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卷一百七十五 志第一百二十八 食貨上三

Volume 175 Treatises 128: Finance and Economics 1c

Chapter 175 of 宋史 · History of Song
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Chapter 175
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1
Finance and Economics, Part Three. (Cloth and Silk, Grain Procurement, and Canal Transport)
2
調綿 西鹿
In cloth and silk the Song continued the systems of earlier dynasties, assessing silk gauze, silks, cloth, thread, and cotton for military supply, while also converting tax quotas from local output and purchasing in the markets. Finer fabrics were handled by specialized offices: the Brocade and Damask Office in the capital; weaving yards at the Western Capital, Zhending, and in Qing, Yi, and Zizhou for brocades, damasks, deer-fetus weave, and open-backed gauze; gauze workshops at Jiangning and Runzhou; a damask yard at Zizhou; crepe gauze sold at Bozhou; crepe and thin silk woven at Daming; and plain silk supplied by markets across Qing, Qi, Yan, Pu, Zi, Wei, Yi, Mi, Deng, Lai, Heng, Yong, and Quan. Each year the Eastern Capital Monopoly Trade Office took in ten thousand bolts apiece of medium plain gauze and small damask for court use and seasonal bestowals. Conversion levies and market purchases varied by prefecture without fixed quotas, except when the inner storehouses needed supplies—in which case the responsible offices set exact amounts to be met. From the Zhou dynasty's Xiande era, all weaving—public and private—had to be two feet five inches wide; each bolt of silk paid in by commoners had to weigh twelve ounces; loose, thin, short, or narrow cloth, and cloth adulterated with powder or fillers, were banned; In Hebei prefectures and garrisons each bolt weighed ten ounces and ran forty-two feet long. The Song kept these standards unchanged.
3
綿 鹿 使
In Kaibao year 3 the court ordered every prefecture to estimate only two years' worth of silk, cotton, fabrics, gauze, hemp cloth, and similar goods, and forbade broad levies or purchases that would burden the people. Earlier Pengzhou had asked to assign rent silk to commoners for damask weaving with wages paid for their labor; Taizu refused. During Taizong's Taiping Xingguo era the Huzhou damask workshop was shut down and all fifty-eight women workers were freed. An edict directed Chuan and Xia purchase offices and weaving yards that, aside from military textiles, they need no longer commission brocades, damasks, deer-fetus weave, open-backed gauze, six-zhu weave, slanting weave, tortoise-shell patterns, and the like; private weaving and sale of such goods was not to be prohibited. Ma Yuanfang, serving as an assistant commissioner of the Three Departments, proposed: "When spring shortages hit, advance treasury funds to lend to the people, then have them deliver silk to the government in summer and autumn." In Dazhong Xiangfu year 3, Hebei transport commissioner Li Shihang added: "This circuit supplies seven hundred thousand bolts of cloth to the armies each year. Cash is scarce, so people often borrow ahead from wealthy lenders at double interest; when taxes come due they must clear debts first, and profits from weaving grow ever thinner. I ask that cloth payments be advanced so deliveries can be made on time—the people would benefit and the government would have enough." The court ordered generous payment at full value. Thereafter the other circuits followed suit. When the silkworm harvest failed, people were allowed to pay in wheat and barley instead, and warehouse loss and surcharge fees were waived.
4
鹿 鹿 鹿 西使
During the Tiansheng era the court halved the two Shu regions' annual tribute of brocades, damasks, deer-fetus weave, open-backed gauze, and slanting weave, and stopped making patterned damask gauze. In the Mingdao era the court cut the two Shu regions' annual tribute of brocades, damasks, gauze, open-backed gauze, and patterned gauze by two-thirds and ordered plain silks and gauze woven for military supply instead. Early in Jingyou the court abolished tribute of brocade-backed, embroidered-backed, and densely patterned open-backed gauze, forbidding their use from the inner palace down to common streets. Later the annual quotas of red brocade and deer-fetus weave from the Zi circuit kept rising until Qingli year 4, when they were halved again. Soon after, the Zi circuit's annual silk gauze tribute was cut by one-third, and red brocade and deer-fetus weave by half. Earlier, at the start of Xianping, Guangnan West transport commissioner Chen Yaosou reported: "The edict requires mulberry and jujube planting, but south of the passes only ramie and hemp grow. Allow quota conversion and let woven cloth be exchanged at government markets at one hundred fifty to two hundred cash per bolt."
5
西
Then the Three Departments asked to pay fodder allowances in cloth, valuing Deng and Lai fine cloth at 1,360 cash and Yi cloth at 1,100. Renzong thought the rates too generous and ordered them reduced. Once war began on the western frontier, military silk and gauze came mainly from the Yi, Zi, and Li circuits, and annual deliveries kept rising; after the armies stood down, those costs fell. In Jiayou year 3 the court first eased delivery quotas for the three circuits. During Zhiping annual output exceeded 155,500 bolts.
6
At Shenzong's accession the capital had surplus grain. He ordered the Transport Bureau to cut harmonized grain purchases by five hundred thousand piculs, buy gold and silks for the capital, store them at the Monopoly Trade Office, and stock supplies for the three frontier circuits. The Jingdong transport commission asked to lend 302,200 strings of cash to the people, with silk due the next year at 1,000 cash per bolt, collected with the first summer-tax deadline. The court ordered the cash sent to Hebei and allowed merchants to tender goods in exchange.
7
使 綿 西
In Xining year 3 censor Cheng Hao reported: "The Jingdong transport commission raised procurement quotas and forced assignments—about 1,000 cash per bolt of silk. Later, for both procurement and tax silk, each bolt required 1,500 cash." Transport commissioner Wang Guangyuan replied that procurement was unchanged and involved no forced assignment. Cheng Hao said he was merely currying favor with the court. Wang Anshi argued that Guangyuan had done everything he could in Jingdong and should not be punished for currying favor. The court then ordered the five hundred thousand strings of special inner-treasury silk funds treated as principal, stored at the Northern Capital, with interest returned to the inner treasury. Right Remonstrator Li Chang added: "Guangyuan used the five hundred thousand strings of surplus funds Chen Ruyi presented, distributing them with procurement silk money; beyond normal tax conversion and open purchase he took another 250,000 strings. I ask that Cheng Hao's charges be referred to the proper offices." The Dingzhou pacification office reported: "The transport commission assigns silks, gauze, cotton, and cloth to urban households in prefectures, towns, and garrisons for large cash payments. Please show mercy for disaster losses—they are on the far frontier—and grant special reductions." The court ordered judicial commissioners to reassess values; if people refused to buy, officials were to sell directly; forced assignments after payment were to be corrected. Once Wang Anshi took power he made interest extraction the main path to state wealth, so profit-seekers like Wang Guangyuan used silk procurement as a cover to advance cash and charge fifty percent interest—harsher even than the Green Sprouts loans. But Anshi backed Guangyuan, and Cheng's and Li's charges never took effect. In the second month the court ordered surplus Ba-Shu funds used to buy cloth and silk stored in Shaanxi for the frontier, sparing Shu transport costs and capital canal haulage.
8
In year 7 Two Zhe inspector Shen Kuo reported: "This circuit supplies 980,000 bolts to the court yearly. People struggle to make up shortfalls, yet the Transport Bureau added 120,000 bolts to advance silk purchases in the name of shifting goods." The court abolished the increase. In year 8 Han Qi memorialized that deferring advance silk purchases would still require five to seven years of catch-up deliveries even after a decent harvest. Anshi disagreed and told Shenzong: "Advance silk purchases have never been deferred since the founding ancestors. Li Ji's request in past years was an exception we granted. Lately regional officials compete to show leniency regardless of resources. When revenue runs short someday, the people will be squeezed again."
9
西貿
From Yuanfeng onward circuits could borrow sealed-store or market-licence funds for advance silk purchases—from tens of thousands to hundreds of thousands of strings. Circuits borrowing promotion-office surplus were sometimes told to deposit silk in Ever-Normal granaries until the transport commission exchanged cash for it. In year 3 Jingdong asked to raise advance purchases by 300,000 bolts, shifted within the circuit itself; the request was approved. In year 4 Li Yuanfu was dispatched to transfer agricultural textiles across the four Chuan-Shaan circuits. The Secretariat directed that textiles reaching Shaanxi not matching provincial standards be traded for grain stored on the frontier, to be completed within one year. In year 5 the Ministry of Revenue reported totals of 8,161,780 bolts and pieces and over 3,462,000 strings of cash.
10
In the first year of Shaosheng the Two Zhe regions had a poor silkworm harvest. For procurement and tax silk, fourth-rank households and below paid cash and exchanged for silks from the left treasury; the transport commission was also to use submitted cash to buy gold and silver, and when silk was plentiful, to buy gauze, damask, silks, and silk gauze for court tribute. In the first year of Yuanfu cloth submitted at Xiongzhou's monopoly market failed the sample; supervising officials and assistant prefects were demoted and had merit reviews delayed by varying terms; their valuation was cut, and similar goods were refused thereafter.
11
西 西 西
The Department of State Affairs reported: "Many people wish to request advance purchase funds; payments should rise per annual precedent, with silks bought next year in convoys for the capital." Left Division Vice Director Chen Guan objected: "Advance purchase interest is several times heavier than Ever-Normal loans—everyone suffers; how can this be called voluntary? This new increase, though called relief for want, is really exaction." Jingdong judicial intendant Cheng Tang added: "Disaster victims in Jingdong and Hebei have not returned. Eastern and western routes now exceed two million bolts yearly with extra purchases beyond quota—I ask that these be abolished." The court ordered circuit promotion offices to stop advancing cash until silkworms and grain were plentiful, then appoint officials and open markets. During Chongning advance purchases required rural and urban households in producing districts to receive graduated equal shares based on wealth. The Chuan-Shaan circuit set its quota at the highest Yuanfeng year's figure; districts that had never received payments were unchanged. Jiangxi procured five hundred thousand bolts of silk yearly; advance payment had been seventy percent salt and thirty percent cash. Once salt certificates replaced salt payments, the transport commission was ordered to pay entirely in cash—but never did. For five years this has been routine, and the people are badly hurt. Early in Daguan the court allowed borrowing 100,000 strings each from this circuit's sealed-store cash and neighboring circuits' sealed salt for payments. Later Ever-Normal promoter Zhang Gen reported: "This circuit's procurement has never paid cash. Please supply a full year's silkworm salt, with transport shifts or household pickup at markets." Jiangxi's ten prefectures had large quotas: twenty catties of salt per bolt, equivalent to nine hundred cash, advanced before December each year. When transport offices lacked salt, the Transport Bureau was ordered to settle years of accumulated arrears.
12
西 西
The Department of State Affairs reported Daguan storehouse shortages and ordered Two Zhe, Jingdong, Huainan, Jiangdong West, Chengdu, Zizhou, and Fujian to buy 1,000 to 30,000 bolts of gauze, damask, and yarn each. In year 2 Jingdong, Huainan, and Two Zhe were ordered to buy 50,000 and 30,000 bolts of silk cloth respectively for the Daguan storehouse; Sichuan circuits each delivered 20,000 bolts to the Yuanfeng storehouse. Jiangdong West matched Sichuan's amounts for the Chongning storehouse. Yet some prefectures valued one mat of salt at 6,000 cash and demanded six bolts of silk at deadline, pressing collection early and driving many to flee; the court increased penalties in stages. Urban advance purchases reached 400–500 bolts; in Xingren Prefecture Wan Yansi's household, with 142,000 strings in assets, averaged over 1,000 bolts yearly and was ordered to halve and redistribute the burden.
13
西 綿
In Two Zhe, beyond surcharges on procurement and tax textiles, officials collected forty cash in market fees plus tens of thousands of strings in exceptional increases for clerks. Early in Zhenghe the court abolished market-standard fees. Circuit textile prices had risen severalfold, yet payment still followed old rates. Memorialists asked for increases; the Revenue Bureau cited Yuanfeng precedent, blocked the change, and ordered only timely disbursement. Jiangdong procurement was as abusive as Jiangxi: only 200 cash was paid; the transport commission required thirteen ounces per bolt, with cash at silk price for short weight—over 200 per ounce. In Xuanhe year 3 the court ordered judicial commissioners to rectify abuses and report. Earlier Chengdu and Hebei allowed official households half their advance purchase quota; in year 4 those who had paid full assessments before were restored to full payment. Soon after, because Two Zhe had many official households, advance purchase quotas were spread evenly. In the winter of year 7, at the suburban sacrifice, Hebei and Jingdong were exempted from procurement levies of cloth, silk, and cotton; tribute goods were bestowed in reduction, remitting nearly several million in obligations.
14
Advance silk purchase began as generous payment meant to help the people, yet it still burdened them. Later people paid cash instead, or received low prices for heavy goods; by the end the government paid nothing fair while exactions grew worse. In the twelfth month the court ordered each transport commission to tally circuit totals, assign them to prefectures and counties, and punish payment in goods other than cash or in months other than the first month as regulatory violations. Yet officials rarely complied. In the first year of Jingkang transport commissions were ordered to prepare Ever-Normal cash one season ahead and pay in the first month as scheduled, without substituting other goods that reduced payments. Jingdong prefectures and counties were not to charge registered households using relocated households' old quotas; those amounts were deducted first and reassessed evenly when refugees returned. Other circuits followed suit.
15
殿西 西
In the third month of year 3, because lower Two Zhe households struggled to obtain cash for procurement textiles, they were allowed seventy percent in kind and thirty percent in cash at current rates. Earlier Hongzhou required eighty percent in kind and twenty percent in reduced cash at 3,000 per bolt. In year 4 commander Hu Shijiang asked that the thirty percent cash portion be valued at 6,000 reduced cash per bolt. He also said silk prices had soared and asked to raise the rate to 5,000 full cash per bolt. The Ministry of Revenue set it at 6,000 full cash. Palace Attendant Censor Zhang Zhiyuan said: "In devastated Jiangxi, procurement and advance silk purchase requested cash substitution; the court agreed to ease the people's burden slightly. Five thousand reduced cash per bolt is already half again the old price—1,500 more than current Two Zhe rates. The Ministry of Revenue now orders six full strings per bolt—doubling exaction by exploiting the people's distress. When goods are not always costly, silk can sometimes be supplied more easily; Once the cash sum is fixed, the price can never come down. An edict followed: Jiangxi government-procured silk could be paid as sixty reduced cash per bolt; those who preferred to deliver actual silk were allowed to do so. That winter, Jiang and Zhe households were for the first time required to pay converted silk-cloth cash. At the time the mobile capital spent over a million strings a month, on top of added garrison costs; silk gauze was fully converted to cash, plain silk half converted, at 5,200 reduced cash per bolt. Converted silk-cloth payments grew heavier still.
16
綿 西 西
In the first month of the ninth year, after Henan was recovered, converted silk-cloth payment was cut by 1,000 per bolt—only to be raised again soon after. In the seventeenth year converted silk-cloth payments were cut: 6,000 per bolt in Jiangnan, 7,000 in Two Zhe, and 6,500 for government procurement. For cotton floss: 300 in Jiangnan and 400 in Two Zhe per two jin. In the twentieth year an edict declared: "Guangxi converted cloth payments, more than doubled under Zhang Jun, are now cut to one string cash per conversion." In the twenty-ninth year the Secretariat reported that converted silk-cloth payments from the four Jiang and Zhe circuits were too distant to transport and should be stored locally. An edict ended the old light-goods conversion in Huizhou, Chuzhou, and Guangde; elsewhere silver conversions became cash payments, though silver was still accepted; the Western Zhe intendant and three general supply offices would oversee it. Previously Jiang and Zhe converted silk-cloth payments exceeded 5.73 million strings a year, all sent to the mobile capital; now, for the first time, they were stored locally for military use.
17
西
In Qiandao year four, converted silk-cloth payments on summer tax and government procurement for Qiandao year five in Two Zhe and Jiangdong/West were cut by half. In the sixth year Huizhou prefect Xi Shengqing, returning from his post, memorialized: "Since Tao Ya raised levies capriciously in the Five Dynasties, Huizhou's taxes have for two centuries been several times heavier than neighboring counties, with miscellaneous cash and conversion burdens worst of all. I beg remission." In the ninth year an edict remitted Huizhou's extra miscellaneous cash of over 12,180 strings and more than 16,600 bolts of silk originally owed to Jiangdong and Two Zhe transport offices.
18
西
In Shaoxi year five an edict found converted silk-cloth payments on government-procured silk in Two Zhe and Jiangdong/West too heavy; from the next year each bolt would be cut by 1,500 cash, with further orders after three years. The shortfall was to be made up from the Inner Storehouse and Sealed Reserves treasuries.
19
In Qingyuan year one Vice Minister Yuan Shuoyou reported abuses in government procurement in Lin'an and Yuhang: "Match Yuhang's original land-survey quota to bolt counts, ignore grade ranks, fix the levy at twenty-four strings per bolt, apportion evenly until the quota is filled, and remit the rest to help the poorest households. Officials could no longer manipulate the people, and the people would no longer need fraudulent household registration—a sound remedy for these abuses." Shuoyou added: "Uniform levy by total quota would stop counties from overcharging and village clerks from gaming the system; fraudsters could not evade it—so corrupt commoners and stubborn clerks raise objections to undermine it." The court ordered a joint review. In the second year Minister Ye Zhu and others recommended adopting the circuit transport commissioner's plan; the court approved.
20
滿
In Jianyan year one Yuezhou prefect Zhai Ruwen reported: "Eastern Zhe's annual government procurement and advance silk purchase is 976,000 bolts, yet Yue alone owes 600,500—nearly thirty percent of the whole circuit. I ask that third-grade households and above pay half, and fourth-grade households and below be temporarily exempt." Soon after, because Hangzhou's procurement quota was too heavy, 120,000 bolts were spread across Two Zhe. In Qiandao year nine Secretariat Gentleman Zhao Cuizhong said: "Government procurement in Two Zhe falls heaviest on Shaoxing, and within Shaoxing on Kuaiji. With thin holdings but heavy taxes, people hide assets under false names and split into many sub-households. From the land survey through Qiandao year five, repeated reassessments cut registered property values, yet shortfalls worsened and the people were exhausted. Apportioning by acreage would end fraudulent household registration." In Chunxi year eight an edict charged Lianghuai transport commissioner Wu Ju and military commissioner Zhang Ziyan with reform. Ziyan and others said: "Powerful families split their registers to pass as lower-grade households—this must be checked. But abuse has roots: in Eastern Zhe's seven prefectures government procurement totals 281,738 bolts; Wenzhou had no quota of its own; together with Taizhou, Mingzhou, Quzhou, Chuzhou, and Wuzhou the total is under 130,000; Yet Shaoxing circuit alone owes 146,938 bolts—one circuit paying what five circuits pay, with more than 10,000 extra. That is the problem of inflated quotas. Registered value for rented oxen was not assessed, since oxen support livelihoods; distillery and salt-works households already paid official levies and were hard to assess again; fields lost to river collapse or the sea were ruined and submerged; monasteries and temples were sometimes exempted by edict; yet provincial quotas were not cut, so ordinary households were quietly assessed instead—the evil of hidden levies. These two abuses compounded until the people could not bear it; evasion followed, and fraudulent household registration spread. By old rule 38 strings 500 cash marked fourth grade; one cash less made fifth grade; evaders often set a base property value of only twenty or thirty strings. Genuine fifth-grade households with both property and adult males would remain exempt; households with property but no adult males would be assessed for procurement if their field property value reached fifteen strings or more, and recorded but not assessed below that—so false fifth-grade households could not escape and real ones would not suffer." An edict followed: "Imperial tomb gardens, monasteries and temples, Yanshan Estate, and rented and plow oxen in Shaoxing Prefecture are exempt from government procurement and struck from the provincial quota; property values for distillery and salt-works households, and reduced assessments on river-collapse fields and release-life ponds, are all to be verified and submitted for imperial decision."
21
西
In the eleventh year officials reported unequal government procurement across Two Zhe and Jiangdong/West; the Ministry of Revenue and drafting reviewers were ordered to study it. Zheng Bing and Qiu Ke argued that equal per-acre assessment was perfectly fair; an edict ordered it implemented. In the sixteenth year Shaoxing prefect Wang Xilü said: "When procurement was uniformly assessed, officials rushed the work and verified nothing; everyone was treated as a fraudulent household. Even property worth a hundred cash or more was assessed, and the poor could not endure it. Remit the more than 20,057 bolts of newly assessed procurement entirely, and the people will feel real relief. An edict halted collection of more than 20,050 bolts from lower-grade households for one year and cut the original quota by more than 44,000 bolts; Hong Mai as Shaoxing prefect was given discretion to carry out the uniform assessment. In Shaoxi year one Mai finalized the rules and submitted them; the court approved and implemented them, and Shaoxing's poor lower-grade households gained some relief.
22
西 使 使
Harmonized grain purchase: each year the Song moved grain by canal to expand military stores and supply the capital. Hebei, Hedong, Shaanxi, and inner provinces also bought grain locally to spare border people forced emergency transport—the policies went by many names. Early in Jianlong Hebei had successive bumper harvests; envoys set up markets and bought grain at premium prices, and the practice became routine. During Xianping the inner palace issued damask, gauze, brocade, and fine silk worth 1.8 million strings and 300,000 taels of silver to the Hebei transport commissioner to buy grain for border stores. An edict followed: wherever border stores held three years' grain, purchases would cease. Early in Dazhong Xiangfu all three circuits had good harvests; the court still ordered expanded purchases and storage beyond the usual quota. Later the inner treasury periodically released cash—tens or hundreds of thousands of strings—and sent officials to organize market purchases; households below middle grade were exempt.
23
西西 西 西 使
When Hedong was first subdued, its rents and levies were reduced. Officers reported fertile land, industrious people, and ample stored grain, and asked for annual market purchase tied to regular tax delivery, with payment mostly in kind. When Jingdong/West, Shaanxi, and Hebei lacked military rations, counties requisitioned grain stored in private homes—called push-placement; using upper-grade household registers to weigh rent paid and apportion purchases equally—called matched purchase; all were extraordinary measures. Because supply routes from Lin and Fu prefectures were long, regular-attendance officials were sent to set up on-site harmonized purchase markets. Hebei also recruited merchants to deliver fodder and grain to the border, redeeming certificates for salt, cash, spices, and treasures in the capital or southeastern garrisons; Shaanxi took salt from the two salt pools—called entry submission. Shaanxi grain purchase had once received annual green-sprout loans; since Tiansheng those were abolished, yet inner-treasury gold and silk issued to aid purchase were beyond count. During Baoyuan pearls from the inner treasury worth 300,000 strings were sent to the State Finance Commission for sale, with proceeds aiding border expenses. Ouyang Xiu returned from a mission to Hedong and said: "Hedong forbids farming along the border, yet private purchase of northern grain and wheat for military stores is the gravest danger." An edict then allowed farming on idle fields at Kezhou, Lanzhou, and Huoshan Army and beyond the border moats by ten li—but border defense did not improve, and annual purchase continued unchanged. Entry submission paid well and merchants flocked to it; abolishing it in the three circuits and paying cash for harmonized purchase saved the state considerable expense.
24
In Xining year five an edict granted 200,000 each of silver and silk to the Hedong military commission for credit sales; principal and interest went into sealed reserves for border defense. Thereafter sealed reserves for the three circuits drew widely—from the State Finance Commission, the market bureau, other transport offices, Ever-Normal funds, sale of rank titles and ordination certificates—without using inner-treasury cash and silk.
25
西 沿西 使 西 西
In the seventh year, because few merchants submitted grain at Minzhou, the State Finance Commission was ordered to report on the long-term merits and flaws of southeastern and western salt-certificate policies. Minzhou prefect Wang Shao proposed: "Follow the border harmonized-purchase precedent: pay one tenth cash and nine tenths western salt certificates at set prices to recruit entry submitters. Whenever border entry submission fell short, issue more capital salt certificates or add incentives to ease the strain on expenditures." That year Hedong's border region had a great harvest; an edict ordered transport commissioners Li Shizhong and Liu Xiang to expand purchases and build five years' stores. Leading ministers were also ordered to revise Shaanxi's border fodder and grain policy: transport offices would add three tenths to old purchase quotas, reward or punish by surplus or deficit, and send officials to inspect. In Shaanxi harmonized purchase, cash, tea, silver, silk gauze, or plain silk were sometimes used to buy grain from archer militia households.
26
使 貿 使 使
In the eighth year Hedong investigation commissioner Li Chengzhu said: "Beyond the two taxes on the Taiyuan route lies harmonized purchase of grain and fodder; officials pay some cash and cloth, but the amounts are trifling and bring no relief, and in famine years it is not remitted—the worst abuse." Taiyuan prefect Han Jiang then asked to cut harmonized purchase by three tenths from the original quota, abolish cash and cloth payments, and send capable officials to study the policy's costs and benefits. The court assigned Chen Anshi to the task. In Yuanfeng year one Anshi memorialized: "Hedong's thirteen prefectures owe more than 392,000 shi in the two taxes, yet harmonized purchase exceeds 834,000 shi; people still pay in bad years because taxes are light and military stores cannot fail. Payments had been half cash and half cloth; amounts were irregular, and traded for certificates they barely recovered half—the state spent real money while the people received empty nominal benefit. He proposed abolishing purchase payments, using the funds each year for border prefectures to buy and seal reserves; in disaster years to cover remissions, and in good years to exempt one payment every three years." The court agreed; an edict abolished Hedong's annual harmonized-purchase payments of more than 80,000 strings and assigned the funds to the transport office as Anshi proposed. Anshi was then appointed Hedong transport commissioner. Later military commissioner Lü Huiqing asked for separate legislation: three prefectures beyond the Yellow River, as border counties, should be exempt; the remaining eleven could share purchase equally. Lower offices deliberated: take one tenth of current annual harmonized purchase, cut two tenths, set eight tenths as the quota apportioned by household grade, and pay no further cash; in disaster years remit as with autumn tax, with transport-office funds covering the shortfall; where loss did not reach five tenths, allow deferral under longstanding practice. Harmonized purchase was then renamed grain and fodder aiding the army.
27
使便 便 西 西
In Yuanfeng year four Vice Commissioner of Revenue Jian Zhoufu was also charged with organizing Hebei's grain-purchase convenience office. The next year an edict assigned palace-guard shortfall funds from the capital region and other circuits, plus surplus salt-interest money from Huai, Zhe, and Fujian, to the grain-purchase office as capital. Ying, Ding, and Chan prefectures each set up granaries; the State Finance Commission would not interfere in sealed reserves; Zhoufu held sole authority, including grain and fodder reserves planned by the Agriculture Bureau's market, silt-farming, and waterworks offices. In the sixth year Hebei West circuit intendant Wang Ziyuan was also charged with joint organization. Before long an imperial hand-edict told Zhoufu: with the Hebei north now abundantly harvested, purchases should be broadly expanded. That year the Daming East and West Jisheng granaries, Dingzhou's Yanji and Baoying granaries, and Yingzhou's prefectural granary were completed; Zhoufu was promoted to Vice Minister of Revenue and replaced by Left Department Director Wu Yong. The next year Wu Yong reported that Hebei granaries were full, with 11.76 million shi of grain and fodder in storage. An edict granted co-organizer Wang Ziyuan third-rank court robes. During Xuanhe harmonized purchase within the capital region was abolished.
28
使 使 西
Since Xining, besides harmonized purchase and entry submission, there were also seated-granary, gambling purchase, contracted purchase, exchange purchase, distributed purchase, entrusted purchase, comprehensive purchase, encouraged purchase, equal purchase, and other such names. This was seated-granary purchase: In Xining year two, armies with surplus grain that wished to sell to the state were paid at assessed rates, and the rice was stored back in the granaries. Wang Gui memorialized: "Outer prefectures can deliver a dou of rice to the capital for forty cash, yet the capital, short of cash, pays a hundred cash per dou under seated-granary purchase—this is a thoroughly bad plan. Sima Guang said: "Seated-granary purchase began when small prefectures ran short of grain but their treasuries still held cash, so they bought grain from soldiers to cover the next month's rations—it was only a stopgap measure. The capital now holds seven years' reserves, yet the treasury is empty of cash; buying more grain from soldiers will only let it sit until it rots—I cannot judge whether that does good or harm. Lv Huiqing said: "If seated-granary purchase brings in a million shi, we cut a million shi from the southeast's annual canal transport and convert the grain into cash for the capital—what shortage of cash is there to fear? Guang replied: "I have heard that south of the Yangtze and Huai the people are starved for cash—they call it a cash famine. The land there favors japonica rice, and the people cannot eat it all. If the state does not buy it for the capital, there is no outlet for the surplus, prices will collapse, and farmers will suffer. Besides, the people have grain while the state refuses grain; the people lack cash while the state insists they pay cash—is that how wealth is circulated and the people helped? The emperor did not heed them. The next year, worried the original price was too low, the Divine and Dragon Guards and other offices paid tiered premiums per shi, and the practice was extended to Hebei, Hedong, and Shaanxi. After Yuanfu, officials began forcing sales at low prices; an edict banned the practice.
29
綿 西
This was competitive purchase: In Xining year seven, Hebei transport and excise offices were ordered to open markets, using Ever-Normal and reduced-cash granary surpluses, cutting prices and letting people trade in silk, floss, damask, and gauze at a markup until the autumn harvest brought competitive purchase. In Chongning year five Shaanxi, where cash was plentiful and goods cheap, was told to have its transport commissioner buy grain competitively with silver, silk, thread, and cloth to steady prices.
30
便 西 西
This was contracted purchase: In Xining year eight Liu Zuo, surveying Sichuan tea, contracted grain for Xihe military stores on the side, securing more than seventy thousand shi; an edict ordered it shipped and issued. Before long merchant Wang Zhen reported that contracted purchase went mostly to unattached officials or idle drifters, some of whom delivered only after years. An edict ordered Sun Jiong, commissioner for Xihe finances, to investigate and report back. Jiong reported that overall commander Wang Junwan was short 140,630-odd strings in contracted-purchase funds for Xi and He prefectures and more than three hundred taels of silver. Cai Que was sent posthaste to impeach them; Junwan and Gao Zunyu were both punished for diverting contracted purchase into illegal market trade and demoted to varying degrees. At the start of Chongning Cai Jing imposed it in Shaanxi, squeezing every penny of civilian wealth to meet quotas. In year five, citing a celestial omen as grounds to review flawed policies, contracted and matched purchase in Shaanxi and Hedong were abolished.
31
貿 便
This was distributed purchase: In Xining year eight the Central Secretariat calculated that shipping a million shi of rice would cost about 370,000 strings, and the emperor was astonished at the figure. Wang Anshi then said: "Distributed purchase would save six or seven hundred thousand strings in annual canal transport costs, and for Hebei entry submission the pricing power would be ours—when grain is dear we stop buying, the people's rice has nowhere to go, and prices fall on their own. That not only stocks the frontier but protects farmers as well. An edict then assigned end-of-season salt tax notes and six hundred thousand guan-shi of capital rice each year to the chief Market Trade commissioner for trade. Land income was assessed, advance payments in cash and goods were issued, and at harvest farmers delivered rice, wheat, and millet to Cangzhou, Beijing, and frontier posts for sealed storage. If prices spiked, entry submission could be halted by decree; the grain-purchase office could draw on stored grain and make good the debt when harvests were plentiful. In Shaosheng year three, on Lv Dazhong's advice, farmers were grouped in mutual guarantees, given half the official advance as a loan, and pressed on the tax schedule; the balance was paid in summer and autumn at current prices according to grain delivered. During Chongning Cai Jing ordered towns and villages paid by household grade, with grain delivered at harvest at market prices; frontier archer militia and Qingtang tribal groups were included. The volume distributed became the basis for officials' rewards and punishments.
32
This was exchange purchase: In Xining year nine the Huainan Ever-Normal office was ordered to conduct timely exchange purchase wherever wheat ripened. In Yuanyou year two, when wheat ripened a broad purchase was ordered on all circuits; if later prices matched the original rate, conversion to exchange purchase was allowed.
33
便
This was entrusted purchase: In Yuanfeng year two grain-purchase officer Wang Ziyuan, discussing convoy transport, said: "When merchants submit grain in lean years they demand steep prices, so entrusted purchase in inner prefectures was set up to balance supply. In year seven an edict noted that Ying and Ding in Hebei bought tens of thousands of shi yet scattered the grain for entrusted purchase across counties, fearing emergencies could not be met in time, and suggested inducing merchants to transport it themselves instead. Li Nangong and Wang Ziyuan both argued: "Entrusted purchase has long been in use, and being close to capital granaries, emergency shipment is not hard. Entrusted purchase was never abolished.
34
使
This was comprehensive purchase: In Yuanfu year one Jingyuan frontier commissioner Zhang Zhe asked for combined border purchase; Notices were posted telling the people not to compete with the state for grain; where official stores already held supplies, households with surplus grain were searched—enough was left for their use, and the rest was bought into government stores.
35
西 使 仿西
These were encouraged purchase and equal purchase: In Zhenghe year one Tong Guan, pacification commissioner for Shaanxi, proposed putting them into practice. Yan-Yan frontier commissioner Qian Ji said: "Encouraged purchase cannot be kept up indefinitely. Equal purchase takes grain first and pays afterward, which does no harm to households that already hold grain. Urban residents usually keep no grain on hand and must buy from outside, which only adds trouble and expense. His memorial was submitted, and he was demoted for it. An edict then ordered Hebei and Hedong to follow Shaanxi's equal purchase; Dingzhou prefect Wang Hanzhi was removed from office for blocking it. Before long the equal purchase system was formally established. In year three, with a good harvest, all circuits rolled out equal purchase. In year five critics said: "Equal purchase is strict in theory, yet grain was taken without payment, or quotas were set beyond what counties could bear—some households were levied hundreds of shi. An edict forbade circuits from imposing equal purchase at will. Then counties used harmonized purchase as a cover to slash prices; transport commissioners pressed harder still, and levies doubled what equal purchase had required; an edict tried to rein it in. In Xuanhe year three, after Fang La was suppressed, the Two Zhes also imposed equal purchase graded by official household standing. The next year Hunan and Hubei imposed equal purchase graded by household wealth. Encouraged purchase later spread to the new frontier, and tribal groups at Shanzhou, Kuozhou, and Jishi Army groaned under it.
36
調 西宿西 調 使 西
Since Xining, Wang Shao had opened Xihe, Zhang Dun developed the stream-cave country, Shen Qi and Liu Yi provoked war with Jiaozhi, and Han Cunbao and Lin Guang exhausted the Qidi campaigns—levies and requisitions grew ever heavier. Shaanxi kept large garrisons; in Yuanfeng year four a major western campaign from six circuits made its military costs the heaviest of any circuit. The emperor, fearing levies were harassing the people, sent Zhao Xu to investigate and found the complaints largely justified. Because rations were coarse and poor, he wanted to execute the Hedong and Jingyuan canal transport officers in irons as a warning—but with armies raised and levies massed, few could meet the demand. Li Ji, Yan-Yan transport commissioner, supervised convoys under an edict allowing execution of prefects and below who failed military needs; people suffered forced transport, many fled, and those killed ran to thousands—not counting those who died on the road. Wen Yanbo then memorialized: "Households in Guan-Shaan have been mobilized to the last ounce of strength; of those who survive, many are grievously afflicted. The right policy now is to encourage the troops, reassure the people, preserve what is left of them, and let them recover. The next year a gracious edict commended and answered him. When the western campaign failed, critics feared the court would try again; from then on the emperor was deeply moved, admonished frontier officers to hold the border and cease war, and Guanzhong began to recover.
37
調西 西 使西 西
When Emperor Zhezong took the throne, senior ministers upheld the early policies and pursued tranquillity; frontier prefectures were largely free of levies, circuits were told only to buy grain broadly for reserves, and Shaanxi and Lin-Fu were ordered to stock five years' grain. At the start of Shaosheng, Zhen, Ding, and Ying in Hebei were ordered to buy ten years' reserves; other prefectures, seven. Later Shaanxi circuits again fought year after year and pushed forward fortifications at Shan, Huang, and other prefectures, at a cost in funds and grain beyond reckoning. In Yuanfu year two Jingyuan commissioner Zhang Zhe remonstrated: "Since the campaigns began, Shaanxi's prefectural treasuries and granaries, inner and outer, have been emptied; loans from the inner treasury in gold and silk must run to tens of millions. Grain and fodder are exhausted everywhere; canal transport officers have no solution; their reports point only to empty stores. Now is the time to rest the armies, ease the people, and simplify affairs—I beg Your Majesty to weigh my words carefully and decide this matter. If Your Majesty consults the chief policy ministers again, I fear they will fix on war alone and mislead the throne." The chief policy ministers" meant Zhang Dun. The inner treasury was then empty; Shaanxi circuits, finding military rewards in silver and silk too scant, asked the inner storehouse for aid, and an edict granted them five hundred thousand bolts of silk. The emperor told his close ministers: "The inner storehouse holds only a million bolts of silk, and we have already given away half."
38
使 西西 西 調 忿
When Cai Jing held power he again pursued expansion, urging Emperor Huizong to bring Qingtang over; Wang Hou was put in charge at a cost of hundreds of millions, and full armies were sent twice before it was taken—yet garrisoning Huangzhou alone cost more than 10,249,000 strings a year. In year five Xihe-Lanhuang transport commissioner Hong Zhongfu said: "In this circuit highland barley yields five shi per mu, and each grain is worth three parts of barley. Formerly troops received refined rice and horses highland barley, both generally at an eight-tenths conversion rate—not only were men and horses fed adequately, but the prices matched. Now frontier officers fail to grasp the matter: refined rice and highland barley are issued at equal measure against unpolished rice and barley—the state loses a tenth and private hands gain a tenth. By the circuit's reckoning, aside from 1.8 million shi of grain and 500,000 of miscellaneous stores, 1.3 million of highland barley converted at equal measure costs 260,000 shi a year—thirty strings per shi, or 7.8 million strings in all. The emperor, fearing the rice was still too coarse and troops might go hungry, ordered a nine-tenths conversion rate. The next year equal-measure distribution was restored and the nine-tenths rate was abolished. Four metropolitan granaries were also built in Shaanxi: at Pingxia Fortress, Enriching Treasures; at Zhenrong Army, Enriching the State; at Tongxia Stockade, Enriching the People; and at Xi'an Prefecture, Enriching the Frontier. After the Xia renounced allegiance, every circuit plotted advance fortifications, and militia west of Shaanxi were all hauling grain. Later Tong Guan personally led troops to build Jingxia, Zhizhu, Fuxiang, and other forts, driving deep into enemy country—for six or seven years in all. By the end of Xuanhe supplies were exhausted; Yan-Yan could not sustain even a month or ten days. Frontier officers competed to open new territory; in the barren lands of Kuizhou, the gorges, and Lingnan they hastily founded prefectures and counties, requisitioning from the people at a cost to the treasury beyond reckoning. Finally came the Yan Mountains campaign; granaries in Xiong, Ba, and other prefectures were drained; soldiers, hungry and furious, threw tiles and stones at deputies or turned blades on their officers. Guo Yaoshi's Ever-Victorious Army in the Yan Mountains was provisioned by head count in cash and grain, at a monthly cost of 300,000 shi of rice and a million strings. Hebei's people could not bear the burden, and debate over corvée exemption payments began.
39
調 調
At first the Yellow River levied corvée each year to repair embankments; those who did not serve immediately paid corvée exemption cash instead. During the Xi and Feng reigns Huainan levied Yellow River corvée at ten thousand per laborer; wealthy households owed as many as sixty laborers—Liu Yi had once protested this. In Yuanyou, Lv Dafang and others championed returning the Yellow River; labor demands were heavy, so labor quotas were assigned with cash payments in lieu of service. During Daguang, when Huazhou's Fish-Pond Embankment was repaired, everyone was first required to pay cash instead of labor. The emperor said the work would be easier to assemble and the people less burdened, and decreed that all spring corvée for river dikes be paid in exemption fees as permanent law. Then Wang Fu proposed, and an edict was issued: "After great armies, how can the task succeed without drawing on the people's strength from every circuit? Tell the people they must exert themselves for state affairs; the whole realm shall pay corvée exemption—twenty thousand per laborer, thirty thousand in Huai, Zhe, Jiang, the lake districts, Lingnan, and Shu. In all more than 17 million strings were collected, and bandit gangs in Hebei rose in great numbers as a result.
40
西 西西
After the southern crossing, feeding the three frontiers made grain purchase unavoidable. During Shaoxing, competitive purchase in Jiang-Zhe and Hunan paid large sellers with official patents, smaller ones with ordination certificates, or with paper notes—most of which would not sell; clerks exploited the system, and public unrest ran high. Prices were then cut to entice households hoarding grain, and at first there was no restriction to registered official households. Whenever gold, silver, cash, or silk was issued and prefectures or counties obstructed or delayed repayment, the officials involved were all sentenced to two years of penal servitude. Guangdong transport vice-commissioner Zhou Gang bought 150,000 shi without harassment or spoilage; Fuzhou prefect Liu Ruyi kept troops supplied without shortage and encouraged relief sales to the displaced—all were promoted one rank. In year seven Raozhou took four dou in spoilage per shi purchased, and the prefect was punished. From then on, officials conducting harmonized purchase who counted surplus for themselves were subject to punishment. In the thirteenth year the Jinghu region enjoyed a bumper harvest, with rice at six or seven cash per dou; the court then purchased grain locally to ease the burden on the people of Jiang and Zhe. In the eighteenth year harmonized purchase was abolished, and the three general headquarters were ordered to establish procurement depots and buy grain. Under the old system, Liangzhe, the Jiang circuits, and the Hu circuits were each year to dispatch 4.69 million hu of rice, (Liangzhe 1.5 million; Jiangdong 930,000; Jiangxi 1.26 million; Hunan 650,000; and Hubei 350,000.) By this time the shortfall exceeded one million hu. An imperial order directed Lin'an, Pingjiang Prefecture, and the three fiscal circuits of Huaidong, Huaidong-West, and Huguang to purchase 1.2 million hu of rice annually: Huaidong-West 165,000; Huguang and Huaidong each 150,000. In year twenty-eight, aside from Liangzhe's 350,000 hu converted to cash payment, convoy rice from the circuits and procurement depots together yielded 4.52 million hu annually. In year twenty-nine, 2.3 million shi were purchased against future relief lending; each shi was paid two thousand cash, with guanzi notes, tea certificates, and silver making up the purchase sum.
41
西
In autumn of Emperor Xiaozong's third Qiandao year, Jiang, Zhe, Huai, and Min were battered by unseasonable rains; an edict ordered prefectures and counties to use their own capital to buy grain at seated granaries, without forcibly apportioning the burden on the people. In year four purchase funds were paid in huizi notes together with cash and silver, at two strings and five hundred wen per shi. In Chunxi year three the Guangxi transport commission was ordered to adjust purchase payments up or down according to harvest conditions and prevailing market prices.
42
使 沿西
In Baoqing year three Supervisory Censor Wang Gangzhong memorialized: "The abuses of harmonized purchase have accumulated over many years; to get at the root and reform them, there is no way around forbidding forced apportionment and price suppression. To stop forced apportionment and suppression, nothing works better than raising the price of rice—a measure already tried and proved. I ask that the responsible offices be ordered to enforce it." The throne assented. In Shaoding year one silver, huizi notes, and ordination certificates were issued to the Huguang general headquarters to harmonized-purchase seven hundred thousand shi of rice for army rations. In year five officials memorialized: "If cash levies owed by the people were instead paid in grain, sparing farmers from having to sell cheap and turn over cash, the benefit to cultivators would be considerable—this is an excellent method of broad procurement." The proposal was adopted. In Kaiqing year one the Yangzi garrison commissioner requisitioned five hundred thousand shi; the Hunan pacification commission five hundred thousand shi; Liangzhe transport five hundred thousand shi; the Huai-Zhe dispatch commission two million shi; the Jiangdong fiscal intendant three hundred thousand shi; Jiangxi transport five hundred thousand shi; Hunan transport two hundred thousand shi; Taiping Prefecture one hundred thousand shi; Huai'an Prefecture three hundred thousand shi; Gaoyou garrison five hundred thousand shi; Lianshui garrison one hundred thousand shi; and Luzhou one hundred thousand shi—all paid down in uniform huizi at prevailing rates to purchase grain for army rations.
43
西西西
In Xianchun year six the Secretariat reported: "For Xianchun year five harmonized-purchase rice, aside from western Zhejiang's permanent suspension of procurement and the Sichuan garrison commission's local purchase of two hundred thousand shi earmarked for army rations, Jinghu, Hunan, Jiangxi, and Guangxi together purchased 1.48 million shi—a pattern repeated in every harmonized-purchase year."
44
貿 調
Canal transport: the Song capital stood at Daliang, served by four rivers—the Bian, the Yellow River, the Huimin, and the Guangji—and the Bian carried by far the greatest volume. While rising to power Taizu won the realm, took warning from the disasters of Tang and Five Dynasties regional military governors, concentrated troops in the capital to keep the center strong and the periphery weak, and therefore treated military provisions as a matter of first importance. From Jianlong onward the three rivers were dredged first; thereafter every circuit's tax grain, monopoly profits, and tribute goods were to be moved to the capital in government-provided boats and carts, without conscripting the people and interfering with agriculture. In Kaibao year five, public and private boats on the Bian and Cai rivers were mobilized to transport several hundred thousand shi of Jiang-Huai rice for army rations. At that time the capital's annual needs were modest, and canal transport remained straightforward. By the early Taiping Xingguo era, with Liangzhe having submitted its territory, annual transport reached four million shi of rice. Everywhere people were hired to tow boats while officials seized every chance for graft. Transport boats sometimes carried extra cash, silk, and goods to the capital, or returned convoys to relay freight to outer circuits; chief storehouse clerks delayed receipts and disbursements—and so some officials traded in government goods on their own account. In year eight capable officials were chosen to divide responsibility for water and land dispatch in the capital. For each convoy the cost of boats, carts, and labor was calculated and paid to convoy chiefs for hiring; boat and cart movements and the receipt and disbursement of goods were all reported and supervised—and from that the abuses of delayed dispatch were eliminated.
45
使
At first in Jinghu, Jiang, Zhe, and Huainan prefectures wealthy local men were chosen to escort tribute goods; most were plain countrymen who could not control boat crews, and when boatmen plundered official goods the escorts were ruined and unable to make restitution. An edict ordered yamen clerks to escort the goods instead, so the people would no longer be harassed. The Datong supervisor transported iron to the imperial workshop for casting weapons; after forging and refining, only four or five usable pieces were obtained from every ten; Guangnan tribute rattan, once the coarse parts were removed, yielded only three liang of usable material per jin. Thereupon iron was ordered to be quenched and finished at the smith's shop, and only usable rattan was to be taken, so that heavy long-distance hauls would not exhaust the people's strength. Bian River boat-towing conscripts mostly starved and froze; Taizong ordered inner eunuchs to find about a hundred of them—tattered and emaciated—and when asked why, they said chief grain clerks routinely seized their rations. The emperor was furious; the culprits were arrested, interrogated, and found guilty; their wrists were severed and the limbs displayed on the riverbank for three days before execution; the escort officials were caned and exiled to Shangzhou. In Yongxi year four the water and land dispatch offices were merged into a single bureau. Convoy chiefs and conscripts who embezzled official goods, adulterated official rice with dirt and sand, or deliberately wrecked boats and caused sinking were executed in public, with rich rewards offered to informants; If loss truly came from shoals, sandbanks, or wind and water on rivers or level stretches, guilt was determined according to the shortfall in the amount salvaged. In Duangong year one the capital water and land dispatch office was abolished, and its duties were divided between the bank-arranging office and the unloading office. Previously the four rivers' transport quotas were not fixed; in Taiping Xingguo year six the Bian River moved three million shi of Jiang-Huai rice and one million shi of beans annually; the Yellow River five hundred thousand shi of grain and three hundred thousand shi of beans; the Huimin River four hundred thousand shi of grain and two hundred thousand shi of beans; the Guangji River one hundred twenty thousand shi of grain—in all five million five hundred thousand shi. Except when drought or flood brought tax remissions, the quota was never missed. In the early Zhidao period the Bian River transported 5.8 million shi of rice. In the early Dazhong Xiangfu era it reached seven million shi.
46
調使 西沿
Rent and purchase grain from Jiangnan, Huainan, Liangzhe, and Jinghu was received at granaries established at Zhen, Yang, Chu, and Si prefectures; boats were dispatched upstream into the Bian to reach the capital, under a dispatch commissioner appointed to oversee the system. Cash, silk, miscellaneous goods, and military equipment sent up from the prefectures followed the same system. Beans and grain from Shaanxi prefectures moved from the Yellow River's Sanmen Gorge downstream into the Bian to reach the capital, likewise under a dispatch office. Grain and silk reaching the capital via the Guangji River came from seventeen Jingdong prefectures; Those reaching the capital via Shitang and the Huimin River came from Chen, Ying, Xu, Cai, Guang, and Shou—six prefectures—all supervised by metropolitan court officials stationed on site. Northeast of Weizhou in Hebei the Yu River reached Qianning army, and its freight was likewise overseen by court officials stationed there. Guangnan gold, silver, aromatics, rhinoceros horn, ivory, and general merchandise went overland to Qianzhou and then by water. Gold, silk, and rent and market cloth from Sichuan and Yi prefectures were relayed from Jianmen in stages to Jiazhou, then connected by water to Jingnan, whence convoy officials were dispatched to carry them to the capital. In the Xianping period annual transport was fixed at six hundred sixty thousand bolts, divided into ten convoys. By the end of Tianxi, water and land transport of tribute gold, silk, and cash totaled more than 231,000 units of guan, liang, duan, and pi; pearls, gems, and aromatics more than 275,000 jin. Prefectures built transport boats each year; by the end of Zhidao there were 3,237 vessels; by the end of Tianxi the number had been reduced by 421. Previously the various rivers' transport quotas had steadily risen over the years; in Jingde year four the Bian River's annual quota was fixed at six million shi. In Tiansheng year four Jinghu, Jiang, and Huai prefectures and counties harmonized-purchased grain for tribute while common people went short of food; from year five onward the quota was temporarily reduced by five hundred thousand shi. During the Qingli period the Guangji River quota was reduced by another two hundred thousand shi. Later Yellow River transport dwindled further until only three hundred thousand shi of beans were moved; each year new transport boats were built, timber purchased, and yaqian labor conscripted—at enormous cost; In Jiayou year four bean transport was abolished and three hundred transport boats were cut from the fleet. From then on annual canal transport ran through only the three rivers.
47
使 使 貿
For Jiang and Hu tribute rice, circuit transport commissioners formerly used local convoys to deliver grain to relay granaries at Zhen, Chu, and Si, loaded salt for the return voyage, sent boats back to their home circuits, and sent conscripts home. Bian boats went to relay granaries to haul rice to the capital, making four round trips a year. When the river ran low in winter, boat conscripts also returned to camp and reassembled in spring—a practice called "release freeze." Conscripts received rotating rest, and desertions were few; Bian boats did not enter the Yangzi routes, so there was no risk of wind, waves, and sinking. Later dispatch commissioners grew more powerful; tribute rice from the six circuits was dispatched in unified convoys no longer delegated to home circuits, and they alone bore the full responsibility. Documents piled up and business multiplied beyond what could be inspected. Boat crews bribed clerks and were able to reach wealthy circuits, buy cheap and sell dear, and hurry on to the capital. From then on Jiang and Bian boats were indistinguishably mixed in transport, and some boat-towing conscripts never returned home in their lives, dying old on the waterways. Registers were filled with phantom names, and canal transport fell into grave disorder.
48
使 使使
During the Huangyou period Dispatch Commissioner Xu Yuan memorialized: "In recent years the circuits have grown lax and the grain-convoy system has broken down, so Bian convoys now go out onto the Yangzi in winter to handle other circuits' relay transport, and the crews never get rest. The circuits should be ordered to add boats and deliver rice to relay granaries to meet the annual quota as in former practice." Profit-seekers mostly agreed with Xu, and an edict followed his memorial. Before long the circuits' convoys failed to assemble. In Jiayou year three an edict sharply rebuked officials for defying imperial orders, the dispatch commissioner for failing to master convoy regulations, and transport commissioners for failing to manage annual intake. Advance orders went to the Jiang, Huai, and Liangzhe transport commissions with a one-year deadline to build boats, replenish crews, and organize home-circuit convoys; from Jiayou year five Bian boats were not to go out onto the Yangzi again. When the deadline arrived, the circuits still lacked enough boats. Bian boats no longer reached the Yangzi, Yangzi boats no longer reached the capital, and merchant profits were lost; Bian boat workers and conscripts sat idle through winter on rations that were always too short; they stole and stripped boat timber for cash to live on, boats deteriorated further, and transport quotas fell ever further short. Critics had initially wanted canal conscripts to get home leave, but in recent years Bian boats mostly hired laborers, with at most one or two conscripts per boat; in winter, when boats had to be guarded, none in fact got home leave. By then Xu Yuan had long since been dismissed; later appointees repeatedly memorialized to send Bian boats out again, but the chief ministers would not allow it. In Zhiping year three an edict first authorized seventy Bian convoys to go out; before long all were going out onto the Yangzi again as before.
49
西西 貿 使
In Zhiping year two canal grain reaching the capital totaled 5.755 million shi on the Bian River, 267,000 shi on the Huimin, and 740,000 shi on the Guangji. Gold, silk, and cash moved by canal to the Left Treasury and Inner Treasury totaled 11.73 million units, not counting inter-circuit transfers and mutual supplies. From Jingxi, Shaanxi, and Hedong firewood and charcoal were transported to the capital: 17.13 million jin of firewood and one million scales of charcoal. That year the circuits newly built 2,540 transport boats. In Zhiping year four the capital's store of polished rice would last more than five years. At this time canal clerks and conscripts up and down the system jointly embezzled and traded in government goods; in the worst cases they feigned losses to wind and water to cover their tracks. Official goods lost and damaged each year came to no less than two hundred thousand hu. In Xining year two Xue Xiang became dispatch commissioner for Jiang, Huai, and other circuits; he first recruited merchant boats to transport alongside official boats under mutual inspection, and the old abuses were eliminated. Once the regular annual quota was met, merchant boats had delivered another 260,000-plus shi to the capital and were still coming; he asked that this surplus count toward the next year's quota.
50
使 西便便 沿 使
Three Departments Commissioner Wu Chong said: "From next year Jiang-Huai canal rice should be cut by two million shi; the dispatch office should exchange the surplus for two million guan worth of light goods; over five years that should yield at least ten million guan, to be stored for equal purchase in the three circuits and border readiness." Wang Anshi replied: "Suddenly converting two million shi of rice would make rice crash in price; suddenly bringing in two million guan of light goods would make those goods soar in price. The dispatch office should identify rice-dear prefectures and circuits, convert payments into light goods, store them at strategic garrisons in Hedong and Shaanxi, and use the Ever-Normal method of sale and purchase—that would be the better course. An edict followed Wang Anshi's proposal. In the seventh year, Deng Runfu, inspector of Jingdong Circuit, and others memorialized: "The coastal prefectures of Shandong span a wide territory, and in good harvest years grain is cheap. If men were recruited for sea transport, Shandong grain could be moved to the Hebei frontier to help feed the armies. An edict directed the transport commissioners of Jingdong and Hebei circuits to study the proposal, but in the end it was never implemented. That year, less than one-third of the grain tribute from the Jiang and Huai regions actually reached the capital. The court ordered Transport Commissioner Zhang Kie to hurry preparations for the following year's canal transport plan.
51
使 使殿
Privy Seal Director Zhang Fangping said: "The present capital is what the ancients called Chenliu, a crossroads where the empire's great routes converge. Its location favors canal transport and the provisioning of armies. At the dynasty's founding, three canals were dredged to carry tribute grain, and standard quotas were set: six million shi on the Bian Canal, 620,000 on the Guangji Canal, and 600,000 on the Huimin Canal. Grain moved on the Guangji Canal served only to feed garrisons in counties such as Taikang, Xianping, and Weishi. Only the rice and wheat transported on the Bian Canal truly filled the reserves of the Great Granary. The Guangji Canal had recently been shut down, and grain from the Huimin Canal no longer reached the Great Granary. The public supply now depended overwhelmingly on the Bian Canal. Reformers keep proposing changes, and that would inevitably cause the Bian Canal to fall further from its former working order. In the twelfth month an edict ordered the Guangji Canal dredged and additional tribute-transport vessels built. Once the canal was finished, 600,000 shi of Jingdong grain were moved by it every year. Miscellaneous tribute goods from the southeastern circuits that had once gone by land were now carried by newly added boats. Escorts for Jiangnan and Jinghu grain convoys on the Bian Canal were assigned seven parts to third-rank envoy-officials and three parts to army generals and palace attendants. Zhen, Chu, and Si prefectures were each told to build a hundred shallow-draft boats, organized into ten convoys for entry into the Bian Canal.
52
使 西
In the fifth year of Yuanfeng the Guangji cartage office and the Jingbei shore-management office were abolished. Tribute goods were rerouted through Huaiyang for entry into the Bian, under the title of the Qinghe cartage commission. Censors pointed out that the Guangji runs easily with the current upstream, while the Qinghe must be navigated against the current into the Bian; the routes differ greatly in distance and difficulty. An edict directed the transport commissioners and judicial intendant-censors to weigh the pros and cons and report back. Jiang Zhiqi, vice-commissioner of Jianghuai dispatch, and Chen Youfu, supervisor of the Directorate of Waterways, opened the Guishan transport canal so that tribute convoys could travel back and forth, ending a century-old danger of foundering in wind and waves. An edict advanced each of them by two ranks, while other officials involved received varying reductions in the years required for routine promotion. In the eighth year the annual shipment of one million shi to the Western Capital was discontinued. Earlier, a canal link from the Luo into the Bian had been used to move southeastern grain and store it at Luoyang. Now the Ministry of Revenue memorialized to abolish that arrangement. That year regulations for rewarding and punishing Bian Canal grain convoys were issued, with inspections held at the end of each year. In Shaosheng 2 the Bian convoy system was reorganized into two hundred convoys altogether. Officials awaiting capital appointment who failed the qualifying examination were assigned to escort tribute grain, and the old practice of using yaqian, local men, and military clerks was discontinued. Before long, however, local men were again recruited to escort convoys on the various routes, just as in the past.
53
滿 西使 使 西 使
In Zhenghe 7 reward standards were established for prefects and vice-prefects in the six southeastern circuits who completed their terms after dispatching tribute grain, with promotion in rank and reduction of required service years varying from ten thousand to four hundred thousand shi. Zhang Gen, as vice-commissioner of Jiangxi West transport, moved 1.2 million shi of rice each year to the capital. Because Jiangnan's prefectures were distant and officials struggled to press collections, Gen regularly kept 300,000 shi on hand as a transport reserve to relieve the counties, a policy much praised at the time. In Xuanhe 2 an edict declared: "Rice and wheat convoys from the six circuits are to recruit officials according to law, giving first preference to junior envoys not yet at court, irregularly appointed officers of captain rank and above who had not yet been allowed to attend court, and tribute submitters to serve as escorts; Huainan convoys were rated at five trips; Liangzhe and Jiangdong within two thousand li at four; Jiangdong beyond that distance and Jiangxi at three; and Hunan and Hubei at two. If the shortfall in each case was less than five li, in addition to the standard rewards they were also allowed one outside assignment of their choosing. Recruitment of local men was abolished altogether. In the seventh year an edict ordered the Tribute Service offices and bureaus along the Jiang and Huai closed and the ornamental stone convoys abolished, and directed transport officials on each route to requisition boats at once and dispatch grain convoys to supply the frontier. Early in the Jingkang era the Bian Canal burst in places up to a hundred paces wide. While repairs were still under way the riverbed dried for more than a month, convoys ceased to move, and both Nanjing and the capital faced grain shortages. Chen Qiudao and other directors of waterworks were held responsible, and Chen Liangbi of the capital tribute office was ordered to join in managing the repairs. Within twenty days the water rose again, convoys arrived one after another, and grain supplies in both capitals were restored.
54
西 使西 西 沿
Hebei, Hedong, and Shaanxi yielded thin tax revenues, not enough to cover military expenses, and garrison and military farms produced little each year. Apart from grain purchases and frontier deliveries, millions in gold, silk, and cash were also sent out yearly from the inner treasury and the capital monopoly office. Envoy-officials and army generals were chosen to organize the supply lines. Hebei grain went by boat as far as Qianning Army; Hedong and Shaanxi grain as far as Heyang. From there overland transport was arranged, using depot troops or garrison soldiers, calling up militia, or hiring laborers, by cart or pack animal as the road allowed. Hebei was comparatively close, but the western route was long and crossed desert terrain, so transport there was extremely arduous. In Xining 6 an edict allowed the Bianyan frontier command to draw on sealed reserve funds in Hedong to purchase three hundred camels for moving grain and fodder along the border.
55
調 調 便 使 西調 西 西沿 西
In the fourth year of Yuanfeng the Hedong transport commission mobilized 11,000 laborers to march with the army. Leading urban households might supply as many as four hundred men; lesser households one or two hundred. Those who preferred to supply donkeys were credited three donkeys for five laborers, and every five donkeys required an additional driver. Hiring a laborer cost more than thirty thousand cash, and a donkey about eight thousand. With deadlines pressing hard, the people could not endure the burden. Military requisitions were oppressive and often pointless. Dates shipped a thousand shi from Jiang Prefecture to Lin and Fu were worth only four hundred cash per shi, yet freight alone cost about thirty strings per shi. Zhang Daning, transport judge of Jingyuan Circuit, said: "For moving supplies, carts are the most practical method. From Xining Fort to Moyikou, and from Moyikou to the foot of Dou Ridge, the route follows broad river valleys where carts can pass without hindrance. North of the ridge the country turns mountainous and waterless, and carts cannot easily travel there. A fort could be built south of the ridge at a favorable spot, with large carts from Zhenrong Army bringing grain and fodder that far, and army draft animals making short relay hauls wherever the troops happened to be. Small relay forts could also be built at measured intervals along the middle route, using laborers on their return trips, and in that way civilian burdens would be reduced by half. Emperor Shenzong praised the proposal. The Jingxi transport commission mobilized thirty thousand laborers from Jun and Deng prefectures, with one official assigned to escort every five hundred men on supply runs to Bianyan. In addition to the daily cash and grain paid on the home leg of the journey, the transport commission calculated the stages from the Shaanxi border to Yanzhou and paid thirty cash for grain and ten for firewood and vegetables per day, all in advance. The grand transport commission of Shaanxi hired carts and laborers in the prefectures, with relays at each prefecture along the way, paying two sheng of grain and fifty cash per man per day until the border was reached. Once grain crossed the frontier, only garrison troops were detailed to carry it. In the sixth year an edict ordered the Xihe Lanzhou frontier command to organize ten thousand men and two thousand horses at Lanzhou for grain and fodder transport, and to levy two thousand official and private camels from prefectures along the route for relay shipment from Xi and He. If labor proved insufficient, militia were called up. Non-urgent frontier supplies for Hedong and Shaanxi were sent in small convoys on successive days.
56
使西 調 西 西 調
In Daguan 2 Wu Zeren, grand transport commissioner of the capital region, said: "Grain for the western auxiliary armies receives 80,000 shi each year from the dispatch commission as supplemental aid. It is unloaded at Xingze, still forty or fifty li from the prefectural seat. Three cart relay stations are established, seventy men to each, and they can move 8,400 shi a month. As the volume of grain moved increased, relay troops were added in proportion. In the tenth month of Jingkang 1 an edict declared: "When war is waged in one quarter and several circuits are mobilized together, the armies have not yet won victory while the people's strength is already spent. In Jingxi, moving grain cost forty strings for each man carrying six dou; in Shaanxi the people paid more than a million strings above and beyond—news of it was appalling. This year harvests are abundant everywhere and grain overflows in the fields. Officials should buy locally at higher prices and must not lightly impose transport duties, in keeping with the court's wish to relieve the people. Convoy transport by water and the usual prefectural shift obligations are to continue unchanged. Such was the general pattern of overland transport by the three circuits to meet military expenses. Other county shipments and emergency mobilizations for temporary needs are not recorded here.
57
便 使
As for rotation transport, since the Xining era its methods began to change. Apart from the six million shi moved each year to the capital, the various granaries regularly held surpluses. When a prefecture reported a poor harvest, tribute was collected at premium rates; this was called quota grain. The prefecture's annual quota was met by substituting local granary stocks for shipment to the capital; this was called substitute dispatch. In good years grain was also purchased at fair prices. When grain was cheap the state bought it, so farmers were not harmed; in famine years cash was accepted in lieu of grain, which the people found convenient. Purchase capital grew year by year, and military rations remained ample. Early in the Chongning era, after Cai Jing became chief minister, he began hunting surplus funds for lavish spending. He appointed his protégé Hu Shiwen transport commissioner; Hu presented several million strings of purchase capital as tribute and was promoted to vice minister of revenue. Later appointees followed his example, making periodic tribute submissions until the purchase capital was exhausted; once the capital was gone, no further purchases could be made, and the reserves stood empty; once the reserves were empty there was nothing left for substitute dispatch, and the rotation system broke down altogether.
58
使 沿
In Chongning 3 Zeng Xiaoguang, minister of revenue, said: "In earlier years, from the Yangtze bank at Zhenzhou in the south to the Huai embankment at Chuzhou in the north, earthen dams held back water and blocked heavy vessels, forcing costly transshipment. Rotation granaries were therefore built beside the dams to receive shipments from each prefecture, and canal boats then carried the grain into the Bian to reach the capital. That spared the labor of hauling boats over the dams, but it also opened the door to embezzlement. During the Tiansheng era Transport Commissioner Fang Zhongxun memorialized to convert the dams at Zhen and Chu into sluice gates. Thereafter gold, silk, tea, cloth, and other southeastern goods went straight to the capital, but tribute grain from the six circuits still followed the rotation system, with officials and soldiers wasting funds and transit losses often reaching tens of thousands. He proposed that tribute grain from all six circuits, like other southeastern goods, be transported directly to the capital or unloaded at the Nanjing prefectural boundary, so as to end embezzlement and unauthorized borrowing. Thereafter each county in the six circuits was assigned its annual quota, and even distant Hunan and Hubei sent grain straight to the capital in what were called direct convoys. In good years no additional purchases were made, and in bad years no substitute dispatch was permitted. When direct convoy grain was on the move, the regulations were harsh. Any damaged boat had to be repaired on the spot without delay. Prefectures and counties, eager to speed convoys through, merely took bonds and paid cash fines. Communities all along the rivers were harassed, and unauthorized fees public and private sprang up everywhere. The salt monopoly had also broken down, so return voyages brought no profit. Boatmen deserted, boats rotted, and the whole system fell apart.
59
In Daguan 3 an edict ordered direct convoys from the following year to revert to the old rotation system. The transport commission was told to supervise repair of granaries, and Wang Shao, Ever-Normal intendant of Jinghu North, was to organize grain-transport vessels on the various routes.
60
宿
In Zhenghe 2 direct convoys were restored and the rotation granaries were torn down. Tan Ji memorialized: "The founders established rotation granaries at Zhen, Chu, and Si for three reasons: to meet emergencies at the capital, to buffer blockages on the canals, and to keep convoy boats loading and sailing in steady rotation without idle days. Since that system was abandoned the canals have grown shallower year by year, and the capital's grain reserves have faltered. The three Huainan rotation granaries must be restored. I ask that restoration begin at Sizhou and then extend to Zhen and Chu. Timber is already on hand and can be floated downstream, so the labor and expense should not be great. When harvests are good, reserves should be built up and the rotation system re-established by law. Xiang Ziyin, transport judge of Huainan, memorialized: "The rotation system embodies the idea of stabilizing grain prices through purchase. Where the Jiang region and lakes have rice, it can be bought at Zhen; where Liangzhe has rice, it can be bought at Yang; where Suzhou and Bozhou have wheat, it can be bought at Si. By watching harvest conditions across the six circuits, officials could substitute cash for grain wherever yields fell short, giving the transport commission room to maneuver. That not only eased fears of failing to meet annual quotas but also lightened the people's burdens. When the transport canals ran low, there was the Bian mouth granary to fall back on. What troubles us now is that the five million strings of purchase capital allocated each year has nearly all been swallowed up by shift obligations."
61
西 西 沿便
In Xuanhe 5 the court issued ordination certificates and salt and frankincense certificates worth one million strings each, ordering Lu Cong and Lu Zongyuan to purchase grain evenly and set it aside exclusively for rotation transport. Xiao Xuchen, transport judge of Jiangxi, said: "Rotation transport adds no real distance, and men are not worn out by repeated unloading. In good years grain can be bought in quantity and stored thickly against the capital's needs. Under direct transport the distances are greater and abuses multiply. East and west of the Yangtze and north and south of Jinghu, some regions could not finish even one trip in a year. Convoys entrusted with ten thousand shi might arrive short seven or eight thousand. Boats were abandoned, crews deserted, and only one or two in ten might survive. Shortfalls arose from delays, while officials along the route created endless obstructions. Some transport commissions failed to maintain their own boats and simply seized returning convoys from other routes—a practice especially harmful. An edict ordered the transport commission to take charge of the matter. In year 6 unscheduled tribute funds and six circuits' old dispatch-grain arrears were set aside as purchase capital; three million strings went to Lu Zongyuan to take Hunan's annual quota, advance shortfalls with regular quotas into relay granaries, then ship equal-purchase grain to the capital; direct convoys would end once relay grain moved in order. In the first year of Jingkang the court ordered tribute grain from the six southeastern circuits: Huainan and Two Zhe kept direct convoys, while the four Jiang and Hu circuits switched to relay transport.
62
西西西 西 西西
In Gaozong's Jianyan year 1 an edict required one-third of convoy grain from every circuit sent to the mobile court and the rest to the capital. In year 2 convoys from Two Guang, Hunan, and Jiangdong West were sent to Pingjiang; the capital region, Huainan, Jingdong, Hebei, Shaanxi, and the three convoy routes went to the mobile court. Another edict allowed Two Guang and Hunan convoys passing through Two Zhe to deliver at Pingjiang; Fujian convoys passing through Jiangdong West could also deliver at Jiangning. In year 3 convoy cash and grain were sent to the Jiankang Ministry of Revenue; gold, silver, and silks went to the mobile court. Early in Shaoxing the court matched grain to place: Two Zhe fed the mobile court, Jiangdong Huaidong, Jiangxi Huaixi, and Jinghu the E, Yue, and Jingnan garrisons. Required amounts were set, transport commissioners delivered them, and surpluses went to the mobile court—the same for cash and silks. Hiring boats and drafting laborers grew unbearably abusive; some people destroyed their boats or abandoned their fields.
63
調 便 沿
In Shaoxing year 4 Wu Jie mobilized Sichuan labor to move 150,000 hu of rice to Lizhou at over forty thousand cash per hu; hunger and disease killed many on the road, and the people of Shu suffered. Transport commissioner Zhao Kai let people deliver grain to inner prefectures and hired boats to haul it—a welcome relief. General-command officials bought grain along the river and set up markets in Xing, Li, and Lang, allowing merchant entry submission. Still fearing popular exhaustion, the court also cut Chengdu water-transport matched-purchase grain. Shaoxing year 16.
64
殿
In year 30 tribute rice was allocated by circuit: Ezhou's 450,000-plus shi yearly came from Quan, Yong, Chen, Shao, Dao, Heng, Tan, E, and Ding; Jingnan's 96,000 shi came from De'an, Jingnan, Li, Chun, Tan, Fu, Jingmen, and Hanyang; Chizhou's 144,000 shi came from Ji, Xin, and Nan'an; Jiankang's 550,000 shi came from Hong, Jiang, Chi, Xuan, Taiping, Linjiang, Xingguo, Nankang, and Guangde; the mobile court needed 1,120,000 shi yearly; beyond Two Zhe grain, Jiankang, Taiping, and Xuan supplied the rest; Xuanzhou's Palace Front Office horse pastures and 30,000 shi of fodder paid in conversion were allocated within the prefecture; all drawn from circuit transport commissions' sealed stores. Armies inside and outside the capital then consumed three million hu yearly, excluding Sichuan.
65
便 西調
When war broke out in Jiading, Yang-Chu transport never stopped and boats reached Hao, Lu, and Anfeng easily; yet the Fuguang garrison depended on supplies from Qi'an, Shu, and Qi; the distant hauls ran a thousand li, the near ones still several hundred. Western Jing stores reached Xiang and Ying directly; only Zaoyang used overland hauls with laborers drafted from Hubei's Ding and Li; roads were vast, each man carried at most eight dou, yet food, sandals, and local exactions often made costs ten times the grain. Middle-income families paid forty or fifty thousand cash to hire a substitute; when a weak household sent one man on corvée the family scattered, and some died on the road.
66
Convoy escort fell to incumbent officials, or when posts were vacant to acting, awaiting-replacement, or capable resident officials—a complex, dreaded duty. From Shaoxing onward generous rewards were set, and many forms of leniency applied to shortfalls. Early in Qiandao shortfalls of fifty shi or less were remitted; in year 3 shortfalls of one hundred shi or less were remitted. In year 9 convoy shortfalls of one-tenth or more were first sent to the responsible offices for investigation. Then officials ruled that shortfalls of one-tenth or more could be made up instead. In the first year of Chunxi an edict declared: "Regardless of the amount owed, no remission shall be granted. Officials demoted for convoy shortfalls who had not embezzled and had fully paid up could have their ranks restored." Thereafter convoy losses were charged to officials, yet because routes crossed vast distances no one person could fully account for them, and remission was sometimes implied as well.
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