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卷四百十七 列傳第一百七十六 喬行簡 范鍾 游似 趙葵 謝方叔

Volume 417 Biographies 176: Qiao Xingjian, Fan Zhong, You Si, Zhao Kui, Xie Fangshu

Chapter 417 of 宋史 · History of Song
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Chapter 417
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1
Qiao Xingjian, Fan Zhong, You Si, and Zhao Kui (elder brother Fan) Xie Fangshu
2
便 西 西 西
Qiao Xingjian, styled Shoupeng, was from Dongyang in Wuzhou. He studied under Lü Zuqian. He passed the jinshi examinations in the fourth year of the Shaoxi era (1193). In successive posts he served as prefect of Tongzhou, where he submitted memorials outlining measures to benefit the people. He oversaw the Ministry of Revenue archives, was summoned for the drafting examination, and was appointed Secretariat rectifier and compiler at the Bureau of Military Affairs. Promoted to secretary gentleman, he served as Huaixi transport intendant and as prefect of Jiaxing. He was reassigned as Huainan transport intendant, concurrently serving as Huaixi judicial commissioner and grain intendant. He argued that the Jin state showed clear signs of impending collapse, and that the Song should hold still and watch how events unfolded. He went on to submit a four-point plan for border defense. Just then certain close ministers were urging war; troops were dispatched, and the Jin seized Qi and Huang prefectures in response. He was transferred to Zhexi judicial commissioner and concurrent prefect of Zhenjiang. He was promoted to diarist-in-attendance, concurrently serving as vice-director of the Directorate of Education, national history compiler and veritable records examiner, and lecturer-in-waiting. He was soon promoted to vice-director of the Imperial Clan Directorate and supervisor of the Secretariat, with acting appointment as vice-minister of Works, all held concurrently.
3
When Emperor Lizong ascended the throne, Xingjian wrote to Chancellor Shi Miyuan urging the emperor to follow Emperor Xiaozong's precedent of observing three years of mourning. In response to an imperial edict he submitted a memorial:
4
If Your Majesty can truly hold to the original intent of the two edicts calling for worthies and for candid counsel, and earnestly pursue their practical benefit, then talent will flourish and the foundations of governance will be secured, national prestige will rise, and treachery will be rooted out. Yet in recent affairs, I have observed what seems to be otherwise. From attendant ministers down to bureau officials, how many are there? From surveillance commissioners down to prefects, how many again? Of the worthy and capable men they have recommended, who can say how many? Your Majesty has surely singled out one or two for summons and appointment. Memorials sealed and submitted by officials within and without the court, great and small, have been forthright or oblique, pointed or broad in every variety; Your Majesty has surely selected one or two for implementation and reward. Yet the realm still suspects that Your Majesty's actions are mere formality.
5
For those summoned are either men who have long been free of official ambition and are resolved never to serve, or men already in the decline of age who cannot possibly come. Men of established integrity, unyielding rectitude, incorruptible principle, and steadfast resolve in office have been recommended again and again, yet never gathered in and summoned. What is implemented and rewarded is often trivial detail, bearing no relation to order or chaos—rough sketches of ancient and modern affairs, carefully inoffensive, chosen only to show a willingness to listen. Surely among them are far-sighted judgments surpassing common opinion, and loyal counsel that would sharpen the imperial ear—yet none of these has been adopted and put to use.
6
便
Since Your Majesty began to rule, eminent court officials and frontier commanders have left office after remonstrating, or returned home at their own request. Some were known for their competence, others for outspoken counsel; the realm knows not why they fell from favor, but sees them cast into idle posts, coming and going in sudden turns, even dismissed, degraded, stripped of rank, or exiled—all taking it as proof that Your Majesty rejects good men and despises frank counsel. Those who leave gain repute for their integrity, while the court reaps slander in consequence—what advantage lies in this? The path for worthies should be wide, not narrow; the path for remonstrance should be open, not closed—on this depends whether the state stands in order or chaos, safety or peril.
7
殿 殿
He also wrote: "Revere Heaven's mandate and uphold the morale of the scholar-official class. " At that time the emperor moved his residence to the Clear Serenity Hall. Xingjian memorialized, "I pray that Your Majesty add to your reverence and caution," and added: "Worthy men are now assembled; I beg that disputes over the Prince of Ji not cause them to scatter. " He was promoted to concurrent lecturer-in-waiting, director of the Directorate of Education, vice-minister of Personnel, and acting minister of Rites. He served as acting minister of Punishments, was appointed academician of the Hall of Enlightenment and co-signatory of the Bureau of Military Affairs, and was then promoted to full co-signatory of the Bureau of Military Affairs.
8
When the empress dowager died, he submitted a memorial:
9
Formerly, Your Majesty's conduct within the inner court was always subject to oversight and approval. Even petty men bent on manipulation and solicitation still had reason to fear and dared not act; now, who can guarantee that such men will not take heart? And how can Your Majesty guarantee that the imperial mind will not slacken even slightly? Your Majesty is sovereign of the realm; you should vigorously uphold the supreme standard, adhere always to the public good, and not privately indulge petty men and be led astray by them.
10
使
All who do this are consort kin of the closest ties, favored intimates of the inner court, and the runners who carry out their orders. Outwardly they seize wealth; inwardly they corrode law and discipline. Above, they cloud the sovereign's judgment and draw the realm's resentment and reproach; below, they subvert official justice and confound right and wrong among the people. Left unchecked, they will inevitably borrow the language of loyal counsel to strike at good men, manufacture popular praise to advance the cunning, and cloak treacherous designs in the guise of devoted service. Month upon month their power grows; the sovereign's authority will be usurped and manipulated before he even knows it.
11
Your Majesty is still in mourning; you should be all the more vigilant. Within the palace there is no longer anyone to inspire strict restraint, and the number of consorts and attendants has grown. In the prime of youth, dwelling where sensual temptation easily leads to excess—if Your Majesty cannot restrain yourself now, your great virtue will suffer grave harm. I pray that Your Majesty remain ever vigilant and self-reflective.
12
He also addressed the call for remonstrance after the fire, asking that the most pointed memorials be sent out for implementation. He also argued that Xu Guo should not be transferred to a civil appointment, citing five grounds for concern; and that Zheng Sun was unfit to command Sichuan.
13
He also wrote: "Shi Qing was by rank a state commissioner and by stature a frontier commander; yet he was suddenly murdered by Li Quan. Li Quan must have doubted that Qing would remain loyal, feared trouble at his side, and therefore struck before rebellion could break out. I believe there are men in the ranks burning with indignation; better to seize the moment, take the Huaiyin army, promote its best to lead the rest, publicly name Qing's killers for execution, and grant Qing posthumous honors—then their factions will split, and we can use that leverage to break their treachery while preserving the larger principle. Otherwise the overbearing will kill at will while none dares punish them; men of merit will see comrades slain and none will dare protest. Once they know the court relies on conciliation alone and never acts with decisive force, who can say they will not follow one another's example? Then the concern is not Li Quan alone.
14
He also wrote: "The people of Shanyang are dispersed and their wealth exhausted; it is no place where violent bandits can long remain secure. They must be planning day and night to spread their power. Yangzhou's walls are strong and its position commanding, enough to dominate the entire Huai basin; these men surely harbor designs upon it. If they take the city, all of Huaidong will be lost—we cannot afford to ignore the danger. " He also requested that heavy forces be stationed along the sea routes, shielding Wu and Yue within and forming the barrier between north and south without.
15
西西
He also argued: "Li Quan is besieging Taizhou; the campaign to destroy him cannot now be halted. This bandit is no greater in stature or mien than other men; he lacks long-range strategy and relies only on raw ferocity and daring to dominate his followers. He lost the western wall of Si while holding it, lost Xiapi while holding it, lost Qingshe while holding it, and then surrendered to the north—he is nothing but a defeated commander. Within ten years he rose from common soldier to one of the three highest ministers, rewarded far beyond his merit; then he betrayed loyalty and forgot past grace—a thing that Heaven and men alike condemn. Only firm resolve will suffice. " Events afterward unfolded exactly as Xingjian had predicted. He was appointed vice grand councilor and concurrent director of the Bureau of Military Affairs. When the court debated recovering the Three Capitals, Xingjian was on sick leave and submitted a memorial:
16
The eight imperial tombs lie within reach of pilgrimage; the Central Plain offers a chance for recovery. With the resources of a great undertaking and a moment when action is possible, success can be planned from one's seat. I do not fear that the campaign will fail outright; I fear that our strength cannot be sustained. Initial success that cannot be sustained will bring worry far deeper than failure. Since antiquity, enlightened rulers have always put internal order first and external conquest second. Your Majesty, consider the state of internal governance today—is it complete, or is it not? Before you personally assumed rule, how many abuses were there? Since you began to govern in person, how much has truly been renewed? If you wish to employ worthy men, their aims have not yet fully been realized; if you wish to remove petty men, their hearts have not yet fully been changed. Above, Your Majesty shows the will to renew the state, yet among scholar-officials the perfunctory and irresolute remain as they were. The court has forbidden bribery and warned against corruption, yet prefects and magistrates still grasp for gain without surfeit. If you wish to enforce the paper-money decree, new notes in the outer prefectures sell at a discount and still find no takers; if you wish to stabilize prices, goods in the capital remain no different from their old levels. Statutes and discipline are largely collapsed and not yet restored; rewards, punishments, and orders are treated lightly and not enforced with rigor. These are Your Majesty's own ministers and subjects, yet they disobey your commands and ignore your initiatives—and you would open the realm, unify the empire, subdue traitors, and break the northern foe: can this fully accord with your intent? This is my first concern.
17
Since antiquity, rulers who wished to mobilize the people had first to win their hearts and make that the foundation. For decades, high and low have dealt with one another solely for profit, heedless of righteousness. The people resent their magistrates; in crisis, who will die rather than flee? Soldiers do not love their officers; on the battlefield, who will charge forward with courage? Resentment stored up over ordinary days means that when hardship comes men shrink back, and when they meet the enemy they flee, caring for profit alone and nothing else. Such is the temper of the people; Your Majesty has done nothing to turn and bind their hearts, yet would suddenly drive them north to face sword and spear—how can loyalty and righteousness be awakened? Moreover, the people within our borders suffer under greedy magistrates and powerful families that swallow their lands; the hungry and cold would seize any chance for revenge, and salt and tea smugglers watch for any opening to rise in rebellion—trouble within the palace walls cannot be ruled out. If war abroad bogs down against a strong enemy, the common folk—restive as the 'red children' of old—may again erupt as in Jiang, Min, and eastern Zhe: what then? The people are easily underestimated, yet must not be neglected; the inner prefectures are thinly defended—something the people have always known. Past rebellions in Jiang, Min, and eastern Zhe were suppressed only with frontier troops. Many of these men still lurk in mountain valleys, watching the countryside; knowing the court is occupied in the north and cannot reach them, will they not again stir up treachery? This is my second concern.
18
使 退
Since antiquity, rulers planning recovery and conquest have first chosen generals, trained troops, filled treasuries and granaries, and only then acted. The frontier is vast; a campaign requires more than one route—how many of Your Majesty's generals can hold a front alone? How many are brave enough to fight? How many are wise and skilled in strategy? Unless you can count twenty or thirty such men on your fingers, I fear there are not enough to command in the field. How many of Your Majesty's troops can actually fight? How many would march by separate routes toward Kaifeng and Luoyang? How many would stay behind to hold the Huai and Xiang lines? Unless the registers yield two or three hundred thousand men, I fear there will not be enough for a campaign of conquest. Even if frontier commanders of established renown could rally men by force of will and reward, pluck generals from the ranks and turn surrendering bands into armies at once—I still do not see where the money and grain would come from. An army of one hundred thousand costs a thousand in gold each day; haul grain a thousand li, and even your soldiers wear hunger on their faces. Supplies now drain day after day without end, mounting to months and then years—who knows how many thousands in gold must pile up before the expense can be met? Many households are already emptied to the last coin; many county treasuries stand bare. Once the main army moves, costs multiply on every side—how will they be paid? Your Majesty is spending gold and silver freely to meet frontier commanders' demands—but that can be done once, perhaps twice, not a third time. After the third round, war still drags on; halt midway and earlier gains are lost; press on by force and there is nothing left to sustain it. The state is already exhausted, and the people can bear no more. I fear the north may prove unattainable while the south erupts first. The Central Plain, trampled underfoot, lies empty and abandoned. Even if grain can be shipped from the southeast, the distances are vast and shortages inevitable. Advance along the Huai, and even with canals open, bandits will intercept supplies. An advance through Xiang would require twenty zhong hauled for every shi delivered—and even that may never arrive. If the army camps a thousand li away and supply lines fail, not even Sun Wu plotting and Han Xin and Peng Yue leading troops could save the situation. When grain runs out and the army can neither advance nor retreat, Your Majesty's mind will be sorely burdened—this is my third concern. I pray Your Majesty will hold firm to your intent, fix the policy of the state, and silence the clamor of opposing views.
19
The court did not adopt his advice. He was promoted to head the Bureau of Military Affairs.
20
殿
When an imperial troop review fell through and the court abruptly purged the ranks instead, the Palace Guard mutinied. The chief commander was dismissed, the metropolitan staff abolished, and yellow placards posted to reassure the men—but the uproar only grew. Xingjian reported the matter; more than twenty ringleaders were executed, and the troops quieted. Soon he was appointed right grand councilor, saying: "After the shattering of the Three Capitals, affairs differ from before; we should strengthen our defenses for war. Xiangyang has been lost—it must be recovered at once. " Others again urged offensive plans. Xingjian submitted a memorial: "Present conditions at home and abroad offer seven grounds for worry and none for complacency. " He argued with such urgency that the campaign was not launched.
21
Xingjian was seasoned and far-sighted; in office he held back nothing. He liked to recommend talent, many of whom rose to high office; among them Qian Shi and Wu Ruyu were reclusive worthies of the day. His writings include General Exposition of the Rites of Zhou and the Kongshan Collection.
22
調 殿 祿 祿 殿 使 殿使
Fan Zhong, styled Zhonghe, was from Lanxi in Wuzhou. He passed the jinshi examinations in the second year of the Jiading era (1209). In successive posts he served as doctorate of the Military Academy, added-duty vice prefect of Taizhou, and prefect of Huizhou. Summoned to court, he was made a bureau director in the Ministry of Justice, then in the Ministry of Revenue with concurrent appointment as lecturer at the Chongzheng Hall. At an audience the Emperor said: "In Emperor Renzong's reign there was no end of business. " Zhong replied: "Renzong began with much to manage, yet through anxious diligence brought the realm to order. Huizong began with little to manage, yet the troubles he left reach down to our own day. " The Emperor was pleased. Soon he was made bureau director in the Ministry of Personnel and lecturer, then vice director of the Secretariat and vice director of the Directorate of Education, concurrently compiling the national history and examining the veritable records. He was appointed diarist of attendance and director of the Directorate of Education, acting vice-minister of War and co-compiler of the national history and veritable records. He became vice-minister of War and supervising censor, then acting minister of War and lecturer-in-waiting, soon adding reader-in-waiting. In the third year of Jiaxi (1239) he was appointed academician of the Duanming Hall and deputy director of the Bureau of Military Affairs. The following year he was appointed vice grand councilor. In the first year of Chunyou (1241) he asked to retire to his home village; the request was denied. In the fourth year he became director of the Bureau of Military Affairs and again asked to retire. In the fifth year he was specially appointed left grand councilor and commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs, enfeoffed as Duke of Dongyang, and again asked to retire; again the request was denied. In the sixth year he asked once more and was permitted to retire. He was promoted to grand academician of the Guanwen Hall and commissioner of the Liquan Abbey with concurrent appointment as reader-in-waiting; he declined, wishing to preserve his reputation in old age, and took appointment as administrator of the Tongxiao Palace instead. In the first month of the ninth year he died.
23
As chief minister, Zhong was upright and law-abiding and guarded official titles jealously; though he won no spectacular renown, in pure conduct and generous bearing he stood with Du Fan and Li Zongmian. He was posthumously enfeoffed as Junior Preceptor with the posthumous title Wensu. His writings include Exposition of the Book of Rites.
24
You Si, styled Jingren, was the son of You Zhonghong, judicial commissioner of the Lizhou Circuit. A jinshi of 1221, he rose through the Court of Judicial Review to assistant director of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices and acting bureau director in the Ministry of War. He became assistant director of the Secretariat and acting bureau director in the Ministry of Personnel, member of the Privy Repository, Kuizhou transport intendant, then Tongchuan judicial commissioner and grain intendant. He memorialized for posthumous honors for Tian Xi; the request was granted. He was made director of the Directorate of Armaments and vice director of the Court of the Imperial Clan, concurrently acting chief secretary of the Bureau of Military Affairs.
25
For a time he also held concurrent appointment as acting vice-minister of Rites and lecturer-in-waiting. When the Bright Hall rites were performed, Si submitted a memorial: "To fulfill the rites of serving Heaven, one must fully devote the heart that reveres Heaven. With the heart truly present, governance will be fitting, words and deeds will accord with reason, rain and sunshine will follow their seasons, and both Chinese and barbarians will live in peace. " He was concurrently co-compiler of the national history and veritable records, acting minister of Rites and reader-in-waiting. He wrote: "Military rewards are dispensed too freely. I propose a patent system: when merit is reported, a written commission should be issued on the spot; only after ten years of service, with further merit and promotion to commander or above, should superiors certify the record to the court and a formal patent be granted—then abuse would cease and merit would be rewarded.
26
He became minister of Rites and supervising censor, compiler of the national history and veritable records, acting vice-minister of Works, and staff officer on the Sichuan Pacification Commission with concurrent appointment as supervising censor. He was made minister of Personnel and attended the classics mat in the inner court. The Emperor asked: "How did Emperor Taizong achieve the results of the Zhenguan reign so swiftly? " Si replied: "A single resolute thought in a ruler's heart can turn Heaven and Earth. Some say hegemony comes quickly while the kingly Way comes slowly; yet benevolence may be restored in a day and established in a month—the kingly Way has never been slow. But let that thought lapse for even a moment, and the great momentum of the realm cannot be recovered. Anxious diligence may fill the imperial mind, yet if the wrong men assist in governance, how can the truth within the palace be made real? " He then cited Taizong's example and said: "Taizong's heart was easily opened to self-congratulation; he could not sustain his effort to the end, and good order stopped with the Zhenguan reign. Your Majesty has reigned more than fifteen years, and peril grows ever worse. Compared with Taizong's swift achievement of good order, the distance is vast. In honoring scholars and heeding remonstrance, in reverence and self-discipline—are you as surpassing as in the Zhenguan reign? In frugality to extend care to the people, in selecting the incorrupt to govern together—are you as pressing and thorough as in the Zhenguan reign? I pray Your Majesty will strengthen your resolve still further.
27
殿 使 殿使
In the first month of the third year of Jiaxi (1239) he was appointed academician of the Duanming Hall and deputy director of the Bureau of Military Affairs, enfeoffed as Earl of Nanchong. In the eighth month he was appointed vice grand councilor. In the intercalary month of the fourth year he became director of the Bureau of Military Affairs and vice grand councilor. In the fourth year of Chunyou (1244) he became administrator of the Wanshou Abbey and reader-in-waiting, still attending court, then director of the Bureau of Military Affairs and vice grand councilor, and was promoted to duke. In the fifth year he was appointed right grand councilor and commissioner of the Bureau of Military Affairs. Ten times he memorialized asking to retire; the Emperor refused. In the seventh year he was specially appointed grand academician of the Guanwen Hall and commissioner of the Liquan Abbey with concurrent appointment as reader-in-waiting, and promoted to state duke. In the eleventh year he was advanced two ranks, retired, and died. He was specially posthumously enfeoffed as Junior Preceptor.
28
使
Zhao Kui, styled Nanzhong, was the son of Zhao Fang, commissioner of the Jinghu Pacification Commission. At his birth someone dreamed that the god of Mount Heng descended upon the household. When Fang was at Xiangyang, he put Kui in charge of provisions and daily supplies. He and his elder brother Fan both burned to achieve something; Fang valued them and engaged Zheng Qingzhi and Quan Zicai as their tutors. He also sent Kui to study under Li Fan of Nankang, pursuing practical learning. Whenever alarms sounded he rode out with the generals; when they met the enemy he plunged into the thick of battle. The generals, fearing for the pacification commissioner's son, fought desperately to save him—and again and again victory came of it. One day Fang rewarded his officers, but the gifts did not match their service and the army was on the verge of mutiny. Kui was twelve or thirteen; sensing trouble, he cried out: "This is the court's gift; our command has separate rewards besides. " That single sentence steadied the troops; all marveled at his quick wit.
29
In the tenth year of Jiading (1217) the Jin generals Heshilie Gui and Wugulun Qingshou invaded Xiangyang and besieged Zaoyang. The frontier had long been quiet; the Jin army came suddenly and the people were stricken with fear. Fang led Fan and Kui into battle and routed the enemy. In the thirteenth year Fang sent Kui and commander-in-chief Hu Zaixing to attack the Jin as far as Gaotou. Gaotou was a place the Jin were certain to hold; they sent crack troops to resist. Kui led the vanguard in a fierce assault, Zaixing followed, and the enemy was destroyed. The next day they advanced to Dengzhou, where the Jin blocked the Bi River to resist. Kui led the attack; generals including Yang Yi joined the fight. The Jin came out in force; in the general engagement they were routed. Nearly twenty thousand were killed, captured, or surrendered; more than ten officers of ten-thousand-household rank and below were taken, eight hundred horses seized, and the pursuit pressed to the city walls before they withdrew.
30
In the fourteenth year the Jin invaded Qizhou; Kui and Fan attacked Tang and Deng. Fang gave them their orders: "If you fail to defeat the enemy, do not come back to face me. " In the third month, on day dinghai, they reached Tangzhou, drew up before the walls, and formed battle lines. The Jin grand general Ahhai led his troops out to fight. Kui took elite cavalry to meet them, Zaixing followed, and they won a great victory, killing more than ten thousand. The Jin shut the city gates and refused to come out. The Jin had held Qizhou for a long time. Several dozen horsemen came down from the hills; Kui led Yang Dacheng and fourteen riders in pursuit. Jin horsemen swelled to several hundred. Kui fought hard and broke them again and again, but Jin foot and horse forces were massing in strength. Fan's and Zaixing's forces joined the fight, and battle did not break off until well past nightfall. On day gengyin the government forces split into two lines—Fan on the left, Zaixing on the right—while Kui led shock cavalry to support both wings. The Jin, backed by the mountain, likewise split into two formations to meet them, but held their ground and did not strike first. Fan said: "The Jin will surely try a night attack again, hoping for a lucky victory. Prepare large drums and order the men not to move until they hear repeated drum rolls. Anyone who moves before the enemy is within fifty paces will be executed. Before long Jin troops began descending the slope. Zaixing charged prematurely, the enemy turned it against him, and Fan's line was driven back. Fan rolled the drums and led a sudden charge; Kui pressed forward after him and cut down several thousand Jin troops. The enemy concentrated against Zaixing. Kui led local leaders including Zhu Wenwei with elite cavalry in a flanking charge, and Jin dead piled up in unbroken rows. The two sides locked in stalemate again until deep night. The Jin pulled back slightly, but their formation held firm. Fan and Kui hastily assembled their officers, picked several thousand shock troops, and at dawn attacked on every side; their war cries shook the valleys. The Jin broke and ran. Pressing the pursuit, they took several thousand heads. The deputy commander threw down his weapons and surrendered. More than ten thousand captives were freed, and wagons, gear, and weapons were captured in mountainous heaps. Kui was appointed registrar and prefect of Zaoyang garrison; Fan was made internal officer of the pacification commission.
31
西 使 使
After Fang died, in the fifteenth year Kui returned from mourning as direct attache of the Secret Pavilion and vice-prefect of Luzhou, then was promoted to rectifier of the Court of Judicial Review and planning officer on the Huai West Pacification Commission. In the seventeenth year Li Quan went to Qingzhou. Xu Guo, commissioner of the Huai East Pacification Commission, summoned Kui to consult on military affairs. When Kui arrived he said: "You mean to destroy the rebels, yet you sit in their trap. Regret will come too late. Strengthen the troops at your headquarters, and you can still keep them in check. " Guo said: "Troops won't assemble, and even if they do they won't be any good. What then? " Kui replied: "Let me inspect the forces on both circuits and pick out the best. Keep thirty thousand at headquarters, and the rebels won't dare stir. " Guo said: "Better to assemble the Huai troops for inspection under your direction. That would impress everyone and let us pick the best. " Kui said: "Every garrisoned prefecture holds a critical post. How can its commander strip his walls bare to obey the pacification commissioner? They will fight it at court and hold troops back for their own defense. Once the court order comes, they will hide their best men and send the old and weak to fill the rolls. You mean to pick elites and will get dregs instead; you mean to show strength and will display weakness—nothing but an invitation to the enemy. " Guo would not listen and was defeated in the end.
32
調 使
In the first year of Baoqing (1225) Fan became prefect of Yangzhou and asked that Kui be transferred with five thousand men from the Qiangyong and Xiongbian armies to hold Baoying against the rebels. At Luzhou Kui often spent his own money entertaining the generals with ball games and archery. He fell out with pacification commissioner Zeng Shizhong and left the post. Critics called it overreach, and he was given a sinecure temple appointment. In the third year he was recalled as assistant director of the Directorate of Palace Buildings.
33
使
Quan redoubled his shipbuilding. Kui wrote again to Shi Miyuan: "Li Quan has taken Yancheng, yet claims Magistrate Chen abandoned it on his own— plainly to deceive the court and stall the punitive expedition while he builds ships, forges weapons, scouts our cities, or even sails straight across the sea to strike the heartland. His treachery is clear as daylight. From the day Yancheng fell I have waited eagerly for action from the pacification commander. Now I hear Wang Jie was sent into Yancheng to plead with the rebel. I also hear two clerks were sent to Shanyang to take orders from the rebel's wife. For a frontier command of such standing to act this way—does it not play into the rebels' hands and make us a laughingstock at home and abroad? I also hear that when Zhang Guoming left Shanyang he already knew the rebels meant to march from Yancheng. If his counsel is followed and leniency prevails again, morale will collapse, order will unravel, and the danger to the realm will be beyond hiding. I do not mean to alarm the court or manufacture a quarrel. Li Quan is no loyal subject and no filial son. If Your Excellency heeds me, changes course, and sends troops against the rebel, you will not only strengthen the realm and secure the altars of state—my father and I, who owe the dynasty a lifetime of favor, may at last repay it in some small way. If Your Excellency refuses and sends no troops, you will not only fail to strengthen the realm—you will leave me with no place to die and no way left to repay the grace of throne and minister. Security or peril, order or chaos—all hinge on whether the court moves against the rebel. Secure Huai East and Jiangnan is secure; secure Jiangnan and the realm is secure; secure the realm and Your Excellency is secure; secure Your Excellency and every subject and every man in your circle is secure.
34
便
He also memorialized the court: "My father, brothers, and I have received the dynasty's favor for generations. Whenever barbarians or bandits insult the realm, loyal outrage has never failed to move us. Today no one surpasses Li Quan in treason, in contempt for the court, or in betraying the sheltering grace of throne and minister. While his rebellion was still hidden, forbearance had some excuse. Now he has sacked cities without restraint. If the court indulges him further, what will remain of the state? I beg the court to act with firm resolve: name him a rebel, dispatch generals and armies that very day by land and sea, destroy this traitor, secure the altars of state, and protect the people. Though I am unworthy, I offer my person to the court; if not, I beg that I be dealt with at once, so the frontier may be settled and state business proceed.
35
使
Miyuan still hesitated to launch a campaign, but Vice Grand Councilor Zheng Qingzhi endorsed the decision. Kui was then made direct attache of the Baozhang Pavilion, Huai East intendant of judicial inspection, and concurrent prefect of Chuzhou. Fan fixed a date and joined Kui. Kui led fourteen thousand foot and horse from the Xiongsheng, Ninghuai, Wuding, and Qiangyong armies, with Wang Jian, Hu Bin, Hu Xian, and others as commanders and Kui as concurrent planning officer. Xian was Ying's elder brother, a man of superhuman strength. At Xiangyang Fang always sent Xian and Kui each with elite troops by separate routes—breaking lines, shattering formations, wheeling and regrouping with no worthy foe before them. For his service Xian rose to acting Grand Commandant.
36
使
Before long Quan attacked Yangzhou's east gate. Kui went out in person to fight. The rebel general Zhang You called at the gate for Kui. When Kui came out, Quan sat his horse across the moat and spoke to him with feigned cordiality. His attendants wanted to shoot Quan, but Kui stopped them and asked why he had come. Quan said: "The court is always suspicious of me. Now you've cut off my supplies. I'm not rebelling—I only want money and grain. " Kui said: "The court has lavished money, grain, and rank on you beyond counting. It treated you as a loyal subject and filial son, yet you turned your blade and seized cities. How could the court keep feeding you? You say you're not rebelling—do you mean to fool men? Or Heaven? " He heaped rebuke upon rebuke. Quan had no answer, strung his bow, nocked an arrow, and galloped at Kui. After that they won battle after battle. In the first month of the fourth year, on day renyin, Quan was killed. The full account appears in the Li Quan biography. Kui was promoted to observer of Fuzhou and senior general of the Left Xiaowei Guard, but he declined the appointment. In the eighth month he was summoned to the Bureau of Military Affairs, accepted appointment as Baozhang Pavilion academician-in-waiting and deputy chief receptionist of the Bureau of Military Affairs, kept his former posts while shedding mourning recall status, and was soon promoted to vice-minister of War.
37
使
In the eleventh month of the sixth year he was appointed commissioner of the Huai East Pacification Commission and concurrent prefect of Yangzhou. At audience the Emperor said: "Your father, brothers, and you have served the realm well. In battle you lead from the front and risk your life for the state—rare even among scholar-officials. I commend you highly. " Kui bowed and replied: "I am unworthy. Gentlemen have taught me loyalty and filial piety. My family has received the dynasty's favor for generations. I should give my life to repay Your Majesty.
38
使使 使
In the first year of Duanping (1234) the court debated retaking the Three Capitals. Kui memorialized asking to take the field and was appointed acting minister of War, commissioner of the Jing-He Pacification Commission, prefect of Yingtian, Nanjing regent, and concurrent Huai East pacification commissioner. They marched in the height of summer. The Bian dike broke, floods spread, supplies failed, and every city they retook was empty—no troops, no grain to sustain them. Before long northern troops came south, crossed the river, and opened the sluice gates. Many men drowned, the army broke, and they retreated. Fan impeached Kui. An edict demoted him and Quan Zicai each one rank, reappointed him vice-minister of War and Huai East pacification commissioner, and moved his headquarters to Sizhou.
39
使 殿使 使
In the first year of Jiaxi (1237) he became Baozhang Pavilion academician and prefect of Yangzhou, keeping his pacification commission. In the second year, for the victory at Anfeng, he was promoted to minister of Justice and academician of the Duanming Hall, granted chief-councilor privileges, and again made concurrent intendant of agriculture for the circuit. Kui spent eight years at Yangzhou in all, opening land and drilling troops until frontier defenses were thoroughly restored. In the second year of Chunyou (1242) he was made grand academician, prefect of Tanzhou, and Hunan pacification commissioner, then transferred to Fuzhou.
40
使 退
In the third year he buried his mother and asked to resume full mourning; the request was denied. Kui memorialized: "To shift loyalty into filial duty is the common obligation of a subject; to teach filial piety in order to win loyalty is the deepest kindness of ruler and father. Loyalty and filial piety share one root and need not conflict. As the saying goes, the loyal minister serves his ruler and the filial son serves his parent—the root is the same. I am unworthy. I have tried to live carefully, fearing only to fall short. In past years I held office and served in the field, marching with my brothers at the fore, risking death without hesitation, giving my body to quell disaster and my life to guard the frontier—that was filial service to the throne in full. Your Majesty has honored this openly with generous favor, so that sons feel gratitude and parents take heart. When I was still in mourning dust I was ordered back to office. I accepted the exceptional rule and put the state's urgency before my grief. Now I have left office, resumed mourning, and dwell in the mourning hut. I beg to follow the proper rites. " Again the request was denied. He memorialized again: "When I was ordered to punish rebellion, a family calamity struck. In grief I was sent on urgent service—shifting filial duty into loyal service, I did not dare refuse. I have already put the state first and done a subject's duty. My parents' grace remains unrepaid. More than twelve years have passed while I eat fine rice and wear brocade—every moment fills me with shame. Moreover I have resumed hemp mourning, grieved upon the mourning mat, carried earth to raise the tomb, and dwell in the hut awaiting death's end. Mourning moves forward and never back—it cannot rightly end after only a few months. " He was then appointed intendant of the Dongxiao Palace but declined.
41
使 使西 使
In the fourth year of Chunyou (1244) he was appointed vice-director of the Bureau of Military Affairs. In a memorial he wrote: "Of all affairs under Heaven today, how many are truly great? Of all talent under Heaven, how much is truly usable? Let us clarify the greatest matters and appoint the usable men. Men of courage and strategy should command armies; men of shrewd planning should manage finances; the generous should govern and nurture the people; the upright should uphold the law. Choose men to fit the office, not offices to fit the men. Only when men are rightly appointed and kept in post long enough can their performance be judged. " He also asked the court to "consult urgently with the chief ministers on overall planning—list every major policy affecting the dynasty's survival, weigh priorities and urgency in forming strategy, and governing success will follow while external threats need not be feared." He also asked to raise a mobile force of thirty thousand to defend the Yangzi. The court approved his requests. In the twelfth month he was made director of the Bureau of Military Affairs and vice grand councilor. He was also specially made commissioner of military affairs and vice grand councilor, with oversight of forces in the Jiang, Huai, Jingxi, and Hubei regions, and enfeoffed as Duke of Changsha. Soon he became prefect of Jiankang, regent of the traveling palace, and Jiang East pacification commissioner.
42
祿使 殿使 使 西 使使 使使 沿使沿使調西使調 便
In the ninth year he was specially made Grandee of Splendid Happiness, right chief councilor and commissioner of military affairs, and enfeoffed as Duke of Xinguo. He submitted four memorials forcefully declining. Critics argued that a chief councilor must be a scholar-official, so he was removed to academician of the Guanwen Hall, made intendant of the Liquan Abbey and reader-in-attendance, and retained court audience privileges. Soon he was assigned to Tanzhou as Hunan pacification commissioner and granted special advancement in rank. In the second year of Baoyou (1254) he was made pacification commissioner of Guangxi. In the third year he was transferred to command the Jinghu region and fortified Jingmen and Yingzhou. He was reassigned as Hunan pacification commissioner and prefect of Tanzhou, declined again, and kept his post as intendant of the Liquan Abbey. In the fifth year he was promoted to Junior Guardian and military governor of the Ningyuan Army, further enfeoffed as Duke of Wei, and made intendant of the Liquan Abbey and reader-in-attendance. He declined four times and the appointments were withdrawn. In the first year of Kaiqing (1259) he was assigned to Qingyuan and made coastal pacification commissioner. Soon he became riverine and Jiang East pacification commissioner with headquarters at Jiankang, charged with frontier defense and deployment between Longxing, Raozhou, Jiangzhou, and Huizhou. For a time he also served as prefect of Jiankang and regent of the traveling palace. He was then made pacification commissioner of Jiang East and West, with authority over regular and militia forces in Rao, Xin, Yuan, Linjiang, Fu, Ji, and Longxing. He was to inquire into the people's hardships, suspend routine promotions and demotions, and act at his discretion as needed.
43
使
Fan, courtesy name Wuzhong, followed his father into the army from youth. In the thirteenth year of Jiading (1220) he and his younger brother Kui annihilated Jin forces at Gaotou. In the fourteenth year the army marched on Tang and Deng; Fan and Kui served as army supervisors. Meng Zongzheng, then prefect of Zaoyang, feared the supply burden and sent someone to ask: "The Jin are at Qi and Huang—why are you attacking Tang and Deng? " Fan replied: "Not so. If we strip Xiangyang's defenses to save Qi and Huang, Tang and Deng will strike at our rear. Besides, the enemy at Qi and Huang is at peak strength. Better to hit Tang and Deng first to show we still have reserves. When Tang and Deng must respond and cannot spare forces, our defenses will hold themselves. The Qi-Huang enemy will wear down day by day, and then we can turn and crush them—victory without lingering danger. " He again defeated Jin forces at Jiuchang. He and his brother Kui were both made internal planners of the pacification commission. The full account appears in the Kui biography.
44
使
In the fifteenth year, after his father's death, he was recalled from mourning as direct attache of the Secretariat Pavilion and vice-prefect of Yangzhou. In the sixteenth year he became assistant director of the Directorate of Armaments and, as direct attache of the Secretariat Pavilion, prefect of Guangzhou. In the seventeenth year he entered the capital as director of the Court of the Imperial Clan, vice-minister of Justice, acting director of the Directorate of Palace Buildings, and acting prefect of Zhenjiang. He was promoted to direct attache of the Huiyou Pavilion, prefect of Yangzhou, and deputy Huai East pacification commissioner. The armies of Liu Quan and Wang Wenxin, with their families, remained at Yangzhou. Fan wanted to reform military administration but feared their men would leak military secrets, so he sent periodic gifts and rewards. When both families were well pleased, Fan wrote to Xu Xiji instructing the two commanders to move their families back to Chu. They complied, and Fan rewarded them generously and sent them off. One Sun Hai also had eight hundred followers. Fan also asked to withdraw Sun Hai to Chuzhou and requested three thousand new cavalry, recruiting strong idlers and men on heavy fortress corvée to fill the ranks. He registered civilians as half-year soldiers who farmed in spring and summer and drilled in autumn and winter. The state need not build camps, and farming was not disrupted.
45
使 使 西
Peng Yibin sent his commander Zhang Shixian to Fan to propose a joint campaign against Li Quan. Fan told Pacification Commissioner Zhao Shanxiang: "Yibin pressing Quan would be like a mountain crushing an egg; yet he asks permission before attacking—he knows there is a court above him. If we fail to support this and instead back the villain, the bonds of authority will unravel. If Yibin wins a great victory without court orders, we will have another Tang-style warlord on our hands—not a sound plan. Better to shift Yangzhou's reinforcements to Xuyi, have each of the four commanders-in-chief keep half his force against the Jin and send the rest, choose one capable general to lead them, order Kui to bring ten thousand Huai West elites to Chuzhou, send fifty ships from Xupu into the Huai to cut the rebels' retreat, and secretly have Yibin attack from the north—nothing would fail. The four commanders are equals in rank. Liu Zhuo may win their goodwill but cannot command their absolute obedience. If Zhuo is chosen, he must lead in person on the field and direct all four commanders—not merely sit planning in the tent. " No reply was given.
46
調調 調
Fan added: "If the state punishes these rebels, the dynasty revives from this moment; if not, it never recovers. If the court does not want a large show of force, Fan is only a judicial intendant whose duty is to capture bandits. Order Fan to deploy this circuit's troops against the Chuzhou salt rebels. Fan would mobilize half the forces of Shi Qing and Zhang Hui with their several hundred ships to press Chu city and block the rebels' route, half the forces of Xia Quan and Fan Chengjin to hold Lian and Hai, and shift Yangzhou's garrison to Xuyi. Then Fan would personally lead elite Xiongsheng and Qiangyong troops to join Shi Qing outside the walls, show the rebels the situation, and warn them of the consequences—they would surely surrender. If they still resist, with northern and southern troops and civilians mixed together, there will surely be collaborators within. Arrange for Yibin to attack from the north; advance below Shanyang to Lian and Hai in support; win over the families of defectors to split their faction—and within half a month the rebels will be destroyed. In that case there is no need for the Xupu navy—even three thousand men under Zhao Kui would suffice. If the court fears expense, Quan has two hundred thousand in advance military funds at Zhenzhou, and Lian and Chu have ample stores on hand.
47
使
Chief Councilor Shi Miyuan wrote back to Fan instructing him to tell the four commanders-in-chief to enjoy their peace and quiet. The planning officer Fan had sent, hearing this, said: "I fear the root of disaster will only grow deeper, and there will be no peace. " Each wiped away tears and returned. When Quan was about to arrive, Fan offered another plan: "The moment for conciliation was missed—it is already too late. Hou Jing, defeated in Henan, brought ruin upon the Liang; now the rebel Quan, thwarted by Yibin and fearing the four commanders will respond, will return to his old base—his scheming will be desperate. Yet it is easy to crush him while he is still reeling from defeat, and hard to strike after he has recovered; moreover the four commanders' joint plot is now exposed in writing—it cannot easily be undone. But circumstances have changed and the situation is different. If the court's plan is settled and you do not wish to issue a public order, but will secretly instruct me, Fan will keep everything concealed and only coordinate with Yibin to attack what Quan must rescue—then the initiative will be ours and yesterday's plan can still work. " The reply came back warning Fan not to overstep his authority and take independent command of troops.
48
使 使穿
Fan then wrote to thank the court and declared: "From the Emperor down through every official and clerk, and on to gentry, commoners, and military officers—everyone knows this villain will rebel. Even Your Excellency knows in your heart that he will rebel. When others know, they speak out. Your Excellency knows yet alone stays silent—and silence is indeed the wiser course. There is no resolve within to endure hardship for revenge, nor preparation without for victory in battle. Your Excellency bears it in silence and slowly considers how to control him—this is why the court's strategy is so lofty. Yet pacification is Xiji's responsibility, while defense is Fan's. Charging Xiji is the coffin-maker's task; charging Fan is the arrow-maker's task. You charge Fan with ensuring no one is hurt, yet forbid him to inflict pain, and hate his words about hurting anyone—why? When the villain sees Fan preparing against him, he will resent it and be unable to act freely. One day he will denounce Fan as the man who first stirred trouble and incited rebellion, and coerce the court into removing Fan. Your Excellency will not believe it at first. Your attendants will say yes, the ministers will say yes, and Your Excellency will surely say: 'Why spare one Zhao Fan when surrendering him would avert disaster? 'You will bind Fan and hand him to the rebels, and Fan will become the Song dynasty's Chao Cuo. Even so, if surrendering Fan would truly avert national disaster, what harm in Fan's death? As the proverb says: 'The dog that guards the house is what thieves hate. 'When thieves see a guard dog, they denounce it to the master and make him remove it first—then they can break in without fear. Killing the dog does nothing to stop the theft. I beg for your compassion and a separate, less demanding appointment. " Miyuan received the letter and was moved.
49
退 退 耀 使 使
In the spring of the second year he received a temple stipend. In the third year he was appointed prefect of Anqing; before taking up the post he was transferred to Chizhou and made concurrent Jiang East intendant of the Ever-Normal Granaries. Miyuan asked Kui to recommend military talent; Kui named Fan. Fan was promoted to direct attache of the Fuwén Pavilion, Huai East intendant of judicial inspection, and concurrent prefect of Chuzhou. Fan said: "For a younger brother to recommend his elder brother is improper. " He declined on grounds that his mother was elderly. He then wrote to Miyuan: "Affairs in Huai East change by the day. With the Huai the Yangzi holds; without the Huai, the enemy can cross anywhere north of the Yangzi—every inlet, creek, and reed marsh offers a hidden crossing. The river front stretches thousands of li—how can it be defended? Some say soft words and generous favors can appease the rebels, not seeing that this plays into their plan to lull our troops. Some say withdrawing garrisons can ease the rebels, not seeing that this enables their plan for deep penetration. Some want scorched earth and walled defense; others want to gather rabble and fight recklessly; some rejoice or fear as rebel words shift between compliance and defiance; others relax or panic as rebel troops advance and retreat—all are losing strategies. Lose the strategy and you lose the Huai; lose the Huai and you lose the Yangzi—and the losses will be beyond hiding. There are blocking forces, mobile forces, and punitive forces. Baoying now presses Shanyang and Tianchang presses Xuyi—each needs ten thousand more garrison troops under capable generals. When rebels come, hold the walls and blunt their attack; when they do not, display force to pressure their territory; watch for openings and send detachments to strike where they are unprepared, showing readiness to fight so that even if they wish to penetrate deeply they will fear raids on their rear—this is the blocking force. The Xuyi rebels have no stores; the Jin cannot sustain them—they can only send detachments to plunder for food; deploy elite troops under brave officers, recruit local strongmen, and use ambushes to hunt and kill them—this is the mobile force. Only at Yangzhou, Jinling, and Hefei should we gather twenty or thirty thousand men each—elite troops, brave officers, sharp weapons, thorough drilling, strict discipline, fair rewards and punishments, and every man resolved to love his commander and die for his leader; If this is truly done, in half a year the state will be strengthened; in one year the rebels can be destroyed. If the rebels cannot penetrate deeply, gain nothing from plunder, and live in fear of punishment, they will turn back to seek support from the Jin; When the Jin lack the strength to support them, they will resent and rage at the rebels—and then we can shift the blame onto the Jin. Some say Yangzhou must not hold heavy garrisons, fearing it will draw rebel disaster upon us—this is wrong. Yangzhou is the realm's northern gate—commanding the Huai, shielding the Yangzi, guarding the Grand Canal—how can it go undefended? Skilled defense leaves the enemy unsure where to strike. If we now garrison Baoying and Tianchang to choke their advance and assign two or three senior commanders to display our strength, the rebels will not know where to strike—how would they dare attack Yangzhou? If the rebels, ignorant of our strength, attack Yangzhou, they will be marching to their deaths. " The court then summoned Fan for consultation and again appointed him prefect of Chizhou.
50
使 殿 調沿調 調西
In the first year of Shaoding (1228) he served as acting director of the Directorate of Palace Buildings and prefect of Zhenjiang. In the third year, after his mother's death, he requested release from office; the request was denied. He was recalled from mourning as direct attache of the Huiyou Pavilion and deputy Huai East pacification commissioner. Soon he was transferred to compiler at the Hall of Right Culture and granted golden belt and formal robes. With no choice, after the end-of-mourning rites he resumed his duties. He again wrote to the court: "I request that mediation be abandoned. First, order the riverine pacification commission to move Wang Ming's main force to Taixing Harbor to block the shortcut downstream from Taizhou on the Yangzi; second, draft the people of Sheyang Lake as soldiers, station half at Gaoyou to check the rebels' rear and half at Guazhou to block them in front; third, urgently transfer Huai West troops to combine with the Chuyang, Liuhe, and other armies to save the river front. Otherwise, even if Fan dies on the riverbank, it will be of no use. " The court then permitted Fan to draft no more than twenty thousand troops from Sheyang Lake, subject to his command.
51
使 使 沿使西使 使沿使
Fan wrote again to Shanxiang: "Today those who share weal and woe with the altars of state—in the capital only the chief councilor, abroad only the commissioner, Fan, and Fan's younger brother Kui. If the rebels succeed, these four households will surely have no hope of survival. " Thereupon the plan to destroy the rebels was settled, and Quan was executed. Fan was promoted to vice-minister of War, Huai East pacification commissioner and concurrent prefect of Yangzhou and planning officer on the Jiang-Huai Pacification Commission; step by step Huai East was recovered. He was further made vice-minister of Personnel, then vice-minister of Works and deputy riverine pacification commissioner, with headquarters temporarily moved and concurrent prefect of Huangzhou; soon he also served as deputy Huai West pacification commissioner. Before long he became dual-Huai pacification commissioner with authority over frontier patrol forces, still concurrently deputy riverine pacification commissioner.
52
殿使使 使 西 使
He was again promoted to academician of the Duanming Hall, Jinghe-Guanxi pacification commissioner, prefect of Kaifeng, Eastern Capital regent, and concurrent Jiang-Huai pacification commissioner. When the army sent into Luoyang routed in disaster, he was appointed Jing-Hu pacification commissioner and concurrent prefect of Xiangyang. When Fan arrived, he relied on Wang Min, Fan Wenbin, Li Boyuan, Huang Guobi, and several others as his inner circle, carousing day and night with no regard for rank. Lawsuits and border defense were entirely neglected. When northern and southern army officers clashed, Fan failed to pacify and control them. Thereupon the northern army officer Wang Min rebelled from within, Li Boyuan followed, and they burned Xiangyang and fled north; the southern army great general Li Hu did not fight the fires, failed to quell the disturbance, and took the opportunity to plunder. Officials and commoners still in the city numbered more than forty-seven thousand; grain and money in the warehouses came to no less than three hundred thousand, with bows, arrows, and weapons in twenty-four storehouses—all fell to the enemy. For one hundred thirty years since Yue Fei recovered it, the city had grown populous and prosperous, with high walls and deep moats, foremost on the western frontier—yet in a single day it was ash; the disaster was appalling. Memorialists impeached Fan; he was demoted three ranks and stripped of office, retaining only his pacification commission. Soon he received a temple stipend and was dismissed on account of criticism; critics still unsatisfied, he was demoted two more ranks and sent to reside at Jianning Prefecture. In the third year of Jiaxi (1239) his offices were restored by seniority and he was given a Taoist abbey post. In the fourth year he was appointed prefect of Jingjiang and later died at home.
53
便 西
Xie Fangshu, styled Defang, was from Weizhou. He passed the jinshi examinations in the sixteenth year of Jiading (1223) and served successively as surveillance censor. In a memorial he submitted: "Uphold firm virtue to turn Heaven's heart; rouse decisive authority to turn the realm's momentum—or perhaps one still fears that those accustomed to flattery will privately sway Your Majesty's ear and delight your heart, so that those who were fearful grow lax, those who were worried rejoice, and those who were cautious grow careless. Of those around and before Your Majesty, those who speak of peril, fear, and dread are loyal to the throne; those who speak of ease, comfort, and pleasure are disloyal to the throne. Whenever there are memorials on flood, drought, or banditry, the submitter must be a loyal minister; whenever there are words of flattery, deception, and concealment, the speaker must be a sycophant. When Your Majesty enjoys jade dishes and rare delicacies, you should think of the pitiable refugees of the two Huai, corpses filling the ditches; when you hear strings, pipes, bells, and drums, you should think of the white bones of western Shu piled like mountains. " He also said: "Honor frugal virtue to accord with Heaven's principle, store talent for Heaven's offices, restore far-reaching strategy to await Heaven's punishment, and practice benevolent government to answer Heaven's intent. " The Emperor was pleased. He was assigned to Hengzhou, appointed vice-director of the Court of the Imperial Clan, then vice-director of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices with concurrent appointment as national history compiler and veritable records examiner.
54
殿
At the time Liu Hanbi, Du Fan, and Xu Yuanjie died in succession. Fangshu said: "In Yuanjie's death, Your Majesty has already ordered officials to investigate and set rewards to capture the villains—yet the guilty have not been found and loyal innocence has not been vindicated. If Your Majesty does not see this through from beginning to end, I fear the pillars of government will be swept away and the state will cease to be a state. " He was transferred to palace censor, and in an audience said: "Self-mastery lies in the heart; order and disorder depend on the realm. The ruler dwells deep as in a silkworm chamber; those close at hand morning and evening—the attendants and favorites who read his will—often watch what the sovereign likes, seeking nothing beyond preserving favor and profit. Yet in the hidden depths there may be roaming persuasions, lurking unnoticed. To guard against the subtle and stop the gradual—this truly depends on the heart's mastery. " He also said: "Today those who plan for the two Huai have five points: first, clarify espionage; second, restore horse administration; third, build mountain-and-water stockades; fourth, manage the square fields near the cities; fifth, increase rewards and punishments for blocking roaming cavalry and rescuing captives. " He requested implementation of land limits and requested recording of Zhu Xi's disciples Hu Anding, Lü Yan, and Cai Mo; the edicts all granted these.
55
殿 使
He served as acting vice-minister of Punishments and acting drafter, was promoted to concurrent lecturer-in-waiting, was formally appointed vice-minister of Punishments with acting appointment as national history compiler and veritable records examiner. He was appointed academician of the Duanming Hall, deputy director of the Bureau of Military Affairs, and participant in governance. In the ninth year of Chunyou (1249) he was appointed participant in governance and enfeoffed as Marquis of Yongkang Commandery. In the eleventh year he was specially appointed director of the Bureau of Military Affairs and participant in governance; soon he was appointed left chief councilor and director of the Bureau of Military Affairs, advanced to Duke of Huiguo. He urged the Emperor to cherish his person and cultivate virtue.
56
When surveillance censor Hong Tiansi memorialized against eunuchs Lu Yunshang and Dong Songchen, the memorial was retained without action. Grand Imperial Clan Court registrar Zhao Chongli wrote to Fangshu: "The palace eunuchs are insolent beyond measure; the chief ministers offer no upright rescue, the censors and remonstrators dare not challenge them, and a newly appointed isolated censor is boldly risking himself to attack them—is this easily come by? For days on end one listens and hears nothing—public opinion does not blame others but blames the chief councilor. Otherwise, if the Emperor should suddenly issue a brush edict appointing someone vice minister, there would be no stopping it—the chief councilor cannot say this is not his responsibility. The chief councilor enjoys the deepest favor of the sovereign and has reached the summit of rank. If your words prevail, the altars of state will rely on you; if they do not prevail, then resign. If you resign, the others will surely not fail to contest—win or lose, you win either way, and you may not resign at all. " Fangshu received the letter and showed embarrassment.
57
使 殿
The next day an imperial brush edict indeed appointed Tiansi vice minister of the Court of Judicial Review, and Tiansi left the court. Thereupon Imperial Academy student Chi Yuanjian, Court of Imperial Sacrifices registrar Zhao Chongjie, and left recorder Li Angying all criticized Yunshang and Songchen. But slanderers also said: "Tiansi's memorial was Fangshu's idea. " And when Tiansi left, they also said: "It was Fangshu's idea. " Fangshu submitted a memorial in self-defense; thereupon surveillance censor Zhu Yingyuan memorialized against Fangshu and he was dismissed as chief councilor. After dismissal, Yunshang and Songchen still thought it insufficient; they bribed Imperial Academy student Lin Ziyang to submit a memorial vigorously denouncing Tiansi and Fangshu, further saying: "I beg that Fangshu be executed so the realm may clearly know that the departure of chief councilor and censor originated in the sovereign's independent decision and had no connection with the inner attendants at all. " After the memorial was submitted, the student quarters detested Lin Ziyang as a partisan of villains and together beat drums to attack him, submitting memorials to proclaim his crimes. Fangshu was then appointed grand academician of the Guanwen Hall and intendant of the Dongxiao Palace. Again impeached twice by surveillance censor Li Qu, his office was stripped and his abbey post revoked. Later his former offices were restored and he was given an abbey post; but when attendant gentleman Zhao Ze and drafting official Lin Cun memorialized for his dismissal, he was removed; surveillance censor Zhang Shiyuan requested further demotion and banishment to the far south. In the second year of Jingding (1261) he requested retirement; his offices were then restored by seniority.
58
使
When Emperor Duzong ascended the throne, Fangshu came to present a zither, a crane, and one golden elixir pill. Chief Councilor Jia Sidao, fearing he sought favor, insinuated to the right director of the Department of State Affairs Lu Yue, left remonstrating officer Zhao Shunsun, drafter Feng Mengde, and right rectifier Huang Yong in succession to request stripping Fangshu's offices and titles; pacification commissioner Lü Wende offered his own office to redeem Fangshu's guilt. In the seventh year of Xianchun (1271) an edict restored his retirement status. In the eighth year he died. He was specially posthumously enfeoffed as Junior Preceptor. While Fangshu was chief councilor, his sons and younger brothers interfered in government affairs—slandering Yu Jie was one example.
59
The historians comment: Qiao Xingjian was magnanimous and profound, fond of talent; in counsel he spoke with forthright remonstrance. Fan Zhong and You Si both held the chief councilor's post, each strict and self-restrained, yet their views did not agree. Zhao Fang foresaw how his two sons would fare, and what Kui and Fan achieved matched what he said—as the proverb has it, no one knows a son like his father. Yet since the Duanping era, those who defended the Huai and Shu frontiers were none other than Kui and his staff officers, or his subordinate generals. The court relied on them like the Great Wall itself. When their strength was already spent, yet their resolve to guard the state did not fade—one must also say, how vigorous! Xie Fangshu's ministerial achievements were nothing extraordinary; in his late years he was trapped by powerful ministers, even offering curios and elixirs to prolong the sovereign's life—for this he suffered demotion, falling far short of the golden mirror indeed!
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