← Back to 宋史

卷一百九十三 志第一百四十六 兵七

Volume 193 Treatises 146: Military 7

Chapter 193 of 宋史 · History of Song
← Previous Chapter
Chapter 193
Next Chapter →
1
Military Affairs VII (Recruitment Regulations)
2
Recruitment as an institution began when the fubing garrison system was abandoned. In late Tang, troops exhausted by constant campaigning often fled. The Later Liang founder ordered every army to tattoo unit marks on recruits' faces, creating the standing expeditionary forces. At muster they first measured stature, then tested running, leaping, and eyesight; only then were faces tattooed, cash and kit issued, and names entered on the rolls. Early Song kept these methods: peasants might be recruited and formed locally; sons of serving soldiers could enlist with their parent commands; famine refugees might fill home garrisons; or convicts could be assigned as labor troops. Recruits came from many channels, but the fit went to the Palace Guards, the less robust to the Provincial Corps, organized in companies and governed by strict regulations. Peacetime still brought costs for ranks, rewards, and rations; but in war these men fought and moved supplies, turning the empire's toughest unemployed into protectors of ordinary citizens.
3
便
Taizu first picked the army's strongest men as "model soldiers," sent them to each circuit, and ordered recruitment to match those standards. Later wooden staffs graded by height—the "graded-height staffs"—replaced the models, and circuit administrators and camp supervisors measured recruits against them. Recruits sent to court were re-tested by the Military Appointment Bureau, presented before the emperor at informal audience, and assigned to regiments.
4
Under Zhenzong in the Xiangfu period, height standards were reset in five grades from five foot eight to five foot five; prefectures sent qualified men to court and slotted them by grade.
5
西西
In Renzong's first Tiansheng year, circuits from Jingdong through Huainan to Shaanxi were ordered to recruit; men sent to court were tattooed "Command," and their families received rations. Officers returning from duty were rewarded or penalized according to their recruitment totals. Another edict required Yi, Li, Zi, and Kui to raise troops yearly; once quotas were met, recruits were sent to court and assigned to the Fengjie, Chuan Loyalty, and Chuan Dedication armies. Thus fierce, jobless men from remote circuits all gained employment.
6
In Qingli 7, Provincial Corps men and recruits five foot seven or taller were sent to court for testing into the Palace Guards.
7
西
In Zhihe 1, Hebei, Hedong, and Shaanxi raised "grain-paid" troops, with four hundred cavalry or five hundred infantry per battalion.
8
In Jiayou 2 height standards were revised again: from the Upper Four Armies through Wusu and Zhongjing all required five foot or more, with pay graded by fractions of an inch—for a one-thousand-cash stipend, three grades at five foot eight, five foot seven, and five foot three. For seven hundred cash, three grades at five foot seven, five foot six, and five foot five. For five hundred cash, three grades at five foot six and five foot five and a half. For four hundred cash, two grades at five foot five and five foot four and a half. For three hundred cash, six grades from five foot five down to five foot two. For two hundred cash, four grades from five foot four to five foot two. Men without stipends were graded at five foot two or below, down to five foot seven or eight tenths of a cun. Only Wuyan and imperial scout units took men chosen for skill; warehouse clerks and technical specialists were exempt from height grading.
9
In year 7, Censor Tang Jie reported that recent Palace Guard recruits were often too slight for armor and urged locking heights to the original standards, with penalties for anyone who tried to lower them. The court replied that combat-ready Guards should follow this rule. Reserve units such as Xiongwu, Xuanchi Six Armies, and labor corps would follow separate cavalry regulations.
10
西 使
In Zhiping 2, Shaanxi locals and soldiers' sons filled Palace Guard battalions only to eighty percent of quota. Envoys also recruited around the capital and in Cao, Pu, Dan, Chen, Xu, Cai, and Bo to fill Huyi and Guangyong units, with an extra bolt of silk and cloth per man.
11
In Zhiping 4, Yanzhou was ordered to raise five Baojie battalions for rotating frontier service. In Xining 1, all circuits were told to recruit famine refugees into the Provincial Corps.
12
便
In Xining 2, the Bureau of Military Affairs noted that early Song had demobilized frontier troops in peacetime, yet after the peace treaty garrisons had swollen, wasting vast sums. Raising more troops in cheap-grain districts inland and posting them only on the far frontier would be far more efficient. The emperor consulted Wen Yanbo, Han Jiang, Chen Shengzhi, and Lü Gongbi; some argued camp armies had always been hired and discharged after crises, others that border forces could not be cut deeply. He ordered Yanbo's group to study the matter and report back.
13
西
In month 7 of Xining 3, Jingxi was told to raise Provincial Corps in grain-rich prefectures, cap thirty thousand. In month 11, Dingzhou prefect Teng Fu asked to restore local archer militia recruitment for border defense. The request was granted.
14
西使
In month 12 of year 4, the Bureau reported capital labor troops were 6,392 below their 18,259 quota; filling them locally would spare men the diseases and deaths of long transfers. They proposed recruiting young men near the capital for capital labor only, barred from official drafts, to reach full strength within a year. External recruiting would be cut correspondingly, and saved rations banked for court ministries. The plan was approved.
15
In year 5, acting Yanzhou commissioner Zhao Qi raised 4,984 Han and tribal archers in eight commands; he was promoted to Vice Minister of Personnel with two hundred bolts of silver silk.
16
使
In year 7, envoys were sent to circuits to scout and recruit Xihe auxiliaries, names to be reported in advance. Hebei and Hedong recruiting was halted entirely. In year 8, soldiers with aged, ill parents lacking caregivers at home could transfer to posts nearer kin.
17
In year 9, vacancies in Pengri, Tianwu, and subordinate guards were to be filled at one-third for cavalry and half for infantry.
18
沿使 西
In the second year of Yuanfeng-II, the Xihe frontier finance office asked for ten pasture supervisors at Minzhou and Tongyuan stockades, staffed by recruited pasture troops. For farming they wanted two hundred Yongji soldiers per estate, up to one thousand Yongji troops total. Approved. In month 7, border officials asked three thousand cash each for intelligence officers, recruited from officials or civilians to spy on enemies. Assistant prefects and supervisors would verify reports for rewards or penalties. Approved. That year famine in Yan, Yun, Qi, Ji, and other circuits led to recruiting refugees to fill capital and Jingdong unit vacancies.
19
In year 3, an edict noted ten thousand capital-region Guard vacancies and ordered rapid filling. Another edict directed Hebei flood victims without food into provisional army recruitment.
20
西調
In year 4, east and west Jingdong repeatedly asked for more garrison troops after troop deployments. The court, holding to fixed troop ceilings, usually ignored these requests. Still, coastal and mountain prefectures faced bandits and deserved consideration: widen recruitment and grant one-year exemptions from tied-garrison duty and other labor duties. In month 6, an edict ordered recruiting 10,500 capital infantry and cavalry among men paid under seven hundred cash. The capital district would also raise ten thousand militia and baojia troops. Shortfalls in Jingyuan's five thousand would be made up from Qinfeng.
21
西
In year 5-V, tea commissioner Pu Zongmin proposed twenty-eight relay depots from Qinzhou to Xizhou with recruited escort troops. Approved. In month 8, recruits in the capital district and Jingxi received an extra thousand cash beyond standard bounty. In month 12, capital patrols recruited men under thirty-five at the four city gates. Hebei also set infantry quotas, allowing each command one hundred men above establishment.
22
In year 5, officers who recruited a hundred men within a year gained one rank. In month 4, Hedong asked to enlist Linzhou Feiqi and Fuzhou Weiyuan youths under twenty-five.
23
西使
In year 7, Guangxi reported large native-troop vacancies and asked to recruit four thousand transfer soldiers from Fujian, Jiangnan, and Guangdong. Jiangnan and Fujian officials were ordered to conduct transfers.
24
使 西
In year 8-IV, Hedong pacifier Lü Huiqing said dare-brave troops, capped at three hundred, drew few recruits because pay was low. On Zhiyan he had raised pay three grades, loaned provincial horses at seventy percent fodder, and set up a training camp—after which enrollment surged. He asked to apply the same Shaanxi rules to Hedong. Approved.
25
In Yuanyou 1-III, Hebei militia volunteers meeting Palace Guard height and skill standards got extra bounties—five thousand cash above Central Army level, three thousand below. Men one finger short who could draw first-grade militia bows might still enlist. This followed a memorial from Right Remonstrance Su Che. In month 6, Vice Minister Sima Guang urged circuits with wholly inadequate garrisons to set quotas and recruit replacements.
26
In year 8, the Bureau noted new recruits were often famine refugees untrained in drill and asked garrison prefectures to train them six months before front-line deployment. In Shaosheng 1, the Bureau proposed reward-and-punishment standards for recruitment officers missing quotas.
27
西 便
In year 4, the Lanzhou frontier office approved four Baojie infantry and one tribal cavalry command at Jincheng Pass. Shaanxi was told to add ten five-hundred-man tribal commands at five prefectures, trained locally and recruited by the frontier commander. The Secretariat and Bureau had long tried recruiting herdsmen without success; Zeng Bu argued expanding cavalry was simpler. Native troops were the empire's best fighters, and expeditionary pools were drained; the plan won universal assent, including the emperor's. Pasture rents held seven million with 1.7 million annual income, while ten new commands cost only 250,000—so both cavalry expansion and civilian horse programs could coexist.
28
In Huizong's Chongning 1, Hubei commander Shu Dan was ordered to raise Shi and Qian native levies against Yao rebels, capped at seven hundred per prefecture. Yao raiders hid in ravines where regular armies could not operate.
29
In year 3, Jingdong and other circuits raised fifty thousand troops: cavalry named Chongjie and Chongrui, infantry named Chongwu and Chongwei.
30
使 使
In year 4-VII, Xihe commissioner Hong Zhongfu, arriving from Hedong, was asked whether the new Chongwei and Chongrui units were drilled. Zhongfu replied that drilling them was easy. I do not know whether the armies Taizu used to conquer the empire and those Shenzong gave to commanders were ever cut; if not, expansion may be unnecessary. Armies should be lean, not massive; adding two corps now costs dearly—I wonder whether planners have funding beyond the regular budget or expect the court to pay. The emperor was taken aback. "When we first debated expanding the army, no one talked about cost—call it off at once." Zhongfu replied that idle soldiers would not simply return to the fields; if abruptly discharged, strong men would band together as robbers and weak ones would become refugees, creating fresh troubles for the court. It would be better to use them to fill vacancies in the camps. Where quotas were full, hold the surplus until openings appeared; within a year or two the excess would disappear naturally. The emperor approved. In the ninth month an edict noted that recent orders had called for recruiting one hundred thousand men into Chongjie, Chongwu, and related commands in the capital and every circuit, along with Xiaozhong and tribal units to cover quota shortfalls. Because filling every slot at once seemed impractical, Chongjie and Chongwu were to raise the first hundred thousand. Once recruitment showed steady progress, officials were to submit a full report for the emperor's decision.
31
In the fifth year an edict declared that anyone of any status who had been forced into the army might appeal for himself or his kin, and that men already branded with military tattoos were also to have the matter corrected.
32
西西西
In Zhenghe 2 the Guangxi command reported that its two generals were authorized more than 10,300 men, but deaths and desertions had forced recruitment onto Jinghu and Jiangnan circuits, where officials treated the work as outside their main duties and gave it little attention. With six tenths of the force now missing, they asked to fill quotas from this circuit and its neighbors by drafting serious offenders sentenced to exile or beating, except men sent to Shamen Island or remote Guangnan, violent robbers, murderers, arsonists, cases touching foreign affairs, and others barred by law; all the rest were to be spared flogging and branding and assigned directly to service. The request was granted.
33
使
In the fourth year Central Guard Grandee Tong Shimin observed that southeastern prefectures usually had no garrison troops and relied on hired labor for every task. If prefects and circuit judicial commissioners were ordered to recruit and fill those quotas, the state might save considerable expense. Approved.
34
使
In Xuanhe 1 Wu Jie, pacification commissioner of the Gaoyang Pass circuit, received a handwritten edict to fill forbidden-army vacancies across the empire. On a scale of ten parts, officials who filled four tenths or less would have their merit-review cycles lengthened step by step, while those reaching seven tenths or more would have them shortened. Hejian, Cang, Ba, En, and the Xin'an Army on the Gaoyang Pass circuit had filled their quotas and asked for promotion rewards. The request was granted.
35
使
In the second year a handwritten edict complained that circuits and garrisons raising garrison units such as river-clearing and wall-guard corps were enrolling timid, undersized youths who failed to meet standards, wasted rations, and could not be put to use. Henceforth all recruitment was to follow the standing regulations, with violations punished as breaches of imperial orders.
36
便
In the first month of the fourth year the Eastern Liangzhe command asked to expand six existing non-jianjiang forbidden-army commands at Wen, Chu, Qu, and Wu into ten commands of five hundred men each, totaling five thousand, so as to complete a full general's force. They also sought to raise one more non-jianjiang forbidden-army command at Taizhou with a quota of four hundred. The request was granted. In the third month officials reported widespread panic on the roads: armies were seizing men and branding them to cover quota shortfalls, often with several soldiers dragging and beating one able-bodied man while he screamed and some even bit their fingers begging to be spared. At a recent great gathering at Jinming Pool, soldiers suddenly sealed the gates and swept the crowd, hauling off every tall youth they found with the cry that he was being drafted. Vegetable sellers stopped entering the city, and travelers, shopkeepers, and even servants hid in terror—a spectacle that horrified all who saw it. The empire was at peace; if the court truly wanted to fill the capital guard, it should publish clear rules, pay generous bounties in gold and silk, and spend a million in cash—then a hundred thousand men would enlist willingly. Snatching men on the highways truly shamed the state, and word of it spread everywhere, near and far, to the court's great detriment. They begged the throne to forbid the practice at once and restore public confidence. About then the Baolu Palace Daoist Zhang Jizi was branded while traveling to Weishi; when the case reached the throne, a handwritten edict ordered the judicial commissioners to investigate it to the full. In the fourth month officials added that when the Bureau of Military Affairs set overly tight deadlines to tattoo recruits and fill forbidden-army shortfalls, the camps ran wild and the populace was terrified. Fortunately an imperial grace edict soon forbade the practice, and public opinion settled. Many men who had been branded against their will had already been released, though some who had appealed to the authorities were still waiting. If such abuses occurred at the capital, what must be happening in the provinces? Petty men everywhere were abusing their power to seize victims, and even when a man escaped after pleading, his household was often already ruined. Travelers still moved about in fear. They asked the emperor to issue a special warning that recruiting parties in the provinces must not exceed their authority. The request was granted.
37
In the seventh year the court cut Inner Palace spending, reduced the monthly stipends of attendants and higher officials, abolished concurrent bureaus, and directed the savings toward grain-purchase funds and recruitment bounties on the circuits.
38
使
When Qinzong took the throne, he ordered magistrates to enlist local strongmen as squad leaders, each to raise men from his own neighborhood. Leaders who raised fifty men received the rank of Advance Righteousness Vice Commander, and those who raised three hundred received Trustworthy Gentleman; civil and military officials versed in arms were recruited as unit commanders. On the day they marched, the issuing prefecture or garrison supplied arms and armor and half a month's rations, with counties along the route continuing payment for men coming from far away. The Capital Region Pacification Bureau reported that dare-brave volunteers recruited on the circuits were to receive three thousand cash in advance, then report to the bureau for testing and certification before receiving silver and silk bonuses. Officials who raised two hundred or more skilled dare-brave volunteers were to receive one rank of promotion, with the same reward for every additional two hundred. Any surveillance commissioner, prefect, or county official who delayed matters tied to the military deadline would be punished under military law. Approved.
39
西 使 西使使
In the first month of Jingkang 1 officials noted that circuits were recruiting troops but local transport offices lacked funds, and asked permission to draw on nearby imperial tribute stores and the Yanfu Palace treasury in the west city so recruitment could proceed quickly. The request was granted. Another edict ordered circuits to select men to fill vacancies in the Dragon Fierce, Dragon Cavalry, Return Far, Strong Brave, and related corps. A further edict directed each locality to recommend rewards by rank according to how many skilled dare-brave volunteers it had raised under earlier orders. Another edict noted that men seeking promotion rewards were forcibly pressing recruits into service. Henceforth only willing volunteers were to be accepted, and violators would face severe punishment. Weak men unfit for combat and men already registered in the army were not to be enrolled indiscriminately. An edict also called for recruiting military examination graduates with proven talent and strategy, men with battle honors or field experience, frontier commissioners regardless of pending criminal cases, martial academy students of proven wit, former bow-and-horse institute trainees, and all other brave fighters willing to serve, and allowing them to report to the Personal Campaign Headquarters. Another edict ordered Shaanxi locals, commissioners, and volunteers to report to Yao Pingzhong's army, with recruits paid twenty strings if ranked Xi Wu Lang or higher, fifteen strings if Jin Yi Vice Commander or higher, and ten strings for soldiers and commoners, all from Kaifeng's official treasury.
40
In the fourth month an edict ordered envoys returning from the Jin front to proceed as previously directed, but allowed men who refused to be issued travel vouchers and sent home. Officials who held posts were to suspend their duties and receive half pay. Men willing to serve at the front were permitted to volunteer.
41
西 西使 西 西 使西
In the fifth month the Hebei-Hedong Pacification Bureau reported that Hebei garrisons held very few regular troops, while many idle men in Shaanxi were willing to enlist, but quotas stayed unfilled because standard enlistment gifts were lacking. If the court paid enlistment bounties in silver and silk, raised the men as Righteous Braves with a tattoo only on the right arm, and supplied clothing and rations at forbidden-army rates, Shaanxi's five circuits could furnish twenty thousand men far more useful than the general troops raised in Huai and Zhe. The proposal was approved, and the throne sent one civil and one military official to Shaanxi to raise twenty thousand men for the capital. Zhao Ding was specially appointed a Kaifeng prefectural clerk and Zhong Xiang a reserve general on the pacification staff, both assigned to Shaanxi solely to handle recruitment. That same month Household Vice Director Chen Shiyin was sent to Fujian to recruit spearmen and staff fighters. Director of Waterways Chen Qiudao warned that officials sent to Shaanxi to raise troops had arrived during a bumper harvest, when recruitment would be difficult. If surveillance commissioners were instead told to mobilize the baojia militia with enlistment gifts and corvée exemptions to stir their morale, fifty thousand strong fighters could be raised. Approved.
42
西 西
In the sixth month Bureau Chief Zhe Yanshi warned that the western peoples had long been allied with the Jurchen and surely harbored designs on Guanzhong. Every circuit was now stripped of troops and horses; if the enemy drove deep into the realm, how could the court hold them off? The thought was chilling, yet the court seemed not to have weighed it seriously. The crisis in the Hedong region has already become visible, and the people are anxious; the danger in Shaanxi had not yet materialized, so people ignored it. If each circuit were given one hundred thousand strings upfront and its commander ordered to recruit local men for defense, hold the passes, and bar enemy entry, the court would still have to back the effort. Transport commissioners should urgently build up grain reserves while there was still time.
43
Kaifeng Prefect Nie Shan also submitted that raising troops was the day's most urgent business. Recently every county around the capital had taken to branding recruits, and when no one volunteered they seized villagers and travelers off the roads. Country folk fled in panic and merchants stopped traveling, a gross betrayal of the court's duty to protect the people. Under the Zhenghe code, repeat thieves sentenced to flogging or worse who could not be released but were fit for service were to receive enlistment gifts and be branded into garrison corps. Bold, hardened thieves still prowled inside and outside the capital; though convicted, they remained unreformed. Drafting them into garrison service under that rule would not only supply strong recruits but also sweep the worst offenders off the streets. If approved, the policy could be applied from the capital outward for all to see. The request was granted.
44
西使使 使使 西 西
In the seventh month Shaanxi Five-Circuit Commissioner Qian Gai reported that Director of Waterways Chen Qiudao had proposed branding fifty thousand baojia militiamen into regular service. Regular troops in western Shaanxi were already scarce and local defense depended entirely on the baojia; after grain transport and corvée duties almost no able men remained. Drafting fifty thousand more would leave few prime males to choose from, alarm the populace, and invite unrest. He asked that prefectures and counties explain the plan to the baojia and accept only volunteers; and if too few volunteered, that the baojia office choose men from the remaining pool of prime males. Together with men already bound for the capital, seventy thousand would be enough. Approved. That month Qian Gai reported that locals recruited in Shaanxi were mostly urban rabble unfit to face the enemy. If Zhe Yanshi allocated one hundred thousand strings of copper cash to each of Shaanxi's six circuits and added ten thousand cash per recruit, the state could carefully select able young men meeting standards and raise ten thousand regular soldiers per circuit, sixty thousand in all. The request was granted.
45
In the tenth month the Bureau of Military Affairs proposed recruiting men of proven martial skill and courage, including hunters and professional hunting households. Approved. It also proposed recruiting in Fujian men of loyal spirit and martial merit who sought office through service, allowing archers, commoners, monks, and even convicted soldiers to enlist alongside the baojia regulars. Men of outstanding skill and recognized courage who volunteered to lead were to serve temporarily as unit commanders and receive provisional rank according to the number they raised. The request was granted.
46
滿 使
By the eleventh month a hundred thousand defenders manned the capital's four walls, and yellow-clad troops with yellow banners filled the streets. Most who enlisted were vagrants and beggars with no will to fight. In intercalary November He Li put Wang Jian in charge of raising irregular troops; even ladle-carrying beggars enlisted, and the unit was hurriedly assembled without proper discipline. The irregulars mutinied, assaulted Wang Jian, and slew dozens of court agents, throwing the Inner Front into chaos. Wang Zongsu beheaded several ringleaders and restored order. Sent into battle, they were overrun by heavy cavalry, broke and fled at first shock, and were wiped out.
47
In December an edict declared that any troops who masqueraded as Jurchen raiders to loot would receive amnesty if they returned stolen goods and surrendered within ten days. Routed soldiers were also to be collected and registered. They were to receive rations.
48
滿 滿 滿 使沿滿 沿 調 滿 滿
Desertion laws had been revised repeatedly since the dynasty's founding. In Xining 5 an edict decreed execution for Palace Guards on the five-hundred-cash pay grade who remained absent seven full days. Under the old rule, three days' absence meant death. At first the chief ministers proposed reform and asked that the limit be ten days. The emperor objected: "Men who flee during combat could still surrender after ten days — would that not reward cowardice?" Wang Anshi replied that desertion in battle already carried immediate execution regardless of days counted. Should we instead treat three days' absence during mobilization as desertion against the enemy, under the bandit-combat statute? Military Affairs Commissioner Cai Ting urged that frontier deserters absent three full days be beheaded. Wang Anshi countered that the frontier included many posts not under wartime mobilization, and heavy penalties could not be applied uniformly. The harsh law had been meant only to deter men from fleeing the enemy or wartime service. The emperor agreed. Wen Yanbo insisted that military law was the ministers' charge and should not be altered lightly, warning that past troop reductions had sparked uprisings. Wang Anshi answered that disasters like Du Yuanying's demobilization stemmed from poor execution, not from demobilization itself. Under Chancellor Xiao Fu the empire had fielded more soldiers than the populace could support — reduction had been unavoidable. When Youzhou sent Zhu Kerong and others to court with a plea not to return Kerong lest he stir rebellion in the north, the court instead kept them stranded in the capital, left them unassigned for years, and then sent them home again. Zhu Kerong's renewed revolt had nothing to do with troop reduction. Wen Yanbo cited the founding-era rule that Palace Guard deserters gone even one day were beheaded. Renzong had extended the limit to three days, and critics even then feared it would erode discipline. Wang Anshi replied that Renzong's reform had saved countless lives without any evident rise in desertions — it had been a sound change. The emperor ordered the limit raised to seven days.
49
In Yuanyong 1 Wang Shao, prefect of Ezhou, proposed allowing deserter-convicts turned bandits to be killed on capture, with a bounty offered. The throne replied with a formal note to Shao: offenses grave yet short of capital punishment were to be referred for imperial review.
50
In the sixth month of year 3 an edict required that deserters who rejoined as volunteers be shackled and returned to their commands for punishment under the statutes. Battle honors would not be rewarded, and merit could not expiate the offense. The order was to be posted throughout the campaign camps.
51
In year 4 the throne instructed Shen Kuo to report that front-line deserters scattered along the roads had often fled from necessity and should be pacified at once. Shen Kuo was to issue a proclamation explaining that men had fled chiefly from hunger and cold, allowing them to surrender arms at nearby posts, draw rations, and rejoin their commands. He was to report recovery totals as they came in.
52
簿
In Chongning 4, ninth month, the Bureau of Military Affairs noted that the Xihe headquarters lacked roster records and asked each commander to keep daily strength accounts, submit ten-day reports on quotas and desertions, post a master ledger, and assign an aide for spot inspections. Granted.
53
In October the Ministry of Revenue reported that deserters were gathering by the thousands, terrorizing villages or turning openly to robbery. Repeated amnesties allowing surrender or transfer had failed to stop the problem. Shenzong had separated command from troops precisely because officers and men did not know each other. Commands charged with every aspect of troop welfare surely bore responsibility for desertion and death in service. Neither regulations nor active code assigned accountability to commanders and staff, so officers overworked their men until they deserted while responsible officials went unpunished. Nearly forty thousand men had recently deserted in Xihe alone, while deputies looked on, staff winked, and fugitives filled the countryside. Vague laws and a chain of squad leaders, officers, and clerks bound to the same camp made unchecked desertion inexcusable. If recruitment brought rewards, flight surely demanded penalties. The ministry now drafted more than ten articles of reward and punishment. All granted.
54
西便
In year 5 the bureau relayed Tong Guan's report that Shaanxi officials had been inviting deserters to surrender anywhere without interrogation and issuing travel rations for return to camp. Border troops, dreading garrison duty, were surrendering in interior prefectures to collect vouchers and return — a habit that would undermine discipline. He asked that all surrenders be reviewed against amnesty deadlines, with post-amnesty deserters punished under the statutes. Granted.
55
西 使便 使
In Daguan 3 officials traced the problem to Judicial Intendant Wu Anxian's policy of luring provincial garrison deserters with transfer and re-enlistment. The practice had bred abuses and slackened discipline. The court had tightened the law, yet fraud in enlistment remained. Commanders were filling rolls with fugitives under false names to cover deserters, avoid censure, or shift troublesome men or skilled laborers between units. Officers evaded blame while drawing fraudulent pay; fraud became entrenched, and soldiers learned they could desert with impunity. He urged heavier rewards and stricter penalties to restore discipline. Granted.
56
便
In year 4 the bureau reported that deserters remained numerous despite amnesty deadlines. It proposed assigning local officials to recruit deserters, with merit-review reductions for three hundred or more men and imperial honors for one thousand or more.
57
使
In Zhenghe 2 officials declared that founding-era military institutions had been sound. Recent desertions stemmed from lax enforcement by local and command officials. Six causes were cited: extortion, usurious camp loans, gambling, unfair assignments, excessive escort distances, and bachelor soldiers without family support. Though all were prohibited, violations were rampant. They asked for investigation, annual desertion comparisons by circuit judicial commissioners, and reports on best- and worst-performing prefectures. Granted.
58
使便 沿
In the eleventh month of year 3 Kaifeng Vice Prefect Chen Yanxiu reported more than 5,700 frostbite victims in the wards, many of them deserters requiring action. He proposed escorting them in parties of twenty to stable official shelters, providing relief rations under the residency-care law until fair weather allowed transit. Travel vouchers were to follow standard deserter-escort rules, with additional travel funds beyond the usual allowances. An edict granted each man three hundred cash, a padded jacket, and dispatch after fair weather in the second month.
59
In year 4 the ministry codified that deserters caught before reaching the front or after half a year of relief service were assigned per capture statutes even during amnesty. Upper-army deserters who surrendered or were captured during amnesty faced assignment under the seven-day rule. Lower-army men liable for assignment were sent a thousand li. Units that illegally detained deserters shared the guilt, and assignment stood even under amnesty. Granted.
60
In year 5 a law was enacted to tattoo the backs of mint workers' hands if they fled.
61
西西滿 滿 沿 滿
In Xuanhe 2 an imperial note directed the Pacification Office to address rising desertions. Tong Guan replied that winter amnesties allowed hundred-day surrenders, yet men with prior offenses feared reduced sentences or reassignment and would not come forward. He asked a hundred-day surrender window for deserters in the capital region, Jingxi, Shaanxi, and Hedong, with restoration to original ranks. Replacement duties and official debts would be waived. Remaining penalties from pre-amnesty offenses would be specially waived. After the deadline, normal penalties would apply. Capital-based deserters surrendering in the capital were to be returned to camp the same day. Men on expedition were to be escorted via travel voucher to their garrison circuit and restored to duty with amnesty. Interior surrenders entitled men to two sheng of rice daily, same-day transfer in batches of twenty with escorts and travel rations to their home garrisons. Expedition troops were held at their staging garrison. Surrendering soldiers could not transfer to other units. Officials who successfully returned deserters within the deadline could earn honors verified by the judicial commissioners or Kaifeng prefecture. All granted.
62
使
In year 3 an edict pardoned deserters from Jiang-Zhe fronts, allowing surrender along expedition routes with restored pay and temporary local custody. Men captured elsewhere were to be sent promptly to their commander's summons. Pacification, command, and judicial officers were charged with oversight; concealment would be punished as a regulatory violation.
63
使
In year 4 officials reported that desertion without cause was widespread throughout the empire. Under the founding emperors, military discipline was severe: garrison soldiers who went home or active-duty men who shirked service faced execution at the camp gate. Today they are pardoned and allowed to transfer to other units without permission from squad leaders; Amnesty deadlines were set—and then extended—to give deserters more time to turn themselves in. I fear deserters will take advantage of this, and the problem will only grow worse. Aside from general amnesties, please do not grant grace periods casually, so soldiers learn that leniency is not permanent and retain some fear of punishment. Approved.
64
使使
In year 5 officials reported that deserters from the various armies were not being reported truthfully. Units everywhere drew pay under false names; at muster they padded the rolls, and when they could not, they hired fugitive deserters to fill quotas—who promptly fled again—leaving no one of real use. In peacetime the burden of pay was hard to sustain; in crisis there was no one to deploy. Meanwhile schemers inserted themselves and simply wasted state revenues. Though collection and verification procedures were introduced and regulations grew ever more detailed, those who profited from the fraud all colluded. We ask that responsible officials first verify actual head counts, certify them to the Transport Commission, and on fixed dates have prefectural deputies inspect the rolls, with military offices notified to enforce the order; Where soldiers could not be summoned to the prefectural seat, officials should inspect on site, with the same deadline to establish the truth. Any fraud should be thoroughly investigated and punished without pardon. Supervisory commissioners should verify by prefecture and report to court; dispatched inspectors should investigate by region and enforce rewards and punishments, so offices waste no funds, armies have real strength, discipline is restored, and state revenues are saved. An edict ordered the proposal sent to the Bureau of Military Affairs to draft implementing measures.
65
使
In the seventh year, month 2, the ministry reported that Kaifeng Prefecture requested: those convicted of theft in the capital, exiled outside, and who then re-entered the capital to enlist elsewhere should be subject to informant capture, punished under deserter-capture statutes, and given an increased assignment. Officials and unit clerks who sheltered them would each receive one hundred strokes of the cane; Those who thereby turned to robbery would be punished under the statute for dispatched soldiers who commit crimes in the capital, with the same guilt as the offender. The maximum penalty was two years penal servitude, not reducible by amnesty upon leaving office. As for those convicted in the capital, placed under guarded exile outside, and who fled back to the capital—though statutes provided for increased assignment by region, rewards for informants were too light, and many repeatedly returned to the capital. They requested rewards of ten strings of cash for original cane offenses, twenty for penal servitude, and thirty for exile—all drawn from the offender's family property. Approved.
66
使
In month 12 an edict ordered that deserters from all circuits—including those who had surrendered under amnesty but then returned to their garrison posts and deserted again—must surrender wherever they were found, would be specially pardoned, assigned to regular units, paid their rations, and dispatched to the front for service.
67
滿 使使 使 歿歿 使 使
In month 6 an edict ordered that dispersed officers from all circuits in Hedong be dispatched by their circuit commanders to the Hedong and Hebei preparation commissions to redeem their faults through merit. Hebei preparation commission supreme commander Wang Yuan reported: by imperial order he had been appointed to gather the dispersed troops under Zhong Shidao and others to reinforce Taiyuan; those who failed to surrender by the deadline would have their families detained, and informants were permitted to capture them and deliver them to the front for severe punishment. Approved. The deadline was set at ten days from the day the order arrived. Hebei commissioner Liu Ge memorialized: recently preparation commissioner Zhong Shizhong had led troops to Yuci, suffered defeat and rout, and Shizhong's fate was unknown. By imperial order, all commanders, officers, and envoys under Shizhong had been granted amnesty. Your subject observes that when an army loses its commanding general in battle, commanders and officers should all be subject to military law. When military law is enforced, men regard the commanding general as paramount and in crisis must protect and rescue him. If military law is not enforced, in crisis all scramble to flee first, treating the commanding general like a stranger and showing no concern at all. In recent years when Gao Yongnian fell in battle, his officers and central army commanders were never punished under military law; then Liu Fa fell; now Zhong Shizhong has died in the service of the state. If two armies meet when strength is insufficient, and men fight to the bloody end and lose, or lose their commander—nothing more need be said. At the Battle of Yuci the army broke in moments: eight or nine out of ten commanders and officers fled, scarcely one or two soldiers in ten were wounded, and only Shizhong did not escape. Even if one holds that Shizhong was insufficiently gracious in command and discipline was lax, he accepted his commission and marched at once, reckless of his life; hearing the right wing had broken, he immediately sent reinforcements—but by then none of the other officers remained. When enemy troops attacked the camp, Shizhong still refused to mount his horse and flee. Had Shizhong harbored any wish to save his own life, he would surely have escaped the moment he heard of defeat. If the officers at that moment had united to rescue him, they might have broken the enemy. Now as soon as one wing wavers, the officers, disregarding their commander, flee one after another. At first they still showed fear; once they heard of amnesty, they all relaxed entirely. The court, because the siege of Taiyuan was not yet lifted, did not wish to pursue the matter to the end. Now armies are being raised anew; I deeply fear there will be no deterrent, and when they meet the enemy they will surely not give their all. I request an order that all commanders and officers under Shizhong be dealt with according to the imperial will, yet still sent to the front to prove themselves. If they obey orders and achieve merit, their previous guilt shall be pardoned; henceforth, unless they establish battlefield merit, even if covered by amnesty they may not be restored to rank. I also request an exceptional edict to posthumously honor Shizhong as encouragement to loyalty and righteousness. An edict ordered that all commanders and officers under Shizhong be demoted five ranks, that a list of positions and names be submitted to the ministry, and that the remainder follow Liu Ge's memorial.
68
使使使 滿
In month 8 the Hebei and Hedong pacification commission reported that supreme commander Wang Yuan had captured dispersed envoys and delivered them to deputy commissioner Liu Ge's army for execution under military law, but that officers and envoys who had not yet surrendered were still at large. An edict ordered that from the day it arrived ten more days be granted; they were permitted to surrender at their local garrison, would still be pardoned under the original order, would receive courier vouchers, and would be speedily dispatched to the front to prove themselves, with exceptional rewards upon merit. If after the extended deadline they still did not surrender, their names would be published and heavy rewards offered for capture, and military law would be enforced without exception. Many notices were also to be posted to publicize the order.
69
使使
In the second year, month 4, an edict reported that dispersed soldiers gathering in bands were committing outrages, forcibly tattooing civilians as soldiers, driving captives as attendants, sending them ahead to meet the enemy, and harming innocent people. Authorities were ordered to post notices: those forcibly tattooed while captured might declare themselves and receive certificates to return to their occupations. Those willing to serve would be tattooed by rank and assigned to the forbidden or garrison armies, with standard provisions per regulations. Another edict addressed deserters among the palace guards and various armies: though orders had already been issued offering amnesty and sending them back to their original posts, escort officers who had not yet received orders might, once the order arrived, declare themselves at local offices and also be granted amnesty.
70
西 沿 便
At the start of the Jianyan era recruitment drew mainly on northwesterners; afterward circuits' prefectures, garrisons, and fortresses, or the Three Commands, were to recruit, or select sons of Three Commands soldiers for tattooing, or select sons of central army soldiers from various prefectures and dispatch them. Another edict ordered prefectures along Cangzhou, Binzhou, and the Yangtze-Huai waterways to recruit skilled divers who could hold their breath underwater for extended periods, with a quota of five thousand. Shenwu Right Army commander Zhang Jun reported that the guard corps had gathered much rabble and proposed reassigning superior men to Shengjie and second-rank men to Zhenhua and Zhenwu so that units could be unified for training. An edict ordered Two Zhe and Jiangdong, except Jiangyin Army, each to recruit two hundred naval troops.
71
In the first year of Shaoxing the Guangdong commander reported that the circuit's garrison troops had originally numbered 5,200 but now stood at 1,319. He proposed that stationed officers and circuit prefecture garrisons each recruit half their quota on a ten-part basis.
72
In year 2 repeated edicts to the capital garrisons forbade recruiting from each other or detaining soldiers from other units; violators would face military law.
73
西 沿
In year 4 an edict ordered that recruited Hebei men fill Hebei Zhenwu units and that others be tattooed into Shaanxi Zhenhua commands. Along the Yangtze naval forces were to be established with warships; southeastern men skilled in water were to be recruited, with a quota of five hundred per command.
74
使使
In year 10 an edict ordered the Three Capitals pacification commission to recruit ten thousand utility troops, including two thousand officer-envoys.
75
西
In year 15 Fujian pacification commissioner Mo Jiang reported that the four prefectures of Ding, Zhang, Quan, and Jian bordered Guangdong and Jiangxi. In recent years bandits had plundered residents; local strongmen spent private funds gathering community households for defense, but officials failed to report their merit; ruined and with nowhere to turn, they inevitably joined the bandits. Government troops were unused to mountain terrain and suffered malarial pestilence; unable to pursue to the end, all the civilians under their jurisdiction turned to banditry. He requested that the four prefectures recruit rootless strongmen, one thousand each, under the name of utility troops—enough for preparedness and a lasting benefit. An edict ordered Zhang Yuan to handle the matter jointly.
76
殿使
In year 24 Palace Front commander Yang Cunzhong reported that under the old system, among the capital's Pengri, Tianwu, Gongsheng, Xiaoqi, Xiaosheng, Ningshuo, Shenqi, Shenyong, Xuanwu, Huyi, and Guangyong forbidden armies, Pengri and Tianwu selected men for palace guard duty and Gongsheng, Shenyong, and lower units selected men for Pengri and Tianwu; excluding deserters with valid excuse, barely 1,900 remained. He requested recruiting one thousand within the designated months of that year.
77
In year 27 Yang Cunzhong received an order that the Three Commands' utility recruitment should halt. The shortfall now stood at 6,726; if not recruited to fill, troop numbers would daily decline. An edict ordered this bureau to resume recruitment as before starting the first month of the following year.
78
In Qiandao year 7 Cavalry Bureau director Wang Youzhi reported that the bureau had more than 2,700 war horses but only 600-odd grooms, and requested recruiting 1,500 grooms, all assigned to Xiongwei. An edict ordered recruiting one thousand men, tattooed with the characters for foot groom. Infantry Bureau director Wu Ting reported that the five infantry armies had a quota of 25,000 but were currently short 3,600. An edict ordered recruitment to fill the quota.
79
殿
In the first year of Chunxi6 deputy Palace Front commander Guo Jun reported that recruitment had halted in Chunxi year 5; now more than ten years had passed, and fire-team grooms for combat units were short. An edict ordered recruiting one thousand. In Shaoxi year 2 an edict ordered the Infantry Bureau to recruit one thousand soldiers.
80
In Baoqing year 2 Wugang prefect Wu Yu reported that palace guard troops strengthened the root and awed foreigners: Taizu had gathered more than 100,000 elite troops in the capital, and prefectures also held more than 100,000. In the first year of Jiading5 the Three Commands' horse and foot armies totaled over 70,000, short 30,000 of the original quota—compared with garrisons in Sichuan, Jing-Xiang, and the two Huai regions, were they not several times the palace guard? The old system should be followed: select prefecture forbidden troops to fill palace guard shortfalls, and have commanders recruit to fill prefecture shortfalls.
81
In Shaoding year 4 officials reported that prefectures had forbidden troops, city guards, garrison armies, and local militia, and that one prefecture's finances should suffice for one prefecture's troops. In recent years rosters were largely fictitious; monthly recruitment and annual filling had all become empty formality. Because prefectures begrudged the cost of maintaining troops, of those recruited barely two or three remained, while six or seven had already deserted. Circuit commanders should be ordered that every incoming or outgoing prefect must report authorized strength, desertions and deaths, and recruitment totals, with promotion and demotion tied to those numbers.
82
In the Baoyou era, vacant prefectures were run by acting officials who ordered recruitment without testing ability, chiefly to loot public funds.
83
In the late Xianchun years, daily frontier alarms made recruitment desperate and court bounties unusually rich. Forcibly drafting civilians was already forbidden by law. Local offices ignored the court's intent and simply seized people for the ranks. Some lured men with smooth talk; others posed as traders, waited for porters to gather, and hauled them away; some bribed ferry crews to rush entire boats to their camps; some sent soldiers' wives to dress up and bait travelers on the road, then tattoo every man they caught. Fields stood empty of farmers and roads of merchants; men often marched into town only in bands of dozens for safety. Some captives drowned or burned themselves; others maimed their hands to escape; some fought recruiters and killed them; and hoodlums used the chaos to prey on the public.
84
Under the old rules, any unit short of quota was to recruit replacements. Xining and Yuanfeng reforms stressed militia, so hired armies shrank while the Three Palace Bureaus kept bloated, hollow rolls. By Jingkang the Palace Guards had withered. After the restoration the court returned to recruitment. Standards of height, courage, and fitness were restored and fraud was audited; although local camps still tattooed recruits, every enrolled man's record was held at the Bureau of Military Affairs.
← Previous Chapter
Back to Chapters
Next Chapter →