the first year of Tongzhi (1862), entered the Hanlin Academy, and was appointed compiler. In the sixth year (1867) he was promoted to censor and patrolled the western city. Imperial clansmen such as Kuanhe had acted lawlessly; he impeached them, and for a time the privileged elite held their tongues. In the seventh year (1868), when Nian rebels fled from Shandong into Zhili, Baichuan urged swift suppression and a ban on opium cultivation in every province. The emperor adopted both proposals. He exposed long-standing abuses by clerks in government offices, and the throne ordered a strict ban empire-wide. He added that eliminating clerk abuses required purifying official conduct and, above all, reviving the morale of the scholar-official class. He asked ministry chiefs to select several able men in each bureau, give them real authority, and hold them accountable. If clerks were found corrupt, they should report the facts; merit should still be judged by diligence or sloth. With clear rewards and punishments, capable men would rise of themselves. Provincial officials already had power to punish clerks; governors must be ordered to match men to posts, not trial men in unsuitable places. Recommend the worthy and impeach the unworthy; appoint upright inspectors to tour on schedule and memorialize on every corrupt official or predatory clerk they find. The Yellow River had shifted north, and Shandong prefectures and counties suffered repeated flooding. Baichuan memorialized for relief. River director Wenbin and Governor Ding Baozhen asked to restore the old Huai–Xu channel, and the court ordered a ministerial debate. Baichuan wrote that the Yellow River might flow south or north, but the court must settle on one coherent policy. If the old course were restored, three questions could not be rushed: using the Daqing River as the main channel would require widening the bed beyond what the old course could hold—how would farmland and homes be moved and resettled? Land surveys must come first; even widened, the channel might not suffice, and branch streams such as Tuhai, Mabang, Goupan, and Gejin would likely be needed—each opening must be weighed for benefit and harm; northward diversion would be unprecedented; mishandling it could stir public unrest and fierce debate—timing must be handled with care. He asked that a senior minister survey the entire river course before any final decision." In the twelfth year (1886) the emperor assumed personal rule and ordered repairs to the Old Summer Palace for the empress dowager's residence. Censor Shen Huai asked to defer repairs. The emperor proclaimed his filial duty to both palaces: only the Palace of Imperial Peace would be restored for ancestral portraits and the empress dowager's residence and offices, with strict economy and no extravagance elsewhere. Baichuan remonstrated again. Summoned and rebuked by the emperor, he spoke frankly without yielding. The emperor was moved, and his reputation for bold remonstrance spread through the court. He soon went home for mourning; after the mourning period he returned to office and was promoted to supervising secretary. In the fifth year of Guangxu (1879) he became Hunan's Heng-Yong-Chen-Gui intendant, then Sichuan provincial judge, then metropolitan prefect of Shuntian, then vice president of the Granary and Storage Board. In the ninth year (1883) a Shandong river breach flooded dozens of counties. Baichuan was sent to join Governor Chen Shijie in relief and repair work. Baichuan rode through Henan's north and south banks and the river's upper and lower reaches, distributing emergency relief first. They jointly proposed outer dikes on both banks and inner thread dikes within them to contain the Yellow River; and dredging the Xiaoqing River to divert Yellow River water to the sea. The court approved. Back in the capital, he was dismissed after the granaries burned. He lived in retirement several years and died. (Supplement) Shen Huai. Shen Huai, style name Dongchuan, came from Yin county in Zhejiang. He earned his juren degree in the twenty-ninth year of Daoguang (1849), entered the Grand Secretariat as a secretary, and served on the Grand Council staff. In the tenth year of Xianfeng (1860), when the Xianfeng Emperor fled to Rehe, Huai could not accompany him and wept so bitterly he tried to throw himself into a well; his family stopped him. He rose through the Ministry of Justice to assistant department director and was appointed Shaanxi circuit censor. He impeached Revenue director Yang Hongdian for grasping power and taking bribes. The case went to the Ministry of Justice, but Yang was only lightly demoted until Yan Jingming became minister and secured his dismissal. When palace repairs began, Huai filed the first remonstrance and was famed alongside Baichuan. In the first year of Guangxu (1875) he supervised the Shuntian provincial examination despite illness and died soon after leaving the examination compound. His family had been comfortably off, but he sold nearly everything he owned during his years in the capital. People admired his integrity all the more. Commentary: In wartime opportunities shift constantly; capital officials who argue from rumor often miss the mark. Zong Jichen stressed finding the right men; Yin Gengyun judged generals' failures; Wang Zheng urged frontier officials to cooperate and focus on defeating rebels—they saw the larger picture. Zheng was the most thorough, for he sat on the Grand Council and read military reports rather than rumor. Mu Jixianga urged careful choice of eunuchs; You Baichuan and others blocked Old Summer Palace repairs. Their reputations for blunt remonstrance were well earned.