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卷六十九 趙充國辛慶忌傳

Volume 69: Zhao Chongguo and Xin Qingji

Chapter 80 of 漢書 ✓ Translated
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Chapter 80
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1
西
Zhao Chongguo, whose courtesy name was Wengsun, came from Shanggui in Longxi; he later moved his household to Lingju in Jincheng commandery. He began his career as a mounted trooper, and as a respectable youth from one of the six border commanderies who excelled at horsemanship and archery he was selected for the Feathered Forest corps. He was composed and courageous, with a strategist’s breadth of mind; even as a young man he admired the bearing of field commanders, mastered military doctrine, and gained a thorough grasp of frontier peoples and their affairs.
2
Under Emperor Wu he served as acting major under General Li Guangli’s campaign against the Xiongnu and found his force tightly encircled by the nomads. For days the Han troops had gone short of provisions and casualties mounted; Zhao Chongguo then led more than a hundred picked men in a breakthrough charge, and when Li Guangli brought the main body up behind them the ring finally broke. He took more than twenty wounds; Li Guangli filed a report on the action, and the court ordered Zhao Chongguo brought before the emperor’s traveling headquarters. Emperor Wu examined the wounds himself, praised him warmly, appointed him a gentleman of the palace, and soon advanced him to chief clerk on the staff of the general of connected cavalry.
3
西
When Emperor Zhao was on the throne the Di of Wudu rose in revolt; Zhao Chongguo, serving under the major general as colonel-protector of the army, crushed the uprising, was promoted to general of the gentlemen of the palace, commanded the garrison at Shanggu, and afterward returned to the capital as superintendent of the imperial household waters and parks. In a strike against the Xiongnu he took the Western Qi king prisoner; the court then named him rear general while he continued to hold his waters-and-parks appointment.
4
He joined Huo Guang in settling the succession and raising Emperor Xuan to the throne, for which he received the marquisate of Yingping. During the Benshi years he led the Pulei column against the Xiongnu, claimed several hundred enemy heads, and on his return was confirmed as rear general and minister of the lesser treasury. The Xiongnu massed more than a hundred thousand horsemen, swept south along the frontier as far as Mount Fuxilu, and prepared to pour through the passes in a major raid. A deserter named Tichu Qutang, who had come over to the Han, brought word of the plan; the court sent Zhao Chongguo with forty thousand cavalry to reinforce the nine frontier commanderies. When the chanyu learned of the deployment he broke off and withdrew.
5
祿使 使 西 使使 西使使 使 使 西使 使
At that time Yiqu Anguo, a grand counselor of the palace, was dispatched on an inspection of the Qiang tribes; the Xianling headmen asked permission to cross the Huang River from time to time and pasture their herds on land the Han peasants did not cultivate. Anguo forwarded their request to the throne. Zhao Chongguo memorialized against him, charging that he had handled the embassy with culpable negligence. Thereafter the Qiang took that earlier concession as a pretext and began crossing the Huang in force; local officials were powerless to stop them. In 63 BCE the Xianling and more than two hundred chieftains from other Qiang groups set aside blood feuds, exchanged hostages, and bound themselves by a solemn alliance. When the emperor asked Zhao Chongguo about it, he answered: "The Qiang have always been manageable because every band has its own headmen, they feud among themselves, and their strength never gathers in one hand." More than thirty years ago, when the western Qiang rose, they too had first buried old quarrels and made a common pact before they struck at Lingju and held the Han at bay for five or six years before the trouble could be stamped out. By the fifth year of Zhenghe the Xianling leader Feng Jian and his fellows were already in touch with the Xiongnu court; the nomads sent an agent into Lesser Yuezhi country to circulate word among the Qiang that more than a hundred thousand of Li Guangli's men had surrendered to them. They added that the Qiang had borne the brunt of the Han wars and been worn down by them. Zhangye and Jiuquan had once been theirs, the envoys said; the ground was fertile, and the tribes should join in driving the Han away and reclaiming the soil. From this it is plain the Xiongnu have meant to ally with the Qiang for more than a single reign. Lately the Xiongnu had been hard pressed in the west; when they heard the Wuhuan were rallying to the Han passes they worried about a second front in the east, so they kept dispatching envoys to kingdoms such as Weili and Weixu, offering hostages, women, and sable gifts in an effort to break that alignment. The scheme misfired. I suspect fresh Xiongnu envoys have reached the Qiang by a desert track through Shayin, out onto the salt flats, past the Longkeng defile, through the Qiongshui line, and south to the dependent state, where they can link up directly with the Xianling. Your servant fears the Qiang revolt will not end here and that they will rope in other tribes; we should prepare now, before the storm breaks. A little over a month later the Qiang chieftain Lang He did send envoys to the Xiongnu to borrow troops, aiming to strike Shanshan and Dunhuang and sever the Han corridor to the west. Zhao Chongguo reasoned that Lang He, a chieftain of the Lesser Yuezhi southwest of Yangguan, lacked the standing to hatch such a scheme by himself; a Xiongnu envoy must already be among the Qiang, which would explain why the Xianling, the Han band, and the Kai had suddenly made peace and joined in covenant. Once autumn fattens the ponies, trouble will flare for certain. Send inspectors along the frontier, put the garrisons on alert, and watch every Qiang faction closely so they cannot renew their alliances—that way we may smoke out the conspiracy before it matures. The two chief ministries therefore recommended another mission for Yiqu Anguo to tour the Qiang country and sort loyal groups from rebellious ones. When Anguo arrived he called in more than thirty Xianling headmen, branded them the worst malcontents, and had every one executed. He then turned his soldiers loose on the general population and claimed more than a thousand heads. The Qiang who had already surrendered, including the Han-appointed chieftain Yang Yu, were terrified and enraged at having nowhere to place their trust; they raided weaker bands, rose in revolt, stormed the frontier, seized towns, and murdered Han magistrates. Anguo, as cavalry colonel, took three thousand horsemen to hold the line against the Qiang, but near Gaohan the tribesmen hit his column hard and he lost wagons, supplies, and arms on a large scale. He fell back to Lingju and sent a full report to the capital. All of this unfolded in the spring of the first Shenjue year (61 BCE).
6
使
Zhao Chongguo was already past seventy, and the emperor worried about his age, so he had Imperial Counselor Bing Ji ask who might take the field; Chongguo answered that no candidate surpassed himself. The emperor sent another inquiry: General, how do you read the Qiang threat, and how large a force will be required? Chongguo replied, A hundred reports are worth less than one look with my own eyes. Armies cannot be sized up from the capital; your servant asks permission to ride straight to Jincheng and submit a plan drawn from the frontier itself. These Qiang are a minor border people who have turned against Heaven; they will not long survive. Leave the campaign in the hands of this old minister and do not lose sleep over it. The emperor smiled and said, Very well.
7
滿 使 西西
At Jincheng he waited until he had ten thousand horsemen assembled, then prepared to ford the river; fearing an ambush, he sent three colonels across at night with their men biting the wooden gag, each detachment throwing up a bridgehead as soon as it reached the far bank, and by daybreak the whole army had crossed in good order. Bands of fifty or a hundred enemy horsemen began to circle the Han camp, darting in and out along the flanks. Chongguo said, Our men and mounts are still tired from the crossing; we must not chase at a gallop. Those are elite riders and hard to pin down; they may well be bait for an ambush. Our aim is to destroy the enemy host, not to snap at petty skirmishes. He ordered his men to hold their fire. He sent scouts into the Siwang defile and found no tribesmen waiting there. That night he marched upstream to Luodu and called in his colonels and majors. These Qiang, he told them, have no idea how to fight a real army. Had they posted even a few thousand men to hold the Siwang gorge, we could never have got this army across. Zhao Chongguo kept scouts far forward, treated every march as though battle were imminent, and every halt as a chance to dig in; he was famously cautious, looked after his men, and always planned before he struck. He pushed west to the western commandant's compound, fed his troops well every day, and won their wholehearted loyalty. The tribesmen baited him again and again, but Chongguo refused to leave his defenses. Prisoners reported that Qiang headmen were berating one another: We warned you not to revolt. The Son of Heaven has sent General Zhao—he must be eighty or ninety—and he is a master of war. Now you want to rush out and die in a single clash—do you think that is still possible?
8
His son Yin, a major of the gentlemen of the palace on the right staff, led the palace guard flying spears, Feathered Forest cadets, and Hu and Yue horse as a flank column to Lingju, where the tribesmen swarmed out and severed the supply line; Yin sent word to his father. An edict ordered the eight colonels, the fierce-cavalry colonel, and the grand administrator of Jincheng to sweep the hills for raiders and reopen the supply routes and river crossings.
9
使
Earlier the Han (Qiang) and Kai leader Midang'er had sent his brother Diaoku to warn the commandant that the Xianling were about to rise; within days the warning came true. Many of Diaoku's clansmen were already with the Xianling column, so the commandant held Diaoku as a hostage. Chongguo judged him innocent, sent him home, and had him tell his headmen: The imperial host punishes only the guilty; make your loyalty plain and you will not be wiped out with the rebels. The emperor has announced to every Qiang band that anyone who seizes and executes a lawbreaker will himself be cleared of guilt. Kill a major guilty chieftain and you receive four hundred thousand cash; a middling headman, one hundred fifty thousand; a minor headman, twenty thousand; an able-bodied man, three thousand; women, children, and elders, one thousand each—and you keep the captives' families and property besides. Chongguo's design was to overawe the Han and Kai bands and the marauders into submission, break up the tribal alliance, and strike only when their strength was spent.
10
西
By then the throne had called up militia from the capital region, commuted convicts from the court of sacrifices, crossbowmen from the central plain commanderies, mounted troops from Longxi and the northern frontier, Qiang auxiliaries, and the standing garrisons under the grand administrators of Wuwei, Zhangye, and Jiuquan—sixty thousand soldiers in all. Xin Wuxian, grand administrator of Jiuquan, wrote: Our local forces are all facing south; the northern sector is wide open, and we cannot hold that posture indefinitely. Some counsel waiting until autumn or winter before attacking—that is precisely the nomads' design: keep the Han host stranded outside the passes until cold and supply failures do their work. The enemy raid daily while the ground is still hard; our horses cannot endure another winter on the steppe, and the ten-thousand-odd cavalry now in Wuwei, Zhangye, and Jiuquan are already run down and thin. Increase the grain ration for the mounts, load thirty days' provisions in early seventh month, and send converging columns from Zhangye and Jiuquan to hit the Han and Kai camps along the Xian River. The nomads live by their herds, and those herds are already scattered. Even if we cannot kill every warrior, we can seize the animals, round up the families, pull back, and hit them again in winter when fresh columns arrive; repeated blows will shatter their morale.
11
退 西
The emperor forwarded Xin Wuxian's paper to Zhao Chongguo and told him to canvass every colonel and frontier officer who knew the Qiang. Chongguo and his chief clerk Dong Tongnian replied that Wuxian proposed to throw ten thousand cavalry out of Zhangye on two roads that would wander a thousand li through empty country. Each horse must hump thirty days' rations—two hu four dou of millet, eight hu of wheat—plus kit and weapons, which makes pursuit almost impossible. By the time our exhausted columns arrive, the enemy will have weighed our movements, slipped away by stages, followed the grazing, and melted into the hills. If we push on into the interior they will seize the heights ahead, plug the defiles behind us, and sever the supply line; we court disaster and ridicule from which the empire might not recover for generations. Yet Wuxian imagines we can simply strip their herds and families—that is brave talk, not a sound plan. Wuwei county and Zhangye's Rile district likewise guard the northern line, with valleys that carry water and forage straight toward the steppe. Your servant fears a joint Xiongnu-Qiang design for a major thrust; if they could cork Zhangye and Jiuquan they would sever the road to the Western Regions—those local garrisons must not be stripped away. The Xianling alone began the revolt; the other bands simply rode along and looted. Your servant's humble plan is to overlook the murky offenses of the Han and Kai bands, keep their lapses unpublicized, and strike the Xianling first to sober the rest; those who repent should be pardoned and placed under capable local officers who understand their ways. That is how we save the army, win the peace, and secure the frontier. The emperor circulated their reply. The high ministers insisted that the Xianling were too strong while the Han and Kai backed them; unless those auxiliaries were crushed first, the Xianling could not be touched.
12
The emperor therefore named Xu Yanshou, Marquis of Lecheng, as strong crossbow general, confirmed Xin Wuxian of Jiuquan as Qiang-breaking general, and sent a sealed rescript praising his strategy. He also sent Zhao Chongguo a written rebuke that read:
13
The emperor inquires after the rear general and regrets the hardship of camp life in the open. You plan to wait until the first month before hitting the Han Qiang; by then they will have brought in the wheat, sent their families away, and ten thousand picked warriors will be free to raid Jiuquan and Dunhuang. The frontier garrisons are thin, the peasants huddle in the forts, and the fields lie idle. East of Zhangye grain already sells at more than a hundred cash a shi and fodder bundles run to dozens of cash each. Convoys are piling onto the roads and the common people groan under the levy. You command more than ten thousand men yet refuse to use autumn, when grass and water still favor us, to fight them for their herds; if you wait for winter they will have fattened their animals and slipped into the defiles, while your troops freeze and their hands split with cold—where is the gain in that? You spare no thought for what this costs the heartland, yet you would stretch the campaign over years for a threadbare victory—no conscientious commander would boast of such a plan.
14
便西使
We now order General Qiang-breaker Xin Wuxian forward with six thousand one hundred men, Grand Administrator Kuai of Dunhuan with two thousand, Colonel Fuchang of the Changshui corps and Marquis Fengshi of Jiuquan with four thousand Chuo and Yuezhi auxiliaries—roughly twelve thousand in all. They carry thirty days' rations and on the twenty-second of the seventh month will strike the Han Qiang, pushing to the Goujian upland north of the Xian River—eight hundred li from Jiuquan and perhaps twelve hundred from your own position. You are to march by the best route westward in concert with them; even if the columns never link up, the tribes must learn that hosts are closing from both east and north—that will divide their counsels and loosen their alliances. We may not annihilate them in one blow, but factions will crack. Gentleman of the palace Yin has further been directed to bring two colonels of Hu and Yue flying-archer foot to reinforce your command.
15
The five planets have now risen in the east—a sign of supreme fortune for the Han and utter ruin for the barbarians. Venus rides high in the sky: a host that pushes deep and fights boldly is blessed; one that hangs back courts disaster. Arm at once, ride the moment Heaven affords, strike down the rebels, and your every move will meet with complete success—do not hesitate further.
16
便
Though the emperor had rebuked him, Zhao Chongguo held that a general in the field bears discretionary authority to act for the safety of the realm. He therefore memorialized an acknowledgment of fault and went on to set out the military advantages and risks in these terms:
17
使使 便
Your servant recalls that when Cavalry Colonel Anguo was favored with an edict, he picked Qiang envoys who could visit the Han and Kai bands, warned them that the imperial host was coming, and promised that the Han would not punish the Han Qiang—meant to break up their conspiracy. The grace shown them was beyond anything a mere minister could have contrived. Your servant has long admired Your Majesty's supreme benevolence and inexhaustible policy; that is why he sent the Kai headman Diaoku to broadcast the emperor's goodness so that every Han and Kai clansman heard the explicit decree. The Xianling chief Yang Yu now fields four thousand horsemen and the Jianjiong five thousand, holding the wooded heights and watching for a chance to strike, whereas the Han Qiang have not yet broken the law. To ignore the Xianling and hit the Han first would spare the guilty and punish the innocent, create one crisis and compound it with another—nothing could be farther from Your Majesty's true intent.
18
便 使
The canon says that when offense is weak, defense is strong, and that the master of war lures the enemy forward rather than being lured himself. If the Han Qiang mean to raid Dunhuang and Jiuquan, we should sharpen our arms, train the men, and wait for them to come to us—that is how to make the enemy serve our plan, strike fresh troops against weary ones, and win. To strip those two commanderies of their already meager garrisons and fling them onto the offensive is to abandon the method of controlling the enemy and adopt the one that lets the enemy control us—your servant cannot approve. The Xianling mean to revolt, which is why they patched up old quarrels with the Han and Kai bands; yet privately they still dread that when the Han host appears those allies may turn on them. Their strategy will be to race to the relief of the Han and Kai first, cementing the alliance; if we strike the Han Qiang, the Xianling will certainly throw in their strength. The nomads' ponies are fat and their granaries full; an attack now may do little damage while letting the Xianling pose as benefactors to the Han Qiang, tighten the pact, and weld the coalition. Once their league hardens they will field more than twenty thousand picked warriors, dragoon the smaller bands, draw ever more adherents, and clans like the Moju will not easily be peeled away. If things go that way their numbers will swell and destroying them will cost several times the effort; your servant fears the empire could labor under the burden for a decade, not merely two or three years.
19
Your servant has enjoyed the emperor's deep favor; he and his son both hold eminent posts. He has risen to senior minister, holds a full marquisate, and at seventy-six years of age would gladly die carrying out an imperial command; his bones may molder, yet he has no private regrets. He has weighed every cost and benefit of war with care; on his plan, once the Xianling are cut down the Han and Kai bands will submit without a further campaign. If the Xianling are destroyed and the Han and Kai still refuse allegiance, we can deal with them after the new year—that would be sound strategy and proper timing. An advance at this moment offers no clear gain; may Your Majesty judge for yourself.
20
He submitted the memorial on the wushen day of the sixth month; on the jiayin day of the seventh month a sealed rescript approved Zhao Chongguo's strategy.
21
使 便
Zhao Chongguo advanced his host to the Xianling encampment. The tribesmen had camped so long that discipline had slackened; when they saw the Han host they threw down wagons and supplies and bolted for the Huang River, but the ford was a tight defile, and Chongguo pressed after them at a deliberate pace. Some officers grumbled that he was throwing away a chance by moving so slowly; Chongguo replied, These are desperate fugitives and must not be cornered. Ease the pressure and they will scatter without looking back; harry them and they will turn and fight to the death. The colonels agreed that he was right. Several hundred drowned in the river; another five hundred were killed or captured; the Han took more than a hundred thousand head of livestock and over four thousand wagons. When the army entered Han Qiang country he forbade the burning of villages or the trampling of hayfields and pastures. The Han Qiang heard the news and exclaimed with relief, The Han truly mean to spare us! The headman Miwang sent envoys to say that his people wished to return to their old grazing grounds. Chongguo forwarded the request; the court had not yet answered. When Miwang came in person to surrender, Chongguo feasted him and sent him back to explain the Han terms to his kinsmen. The protector of the army and the officers under him protested: He is a rebel chief and must not be sent home on your own authority. Chongguo retorted, You care only for tidy paperwork that covers your own backs, not for what serves the state. Before the argument ended a sealed edict arrived directing that Miwang be dealt with by ransom rather than execution. In the end the Han Qiang submitted without another blow being struck.
22
使 使
That autumn Zhao Chongguo fell ill, and the emperor sent him a letter that read: By imperial command to the rear general: We hear you suffer from swollen shins and dysentery from the cold; age and sickness together admit no disguise of strength, and We are deeply concerned. We now order the Qiang-breaking general to join your camp as second-in-command and, while Heaven favors us and the troops' morale is keen, strike the Xianling in the twelfth month. If your condition worsens, stay with the garrison and do not take the field yourself; send only the Qiang-breaking and strong crossbow generals forward. By then more than ten thousand Qiang had already come over to the Han. Chongguo judged that the enemy coalition would crumble; he wished to disband much of the cavalry in favor of frontier garrison farming and let exhaustion do the rest. Before he could submit his memorial the advance order arrived. Yin the gentleman of the palace, frightened, sent a client to argue with Chongguo: If the emperor's offensive should smash our army, cost us our generals, and shake the realm, your stubborn refusal might at least be excused. But when the odds of gain and ruin are evenly balanced, what point is there in defying the court? Offend the throne once and an inspector in embroidered silk will come to call you to account; you will not preserve your own person, still less the peace of the realm. Chongguo sighed, What disloyal counsel is this! Had the court followed my advice from the first, would the Qiang ever have reached this pass? When the court asked who should take the field first, I named Xin Wuxian; the chancellor and imperial counselor overruled me and sent Yiqu Anguo, and the frontier policy collapsed. Grain in Jincheng and the Huangzhong basin was selling at eight cash a hu; I urged Vice Censor Geng to buy two million hu into frontier granaries, which would have frozen the Qiang in place. Geng asked permission to buy a million hu but was allowed only four hundred thousand. Yiqu Anguo was sent twice and squandered half of even that stock. Those two blunders are why the Qiang dared to rebel. A hair's breadth of error becomes a thousand li of disaster—that is how it has turned out. If this war drags on unresolved, the other frontier peoples may stir in sympathy; no strategist alive could tidy up the mess—and the Qiang would be the least of our worries! I will defend my course to the death, for a discerning sovereign may still be told the truth. He therefore memorialized on military agriculture in these words:
23
便
Your servant has read that armies exist to display the sovereign's virtue and remove harm; success abroad brings blessing at home, so their use admits no carelessness. The officers, men, horses, and oxen under your servant's command consume each month 199,630 hu of grain, 1,693 hu of salt, and 250,286 shi of fodder. A long stalemate means corvée and transport levies without end. Your servant also fears that other border peoples may seize the moment and rise in concert—hardly the kind of risk a wise ruler should court, and far from the counsel of victory decided in the ancestral temple. The Qiang are easier to break by policy than to grind down by battle; your servant therefore believes a major offensive is inadvisable.
24
西 簿
From Lintao east to Gaohan lie more than two thousand qing of old Qiang cropland, government fields, and land the peasants never broke; many relay stations along that strip are in ruins. Your servant has already sent men into the hills to fell more than sixty thousand logs of every size, stacked ready on the riverbank. He asks to release the cavalry but keep commuted convicts who have enlisted, Huaiyang and Runan foot soldiers, and clerks and volunteers—10,281 men in all—at a monthly cost of 27,363 hu of grain and 308 hu of salt, posted along the critical sectors. When the ice breaks, float supplies downstream, repair the rural post houses, clear the irrigation channels, and rebuild the seventy bridges on the road west of the Huang gorge so that traffic can reach the banks of the Xian River. Each farmer is to receive twenty mu when the ploughing season opens. In the fourth month, when pasture returns, detail a thousand picked horsemen from each commandery and dependent-state Hu unit, with two spare mounts in every ten, to screen the farmers as mobile guards. The harvest would replenish Jincheng's granaries, swell our reserves, and spare the treasury enormous outlay. The grain the minister of agriculture has already forwarded is enough to feed ten thousand men for a full year. Your servant encloses schedules of land and equipment and awaits the emperor's decision.
25
便
The emperor answered: The Son of Heaven asks the rear general: you propose to stand down ten thousand horsemen and put them to the plough. If your plan is followed, when will the enemy be brought to book and the campaign closed? Weigh the advantages carefully and memorialize again. Chongguo replied in a memorial:
26
Your servant has learned that the armies of true kings aim at total victory and therefore honor strategy above battle. Even a hundred bloodless victories rank second to the highest skill; the sage commander first secures himself against defeat, then waits for the moment when the enemy can be defeated. Frontier peoples follow customs unlike those of the central states, yet in wishing to escape harm, seek advantage, cherish kinsmen, and dread death they are no different from us. The nomads have lost their rich pastures; wives and children fret in distant refuges; families are divided and many hearts turn toward revolt. Meanwhile a wise sovereign recalls surplus troops, leaves ten thousand men to farm in harmony with the seasons and the terrain, and waits until the enemy can be overthrown. They may not yield at once, yet the issue of arms can be settled within a matter of months. The Qiang coalition is already cracking: more than ten thousand seven hundred have surrendered in recent weeks, and seventy parties have carried our terms back to their camps—this is how we dismantle the rebellion without further pitched battles.
27
便 使 西 便
Your servant respectfully lists twelve advantages of keeping the army in place to farm rather than marching it out. First, nine infantry regiments with ten thousand rotating troops can stay encamped as a ready striking force while their fields yield grain, so force and benevolence advance together. Second, we keep pressing the Qiang so they cannot regain their fertile valleys, bleed their manpower, and hasten the moment when they begin to betray one another. Third, local householders can resume farming alongside the troops and miss no agricultural season. Fourth, a month's fodder for warhorses covers a year's rations for farmer-soldiers; standing down the cavalry saves enormous expense. Fifth, come spring we can lighten the men's kit, run barges of grain up the Huang to Lintao, and parade our might before the Qiang in a display that will serve generations as a deterrent. Sixth, whenever the camp is quiet we can raft down the felled timber, mend the post stations, and stockpile supplies inside Jincheng. Seventh, a rash offensive gambles on luck; by staying put we leave the rebels shivering in the cold, prey to frost, disease, and frostbite, while we secure victory without stirring. Eighth, we avoid the casualties of forcing defiles and long pursuits. Ninth, we keep the capital's dignity intact at home and deny the enemy an opening abroad. Tenth, we need not alarm the Greater and Lesser Kai south of the river and risk fresh uprisings. Eleventh, rebuilding the bridges through the Huang gorge down to the Xian gives us leverage on the Western Regions and projects authority a thousand li—future armies may cross as if from their own beds. Twelfth, great outlays are spared, corvée is calmed in advance, and we guard against surprises. Garrison farming yields these twelve gains; a major offensive forfeits the same twelve advantages. Your servant Chongguo is a mediocre man, grown old and short of long views; may Your Majesty set this proposal beside the counsel of the ministers and decide which course to favor.
28
便
The emperor answered again: The Son of Heaven has heard the rear general's twelve points in favor of garrison farming. You say the enemy need not yet be executed but that the campaign can be settled within a few months—do you mean this coming winter? Or what date do you have in mind? Have you considered that once the tribes hear we are thinning our ranks their warriors may mass again, raid the farmers and the detachments on the supply roads, and butcher the populace—how would you stop them? The Greater and Lesser Kai chiefs have already protested: We showed the Han where the Xianling were, yet no attack came while your army lingered—will you repeat the fifth-year blunder and strike us together with the guilty? They live in constant fear of that outcome. If we hold the army back now, might they not turn on us and unite with the Xianling? General, weigh these points carefully and memorialize again. Chongguo replied:
29
便便 便 便
Your servant has read that war rests on calculation, and that thorough planning defeats hasty planning. The Xianling can field at most seven or eight thousand picked warriors now; they are landless exiles, scattered, starving, and cold. The Han, Kai, and Moju bands meanwhile prey on their weaker neighbors' herds, and deserters keep slipping away to us because everyone has heard the emperor's bounty for bringing in rebel heads. Your servant believes their collapse may come within a few months, certainly by next spring at the latest—hence his earlier remark that the campaign could be settled in short order. Along the northern line from Dunhuang to Liaodong—more than eleven thousand five hundred li—only a few thousand clerks and soldiers man the wall and beacon chain, yet the nomads have stormed it in force again and again without breaking through. Ten thousand foot soldiers on the farms hold level ground with commanding heights for observation; companies shield one another behind ditches, palisades, and log barriers in an unbroken chain, with crossbows ready and shields and spears in order. The beacon line stays open, the detachments can combine at need, and fresh troops await weary raiders—the classic advantage in war. Garrison farming saves the treasury at home and forms a shield abroad. Even with the cavalry sent home, the sight of ten thousand farmers in arms tells the tribes they are trapped; their morale will crumble and they will sue for peace before long. Within three months their ponies will be gaunt; they will not dare leave wives and children with alien bands while they march hundreds of li to raid. Facing ten thousand veteran farmer-soldiers, they will never drag their families and herds back to the old pastures. That is the point of your servant's plan: to let the enemy rot in place and collapse without a general engagement. Petty murders and theft by scattered bands cannot be stopped overnight. Your servant has learned never to cross blades when victory is uncertain. Never waste the army on an assault that may not succeed. If a major offensive could not crush the Xianling but would at least end small-scale raiding, your servant would favor it. To abandon a strategy that wins from a seat of strength, court needless risk, gain nothing in the end, exhaust the interior, and lower the dynasty's prestige is no way to overawe the frontier peoples. Once the main host marches out it cannot simply return to the farms, nor can Huangzhong be left bare—another round of levies would follow. The Xiongnu must still be guarded and the Wuhuan watched. Prolonged convoys drain the treasury and pour our reserve funds into a single corner—your servant cannot approve. Colonel Linzhong may rely on Your Majesty's prestige, rich gifts, and clear edicts to win the Qiang bands—they should all incline to Han. Even if they once asked whether the fifth-year mistake would be repeated, they have no deeper disloyalty, and that alone is no reason to take the field. Your servant has turned these matters over in his mind. To obey an order, march deep into the steppe, waste the empire's best troops and scatter its wagons and mail for no measurable gain, yet escape censure—that is the selfish profit of an unfaithful minister, not the blessing of the altars of state. Your servant was honored with crack troops to chastise rebels yet has long delayed Heaven's judgment—he deserves death ten thousand times over. Your Majesty's kindness has spared him execution and allowed him time and again to think the matter through. Your foolish servant has weighed every alternative; he does not shrink from the executioner's axe but risks his life to speak plainly, and begs Your Majesty to judge.
30
便
Each time Chongguo submitted a memorial the emperor referred it to the high ministers for debate. At first only three men in ten sided with him, then half, and finally eight in ten. An edict called in those who had called his plan unworkable; they kowtowed and conceded. Chancellor Wei Xiang said, Your servant is no soldier, yet whenever the rear general has laid out a campaign his counsel has proved sound; your servant vouches that his strategy should be followed. The emperor answered: The Son of Heaven accepts the rear general's account of how the Qiang may be defeated and approves your plan. Memorialize the numbers of men and horses to stay on the farms and those to be stood down. Eat well, take care in camp, and look after your health. Because the Qiang-breaking and strong crossbow generals still pressed for battle while Chongguo's farm garrisons lay exposed to raid, the emperor split the difference: he ordered both generals and Gentleman of the Palace Yin to launch a sortie. The strong crossbow column brought in more than four thousand captives, the Qiang-breaking general claimed two thousand heads, Yin the gentleman of the palace another two thousand killed or surrendered, and Chongguo's own negotiations won over five thousand more. An edict then stood down the host, leaving only Chongguo's men on the farms.
31
In the fifth month of the following year Chongguo reported: The Qiang could originally muster fifty thousand men; we have taken 7,600 heads, accepted 31,200 surrenders, and five or six thousand more have drowned in the Huang or died of hunger; fugitives who have joined the Jianjiong and Huangdi bands cannot number more than four thousand. Miwang and other chiefs have pledged to run the rest to earth; your servant asks that the garrison be disbanded. The throne approved the memorial. Chongguo marched his troops home in good order.
32
His friend Haoxing Ci met him on the road and urged him: The court believes the Qiang-breaking and strong crossbow columns won the war with their heads taken and captives gathered. Men of judgment know the tribes were already broken and would have yielded even without that sortie. When you are called to audience you should credit the two generals' attack—something no petty official could have matched. That way your own strategy still looks sound. Chongguo answered, I am old and my honors are complete; would I trim one episode of the truth to deceive an enlightened sovereign? Military affairs are the great business of the state and must be recorded faithfully for posterity. If this old minister does not speak plainly to Your Majesty of what war gains and costs while he still draws breath, who will tell you after he is gone? When he faced the throne he answered along those lines. The emperor accepted his account, sent Xin Wuxian back to his post as grand administrator of Jiuquan, and restored Chongguo as rear general and commandant of the guards.
33
That autumn the Qiang leaders Ruoling, Liliu, Qiezhong, and Hanku jointly slew the Xianling headmen Youfei and Yang Yu, while Ze, Yangdiao, Lianghan, Miwang, and others led more than four thousand men of the Jianjiong and Huangdi bands to surrender to the Han. Ruoling and Ze were enfeoffed as kings commanding the masses, Liliu and Qiezhong as marquises, Hanku and Lianghan as lords, Yangdiao as marquis of the muster of arms, and Miwang as lord of the tribute ox. The court first established the Jincheng dependent state to house the surrendered Qiang.
34
使
When an edict called for nominees for colonel protecting the Qiang, Zhao Chongguo was ill and the four chief ministries put forward Xin Tang, younger brother of Xin Wuxian. Chongguo rose from his sickbed to memorialize: Tang is a drunkard and unfit to govern barbarians. His elder brother Linzhong would be the better choice. Tang had already received his commission, but an edict superseded it and named Linzhong instead. When Linzhong later resigned on grounds of illness the five ministries nominated Tang again; Tang repeatedly abused the Qiang while drunk, the tribes rose in revolt, and events unfolded exactly as Chongguo had warned.
35
Earlier, while Qiang-breaker Xin Wuxian was in camp, he drank with Gentleman of the Palace Yin, who told him how General of Chariots and Cavalry Zhang Anshi had once angered the emperor, who meant to put him to death; Yin's father the general had argued that Anshi had borne satchel and brush in Emperor Wu's service for decades and was known for loyalty and care, and deserved to be spared. Anshi was spared on that account. After Chongguo returned to discuss the campaign, Wuxian was sent back to his old post nursing a bitter grudge; he memorialized that Yin had leaked confidential palace conversation. Though Yin was confined pending trial, he forced his way into his father's headquarters among the staff officers and threw the camp into disorder; once the magistrates took charge he committed suicide.
36
忿
When Chongguo asked leave to retire, the court gave him a comfortable carriage, a team of four horses, sixty jin of gold, and permission to withdraw to his estate. Whenever the court debated major frontier questions he was still summoned to advise on arms and strategy. He died at eighty-six in the second year of the Ganlu era (52 BCE) and received the posthumous title Stalwart Marquis. The marquisate passed to his son and then to his grandson Qin, who married Princess Jingwu. The princess bore no heir, so she coached Qin's concubine Xi to fake a pregnancy and pass off another woman's child as her own. When Qin died his son Cen succeeded to the title and Xi was honored as dowager. Cen's natural parents, bled dry by demands for money, turned on one another in anger and denounced the fraud. Cen was stripped of his rank as a false heir and the marquisate was abolished. During the Yuanshi era, when the court renewed the lines of meritorious houses, Chongguo's great-grandson Renji was again enfeoffed as Marquis of Yingping.
37
西
Zhao Chongguo was first ranked with Huo Guang among the meritorious ministers whose portraits were painted in Weiyang Palace. Under Emperor Cheng, when trouble stirred again on the western Qiang frontier, the emperor thought of past commanders, recalled Zhao Chongguo's fame, and ordered the Yellow Gate gentleman Yang Xiong to compose a eulogy before his portrait. It reads:
38
西 西
Under the sage Emperor Xuan the Rong bred the Xianling tribe. The Xianling grew arrogant and swept against the Han's western marches. The Han called forth a tiger among ministers—the rear general—to marshal the hosts of the six armies for chastisement and terror. On their soil he blended awe with mercy, while armchair critics boasted of small gains and called him too timid to win. They clamored to march on the Han Qiang; the Son of Heaven bade him follow the host to the Xian River front. The Marquis of Yingping held firm in honor, memorial after sealed memorial sized up the foe and seized victory; his stern designs knew no rash pride. So the western Rong were broken, the army came home to the capital, the ghost lands bowed as guests, and none failed to attend the Han court. In olden days King Xuan of Zhou had Fang Shu and Shi Hu; the poets hymned their deeds and set them among the Hymns. In the Han restoration Zhao Chongguo stood as their warrior, bold and towering, heir to that same line of glory.
39
Zhao Chongguo served as rear general and moved his household to Duling. Seven years after returning from the Qiang campaign Xin Wuxian was again named Qiang-breaking general for an expedition against the Wusun as far as Dunhuang; he never took the field, and the army had not yet marched when he died of illness. His son Xin Qingji rose to high rank at court.
40
Xin Qingji, whose courtesy name was Zizhen, entered office young through his father's rank as assistant colonel of the right; he followed Marquis Chang Hui to the garrison farms at the Wusun capital of Chigu, fought the Shehou chieftain, broke the enemy line, and drove him back. Chang Hui reported his deeds and he was made a gentleman consultant, then colonel, commanding a garrison in the kingdom of Yanqi. Back in the capital he served as an usher and was still little known. Early in Emperor Yuan's reign he was named chief clerk of Jincheng, recommended as outstanding talent, promoted through gentleman of the palace to general of chariots and cavalry, and so highly regarded at court that he was shifted to colonel, then grand administrator of Zhangye and of Jiuquan, winning fame in every post.
41
祿 西 祿 祿
At the start of Emperor Cheng's reign he was recalled as grand counselor of the palace, rose to general of the gentlemen of the palace for the left staff, and advanced to bearer of the golden mace. Xin Wuxian and Zhao Chongguo had long been at odds, and later the Zhao household killed a member of the Xin clan; when Qingji held the mace his own son murdered a Zhao, and he was demoted to grand administrator of Jiuquan. A little over a year later Grand General Wang Feng recommended him: He left a strong record in two border commanderies, answered every summons to the capital, and won the trust of everyone at court. He is upright by nature, wins men by humanity and courage, knows war inside out, and combines clear judgment with the bearing of a pillar of state. His father, Qiang-breaking general Xin Wuxian, was famous in the last reign and overawed the western tribes. Your servant Wang Feng ought not long to rank above Qingji. He was therefore recalled as grand counselor of the palace and bearer of the golden mace. Some years later a minor infraction cost him the grand administratorate of Yunzhong, but he was soon summoned back as superintendent of the imperial household.
42
使使 祿
As portents multiplied, He's Wu, the chancellor's investigator, submitted a sealed memorial: When Yu had Gong Zhiqi at court, Duke Xian of Jin could not close his eyes in peace; while Wei Qing held high office, the king of Huainan shelved his plot. A worthy at court who turns back the enemy in counsel does more than an army that never takes the field. The Sima Methods warns: In an age of peace, forgetfulness of war invites ruin. If generals are not chosen in advance, there is no one to meet a sudden emergency; if troops are not kept in constant readiness, they cannot be ordered to their deaths in battle. Hence the late emperor set up graded commands for generals, with imperial clansmen watching the interior and outsiders holding the frontier, so treason never took root—a policy fit to endure forever. Superintendent Xin Qingji is upright in conduct, firm yet flexible, steadfast of character, and far-sighted in counsel. On the frontier he repeatedly smashed the enemy and took captives, and his name is known to every outer tribe. Lately heaven has sent a cluster of great portents, yet no moral response has followed. Moreover the army has lain idle for years. The Spring and Autumn praises guarding against disaster before it strikes; Xin Qingji belongs to the corps of fang-and-claw officers who stand ready for the unexpected. He was then named right general with concurrent appointments as palace attendant and attendant cavalry, and a little over a year later was shifted to left general.
43
輿 西
Qingji lived modestly and dressed plainly, but he loved fine horses and carriages, kept them gleaming, and indulged himself in nothing else. A tiger minister of the empire in an age of peace, he won the submission of the Xiongnu and the Western Regions, who respected his authority. He died in office at an advanced age. His eldest son Tong became colonel protecting the Qiang, his second Zun commandant of Hangu Pass, his youngest Mao superintendent of the imperial household waters and parks and then grand administrator of a commandery; each had the bearing of a field commander. More than ten of his kinsmen by blood or marriage rose to the rank of two thousand piculs.
44
西
During the Yuanshi era Wang Mang, as lord who pacifies the Han, held power; knowing that Qingji had been promoted by Grand General Wang Feng and that all three sons were able men, he sought to win the family over. Mang was then consolidating his grip and relied on Zhen Feng and Zhen Han; the pair had just risen to power and overawed the whole court. Xin Mao, superintendent of the waters and parks, considered himself the scion of a great house with brothers all in high place, and bowed little to the two Zhens. Emperor Ping was still a child and the Wei in-laws were barred from the capital, but Colonel Xin Tong's eldest son, Cixiong, was intimate with the emperor's cousin Wei Zibo; both were famous swordsmen with large clienteles. When the Lü Kuan case broke, Wang Mang wiped out the Wei family. The two Zhens spread word that the Xins were secretly in league with Wei Zibo and plotted ingratitude against the lord who pacifies the Han. Investigator Chen Chong then impeached his kinsmen, such as Xin Xing of Longxi, for bullying the common people and throwing their weight across several provinces. Wang Mang seized Xin Tong and his sons, Xin Zun, Xin Mao, their brothers, Nan commandery grand administrator Xin Bo, and others, and put them all to death. The house of Xin was destroyed from that moment. Qingji was a native of Didao; when he became a general he moved his household to Changling. When the Changling project was abandoned he stayed on in Chang'an.
45
西 西西
The historian's verdict runs: Since Qin and Han times the lands east of the mountains have yielded chief ministers, and the lands west of the mountains have yielded generals. Under Qin, General Bai Qi came from Mei; Wang Jian came from Pinyang. Since the rise of Han, Wang Wei of Yuzhi and Gan Yanshou, Gongsun He and Fu Jiezi of Yiqu, Li Guang and Li Cai of Chengji, Su Jian and Su Wu of Duling, Shanggu Jie and Zhao Chongguo of Shanggui, Lian Bao of Xiangwu, and Xin Wuxian with Xin Qingji of Didao have all won fame by courage and arms. The Su and Xin families in two generations showed conspicuous loyalty; they are the ones worth naming here, while the rest are beyond counting. Why is this so? West of the mountains, in Tianshui, Longxi, Anding, and Beidi, the ground presses close on the Qiang and the Hu, so the people train for war from childhood and honor horsemanship, courage, and the bow. Hence the old Qin song: The king calls out the host; we mend our mail and blades; with you I march together. That temper is ancient; even today their ballads ring with martial fire, and the old spirit lingers on.
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