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卷五十三 志第四十三 食貨三

Volume 53 Treatises 49: Finance and Economics 3

Chapter 53 of 新唐書 · New Book of Tang
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Chapter 53
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1
The Tang made Chang'an its capital, and although Guanzhong was renowned as rich farmland, the region was too small to feed the court and buffer against famine and flood. The state therefore relied on regular canal shipments of grain from the southeast. Under Gaozu and Taizong, the court spent sparingly and provisions were ample. Combined water and land transport never exceeded two hundred thousand shi a year, so grain logistics remained straightforward. After Gaozong's reign the annual haul kept growing, while schemes for profit multiplied, and the people bore the cost.
2
西
Initially, canal grain from the Jiang-Huai region was shipped to Luoyang and stored in the Hanjia Granary, then hauled overland by cart or pack train to Shanzhou. Water carriage covered long distances and was plagued by storms and sinkings; losses often ran to seven or eight parts in ten, so a full haul was reckoned when eight dou out of every hu actually arrived. Overland hauls to Shan covered only three hundred li, yet hire for every two hu cost a thousand cash. Those who delivered rent bore both water and land transport charges, and the Yellow River held the hazards of Sanmen Gorge and the Dizhu rocks. In Xianqing 1 (656), Chu Lang, overseer of the western imperial park, proposed cutting a beam road through Sanmen Mountain to open a land route. Six thousand laborers were drafted to cut the pass, but the project failed. Later Yang Wulian, chief artisan of the palace works directorate, cut a plank road instead to haul grain boats through. Haulers wore two iron hooks on their chests. Ropes snapped constantly; when men fell to their deaths the incident was logged as desertion, and their families were jailed. The practice was widely hated.
3
耀耀便 調 使 耀耀耀使 西西 西 西 耀使使
In Kaiyuan 18 (730), Xuancheng prefect Pei Yaoji came to court for the annual assembly. Xuanzong asked his views on grain transport, and Yaoji submitted a detailed plan: 'Jiangnan is densely populated yet exempt from frontier garrison duty. Yet rent, corvée cloth, and diao goods had to reach Yangzhou's sluice by the second month, cross the Huai into the Bian only after the fourth, and often struggle through shallows until the sixth or seventh month to reach the Yellow River mouth—by which time the flood was rising. Not until the eighth or ninth month, when the water fell, could they move upriver into the Luo. The route was chronically blocked and convoys jammed the channel. Jiangnan crews were unused to river work and had to hire skilled pilots and sailors at great extra cost. Days under way were few; days stuck in port were many. The Han and Sui canal systems left riverside granaries whose sites can still be found. Build the Wulao Granary at the river mouth and the Luokou Granary in Gong County, so Jiangnan vessels stop at the mouth and Yellow River craft never push into the Luo junction. Relay through granaries at Heyang, Baiya, Taiyuan, Yongfeng, and Weinan: sail when the channel is full, store when it is low. Convoys would never idle long and spoilage would drop sharply. The savings would be enormous. Xuanzong at first paid little attention. In Kaiyuan 21 (733), now metropolitan governor of Jingzhao, Yaoji faced floods in the capital and soaring grain prices as Xuanzong prepared to move to Luoyang. Asked again about transport, he urged ending the Shan overland haul, building river-mouth granaries where Jiangnan convoys would unload and leave, and having the state hire boats to move grain into the Yellow River and Luo systems. Place granaries on both sides of Sanmen Gorge: boats unload at the east warehouse, porters carry overland to the west warehouse, then boats resume the river leg—bypassing Sanmen's rapids. Xuanzong agreed. The Heyin Granary was built at Heyin and the Baiya Granary at Heqing; east of Sanmen the Jijin Granary and west of it the Yan Granary; and an eighteen-li mountain road was cut for the overland relay. Jiang-Huai grain all went to Heyin; the leg from Heyin west to Taiyuan was called the Northern Route, and from Taiyuan boats sailed the Wei to supply Guanzhong. Delighted, Xuanzong made Yaoji vice director of the Huangmen and chief minister, with overall charge of Jiang-Huai transport; Cui Xiyi and Xiao Jiong served as deputies. Rent from eight more prefectures was added to the relay into the Wei. Within three years seven million shi moved by water, saving three hundred thousand strings in overland hire.
4
Peace had enriched the realm and swollen court spending. Beyond legitimate transport fees, levies multiplied under labels like 'crate-foot' and 'granary upkeep.' People said it cost a coin's worth of cash to move a coin's worth of grain—such was the waste.
5
耀 使
After Yaoji left office the northern route faltered; only a million shi a year reached the capital. In Kaiyuan 25 (737) the northern route was abandoned. Cui Xiyi, as Henan-Shan transport commissioner, moved 1.8 million shi annually. Later, with the Great Granary overflowing, the annual quota was trimmed by hundreds of thousands of shi.
6
使便
In Kaiyuan 29 (741), Shan prefect Li Qiwu cut a gate through the Dizhu rocks for grain boats, blasted a haul road along the ridge by heating stone and dousing it with vinegar. Rubble dumped in the channel only made the current fiercer. Boats could not use the new gate until the flood rose, when teams hauled them through. The emperor had doubts and sent eunuch inspectors; Qiwu bribed them heavily, and they reported the project sound.
7
使 使 耀
Qiwu was promoted to minister of ceremonial; Wei Jian, magistrate of Chang'an, replaced him as combined water-and-land transport commissioner. Wei Jian restored the Han and Sui canals from Tong Pass to Chang'an to bring Shandong grain and taxes to the capital. He diverted the Ba and Chan, ran the channel east along the Wei to the Yongfeng Granary, and rejoined the main Wei. Below Wangchun Tower on Changle Slope he excavated a basin beside the imperial park wall to berth the grain fleet. Each vessel flew its home commandery's name and displayed local treasures and curios on deck beams. Earlier folk had sung a ditty: 'Deti he na ye.' When a treasure talisman was found at Taolin, Shan county aide Cui Chengfu rewrote the refrain as 'Treasure found in the Hongnong wilds.' Jian dressed the boatmen in Wu-Chu costume—wide hats, flowing sleeves, straw sandals—to perform the song. Chengfu expanded it to ten stanzas, stood on the lead boat in green robe, brocade half-sleeves, and red forehead cloth to lead the chorus, and assembled over a hundred women from two counties in bright dress with drums, pipes, and flutes. The flotilla moored in turn below the tower. The emperor was delighted and named the basin Guangyun, 'Broad Transport.' That year four million shi of Shandong grain reached the capital by water. After Pei Yaoji's reforms, favored officials usually held transport portfolios as well; Wei Jian stood at the peak.
8
耀 使 耀宿
When Yaoji opened the new water route he had sought to end overland hauls, but the land leg survived. From the Jingyun period the northern overland route used eight relay stages with hired civilian carts and oxen. Early in Kaiyuan, Henan governor Li Jie as transport commissioner moved 2.5 million shi a year; the eight relays alone required 1,800 carts. Years after Yaoji left office, Henan governor Pei Jiong cut the eight relays to two exchange points with riverside depots and official overseers, and built stone weirs from east of Longmen to Tianjin Bridge to tame the current. Then major rebellions broke out and the empire was drained.
9
使
Late in Suzong's reign Shi Chaoyi's forces swept out of Songzhou and severed the Huai route; rent, corvée goods, salt, and iron had to go up the Han instead. Henan governor Liu Yan, as vice minister of revenue, also ran finance, transport, salt and iron, and minting. Jiang-Huai grain and cloth reached the capital via the Xiang-Han corridor and the Shangyu road.
10
使西西使 調 使
When Daizong escaped through Shanzhou, Guanzhong was destitute and transport was massively expanded to feed the court. In Guangde 2 (764) the revenue-handler post was abolished and Liu Yan took sole charge of transport, rent and yong, minting, and salt and iron from Luoyang through Henan, Huaixi, and both Jiangnans to the capital. Every circuit tax commissioner answered to him on grain logistics. He funded hired crews from salt profits and posted officers along the Yangtze, Bian, Yellow River, and Wei as each stretch required. Previously grain went overland from Runzhou to Yangzi at nineteen cash per dou; Yan switched to bagged rice by boat and cut fifteen cash; from Yangzhou to Heyin the cost had been 120 cash per dou. Yan fielded two thousand river barges of a thousand hu each, grouped in convoys of ten with three hundred men and fifty polemen, escorted by officers to Heyin and through Sanmen as 'gap-filling upper-gate ships,' cutting ninety cash per dou. Hemp, bamboo, and rushes from the southwest became tow ropes; rotten cord and scrap wood replaced fuel—nothing was wasted. Within a decade crews mastered the river hazards. Yangtze craft stopped at the Bian junction, Bian craft at the Yellow River, Yellow River craft at the Wei; Jiangnan freight piled up at Yangzhou, Bian freight at Heyin, Yellow River freight at the Wei mouth, and Wei boats fed the Great Granary. Annual deliveries reached 1.1 million shi without a single bushel lost to the river. Light cargo from Yangzi to Bianzhou had cost 2,200 cash per pack; Yan cut 900 and saved over 100,000 strings a year. Officials guarded Danyang Lake and banned irrigation diversions, keeping the canal full thereafter. In Dali 8 (773), with Guanzhong harvests rich, the quota was cut by 100,000 shi and the treasury bought grain at fair rates to aid farmers. Since the late Tianbao era Yan had run receipts, annual transport, and both treasuries—more than thirty years at the fiscal helm. When Yang Yan became chancellor he removed Yan over old grudges. Transport reverted to the revenue office, and Jiang-Huai grain fell to Cui Hetu of the storehouse bureau.
11
使 西使
When Tian Yue, Li Weiyue, Li Na, and Liang Chongyi rebelled, imperial armies marched on them and looked to the capital for every ration. Li Na and Tian Yue held Wokou; Liang Chongyi blocked Xiang and Deng. North and south supply lines collapsed and the capital panicked. Transport commissioner Du You argued that the Qin-Han route left Junyi, entered Pipa Ditch, crossed the Cai, and met at Chenzhou—a path abandoned since the Sui cut the Bian. Reopening it by modest dredging and bank work would be cheap; clear Jiming Hill at both ends for boats with only forty li of portage, and grain from the Yangtze lakes, Qianzhong, Lingnan, Shu, and Han could sail in convoys via Baisha to Dongguan, through Ying and Cai, across the Bian to Luoyang—avoiding the muddy Huai-Yellow River stretch and saving more than two thousand li. But Li Na's general Li Xu surrendered Xuzhou, the Huai route reopened, and the project was dropped. Vice Minister Zhao Zan, finding Huai exports of cash and goods too slow, split eastern and western Bianzhou transport and dual-tax salt-and-iron offices under overall revenue control.
12
宿 使使使使 西西西使使西 使 使
Early in Zhenyuan (785), with troops garrisoning Guanzhong, rice hit a thousand cash per dou. The Great Granary could feed court and harem less than ten days. The palace could not brew wine. Imperial camels hauled Yongfeng grain to the guards while overland oxen died off. Dezong made Supervising Secretary Cui Zao chancellor for his blunt counsel and reputation for action. Zao, reflecting Jiang-Wu hatred of profit-grabbing finance commissioners, urged circuit governors to send the dual tax through chosen officials, abolished transport commissioners and revenue patrols, restored revenue and salt and iron to the Ministry of Revenue, and had chancellors divide the six ministries among themselves. Vice Minister Yuan Xiu took salt, iron, and wine monopoly; Vice Minister Ji Zhongfu took revenue and the dual tax. Jiang-Huai shipments rose: eastern and western Zhejiang moved 750,000 shi yearly, another million shi bought with dual-tax revenue, and Jiangxi, Hunan, E'yue, Fujian, and Lingnan added 1.2 million shi. Han Huang and Du Ya were ordered to deliver to the eastern and western Wei Bridge granaries. Patrol offices were restored wherever circuits produced salt or iron. At year-end chancellors graded each other's performance. Zao favored Yuan Xiu, but Han Huang still ran transport and argued that national grain logistics must not be dismantled. The emperor respected Huang and reappointed him Jiang-Huai transport commissioner. Yuan Xiu resented Huang's harsh manner; they could not cooperate and a feud opened. Xiu resigned on grounds of illness. Huang took revenue, salt and iron, and transport; Zao fell soon after. Huang accused Xiu of feeding Ziqing and Hezhong—supplies Li Na and Zhu Ci's general Huai Guang used to rebel. Xiu was banished to Leizhou as registrar and soon ordered to take his own life.
13
使 使西 使 西使使西使 使使
Each spring and summer the Bian-Song commissioner posted officers on the Bian Canal to catch illegal irrigation diversions. Each year's convoys through the Dizhu rocks lost nearly half their boats. A mid-river peak was called 'Rice Mound.' Boats entering Sanmen hired Pinglu pilots called 'gate craftsmen' to signal the way; a single vessel might need a hundred days to get through. A proverb ran: 'Since antiquity there have been no gate craftsmen's graves. —because they all drowned. Shan-Guo commissioner Li Bi cut a haul road west of Jijin Granary linked to Sanmen, rebuilt the upper track for empty carts at fifty thousand strings and the lower at half that; and built five-plank Wei barges that moved 1.3 million shi from the Eastern Wei Bridge granary, ending the southern overland haul. Later circuit transport commissioner Zhang Pang restored the Jiang-Huai patrol office. When Zhexi commissioner Li Qi took charge, he taxed private roads and small weirs on Jiang-Huai works under Zhexi; deputy Pan Mengyang ran the capital liaison office. Li Xun as circuit transport and salt-and-iron commissioner returned the dams to salt-and-iron control and abolished Li Qi's extra taxes. After Liu Yan, Jiang-Huai grain to Wei Bridge had steadily fallen; under Li Xun it recovered to Yan's levels.
14
使 使 使 使
Yangzhou had dredged Taizi Harbor, Chen Deng Pond, and thirty-four other reservoirs to feed the canal, but they kept silting shut again. Huainan commissioner Du Ya dredged the Shugang channel, opened Jucheng Lake and Aijing Reservoir, and built dikes through the city so large vessels could pass. The channel sank lower as water drained toward the Huai; in summer boats could not move upstream. Commissioner Li Jifu built the Pingjin Weir to spill excess water and hold back shortages, and the grain route opened again. Yet shipments kept shrinking; only two hundred thousand hu of Jiang-Huai rice reached Wei Bridge. Circuit commissioner Lu Tan bought grain for a year's reserve and eliminated eighty redundant posts. South of the Yangtze every post answered to the patrol bureaus, and grain losses in transit were heavy. Wang Bo of the Ministry of Justice replaced Tan and proposed death for anyone losing fifty shi out of every five hundred delivered to Wei Bridge. Later revenue chief Huangfu Bo ruled: losses of three hundred hu per ten thousand required repayment; 1,700 hu meant exile to the northern frontier; beyond that, death; theft of ten hu meant exile, thirty hu meant death. Yet with sinkings and wrecked hauls, arrivals often fell below forty or fifty percent. Clerks and boatmen colluded in fraud. Flogging and cries of pain echoed along the routes. Men languished in prison for years; even after amnesties, the dead in custody were beyond count. Death sentences were later commuted to exile in the northern frontier towns. With no fear of the law, seven or eight parts in ten of shipped grain never arrived. Transport commissioner Liu Gongchuo asked to restore Wang Bo's harsher penalties. Early in the Dahe era drought emptied the rivers. Convoys dug through sand to advance, grain spoiled, and many were executed on the spot without awaiting imperial review.
15
The Qin-Han canal's Xingcheng Weir once reached the Yongfeng Granary. Xianyang magistrate Han Liao proposed dredging the three-hundred-li stretch from Xianyang to Tong Pass to end cart haulage. Chancellor Li Guyin said the timing was wrong. Wenzong replied: 'If it helps the people, I do not care about yin-yang taboos. The project was approved. When the weir was finished, haul oxen returned to the fields and Guanzhong benefited.
16
使 使
By precedent county officials led transport gangs; delivering forty thousand in light goods earned top marks. Early in Kaicheng the 'long-fixed gang' system chose tough officials to deliver the dual tax: one promotion per hundred thousand delivered, and ten years of round trips earned a county magistracy. Jiang-Huai cash piled up at Heyin. Transport cost over 170,000 strings a year, and many gang leaders were executed for theft. Revenue chief Wang Yanwei fielded 13,300 relay teams raised by roadside households for hire, one post station per day, cutting costs sharply. Chancellors complained the long-fixed gang promoted unqualified men—over ten appointments yearly in major Jiang-Huai prefectures. The system was scrapped: fifty thousand earned top marks, seventy thousand cut one promotion cycle, five hundred thousand cut three. When Vice Minister Pei Xiu took charge, riverside magistrates oversaw transport from the Yangtze to the Wei—four hundred thousand shi of rice. Within three years deliveries to Wei Bridge reached 1.2 million shi.
17
Such, in broad outline, was how canal grain reached the capital and met state needs. Local transport for prefectures, counties, and garrisons, or ad hoc military supply runs, need not be recorded here.
18
便
The Tang posted military prefectures on key passes and opened garrison farms on spare land—992 farms nationwide. Directorate of Agriculture farms held thirty qing each; prefectural and garrison farms fifty qing each. Soil quality, crop choice, labor costs, and expected yields were all set by the Department of State Affairs. Imperial park farms appointed skilled farmers as officers and deputies; censors inspected deliveries on circuit. One ox was allotted per fifty mu of good land, twenty mu of poor land, or eighty mu of paddy. Farms were graded in three tiers by soil and harvest conditions, using civilian yields and the average good year as the benchmark. In emergencies a thousand soldiers or laborers were drafted to help harvest. Each third month the agriculture director and deputy toured farms under their charge and punished violations. High-yield farms earned praise and promotion for their officers. Each mid-spring they registered next year's acreage and distances to posts, reported to the Ministry of War, and deployed men as needed. In Kaiyuan 25 (737) an edict tied farm officers' merit ratings to whether the harvest was good or poor. Where garrison land could be farmed, each soldier received ten mu for his rations. Each spring farm officers toured the fields and punished untimely work. Nationwide garrison farms harvested over 1.9 million hu of grain.
19
便 調
Initially the treasury bought grain yearly at Taiyuan to feed armies at Zhenwu, Tiande, Lingwu, Yan, and Xia—five or six hundred thousand strings—and many boats were lost going upriver. Early in Jianzhong (780), Chancellor Yang Yan proposed garrison farms at Fengzhou and drafting Guanfu laborers to dig the Lingyang Canal for irrigation. Jingzhao governor Yan Ying, who had served in Shuofang and knew the region, opposed the plan in a memorial that went unanswered. Ying memorialized again: 'The old Five Cities garrison farms are vast. Lend canal-opening grain to those posts for winter delivery; pay canal workers in cloth and silk upfront, then convert the value into grain deliveries. Guanfu would be spared levies, the Five Cities farms expanded, and the gain would be ten times that of digging the canal. Yang Yan was in power; Yan's plan was rejected and the Lingyang Canal was never finished. Yet Zhenwu and Tiande still held rich farmland stretching a thousand li.
20
西使使 西
During Yuanhe (806–820) the Zhenwu army went hungry. Chancellor Li Jiang urged garrison farming to cut treasury transport costs and end hedi purchase fraud. Xianzong approved and made Han Chonghua commissioner for Zhenwu and Jingxi garrison farms, hedi purchases, and water transport. North of Dai he opened three hundred qing, released over nine hundred corrupt officials, gave them tools and oxen and seed on loan to repay debts, and reaped a great harvest within two years. He raised fifteen farms of 130 men each, a hundred mu per man, with hilltop forts from Zhenwu west past Yunzhou to the Middle Accepted-Submission City—over six hundred li, twenty palisades, 3,800 qing under cultivation, 200,000 shi harvested yearly, saving the treasury over twenty million strings. At court Chonghua asked to open another five thousand qing with seven thousand men, enough to supply all Five Cities garrisons. Li Jiang had already left office; later chancellors shelved the plan. Late in Xianzong's reign garrison farms hired civilians or borrowed corvée labor and swapped poor plots for good ones—the people suffered. Muzong ordered the swapped land returned and put garrison farms back under military labor. Those who farmed official land received one-third of the yield for life.
21
西使
Lingwu and Binning had vast fertile soil that locals did not farm. Late in Dahe (835), Wang Qi memorialized to establish garrison farms. When Tanguts ravaged Hexi, Binning commissioner Bi Tan recruited men for garrison farms, harvesting three hundred thousand hu a year and saving the treasury millions of strings.
22
西
After Zhenguan and Kaiyuan the frontier stretched west to Gaochang, Kucha, Yanqi, and Little Bolü and north to the Xueyantuo lands. Dozens of border prefectures held large garrisons. When farms and land tax could not feed the troops, the state began hedi grain purchases. Under Chancellor Niu Xianke, Peng Guo proposed expanding Guanfu grain purchases. Capital stores overflowed, and Xuanzong never again visited Luoyang. In the Tianbao era (742–756) circuits paid six hundred thousand strings yearly for hedi purchases with a three-cash premium per dou; over a million hu reached capital granaries each year. When rice was cheap the Court of the Imperial Treasury bought at a premium; when dear it sold at reduced prices.
23
Early in Zhenyuan (785) Tibetans broke the peace treaty and 170,000 troops from all circuits were posted to the frontier. Guanzhong had been ravaged by Tibetans for twenty years. North to the river bend few households remained. Frontier garrisons needed 170,000 hu of grain monthly, all bought in Guanzhong. Chancellor Lu Zhi argued: 'Guanzhong grain is cheap. Hedi purchases could reach over a million hu. Boat and cart delivery from the counties to the Great Granary costs over forty for grain and seventy for rice. One year of hedi buying equals two years of canal transport; one dou moved by canal costs what five dou cost by hedi purchase. Cut transport to stock the frontier, but keep enough transport for emergencies. Cut Jiang-Huai grain to Heyin by 800,000 hu, Heyin to Taiyuan by 500,000, and Taiyuan to Eastern Wei Bridge by 200,000. Sell the saved grain in flood-hit Jiang-Huai counties at fifty cash below market to relieve distress. At the capital's Eastern Wei Bridge, pay thirty cash above market per dou to benefit farmers. Use proceeds from Jiang-Huai grain sales and transport savings to buy silk for the capital. The emperor ordered the treasury to buy an extra 330,000 hu at premium prices but did not adopt Zhi's full plan. Early in Xianzong's reign, with a bumper harvest, officials proposed hedi purchases in the capital region. Prefectures and counties assigned household quotas and beat those who fell behind—worse than taxation. It was called hedi purchase, but it harmed the people.
24
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Collation notes for this chapter.
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