1
夫人宵天地之䫉，懷五常之性，聰明精粹，有生之最靈者也。 爪牙不足以供耆欲，趨走不足以避利害，無毛羽以禦寒暑，必將役物以為養，任智而不恃力，此其所以為貴也。 故不仁愛則不能群，不能群則不勝物，不勝物則養不足。 群而不足，爭心將作，上聖卓然先行敬讓博愛之德者，眾心說而從之。 從之成群，是為君矣； 歸而往之，是為王矣。 洪範曰：「天子作民父母，為天下王。」 聖人取類以正名，而謂君為父母，明仁愛德讓，王道之本也。 愛待敬而不敗，德須威而久立，故制禮以崇敬，作刑以明威也。 聖人既躬明悊之性，必通天地之心，制禮作教，立法設刑，動緣民情，而則天象地。 故曰先王立禮，「則天之明，因地之性」也。 刑罰威獄，以類天之震曜殺戮也； 溫慈惠和，以效天之生殖長育也。 《書》云「天秩有禮」，「天討有罪」。 故聖人因天秩而制五禮，因天討而作五刑。 大刑用甲兵，其次用斧鉞； 中刑用刀鋸，其次用鑽鑿； 薄刑用鞭扑。 大者陳諸原野，小者致之市朝，其所繇來者上矣。
Human beings, bearing the form of Heaven and Earth and the nature of the Five Constants, are the most numinous of living creatures. Because humans lack natural weapons and coverings, they survive by organizing the world through intelligence, not brute strength; that is what makes them distinctive. Without humane solidarity, people cannot form society; without society, they cannot secure resources for life. When scarcity persists, conflict begins. The sages preempted this by modeling respect, deference, and universal concern, winning willing allegiance. Once people gathered under such leadership, that person became a ruler; When all under heaven gravitated to him, he became a true king. The Great Plan says: 'The Son of Heaven acts as father and mother of the people, becoming king for all under heaven.' Calling the ruler 'parent' emphasized that humane care and moral deference are the foundation of legitimate kingship. Affection alone is unstable; it must be paired with respect, and virtue must be backed by enforceable authority. Hence both ritual and penal law. Because sages understood both human nature and cosmic principle, they built ritual, education, law, and punishment around real human emotions while mirroring cosmic order. Therefore it is said former kings established rites by 'patterning Heaven's brightness and following Earth's nature.' Punitive law mirrors the coercive side of cosmic power—thunder, lightning, and lethal force; while benevolence and care imitate Heaven's life-giving and nurturing functions. The Documents says, 'Heaven's ordered ranks have rites,' and 'Heaven punishes the guilty.' So the sages derived both ritual classification and penal classification from Heaven's own ordering and sanction. At the highest level, punishment means military force; next comes execution by weapons; Middle grades involved mutilating instruments; Lighter ones used flogging. Major penalties were public in open ground, lesser penalties in urban spaces-a very old institutional pattern.
2
自黃帝有涿鹿之戰以定火災，顓頊有共工之陳以定水害。 唐虞之際，至治之極，猶流共工，放讙兜，竄三苗，殛鯀，然後天下服。 夏有甘扈之誓，殷、周以兵定天下矣。 天下既定，戢臧干戈，教以文德，而猶立司馬之官，設六軍之眾，因井田而制軍賦。 地方一里為井，井十為通，通十為成，成方十里； 成十為終，終十為同，同方百里； 同十為封，封十為畿，畿方千里。 有稅有租。 稅以足食，賦以足兵。 故四井為邑，四邑為丘。 丘，十六井也，有戎馬一匹，牛三頭。 四丘為甸。 甸，六十四井也，有戎馬四匹，兵車一乘，牛十二頭，甲士三人，卒七十二人，干戈備具，是謂乘馬之法。 一同百里，提封萬井，除山川沈斥，城池邑居，園囿術路，三千六百井，定出賦六千四百井，戎馬四百匹，兵車百乘，此卿大夫采地之大者也，是謂百乘之家。 一封三百一十六里，提封十萬井，定出賦六萬四千井，戎馬四千匹，兵車千乘，此諸侯之大者也，是謂千乘之國。 天子畿方千里，提封百萬井，定出賦六十四萬井，戎馬四萬匹，兵車萬乘，故稱萬乘之主。 戎馬車徒干戈素具，春振旅以搜，夏拔舍以苗，秋治兵以獮，冬大閱以狩，皆於農隙以講事焉。 五國為屬，屬有長； 十國為連，連有帥； 三十國為卒，卒有正； 二百一十國為州，州有牧。 連帥比年簡車，卒正三年簡徒，群牧五載大簡車徒，此先王為國立武足兵之大略也。
From the earliest legendary rulers, armed action was used to suppress catastrophic disorder, whether framed as fire or flood threats. Even under ideal sage rule, severe sanctions remained necessary against major disorder before universal compliance was achieved. Xia, Shang, and Zhou alike relied at key moments on military force to establish order. Even in peace they promoted civil culture while maintaining a structured military apparatus tied to land and taxation. Administrative-military units scaled up from the basic well-field: ten wells to a tong, ten tong to a cheng. Further aggregation produced larger territorial blocks up to one-hundred-li squares; and ultimately to the thousand-li royal domain. The system distinguished tax and rent obligations. Food revenue sustained population; military levy sustained defense. At lower levels, four wells formed a hamlet and four hamlets a larger unit. Each qiu of sixteen wells carried specified livestock obligations for war support. Four qiu constituted a dian. A sixty-four-well unit supported a full standardized military package of horses, chariot, draft oxen, officers, infantry, and weapons. In a hundred-li fief, after non-taxable terrain was removed, 6,400 productive wells supported 400 horses and 100 chariots-the upper scale of grand-official estates. At major feudal scale, assessed land supported a thousand-chariot military capacity. The royal domain's assessed capacity justified the classic title 'lord of ten thousand chariots.' Military readiness was seasonal and synchronized with agricultural downtime, preserving both farming and defense. Five states formed a lower cluster under a chief; Ten formed a larger command under a marshal; Thirty formed a corps under a chief officer; Two hundred ten constituted a regional circuit under a governor. The old system used regular inspection cycles to maintain force quality without abandoning institutional control.
3
周道衰，法度颦，至齊桓公任用管仲，而國富民安。 公問行伯用師之道，管仲曰：「公欲定卒伍，修甲兵，大國亦將修之，而小國設備，則難以速得志矣。」 於是乃作內政而寓軍令焉，故卒伍定虖里，而軍政成虖郊。 連其什伍，居處同樂，死生同憂，禍福共之，故夜戰則其聲相聞，晝戰則其目相見，緩急足以相死。 其教已成，外攘夷狄，內尊天子，以安諸夏。 齊威既沒，晉文接之，亦先定其民，作被廬之法，總帥諸侯，迭為盟主。 然其禮已頗僭差，又隨時苟合以求欲速之功，故不能充王制。 二伯之後，寖以陵夷，至魯成公作丘甲，哀公用田賦，搜狩治兵大閱之事皆失其正。 春秋書而譏之，以存王道。 於是師旅亟動，百姓罷敝，無伏節死難之誼。 孔子傷焉，曰：「以不教民戰，是謂棄之。」
As Zhou order eroded, Qi's reform under Guan Zhong restored wealth and stability. The duke asked about hegemony by military means. Guan Zhong said: 'If Your Grace wishes to fix ranks and repair armor and weapons, great states will also repair theirs, and small states will ready defenses, so quick success will be hard.' He embedded military organization within civil administration, creating readiness without provoking immediate counter-mobilization. By tightly integrating local units into shared daily life, he produced battlefield cohesion and mutual commitment under stress. Once internal discipline matured, Qi could defend frontiers, uphold royal legitimacy, and secure the central states. Jin's Duke Wen continued the model: domestic consolidation first, then interstate leadership. But hegemonic politics remained institutionally compromised and short-term, never achieving true kingly order. Post-hegemonic states distorted older military-ritual norms into ad hoc extraction and display. The Spring and Autumn Annals condemned these practices to preserve the normative ideal. Frequent campaigning wore down the populace and eroded sacrificial civic ethos. Confucius lamented it, saying: 'To send the people to war without teaching them is to abandon them.'
4
故稱子路曰：「由也，千乘之國，可使治其賦也。」 而子路亦曰：「千乘之國，攝虖大國之間，加之以師旅，因之以饑饉，由也為之，比及三年，可使有勇，且知方也。」 治其賦兵教以禮誼之謂也。
So he praised Zilu: 'You, You, in a thousand-chariot state, can be made to govern its levies.' And Zilu also said: 'In a thousand-chariot state hemmed between great states, pressed by armies and followed by famine, if I governed it, by three years I could make them brave and also know proper direction.' Military administration, in this view, must be inseparable from moral-political education.
5
春秋之後，滅弱吞小，並為戰國，稍增講武之禮，以為戲樂，用相夸視。 而秦更名角抵，先王之禮沒於淫樂中矣。 雄桀之士因勢輔時，作為權詐以相傾覆，吳有孫武，齊有孫臏，魏有吳起，秦有商鞅，皆禽敵立勝，垂著篇籍。 當此之時，合從連衡，轉相攻伐，代為雌雄。 齊愍以技擊彊，魏惠以武卒奮，秦昭以銳士勝。 世方爭於功利，而馳說者以孫、吳為宗。 時唯孫卿明於王道，而非之曰：「彼孫、吳者，上勢利而貴變詐； 施於暴亂昏嫚之國，君臣有間，上下離心，政謀不良，故可變而詐也。 夫仁人在上，為下所卬，猶子弟之衛父兄，若手足之扞頭目，何可當也？ 鄰國望我，歡若親戚，芬若椒蘭，顧視其上，猶焚灼仇讎。 人情豈肯為其所惡而攻其所好哉？ 故以桀攻桀，猶有巧拙； 以桀詐堯，若卵投石，夫何幸之有！ 《詩》曰：『武王載旆，有虔秉鉞，如火烈烈，則莫我敢遏。』 言以仁誼綏民者，無敵於天下也。 若齊之技擊，得一首則受賜金。 事小敵鲧，則媮可用也； 事鉅敵堅，則渙然離矣。 是亡國之兵也。 魏氏武卒，衣三屬之甲，操十二石之弩，負矢五十丢，置戈其上，冠冑帶劍，贏三日之糧，日中而趨百里，中試則復其戶，利其田宅。 如此，則其地雖廣，其稅必寡，其氣力數年而衰。 是危國之兵也。 秦人，其生民也骥阨，其使民也酷烈。 劫之以勢，隱之以阨，狃之以賞慶，道之以刑罰，使其民所以要利於上者，非戰無由也。 功賞相長，五甲首而隸五家，是最為有數，故能四世有勝於天下。 然皆干賞蹈利之兵，庸徒鬻賣之道耳，未有安制矜節之理也。 故雖地廣兵彊，鰓鰓常恐天下之一合而共軋己也。 至乎齊桓、晉文之兵，可謂入其域而有節制矣，然猶未本仁義之統也。 故齊之技擊不可以遇魏之武卒，魏之武卒不可以直秦之銳士，秦之銳士不可以當桓、文之節制，桓、文之節制不可以敵湯、武之仁義。」
In the Warring States era, military ritual became spectacle and competitive display. By Qin, old ritual forms had been recast as entertainments, their normative substance lost. Strategists such as Sun Wu, Sun Bin, Wu Qi, and Shang Yang turned military thought toward power and deception, with influential textual legacies. Alliance blocs constantly realigned, producing perpetual competitive warfare. Different states specialized in different military institutions to seek advantage. With utility dominant, military discourse canonized the Sun-Wu tradition. Only Xunzi was clear on the kingly way and criticized them, saying: 'Those Sun and Wu strategists esteem advantage and prize changing deception; Such methods work only in already disordered polities fractured by distrust and poor governance. Under genuine benevolent authority, social cohesion resembles familial protection; such a polity is not easily defeated. If we govern well, neighbors are drawn to us warmly, while resenting their own oppressive rulers. People do not willingly fight for what they detest against what they admire. Even tyrant-against-tyrant conflict leaves room for tactical skill; But trying to defeat true sage rule by trickery is like hurling an egg at rock. As the Odes describes King Wu's campaign, moral legitimacy generated unstoppable force. Rule grounded in benevolence and justice is strategically unmatched. Qi incentivized shock troops through cash-for-head rewards. Such troops may work against minor opponents; But against strong adversaries they quickly disintegrate. That is a military model fit for state collapse. Wei's elite infantry were heavily equipped and physically tested, then compensated through tax and property privileges. Such a force imposes heavy fiscal burdens and erodes demographic strength over time. That too is a dangerous military model. Qin organized society through strict coercive discipline and severe extraction. By combining pressure, reward conditioning, and punishment, Qin made military performance the sole path of advancement. Its quantified merit system produced sustained multi-generational battlefield success. But such forces were fundamentally transactional, lacking stable moral-institutional discipline. Hence even at peak strength, Qin lived in strategic fear of coalition encirclement. Huan and Wen improved discipline but still fell short of a fully benevolent-just political foundation. Thus Qi's technical fighters cannot meet Wei's martial graduates; Wei's martial graduates cannot directly face Qin's elites; Qin's elites cannot withstand Huan and Wen's disciplined system; Huan and Wen's discipline cannot rival Tang and Wu's benevolence and righteousness.'
6
故曰：「善師者不陳，善陳者不戰，善戰者不敗，善敗者不亡。」 若夫舜修百僚，咎繇作士，命以「蠻夷猾夏，寇賊姦軌」，而刑無所用，所謂善師不陳者也。 湯、武征伐，陳師誓眾，而放禽桀、紂，所謂善陳不戰者也。 齊桓南服彊楚，使貢周室，北伐山戎，為燕開路，存亡繼絕，功為伯首，所謂善戰不敗者也。 楚昭王遭闔廬之禍，國滅出亡，父老送之。 王曰：「父老反矣！ 何患無君？」 父老曰：「有君如是其賢也！」 相與從之。 或奔走赴秦，號哭請救，秦人憐之謂之出兵。 二國并力，遂走吳師，昭王返國，所謂善敗不亡者也。 若秦因四世之勝，據河山之阻，任用白起、王翦豺狼之徒，奮其爪牙，禽獵六國，以并天下。 窮武極詐，士民不附，卒隸之徒，還為敵讎，猋起雲合，果共軋之。 斯為下矣。 凡兵，所以存亡繼絕，救亂除害也。 故伊、呂之將，子孫有國，與商周並。 至於末世，苟任詐力，以快貪殘，爭城殺人盈城，爭地殺人滿野。 孫、吳、商、白之徒，皆身誅戮於前，而功滅亡於後。 報應之勢，各以類至，其道然矣。
Therefore it is said: 'One good at commanding does not deploy; one good at deployment does not fight; one good at fighting does not lose; one good at losing does not perish.' When Shun ordered the hundred officials and Gao Yao served as judicial officer, tasked with 'barbarians troubling Xia, bandits and rebels,' yet punishment had no use—this is what is meant by one good at commanding not deploying. Tang and Wu's legitimacy made victory decisive once forces were arrayed, minimizing prolonged combat. Huan's record shows effective campaigning and interstate stabilization without strategic defeat. Even after catastrophic defeat under Wu pressure, King Zhao entered exile with popular support. The king said: 'Elders, return home! Why worry that there will be no ruler?' The elders replied, 'We have a ruler as worthy as this!' They all followed him together. Others appealed to Qin in tears, and Qin was moved to dispatch aid. With allied support Chu recovered, illustrating how political legitimacy can survive even major military defeat. Qin then pursued total conquest through accumulated advantage, strategic geography, and ruthless generals. By overreliance on coercion and deceit, Qin alienated society; its own lower ranks eventually joined the coalition that destroyed it. That is the lowest strategic outcome. The proper function of military force is restorative: preserving order, rescuing the endangered, and eliminating harm. Hence the great founders' strategists left enduring political lineages, their merit recognized alongside dynastic houses. In decadent times, rulers chased gain through fraud and violence, producing mass slaughter in both urban sieges and territorial wars. The lineages of Sunzi, Wuzi, Shang Yang, and Bai Qi ended in violent ruin, and their victories did not endure. Consequences answer in kind; that is how moral causation operates.
7
漢興，高祖躬神武之材，行寬仁之厚，總攬英雄，以誅秦、項。 任蕭、曹之文，用良、平之謀，騁陸、酈之辯，明叔孫通之儀，文武相配，大略舉焉。 天下既定，踵秦而置材官於郡國，京師有南北軍之屯。 至武帝平百粵，內增七校，外有樓船，皆歲時講肄，修武備云。 至元帝時，以貢禹議，始罷角抵，而未正治兵振旅之事也。
At Han's founding, Gaozu combined military charisma with political magnanimity, uniting talent to defeat Qin and Xiang Yu. By balancing bureaucrats, strategists, diplomats, and ritual specialists, Gaozu aligned civil and military governance into a coherent founding program. Once unified, Han retained Qin-style local military offices and permanent capital garrisons. After Emperor Wu's southern campaigns, Han expanded both land and naval forces and institutionalized regular training. Under Emperor Yuan, jiaodi spectacle was removed, but proper military-ritual discipline was still not fully reestablished.
8
古人有言：「天生五材，民並用之，廢一不可，誰能去兵？」 鞭扑不可弛於家，刑罰不可廢於國，征伐不可偃於天下； 用之有本末，行之有逆順耳。 孔子曰：「工欲善其事，必先利其器。」 文德者，帝王之利器； 威武者，文德之輔助也。 夫文之所加者深，則武之所服者大； 德之所施者博，則威之所制者廣。 三代之盛，至於刑錯兵寢者，其本末有序，帝王之極功也。
An old saying says: 'Heaven produced five materials, and people use all of them; none can be discarded-who can remove arms?' Domestic discipline, state law, and military force each remain necessary in their domains; the issue is sequence and measure, not absolute presence or absence. Confucius said: 'If a craftsman wishes to do good work, he must first sharpen his tools.' For kingship, civil virtue is the primary instrument; military force serves as its supporting arm. The deeper moral influence runs, the broader military submission becomes; the wider virtue is applied, the wider coercive order can be stabilized. The Three Dynasties reached penal and military minimalism only after correctly ordering moral foundations and coercive means.
9
昔周之法，建三典以刑邦國，詰四方：一曰，刑新邦用輕典； 二曰，刑平邦用中典； 三曰，刑亂邦用重典。 五刑，墨罪五百，劓罪五百，宮罪五百，刖罪五百，殺罪五百，所謂刑平邦用中典者也。 凡殺人者踣諸市，墨者使守門，劓者使守關，宮者使守內，刖者使守囿，完者使守積。 其奴，男子入于罪隸，女子入舂槁。 凡有爵者，與七十者，與未齔者，皆不為奴。
Zhou's tripartite penal doctrine prescribed lighter law for newly integrated polities; medium law for stable polities; and heavy law for chaotic ones. The so-called medium code enumerated graded corporal and capital penalties in standardized counts. Penalty types were tied to assigned labor posts, from gate and pass duties to granary and park custody. Male convicts became penal bond-laborers; females were assigned grain-processing labor. Rank holders, elders, and very young minors were exempted from enslavement.
10
周道既衰，穆王眊荒，命甫侯度時作刑，以詰四方。 墨罰之屬千，劓罰之屬千，髕罰之屬五百，宮罰之屬三百，大辟之罰其屬二百。 五刑之屬三千，蓋多於平邦中典五百章，所謂刑亂邦用重典者也。
As Zhou weakened, punitive legislation was expanded under King Mu through the code associated with Marquis Fu. The punitive taxonomy under this later code was far larger and harsher than earlier norms. This three-thousand-item structure exemplified heavy-law governance for disorder.
11
春秋之時，王道寖壞，教化不行，子產相鄭而鑄刑書。 晉叔嚮非之曰：「昔先王議事以制，不為刑辟。 懼民之有爭心也，猶不可禁禦，是故閑之以誼，糾之以政，行之以禮，守之以信，奉之以仁； 制為祿位以勸其從，嚴斷刑罰以威其淫。 懼其未也，故誨之以忠，霭之以行，教之以務，使之以和，臨之以敬，蒞之以彊，斷之以剛。 猶求聖哲之上，明察之官，忠信之長，慈惠之師。 民於是乎可任使也，而不生禍亂。 民知有辟，則不忌於上，並有爭心，以徵於書，而徼幸以成之，弗可為矣。 夏有亂政而作禹刑，商有亂政而作湯刑，周有亂政而作九刑。 三辟之興，皆叔世也。 今吾子相鄭國，制參辟，鑄刑書，將以靖民，不亦難乎！ 《詩》曰：『儀式刑文王之德，日靖四方。』 又曰：『儀刑文王，萬邦作孚。』 如是，何辟之有？ 民知爭端矣，將棄禮而徵於書。 錐刀之末，將盡爭之，亂獄滋豐，貨賂並行。 終子之世，鄭其敗虖！」 子產報曰：「若吾子之言，僑不材，不能及子孫，吾以救世也。」 媮薄之政，自是滋矣。 孔子傷之，曰：「導之以德，齊之以禮，有恥且格； 導之以政，齊之以刑，民免而無恥。」 「禮樂不興，則刑罰不中； 刑罰不中，則民無所錯手足。」 孟氏使陽膚為士師，問於曾子，亦曰：「上失其道，民散久矣。 如得其情，則哀矜而勿喜。」
As royal norms collapsed, Zheng's Zichan famously codified criminal law in public bronze text. Jin's Shuxiang criticized it: 'Former kings deliberated affairs and regulated, and did not make penal statutes public. To prevent litigious contention, governance had relied on layered moral-political discipline: righteousness, policy, rite, trust, and benevolence; Institutional incentives and decisive penalties worked together under a moral framework. Even so they reinforced order through constant ethical training, administrative harmony, and firm adjudication. They prioritized selecting high-caliber moral and administrative personnel. Under such conditions, the populace could be mobilized without social breakdown. Public legalism alone, he argued, breeds technical litigation and opportunistic evasion. Major penal codifications historically arose in periods of political disorder. Thus codified penal expansion marks late-decline politics, not high-order rule. Shuxiang warned Zichan that legal codification would not easily produce social pacification. As the Odes says, order comes by emulating King Wen's virtue. Likewise, moral modeling creates political trust across states. If virtue governs, why foreground penal text? Litigation culture will replace ritual culture. Petty technical disputes will explode, along with corruption in adjudication. By your generation's end, Zheng will likely fail!' Zichan replied: 'If it is as you say, I, Qiao, am unworthy and cannot benefit my descendants; I do this to save the present age.' Thereafter instrumental and morally thinned governance intensified. Confucius lamented it, saying: 'Guide with virtue and align with rites, and people will have shame and also rectify; guide with policy and align with punishments, and people avoid penalties but have no shame.' 'If rites and music do not flourish, punishments will not hit the mark; if punishments do not hit the mark, the people will have nowhere to place hands and feet.' When the Meng clan made Yang Fu judicial officer, he asked Zengzi, who likewise said: 'When superiors lose the Way, people have long been scattered. If one obtains the facts, then be sorrowful and compassionate, and do not rejoice.'
12
陵夷至於戰國，韓任申子，秦用商鞅，連相坐之法，造參夷之誅； 增加肉刑、大辟，有鑿顛、抽脅、鑊亨之刑。
By Warring States times, collective-liability and extreme punitive innovations became standard in some states. Severe torture and execution forms proliferated.
13
至於秦始皇，兼吞戰國，遂毀先王之法，滅禮誼之官，專任刑罰，躬操文墨，晝斷獄，夜理書，自程決事，日縣石之一。 而姦邪並生，赭衣塞路，囹圄成市，天下愁怨，潰而叛之。
After unification, Qin centralized legal bureaucracy under the emperor, suppressing ritual institutions and ruling through document-intensive penal administration. Hyper-penal governance produced mass criminalization, prison overexpansion, and ultimately revolt.
14
漢興，高祖初入關，約法三章曰：「殺人者死，傷人及盜抵罪。」 蠲削煩苛，兆民大說。 其後四夷未附，兵革未息，三章之法不足以禦姦，於是相國蕭何雳摭秦法，取其宜於時者，作律九章。
When Han arose, Gaozu upon first entering the passes made the Three Articles: 'Killers die; injuring others and theft are punished according to the crime.' Abolition of oppressive clauses won broad popular support. As security pressures rose, Han expanded from minimal law to Xiao He's Nine-Chapter code.
15
當孝惠、高后時，百姓新免毒酿，人欲長幼養老。 蕭、曹為相，填以無為，從民之欲，而不擾亂，是以衣食滋殖，刑罰用稀。
Early Han society sought recovery and household stability after Qin-era trauma. Under Huang-Lao style minimal interference, economic recovery accelerated and penal severity declined.
16
丞相張蒼、御史大夫馮敬奏言：「肉刑所以禁姦，所由來者久矣。 陛下下明詔，憐萬民之一有過被刑者終身不息，及罪人欲改行為善而道亡繇至，於盛德，臣等所不及也。 臣謹議請定律曰：諸當完者，完為城旦舂； 當黥者，髡鉗為城旦舂； 當劓者，笞三百； 當斬左止者，笞五百； 當斬右止，及殺人先自告，及吏坐受賕枉法，守縣官財物而即盜之，已論命復有笞罪者，皆棄市。 罪人獄已決，完為城旦舂，滿三歲為鬼薪白粲。 鬼薪白粲一歲，為隸臣妾。 隸臣妾一歲，免為庶人。 隸臣妾滿二歲，為司寇。 司寇一歲，及作如司寇二歲，皆免為庶人。 其亡逃及有罪耐以上，不用此令。 前令之刑城旦舂歲而非禁錮者，如完為城旦舂歲數以免。 臣昧死請。」 制曰：「可。」 是後，外有輕刑之名，內實殺人。 斬右止者又當死。 斬左止者笞五百，當劓者笞三百，率多死。
Chancellor Zhang Cang and Censor-in-chief Feng Jing memorialized: 'Corporal penalties forbidding wickedness have existed long. They acknowledged imperial concern that lifelong corporal penalties blocked moral rehabilitation. They proposed commutation schedules replacing some mutilations with hard labor terms; Tattoo penalties were converted to shaved-and-shackled labor; Nose-cutting became three hundred lashes; left-foot amputation became 500 lashes; A range of aggravated and official-corruption offenses remained capital, with public marketplace execution. Post-sentence labor moved through staged penal-service categories. One service stage transitioned convicts into state bond-servitude. Completion of term could restore commoner status. Extended service could shift them into judicial labor classification. Further service terms eventually led to formal release. Escapers and higher-grade offenders were excluded from commutation rules. Legacy penal terms were harmonized with the new commutation-release schedule. The ministers closed with the standard death-risk petition formula." The edict said: 'Approved.' In practice, nominal commutation often produced lethal outcomes. Some commuted categories remained effectively capital. Extreme flogging rates caused high mortality.
17
及至孝武即位，外事四夷之功，內盛耳目之好，徵發煩數，百姓貧耗，窮民犯法，酷吏擊斷，姦軌不勝。 於是招進張湯、趙禹之屬，條定法令，作見知故縱、監臨部主之法，緩深故之罪，急縱出之誅。 其後姦猾巧法，轉相比況，禁罔寖密。 律令凡三百五十九章，大辟四百九條，千八百八十二事，死罪決事比萬三千四百七十二事。 文書盈於几閣，典者不能遍睹。 是以郡國承用者駮，或罪同而論異。 姦吏因緣為市，所欲活則傅生議，所欲陷則予死比，議者咸冤傷之。
Under Emperor Wu, military expansion and fiscal extraction intensified social strain, while harsh enforcement failed to control rising crime. Legal technocrats expanded doctrinal categories and tightened accountability frameworks, especially around supervisory responsibility. Both officials and offenders exploited technical legal analogies, producing ever denser legal restrictions. Han law became massively complex in chapters, clauses, and precedent files. The legal archive grew beyond practical administrative mastery. Uneven implementation generated sentencing inconsistency across jurisdictions. Legal complexity enabled prosecutorial rent-seeking, with life/death outcomes manipulated through selective precedent.
18
宣帝自在閭閻而知其若此，及即尊位，廷史路溫舒上疏，言秦有十失，其一尚存，治獄之吏是也。 語在溫舒傳。 上深愍焉，乃下詔曰：「間者吏用法，巧文寖深，是朕之不德也。 夫決獄不當，使有罪興邪，不辜蒙戮，父子悲恨，朕甚傷之。 今遣廷史與郡鞠獄，任輕祿薄，其為置廷平，秩六百石，員四人。 其務平之，以稱朕意。」 於是選于定國為廷尉，求明察寬恕黃霸等以為廷平，季秋後請讞。 時上常幸宣室，齋居而決事，獄刑號為平矣。 時涿郡太守鄭昌上疏言：「聖王置諫爭之臣者，非以崇德，防逸豫之生也； 立法明刑者，非以為治，救衰亂之起也。 今明主躬垂明聽，雖不置廷平，獄將自正； 若開後嗣，不若刪定律令。 律令一定，愚民知所避，姦吏無所弄矣。 今不正其本，而置廷平以理其末也，政衰聽怠，則廷平將招權而為亂首矣。」 宣帝未及修正。
Because Emperor Xuan knew grassroots legal abuse firsthand, memorial criticism of judicial bureaucracy resonated with him. The memorial text is preserved in Lu Wenshu's biography. The emperor deeply pitied this, and issued edict: 'Recently officials using law have grown deeply into clever wording-this is my lack of virtue. Misjudged cases both embolden true criminals and destroy innocents, causing profound social trauma. He created four 'Court Equalizer' posts to participate in local adjudication and improve balance. Their task is to level judgments, so as to accord with my intent.' He appointed capable judicial leadership and staffed equalizer roles with officials known for careful and lenient judgment. With direct imperial attention to adjudication, penal practice was for a time regarded as comparatively fair. At that time Zhuojun governor Zheng Chang memorialized: 'Sage kings establish remonstrating ministers not to ornament virtue, but to prevent the rise of indulgent ease; law is remedial for disorder, not the highest form of rule. Given active imperial oversight, he argued, adjudication could already be corrected; For the benefit of posterity, revising and fixing statutes and ordinances mattered more than temporary offices. A clear, stable code would both guide commoners and reduce discretionary abuse by officials. If fundamentals are left untouched and only procedural offices are added, those offices can eventually become new centers of abuse." Emperor Xuan never fully carried out structural reform.
19
至元帝初立，乃下詔曰：「夫法令者，所以抑暴扶弱，欲其難犯而易避也。 今律令煩多而不約，自典文者不能分明，而欲羅元元之不逮，斯豈刑中之意哉！ 其議律令可蠲除輕減者，條奏，唯在便安萬姓而已。」
When Emperor Yuan first ascended, he issued an edict: 'Laws and ordinances are meant to restrain the violent and support the weak, so they should be hard to violate and easy to avoid. The edict criticized legal overcomplexity that trapped ordinary people even when experts struggled to interpret it. Deliberate what can be remitted, removed, or reduced; submit by categories, with only the convenience and safety of the myriad people in view.'
20
至成帝河平中，復下詔曰：「甫刑云『五刑之屬三千，大辟之罰其屬二百』，今大辟之刑千有餘條，律令煩多，百有餘萬言，奇請它比，日以益滋，自明習者不知所由，欲以曉喻眾庶，不亦難乎！ 於以羅元元之民，夭絕亡辜，豈不哀哉！ 其與中二千石、二千石、博士及明習律令者議減死刑及可蠲除約省者，令較然易知，條奏。 書不云乎？ 『惟刑之恤哉！』 其審核之，務準古法，朕將盡心覽焉。」 有司無仲山父將明之材，不能因時廣宣主恩，建立明制，為一代之法，而徒鉤摭微細，毛舉數事，以塞詔而已。 是以大議不立，遂以至今。 議者或曰，法難數變，此庸人不達，疑塞治道，聖智之所常患者也。 故略舉漢興以來，法令稍定而合古便今者。
In Chengdi's Heping years another edict said: 'The Fuxing says the Five Penalties have three thousand categories and capital punishment two hundred; now capital clauses are over a thousand, statutes and ordinances are cumbersome and many, over a million words, extraordinary petitions and analogies increase daily; even specialists do not know the basis-how can we explain this to the masses? The court explicitly linked legal complexity to wrongful death. A broad review group was convened to reduce capital punishment and simplify statutes. The edict cited scriptural authority: 'Be cautious in punishment. Examine and verify carefully, striving to align with ancient law; I will personally review with full attention.' Because officials lacked high-level statecraft, they answered reform edicts with piecemeal technicalities instead of systemic restructuring. As a result, major legal reform repeatedly stalled. The text rejects conservative legal inertia as a recurring obstacle to effective governance. It then summarizes instances where Han law moved toward both classical legitimacy and practical utility.
21
周官有五聽、八議、三刺、三宥、三赦之法。 五聽：一曰辭聽，二曰色聽，三曰氣聽，四曰耳聽，五曰目聽。 八議：一曰議親，二曰議故，三曰議賢，四曰議能，五曰議功，六曰議貴，七曰議勤，八曰議賓。 三刺：一曰訊群臣，二曰訊群吏，三曰訊萬民。 三宥：一曰弗識，二曰過失，三曰遺忘。 三赦：一曰幼弱，二曰老眊，三曰憃愚。 凡囚，「上罪梏拲而桎，中罪梏桎，下罪梏； 王之同族拲，有爵者桎，以待弊。」 高皇帝七年，制詔御史：「獄之疑者，吏或不敢決，有罪者久而不論，無罪者久繫不決。 自今以來，縣道官獄疑者，各讞所屬二千石官，二千石官以其罪名當報之。 所不能決者，皆移廷尉，廷尉亦當報之。 廷尉所不能決，謹具為奏，傅所當比律令以聞。」 上恩如此，吏猶不能奉宣。 故孝景中五年復下詔曰：「諸獄疑，雖文致於法而於人心不厭者，輒讞之。」 其後獄吏復避微文，遂其愚心。 至後元年，又下詔曰：「獄，重事也。 人有愚智，官有上下。 獄疑者讞，有令讞者已報讞而後不當，讞者不為失。」 自此之後，獄刑益詳，近於五聽三宥之意。 三年復下詔曰：「高年老長，人所尊敬也； 鰥寡不屬逮者，人所哀憐也。 其著令：年八十以上，八歲以下，及孕者未乳，師、朱儒當鞠繫者，頌繫之。」 至孝宣元康四年，又下詔曰：「
Classical Zhou jurisprudence included multi-layered evidentiary and mitigation frameworks. The Five Hearings evaluated testimony through words, expression, breath, auditory clues, and visual observation. The Eight Deliberations were status-based mitigating categories covering kinship, merit, office, and diplomatic standing. Judgment involved consultation across ministers, administrators, and populace. Three pardonable conditions were non-knowledge, mistake, and lapse of memory. Legal exemption categories included very young, very old, and intellectually limited persons. As for prisoners: 'Upper crimes cuffed and fettered; middle crimes cuffed and fettered; lower crimes cuffed; members of the king's own clan are only cuffed; those with rank only fettered, awaiting final outcome.' In Gaozu year seven, an edict to Censors said: 'In doubtful cases officials sometimes dare not decide; the guilty remain long untried and innocents remain long detained undecided. Local doubtful cases were escalated to higher prefectural review. Unresolved matters moved upward to central judicial review. What the Chief Justice cannot decide, carefully memorialize and attach the matching statutes and ordinances for hearing.' Despite clear directives, administrative implementation remained weak. Therefore in Jingdi middle year five another edict said: 'In all doubtful prisons, though textually fitting statute but not satisfying human feeling, immediately refer them for review.' Yet legal formalism reasserted itself through pedantic loopholing. In Houyuan year one another edict said: 'Prisons are weighty matters. Human and administrative capacities vary; Doubtful cases should be reviewed; when ordered review has already reported review but later proves improper, the reviewer is not counted at fault.' The system moved somewhat closer to classical evidentiary and mitigation principles. Three years later another edict said: 'The very old are those people honor and respect; Widowers and widows not subject to summons were also persons whom people pitied. Set this in statute: those over eighty, below eight, and pregnant women before weaning, as well as teachers and dwarf retainers who should be arrested, are to be held by summons rather than bound detention.' “By Emperor Xuan Yuankang year four, another edict said:
22
朕念夫耆老之人，髮齒墮落，血氣既衰，亦無暴逆之心，今或羅于文法，執于囹圄，不得終其年命，朕甚憐之。 自今以來，諸年八十非誣告殺傷人，它皆勿坐。」 至成帝鴻嘉元年，定令：「年未滿七歲，賊鬥殺人及犯殊死者，上請廷尉以聞，得減死。」 合於三赦幼弱老眊之人。 此皆法令稍定，近古而便民者也。
He emphasized mercy for frail elders swept into penal machinery despite low social threat. The policy narrowed elder criminal liability to severe or malicious offenses. In Chengdi Hongjia year one, an order fixed: 'If not yet seven years old, and in robbery-fighting homicide or capital offenses, submit to Chief Justice for hearing and may receive commuted death.' The measure was framed as consistent with classical exemption doctrine. Such revisions are presented as successful examples of humane legal normalization.
23
孔子曰：「如有王者，必世而後仁； 善人為國百年，可以勝殘去殺矣。」 言聖王承衰撥亂而起，被民以德教，變而化之，必世然後仁道成焉； 至於善人，不入於室，然猶百年勝殘去殺矣。 此為國者之程式也。 今漢道至盛，歷世二百餘載，考自昭、宣、元、成、哀、平六世之間，斷獄殊死，率歲千餘口而一人，耐罪上至右止，三倍有餘。 古人有言：「滿堂而飲酒，有一人鄉隅而悲泣，則一堂皆為之不樂。」 王者之於天下，譬猶一堂之上也，故一人不得其平，為之悽愴於心。 今郡國被刑而死者歲以萬數，天下獄二千餘所，其冤死者多少相覆，獄不減一人，此和氣所以未洽者也。
Confucius said: 'If there were a true king, it would take a generation before benevolence; A good man governing a state for a hundred years could overcome cruelty and remove killing.' Moral transformation is gradual and depends on long-term virtue-centered statecraft. Even second-best rulers, if persistent, can still greatly reduce penal violence over time. This sets the proper timeline expectation for political reform. Across the mid- and late Western Han reigns, capital sentences still averaged about one execution per thousand-odd persons yearly, and severe non-capital punishments ran at more than triple that rate. An old saying says: 'If a hall is drinking and one person in a corner weeps, then the whole hall is unhappy.' A ruler should treat each unjust case as a stain on the whole polity. Mass incarceration and high execution counts are cited as causes of unresolved social disharmony.
24
原獄刑所以蕃若此者，禮教不立，刑法不明，民多貧窮，豪桀務私，姦不輒得，獄豻不平之所致也。 《書》云「伯夷降典，悊民惟刑」，言制禮以止刑，猶隄之防溢水也。 今隄防凌遲，禮制未立； 死刑過制，生刑易犯； 饑寒並至，窮斯濫溢； 豪桀擅私，為之囊橐，姦有所隱，則狃而寖廣：此刑之所以蕃也。 孔子曰：「古之知法者能省刑，本也； 今之知法者不失有罪，末矣。」 又曰：「今之聽獄者，求所以殺之； 古之聽獄者，求所以生之。」 與其殺不辜，寧失有罪。 今之獄吏，上下相驅，以刻為明，深者獲功名，平者多後患。 諺曰：「鬻棺者欲歲之疫。」 非憎人欲殺之，利在於人死也。 今治獄吏欲陷害人，亦猶此矣。 凡此五疾，獄刑所以尤多者也。
The text attributes penal overgrowth to moral-institutional failure, socioeconomic stress, elite predation, and uneven enforcement. The Documents says, 'Bo Yi descended with canons, wise people rely on punishment,' meaning rites are made to stop punishment, like dikes preventing flood overflow. With normative institutions eroded, legal pressure rises. Capital punishment is overused while minor liability is overly broad; Material deprivation pushes people into offense; elite shielding networks conceal crime, normalizing broader lawlessness and expanding punitive response. Confucius said: 'Those who understood law in antiquity could reduce punishments-this is root; Those who understand law now merely do not miss the guilty—this is branch.' He also said: 'Those who hear cases now seek how to kill; Those who heard cases in antiquity sought how to let live.' The preferred error is under-punishment over wrongful killing. Bureaucratic incentives reward harshness and punish moderation. A proverb says: 'The coffin seller desires epidemics each year.' The motive is profit structure, not explicit malice. The same perverse incentive logic applies to predatory legal officials. These five systemic pathologies drive penal overexpansion.
25
自建武、永平，民亦新免兵革之禍，人有樂生之慮，與高、惠之間同，而政在抑彊扶弱，朝無威福之臣，邑無豪桀之俠。 以口率計，斷獄少於成、哀之間什八，可謂清矣。 然而未能稱意比隆於古者，以其疾未盡除，而刑本不正。
In early Eastern Han recovery, social conditions resembled early Han: pro-weak governance and reduced private coercive power. Per capita criminal adjudication fell dramatically versus late Western Han, indicating relative legal clarity. Even improved conditions fell short while structural causes and penal foundations remained uncorrected.
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善乎！ 孫卿之論刑也，曰：「世俗之為說者，以為治古者無肉刑，有象刑墨黥之屬，菲履赭衣而不純，是不然矣。 以為治古，則人莫觸罪邪，豈獨無肉刑哉，亦不待象刑矣。 以為人或觸罪矣，而直輕其刑，是殺人者不死，而傷人者不刑也。 罪至重而刑至輕，民無所畏，亂莫大焉。 凡制刑之本，將以禁暴惡，且懲其
Well said! Xunzi's discussion of punishment says: 'Common talk says ancient good governance had no corporal penalties, only symbolic penalties like tattooing types and rough shoes/red clothes; this is incorrect. If crime truly vanished, all penalties-not just corporal ones-would be unnecessary. Simply lightening punishment without moral order would nullify deterrence for grave violence. Severe crime with weak sanction creates maximal disorder. The root purpose of punishment is to prohibit violence and evil, and to chastise their
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末也。 殺人者不死，傷人者不刑，是惠暴而寬惡也。 故象刑非生治古，方起於亂今也。 凡爵列官職，賞慶刑罰，皆以類相從者也。 一物失稱，亂之端也。 德不稱位，能不稱官，賞不當功，刑不當罪，不祥莫大矣焉。 夫征暴誅悖，治之威也。 殺人者死，傷人者刑，是百王之所同也，未有知其所由來者也。 故治則刑重，亂則刑輕，犯治之罪固重，犯亂之罪固輕也。 《書》云『刑罰世重世輕』，此之謂也。」 所謂「象刑惟明」者，言象天道而作刑，安有菲屨赭衣者哉？
downstream excesses. Excessive leniency toward violent offenders is itself injustice to social order. So-called symbolic punishment is not a pristine ancient ideal but a product of later disorder. Political order requires proportional correspondence among status, reward, and penalty. Any mismatch in these correspondences opens a path to institutional chaos. Nothing is more ruinous than systemic misalignment between merit, office, reward, and sanction. Coercive suppression of rebellion is an essential dimension of state authority. Across dynasties this principle remained constant and foundational. Xunzi paradoxically argues that robust order permits stricter sanction because normative standards are higher. This is the meaning of the classical phrase about historically variable penal weight. 'Symbolic punishment' should be read cosmologically, not as mere costume penalties.
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孫卿之言既然，又因俗說而論之曰：禹承堯舜之後，自以德衰而制肉刑，湯武順而行之者，以俗薄於唐虞故也。 今漢承衰周暴秦極敝之流，俗已薄於三代，而行堯舜之刑，是猶以鞿而御駻突，違救時之宜矣。 且除肉刑者，本欲以全民也，今去髡鉗一等，轉而入於大辟。 以死罔民，失本惠矣。 故死者歲以萬數，刑重之所致也。 至乎穿窬之盜，忿怒傷人，男女淫佚，吏為姦臧，若此之惡，髡鉗之罰又不足以懲也。 故刑者歲十萬數，民既不畏，又曾不恥，刑輕之所生也。 故俗之能吏，公以殺盜為威，專殺者勝任，奉法者不治，亂名傷制，不可勝條。 是以罔密而姦不塞，刑蕃而民愈嫚。 必世而未仁，百年而不勝殘，誠以禮樂闕而刑不正也。 豈宜惟思所以清原正本之論，刪定律令，篹二百章，以應大辟。 其餘罪次，於古當生，今觸死者，皆可募行肉刑。 及傷人與盜，吏受賕枉法，男女淫亂，皆復古刑，為三千章。 詆欺文致微細之法，悉蠲除。 如此，則刑可畏而禁易避，吏不專殺，法無二門，輕重當罪，民命得全，合刑罰之中，殷天人之和，順稽古之制，成時雍之化。 成康刑錯，雖未可致，孝文斷獄，庶幾可及。 《詩》云「宜民宜人，受祿于天」。 《書》曰「立功立事，可以永年」。 言為政而宜於民者，功成事立，則受天祿而永年命，所謂「一人有慶，萬民賴之」者也。
He reinterprets historical shifts as responses to declining social-moral conditions. Given post-Zhou/Qin social deterioration, applying ultra-lenient antiquarian models is seen as impractical and dangerous. Commutation policy can perversely increase death sentencing if replacement scales are misdesigned. That outcome betrays the reform's humanitarian purpose. High annual execution counts are attributed to excessive penal severity. Conversely, many offenses are under-deterred by too-light sanctions. Mass punishment without moral effect indicates miscalibration at the lenient end too. Administrative culture came to reward lethal zeal over lawful balance, corroding institutional norms. Legal expansion without legitimacy produces both more law and more defiance. Failure over long horizons is traced to absent ritual order and distorted penal structure. The text calls for foundational legal redrafting into a coherent, compressed code. It proposes commuting many currently capital crimes to calibrated corporal sanctions. For assault, theft, corrupt officials who pervert the law, and sexual misconduct, penalties should be reset to the older classical scale, yielding a code of three thousand provisions. All petty, manipulative, and overly technical legal provisions should be abolished entirely. If this is done, the law will be stern yet navigable, officials will no longer wield death arbitrarily, punishments will fit offenses, and lives will be preserved. It would restore balanced penal governance, deepen harmony between Heaven and human society, align with tested ancient institutions, and produce an age of social concord. We may not reach the ideal era of Cheng and Kang, when punishment was scarcely needed, but we can still aspire to the humane judicial standard associated with Emperor Wen. As the Odes says, 'When governance truly suits the people, Heaven grants its favor.' The Documents says: 'Establish achievement and establish institutions, and one can endure for long years.' In other words, governance that truly benefits the people creates lasting achievement and institutions. Such rule receives Heaven's favor and endures, fulfilling the saying: 'When one person is blessed, all the people depend on it.'