← Back to 宋史

卷一百七十六 志第一百二十九 食貨上四

Volume 176 Treatises 129: Finance and Economics 1d

Chapter 176 of 宋史 · History of Song
← Previous Chapter
Chapter 176
Next Chapter →
1
Finance and Economics, Part Four (Military Colonies, Ever-Normal Granaries, and Charity Granaries))
2
西 便 西使便
In earlier dynasties, wherever armies were posted, favorable ground was turned into military colonies and garrison farms to cut the cost of supplying the troops. When Emperor Taizong of Song marched against the Khitan with an eye to Yan and Ji, the frontier was thrown open and the Hebei region was unsettled year after year. Farming and weaving collapsed, idle land accumulated in the prefectures and counties, and border garrisons only grew larger. East of Xiongzhou as far as the sea lay extensive flooded ground that checked the Khitan and kept them from raiding freely; but from Shun'an Army west to Beiping for two hundred li the country was flat and open, and the invaders usually came in along that corridor every year. Advisers argued that the land should be surveyed for height and slope, waterways and roads used to advantage, fields laid out, canals dug, and the five grains planted more widely—thereby stocking the border granaries and blocking the enemy cavalry. In 989, Chen Shu and Fan Zhigu were appointed to organize garrison farms on the eastern and western Hebei circuits respectively; Chen Shu argued forcefully in audience that the plan was ill-advised. A few days into their mission an edict came ordering them instead to repair fortifications and clear waterways, and the garrison-farm scheme was dropped. About the same time Zhang Qixian, prefect of Daizhou, was told to organize garrison farms across Hedong, but that effort was soon abandoned as well.
3
使西 沿使
He Chengju, commissioner of the Six Residences, proposed diverting the Yi River west of Shun'an Stockade and building dikes for military-colony fields. Floods then struck the Hebei region year after year. When He became prefect of Xiongzhou he urged storing the floodwater in ponds and developing rice paddies on a large scale to feed the region. About then Huang Mao of Fujian, magistrate of Linjin in Cangzhou, memorialized: "In Fujian we grow only wet rice, channeling springs down from the hills at twice the usual labor. Here in Hebei the garrisons already have many ponds. Irrigating from them would take less work and succeed quickly; within three to five years both the state and the people would profit greatly." The court ordered He Chengju to inspect the ground and report; his memorial confirmed Huang Mao's assessment. He Chengju was then appointed commissioner for border military colonies in Hebei, with Huang Mao as his assistant judge from the Court of Judicial Review, and eighteen thousand troops from the border garrisons were assigned to the project. Dikes six hundred li long were built across Xiong, Mo, Bazhou, Pingrong, Shun'an, and neighboring commands, with sluice gates installed to draw water from the Baiyang Marshes for irrigation. The first year's rice planting was ruined by an early frost. Huang Mao noted that late rice ripens in the ninth month: Hebei frosts early though the soil warms slowly, whereas early rice in the lower Yangtze ripens in the seventh month. He brought seed from the south and had it planted under quota; that year the rice ripened in the eighth month. When He Chengju first proposed the scheme, many spoke against it; and career officers, bred for combat, were ashamed to be put to building and ditch work. After the failed rice crop opposition swelled, and the whole project nearly collapsed. He Chengju then sent several cartloads of rice ears to the capital by official courier, and the critics fell silent. The wetlands also yielded rich harvests of reeds, rushes, and shellfish on which the people came to depend.
4
宿 使 祿
Chen Yaosou and other fiscal commissioners of the Revenue Section also argued: "From Han through Tang, Chen, Xu, Deng, Ying, Cai, Su, Bo, and as far as Shouchun had been brought under cultivation by water control—the evidence is still there. Officials should be chosen to reopen military colonies on a large scale, restore the waterways, and assign scattered troops from the Jiang-Huai commands plus recruited civilians to the work. State funds would buy oxen and tools, canals would be dug, and protective dikes built. Each colony would hold ten men, each with one ox and fifty mu under cultivation. The ancient allotment was one hundred mu per man; for the present half that would suffice, and the full measure could be restored in time. At roughly three hu per mu, annual yield would reach one hundred fifty thousand hu; twenty colonies across the seven prefectures would produce three million hu, and further expansion in a few years could fill the granaries and spare the Jiang-Huai grain convoys. Unopened private land would be planted by the state; unreclaimed public land would be opened by recruited tenants; and the annual levy would follow the usual landlord-tenant shares. Master Fu wrote: "Dry farming hangs on the weather: no matter how hard men work, untimely flood or drought wastes a year's effort. Wet rice depends on human labor; where labor is steady, the land's full yield can be had." Insect damage is lighter than on dry land, and once wet fields are in order the return is twice as great." The emperor approved the memorial and sent Huangfu Xuan and He Liang on fast courier to survey the ground, but the plan was never executed.
5
調
During the Xianping period, Wang Zongdan asked that civilians be recruited to farm fifteen hundred qing of pond and waste land in Yingzhou. Over three hundred households answered the call; an edict exempted them from corvée until rent and tax came due. The scheme brought little practical gain. Ruzhou had once maintained the Luonan Office, where palace-garden troops grew rice; it was abolished in 985 and the land given to civilians, but now it was restored under a capital official appointed to run it. More than two hundred tenant households supplied their own oxen; group leaders were appointed; six hundred qing were opened; the Ru River was channeled for irrigation; and the annual harvest reached twenty-three thousand shi. In Xiangyang county dikes on the Chun River had long diverted water into the official canal to irrigate three thousand qing of private fields; the Man River at Yicheng county watered seven hundred qing; and there were more than three hundred qing of military-colony land besides. Prefect Geng Wang of Xiangzhou asked to add waste land to the old sites and set up upper, middle, and lower garrison-farm offices. Five hundred laborers built dikes and weirs; two hundred troops from neighboring commands were assigned to each office; and seven hundred oxen were bought in Jing-Hu and issued to them. That year more than three hundred qing of rice were planted.
6
西使 使使
In 1001 Liu Zong, Shaanxi transport commissioner, also urged establishing Zhenrong Army at old Yuanzhou with military colonies. The army already consumed over four hundred thousand shi and bundles of fodder and grain a year, costing some five hundred thousand in tea and salt equivalents; forcing distant civilians to haul supplies would only add to the burden. He proposed military-colony offices around the garrison, five hundred qing opened to cultivation, two thousand lower-army troops and eight hundred oxen assigned to farm them; and stockades before and behind the city and north to Mukou Pass, garrisoning the men so they would farm in peace and fight when raiders came. The army commander would serve as colony commissioner, choose envoys to supervise the four stockades, and assign five hundred colony troops to each. The court approved. Yuan and Wei prefectures soon opened square fields as well, and tribesmen who submitted were able to settle securely.
7
西 調
As military costs mounted, any proposal for military or garrison farms brought orders for border officials to plan and execute it. Ma Ji, military superintendent of Shun'an Army, proposed damming the Bao River east of Jingrong Army, cutting a canal into Shun'an and Weilu, and establishing land and water garrison farms along it. Shi Pu, deployment commander of Mozhou, was put in charge; the work took more than a year. Zhao Bin, prefect of Baozhou, also proposed tapping Jiju Spring and diverting the Xu River south from the prefecture west to Pucheng into the transport canal, with extensive land and water military colonies; Wang Zhaoxun, stationed fleet superintendent, was ordered to help finish the work. Dingzhou then established military colonies as well. In 1002 the lower garrison-farm office at Xiangzhou was abolished. In 1003 Geng Wang asked for a similar office at Zheyang Pond in Tangzhou; more than seventy qing were planted yearly under the Fangcheng magistrate and staff, with corvée labor for hoeing and harvest.
8
西使 使
Early in the Jingde period, at the request of Zhang Xun, western capital transport commissioner, an edict forbade drafting garrison-farm troops for corvée. In 1005 border commands with military or garrison farms were told that their chief officials would concurrently oversee all such farms; existing special commissioners were left in place. In 1016 the garrison-farm offices at Baozhou and Shun'an Army were renamed military-colony offices; supervisors and clerks were posted to all nine border commands. Huainan and the two Zhe circuits had once had military colonies too, but most land was later assigned to civilians for rent while the names alone survived. In Hebei the colonies still functioned, but annual revenue was slight; the real benefit was impounding water to block enemy cavalry. By the end of the Tianxi era colonies nationwide totaled over forty-two hundred qing; Hebei yielded over twenty-nine thousand four hundred shi a year, more than half from Baozhou alone.
9
使 調
After the Xiang and Tang garrison farms were abolished, transport commissioner Xu Ti restored them during the Jingde period. At first Geng Wang borrowed tenants' oxen and drafted labor for hoeing and harvest, and revenue was substantial. Zhang Xun later changed the rules, recruiting wetland tenants to farm in shares; Xu Ti added troops to the mix; in time little profit remained. In 1026 Liu Hanjie of the Ministry of Revenue's Colony Section was sent to inspect. He reported: "Since restoration, Xiangzhou had produced over three hundred thirty thousand shi of grain, worth more than ninety thousand strings; Tangzhou over sixty thousand shi, worth more than twenty thousand strings. But pay, rations, official oxen, and overhead had cost Xiangzhou over one hundred thirty thousand strings and Tangzhou over forty thousand—the accounts showed a net loss. An edict abolished the farms and gave the land to poor civilians at half tax for a period.
10
西 使
When war broke out in Shaanxi the transport office was told to find spare land for garrison farms to ease frontier costs; pasture at Shazhou in Tongzhou was also lent for the purpose; but Fan Yong of Yongxing Army's roundup of oxen from many prefectures caused such trouble that the scheme was soon dropped. Right Rectifier Tian Kuang proposed: "Zhenrong, Yuan, and Wei cover hundreds of li that were once farmland but lie idle. Garrison farms could be opened there; Baojie troops unfit for battle could farm in groups of five hundred per stockade under one farm officer per two or three stockades, sowing on schedule and drilling in the farming slack season. The memorial was ignored. Later Xia Anqi and others of the Three Departments were ordered to plan border-wide military colonies, but nothing came of it.
11
西
In 1066 Hebei military colonies covered three hundred sixty-seven qing and yielded thirty-five thousand four hundred sixty-eight shi. Early in the Xining reforms the eunuch Li Ruoyu was made co-superintendent of Hebei military colonies. In 1070 Wang Shao reported: "From Weiyuan city down to Chengjii in Qinzhou along the river for five or six hundred li lie at least ten thousand qing of good land lying fallow; working one thousand qing would yield three hundred thousand hu a year. Prefect Li Shizhong of Qinzhou objected: "Shao means land on the extreme frontier where mounted archers are being recruited; Qinzhou will only see more trouble. The court sent Wang Kechen and others to inspect; they agreed with Li Shizhong. Shen Qi was consulted next and reported: "I cannot tell which land Shao means. Even if it exists, calling in settlers to farm may alarm the western Tibetans. Censor Xie Jingwen said: "I hear that Shen Qi falsely cited Gangu city archer land to discredit Shao." Dou Shunqing memorialized: "In fact there is only one qing and forty-three mu of idle land." The Secretariat said: "Qi never pointed to Gangu city land to substantiate Shao's memorial, while Shizhong and Shao had long traded accusations in Qinzhou, each with some justice on his side." Shao was demoted from Assistant Archivist to military judge of Baoping Army for falsely claiming idle land; Shizhong lost his pending appointment as well. Later Han Zhen as prefect of Qinzhou reported over four thousand qing of unclaimed archer land at Guwei Stockade. Shao's rank was restored and his proposal approved. The next year the Hebei Military Colony Office reported that even in a good year revenue did not cover costs. Border land and water colony offices were abolished, the land rented to civilians, and the troops reassigned as prefectural garrison soldiers.
12
西 使
Much of Shaanxi still lay uncultivated while garrisons could not be reduced and distant regions bore heavy transport costs. Zhao Xu, prefect of Yanzhou, asked to recruit civilians to farm and ease the court's burden; the proposal was referred for action. Pacification commissioner Guo Kui replied that the hundred li around Huaining Stockade was already allotted to mounted archers and no idle land remained. Zhao Xu persisted; a land survey found over fifteen thousand qing; nearly five thousand Han and tribal troops were recruited in eight commands; and Xu was promoted and rewarded with gold and silks. Wang Shao of Xizhou also asked to recruit mounted archers on river-valley land near Hezhou cities and tribal archers on hillsides—five commands per stockade, two hundred fifty men each, one qing per man, two for tribal officers, three for senior tribal officers. The Xi-He region had abundant good land; in 1074 Zheng Minxian, Qinfeng circuit penal intendant, was ordered to open garrison farms and allowed to recruit staff by memorial.
13
使 仿 便 調 便
Councilor of State Wu Chong wrote: "Military colonies are hard to run today. In antiquity each man held one hundred mu plus ten mu of public field; better to adapt the ancient aid-field system to the mounted archers. The four Xi-He prefectures had at least fifteen thousand qing; a tenth as public fields, at roughly one shi per mu in an average year, would yield one hundred fifty thousand shi. The state would avoid colony barracks, oxen, tools, and ration costs; use popular labor without overburdening the people; suffer no loss in famine years; save transport costs; and stabilize grain prices—six advantages in all. Zheng Minxian, penal intendant, said: "Under the founding emperors military colonies used troops and garrison farms used civilians, each with its own office—the two systems had always differed. Yet at Xiangzhou the garrison farm drafted corvée labor and still drew troops from neighboring prefectures, so garrison farms were never staffed by civilians alone; On the frontier, garrison colonies made no distinction between soldier and civilian and pressed both into service, so military colonies likewise were never manned by troops alone; Where mounted archers could not fill the quota, civilians were recruited as well; soldiers and civilians were jumbled together, and in practice the two systems amounted to the same thing. In repeated trials the policy brought encroachments on private fields, forced loans of weeding labor, county-wide roundups of oxen, mixed soldier-civilian plowing, and garrison troops who knew nothing of farming or local conditions—altogether a heavy burden on the people. Annual yields never matched costs, and the scheme was abandoned once more. Only the mounted-archer aid-field plan looked promising: each man would hold one hundred mu plus ten mu of public field, supplying seed and labor himself; the levy was one shi per mu yearly, with a third forgiven in flood or drought. The state would avoid granary payouts and the farmers would keep the gains of cultivation—an arrangement that seemed genuinely advantageous. But the archers, once recruited, had not yet put down roots, lacked seed and provisions, and were already liable for labor on the public fields; lest morale falter, he asked that the plan wait until the land had yielded a few good harvests." In the ninth year an edict ordered that until Xi-He archers could work their allotments, the Pacification Commission should detail garrison troops to farm the land, supply oxen, tack, and tools at one qing per man, and at year's end rank archer and garrison yields for reward or penalty. Archers' abandoned plots and garrison-farm tenancies would be assessed for rent, payable at the nearest home fort or stockade, with conversion fees and transport diversions waived.
14
In 1079 the Dingzhou Military Colony Office was renamed the Hydraulic Office. When Zhang Dun fortified Yuanzhou he set up a colony commission too, but it was later abolished; civilians were hired to tenant the fields and the corvée troops sent back to their commands. In 1082 an edict merged the Xi-He mounted archers, garrison farms, and frontier tribes under one superintendency subordinate to the Jingyuan Pacification Commission. Kang Shi, superintendent of Xi-He garrison farms, proposed: "On the newly recovered lands, officials should survey boundaries, assign one qing apiece to garrison troops who know farming, and give the rest to mounted archers at an extra qing per man—fifty mu more for those with horses—forming a camp every fifty qing. Where the four forts and bastions lacked farming garrison troops, he asked to recruit garrison troops and courier-station soldiers from Qinfeng, Jingyuan, and Xi-He, with two thousand cash in outfit money for each volunteer. The throne approved every item.
15
使
Lu Huiqing, prefect of Taiyuan, once memorialized on garrison farms: "The fertile land around Jialu and Mizhi runs to ten or twenty thousand qing at least. The Xia name the region Pearl Mountain and Treasure Mountain for the grain it yields. Reclaim even half of it and the new frontier forts on both routes would no longer lean wholly on the interior for supplies—let alone if the whole were brought under the plow. The reason plowing had not been attempted earlier was simply that there was no shield on the outside. Build a fort at Jialu and another at Mizhi, a hundred and twenty li apart, with smaller posts between them in mutual view, and from Yizhou's Yihe and Baicao to Shizhou's Wubao and Kehu and the forts beyond—a thousand li of frontier becomes hinterland. The idle lands of the three prefectures across the river could then be opened to feed the armies. Every field once raided by the Xia and left fallow under Su Anjing's policy of mutual abstention could be planted by this same method. Grain could be bought locally beyond the river, while people within it who had borne transport diversions would be compensated for porterage—ending a hundred years of costly long hauls and ruinous state purchases. As revenues strengthened, the route from Jialu to Shenmu in Linzhou and its chain of posts could follow the same pattern, and the rich soil of Hengshan would be firmly in our hands."
16
西
In 1084 Huiqing hired oxen from five counties, sent regular troops to guard the perimeter, and plowed Papaya Plain, the rich ground between newly taken Jialu and Wubao—over five hundred qing in all, plus seven hundred thirty qing in Lin, Fu, and Feng prefectures and nine hundred sixty qing for archers, poor civilians, and fields long left idle by both sides. Huiqing declared the harvest enormous and a boon to frontier finance, and asked that the scheme be spread across Shaanxi. In 1085 the Bureau of Military Affairs reported that farming Papaya Plain the previous year had consumed more than eighteen thousand regular troops and two thousand horses, over seven thousand strings of cash, nearly nine thousand shi of grain, fifty thousand jin of field rations, and fourteen thousand bundles of fodder; community-defense levies added thirteen hundred strings and thirty-two hundred shi of rice; fifteen hundred farmers and a thousand hired oxen had all been wrung from the populace by force; the harvest—grain, millet, and buckwheat—totaled eighteen thousand shi and fodder one hundred two thousand bundles, falling short of the outlay. Seed money and grain borrowed from the transport commission remained unpaid, and the extra manpower and horses for frontier defense still sat outside the annual accounts. They feared the Pacification Commission would try planting again the next year and asked that limits be set at once. An edict warned Huiqing not to repeat his earlier error.
17
Hedong pushed forward fortifications for nearly three hundred li from Linshi to Fuyan, and across the newly recovered posts of Jingyuan, Huanqing, and Xi-He Lanzhou and Huizhou garrison troops were recruited to farm with corvée waived. Before long the Garrison Farm Office reported that recruited garrison troops everywhere were useless in the fields, and each man was sent home to his prefecture.
18
使 使 滿 使殿
In 1131 Xie Qian, prefect of Jingnan, recommended Zong Gang and Fan Bin to set up military colonies; Gang was made commissioner for garrison farms in five prefectures under the Jingnan pacification command, with Fan Bin as deputy. Southern garrison farming likely dates from this moment. Thereafter Jingzhou fed its garrisons from the farms, easing by about half what local officials had once been obliged to furnish. In 1133 Chen Gui, pacification commissioner for De'an, Fuzhou, and Hanyang Army, revived the old colony system. Soldiers were to hold defensible points, build forts, and farm while they guarded; the state paid farming costs and issued grain at harvest under the hoe-field rule, with the surplus to government stores. Civilians owed one dou of husked rice per mu on paddy land and five sheng of beans or wheat per mu in each of summer and autumn on dry land; after two years without default the plot became theirs in perpetuity. Soldiers and civilians lived apart; as refugees returned in swelling numbers, forts were also raised to settle them in colonies. Military-colony business fell jointly to the Garrison Farm Office; garrison-farm business to prefectures and counties. Following Gui's proposal, court officials urged a wider rollout: one hundred mu per man was the ancient rule, and with wasteland abundant the people should be free to apply to reclaim it. Where oxen were scarce, two men should pull a single plow by hand. Every grant would group five men in a tithing, with five mu of vegetable ground set aside for houses, yards, and gardens. Military colonies would answer to grand emissary officials and civilian colonies to magistrates, ranked by annual yield. The plan was dispatched to the prefectures for adoption.
19
西使西 沿西 滿 西西
Han Shizhong, pacification commissioner of Jiangdong and Jiangxi, was ordered to organize Jiankang garrison farms on the Shaanxi archer model. Shizhong replied: "Wasteland is plentiful along the river, but most of it already has owners; the Shaanxi model will not do—I ask instead to recruit civilians to tenant the fields. The Chief Council agreed, exempting rent for three years and providing that after five years, if the owner did not claim the land, the tenant would receive it in perpetuity. Hubei, western Zhe, and Jiangxi were ordered to follow suit. Corvée and special levies were waived entirely. In 1135 an edict extended military colonies to Huainan, Sichuan-Shaanxi, and the Jing-Xiang region.
20
使 殿
In 1136 Zhang Jun proposed renaming Jiang-Huai military colonies as garrison farms, registering all official and abandoned fields, grouping them into five-qing estates, and recruiting civilian tenants. Five households would form a mutual-liability group to tenant one estate under a headman; each estate received five oxen, plows, seed, ten mu for vegetables, and a loan of seventy thousand cash repaid over five years. Fan Bin and Wang Fu were put in charge. Shortly afterward the five great generals—Liu Guangshi, Han Shizhong, Zhang Jun, Yue Fei, and Wu Jie—along with the Jiang-Huai, Jing, Xiang, and Li route commanders were all named garrison-farm commissioners. Fan Bin was promoted to vice minister of agriculture and superintendent of Jiang-Huai garrison farms with headquarters at Jiankang; Wang Fu, outer-sect director of military colonies, served as his deputy. With oxen and seed from the state and care for the displaced, the program harvested more than three hundred thousand shi in a single year. Shi Gongkui, Li Cai, and Wang Fu all denounced the abuses of garrison farming; Zhang Jun too saw the disruption and asked to abolish the dedicated office in favor of surveillance commissioners—whereupon commanders were ordered to oversee garrison farms concurrently.
21
西 西
In the ninth month Wu Jie, Sichuan-Shaanxi pacification commissioner, was commended by edict for restoring ruined weirs and operating sixty garrison-farm estates on eight hundred fifty-four qing, yielding two hundred fifty thousand shi yearly for army stores. In 1162 Wang Che, overseer of Hubei and Jingxi forces, reported: "The Jing and Hu armies holding Xiangyang and Hanzhong consume provisions on a vast scale. Xiangyang once had two canals—the Long Canal watering seven thousand qing and the Wood Canal three thousand—but both had silted up in the wars. He proposed rebuilding the weirs and clearing the channels, hiring frontier civilians or aged and weak soldiers to farm them with oxen, plows, and seed furnished by the Hebei and Jingxi transport offices—cutting transport costs while resettling refugees. The court agreed.
22
穿 西 使使 便
In 1163 officials laid out ten requirements for sound garrison farming: careful choice of officers, broad recruitment, deep canals, repaired district posts, complete equipment, well-sited fields, ample provisions, sufficient plows, light taxes, and strict rewards and punishments. They also proposed bounty scales for recruitment and a three-year halt to the Guangxi horse tribute so the proceeds could buy oxen. Complaints about abuses at Xiangyang's military colonies reached the throne, and the emperor moved to shut them down. Minister of Works Zhang Kai argued: "The trouble at Jing-Xiang colonies is that men with no land to farm are taxed while vagrants are pressed into service; when vagrants ran short, commoners were dragooned—leaving their own ripe fields to work raw government soil, hauled in from hundreds of li away, or taxed as two-adult households while only the strong were taken and the old and young left destitute. The region was in turmoil, and abolition is justified. Yet since last year more than one hundred thousand has been spent on oxen, tools, and the Long and Wood canals; to throw that away now would be to abandon Jing-Xiang cultivation for good. Refugees returning to the Two Huai now number tens of thousands; if the state cannot keep feeding them, the old and weak starve and the strong wander off. Set them to farming Jing-Xiang and you not only halt the wandering—you show people of the Central Plain that the court has a place for them, and they will come in swarms with infants on their backs. Once reclamation widens, the surplus delivered to the state would serve both people and treasury. An edict kept fields already under cultivation as they were and assigned the rest to Yu Yunwen and Wang Jue. In 1164 Chen Junqing of the Jiang-Huai Chief Council proposed using unarmed men on abandoned government land, marking out stockades, buying oxen and plows in quantity, and letting them farm rent-free so that people would come willingly. In a few years reclaimed acreage would swell and grain would cheapen. Colonies scattered across the land would spare villages the fear of bandits; and once army rations were secure, the burden of long supply lines would lift. That, he said, was the lasting way to hold the Huai line. The throne approved.
23
使
In the third month of 1169 Sichuan pacification commissioner Zheng Gangzhong put troops to the plow, applying the annual rent harvest against twelve thousand shi of Chengdu-route harmonized-purchase rice for army rations. But soldiers and civilians mingled in every hamlet, and trouble sprouted on every side; and community-defense peasants were drafted from hundreds of li away to teach farming, some not relieved for two or three years, to the people's great distress. Chao Gongwu, prefect of Xingyuan, proposed fixing the quota at the best of three years' harvests, recruiting tenants by graded shares, and freeing troops and militia for border defense. The court agreed. In the eighth month an edict recalled military-colony troops at the Zhenjiang command, the Wufeng Army, and three other posts to their units for drill. In 1170 military colonies at Hezhou and Yangzhou were abolished. In 1172 Luzhou's troop colonies were abolished as well.
24
便
In 1183 Guo Gao, deputy overall commander at Ezhou and Jiangling, reported: "Xiangyang's military colonies, running more than twenty years, have scarcely helped frontier finance. The soil is not to blame—effort has simply fallen short. With the frontier at peace, he urged renewal as the way to make the border truly secure. His command held seven hundred fifty qing of idle and half-worked land; he asked for thirty thousand strings to buy oxen and tools and begin at once. If capacity allowed later, more wasteland could be registered and opened in turn. The request was granted.
25
西 便 使
In 1190 Liu Wei, prefect of Hezhou, used surplus land to recruit civilians as ten-thousand crossbowmen farming in rotation. In 1214 Jingxi military colonies recruited farmers. In 1220 Sichuan pacification commissioner An Bing and fiscal commissioner Ren Chuhou reported: "In 1145 the prefectures together reclaimed more than twenty-six hundred fifty qing, paid one hundred forty-one thousand shi of rent rice in summer and autumn, fed the garrisoned troops, and ended harmonized civilian purchase—the gain was enormous. After 1168 colony troops went back to drill while garrison lands were leased by the prefectures; rent revenue collapsed, arrogant generals and local strongmen grabbed what they could, and the abuses are too many to list. Now the bullies have gone and the fields lie fallow; this is the season to put them under cultivation again, they said, and the fiscal and pacification offices should jointly take charge. Abandoned fields within and beyond the passes are likewise numerous and no less profitable than garrison farms—they asked that those be registered too. When Wu Jie first held Shu, military stores ran short and he turned the Bao city weir into colonies; the people found it anything but convenient. At transport official Guo Dazhong's urging, the levy was cut to a median figure and the people were left to farm on their own. Every household went back to its trade, and yearly income from the fields surpassed what the military colonies had yielded.
26
In August of Duanping 1, following memorials from the bureaucracy, the court settled fifty thousand troops on both banks of the Huai to cultivate land and hold the line. A special intendant supervised the scheme, drilling the men in horsemanship and archery whenever they were off duty. Land tax was waived entirely for the first three years; in the next three, only half was levied. In the tenth month, Shao Qian, director of the Daining office, memorialized: "Zheng Gangzhong had once intermingled troops and commoners for frontier farming at the mountain passes of Shu, harvesting over two hundred thousand shi of grain each year. Since then that system had lapsed and freight costs had climbed. He urged the court to let frontier commanders put soldiers and civilians back on the land and pay fair value for the harvest, sparing the supply bureau endless convoys, filling the passes with stores, and leaving campaigns and garrisons with grain to spare." The court approved.
27
In Jiaxi 4, refugees along the Yangtze frontier were given plots to till within seventy li of the banks; at the first alarm they were to man the river line. Similar allotments were made thirty to fifty li outside border towns, with the same duty to fall in for urban defense when danger threatened. Men stationed in fortified camps worked the open fields around them and rallied to hold those camps. State land was rent-free; on private plots, only ten or twenty percent of the crop went to the original owner. After three years of calm, every man was to return to his former livelihood.
28
In the third year of Xianchun an imperial edict declared: "Peasants farming military colonies in the Huai, Shu, Hunan, and Xiang regions are crushed between punitive quotas and corrupt levies. Already uprooted and half-starved, they cannot meet the tax when flood or drought strikes—yet collectors descend like wildfire. How can the people bear it! Every outstanding debt is cancelled, and any official who duns the people again will be prosecuted for violating regulations."
29
The Ever-Normal and Charity Granary systems were two exemplary Han and Sui policies for the common good—the first to even out grain prices, the second to stockpile against famine. Under Later Zhou Xiande, the court added People's Relief granaries, turning assorted surcharge payments into stored grain to be sold cheaply in bad harvest years. The Song preserved all three institutions.
30
使
When Taizu seized power amid the wreckage of the Five Dynasties, civil turmoil left the Charity Granaries moribund. Early in Qiande, the throne mandated a Charity Granary in every county, funded by a one-dou levy on each shi of the twice-yearly land tax. Starving farmers who needed seed grain would be registered by the county, the prefect would lend grain by headcount on the spot, and only then notify the capital. The scheme was later scrapped as too burdensome to supply. After a bumper harvest around the capital in Chunhua 3, agents opened purchase stations at all four gates, paying above market to buy grain for nearby empty stores—the Ever-Normal Granaries. In famine years grain was sold back to the people at the original price.
31
西西使 沿
During Xianping, Treasury official Cheng Su persuaded the court to expand People's Relief granaries in Fujian, prompting an empire-wide review of the Chunhua relief model. Jingde 3 brought a memorial to establish Ever-Normal stores across Hebei, Hedong, Shaanxi, Jiangnan, Huainan, and both Zhes. Each prefecture would keep two or three thousand to as many as ten or twenty thousand strings of tribute funds, proportioned to household counts. Transport commissioners were to appoint honest officers to manage them under the Ministry of Revenue, with the Three Departments forbidden to raid the funds. Each summer and autumn officials bought grain above market when prices fell and sold below market when they rose, never discounting below the original purchase cost. Frontier districts were exempt. The Three Departments deliberated and recommended adoption as proposed. New Ministry of Revenue staff, offices, and ledgers followed, and the Expenditure Bureau created a dedicated Ever-Normal desk. The rule of thumb was ten thousand shi per ten thousand households, capped at fifty thousand shi no matter how large the county. Grain unsold after three years was rotated into military stores and replaced with fresh stock. In disaster counties purchase price was capped at one hundred cash per dou. Officials who doubled their purchase quotas would have the excess credited as meritorious service. Tianxi 4 extended Ever-Normal stores to Jinghu, Sichuan gorges, and Guangnan. By year five circuits had bought 183,000 hu and sold 243,000 hu.
32
使
During the Jingyou era, Huainan vice transport commissioner Wu Zunlu said: "This circuit has one million five hundred thousand adult mouths, yet Ever-Normal money and grain total only four hundred thousand-odd; in famine years that is insufficient for relief. I ask to raise the reserve to two million myself; none other may divert it." The request was granted. A later edict barred both the Three Departments and transport offices from touching Ever-Normal reserves anywhere in the empire. Within years the Ever-Normal coffers swelled even as army rations ran short, so the court released one million strings from the granary funds to feed the troops. Repeated raids soon drained the reserves.
33
西
When the capital region famished early in Jingyou, middle and lower households each received one hu on loan from the Ever-Normal stores. During Qingli western-capital grain was opened for the poor, yet some venal officials marked up the sale price to curry favor. Huangyou 3 brought an imperial rebuke. Pacification commissioners Chen Sheng-zhi and others said: "Disaster-stricken prefectures and armies seeking to sell Ever-Normal grain were told to add ten or fifteen cash above the purchase price—utterly contrary to the intent of cherishing the people. An edict ordered sales only at the original purchase price." In the fifth year an edict said: "Recently Hubei had a lean year and Ever-Normal grain was released to aid the hungry; we hear the Ministry of Revenue again pressed for repayment—is this the court's intent to relieve and succor? All such debts are completely remitted."
34
便使
Mingdao 2 revived debate over Charity Granaries, but nothing came of it. During the Jingyou era, Hanlin collator Wang Qi proposed reviving Charity Granaries: "Let households of the fifth rank and above, with the summer and autumn two taxes, for every two dou separately submit one sheng; when water and drought reduce taxes, submission is exempted. Counties would site stores at convenient locations under transport commissioners. A typical county yielding one hundred thousand shi could stock five thousand—a model that scaled empire-wide would be transformative. In Mingdao famine years the state could not feed both the army and the starving, and refugees filled the roads. Wealthy landlords who donated thousands of shi won petty office—surely they did not scorn rank? They acted from genuine concern for the afflicted, having no other choice. Large landowners held the most fields and would contribute the most; modest farmers held less and would pay less. Yet in disaster the rich needed no relief, while middling and poor families would be saved first. The proposal went to the ministries, where divided counsel killed it. Early in Qingli Wang Qi pressed again; Renzong ordered Charity Granaries empire-wide with levies on the top three household ranks—then cancelled the scheme.
35
Later Jia An also said: "Today the realm is without incident, the harvest is abundant, the people are peaceful and joyous, and fathers and sons keep one another safe. One drought turned abundance to corpses on the highways; state granaries could not stretch, levies on the wealthy could not suffice, grain convoyed a thousand li arrived too late, and resettling the hungry only spread misery. When ministers and magistrates panicked without a plan, half the populace could perish. He urged restoring Sui-style communal Charity Granaries, with laws encouraging every prosperous prefecture to save against calamity. As Mencius said, abundance permits levy without cruelty—and here the levy would serve the people themselves. His proposal was sent to the circuits to gauge feasibility; only four deemed it workable; others cited double taxation, fear of bandits, faith in Ever-Normal stores, or administrative burden.
36
使 使
Thereupon Jia An again memorialized: "I once served as judge of the Ministry of Justice and saw annual death sentences nationwide often reach more than four thousand; of these robbers comprised sixteen or seventeen in ten—ignorant people pressed by hunger and cold, owing to flood and drought, wrongly fallen into capital punishment. Charity Granaries, he insisted, were the only hedge against such years. The objections from the circuits were mostly spurious. On double taxation: Charity Granaries teach self-reliance against disaster—public law for public good. Given time, people would contribute willingly. On bandits: thieves prefer gold to grain; wealthy villages store tens of thousands of shi without incident. Banditry itself springs from want. Full barns would let men live without crime—the true cure for banditry. Ever-Normal granaries were meant to stabilize prices, not sustain famine relief. Using them for relief perverts their purpose, drains the treasury, and reserves are already thin. Recent minor disasters still produced refugees and bandits—clear proof Ever-Normal stores cannot carry the burden. As for administrative burden, the state constantly conscripted labor for post stations—Charity Granaries deserved no special timidity. People resist new ideas but embrace their fruits—only imperial resolve could break the deadlock. Yet at the time public opinion prevailed, and in the end the plan was not carried out.
37
使 滿
Jiayou 2 mandated Broad Relief granaries nationwide. The state had been selling land forfeited by extinct households. Privy councilor Han Qi asked to keep such land under cultivation, sequestering rent in new stores to feed the aged, sick, and destitute in county seats under judicial intendants, with annual accounting to the Three Departments. Reserves scaled with population: one thousand shi below ten thousand households, doubling at ten thousand, rising to three thousand at twenty thousand, four thousand at thirty thousand, five thousand at forty thousand, six thousand at fifty thousand, eight thousand at seventy thousand, and ten thousand at one hundred thousand. Surplus land was still sold as before. Year four placed the stores under the Ministry of Revenue, with two local officers managing disbursements, autumn inspections, and registered recipients. From November through February each eligible person received one sheng every three days, half rations for children. Any surplus went to surrounding counties in proportion to need. Such were the broad outlines. Zhiping 3 saw Ever-Normal stores take in 501,048 shi and disburse 471,157 shi.
38
便 西 便 使
In the second year of Xining the Fiscal Reform Bureau said: "Ever-Normal and Broad Relief granary money and grain of all circuits, roughly totaling strings and shi, could reach more than fifteen million; collection and dispersal did not obtain their proper balance, so benefit was not vast. They proposed using existing stores to sell below market when prices rose and buy above market when they fell, with transport offices allowed to swap tax grain and cash as local conditions required. Cash reserves would also fund advance loans on the Shaanxi Green Sprouts model for any farmer who applied. Repayment would follow the tax schedule in two halves, summer and autumn, with borrowers free to pay in grain or cash depending on market prices. Disaster victims could defer payment until the next harvest. The loans would buffer against famine and keep wealthy landlords from exploiting the lean season with usurious rates. Ever-Normal and Broad Relief grain sat idle until scarcity drove prices up, benefiting only urban speculators. Circulating reserves across each circuit—selling high, buying low—would stabilize prices, keep farmers working through the seasons, and deny landlords their moment of leverage. All of this served the people, not the treasury—true to the sage-kings' ideal of public benefit as support for farming and taxation. Officials would be dispatched to audit reserves and appoint a deputy in each prefecture to manage transfers, piloting the scheme in Hebei, Hebei East, and Huainan before rolling it out empire-wide. Broad Relief stores would keep only enough for the aged, sick, and poor; the rest would follow Ever-Normal circulation rules. An edict approved."
39
Soon after the Regulations Bureau again said: "Ever-Normal and Broad Relief granary regulations, first implemented in Hebei, Hebei East, and Huainan three circuits—inquiring among the people many wished to receive loans; we beg to send down to all circuits' transport commissions for implementation, and should deliberate establishing overseeing officials. At that time Ever-Normal money and grain currently in store throughout the realm amounted to fourteen million strings and shi." An edict appointed two overseers per circuit—one court official and one capital official, or both roles combined—plus one for the Kaifeng metropolitan district, forty-one in all.
40
使 使 使便
Early in Shenzong's reign, after making Wang Anshi vice grand councilor, the emperor accepted Wang's argument that the state must actively manage the flow of national wealth, and established the Fiscal Reform Bureau. Wang then appointed Lü Huiqing as text examiner for the bureau and focused on drafting new institutions, above all the Green Sprouts loan program. Su Zhe, a legal officer at Daming, submitted a memorial, was summoned to court, and likewise joined the bureau as text examiner. Wang showed Su the Green Sprouts draft. Su said, "Lending cash to farmers at two percent interest was never meant to be a profit scheme. But at every point of disbursement and collection clerks would find ways to cheat, and no law could stop them; once cash reached a household, even honest farmers would spend it unwisely; and when repayment came due, even prosperous families would miss their deadlines. The result would be floggings across the countryside and endless trouble for local officials. In Tang times Liu Yan had run national finance without ever making state loans. When criticized, Liu Yan said, "Handing cash to people on easy terms is no blessing for the state; and having clerks enforce repayment by law is no convenience for the people. I never lent, yet I always knew within the hour whether grain was plentiful or scarce, cheap or dear in every quarter of the empire. When prices fell I bought; when they rose I sold—and so the realm never suffered extreme scarcity or glut. What need was there for loans?" That is simply the Han Ever-Normal system. Implement that, and you will match Liu Yan without lending a copper coin." Wang Anshi said nothing more about Green Sprouts for over a month.
41
西 便 便 西
Then Wang Guanglian of the Hebei transport commission was called in for consultation. He had once sought permission to raise capital by selling thousands of ordination certificates and had quietly run a Green Sprouts program in Shaanxi—loans in spring, collection in autumn—matching Wang Anshi's design. He now asked to extend the scheme to Hebei. Wang Anshi committed fully to it, and the Ever-Normal and Broad Relief granaries became the Green Sprouts program. Su Zhe was removed for dissent. Circuit overseers competed to please Wang by disbursing as much money as possible. Wealthy families refused the loans while poor ones wanted them, so officials graded allotments by household rank and grouped ten households—rich and poor mixed—with one guarantor. In Hebei Wang Guanglian gave fifteen thousand cash to first-rank households, tapering down to one thousand even for fifth-rank families—and the public outcry made clear the scheme was no benefit. Guanglian reported to court that the people cheered in gratitude, though complaints were widespread. Remonstrators Li Chang and Sun Jue asked the throne to forbid officials from forcing loans on unwilling borrowers. Hou Shuxian, overseer of Ever-Normal stores in the capital district, kept pressing Intendant Lü Jing to lend out cash. Jing replied that garrison costs already consumed the counties' entire tax yield; that more than five hundred thousand shi of grain was already on loan to farmers, which he had duly reported; and that the bureau now wanted to add five hundred thousand strings from Shaanxi salt-certificate purchases as Green Sprouts funds—more than the people could possibly repay. The throne referred the matter to the bureau and summoned the overseers to the Secretariat for a reprimand. Wang Anshi objected: "That will make every circuit hang back from implementing reform. Leave direction to the Regulations Bureau alone. The emperor agreed."
42
In the third year of Xining, Han Qi, prefect of Daming, memorialized:
43
使
The edict on Green Sprouts promised relief for small farmers, protection against usurious landlords, and no profit for the state. The new rules fixed loan quotas for every rural household down to the lowest rank, allowed upper ranks to borrow more, and extended the same terms to wealthy townspeople. Yet those upper rural and urban households were precisely the moneylenders the policy was meant to restrain. Forcing them to borrow at thirty percent interest made the state itself a usurer—in direct violation of the original decree. The rules banned coercion in name, but required well-off guarantors for every loan group. Farmers thought only of the easy cash at borrowing time, not the hard repayment ahead. Since the program began, officials and commoners alike had feared that without compulsion prosperous households would never borrow, while poorer applicants who did want the money would surely default. Sooner or later there would be torture to collect debts, with clerks, jailers, elders, and guarantors all held jointly liable.
44
西便 西 使
Last year the north had a bumper harvest—rice at seventy or eighty cash a dou. Buying grain then and selling when prices rose would have honored the ancient Ever-Normal system, protected the harvest, helped the people, and still yielded a surplus for the state. Instead overseers halted grain purchases precisely to redirect those funds into Green Sprouts loans—thirty percent interest counted as their achievement, with no thought for the harm ahead? The Shaanxi pilot succeeded only because military grain stores ran short and timely rains promised a good wheat crop—it was a one-season emergency measure, not a permanent model. To build a permanent bureaucracy around thirty-percent interest was nothing like Shaanxi's temporary expedient? The original edict had limited the trial to Hebei, Hebei East, and Huainan, to expand only after results were in. To appoint overseers empire-wide before the pilot circuits had even reported violates both Your Majesty's care for the people and the spirit of our ancestors' benevolence. I beg you to abolish the overseers and restore the old Ever-Normal system under the judicial intendants.
45
使
The emperor produced Han Qi's memorial for the chief ministers. "Han Qi is a true loyal minister. I thought this policy would help the people. I had no idea it would hurt them like this. Urban wards aren't even supposed to get crop loans—why are envoys forcing money on them?" Wang Anshi flushed and stepped forward. "If they want the money, what harm is there in lending to townspeople?" He refuted Han Qi's arguments. "Your Majesty restores Ever-Normal stores to help the people. Collecting interest is itself a practice handed down from the Duke of Zhou. Sang Hongyang, who monopolized the empire's wealth for the emperor's private purse—that was a 'profit-seeking minister.' Restraining landlords, strengthening the poor, and appointing officials to manage public finance—this serves no private greed. How can you call that profit-seeking?" Zeng Gongliang and Chen Shengzhi both argued that townspeople should not receive allocated loans; they wrangled with Wang Anshi at length before the meeting broke up. The emperor remained troubled by Han Qi's account, and Wang Anshi pleaded illness and stayed home.
46
The emperor told the chief ministers to cancel Green Sprouts. Zeng and Chen wanted to obey at once, but Zhao Bian insisted on waiting for Wang Anshi to return—and for days the court could decide nothing. More uncertain than ever, the emperor sent Lü Huiqing to fetch Wang back. Wang appeared at court to thank the throne. Once back at work his temper was fiercer than before. He berated Zeng Gongliang to his face and dug in harder on every reform. The throne referred Han Qi's memorial to the Fiscal Reform Bureau, which issued a point-by-point rebuttal. Han Qi submitted another memorial:
47
便
"The bureau stripped my memorial of its essential arguments and answered with selective quotations. It cites the Zhou Rites on "national service as interest" to dress up absurdity—deceiving Your Majesty above and misleading the empire below. The Duke of Zhou's order was for great peace, not suited for stripping the people of profit—though Han commentators may disagree on details. The Zhou Rites taxes garden plots at five percent and lacquer groves at twenty-five percent. Zheng Xuan inferred from this that official loans carried five percent interest on ten thousand cash. Jia Gongyan extended the logic: near suburbs would pay ten percent, distant suburbs fifteen percent, and the outer domains twenty percent on a loan of ten thousand." Even at the highest rate that would mean twenty-five percent—and only for lacquer growers. The Zhou economy almost certainly did not work that way. Green Sprouts lends ten thousand in spring and demands two thousand interest within six months, then lends ten thousand again in autumn and demands another two thousand by year's end—forty percent on ten thousand, everywhere alike. The Zhou Rites cap interest at twenty percent even in the farthest domains. Green Sprouts doubles that—yet the bureau insists its rates are modest by Zhou standards, as if the entire empire were too stupid to tell the difference.
48
Times change. Much of the Zhou Rites cannot be applied today—and this is only one example. If the Treasury Office is truly revivable today, why does the bureau cherry-pick only the passage on loan interest to silence every critic in the empire? Zheng Xuan also notes that under Wang Mang, loans for productive enterprise charged interest only on actual profits, capped at ten percent per year." Jia Gongyan explains that Wang Mang fixed the principal in advance but collected only on what the borrower actually earned. Ten thousand profit meant one thousand interest; five thousand profit meant five hundred—always one-tenth of gains." Smaller profits meant smaller payments—far gentler than Green Sprouts. Apart from Wang Mang, no dynasty from Han through Tang ever codified state lending at interest. Faced with a ruler as wise as Yao and Shun, the bureau offers nothing from the sages' governance but a lending scheme worse than Wang Mang's—an outrage your aging servant must answer.
49
Land tax already exceeds the Zhou ideal of one tenth, with more than a dozen miscellaneous levies—farm tools, ox hides, salt yeast, shoe fees, and the rest. Each summer and autumn the government undercounts silk and grain, forcing farmers to make up the gap in miscellaneous cash payments. Each year the state distributes salt—the so-called silkworm salt—payable in silk cloth. Advance purchase and harmonized purchase of silk add yet more—I cannot name them all. These burdens already far exceed the Zhou tithe and already crush the farmer. How dare the bureau invoke Zhou Rites to claim Green Sprouts interest is the Duke of Zhou's own proven method? This defiles the classics and obscures your sagacity—I can only sigh and weep in grief!
50
The bureau claims the old Ever-Normal system also sold grain to townspeople. Property-owning townspeople never bought grain by the bowl from Ever-Normal stores—the bureau only wants to lend them more cash for more interest and invents a Zhou Rites excuse to erase the difference between town and country. I beg Your Majesty to judge for yourself."
51
使便使便 使 西 西 使
Military Affairs Commissioner Wen Yanbo also protested repeatedly. The emperor said, "I sent two palace envoys to ask the people themselves. They report universal satisfaction. Wen replied, "Han Qi served three reigns as grand councilor—and you trust two eunuchs instead?" Wang Anshi had privately cultivated Inner Deputy Director Zhang Ruoshui and Duty Shift Leader Lan Yuanzhen. The emperor sent them to inspect capital-district lending. They returned reporting willing borrowers and no coercion—and the emperor's faith in the program only grew. After a lecture session at the Zhiying Hall, the emperor asked, "Why is the entire court in uproar every time we change a policy? Sima Guang said, "Private lenders already gnaw away at poor households until families starve and scatter. What will happen when county officials enforce the law?" Lü Huiqing said, "Green Sprouts is voluntary—no one is forced to borrow." Sima Guang said, "People see the benefit of borrowing but not the pain of repayment. Rich lenders do not have to force anyone either—the poor beg for the money." The emperor said, "Shaanxi has run it for years without complaint." Sima Guang said, "I am from Shaanxi. I saw the harm, not the benefit. Officials abused the people even when the law forbade it—what will they do once it is legal!" When offered the vice commissionership of military affairs, Sima Guang refused six or seven times, writing: "If Your Majesty abolishes the Fiscal Reform Bureau, recalls the overseers, and cancels Green Sprouts and corvée substitution, I need no office—I will still owe you a debt of gratitude. Otherwise I dare not accept the appointment." In the end he was posted as prefect of Yongxing.
52
使
Opposition was widespread. Hanlin Academician Fan Zhen said, "Your first edict promised the state would take no profit. Now overseers lend by household rank at thirty percent interest. Public chatter says no emperor since antiquity ever ran a pawnshop for the throne. However simple the people may seem, they are not to be underestimated. When his advice went unheeded he retired from office. Censorial officials Lü Gongzhu, Sun Jue, Li Chang, Zhang Zhan, Cheng Hao, and others were all removed for opposing Green Sprouts. Fu Bi of Bozhou and Ouyang Xiu of Qingzhou followed Han Qi in denouncing Green Sprouts and refusing to enforce it—they too were transferred. Jiang Qian had been magistrate of Chenliu only a few months when the Green Sprouts order arrived. He posted notices at the county gate and in every village. After three days at each site with no applicants, he took the notices down and told his clerks, "The people do not want these loans! The prefectural and judicial commissioners suspected Jiang of blocking the policy and sent investigators—but found no violation of the order. Knowing punishment was inevitable, Jiang Qian at once claimed illness and left office.
53
便 便 使 西使 簿
Chen Shunyu, magistrate of Shanyin County, refused to enforce the policy and submitted a self-impeachment memorial: 「The common people are now in dire want, and many would gladly take a loan. It is like children spying sweets—who would not reach out and fight to taste them? Yet parents quickly forbid it, lest the accumulating sweetness make them sick. Elders warn their neighbors, fathers and elder brothers teach their sons, always calling borrowing a sign of bad household management. Now the state itself lends money, luring people with convenience and driving them with harsh penalties—this is no kingly way to govern. Worse, the summer tranche is disbursed in the first month and the autumn tranche in the fifth, yet repayment is due the same month; peasants get the cash only to pay interest at once, gaining nothing in fact. One Green Sprouts loan binds a household for life—and generations after—for a year in which interest is paid twice; it becomes a separate tax that ruins the people. For this he was banished to supervise the salt-and-wine tax at Nankang Circuit. Chen Ze, deputy transport commissioner for Shaanxi, barred six prefectures including Huan and Qing from issuing Green Sprouts loans and kept Ever-Normal stores in reserve. The Legislation Commission charged him, but an edict pardoned him. In the fifth month the Fiscal Reform Commission was dissolved and restored to the Secretariat. Ever-Normal reforms passed to the Ministry of Revenues, with Lü Huiqing as its concurrent chief, also supervising field corvée and waterworks. In the seventh year the emperor grew troubled that Ever-Normal officers frequently broke the law. Wang Anshi proposed a dedicated registrar in each county for corvée and Ever-Normal duties—at most five hundred posts, for just three hundred thousand strings. The emperor agreed.
54
便
Anxious about the long drought, Han Wei, Chancellor of the Hanlin Academy, said: 「Around the capital, Green Sprouts collection has grown fierce—officials whip people to fill quotas; peasants are felling mulberries for firewood just to raise the cash. At the height of drought, they must endure this torment on top of famine. The emperor was deeply shaken. The Grand Empress Dowager also told the emperor: 「I hear the people are crushed by Green Sprouts and corvée-assistance payments—why not end them! As refugees streamed across the land, grief filled the emperor's face. He came to doubt the new laws and wanted them abolished. Wang Anshi, displeased, repeatedly asked to resign. In the fourth month he was posted prefect of Jiangning. Before leaving, Wang Anshi recommended Han Jiang as chancellor and kept Lü Huiqing as his aide; Wang's policies went on unchanged. An edict then required every circuit to keep half its Ever-Normal stores on hand before any disbursement. Households that had twice deferred repayment were barred from new loans. When peasants faced seasonal shortages, they could pledge crops as collateral and repay on the Ever-Normal schedule. Those who owed cash but preferred grain or cloth could pay at official fair rates. If pledged goods fell short, cash covered the remainder. If cash fell short of the goods' value, the surplus was refunded. Peasants could also trade silk or gold for grain, though officials added a small premium on the metal and cloth. In the sixth year the Ministry of Revenue reported: 「As ordered, each circuit should set Ever-Normal quotas from the three-year median of lending and collection, then at year's end report gains and losses. Annual targets were set—in strings, piculs, bolts, and ounces: disbursements of 11,037,772; collections of 13,965,459. Disbursements rose 2,148,342 over the third year of Yuanfeng; collections rose 1,034,963; In year four disbursements rose 2,799,964, while collections fell short by 1,986,515. Circuits where lending outpaced collection—or both lagged—in those years were ordered to file detailed explanations with the Ministry.
55
西西
In the tenth year the court first instituted charity granaries in the capital region, starting with the most fertile metropolitan counties. The next year Cai Chenxi, overseer of the capital counties, said: 「The charity levy—one peck per two piculs—is already modest enough. I ask that it take full effect with this summer's tax collection. The court agreed and placed charity granaries under the supervising offices. In the eastern capital, Huainan, Hedong, and Shaanxi circuits, charity granaries began with the autumn tax; those owing less than a peck were exempt. The rule was extended to the four Sichuan circuits. In the second year of Yuanfeng three frontier prefectures—Wei, Mao, and Li—were exempted, as Han and non-Han lived side by side and yields were too low. In the eighth year charity granaries were abolished throughout the empire.
56
簿 覿 便
In Yuanyou 1 an edict ordered that funds hoarded by supervising officers be reclassified as Ever-Normal stores, placed under judicial intendants, and run under the old Ever-Normal rules. Dedicated county registrars were abolished. In the fourth month Ever-Normal lending with interest was revived, capped at half quota disbursed in January or February. Where wheat and silk flourished, half could be prepaid with the summer tax; voluntary borrowers owed only one percent interest. Wang Yansou, Shangguan Jun, Wang Di, Su Che, and Censor-in-Chief Liu Zhi jointly memorialized against reviving Green Sprouts. In the eighth month Sima Guang wrote: 「The previous dynasty meant Green Sprouts to help the people and relied on voluntary uptake. Supervisors then rushed for credit and pushed ever more loans—calling whole counties to account or going door to door; Worthless sons tricked their elders and kept the cash; Strangers borrowed under false names, and when collectors came, the debt always landed on the registered household. The court now knows these abuses well, which is why it abolished supervisors and quota audits—and I hear the people breathe easier. I propose ordering judicial intendants on every circuit to enforce the ban on forced allocation. The court agreed.
57
使 覿
Su Shi, a Secretariat drafter, refused to endorse the edict and wrote: 「Even Xining's laws banned forced allocation—and still the damage was this great. Families live within their means; even the poor get by. Give them extra cash and spending swells of its own accord. When sons deceive fathers or loans are taken under false names, that hardly looks like forced allocation—but it is the same harm. Capping disbursement at half the quota differs not at all from Xining policy. Calling it voluntary still means trapping people—indulgence today without heed for collection tomorrow. Neither approach is sound; they differ little. Ever-Normal grain sales already help the people and bring the state modest profit—why court endless hatred for two percent interest? Wang Yansou, Su Che, Zhu Guangting, Wang Di, and others protested again: 「We have repeatedly asked to abolish Green Sprouts, yet the court never forwarded our memorials. Send them to the Three Departments and debate the matter openly. Earlier, Fan Chunren of the Bureau of Military Affairs, citing empty coffers, had urged reviving Green Sprouts—the April edict was largely his doing. Sima Guang was then on sick leave. When censors and remonstrators objected, the court answered nothing. Sima Guang soon urged tighter limits on forced allocation; Su Shi submitted another memorial demanding full abolition. Sima Guang finally saw the truth and dragged himself from sickbed to face the throne. Soon an edict ordered counties to buy and sell Ever-Normal grain in season as before and to stop all Green Sprouts disbursements. Waive outstanding two-percent interest; verify remaining principal and collect it in installments with the regular taxes.」
58
In Xuanhe 5 counties were told to post all borrowers' names after annual disbursement and collect after one month, to curb fraud. After disasters had drained tribute grain and left the capital short, the court ordered charity granaries in the east, Jiangnan, two Zhes, and Jinghu to keep thirty percent locally and send the rest to the capital to make up diverted tribute. In the sixth year the order was revoked.
59
使
In Longxing 2 (1164) Chen Liangbi, vice minister of revenues, was dispatched to inspect Ever-Normal granaries in eastern Zhejiang. In Qiandao 6 the prefect of Quzhou, Hu Jian, asked to expand Ever-Normal grain purchases. Shen Shu, Fujian's deputy transport commissioner, asked drought-stricken prefectures to keep coordinated-purchase grain for Ever-Normal reserves; the emperor approved at once. In year 8 Vice Minister Yang Tan reported: 「Charity granaries legally levy five sheng per peck of summer and autumn tax; those owing less than a peck are exempt; in fertile counties the rate rises to one sheng per nine-tenths or more. Circuits collect over six million piculs of tax rice yearly—charity reserves should be substantial—yet when disaster strikes, payouts are meager. I hear prefectures spend it freely—please investigate.」
60
In Baoqing 3 Censor Li Zhixiao said: 「Local governments keep no reserves and lean on the court in crisis—that was never the law's purpose. When Yue Ke was Jiangdong transport vice commissioner, he bought fifty thousand piculs with surplus funds and stored them across nine prefectures, selling and lending grain as needed—all benefited. Later Shi Mizhong in Raozhou and Zhao Yanjie in Guangde each bought five thousand piculs from local savings. From this it follows that thrift and care for the people will yield surpluses at every level. Set rules with rewards and punishments—promote those who stock ten thousand piculs, penalize those who hoard, harass, or falsify records—and counties will build reserves year by year for lasting benefit. The throne agreed.
61
使
A Jingding 1 (1260) amnesty condemned a common abuse: after charity rice was sold for cash, prefectures forced wealthy households to buy grain at low prices to refill stores. Tax evasion left charity stocks empty; Ever-Normal offices held counties liable, and counties spread the cost across clerks, ward chiefs, and tax brokers. Henceforth purchase grain in season, and remit all outstanding replacement payments owed by clerks and others.」 In year 5 Censor Cheng Yuanyue wrote: 「The law ties the charity levy to hulled rice alone. Yet beyond rice, officials impose so-called outer charity on silk, satin, and beans—how can charity attach to cloth and legumes? Even illegal surcharges should at least match the commodity—silk on silk, beans on beans; But counties squeeze every tax item with a ten-percent charity markup—and even after amnesties wipe the two main levies, charity rice is still collected. The poor owed mere handfuls of grain, yet urgent collection cost them hundreds of times more. Families were ruined, wives and children sold—the cries of despair were unbearable. I urge strict oversight: charity levy on hulled rice only—all other surcharges abolished. Punish harshly any official who persists in these abuses. The court agreed. In Xianchun 2 more than two million piculs of Ever-Normal and charity rice hoarded since before Jingding 3 were sold at reduced market prices empire-wide.
← Previous Chapter
Back to Chapters
Next Chapter →