1
唐有鹽池十八，井六百四十，皆隸度支。 蒲州安邑、解縣有池五，總曰「兩池」，歲得鹽萬斛，以供京師。 鹽州五原有烏池、白池、瓦池、細項池，靈州有溫泉池、兩井池、長尾池、五泉池、紅桃池、回樂池、弘靜池、會州有河池，三州皆輸米以代鹽。 安北都護府有胡落池，歲得鹽萬四千斛，以給振武、天德。 黔州有井四十一，成州、巂州井各一，果、閬、開、通井百二十三，山南西院領之。 邛、眉、嘉有井十三，劍南西川院領之。 梓、遂、緜、合、昌、渝、瀘、資、榮、陵、簡有井四百六十，劍南東川院領之。 皆隨月督課。 幽州、大同橫野軍有鹽屯，每屯有丁有兵，歲得鹽二千八百斛，下者千五百斛。 負海州歲免租為鹽二萬斛以輸司農。 青、楚、海、滄、棣、杭、蘇等州，以鹽價市輕貨，亦輸司農。
Under the Tang there were eighteen salt ponds and six hundred forty salt wells, all administered by the Department of Expenditure. In Puzhou, Anyi and Jie counties together had five ponds known as the "Two Ponds," which produced ten thousand hu of salt a year for the capital. Yanzhou's Wuyuan had the Wu, Bai, Wa, and Xixiang ponds; Lingzhou had the Wenquan, Liangjing, Changwei, Wuquan, Hongtao, Huile, and Hongjing ponds; Huizhou had the He pond. These three prefectures all paid grain in place of salt tribute. The Anbei Protectorate had the Huluo salt pond, which yielded fourteen thousand hu a year to supply the Zhenwu and Tiande garrisons. Qianzhou had forty-one salt wells, Chengzhou and Xizhou one each, and Guo, Lang, Kai, and Tong one hundred twenty-three together—all under the Shannan West salt office. Qiong, Mei, and Jia together had thirteen wells, administered by the Jiannan West salt office. Zi, Sui, Mian, He, Chang, Yu, Lu, Zi, Rong, Ling, and Jian had four hundred sixty wells between them, under the Jiannan East salt office. Production at all of these sites was assessed and collected on a monthly schedule. Youzhou and the Datong Hengye Army maintained salt colonies staffed by laborers and soldiers, with annual yields ranging from fifteen hundred to twenty-eight hundred hu. Coastal prefectures delivered twenty thousand hu of salt a year to the Court of Imperial Granaries in lieu of land tax. Qing, Chu, Hai, Cang, Di, Hang, Su, and other prefectures used salt proceeds to buy light goods, which they also delivered to the Court of Imperial Granaries.
2
From the Tianbao through the Zhide period, salt sold for ten cash a dou. In 758, Salt and Iron Commissioner Diwu Qi overhauled the salt law. He placed supervisory offices wherever mountains, coasts, wells, or salterns could profit, registered vagrant salt workers as saltern households, and exempted them from miscellaneous corvée. Anyone who stole and sold salt was prosecuted under the statute. Once Qi became commissioner for salt and iron monopolies across the prefectures, he brought all salt under state control, adding one hundred cash to the market price per dou and selling it for one hundred ten.
3
自兵起，流庸未復，稅賦不足供費，鹽鐵使劉晏以為因民所急而稅之，則國足用。 於是上鹽法輕重之宜，以鹽吏多則州縣擾，出鹽鄉因舊監置吏，亭戶糶商人，縱其所之。 江、嶺去鹽遠者，有常平鹽，每商人不至，則減價以糶民，官收厚利而人不知貴。 晏又以鹽生霖潦則鹵薄，暵旱則土溜墳，乃隨時為令，遣吏曉導，倍於勸農。 吳、越、揚、楚鹽廩至數千，積鹽二萬餘石。 有漣水、湖州、越州、杭州四場，嘉興、海陵、鹽城、新亭、臨平、蘭亭、永嘉、大昌、候官、富都十監，歲得錢百餘萬緡，以當百餘州之賦。 自淮北置巡院十三，曰揚州、陳許、汴州、廬壽、白沙、淮西、甬橋、浙西、宋州、泗州、嶺南、兗鄆、鄭滑，捕私鹽者，姦盜為之衰息。 然諸道加榷鹽錢，商人舟所過有稅。 晏奏罷州縣率稅，禁堰埭邀以利者。 晏之始至也，鹽利歲纔四十萬緡，至大曆末，六百餘萬緡。 天下之賦，鹽利居半，宮闈服御、軍饟、百官祿俸皆仰給焉。 明年而晏罷。
After the rebellion began, refugees had not returned and tax income could not cover expenses. Salt Commissioner Liu Yan argued that levying taxes on what people could not do without would keep the state solvent. He then proposed a balanced salt policy: too many salt officials harassed local government. In producing districts he restored officers at existing posts, let saltern households sell to merchants, and allowed merchants to trade freely. In the Yangzi and Ling regions far from salt sources he maintained Ever-Normal reserves: when merchants failed to arrive, officials cut prices to sell to the public. The state still took a large margin, yet consumers scarcely felt the burden. Yan also knew that heavy rains thinned the brine and droughts washed soil over the beds, so he issued seasonal orders and sent officers to guide production—more diligently than any agricultural campaign. Salt granaries in Wu, Yue, Yang, and Chu numbered in the thousands and held more than twenty thousand shi in reserve. Four production fields operated at Lianshui, Huzhou, Yuezhou, and Hangzhou, and ten supervisory posts at Jiaxing, Hailing, Yancheng, Xinting, Linping, Lanting, Yongjia, Dachang, Houguan, and Fudu. Annual revenue exceeded one million strings—equivalent to taxes from more than a hundred prefectures. North of the Huai he established thirteen patrol offices—from Yangzhou to Zheng-Hua—to suppress smuggling, and illicit salt trade sharply declined. Yet circuits still added monopoly surcharges, and merchants were taxed at every port their boats touched. Yan petitioned to end ad hoc local levies and to forbid dam keepers from extorting travelers for passage fees. When Yan took office annual salt revenue was only four hundred thousand strings; by the end of the Dali era it exceeded six million. Salt profits accounted for half of national revenue, funding palace supplies, army rations, and official salaries alike. The following year Yan was removed from office.
4
貞元四年，淮南節度使陳少游奏加民賦，自此江淮鹽每斗亦增二百，為錢三百一十，其後復增六十，河中兩池鹽每斗為錢三百七十。 江淮豪賈射利，或時倍之，官收不能過半，民始怨矣。
In 788 Huainan governor Chen Shaoyou petitioned to raise civilian taxes. Jiang-Huai salt then rose two hundred cash per dou to three hundred ten, later another sixty; salt from the Two Ponds in Hezhong sold for three hundred seventy a dou. Wealthy Jiang-Huai merchants speculated, sometimes doubling prices, while the state captured less than half the proceeds—and popular resentment began.
5
After Liu Yan's salt reforms, merchants paying silk in lieu of salt dues paid an extra two hundred cash per string to fund spring uniforms for the troops. As transport, tax, and salt commissioner Bao Ji let merchants pay salt dues in lacquer, tortoiseshell, and brocade—even worthless goods at inflated prices—padding accounts to deceive the court. Saltern households broke the law and illicit sales continued unabated, while patrol troops spread through every prefecture and county. Salt prices kept rising as merchants profiteered. Poor villagers in remote districts, crushed by inflated valuations, were reduced to eating food without salt. With so many patrol officers, bureaucratic bloat drained the treasury—a grievance widely noted at the time. As military costs mounted, salt prices kept climbing until some people traded several dou of grain for a single sheng of salt. Illegal private trade never let up.
6
Under Emperor Shunzong Jiang-Huai salt was cut to two hundred fifty cash a dou, and the Two Ponds salt in Hezhong to three hundred. Three new salt supervisory posts were established at Yun'an, Huanyang, and Tuwei. Later Salt Commissioner Li Qi petitioned to cut Jiang-Huai salt by ten cash a dou to ease the burden on the people, but the reduction was soon reversed. Li Qi lavished tribute to secure favor and bribed senior ministers with rich gifts, hoarding salt profits privately while the treasury emptied. The monopoly system collapsed into sham valuations—of every thousand cash collected, barely one hundred thirty was real revenue. When Vice Minister Li Xun took charge, salt revenue returned fully to the Department of Expenditure with no inflated valuations. Nationwide salt sales and tea taxes yielded a surplus of 6.65 million strings. The first year's yield matched Liu Yan's final year; within a few years revenue tripled Yan's peak. The Two Ponds alone brought in more than 1.5 million strings a year. Wealthy and unscrupulous merchants from every region gathered at Jie County, headed by a court gentleman with censors as deputies. Although salt workers' land was registered locally, magistrates could not treat them as ordinary county subjects.
7
During Xianzong's campaign against Huaixi, Expenditure Commissioner Huangfu Bo raised salt valuations in eastern and western Jiannan and Shannan West to fund the war. Under Zhenyuan, selling a shi of smuggled Two Ponds salt meant death; under Yuanhe the penalty was reduced to exile at the Five Forts of Tiande. Huangfu Bo petitioned to restore the death penalty. Offenders with a dou or more were flogged and their transport confiscated; anyone who seized a dou of smuggled salt received a thousand-cash reward; governors and observation commissioners assigned aides, and prefectures assigned clerks to police smuggling; officials who let a shi or more pass lost their salary allotments; anyone selling Two Ponds salt implicated innkeepers and brokers in the wards and markets; stealing a dou of brine earth was punished as equivalent to a sheng of salt. Prefectures and counties organized mutual surveillance groups—harsher than the Zhenyuan regulations. After the rebellions began, Hebei salt policy was only loosely enforced. Huangfu Bo then petitioned to install salt monopoly commissioners on the Jiang-Huai model, and violations grew year by year. When Tian Hongzheng returned Weibo to the throne, Emperor Muzong abolished the Hebei salt monopoly. Vice Minister Zhang Pingshu argued that monopoly salt policy was broken and that state salt sales could enrich the country. The emperor ordered senior ministers to debate the proposal. Secretariat Drafter Wei Chuhou and Vice Minister Han Yu rebutted the plan point by point as unworkable, and Pingshu backed down.
8
At Fengtian the brine ponds then yielded water cypress ash from which one hu produced twelve jin of salt—twice the profit of ordinary brine evaporation. Under Wenzong, collecting a dou of ash was punished as equivalent to stealing a jin of salt. Late in the Kaicheng era an edict decreed that if smuggling recurred twice in a month, the county magistrate would be replaced and the prefect's salary docked; after ten violations, the observation commissioner and his aide lost their salary allotments.
9
When Xuanzong ascended the throne, tea and salt regulations tightened: commissioners and aides were censured whenever official sales lagged and smuggling flourished, with no ten-strike threshold. Vice Minister Lu Hongzhi, finding the Two Ponds system failing, sent patrol official Sikong Yu to draft new rules. Revenue doubled, and Yu was promoted to Salt Monopoly Commissioner. Moats and fences guarded the pond dikes: damaging them or selling brine was capital, and salt smugglers armed with bows faced execution as well. Vice Minister Zhou Chi also proposed: "For Two Ponds smugglers, trace their dwellings and hold mutual-aid groups and village communities collectively liable. Selling five shi, buying two shi, or saltern households illicitly selling two shi—all carried the death penalty." Meanwhile Jiang and Wu bandits traded loot for tea and salt, burning the homes of anyone who refused. Officials dared not resist, while garrison posts, depots, and toll dams grew rich controlling the routes. Xuanzong then appointed former magistrates of prestigious capital-region counties to supervise the salt offices. Vice Minister Pei Xiu became Salt Commissioner, submitted an eight-point salt reform, saw every measure enacted, and sharply increased Two Ponds monopoly revenue.
10
Later, as warfare engulfed the empire, regional commands seized profits for themselves. Wang Chongrong, governor of Hezhong, controlled the Two Ponds and sent three thousand cartloads of salt in annual tribute. Eunuch Tian Lingzi raised fifty-four new army units but could not supply them. He urged returning the Two Ponds to the Salt and Iron Commissioner; Wang Chongrong refused, rebelled, and forced Emperor Xizong to flee the capital again, yet the court never regained the ponds.
11
Early in the Tang there was no prohibition on alcohol. In 758 capital wine prices soared. Because grain rations were tight, Suzong banned wine sales in the capital until the wheat harvest. The next year famine returned and the ban was reimposed. The court served wine only for Guanglu sacrifices and banquets for foreign envoys.
12
In 764 the state required all licensed wine sellers to pay a monthly tax. In 780 the levy was abolished. Three years later private sales were banned again to fund the army. The state opened breweries charging three thousand cash per hu, with prefectures and counties in charge, and punished illegal home brewing. Soon afterward, because the capital drew goods from every direction, the monopoly was lifted. In 786 wine was banned again in the capital and nearby counties. Licensed sellers nationwide paid one hundred fifty cash per dou and were exempt from corvée, while only Huainan, Zhongwu, Xuanwu, and Hedong retained yeast monopolies. In 811 capital wine shops were closed and wine tax was folded into the two-tax and green-sprout assessments. In 834 the capital wine monopoly was finally abolished. Nationwide wine monopoly revenue totaled 1.56 million strings, one third of which went to brewing costs—not counting poor households who evaded the tax. Under Zhaozong, the cash-strapped court altered yeast regulations near the capital and restored the wine monopoly to fund the army. Fengxiang Military Governor Li Maozhen, who had controlled the profits, held his troops in readiness and requested an audience to argue the policy's merits. The emperor immediately canceled it.
13
Initially Dezong adopted Vice Minister Zhao Zan's plan to tax tea, lacquer, bamboo, and timber nationwide at ten percent to fund Ever-Normal Granary reserves. After fleeing to Fengtian he repented and urgently abolished the levies by edict. After Zhu Ci's rebellion was crushed, ever more courtiers currying favor pushed profit-seeking schemes. In 792 flood relief cut taxes; the next year Circuit Salt Commissioner Zhang Pang proposed taxing tea at ten percent with three-tier valuations at producing counties, mountain districts, and major trade routes. Thereafter the levy brought in four hundred thousand strings a year, yet none of it was ever used for flood or drought relief.
14
When Muzong ascended the throne, war on two fronts emptied the treasury while the palace built a hundred-foot tower at incalculable cost. Salt Commissioner Wang Bo, courting imperial favor, raised the national tea tax by fifty percent—fifty cash on every hundred. Bo personally controlled tea in Jiang-Huai, eastern and western Zhe, Lingnan, Fujian, and Jing-Xiang, while the Ministry of Revenue handled the two Sichuan circuits. Nationwide, twenty liang were added to each jin of tea sold, and Bo petitioned for yet another surcharge. Right Reminder Li Jue submitted a memorial of protest: "Monopoly taxes were meant to fund armies. The borders are now peaceful, yet heavy levies still harm the people—that is the first objection. Tea is a daily necessity. Heavy taxes must raise prices and further burden the poor—that is the second objection. Mountain and marsh yields are limitless in principle, yet taxing by volume sold for profit drives prices so high that buyers disappear—that is the third objection." Later Wang Ya headed both commissions, created a Tea Monopoly Commissioner, transplanted private tea trees to government plantations, and burned existing stockpiles—provoking widespread outrage. Linghu Chu succeeded him as Salt and Iron Commissioner and also Tea Monopoly Commissioner, restoring monopoly payments with price increases only. When Li Shi became chancellor, tea revenue returned to the Salt and Iron administration and the Zhenyuan system was restored.
15
When Wuzong ascended the throne, Transport Commissioner Cui Gong raised Jiang-Huai tea taxes again. Tea merchants faced heavy taxes in every prefecture and county they passed, with boats sometimes seized and cargo left exposed in the rain. Circuits set up tax lodges charging what was called "ground-pressing money," and smuggling only increased. Early in the Dazhong era, Transport Commissioner Pei Xiu issued regulations: three convictions for selling three hundred jin of tea illegally meant death; itinerant merchant bands faced death for carrying even a small amount of tea; hired carriers convicted three times up to five hundred jin, and innkeepers and brokers four times up to one thousand jin, all faced execution; tea growers selling more than one hundred jin privately were flogged; after three offenses their corvée was doubled; When growers cleared their plantations and lost their livelihoods, prefects and magistrates were charged with condoning smuggling, as with private salt. Lu, Shou, and Huainan added a fifty-percent surcharge; smugglers who surrendered received passes; nationwide tea tax doubled the Zhenyuan level. Jiang-Huai tea was sold in bulk lots of up to fifty liang per jin. Circuit Commissioner Yu Cong added five cash per jin in a "surplus tea" surcharge, and standard weights were restored.
16
凡銀、銅、鐵、錫之冶一百六十八。 陝、宣、潤、饒、衢、信五州，銀冶五十八，銅冶九十六，鐵山五，錫山二，鉛山四。 汾州礬山七。 麟德二年，廢陝州銅冶四十八。
There were one hundred sixty-eight smelteries for silver, copper, iron, and tin in all. In Shan, Xuan, Run, Rao, Qu, and Xin: fifty-eight silver works, ninety-six copper works, five iron mines, two tin mines, and four lead mines. Fenzhou had seven alum mines. In 665 forty-eight copper smelteries in Shanzhou were shut down.
17
In 727 silver and tin from Wuzhong Mountain in Yiyang were first taxed. Under Dezong, Vice Minister Han Hui argued that mineral revenues should belong to the throne; thereafter all mines fell under the Salt and Iron administration.
18
元和初，天下銀冶廢者四十，歲采銀萬二千兩，銅二十六萬六千斤，鐵二百七萬斤，錫五萬斤，鉛無常數。
Early in Yuanhe forty silver works nationwide lay idle. Annual output was twelve thousand liang of silver, 266,000 jin of copper, 2.7 million jin of iron, and 50,000 jin of tin; lead had no fixed quota.
19
In 836 mineral revenues reverted to prefectures and counties, with prefects appointing officers to manage them. Prefectures then kept profits for themselves; nationwide revenue fell below seventy thousand strings—less than one county's tea tax. When Xuanzong added 520,000 bolts of silk for Hehuang garrisons, Pei Xiu petitioned to restore central control of mines for state revenue, adding two silver works and seventy-one iron mines while closing twenty-seven copper works and one lead mine. Annual nationwide output was 25,000 liang of silver, 655,000 jin of copper, 114,000 jin of lead, 17,000 jin of tin, and 532,000 jin of iron.
20
At the end of the Sui the five-zhu white coin circulated; rebellion spread and private coinage proliferated. A thousand coins initially weighed two jin, then grew lighter until they weighed less than one jin; iron sheets and leather tokens passed as currency. When Gaozu entered Chang'an, thread-ring coins circulated—so light and small that eighty or ninety thousand barely filled half a hu.
21
In 621 the "Kaiyuan tongbao" was introduced: eight fen in diameter, two zhu four can in weight, ten coins to the liang—a balanced standard inscribed in three scripts. Mints were established at Luoyang, Bing, You, Yi, Gui, and other prefectures. Three furnaces were granted to the Princes of Qin and Qi, and one to Vice Director Pei Ji for minting. Illicit coiners faced death, and their families were confiscated into government servitude. Counterfeiting gradually spread thereafter.
22
顯慶五年，以惡錢多，官為市之，以一善錢售五惡錢，民間藏惡錢以待禁弛。 乾封元年，改鑄「乾封泉寶」錢，徑寸，重二銖六分，以一當舊錢之十。 踰年而舊錢多廢，明年，以商賈不通，米帛踊貴，復行開元通寶錢，天下皆鑄之。 然私錢犯法日蕃，有以舟筏鑄江中者。 詔所在納惡錢，而姦亦不息。 儀鳳中，瀕江民多私鑄錢為業，詔巡江官督捕，載銅、錫、鑞過百斤者沒官。 四年，命東都糶米粟，斗別納惡錢百，少府、司農毀之。 是時鑄多錢賤，米粟踊貴，乃罷少府鑄，尋復舊。 永淳元年，私鑄者抵死，鄰、保、里、坊、村正皆從坐。 武后時，錢非穿穴及鐵錫銅液，皆得用之，熟銅、排斗、沙澀之錢皆售，自是盜鑄蜂起，江淮游民依大山陂海以鑄，吏莫能捕。
In 660, with debased coin rampant, the government bought bad coins at one good for five bad; people hoarded debased coin expecting the ban to lift. In 666 the "Qianfeng quanbao" replaced old coinage—one cun across, two zhu six fen, valued at ten old coins. Within a year old coin was largely abandoned; the next year trade stalled and prices soared, so Kaiyuan tongbao was restored and minted nationwide. Yet private minting violations multiplied daily, some casting coin on river rafts. An edict ordered acceptance of debased coin everywhere, yet fraud did not cease. During Yifeng many riverside people made a living counterfeiting; river patrols were ordered to seize anyone transporting more than one hundred jin of copper, tin, or alloy. In the fourth year, the eastern capital sold grain and collected one hundred debased coins per dou; the Court of Imperial Manufactories and the Court of Imperial Granaries then destroyed them. With overminting cheapening coin and grain prices soaring, the Court Provisioner's mints were shut down, then soon reopened. In 682 private minters faced death, with neighbors, mutual-aid groups, and local officials all punished as accomplices. Under Empress Wu, any coin not pierced or made of iron, tin, or slag was accepted—including inferior copper and gritty coin. Counterfeiting swarmed as Jiang-Huai vagrants minted in remote mountains and marshes beyond official reach.
23
Around Xiantian debasement worsened in both capitals; Chen and Heng coin barely had rims, and iron, tin, and five-zhu types all circulated. Some melted tin and cast molds, producing dozens of coins in moments. Early in Kaiyuan Chancellor Song Jing petitioned to ban debased coin, enforce the two-zhu four-can standard, and destroy unusable old coin. Jiang-Huai had official, private, ridged, and seasonal coin types. Censor Xiao Yinzhi was sent to compel households to surrender bad coin with harsh penalties—good coin to the state, inferior coin sunk in rivers. Markets seized up, prices rose, and Yinzhi was demoted. Song Jing also proposed releasing one hundred thousand hu of grain to buy up debased coin for destruction. In the eleventh year an edict ordered increased minting and banned sale of copper and tin and manufacture of copper vessels. In the twentieth year one thousand coins were fixed at six jin four liang, each coin at two zhu four can, with chipped, gritty, washed, and rim-defective coins banned. Surrendered coin was bought by the government. One jin of copper yielded eighty coins.
24
二十二年，宰相張九齡建議：「古者以布帛菽粟不可尺寸抄勺而均，乃為錢以通貿易。 官鑄所入無幾，而工費多，宜縱民鑄。」 議下百官，宰相裴耀卿、黃門侍郎李林甫、河南少尹蕭炅、祕書監崔沔皆以為「嚴斷惡錢則人知禁，稅銅折役則官冶可成，計估度庸則私錢以利薄而自息。 若許私鑄，則下皆棄農而競利矣」。 左監門衞錄事參軍事劉秩曰：「今之錢，古之下幣也。 若捨之任人，則上無以御下，下無以事上，不可一也。 物賤傷農，錢輕傷賈，物重則錢輕，錢輕由乎物多，多則作法收之使少，物少則作法布之使輕，奈何假人？ 不可二也。 鑄錢不雜鉛鐵則無利，雜則錢惡。 今塞私鑄之路，人猶冒死，況設陷穽誘之？ 不可三也。 鑄錢無利則人不鑄，有利則去南畝者眾，不可四也。 人富則不可以賞勸，貧則不可以威禁。 法不行，人不理，繇貧富不齊。 若得鑄錢，貧者服役於富室，富室乘而益恣，不可五也。 夫錢重繇人日滋於前，而鑪不加舊。 公錢與銅價頗等，故破重錢為輕錢，銅之不贍，在採用者眾也。 銅之為兵不如鐵，為器不如漆。 禁銅則人無所用，盜鑄者少，公錢不破，人不犯死，錢又日增，是一舉而四美兼也。」 是時公卿皆以縱民鑄為不便，於是下詔禁惡錢而已。 信安郡王禕復言國用不足，請縱私鑄，議者皆畏禕帝弟之貴，莫敢與抗，獨倉部郎中韋伯陽以為不可，禕議亦格。
In the twenty-second year Chancellor Zhang Jiuling proposed: "In antiquity, because cloth, grain, and beans could not be divided precisely for exchange, coin was created to facilitate trade. Official minting yields little while labor costs are high; private minting should be permitted." The proposal was circulated among the court officials. Chancellor Pei Yaoqing, Yellow Gate Vice Director Li Linfu, Henan Junior Prefect Xiao Jiong, and Secretariat Director Cui Mian all argued: "Strictly suppressing bad coin would make the people understand the prohibition; taxing copper and commuting labor service would enable the official mints to operate; setting valuations and labor quotas would make private coinage unprofitable and cause it to cease of itself. If private minting is allowed, everyone will abandon farming for profit." Recorder Liu Zhi of the Left Gate Guard said: "Today's coin is the inferior currency of antiquity. If minting is left to private hands, the ruler cannot govern subjects nor subjects serve the ruler—that is the first objection. Cheap goods harm farmers; light coin harms merchants. When goods are plentiful coin grows light—the state must contract or expand the money supply by policy. How can this be delegated to private hands? That is the second objection. Minting without lead or iron alloy yields no profit; with alloy, coin is debased. Even with private minting banned people risk death—how much worse to lure them with temptation? That is the third objection. Without profit no one will mint; with profit many will leave the fields—that is the fourth objection. The rich cannot be swayed by rewards; the poor cannot be restrained by punishment. When law fails, society breaks down—because wealth is unequal. If minting is permitted, the poor will serve the rich, who will grow more arrogant—that is the fifth objection. Coin had grown scarce because the population increased daily while the number of minting furnaces remained unchanged. Official coin value nearly equals raw copper price, so heavy coin is melted into light coin; copper runs short because demand is vast. Copper makes poorer weapons than iron and poorer vessels than lacquerware. Banning copper for other uses would reduce counterfeiting, preserve official coin, spare lives, and increase the money supply—four benefits in one policy." The high ministers all rejected private minting, and the emperor issued an edict banning debased coin only. Li Yi, Prince of Xin'an, again petitioned to allow private minting because state revenues were insufficient; courtiers feared opposing the emperor's brother, and only Wei Boyang objected, so the proposal was blocked.
25
二十六年，宣、潤等州初置錢監，兩京用錢稍善，米粟價益下。 其後錢又漸惡，詔出銅所在置監，鑄開元通寶錢，京師庫藏皆滿。 天下盜鑄益起，廣陵、丹楊、宣城尤甚。 京師權豪，歲歲取之，舟車相屬。 江淮偏鑪錢數十種，雜以鐵錫，輕漫無復錢形。 公鑄者號官鑪錢，一以當偏鑪錢七八，富商往往藏之，以易江淮私鑄者。 兩京錢有鵝眼、古文、綫環之別，每貫重不過三四斤，至翦鐵而緡之。
In the twenty-sixth year mints were first established at Xuan and Run; capital coin improved and grain prices fell. Coin debasement returned; edicts established mints wherever copper was found, casting Kaiyuan tongbao until capital treasuries overflowed. Counterfeiting spread nationwide, worst at Guangling, Danyang, and Xuancheng. Capital power brokers took coin year after year in endless processions of boats and carts. Jiang-Huai had dozens of private coin types mixed with iron and tin—so light they barely resembled coin. Official coin, worth seven or eight private coins, was hoarded by wealthy merchants to trade for Jiang-Huai counterfeits. Both capitals had goose-eye, ancient-script, and thread-ring coin; a full string weighed barely three or four jin, and some merchants strung cut iron as coin.
26
Chancellor Li Linfu proposed releasing three million bolts of silk to buy coin at fair rates; prices soared and ten thousand people protested daily. Vice Minister Yang Guozhong, courting popularity, cracked his whip at the market gate and declared: "The old coin will soon return." The next day an edict restored the old coin standard. In 752 the court spent three hundred thousand strings to buy debased coin in both markets, releasing stacked coin from the Left Treasury for public exchange. Guozhong further ruled that any coin not made of iron, tin, copper slag, pierced, or ancient-script was acceptable.
27
是時增調農人鑄錢，既非所習，皆不聊生。 內作判官韋倫請厚價募工，繇是役用減而鼓鑄多。 天下鑪九十九：絳州三十，揚、潤、宣、鄂、蔚皆十，益、郴皆五，洋州三，定州一。 每鑪歲鑄錢三千三百緡，役丁匠三十，費銅二萬一千二百斤、鑞三千七百斤、錫五百斤。 每千錢費錢七百五十。 天下歲鑄三十二萬七千緡。
Farmers were conscripted to mint coin though untrained, and many could barely survive. Inner Works official Wei Lun proposed hiring skilled workers at high wages, reducing corvée while increasing output. Ninety-nine furnaces operated nationwide: thirty at Jiangzhou, ten each at Yang, Run, Xuan, E, and Yu, five each at Yi and Chen, three at Yang Prefecture, and one at Dingzhou. Each furnace produced 3,300 strings a year with thirty workers, consuming 21,200 jin of copper, 3,700 jin of alloy, and 500 jin of tin. Each thousand coins cost seven hundred fifty cash to mint. Annual nationwide minting totaled 327,000 strings.
28
肅宗乾元元年，經費不給，鑄錢使第五琦鑄「乾元重寶」錢，徑一寸，每緡重十斤，與開元通寶參用，以一當十，亦號「乾元十當錢」。 先是諸鑪鑄錢窳薄，鎔破錢及佛像，謂之「盤陀」，皆鑄為私錢，犯者杖死。 第五琦為相，復命絳州諸鑪鑄重輪乾元錢，徑一寸二分，其文亦曰「乾元重寶」，背之外郭為重輪，每緡重十二斤，與開元通寶錢並行，以一當五十。 是時民間行三錢，大而重稜者亦號「重稜錢」。 法既屢易，物價騰踊，米斗錢至七千，餓死者滿道。 初有「虛錢」，京師人人私鑄，併小錢，壞鍾、像，犯禁者愈眾。 鄭叔清為京兆尹，數月榜死者八百餘人。 肅宗以新錢不便，命百官集議，不能改。 上元元年，減重輪錢以一當三十，開元舊錢與乾元十當錢，皆以一當十，碾磑鬻受，得為實錢，虛錢交易皆用十當錢，由是錢有虛實之名。
In Suzong's first year of Qianyuan (758), with expenses insufficient, Mint Commissioner Diwu Qi cast the Qianyuan zhongbao—one cun across, ten jin per string, valued at ten Kaiyuan coins, also called the "ten-for" coin. Official mints had been casting thin coin; people melted old coin and Buddha images—called "pantuo"—into private coin, punishable by beating to death. As chancellor Diwu Qi ordered Jiangzhou to cast heavy-rim "Qianyuan zhongbao"—one cun two fen, twelve jin per string, valued at fifty Kaiyuan coins. Three coin types circulated; large heavy-rim pieces were called "heavy-rim coin." Repeated currency reforms sent prices soaring—rice to seven thousand cash a dou, with the dead filling the roads. "Fictitious money" appeared as everyone in the capital counterfeited, melting small coin and destroying bells and statues—violations multiplied. Metropolitan Prefect Zheng Shuqing had more than eight hundred people flogged to death in just a few months. Suzong found the new coin unworkable and convened the court to debate reform, but no change could be agreed. In 760 heavy-rim coin was cut to thirty-for-one; old Kaiyuan and ten-for Qianyuan were set at ten-for-one. Milled coin became "real money" while transactions used "fictitious" ten-for coin—giving currency its dual names.
29
史思明據東都，亦鑄「得一元寶」錢，徑一寸四分，以一當開元通寶之百。 既而惡「得一」非長祚之兆，改其文曰「順天元寶」。
Shi Siming, holding the eastern capital, also minted "Deyi yuanbao"—one cun four fen, valued at one hundred Kaiyuan coins. He soon disliked "deyi" (attain the one) as an ill omen for long rule and renamed it Shuntian yuanbao.
30
When Daizong ascended, Qianyuan zhongbao was cut to two-for-one and heavy-rim to three-for-one; within three days all denominations were equalized at par. Since Diwu Qi's reforms hundreds violated the ban daily despite local enforcement; yet people welcomed the simplification. Thereafter Qianyuan and heavy-rim coin were melted into vessels and ceased to circulate.
31
當時議者以為「自天寶至今，戶九百餘萬。 王制：上農夫食九人，中農夫七人。 以中農夫計之，為六千三百萬人。 少壯相均，人食米二升，日費米百二十六萬斛，歲費四萬五千三百六十萬斛，而衣倍之，吉凶之禮再倍，餘三年之儲以備水旱凶災，當米十三萬六千八十萬斛，以貴賤豐儉相當，則米之直與錢鈞也。 田以高下肥瘠豐耗為率，一頃出米五十餘斛，當田二千七百二十一萬六千頃。 而錢亦歲毀於棺瓶埋藏焚溺，其間銅貴錢賤，有鑄以為器者，不出十年錢幾盡，不足周當世之用」。 諸道鹽鐵轉運使劉晏以江、嶺諸州，任土所出，皆重粗賤弱之貨，輸京師不足以供道路之直。 於是積之江淮，易銅鉛薪炭，廣鑄錢，歲得十餘萬緡，輸京師及荊、揚二州，自是錢日增矣。
Contemporary analysts argued: "From the Tianbao era to the present there are more than nine million households. Royal regulations held that a superior farmer supported nine people and a middling farmer seven. By middling-farmer reckoning, the population came to sixty-three million. With young and old evenly distributed and two sheng of rice per person daily, daily consumption was 1.26 million hu and annual consumption 453.6 million hu; clothing doubled that, ritual expenses doubled again, and three years' reserves for disaster required 1.3608 billion hu—at which rice and coin would balance in value. By field quality, one qing yielded fifty-odd hu of rice, requiring 27.216 million qing of farmland. Coin was also lost yearly to coffins, burial, burning, and drowning; as copper grew dear and coin cheap, melting coin for vessels would exhaust the supply within a decade—insufficient for contemporary needs." Transport Commissioner Liu Yan noted that Jiang and Ling prefectures produced only bulky, low-value goods whose transport to the capital could not cover shipping costs. He stockpiled goods in Jiang-Huai, traded for copper, lead, and fuel, expanded minting, and sent over one hundred thousand strings yearly to the capital and Jing and Yang—after which the money supply steadily grew.
32
In 772 the empire banned casting copper vessels. Early in Jianzhong Vice Minister Han Hui, citing abundant copper at Shangzhou's Hongya, petitioned to reopen the abandoned Luoyuan mint with ten furnaces producing 72,000 strings a year at nine hundred cash per thousand. Dezong approved.
33
Jiang-Huai abounded in lead-tin coin with copper scraped thin; silk prices kept rising. A thousand coins melted to six jin of copper, but one jin cast into vessels yielded six hundred coins' worth—so melting proliferated and coin grew scarcer. Acting Expenditure Commissioner Zhao Zan minted large coins from Lianzhou white copper, valued at ten-for-one, to stabilize exchange rates. Early in Zhenyuan, Luogu and San Pass barred travelers from carrying even a single coin out. Circuit Commissioner Zhang Pang petitioned to ban Jiang-Huai copper vessels except mirrors. In the tenth year, an edict capped copperware at one hundred sixty cash per jin and punished anyone who melted coin as an illicit coiner. Yet coin grew scarcer, silk prices fell, prefectures blocked coin from leaving their borders, and commerce stalled. Zhexi Commissioner Li Ruochu petitioned to allow coin circulation, while capital merchants trading coin nationwide were beyond count. An edict reimposed the ban. In the twentieth year markets were required to accept damask, gauze, silk, cloth, and goods alongside coin. Xianzong, with coin scarce, again banned copper vessels.
34
時商賈至京師，委錢諸道進奏院及諸軍、諸使富家，以輕裝趨四方，合券乃取之，號「飛錢」。 京兆尹裴武請禁與商賈飛錢者，廋索諸坊，十人為保。
Merchants in the capital deposited funds with circuit liaison offices or wealthy households attached to armies and commissioners, then traveled light and redeemed matching vouchers elsewhere. The system was called "flying money." Metropolitan Prefect Pei Wu petitioned to ban flying-money transactions, searching all wards with ten-person mutual-guarantee groups.
35
鹽鐵使李巽以郴州平陽銅坑二百八十餘，復置桂陽監，以兩鑪日鑄錢二十萬。 天下歲鑄錢十三萬五千緡。
Salt Commissioner Li Xun, citing over 280 copper pits at Chenzhou's Pingyang, restored the Guiyang mint with two furnaces casting 200,000 coins daily. Annual nationwide minting totaled 135,000 strings.
36
命商賈蓄錢者，皆出以市貨； 天下有銀之山必有銅，唯銀無益於人，五嶺以北，採銀一兩者流他州，官吏論罪。 元和四年，京師用錢緡少二十及有鉛錫錢者，捕之； 非交易而錢行衢路者，不問。 復詔采五嶺銀坑，禁錢出嶺。 六年，貿易錢十緡以上者，參用布帛。
Merchants hoarding coin were ordered to spend it on goods; where silver mountains existed copper was also found; silver alone was deemed of little public benefit—north of the Five Ridges, mining even one liang meant exile, with officials punished. In 809 the capital seized short strings and lead-tin coin; but coin carried in streets without active trade was not penalized. An edict reopened Five Ridges silver mining and barred coin from leaving the region. In the sixth year transactions over ten strings required partial payment in cloth and silk.
37
Weizhou's Sanhe smeltery lay twenty li from the old Feihu mint. Hedong governor Wang E built furnaces using Juma River waterpower, with Prefect Li Ting overseeing five furnaces each producing 300,000 coins monthly—ending Hedong tin coin entirely.
38
自京師禁飛錢，家有滯藏，物價寖輕。 判度支盧坦、兵部尚書判戶部事王紹、鹽鐵使王播請許商人於戶部、度支、鹽鐵三司飛錢，每千錢增給百錢，然商人無至者。 復許與商人敵貫而易之，然錢重帛輕如故。 憲宗為之出內庫錢五十萬緡市布帛，每匹加舊估十之一。
After the capital banned flying money, hoarded coin sat idle and prices gradually fell. Lu Tan, Wang Shao, and Wang Bo proposed state-sponsored flying money through the three fiscal offices with a hundred-cash premium per thousand—but no merchants used it. They again allowed merchants to exchange at par, yet coin remained scarce and silk cheap as before. Xianzong spent five hundred thousand strings from the inner treasury to buy cloth and silk at ten percent above the old valuation.
39
會吳元濟、王承宗連衡拒命，以七道兵討之，經費屈竭。 皇甫鎛建議，內外用錢每緡墊二十外，復抽五十送度支以贍軍。 十二年，復給京兆府錢五十萬緡市布帛，而富家錢過五千貫者死，王公重貶，沒入於官，以五之一賞告者。 京師區肆所積，皆方鎮錢，少亦五十萬緡，乃爭市第宅。 然富賈倚左右神策軍官錢為名，府縣不敢劾問。 民間墊陌有至七十者，鉛錫錢益多，吏捕犯者，多屬諸軍、諸使，謼集市人彊奪，毆傷吏卒。 京兆尹崔元略請犯者本軍、本使涖決，帝不能用，詔送本軍、本使，而京兆府遣人涖決。 穆宗即位，京師鬻金銀十兩亦墊一兩，糴米鹽百錢墊七八。 京兆尹柳公綽以嚴法禁止之。 尋以所在用錢墊陌不一，詔從俗所宜，內外給用，每緡墊八十。
When Wu Yuanji and Wang Chengzong rebelled in alliance, seven armies were mobilized and the treasury was drained. Huangfu Bo proposed clipping twenty per string nationwide and extracting fifty more for the army fund. In the twelfth year, the metropolitan government received five hundred thousand strings to buy cloth and silk. Wealthy households holding more than five thousand strings faced death; princes and dukes were heavily demoted and their property confiscated, with one-fifth awarded to informers. Capital markets hoarded regional-command coin—at least five hundred thousand strings each—and competed to buy mansions. Wealthy merchants sheltered behind Divine Strategy Army funds, and local officials dared not investigate. Clipping reached seventy percent; lead-tin coin proliferated. Arrested violators were mostly army and commissioner affiliates who incited mobs to assault officers. Prefect Cui Yuanlue asked that offenders be tried by their own army or commissioner; the emperor refused, ordering transfer to those units while the metropolitan government still sent officers to adjudicate. When Muzong ascended, capital gold and silver sales clipped one liang per ten, and rice and salt purchases clipped seven or eight per hundred. Metropolitan Prefect Liu Gongchuo banned it by strict enforcement. Because short-string practice varied by region, an edict allowed local custom but required court and provincial payments to deduct eighty coins from each nominal string.
40
寶曆初，河南尹王起請銷錢為佛像者以盜鑄錢論。 大和三年，詔佛像以鉛、錫、土、木為之，飾帶以金銀、鍮石、烏油、藍鐵，唯鑑、磬、釘、鐶、鈕得用銅，餘皆禁之，盜鑄者死。 是時峻鉛錫錢之禁，告千錢者賞以五千。
Early in Baoli, Henan Prefect Wang Qi petitioned to prosecute melting coin for Buddha images as counterfeiting. In 829 an edict required Buddha images of lead, tin, earth, or wood; ornamental bands might use gold, silver, brass, black oil, and blue iron; copper was limited to mirrors, chimes, nails, rings, and buttons—illicit casters faced death. Lead-tin coin was strictly banned; informants on one thousand coins received five thousand in reward.
41
四年，詔積錢以七千緡為率，十萬緡者期以一年出之，二十萬以二年。 凡交易百緡以上者，匹帛米粟居半。 河南府、揚州、江陵府以都會之劇，約束如京師。 未幾皆罷。
In the fourth year, an edict treated holdings of seven thousand strings or more as hoarding. Those with one hundred thousand strings had one year to release the money, and those with two hundred thousand had two years. Transactions over one hundred strings required half payment in silk, cloth, or grain. Henan Prefecture, Yangzhou, and Jiangling, as major commercial hubs, were regulated like the capital. Soon all these measures were repealed.
42
In the eighth year Hedong tin coin returned; Wang Ya established the Feihu mint at Weizhou; annual nationwide output fell below one hundred thousand strings. Wenzong, troubled by cheap goods and dear coin, allowed regional commands free trade in coin and grain. Though copper vessels were banned, Jiang-Huai and Lingnan shops sold them openly—melting a thousand coins into vessels yielded several times the profit. Chancellor Li Jue petitioned to expand minting; copper vessels were then banned and bought up by the state. Fifty copper mines operated nationwide, yielding 266,000 jin annually.
43
When Wuzong suppressed Buddhism, Yongping mint official Li Yuyan requested that copper statues, bells, chimes, censers, and clappers be confiscated for the patrol offices, greatly increasing the prefectures' copper supplies. The Salt Commissioner, finding regular labor insufficient for expanded minting, allowed all observation commissioners to establish mint workshops. Huainan military governor Li Shen proposed minting coin named by prefecture—capital coin for the capital, one cun like Kaiyuan tongbao, with old coin banned in trade. When Xuanzong ascended, Huichang-era policies were reversed; newly distinguishable coin was melted back into Buddhist images.
44
45
校勘記
Collation notes