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卷二十七 志第八: 河渠 黃河 漕渠盧溝河 滹沱河 漳河

Volume 27 Treatises 8: Rivers and Canals - Yellow River and its Branches and Channels, Hutuo River, Zhang River

Chapter 27 of 金史 · History of Jin
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1
沿 西 使
When the Jin first overran the Song, both banks of the Yellow River were handed entirely to Liu Yu. When Yu fell, the river and its works lay wholly within Jin borders. For decades it broke out or was dammed, its channel wandering without fixed line. The Jin set up offices and staff to take charge of the work. Along the full reach of the river stood twenty-five levee sections—six south of the stream, nineteen north—each with a roving river-patrol officer. Xiongwu, Yingze, Yuanwu, Yangwu, and Yanjin also oversaw the Bian Canal; a single Combined Huang-Bian regional director at Heyin supervised them. Huaizhou, Mengjin, Mengzhou, and the four north-city sao shared Qin River duty; a Combined Huang-Qin director at Huaizhou watched over them. Upper and Lower Chongfu, Weinan, and Qishang fell under the Weinan regional director, based at Xinxiang. Wucheng, Baima, Shucheng, and Jiaocheng answered to the Xun-Hua regional director at Jiaocheng. The Caodian regional director commanded Dongming, Xijia, Menghua, and Lingcheng. The Cao-Ji regional director ran Dingtao, Jibei, Hanshan, and Jinshan. In all there were six regional river-patrol directors. Later they added a dedicated director for Upper and Lower Chongfu, who also served as Stone Bridge commissioner. Every patrol officer came up through the Directorate of Waterways' integrity screening, commanding twelve thousand sao troops. Each year the works consumed over 1.11 million bundles of fuel wood and over 1.83 million bundles of thatch, not counting piling timber—standing river-defense scale.
2
使 沿 ' 便 調 使
In the sixth month of Dading 8 the river broke at Ligudu, flooding Caozhou and splitting across Danzhou. The first month of year 9 the court sent Liang Su of the Directorate of Waterways to inspect. Henan military commissioner Zong Xu of the imperial clan said: "The Yellow River breaches because the bed is choked with silt and will not hold the flow. Cao and Dan suffer, yet both counties live by hydraulic labor—the cropland lost is small. To force the river back into its old bed would cost enormous labor and still fail at once. Even if sealed, the next cloudburst would burst it again—and Shandong's flood would dwarf what Cao and Dan see now. Along the river, sudden mass corvée would shake the people; the Song might use the unrest to raid the frontier." Su added: "The new channel carries six-tenths of the flow, the old four. Block the new stream and both become one. At flood stage a southern break would drown Nanjing; a northern break would wash Shandong and Hebei alike. Better to build a dike south of Ligu against breakout—that is the prudent course." The Secretariat memorialized; the throne agreed. Third month, year 10: Zong Xu became participation councillor. The emperor told him: "As Henan commander you once laid out the Yellow River dikes and sao—exactly what I needed. I think constantly of the people: every levy breeds clerkish fraud; wait until the deadline and the cost multiplies tenfold. What they seize often rots in storehouses for years—tens of thousands in wealth turned to trash. That harm is not small. You sit in council now—root out such abuses and keep only what truly serves the realm." Year 11 the river broke at Wangcun; Nanjing and the Meng and Wei frontier bore the brunt. First month, year 12: the Secretariat reported that inspectors found the current driving southeast with violent force. They proposed a dike from Heyin's Guangwu Mountain east along the river through Yuanwu, Yangwu, Dongming, and the Meng and Wei prefectures—11,000 laborers a day, sixty days to finish." An edict sent Zhang Jiusi of the Palace Storehouse and Nanjing deputy defender Wanyan Yaosun (courtesy Aibusun) to supervise. Third month, year 13: at the Secretariat's request to repair Mengjin, Yingze, and Chongfu sao dikes, the throne ordered Xiongwu and seven sao downstream to do the same. Autumn, seventh month, year 17: heavy rains; the river broke at Baigou. Twelfth month: the Secretariat proposed river dikes at 11,500 workers a day, sixty-day completion. Year 18, second month, first day: corvée within six hundred li—troops plus half the official staff, the rest civilians—under Zhang Dajie of the Works Bureau and Nanjing deputy Gao Su. Earlier, forty-odd li of Yellow River dike from Chenqiao in Xiangfu east to Pan hillock in Chenliu had been run by county deputies; Nanjing asked for a dedicated sao officer—in the ninth month of year 19 a Jing sao patrol officer was appointed. Year 20: breaches at Weizhou and Tingjin Jingdong sao flooded as far as Guide Prefecture. Inspector Shimo Hui, Nanjing deputy defender, reported: "Autumn floods drove the river out of its old bed; the current is shoving ever farther south." The chancellors memorialized. They raised dikes from Weizhou sao down along both banks of Guide—1,796,000-odd work units, 24,000 laborers a day, seventy days. Guide gained a new patrol officer and two hundred sao troops; corvée districts were excused that year's taxes. Tenth month, year 21: the river had left its old bed—orders to build protective dikes.
3
使
Eighth month, year 26: the river broke Weizhou's dike and wrecked the city. The throne sent Wang Ji of Revenue and Wang Rujia of the Directorate of Waterways post-haste to organize defenses. Ji ignored the drowning counties and set men to net fish for the treasury; resentment boiled up. Word reached the throne; the emperor was disgusted. The flood soon spread to Daming. The emperor sent Liu Wei of Revenue to handle Works matters with full discretion and demoted Ji to defender of Caizhou. Winter, tenth month: the emperor told his ministers, "I hear the fallen Song posted one man every pace along the dikes—we should enlarge the river-defense corps." Another day he said: "The floods have emptied people's stores—why send assessors down the disaster routes to squeeze more?" Vice director Zhang Rulin said: "The assessments aren't even hitting the flooded districts." The emperor said: "Even so—they border the water. Live beside the river and nobody flees or panics? Count their goods—what surplus remains? Why assess at all?" Eleventh month: "Before Weizhou broke, someone warned me. After the breach, why was I kept in the dark?" He ordered an inquiry.
4
Spring, first month, year 27: the Secretariat reported that at Heyin in Zhengzhou, Sheng Hou's temple— prayer had calmed the river; they asked to renew the honors." The throne agreed, adding the title "Manifest Responsive Smooth-Flowing Sacred Queen" and naming the temple "Temple of Spiritual Virtue and Beneficent Profit."
5
簿 沿 沿 沿 使 便
Second month: Xinxiang magistrate Zhang Xu, aide Tangut Tangguchu, and registrar Wendun Weina earned graded promotions for sealing the breach when the river drove into the city. The Censorate said: "River officials have long watched gaps in the dikes inside their jurisdictions and shrugged. Put river defense in the chief and vice magistrates' titles: reward those who hold a breach; punish negligence reported in time." The emperor agreed and ordered a Works Bureau inspector along the river each flood season. Nanjing and its counties, Guide and its counties, Henan, Hezhong, Huai, Tong, Wei, Xu, Meng, Zheng, Xun, Shan, Cao, Hua, Sui, Teng, Dan, Jie, Kai, and Ji—chiefs and deputies of four prefectures and sixteen zhou were made river-defense commissioners; magistrates and aides of forty-four counties were made river-defense overseers. Earlier the flood had wrecked Weizhou; the court had ordered Sumen raised and the seat moved. By year 28 the water had fallen back; people drifted home and refused relocation. The court sent Kang Yuanbi of the Grand Court of Review to inspect on site. Yuanbi reported: "Many have reopened the old town; the southern envoy post stands there—lack of flood prep caused the ruin. Patch the thin spots in the dike and we need not fear—far cheaper than moving the seat. Honor the people and rebuild the old walls." The seat stayed put; slack river officials would face heavy punishment from then on.
6
使 沿 便
Fifth month, year 29: the river topped the small dike north of Caozhou. Sixth month: "I hear the river topped on the twenty-eighth of the fifth month—yet your report crawled in. Water work brooks no delay—wait a moment and the levee is lost." Twelfth month: Works reported 6.08 million work units for dikes—sao troops and soldiers aside, 4.3 million needed civilians. Prefectures within five hundred li were to hire labor; where no corvée was levied, hire fees were spread by property assessment. Each work unit paid 150 cash plus fifty wen and one and a half sheng of rice per day. Imperial clansman Daling Shou, Zhanghua Army commissioner and vice director of waterways, was sent with five hundred men to keep order. Earlier the Henan judicial commissioner had said river corvée was driving riverside families into flight. Flood defense is dikes and sao—honest earthwork tallies and timely fuel and piling levies should be manageable. This spring the Directorate estimated borrow-pits nearby; at mobilization the haul was several times farther. Teams missed deadlines and bought soil at a thousand strings a gang. Xuzhou was levied 180,000 bundles of thatch, then 44,000 more—annual staples better assessed in the slack season. Hereafter let the Directorate measure real need, annual material totals, commuted tax or winter negotiated purchase in three installments." The throne told the Secretariat to deliberate and report.
7
使 使' ' 使
Mingchang 1, spring: the Secretariat proposed that every project first fix haul distance and lift height, set labor quotas and deadlines, post notices—no surprise corvée. River materials: each year before the eighth month the Directorate would inventory stores, report shortfalls and spring work to the transport office, and collect in three winter installments. Summer floods could draw neighboring sao stores; shortfalls would be bought nearby. Muddy roads might force in-kind tax swaps at markup, paid in cash—violators prosecuted, judicial commissioners riding post to inspect—so work stayed on schedule and the river stayed guarded." Approved. Eleventh month, year 4: Wang Rujia of He Ping Army reported that old diversion mouths on the south bank might vent the current; north of the long dike there might be outlets to receive water—he asked for inspection. He also proposed moon dikes north of Jibei sao. The Secretariat favored the plan. Skilled Directorate staff should inspect with Rujia to avoid dispute. If diversions proved impossible, moon dikes should be built as estimated." The emperor agreed.
8
Now the river chewed the long dike in ten-odd places with ponded water outside—raising the long dike and new moon dikes looked doubtful on the old estimates.
9
使 輿 使 使調 使
Li proposed breaching at Qiang village on the north bank into the Liangshan marsh old bed to restore the two Qing rivers. The river was driving north, chewing the long levee in ten-odd places with ponded water outside—raising the long dike and new moon dikes looked doubtful on the old estimates. Li proposed breaching at Qiang village on the north bank into the Liangshan marsh old bed to restore the two Qing rivers. The North Qing's old levee had crumbled for years—they should set a schedule to raise the main dike, and relocate the garrison farms clogging the Liangshan old bed. For now they would breach at Wangcun and Yicun on the south bank to ease the long dike, or—if that failed—open four channels as planned and adapt to the current. The Secretariat noted Li's plan clashed with Liu Wei's Mingchang 2 inspection and Feng Deyu's face-to-face review, and referred the dispute to the Works Bureau. They warned that a rush breach at Qiang village would threaten twenty-odd North Qing counties along a thousand-odd li of unmended levee and garrisons that could not be moved in time. They proposed breaching Yanjin's south-bank dike this year while strengthening the long levee from Baima to Dingtao against future floods. East of Dingtao they would abandon three sao levees, open old mouths, and send ponded water southeast between Zhang Biao and Baita—relocating flooded garrisons and Liangshan settlers in advance." The chancellors said sudden adoption of Li's scheme risked great harm. They would send two capable officers with Wang Rujia to reinspect, then scale labor and corvée, keep spring overseers on flood watch, and seek a lasting plan with the Directorate. Li Jingyi, imperial clansman and prefect of Daming, was named acting Works commissioner; Xu Chiguo, participation councillor, directed the effort. Li Xiankai of Dezhou and Jiao Xu of Revenue were sent to raise city dikes along Shandong's flood path and repair North Qing levees while studying long-term defense.
10
' ' ' '便 使 ' ' 使 使 使 使 使 沿
The emperor handed Ma Qi a fascicle on Yellow River policy by the Song writer Yan Shiliang: "Some of this may be useful." Second month: the emperor told Grand Councillor Shouzhen, "Rujia and Li own the river works—a matter of state weight. I asked if they had walked the south bank." They said, "Not yet." Could a breach send the river south? Again: "We cannot know." The current had run north for years—they should have planned last year. "Go guard the works with all your heart, plan for the long term. Slack off and you will all be punished together." Third month: the traveling office, Works commissioners, and Directorate staff each reported on river defense. The Directorate favored breaching at Wangcun—several li of lying roll above Wangcun could be cut without hitting towns, while Yicun looked slower. They also wanted Qiang village on the north bank to restore the two Qing rivers into Liangshan, rebuilding the great dike where small levees had failed. The Secretariat warned: breaching at Qiang village would drown Shandong's fertile fields and salt works. Even repaired levees might not hold the flow—massive labor would only exhaust Shandong for no gain. The long dike was already strengthened; south-bank cuts and the Liangshan diversion were set aside; cities were building walls; old Qing levee work should stop. Aide Li wanted three sao east of Dingtao left unrepaired, opening old mouths to pond water north of the dike and relocating every household in the flood path. The ministers preferred timber revetments and seasonal evacuation—not mass relocation, matching the traveling Works office. The distances are too great for us to know every consequence—let the traveling office plan with full heart." Fourth month: the emperor told Chiguo, "River work is not yours alone—all of you must plan as one so I need not worry. Li spoke of two hundred thousand work units, fifty days a year, five years to finish—unprecedented scale. Success was uncertain; even if possible, execution looked doubtful. Moving four thousand garrison households was manageable, but an uncontrolled breach could run anywhere—how would they brace it? South-bank cuts might split the current—but without seeing the river, neither he nor his ministers could dictate details. Gather the officials and debate before acting. without seeing the river, neither he nor his ministers could dictate details. Gather the officials and debate before acting." The assembly backed Li's plan to abandon the long levee, reopen Liangshan, and split the Qing rivers as a long-term saving of labor. The throne replied that the Yellow River obeyed no human command— Liangshan was silt-choked, the North Qing too narrow, and farms and wells lined the route—forcing the river north would drown Shandong. Li had also asked military-deadline funding and executive control for the Directorate— but posts were already filled, chiefs and magistrates already oversaw the dikes, and slackness already carried military penalties—none of Li's extras applied." The plan was shelved.
11
使使 使
Eighth month: a breach at Yangwu's old dike flooded Fengqiu eastward—the Secretariat blamed the Directorate and traveling officers for weak guard. Gao Xu of Transport and Wanyan Yilie of the Martial Guard were sent to organize repairs. The Secretariat noted the Directorate had been warned before— yet Rujia and others ignored the southward current, delayed on repeated alerts, and harmed the people. That was deliberate disobedience—private offense merited beating." Rujia and the rest lost two ranks, took seventy blows, and were dismissed.
12
便 便使 祿 退 沿 簿 滿 使 調使
The emperor told his ministers: "Li Yu was right that a great minister should go to steady the people after a breach. Hebei breaches had warranted a traveling office—this disaster deserved more than minor deputies. Shandong mattered no less than Henan; the people were all his children." Ma Qi, participation councillor, was sent with full discretion. "Li Yu is not innocent—Directorate officers need not wait on the judicial commissioner; they could have rallied the defender's office and reported upward. He only panicked at the flood and planned nothing; after the breach he merely toured with Rujia and did nothing. Asked when Wangcun would be opened, he said end of the fourth month—it was the sixth, and he did not even know the calendar. Is that fit for a judicial commissioner?" Revenue aide He Ge was sent to relieve the flooded counties. Chiguo and Ma Qi reported from Guanglu village at the breach. Floodwater had undercut the bank for more than ten li before borrow-pits were reachable. The crown was only a few paces wide—men could not work it; forced labor would collapse again. Silt blocked the mid-channel with uneven bed; when the water fell, fresh shoals would be hard to cut. Where the Bian east bank at Menghua sao and the Mengyang dike allowed work, they would repair through the farming slack and finish before freeze-up so the capital would be safe. Ma Qi said the outer Directorate was overstaffed—officials bickered and ruined the work. He proposed dropping aides and naming two handlers. Patrol posts had been filled by Directorate patronage—clerks dodging warehouses through bribes, often unfit. Regional directors would rise to rank 7 and be drawn from magistrate candidates; roving officers from integrity lists under sixty with vigor. After one year the judicial commissioner could dismiss the unfit immediately. Those who kept the river quiet would be jointly recommended for promotion. Bridge deputies would be chosen the same way. Chiguo agreed; the throne approved. Intercalary tenth month: Shouzhen noted Ma Qi had not reported work totals, corvée was exhausting the people, and Chiguo was ill—send another capable officer." If the dikes can be saved, I will not spare treasure— but I fear spending everything to build levees that collapse again." The ministers said solid guard lightened the harm; neglect worsened it." Will this breed bandits?" Shouzhen said Song river works had sparked banditry in famine years— but peace and harvest made that unlikely now. River labor was duty; the current corvée was still bearable. Forced fodder levies regardless of supply were what broke households." Take laborers nearby, not from afar, and keep the ferries open," the emperor said. He would wait for Ma Qi's return before deciding. On gengchen Ma Qi reported: Mengyang and the Bian dikes were patched—the river could not take Bian city. The current was running north; next spring he would cut the mid-channel to ease both banks. The job totaled 8.7 million-odd work units, to start at month's end. He asked to return early to the river. The memorial went to the Secretariat; inspectors and flood-watch officers were punished by degree. Later Ma Qi told the emperor he had done his utmost but might lack wit— another survey might find a better plan— and if it matched his, work could proceed with less court anxiety." The throne agreed and sent Aotun Zhongxiao (acting Revenue) and Wen Fang (acting Works) to the river. "You are men I know—do not fail me. Err and I will not spare you."
13
沿
Cheng'an 1, seventh month: along-river posts would not be left vacant even for central appointees. Taihe 2, ninth month: the Censorate was told river defense was their business too—inspect what ought to be inspected. Year 5: Cui Shouzhen reported that though fodder was commuted or "negotiated purchase," payment came five or six times a year and was never made. Guo Xie and Censor-in-chief Meng Zhu were ordered to investigate. They found 219,000-odd strings unpaid for fodder from Daming, Zhengzhou, and elsewhere since Cheng'an 2. Capable officers were to repay county by county from local cash; the inspection office would follow up.
14
使 西使 退 使 沿
Xuanzong, Zhenyou 3, eleventh month, renshen day: Hou Zhi sacrificed to the river god at Yicun. Fourth month, year 3: Danzhou prefect Yan Zhan Tianze said defense meant breaching the great river north through De, Bo, Guan, and Cang. The old dike still stood—the work was light, and the current running downhill would not drown the land. Objectors who skip the argument about damaging the Cang salt works always fall back on flooding Hebei's good farmland. River elders say dispersed water is too shallow for horses and too deep for boats—a cornerstone of defense. Daily flooding sounds dire, but after the river moves the silt turns to rich soil and yields can double—what gain compares? Lose this plan and Henan Route runs short of army grain while Hebei and Shandong unravel. An edict ordered the matter debated. In the third month of the fourth year Yanzhou inspector Wen Saxike said: "Lately the river has left its old channel, running southeast from Weizhou to the sea via Xu and Pi, which has pinched Henan's territory. West of Xinxiang the water could be cut northeast; old dikes to the south would contain it; after fifty-odd li it would meet the Qing River and reach the sea via Junzhou, Daming, Guanzhou, Qingzhou, and Liukou—the old course, already diked, needing only gaps filled. Shandong and Daming would lie south of the river, Hebei would recover half its ground—enough for defense in retreat and a stronger base for recovery. He also asked relief for south-bank residents already drafted for dikes and guard posts and for fodder transport—burdens heavier than elsewhere, land tax aside—to trim the lighter levies. The Secretariat received it; the chief ministers said the southeast course was entrenched. A sudden breach might overflow the old channel, split into many streams, and prove irreversible. Split channels run shallow and freeze in winter, easing enemy crossings—this must not be done. The edict only ordered easing levies on south-bank prefectures and counties. In the fourth month of summer, year five, the Privy Council was told to build stone banks along the river at key points and add scattered-star piles and horse-trap moats against attack.
15
沿 使
With the capital at Yan, fifty li east stood the Lu River; sluices regulated the Gaoliang River, Bailian Pond, and other waters to feed Shandong and Hebei grain inland. River cities stored tax grain from nearby commanderies—Linqing and Liting in Enzhou, Jiangling and Dongguang in Jingzhou, Xingji and Huichuan in Qingzhou, Wuqiang in Xian and Shen—the six prefectures' granary counties. Grain routes: the old Yellow River through Huazhou, Daming, Enzhou, Jingzhou, Cangzhou, and Huizhou; the Zhang as the northeast Yu River to Sumen, Huojia, Xinxiang, Weizhou, Junzhou, Liyang, Weixian, Zhangde, Cizhou, and Mingzhou; the Heng meeting the Hutuo at Shenzhou for Xian and Qing—all ending at Xin'an coastal depots. Upstream to Tongzhou, through its sluice, then ten-odd days to the capital. Buzhou's Juma, Xiongzhou's Sha, and Shandong's North Qing River also fed the network. Above Tongzhou the land rose, water did not hold, channels shoaled, and boats grounded—so haulage went by land at great cost. Under Shizong, memorialists urged opening the Lugou golden mouth for transport; years of labor failed—see "Lugou River." Later the sluice river ran intermittently and carts alone carried the grain. Spring convoys ran from ice-out until the summer rains ended. Autumn convoys ran from the eighth month until freeze-up. When a convoy was to sail— crews bundled and sealed the grain, sent samples ahead to the discharge point, and accepted cargo only if it matched the seal. Ships were overhauled three days ahead; one convoy loaded per day; three days after loading, they sailed. Mileage set upstream and downstream limits; three days to unload at the granary and three to issue receipts. Water porterage: salt 48 wen per shi per 100 li; rice 50.127 wen; millet 40.13 wen; cash 1.728 wen per string. Land porterage: rice 112.15 wen per shi per 100 li; millet 57.684 wen; cash 3.96 wen per string. Other goods per 100 jin per 100 li: level roads 131.5 wen spring/winter, 157.8 wen summer/autumn; mountain roads 149 wen spring/winter, 201 wen summer/autumn. Office tax porterage: 90.3 wen spring/winter, 114 wen summer/autumn per 100 jin per 100 li. Households renting official transport ships paid porterage on a ten-part scale: 20% the first year, then 18%, 17%, 15%, and 10% from the fifth year on.
16
使 使 調 沿
In the eighth month of Dading 4 Shizong, with Shandong in great harvest, ordered grain moved to the capital. In the tenth month the emperor rode out, saw the canal choked, and asked why. Officials blamed the Revenue Bureau for lack of planning. He summoned Revenue Vice Minister Cao Wangzhi: "You leave a river undredged and force the people into costly land haulage—the fault is yours. I will not punish you yet—exert every effort to open the transport canal." In the first month of year five the Secretariat proposed tens of thousands of laborers; the emperor said spring must not burden the people and ordered palace registry households, Eastern Palace followers, and five hundred inner-palace troops to dredge. In year twenty-one, with capital stores low, over a million shi from En, Xian, and four other river prefectures went to Tongzhou and then by cart to the capital. In the fourth month of Mingchang 3 the Secretariat said Liaodong and Beijing routes were rich in grain and should feed Shandong by sea. A recent survey from Dawu Qingkou to Xianping found sites for coastal granaries; if Shandong or Hebei failed, grain could be shifted to help." Approved. In Cheng'an 5, river granary districts could commute twenty thousand shi of beans and ten thousand shi of wheat to the capital, with grades checked for horse upkeep from salaries, all in kind. Director of Waterways Vice Commissioner Tian Li was sent to survey the transport channel.
17
使
In Taihe 1 the Secretariat reported Jingzhou's six river granaries took sixty thousand shi yearly from counties up to two hundred li away while officials extorted and delayed—misery even under nearby supervisors. An investigating censor was appointed to tour and correct abuses. In year five, at Buzhou, finding the old canal shallow, he ordered six thousand laborers from Shandong, Hebei, Hedong, Zhongdu, and Beijing to cut a new channel. Garrison-field land was compensated by the state in kind. Civilian fields were mostly bought out at price. In year six the Secretariat complained that river prefects ignored transport channels until they shoaled, letting convoy crews fake "shallow-water stripping" for endless fraud. Regulations then required prefects to carry "supervise grain-transport river affairs" and counties "manage grain-transport river affairs" to hurry convoys and tend dikes. Three prefectures: Daxing, Daming, Zhangde. Twelve prefectures: En, Jing, Cang, Qing, Xian, Shen, Wei, Jun, Hua, Ci, Ming, and Tong. Thirty-three counties: Daming, Yuancheng, Guantao, Xiajin, Wucheng, Liting, Jianqing, Wuqiao, Jiangling, Dongguang, Nanpi, Qingchi, Jinghai, Xingji, Huichuan, Jiaohe, Leshou, Wuqiang, Anyang, Tangyin, Jianzhang, Cheng'an, Fuyang, Neihuang, Liyang, Wei, Sumen, Huojia, Xinxiang, Ji, Lu, Wuqing, Xianghe, and Huayin.
18
In the twelfth month one patrol officer was added for the Tongji River, merged with Tianjin River under one office managing sluices and banks—the Tianjin River patrol officer under the Directorate of Waterways. In the sixth month of year eight Tongzhou inspector Zhang Xingxin said ships needed ten-odd days from Tongzhou to the capital but porterage was paid for only five. Porterage was increased.
19
便 便 西西 宿 使西西 使
In Zhenyou 3, after the move to Bian, Chen and Ying on the water made borrowing civilian boats awkward, so they copied Guanzhou's transport office with a commissioner, registered boat households, and sent Revenue agents to supervise. In year four, on Right Vice Minister Hou Zhi's advice, the Qin River was opened for supply transport. Mindful of capital transport burdens, he also sent imperial stable oxen and official carts to help. In the tenth month of Xingding 4 he told the crown prince: "Choose the Zhongjing grain escort carefully—one slip and Privy Council officials share the guilt! Use Maohua workshop double-ended boats with ferry-style banners so enemies do not know they carry grain." Shaanxi Branch Secretariat Ba Hulu said Shaanxi's yearly grain for Guandong exhausted the people; boats from the Wei downriver could ease that burden. He ordered strict scouting and, on alarm, all boats to moor on the south bank. The court noted Pi, Xu, Su, and Si stores and Jingdong counties' yearly carting of over one hundred thousand shi and the people's great suffering. In Yuanguang 1 Guide Prefecture gained a Tongji granary with a director to receive eastern commandery grain. Dingguo Army jiedushi Li Fuheng said: "At Henan troops and grain must be ample; lately any shortfall turns to Shaanxi, whose fertile fields could spare one hundred thousand shi. Yet carting wastes half the cost upfront—how can people endure it? Build twenty large boats from Daqing Pass into the river to Hucheng: a round trip in days, under one hundred polemen, each holding 350 hu—one hundred men could move seven thousand hu in days. From summer through autumn three million-odd hu could move without backlog. The emperor agreed. They also placed granary directors at Tongjun in Lingbi for the Changzhi ditch, planning Wan'an Lake boat transport into Bian and Si for storage.
20
Lugou River
21
使 使 使西 西便
In Dading 10 they debated cutting the Lugou for capital transport; the emperor said gladly: "Then goods from every route could reach the capital—what gain compares? He ordered plans drawn; it would draft commoners within a thousand li, exempt disaster areas, and use officials' followers as labor. Soon he told the chief ministers: "Shandong is in famine. Works would hinder farming—how could people not resent it? The canal was meant to help the people, not breed resentment—impossible! Stop it for now." In the twelfth month of year eleven ministers urged reopening from the golden mouth to the capital moat and east to Tongzhou's north into the Lu River—eighty days' labor. In the third month of year twelve reinspection reported only fifty days were needed. He summoned the chief ministers: "The extra thirty days only waste farming—why did you not foresee this?" When the channel opened, the ground was high and steep and the water muddy. Steep grades made swirling currents that ate the banks; mud silted the bed until boats could not pass. Later he told ministers: "Diverting the Lugou for transport still fails; if it worked, southern goods would flood the capital and prices would fall." Chief Councilor and imperial son-in-law Yuan Zhong asked experts to survey the ground. In the end it could not operate and was abandoned. In the fifth month of year twenty-five the Lugou broke at Shangyang Village. It had earlier broken at Xiantong Stockade and Zhongdu labor within three hundred li was drafted to seal it; when it broke again the court feared waste and ordered no repair for now. In the third month of year twenty-seven ministers said the Mengjiashan golden-mouth sluice stood 140-odd chi above the capital, guarded only by archer-grain troops—hardly safe. A sudden flood or treachery could do great harm. Blocking it would dry the irrigated paddies, yet grain and wheat could still be planted. Or build heavier sluices with sao offices and barracks on the bank—then perhaps safe." The emperor agreed and sent envoys to seal it. On bingzi day in the fourth summer month the Lugou water spirit was enfeoffed as Marquis of Anping. In the fifth month of year twenty-eight an edict ordered stone bridges at Lugou ferry crossings for envoys and travelers. Before work began Shizong died. In the sixth month of Dading 29 Zhangzong again, travelers suffering from the swift current, first ordered boats, then stone bridges. In the third month of Mingchang 3 it was finished and named Guangli by edict. Offices said the imperial route and merchant traffic met there and asked the state to build east and west galleries for lodgings. The emperor said: "Why force it? People will build on their own." Left Vice Minister Shouzhen said powerful families might seize the sites and profiteers clustered on the east bank—state galleries on both banks would aid oversight. The court agreed.
22
In the sixth month the Lugou dike broke; an edict ordered swift blocking lest it flood widely. Right Reminder Lu Duo urged diverting with the current rather than repairing the old dike from below Xuantong Mouth to above Ding Village. The emperor ordered ministers to debate and sent Works Minister Xu Chiguo with Lu Duo to inspect the dikes.
23
Hutuo River
24
西 使西使
In the sixth month of Dading 8 the Hutuo struck Zhending; twenty-eight thousand laborers from Hebei West Circuit, Hejian, Taiyuan, and Jizhou repaired its banks. In the second month of year ten two Hutuo River patrol officers were created. In year seventeen it broke at Baima Hill; envoys were sent to seal it and Zhending drafted labor within five hundred li from the first day of the second month, year eighteen, under Associate Administrator Gushahu and Associate Transport Commissioner Xu Wei.
25
調
In the first month of spring, Dading 20, offices were told to maintain Zhang River sluices with state labor and materials and not trouble the people. In the sixth month of Mingchang 2 the Zhang and Lugou dikes both broke; an edict ordered quick repairs. On guiwei day in the first spring month of year four offices reported 380,000-odd work units to repair Zhang River dike-sao; following the Lugou precedent, flood-starved people were hired at state pay, then flood households if needed, on the same terms.
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