← Back to 新唐書

卷五十四 志第四十四 食貨四

Volume 54 Treatises 50: Finance and Economics 3

Chapter 54 of 新唐書 · New Book of Tang
← Previous Chapter
Chapter 54
Next Chapter →
1
25% 西 西
Under the Tang there were eighteen salt ponds and six hundred forty salt wells, all administered by the Department of Expenditure. In Puzhou, Anyi and Jie counties together had five ponds known as the Two Ponds, which produced ten thousand hu of salt a year for the capital. Yanzhou's Wuyuan had the Wu, Bai, Wa, and Xixiang ponds; Lingzhou had eight ponds including Wenquan and Huile; Huizhou had the He pond. These three prefectures all paid grain in place of salt tribute. The Anbei Protectorate had the Huluo salt pond, which yielded fourteen thousand hu a year to supply the Zhenwu and Tiande garrisons. Qianzhou had forty-one salt wells, Chengzhou and Xizhou one each, and Guo, Lang, Kai, and Tong one hundred twenty-three together—all under the Shannan West salt office. Qiong, Mei, and Jia together had thirteen wells, administered by the Jiannan West salt office. Zi, Sui, Mian, He, Chang, Yu, Lu, Zi, Rong, Ling, and Jian had four hundred sixty wells between them, under the Jiannan East salt office. Production at all of these sites was assessed and collected on a monthly schedule. Youzhou and the Datong Hengye Army maintained salt colonies staffed by laborers and soldiers, with annual yields ranging from fifteen hundred to twenty-eight hundred hu. Coastal prefectures paid twenty thousand hu of salt a year to the Minister of Revenue in lieu of land tax. Qing, Chu, Hai, Cang, Di, Hang, Su, and other prefectures used salt proceeds to buy light goods for delivery to the Minister of Revenue as well.
2
使 使
From the Tianbao through the Zhide period, salt sold for ten cash a dou. In 758, Salt and Iron Commissioner Diwu Qi overhauled the salt law. He placed supervisory offices wherever mountains, coasts, wells, or salterns could profit, registered vagrant salt workers as saltern households, and exempted them from miscellaneous corvée. Anyone who stole and sold salt was prosecuted under the statute. Once Qi became commissioner for salt and iron monopolies across the prefectures, he brought all salt under state control, adding one hundred cash to the market price per dou and selling it for one hundred ten.
3
使 西西 祿
After the rebellion began, refugees had not returned and tax income could not cover expenses. Salt Commissioner Liu Yan argued that levying taxes on what people could not do without would keep the state solvent. He then proposed a balanced salt policy: too many salt officials harassed local government. In producing districts he restored officers at existing posts, let saltern households sell to merchants, and allowed merchants to trade freely. In the Yangzi and Ling regions far from salt sources he maintained Ever-Normal reserves: when merchants failed to arrive, officials cut prices to sell to the public. The state still took a large margin, yet consumers scarcely felt the burden. Yan also knew that heavy rains thinned the brine and droughts washed soil over the beds, so he issued seasonal orders and sent officers to guide production—more diligently than any agricultural campaign. Salt granaries in Wu, Yue, Yang, and Chu numbered in the thousands and held more than twenty thousand shi in reserve. Four production fields operated at Lianshui, Huzhou, Yuezhou, and Hangzhou, and ten supervisory posts at Jiaxing, Hailing, Yancheng, and elsewhere. Annual revenue exceeded one million strings—equivalent to taxes from more than a hundred prefectures. North of the Huai he established thirteen patrol offices—from Yangzhou to Zheng-Hua—to suppress smuggling, and illicit salt trade sharply declined. Yet circuits still added monopoly surcharges, and merchants were taxed at every port their boats touched. Yan petitioned to end ad hoc local levies and to forbid dam keepers from extorting travelers for passage fees. When Yan took office annual salt revenue was only four hundred thousand strings; by the end of the Dali era it exceeded six million. Salt profits accounted for half of national revenue, funding palace supplies, army rations, and official salaries alike. The following year Yan was removed from office.
4
使
In 788 Huainan governor Chen Shaoyou petitioned to raise civilian taxes. Jiang-Huai salt then rose two hundred cash per dou to three hundred ten, later another sixty; salt from the Two Ponds in Hezhong sold for three hundred seventy a dou. Wealthy Jiang-Huai merchants speculated, sometimes doubling prices, while the state captured less than half the proceeds—and popular resentment began.
5
使
After Liu Yan's salt reforms, merchants paying silk in lieu of salt dues paid an extra two hundred cash per string to fund spring uniforms for the troops. As transport, tax, and salt commissioner Bao Ji let merchants pay salt dues in lacquer, tortoiseshell, and brocade—even worthless goods at inflated prices—padding accounts to deceive the court. Saltern households broke the law and illicit sales continued unabated, while patrol troops spread through every prefecture and county. Salt prices kept rising as merchants profiteered. Poor villagers in remote districts, crushed by inflated valuations, were reduced to eating food without salt. With so many patrol officers, bureaucratic bloat drained the treasury—a grievance widely noted at the time. As military costs mounted, salt prices kept climbing until some people traded several dou of grain for a single sheng of salt. Illegal private trade never let up.
6
𣉯 使便 滿 使
Under Emperor Shunzong Jiang-Huai salt was cut to two hundred fifty cash a dou, and the Two Ponds salt in Hezhong to three hundred. Three new salt supervisory posts were established at Yun'an, Huanyang, and Tuwei. Later Salt Commissioner Li Qi petitioned to cut Jiang-Huai salt by ten cash a dou to ease the burden on the people, but the reduction was soon reversed. Li Qi lavished tribute to court his patrons and bribed senior ministers with rich gifts, hoarding salt profits privately while the treasury emptied. The monopoly system collapsed into sham valuations—of every thousand cash collected, barely one hundred thirty was real revenue. When Vice Minister Li Xun took charge, salt revenue returned fully to the Department of Expenditure with no inflated valuations. Nationwide salt sales and tea taxes yielded a surplus of 6.65 million strings. The first year's yield matched Liu Yan's final year; within a few years revenue tripled Yan's peak. The Two Ponds alone brought in more than 1.5 million strings a year. Wealthy and unscrupulous merchants from every region gathered at Jie County, headed by a court gentleman with censors as deputies. Although salt workers' land was registered locally, magistrates could not treat them as ordinary county subjects.
7
西使西西 使 使
During Xianzong's campaign against Huaixi, Expenditure Commissioner Huangfu Bo raised salt valuations in eastern and western Jiannan and Shannan West to fund the war. Under Zhenyuan, selling a shi of smuggled Two Ponds salt meant death; under Yuanhe the penalty was reduced to exile at Tiande and Wucheng. Huangfu Bo petitioned to restore the death penalty. Offenders with a dou or more were flogged and their transport confiscated; anyone who seized a dou of smuggled salt received a thousand-cash reward; governors and observation commissioners assigned aides, and prefectures assigned clerks to police smuggling; officials who let a shi or more pass lost their salary allotments; anyone selling Two Ponds salt implicated innkeepers and brokers in the wards and markets; stealing a dou of brine earth was punished as equivalent to a sheng of salt. Prefectures and counties organized mutual surveillance groups—harsher than the Zhenyuan regulations. After the rebellions began, Hebei salt policy was only loosely enforced. Huangfu Bo then petitioned to install salt monopoly commissioners on the Jiang-Huai model, and violations grew year by year. When Tian Hongzheng returned Weibo to the throne, Emperor Muzong abolished the Hebei salt monopoly. Vice Minister Zhang Pingshu argued that monopoly salt policy was broken and that state salt sales could enrich the country. The emperor ordered senior ministers to debate the proposal. Palace Attendant Wei Chuhou and Vice Minister Han Yu rebutted the plan point by point as unworkable, and Pingshu backed down.
8
At Fengtian the brine ponds then yielded water cypress ash from which one hu produced twelve jin of salt—twice the profit of ordinary brine evaporation. Under Wenzong, collecting a dou of ash was punished as equivalent to stealing a jin of salt. Late in the Kaicheng era an edict decreed that if smuggling recurred twice in a month, the county magistrate would be replaced and the prefect's salary docked; after ten violations, the observation commissioner and his aide lost their salary allotments.
9
輿使 使
When Xuanzong ascended the throne, tea and salt regulations tightened: commissioners and aides were censured whenever official sales lagged and smuggling flourished, with no ten-strike threshold. Vice Minister Lu Hongzhi, finding the Two Ponds system failing, sent patrol official Sikong Yu to draft new rules. Revenue doubled, and Lu was promoted to Salt Monopoly Commissioner. Moats and fences guarded the pond dikes: damaging them or selling brine was capital, and salt smugglers armed with bows faced execution as well. Vice Minister Zhou Chi also proposed: "For Two Ponds smugglers, trace their dwellings and hold mutual-aid groups and village communities collectively liable. Selling five shi, buying two shi, or saltern households illicitly selling two shi—all carried the death penalty." Meanwhile Jiang and Wu bandits traded loot for tea and salt, burning the homes of anyone who refused. Officials dared not resist, while garrison posts, depots, and toll dams grew rich controlling the routes. Xuanzong then appointed former magistrates of prestigious capital-region counties to supervise the salt offices. Vice Minister Pei Xiu became Salt Commissioner, submitted an eight-point salt reform, saw every measure enacted, and sharply increased Two Ponds monopoly revenue.
10
使 使
Later, as warfare engulfed the empire, regional commands seized profits for themselves. Wang Chongrong, governor of Hezhong, controlled the Two Ponds and sent three thousand cartloads of salt in annual tribute. Eunuch Tian Lingzi raised fifty-four new army units but could not supply them. He urged returning the Two Ponds to the Salt Commissioner; Wang Chongrong refused, rebelled, and forced Emperor Xizong to take the field twice—yet the court never regained the ponds.
11
祿
Early in the Tang there was no prohibition on alcohol. In 758 capital wine prices soared. Because grain rations were tight, Suzong banned wine sales in the capital until the wheat harvest. The next year famine returned and the ban was reimposed. The court served wine only for Guanglu sacrifices and banquets for foreign envoys.
12
使
In 764 the state required all licensed wine sellers to pay a monthly tax. In 780 the levy was abolished. Three years later private sales were banned again to fund the army. The state opened breweries charging three thousand cash per hu, with prefectures and counties in charge, and punished illegal home brewing. Soon afterward, because the capital drew goods from every direction, the monopoly was lifted. In 786 wine was banned again in the capital and nearby counties. Licensed sellers nationwide paid one hundred fifty cash per dou and were exempt from corvée, while only Huainan, Zhongwu, Xuanwu, and Hedong retained yeast monopolies. In 811 capital wine shops were closed and wine tax was folded into the two-tax and green-sprout assessments. In 834 the capital wine monopoly was finally abolished. Nationwide wine monopoly revenue totaled 1.56 million strings, one third of which went to brewing costs—not counting poor households who evaded the tax. Under Zhaozong, short of funds, the court altered yeast regulations near the capital and restored the wine monopoly to fund the army. Fengxiang governor Li Maozhen, who had been monopolizing the profits, marched troops to demand an audience on the policy—and the emperor immediately canceled the monopoly.
13
使
Initially Dezong adopted Vice Minister Zhao Zan's plan to tax tea, lacquer, bamboo, and timber nationwide at ten percent to fund Ever-Normal Granary reserves. After fleeing to Fengtian he repented and urgently abolished the levies by edict. After Zhu Ci's rebellion was crushed, ever more courtiers currying favor pushed profit-seeking schemes. In 792 flood relief cut taxes; the next year Circuit Salt Commissioner Zhang Pang proposed taxing tea at ten percent with three-tier valuations at producing counties, mountain districts, and major trade routes. Thereafter the levy brought in four hundred thousand strings a year, yet none of it was ever used for flood or drought relief.
14
使 西 使使 使使
When Muzong ascended the throne, war on two fronts emptied the treasury while the palace built a hundred-foot tower at incalculable cost. Salt Commissioner Wang Bo, courting imperial favor, raised the national tea tax by fifty percent—fifty cash on every hundred. Bo personally controlled tea in Jiang-Huai, eastern and western Zhe, Lingnan, Fujian, and Jing-Xiang, while the Ministry of Revenue handled the two Sichuan circuits. Nationwide, twenty liang were added to each jin of tea sold, and Bo petitioned for yet another surcharge. Right Reminder Li Jue submitted a memorial of protest: "Monopoly taxes were meant to fund armies. The borders are now peaceful, yet heavy levies still harm the people—that is the first objection. Tea is a daily necessity. Heavy taxes must raise prices and further burden the poor—that is the second objection. Mountain and marsh yields are limitless in principle, yet taxing by volume sold for profit drives prices so high that buyers disappear—that is the third objection." Later Wang Ya headed both commissions, created a Tea Monopoly Commissioner, transplanted private tea trees to government plantations, and burned existing stockpiles—provoking widespread outrage. Linghu Chu succeeded him as Salt and Tea Commissioner, restoring monopoly payments with price increases but abandoning the harshest measures. When Li Shi became chancellor, tea revenue returned to the Salt and Iron administration and the Zhenyuan system was restored.
15
使 使 使
When Wuzong ascended the throne, Transport Commissioner Cui Gong raised Jiang-Huai tea taxes again. Tea merchants faced heavy taxes in every prefecture and county they passed, with boats sometimes seized and cargo left exposed in the rain. Circuits set up tax lodges charging what was called "ground-pressing money," and smuggling only increased. Early in the Dazhong era, Transport Commissioner Pei Xiu issued regulations: three convictions for selling three hundred jin of tea illegally meant death; for armed traveling bands, even a small amount of tea meant death; hired carriers convicted three times up to five hundred jin, and innkeepers and brokers four times up to one thousand jin, all faced execution; tea growers selling more than one hundred jin privately were flogged; after three offenses their corvée was doubled; When growers cleared their plantations and lost their livelihoods, prefects and magistrates were charged with condoning smuggling, as with private salt. Lu, Shou, and Huainan added a fifty-percent surcharge; smugglers who surrendered received passes; nationwide tea tax doubled the Zhenyuan level. Jiang-Huai tea was sold in bulk lots of up to fifty liang per jin. Circuit Commissioner Yu Cong added five cash per jin in a "surplus tea" surcharge, and standard weights were restored.
16
There were one hundred sixty-eight smelteries for silver, copper, iron, and tin in all. In Shan, Xuan, Run, Rao, Qu, and Xin: fifty-eight silver works, ninety-six copper works, five iron mines, two tin mines, and four lead mines. Fenzhou had seven alum mines. In 665 forty-eight copper smelteries in Shanzhou were shut down.
17
使
In 727 silver and tin from Wuzhong Mountain in Yiyang were first taxed. Under Dezong, Vice Minister Han Hui argued that mineral revenues should belong to the throne; thereafter all mines fell under the Salt and Iron administration.
18
Early in Yuanhe forty silver works nationwide lay idle. Annual output was twelve thousand liang of silver, 266,000 jin of copper, 2.7 million jin of iron, and 50,000 jin of tin; lead had no fixed quota.
19
使使
In 836 mineral revenues reverted to prefectures and counties, with prefects appointing officers to manage them. Prefectures then kept profits for themselves; nationwide revenue fell below seventy thousand strings—less than one county's tea tax. When Xuanzong added 520,000 bolts of silk for Hexi garrisons, Pei Xiu petitioned to restore central control of mines for state revenue, adding two silver works and seventy-one iron mines while closing twenty-seven copper works and one lead mine. Annual nationwide output was 25,000 liang of silver, 655,000 jin of copper, 114,000 jin of lead, 17,000 jin of tin, and 532,000 jin of iron.
20
滿
At the end of the Sui the five-zhu white coin circulated; rebellion spread and private coinage proliferated. A thousand coins initially weighed two jin, then grew lighter until they weighed less than one jin; iron sheets and leather tokens passed as currency. When Gaozu entered Chang'an, thread-ring coins circulated—so light and small that eighty or ninety thousand barely filled half a hu.
21
In 621 the Kaiyuan tongbao was introduced: eight fen in diameter, two zhu four can in weight, ten coins to the liang—a balanced standard inscribed in three scripts. Mints were established at Luoyang, Bing, You, Yi, Gui, and other prefectures. Three furnaces were granted to the Princes of Qin and Qi, and one to Vice Director Pei Ji for minting. Counterfeiters faced death and confiscation of their families' property. Counterfeiting gradually spread thereafter.
22
穿
In 660, with debased coin rampant, the government bought bad coins at one good for five bad; people hoarded debased coin expecting the ban to lift. In 666 the Qianfeng quanbao replaced old coinage—one cun across, two zhu six fen, valued at ten old coins. Within a year old coin was largely abandoned; the next year trade stalled and prices soared, so Kaiyuan tongbao was restored and minted nationwide. Yet private minting violations multiplied daily, some casting coin on river rafts. An edict ordered acceptance of debased coin everywhere, yet fraud did not cease. During Yifeng many riverside people made a living counterfeiting; river patrols were ordered to seize anyone transporting more than one hundred jin of copper, tin, or alloy. In the fourth year the eastern capital sold grain, collecting one hundred debased coins per dou, which the Court Provisioner and Minister of Revenue then destroyed. With overminting cheapening coin and grain prices soaring, the Court Provisioner's mints were shut down, then soon reopened. In 682 private minters faced death, with neighbors, mutual-aid groups, and local officials all punished as accomplices. Under Empress Wu, any coin not pierced or made of iron, tin, or slag was accepted—including inferior copper and gritty coin. Counterfeiting swarmed as Jiang-Huai vagrants minted in remote mountains and marshes beyond official reach.
23
使
Around Xiantian debasement worsened in both capitals; Chen and Heng coin barely had rims, and iron, tin, and five-zhu types all circulated. Some melted tin and cast molds, producing dozens of coins in moments. Early in Kaiyuan Chancellor Song Jing petitioned to ban debased coin, enforce the two-zhu four-can standard, and destroy unusable old coin. Jiang-Huai had official, private, ridged, and seasonal coin types. Censor Xiao Yinzhi was sent to compel households to surrender bad coin with harsh penalties—good coin to the state, inferior coin sunk in rivers. Markets seized up, prices rose, and Yinzhi was demoted. Song Jing also proposed releasing one hundred thousand hu of grain to buy up debased coin for destruction. In the eleventh year an edict ordered increased minting and banned sale of copper and tin and manufacture of copper vessels. In the twentieth year one thousand coins were fixed at six jin four liang, each coin at two zhu four can, with chipped, gritty, washed, and rim-defective coins banned. Surrendered coin was bought by the government. One jin of copper yielded eighty coins.
24
貿 耀 使使 便
In the twenty-second year Chancellor Zhang Jiuling proposed: "In antiquity, because cloth, grain, and beans could not be divided precisely for exchange, coin was created to facilitate trade. Official minting yields little while labor costs are high; private minting should be permitted." The debate went to the full court. Chancellor Pei Yaoji, Li Linfu, Xiao Jiong, and Cui Hao all argued that strict suppression of bad coin, copper taxes commuted to corvée, and regulated valuations would let official mints succeed and private coin die from thin margins. If private minting is allowed, everyone will abandon farming for profit." Recorder Liu Zhi of the Left Gate Guard said: "Today's coin is the inferior currency of antiquity. If minting is left to private hands, the ruler cannot govern subjects nor subjects serve the ruler—that is the first objection. Cheap goods harm farmers; light coin harms merchants. When goods are plentiful coin grows light—the state must contract or expand the money supply by policy. How can this be delegated to private hands? That is the second objection. Minting without lead or iron alloy yields no profit; with alloy, coin is debased. Even with private minting banned people risk death—how much worse to lure them with temptation? That is the third objection. Without profit no one will mint; with profit many will leave the fields—that is the fourth objection. The rich cannot be swayed by rewards; the poor cannot be restrained by punishment. When law fails, society breaks down—because wealth is unequal. If minting is permitted, the poor will serve the rich, who will grow more arrogant—that is the fifth objection. Coin debasement grows because private minting proliferates while official furnaces do not increase. Official coin value nearly equals raw copper price, so heavy coin is melted into light coin; copper runs short because demand is vast. Copper makes poorer weapons than iron and poorer vessels than lacquerware. Banning copper for other uses would reduce counterfeiting, preserve official coin, spare lives, and increase the money supply—four benefits in one policy." The high ministers all rejected private minting, and the emperor issued an edict banning debased coin only. Prince Li Fu of Xin'an again petitioned to allow private minting for lack of revenue; courtiers feared opposing the emperor's brother, until only Wei Boyang objected and the proposal was blocked.
25
滿
In the twenty-sixth year mints were first established at Xuan and Run; capital coin improved and grain prices fell. Coin debasement returned; edicts established mints wherever copper was found, casting Kaiyuan tongbao until capital treasuries overflowed. Counterfeiting spread nationwide, worst at Guangling, Danyang, and Xuancheng. Capital power brokers took coin year after year in endless processions of boats and carts. Jiang-Huai had dozens of private coin types mixed with iron and tin—so light they barely resembled coin. Official coin, worth seven or eight private coins, was hoarded by wealthy merchants to trade for Jiang-Huai counterfeits. Both capitals had goose-eye, ancient-script, and thread-ring coin; a full string weighed barely three or four jin, and some merchants strung cut iron as coin.
26
穿
Chancellor Li Linfu proposed releasing three million bolts of silk to buy coin at fair rates; prices soared and ten thousand people protested daily. Vice Minister Yang Guozhong, courting popularity, cracked his whip at the market gate and declared: "The old coin will soon return." The next day an edict restored the old coin standard. In 752 the court spent three hundred thousand strings to buy debased coin in both markets, releasing stacked coin from the Left Treasury for public exchange. Guozhong further ruled that any coin not made of iron, tin, copper slag, pierced, or ancient-script was acceptable.
27
調
Farmers were conscripted to mint coin though untrained, and many could barely survive. Inner Works official Wei Lun proposed hiring skilled workers at high wages, reducing corvée while increasing output. Ninety-nine furnaces operated nationwide: thirty at Jiangzhou, ten each at Yang, Run, Xuan, E, and Yu, five each at Yi and Chen, three at Yangzhou, one at Dingzhou. Each furnace produced 3,300 strings a year with thirty workers, consuming 21,200 jin of copper, 3,700 jin of alloy, and 500 jin of tin. Each thousand coins cost seven hundred fifty cash to mint. Annual nationwide minting totaled 327,000 strings.
28
使 滿 便
In 758, with expenses insufficient, Mint Commissioner Diwu Qi cast the Qianyuan zhongbao—one cun across, ten jin per string, valued at ten Kaiyuan coins, also called the "ten-for" coin. Official mints had been casting thin coin; people melted old coin and Buddha images—called "pantuo"—into private coin, punishable by beating to death. As chancellor Diwu Qi ordered Jiangzhou to cast heavy-rim Qianyuan zhongbao—one cun two fen, twelve jin per string, valued at fifty Kaiyuan coins. Three coin types circulated; large heavy-rim pieces were called "heavy-rim coin." Repeated currency reforms sent prices soaring—rice to seven thousand cash a dou, with the dead filling the roads. Fictitious money appeared as everyone in the capital counterfeited, melting small coin and destroying bells and statues—violations multiplied. Metropolitan Prefect Zheng Shuqing posted over eight hundred executions in a few months. Suzong found the new coin unworkable and convened the court to debate reform, but no change could be agreed. In 760 heavy-rim coin was cut to thirty-for-one; old Kaiyuan and ten-for Qianyuan were set at ten-for-one. Milled coin became "real money" while transactions used "fictitious" ten-for coin—giving currency its dual names.
29
Shi Siming, holding the eastern capital, also minted Deyi yuanbao—one cun four fen, valued at one hundred Kaiyuan coins. He soon disliked "deyi" (attain the one) as an ill omen for long rule and renamed it Shuntian yuanbao.
30
便
When Daizong ascended, Qianyuan zhongbao was cut to two-for-one and heavy-rim to three-for-one; within three days all denominations were equalized at par. Since Diwu Qi's reforms hundreds violated the ban daily despite local enforcement; yet people welcomed the simplification. Thereafter Qianyuan and heavy-rim coin were melted into vessels and ceased to circulate.
31
使
Contemporary analysts argued: "From the Tianbao era to the present there are more than nine million households. Royal regulations held that a superior farmer supported nine people and a middling farmer seven. By middling-farmer reckoning, the population came to sixty-three million. With young and old evenly distributed and two sheng of rice per person daily, annual consumption reached 45.36 million hu; clothing doubled that, ritual expenses doubled again, and three years' reserves for disaster required 1.36 billion hu—at which rice and coin would balance in value. By field quality, one qing yielded fifty-odd hu of rice, requiring 27.216 million qing of farmland. Coin was also lost yearly to coffins, burial, burning, and drowning; as copper grew dear and coin cheap, melting coin for vessels would exhaust the supply within a decade—insufficient for contemporary needs." Transport Commissioner Liu Yan noted that Jiang and Ling prefectures produced only bulky, low-value goods whose transport to the capital could not cover shipping costs. He stockpiled goods in Jiang-Huai, traded for copper, lead, and fuel, expanded minting, and sent over one hundred thousand strings yearly to the capital and Jing and Yang—after which the money supply steadily grew.
32
In 772 the empire banned casting copper vessels. Early in Jianzhong Vice Minister Han Hui, citing abundant copper at Shangzhou's Hongya, petitioned to reopen the abandoned Luoyuan mint with ten furnaces producing 72,000 strings a year at nine hundred cash per thousand. Dezong approved.
33
使 西使貿
Jiang-Huai abounded in lead-tin coin with copper scraped thin; silk prices kept rising. A thousand coins melted to six jin of copper, but one jin cast into vessels yielded six hundred coins' worth—so melting proliferated and coin grew scarcer. Acting Expenditure Commissioner Zhao Zan minted large coins from Lianzhou white copper, valued at ten-for-one, to stabilize exchange rates. Early in Zhenyuan, Luogu and San Pass barred travelers from carrying even a single coin out. Circuit Commissioner Zhang Pang petitioned to ban Jiang-Huai copper vessels except mirrors. In the tenth year an edict permitted copper vessels of one jin maximum at one hundred sixty cash, with coin melting punished as counterfeiting. Yet coin grew scarcer, silk prices fell, prefectures blocked coin from leaving their borders, and commerce stalled. Zhexi Commissioner Li Ruochu petitioned to allow coin circulation, while capital merchants trading coin nationwide were beyond count. An edict reimposed the ban. In the twentieth year markets were required to accept damask, gauze, silk, cloth, and goods alongside coin. Xianzong, with coin scarce, again banned copper vessels.
34
使
Merchants in the capital deposited funds with circuit memorial offices and army brokers, traveled light to trade nationwide, and redeemed vouchers for payment—called "flying money." Metropolitan Prefect Pei Wu petitioned to ban flying-money transactions, searching all wards with ten-person mutual-guarantee groups.
35
使
Salt Commissioner Li Xun, citing over 280 copper pits at Chenzhou's Pingyang, restored the Guiyang mint with two furnaces casting 200,000 coins daily. Annual nationwide minting totaled 135,000 strings.
36
貿
Merchants hoarding coin were ordered to spend it on goods; where silver mountains existed copper was also found; silver alone was deemed of little public benefit—north of the Five Ridges, mining even one liang meant exile, with officials punished. In 809 the capital seized short strings and lead-tin coin; but coin carried in streets without active trade was not penalized. An edict reopened Five Ridges silver mining and barred coin from leaving the region. In the sixth year transactions over ten strings required partial payment in cloth and silk.
37
使使
Weizhou's Sanhe smeltery lay twenty li from the old Feihu mint. Hedong governor Wang E built furnaces using Juma River waterpower, with Prefect Li Ting overseeing five furnaces each producing 300,000 coins monthly—ending Hedong tin coin entirely.
38
使
After the capital banned flying money, hoarded coin sat idle and prices gradually fell. Lu Tan, Wang Shao, and Wang Bo proposed state-sponsored flying money through the three fiscal offices with a hundred-cash premium per thousand—but no merchants used it. They again allowed merchants to exchange at par, yet coin remained scarce and silk cheap as before. Xianzong spent five hundred thousand strings from the inner treasury to buy cloth and silk at ten percent above the old valuation.
39
使 使使
When Wu Yuanji and Wang Chengzong rebelled in alliance, seven armies were mobilized and the treasury was drained. Huangfu Bo proposed clipping twenty per string nationwide and extracting fifty more for the army fund. In the twelfth year the metropolitan government received five hundred thousand strings to buy silk; hoarders with over five thousand strings faced death; princes' illicit purchases were confiscated with one-fifth to informers. Capital markets hoarded regional-command coin—at least five hundred thousand strings each—and competed to buy mansions. Wealthy merchants sheltered behind Divine Strategy Army funds, and local officials dared not investigate. Clipping reached seventy percent; lead-tin coin proliferated. Arrested violators were mostly army and commissioner affiliates who incited mobs to assault officers. Prefect Cui Yuanlue asked that offenders be tried by their own army or commissioner; the emperor refused, ordering transfer to those units while the metropolitan government still sent officers to adjudicate. When Muzong ascended, capital gold and silver sales clipped one liang per ten, and rice and salt purchases clipped seven or eight per hundred. Metropolitan Prefect Liu Gongchuo banned it by strict enforcement. Soon, with clipping varying by region, an edict standardized disbursements at eighty percent per string nationwide.
40
Early in Baoli, Henan Prefect Wang Qi petitioned to prosecute melting coin for Buddha images as counterfeiting. In 829 an edict required Buddha images of lead, tin, earth, or wood, with gold and silver ornament only; copper was limited to mirrors, chimes, nails, rings, and buttons—counterfeiters faced death. Lead-tin coin was strictly banned; informants on one thousand coins received five thousand in reward.
41
In the fourth year hoarders of seven thousand strings or more were required to release funds within one year for holdings up to one hundred thousand, two years for two hundred thousand. Transactions over one hundred strings required half payment in silk, cloth, or grain. Henan Prefecture, Yangzhou, and Jiangling, as major commercial hubs, were regulated like the capital. Soon all these measures were repealed.
42
使
In the eighth year Hedong tin coin returned; Wang Ya established the Feihu mint at Weizhou; annual nationwide output fell below one hundred thousand strings. Wenzong, troubled by cheap goods and dear coin, allowed regional commands free trade in coin and grain. Though copper vessels were banned, Jiang-Huai and Lingnan shops sold them openly—melting a thousand coins into vessels yielded several times the profit. Chancellor Li Jue petitioned to expand minting; copper vessels were then banned and bought up by the state. Fifty copper mines operated nationwide, yielding 266,000 jin annually.
43
使使 使
When Wuzong suppressed Buddhism, mint official Li Yuyan petitioned to confiscate copper statues, bells, chimes, censers, and clappers for the patrol office, greatly increasing copper supplies in the prefectures. The Salt Commissioner, finding regular labor insufficient for expanded minting, allowed all observation commissioners to establish mint workshops. Huainan governor Li Shen proposed minting coin named by prefecture—capital coin for the capital, one cun like Kaiyuan tongbao, with old coin banned in trade. When Xuanzong ascended, Huichang-era policies were reversed; newly distinguishable coin was melted back into Buddhist images.
44
Late under Zhaozong the capital counted eight hundred fifty coins as a full string—only eighty-five per nominal hundred; Henan Prefecture reportedly used eighty as one hundred.
45
0.85em|columns=2
Collation notes (editorial references for textual variants in this chapter).
← Previous Chapter
Back to Chapters
Next Chapter →