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卷121 志九十六 食货二 赋役仓库

Volume 121 Treatises 96: Food and Money 2, Taxes, Labor Service, and Granaries

Chapter 121 of 清史稿 · Draft History of Qing
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1
Treatise 96.
2
Food and Money II.
3
Taxes, Labor Service, and Granaries.
4
西 便 簿
The first part of taxes and corvée service is titled "Rules on Tax Assessment." As soon as the Qing entered China proper, they abolished the three extra military levies the late Ming had imposed. By then, roving rebels had destroyed much of the tax registers and cadastral records. In Shunzhi 3 (1646), the throne ordered the Ministry of Revenue to verify original tax quotas, compile the Complete Register of Taxes and Corvée, and restore rates to the Ming Wanli baseline. Nationwide, Jiangnan, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi carried the heaviest tax load; within them, Suzhou, Songjiang, Jiaxing, and Huzhou bore the most. In year six, Dong Duxing of the Household Section asked that plain-language tax notices be distributed. In year eight, once the Shunzhi Emperor assumed direct rule, he sent censors to tour the provinces and report on local grievances and remedies. Qin Shizhen, censor touring Suzhou and Songjiang, submitted eight proposals: landowners should measure their own fields and record the results in stamped registers; second, fixed tax quotas should appear on plain-language notices, with separate slips for any change so corrupt clerks could not invent fees; third, notices should list totals, line items, and household names for audit; fourth, use rolling collection lists to collect taxes in strict order; fifth, let village households pay grain directly into official chests, stamped by prefectural and provincial seals; sixth, collect urgent levies first and defer lesser ones, with firm deadlines for clearing accounts; seventh, apportion corvée by land survey and verify against household registers; eighth, reserve funds must not be overdrawn; the provincial treasurer should collect remittance registers quarterly and report to the ministry at year-end. After that, entrenched abuses in tax collection were steadily cleaned up.
5
簿簿 簿簿 簿
In year eleven, Wang Hongzuo was ordered to revise the tax register: original land and poll quotas first, then wasteland and abandoned fields, actual collections, and finally forwarded versus retained amounts. Forwarded revenue was broken out by ministry, temple, and granary; retained funds listed every line item. Newly opened land and settled households were added at the register's end. Each county issued two copies—one for the magistrate, one for the county school. Tax records included survey registers—fish-scale books—listing upper, middle, and lower land grades. Yellow registers tracked yearly changes in household rolls, paired with the complete tax register. Red ledgers had taxpayers record payments themselves, submit them to the provincial treasurer, and reconcile at year-end. Accounting books listed each county's regular taxes in grain and silver, with remittance dates to the ministry. The Ming Wanli single-whip tax system was reinstated. Under the single whip, a county's summer tax, autumn grain, retained and forwarded shares, corvée, lijia duties, tribute, hired labor, and silver surcharges were merged into one levy, collected once and apportioned evenly. Transport and hired labor were paid by the state, leaving the populace out of it. Plain-language tax notices went to every registered household. Each notice listed land grades and regular and miscellaneous taxes in grain and silver, with totals at the end, issued a month before collection opened. They were supplemented by installment tickets, stamped registers, revolving collection books, grain rolls, and year-end settlement memorials. Installment tickets showed actual land and poll tax due in ten monthly shares; when paid, the ticket was cut through the seal, half kept by official and taxpayer—the linked-ticket system. Stamped registers came from the provincial treasurer; taxpayers entered payments themselves, and counties submitted them quarterly in winter to the ministry. Revolving books followed the tax register, prioritizing urgent items and collecting them month by month in rotation. Grain registers listed every paying household in a district, matching each lijia unit's total. Year-end settlement memorials summed a province's collected and outstanding taxes, disbursements, forwarding, and retention for ministry audit. The regulations were remarkably thorough.
6
西
In year fifteen, Censor Xu Zhijian of Jiangxi wrote: "The worst fiscal abuse is corrupt clerks—officials may be impeached and removed, but the clerks stay entrenched. Order governors and censors to investigate; execute the worst offenders, so entrenched abuses may finally be cleared." Shi Biaogu of the Engineering Section asked to ban surcharges beyond regular quotas and print the ban on private levies in plain-language tax notices so everyone would know. The Emperor found the memorials hit current abuses squarely and ordered the relevant offices to deliberate and report back.
7
When the Kangxi Emperor ascended the throne, he tightened bans on concealing land, evading taxes, and fabricating new reclamation, and revised penalties for collectors and supervisors. Officials who diverted regular funds, invented popular arrears, or levied unauthorized surcharges were punished. Finding tax notices too complex, the Emperor ordered each notice to list actual silver and grain per mu for upper, middle, and lower land grades; notices not reported to the ministry by the eighth month would punish counties, garrisons, and forwarding officials. Yao Wenran wrote: "When disaster relief came after taxes were already collected, that year's remission was applied to next year's regular levy—the rolling offset—and should appear on tax notices so taxpayers actually benefited. But fixed notices went out in the eleventh month of the prior year and had to be compiled in the ninth and tenth months, while summer disasters were reported in the sixth month and autumn ones in the ninth—by the time the ministry verified and notified governors, notices were already printed, so offsets could not be included. Rolling offsets should be entered on the following year's notices to close this loophole." The ministry approved and carried it out.
8
In metropolitan provinces, summer tax was collected in the fifth and sixth months and autumn grain in the ninth and tenth; each bureau audited reported amounts at settlement and sent them yearly to the Capital Intendant for review. After Shunzhi fixed the tax system, regular and miscellaneous items multiplied; when memorials erred and the ministry ordered review, seal clerks used ministry rejections as pretexts for private levies; regular taxes had fixed quotas, yet when officials needed other funds they always found ways to raise them—no different from surcharges. Strict prohibition followed, ending the practice of letting indebted counties keep officials in post until taxes were cleared. In year seven, fearing late summer and autumn deadlines would delay military funds, the old rule returned: counties forwarded taxes as soon as they collected them. Each province's land and poll taxes were settled at year-end by the governor, who reported forwarding, retention, military pay, tribute purchases, and surpluses in full. Yellow registers and accounting books were costly and useless and were abolished. In year fifteen, penalties for concealed land by officials and commoners were tightened. Officials who uncovered hidden land received graded commendations. Commoners who reported more than ten qing of hidden land received it as reward.
9
簿
In year eighteen, counties had to submit daily collection ledgers yearly for audit; red ledgers were abolished. More than twenty years after the Shunzhi tax register, population and land had grown, corvée rose with households and taxes with fields, and entries became confusing. In year twenty-four, a revision kept only essential items—forwarding, retention, grain transport, river works—and dropped fractional tails, titled the Concise Tax Register. It was finished in year twenty-six. Court debate held the old register had long been in use and yearly changes were traceable in settlement books, so the new edition was never issued. That year all provinces were exempted from printing tax notices to stop collection fees harassing taxpayers.
10
退 沿
In year twenty-eight, governors had to audit provincial treasuries at annual settlement. Previously counties used two-part linked tickets; corrupt officials and clerks marked paid taxes unpaid and heavy collections as light, and abuses grew daily. Three-part linked tickets were adopted: one for the magistrate, one for the collector, one for the taxpayer. Later four-part tickets were printed: one to the prefecture, one stub, one to the household, and one deposited when grain was paid to clear arrears. Soon the three-part ticket system was restored. Provincial gentry had poll-tax exemptions, but powerful locals falsely registered land for illicit relief; some gentry monopolized tax collection and kept surcharges, burdening officials and taxpayers alike. An edict ordered falsely registered land returned to true owners. In year thirty, with tax notices discontinued, metropolitan counties and garrisons carved tax rates from the register on stone tablets outside their gates. Concealed land had to be reported within two years, soon extended another two. Fujian was to survey coastal fields and fix boundaries; in vast Hunan, people measured their own land first, then officials sampled, punishing concealment.
11
便
At the time, officials often imposed unauthorized surcharges under many names. District-wide shared surcharges were called soft carrying; rotating lijia-only levies were hard camel; rolling lists were introduced to stop both. Each li used lists of five or ten households noting land, silver, grain, and spring and autumn dues in ten installments; li heads collected in order while payers sealed payments and deposited them themselves. Once one installment was done, the next rolled forward; defaulters were punished severely, and taxpayers welcomed the system. In Zhejiang, Hubei, Shandong, and elsewhere, artisan-corvée silver was folded into land and poll taxes. In year forty-five, Jiujiang surveyed over three thousand qing of riverside reed land, all taxed at the lowest rate.
12
調
In year fifty-one, Governor Nian Gengyao of Sichuan wrote: "Sichuan's original tax quota exceeded 1.61 million taels; only a tenth is collected. Set rewards and penalties: within five years, reach four or five tenths of quota for promotion; below two tenths, no promotion; below one tenth, demotion; no increase, dismissal." Censor Duan Xi objected, writing in brief: "Since the Ming wars, Sichuan has been vast and sparsely settled. After our dynasty surveyed the province, repeated audits raised collections to only a tenth of the original quota. Recently the governor intensified collection, raising revenue by more than twenty-six thousand taels. Demanding two tenths or four or five tenths of the quota within five years would triple or quadruple current collections. Capable officials would be impeached for missing quotas; corrupt ones would coerce false reports, harassing the people endlessly. Investigate concealed Sichuan taxes thoroughly instead of inventing new reward-and-punishment rules." The throne agreed. In year fifty-nine, an edict ordered: "Henceforth all counties shall forward taxes as they collect them. If the provincial treasurer applied forwarded funds to miscellaneous levies and withheld payment, counties could appeal directly to the governor." The next year, governors had to make up granary deficits within three years.
13
滿 沿
During the Kangxi Emperor's sixty-year reign, policy was broadly lenient. Corrupt officials routinely invoked disaster exemptions to run deficits; superiors connived and set repayment deadlines as routine. Even as crown prince, the Yongzheng Emperor understood these abuses well. After enthronement, he told the Ministries of Revenue and Works that all settlement of taxes, grain, prices, and materials must be audited, registered, and memorialized in full. Reporting less as more, cheap as dear, mismatched figures, or false valuations was punishable. Governors had to audit tax deficits under their jurisdiction, make them up within three years, and not conceal them or levy harsh surcharges on the people. Anyone who failed to pay in full by the deadline was punished with aggravated penalties. Along rivers and the seacoast, the standing rule called for a full land survey once every ten years. In Yongzheng 1 (1723), the throne ordered ad hoc inspections: land lost to erosion would be exempted, while newly accreted land would be brought onto the tax rolls.
14
西使
In the second year, at the petition of Shanxi Governor Nuo Min and Provincial Treasurer Gao Chengling, meltage surcharges were ordered submitted to the public coffers and disbursed for officials' integrity stipends and other public expenses. The meltage surcharge was an extra levy imposed on top of the regular land-tax and grain quotas. Because grain paid in kind had to be converted to silver—and melting always entailed some loss—while transport to and from the capital incurred costs at every stage, local officials had no choice but to collect a little extra to cover the shrinkage: as much as several cash in the heaviest cases, or a fraction of a cash in the lightest. Over time, counties grew heavy-handed in collecting from the people, while superiors in turn squeezed the counties. Official errands became pretexts for unauthorized surcharges under countless names, until the abuse far exceeded mere heavy meltage. Near the end of the Kangxi reign, Governor-General Nian Gengyao of Shaanxi and Gansu proposed retaining part of the province's meltage for official expenses and contributing the rest toward fiscal shortfalls. The Kangxi Emperor refused. Nuo Min and his colleagues now raised the proposal again. The throne approved their petition. Nuo Min also asked that a fixed rate be set. The Emperor replied: "Once a discretionary rate is fixed, it will harden into precedent and can only rise, never fall. Now that meltage surpluses are remitted together with regular revenues, every county knows that padding meltage does it no good—who would still dare to over-collect? If officials were allowed to withhold what they were due, they would inevitably collect beyond quota, taking more than their allotted share." The court therefore established the system of state-paid integrity stipends. Henan Governor Shi Wenzhuo proposed putting donated-grain meltage surpluses into the public treasury. The Emperor answered: "Meltage surpluses are kept in store precisely to meet local public needs. The state's budget has its fixed quotas. How can meltage surpluses be folded into regular revenues, inviting fresh abuses of unauthorized levies and diversion of funds?" He also told the Board of Revenue: "When county officials ran short on land tax and grain, they sometimes made the whole district pay on their behalf under the name of 'voluntary contributions'—which was forced levy in all but name. Such practices must be forbidden."
15
Because surplus-grain assessments in Suzhou and Songjiang exceeded those of any other province, the throne remitted 300,000 taels of Suzhou's quota and 150,000 taels of Songjiang's, making the reduction permanent. Jiangsu Governor Zhang Kai wrote: "Apart from the remission of surplus-grain assessments, Jiangsu's annual quota should yield a little over 3,500,000 taels in actual collection. Arrears accumulated over the years came to more than 8,810,000 taels, bringing the total owed to over 12,000,000. Even if common people surrendered everything they earned in a year, full payment would still be impossible. The collection plan was this: the current year's new levy would be collected in full; old arrears would be spread across ten equal installments, one collected each year beginning the next year until the debt was cleared; each year at account submission, a separate register would be filed. Jiading County alone owed more than 1,400,000 taels and asked that its arrears be collected in fifteen installments. Shanghai, Kunshan, Changshu, Huating, Yixing, Wujiang, Wujin, Lou, and Changzhou—nine counties in all—each owed about 400,000 taels and should pay in twelve installments to ease the people's burden." The Emperor warmly endorsed the proposal.
16
Of all the provinces burdened with heavy levies, none after Suzhou and Songjiang surpassed the prefectures of Jiaxing and Huzhou in Zhejiang. In the fifth year, a tenth of the quota was cut by imperial decree—more than 80,000 taels in all. Zhejiang's early- and autumn-rice quotas were also to be reckoned yearly in ten parts, entered in a separate account for reporting; failure to deliver in full would bring punishment upon the supervising officials concerned. Across the provinces, officials seldom disclosed the exact figures of tax paid and owed, leaving clerks room to cheat; shortfalls and arrears were treated as business as usual. The throne ordered governors, governor-generals, and provincial treasurers to require county officials each year to submit village-by-village figures of payment and arrears for verification, post the totals locally, and let the people know exactly where they stood. If officials skimmed collections, taxpayers were allowed to produce their receipt strips and bring formal charges. For arrears collected in annual installments, the amount each registered household owed each year was also to be posted in detail, so that no extra levy beyond the quota could be imposed. In the seventh year, a third of Zhejiang's quota was remitted—100,000 taels in all. Jiangsu's overdue levies from the renzi year onward were split: sums lost to embezzlement or unauthorized collection would be recovered over ten years. Genuine arrears owed by taxpayers would be spread over twenty years. Whatever amount was fully paid in a given year would be deducted from the next year's quota levy in equal measure. If taxpayers paid more than required, the following year's remission would match the surplus they had paid.
17
In the eleventh year, Anhui Governor Xu Ben proposed grain-collection reforms: first, county grain chests should use county seals directly; second, registered households should still receive triplicate receipt strips when paying grain; third, for scattered payments under one qian, taxpayers might pay in standard copper cash at the collector's discretion. The proposals were approved. In the twelfth year, work began on revising the Complete Book of Levies and Corvée. Within the quota land and poll taxes and commercial levies, every disbursement—for official salaries, corvée wages, courier costs, and goods due in kind or as converted tribute, from silk and cloth to dyes, vermilion, copper, tin, tea, and wax—was to be traced with meticulous precision through original quotas, new assessments, totals, and line-item breakdowns. Thereafter the book was to be revised once every ten years.
18
In Jiangnan, Huguang, and other provinces, reed-bank sandbars shifted endlessly through erosion and accretion. Surveys were required every five years, and corrupt officials routinely turned the rule into an occasion for bribery and fraud. In Qianlong 1 (1736), the throne ordered a thorough inspection. False reporting of land reclamation was also forbidden in every province. Grand Secretary Zhu Shi asked that common people be barred from initiating field surveys on their own. Censor Jiang Bing identified three abuses in county grain collection. First, tax rates per mu varied; he asked that each year the Ministry's fixed quotas be verified and publicly posted; second, when sealed bags were opened and the silver fell short on the scales, the shortage should be marked on the bag and taxpayers allowed to make up the difference themselves; third, counties had set up official silversmiths to melt silver, extort fees for completing payment, and skim heavy profits; henceforth taxpayers might have silver melted wherever they chose, and official silversmiths were abolished for good. All were approved. An edict revised the reduction of tribute white grain in Jiangnan and Zhejiang by 120,000 shi, and remitted 200,000 taels of quota silver for surplus-grain assessments in Suzhou and Songjiang.
19
西 便
After Shanxi pioneered the submission of meltage surcharges to the public treasury, every metropolitan province followed suit in turn. Rates were later fixed as well. Civil officials' integrity stipends across the provinces came to more than 2,800,000 taels, and every category of public expense was funded from meltage surpluses. When the new emperor took the throne, many court officials argued that the system was unsatisfactory. The Emperor himself worried that excessive collection would burden the people. At the palace examination he made the meltage system the topic of debate, and again ordered court officials and provincial governors to submit their views. Grand Secretary Ortai, Vice Minister of Justice Qian Chenqun, and Huguang Governor-General Sun Jiahan all argued: "The meltage system has long been in place with fixed rates, and officials dare not over-collect. Measured against what was taken before rates were fixed, the fixed amount is still less than half. It may look like an added levy, but in practice collection was reduced. Moreover, once meltage went to the public treasury, old abuses were swept away: superiors could no longer extort, counties had no pretext for unauthorized levies, and common people were freed from crushing meltage charges. The law was sound, the intent admirable, and fit to endure for generations." Censor Zhao Qingli added: "With meltage surpluses in the public treasury, the abundant are tapped to help the scarce. Every fraction by which collection is eased is a fraction of relief the people receive. And since the meltage surplus still bears its own name, officials cannot legitimately demand more beyond the regular quota. He asked that the system not be lightly reopened for debate." Only Censor Chai Chaosheng maintained that meltage surpluses were the great fiscal abuse of the age. An edict upheld the position of Ortai and his colleagues. Previously, when provinces forwarded tribute silver to the capital, a corrupt custom of accompanying scale adjustment had prevailed. Early in the Yongzheng reign, an edict had forbidden the practice. Later, when an audit uncovered a Ministry treasury shortfall of more than 2,500,000 taels, Prince Yi proposed covering it with scale surpluses on capital tribute: twenty-five taels for every thousand, all drawn from meltage surpluses for forwarding—a steep cut from the old corrupt practice. Once the deficit was fully covered, the levy was cut in half. Submission to the Ministry was then halted; the funds were kept in provincial treasuries for famine relief and other measures to benefit the people's livelihood. Since Ming times, Jiangnan's annual land tax, poll tax, grain transport, reed-bank, and miscellaneous levies had been supplemented by so-called miscellaneous assignments—numerous categories folded into land-and-poll tax totals for reporting. When the Complete Book of Levies and Corvée was compiled, only amounts due for submission were entered; the origins of miscellaneous assignments were omitted. Regulations were now fixed to stop over-collection: genuine shortfalls that burdened officials and people were remitted, and counties were forbidden to pad grain collections with fractional remainders.
20
In the twelfth year, Grand Secretary Neqin and others noted that Jiangsu's land-tax arrears exceeded 2,000,000 taels and that clerk-runners' embezzlement could hardly be avoided; they drafted rules for voluntary confession and partial remission. The throne again ordered Huang Tinggui and others to root out abuses in Jiangsu's tax enforcement. Each province reported accumulated land-tax arrears at year's end, but the true totals of payment and shortfall could be fixed only when accounts were submitted the following fifth month. An edict declared: "Henceforth each province's annual figures of payment and arrears shall be verified and reported at account submission, without waiting for the old year-end report." In the twenty-second year, Jiangnan's accumulated arrears in transport silver, grain, land price, and meltage surpluses dating before Qianlong 10 were remitted. Jiangsu Governor Chen Hongmou wrote: "For years Jiangsu's land tax could not be fully reconciled because county records were kept in clerks' private rooms, where pages were lost or destroyed beyond recovery. Every county should be ordered to bind its files, affix official seals, and store them securely in the yamen. Because Jiangsu's expenses were heavy, counties often had to advance funds on credit; they were still required to file detailed requests for reimbursement as the need arose. Failure to report within four months, when the sum exceeded 500 taels, would trigger impeachment; if delay reached a full year, the prefect and departmental officials would also be impeached by memorial. All was implemented as proposed."
21
In the thirtieth year an edict noted: "Account registers list mountain land, paddy, flooded fields, wasteland, and newly reclaimed land first, then the three gates and nine categories of quota collection in kind and in silver, land-and-poll tax remittances, and retained sums—a model of clarity. Henceforth, when the Complete Book of Levies and Corvée was printed, it was to follow the account-submission format; only land newly lost or newly reclaimed within ten years was to be added in notes, and petty irregular categories were to be struck out entirely." The Board of Revenue then fixed rules for collecting land tax and grain in every province and for all reporting and disbursement. All silver amounts were rounded to the li; sums below one li were adjusted downward. Grain was rounded to the shao; fractional remainders of five miao or more counted as one shao, and those below five miao were dropped. Copper cash paid out for salaries was rounded to the nearest wen, and the slightest fictitious fractions in the registers were struck out as well. Silver due from every county, guard, and post was to have odd fractions rounded down on the master receipt, while the detailed line items at the head of each receipt were preserved unchanged so they still matched the Complete Book of Levies and Corvée and the fish-scale land register. In the thirty-third year, the throne ordered that in metropolitan provinces, enfeoffment lands must be reported by common households and taxed like any other holding.
22
便
In the thirty-sixth year, noting that recent nationwide remissions had left the people better able to pay, governors were ordered that in years of rotating tax relief they must still press collection of deferred installments, lest old and new levies pile up the following year. In the forty-seventh year, Censor Zheng Cheng asked that governors inspect granaries and treasuries; where shortfalls were found, the responsible official would be punished and forced to make restitution, while the governor would face aggravated penalties and pay double indemnity. Counties were also required to report actual stored amounts every three months, with governors supervising verification at all times. Shandong counties were especially prone to misappropriating granary and treasury funds. Some outgoing officials with no real shortfall even fabricated deficits, drew up private arrears agreements, and handed them to successors as a way to line their pockets. He asked that governors be instructed: when a predecessor's deficit was backed by a successor's written arrears agreement, the successor must still make good the loss—but the predecessor must also be compelled to repay the full amount to the state, to stop the abuses of short delivery and careless handovers. The Emperor warmly approved the proposal. At the opening of the Jiaqing reign, governors were again ordered that when local officials changed posts, anyone who failed to clear accounts within the deadline would be held until every sum was paid, and only then allowed to assume a new post or go home; private settlement agreements were forbidden. From that point on, fiscal controls grew ever tighter. Censor Peng Xiluo reported that excess collection remained a widespread abuse in provincial land-tax administration. An edict ordered that before each collection season, every governor must verify at current market rates the silver equivalent due to the treasury, post the figures on public thoroughfares, and let taxpayers pay in silver or convert to cash as they chose.
23
滿調 調滿調
In those years provincial magistrates routinely shuffled new receipts against old quotas, booking collected taxes as unpaid debt; within three or four years the backlog had swollen to more than twenty million taels. The throne ordered every province to audit years of arrears, whether still owed by taxpayers or sitting in official coffers, and either retain or remit the sums as appropriate; breach of the order would be punished. The Board of Revenue reported that for five years the provinces had been borrowing against meltage surpluses, and asked that each governor-general and governor trace and restore every loan, trim discretionary spending from those funds, and submit a full accounting of idle balances on hand. In Zhili alone, the audit of subordinate districts turned up deficits in the tens of thousands of taels. Anhui's storehouses were short more than 1.8 million taels across several accounts. The Emperor ruled that officials newly found in deficit must, beginning that year, clear their old shortfalls within four years. Those who still owed at year's end would have their integrity stipends docked each year—nine-tenths for circuit and provincial officers, half for prefects and magistrates—and the withheld sums paid into treasury toward the debt. The Board reported that in fifteen provinces, Zhili included, apart from deferred and carried collections, more than 8.7 million taels in land and poll taxes remained outstanding, and the twelfth year's roll alone had added another 2.9 million. The Emperor noted that when a collector's disciplinary deadline was nearly up, superiors would shuffle him to an acting post elsewhere so his replacement could start a new clock—allowing counties to dodge accountability. Henceforth, he ordered, no magistrate might be transferred until the ministry confirmed that no collectible taxes remained due from his term—and no such transfer at deadline's end. Supervising Secretary Zhao Peixiang wrote that repeated deficit audits across the provinces only bred endless delay, and begged a strict ban on the practice. Earlier, after Zhili's magistrates had emptied local treasuries, the court had secretly ordered the provincial leadership to investigate and assign recovery case by case. Other provinces then followed suit, setting up audit offices of their own; new receipts masked old holes, abuses bred in the dark, and some officials padded deficits only to skim the difference—hence Zhao's protest. The Emperor ordered the remaining items from Zhili's three audits repaid on a fixed schedule, with supervising superiors held to shared compensation if deadlines were missed; audits were abolished for good, and repeat petitions would be punished.
24
西西
In the seventeenth year the Board totaled each province's arrears in grain taxes, meltage, and miscellaneous dues: Anhui and Shandong topped four million each; Jiangning and Jiangsu over two million; Fujian, Zhili, Guangdong, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Gansu, Henan, Shaanxi, Hunan, and Hubei ranged from above a million down to tens or hundreds of thousands. The Emperor sharply rebuked the governors for lax collection, and ordered the Board at year's end to report each province's original arrears and what had or had not been cleared. Of all the provinces, Jiangsu owed the most. Governor Zhu Li proposed a staged recovery plan—year-by-year repayment and a halt to fresh shortfalls. Subordinates still concealed the truth and dragged their feet. From the second to the eighteenth year Zhili's backlog ran to more than 3.4 million taels of silver and over 140,000 shi of grain and other dues. Governor-General Na Yincheng asked for partial remission; the throne answered with a sharp rebuke. Shandong's magistrates together owed more than six million taels in old and new deficits; one county alone was short more than sixty thousand. The code was tightened: a shortfall of ten thousand taels brought decapitation after imprisonment; twenty thousand or more, immediate execution. Deficits were to be recovered under supervised deadlines: full payment within the term spared the convict's life but barred him from office forever; miss the deadline and there would be no reprieve.
25
Censor Ye Zhongwan asked that provincial treasury loans be sorted out; Hu Chenggong petitioned to clean up Zhili's deficit abuses. Provincial treasuries, pressed by local emergencies, lent freely; loans lingered unpaid, were rolled and offset in circles, and the tangle of abuses grew. Meanwhile apportioned surcharges and allowances multiplied by the day; magistrates were crushed under the load, regular revenues went unfunded as a matter of course, and even the harshest law could not stop it. By the close of Qianlong the empire had long been at peace, every branch of government prospered, and the central treasury held more than seventy million taels. Under Jiaqing came war in Sichuan and Hubei, Yellow River floods, and one great project after another at ruinous cost; arrears mounted month by month, and the storehouses slowly emptied.
26
仿
In Daoguang 2, Censor Luo Chen proposed that provincial tax remittances follow the salt- and tea-ticket system to block official embezzlement. The Emperor judged the scheme too disruptive and refused it. At Censor Yu Wenquan's urging, the county grain and treasury chief clerkships were abolished. Early in Qianlong, magistrates still collected taxes with comparatively little overcharge. Abuses soon multiplied: first a little extra taken at the measuring trough, then discount rules— a few sheng shaved from each shi, rising to fifty or sixty percent off, until collectors took two and a half dou where one shi was due—and the common people bore the pain. Court debated fixing collection at eighty percent of quota as a cap on overcharge. Grand Secretary Tang Jinzhai memorialized against the plan. Censor Wang Jiaxiang added that eighty-percent collection might be tried in Changzhou, Zhenjiang, Jianghuai, Yangzhou, Xuzhou, and the like, but in grain-heavy Suzhou and Songjiang the obstacles would be many. The proposal died in committee. By then the southeast—the empire's treasury—lay half in ruins. Even counties untouched by war groaned under greedy magistrates who overcharged and forced discounts; wrath boiled over, and mobs killed officials again and again. Magistrates routinely blamed "grain resistance" to hide their own extortion. In Suzhou, Songjiang, and their districts, whenever relief or deferral was granted, clerks would shake down landowners for cash—a trade called "selling famine." Pay, and even in a bumper year you could defer collection; refuse, and even in famine you would get no relief at all. An edict banned the practice outright. Hubei's grain transport had festered for years; Governor Hu Linyi petitioned to commute tribute and abolish customary fees—saving the people more than 1.4 million strings of cash, adding over 400,000 taels to the treasury, and reserving another 300,000. The throne commended him in an edict.
27
After the armies marched, Sichuan and other provinces levied taxes in advance to feed the troops. Yu Rui asked that gentry and commoners be urged to pay grain surcharges in lieu of advance levies, and that advance collection be ended. Ying Gui reported that though taxes were due half in silver and half in cash, officials still reckoned in silver alone, treating two thousand cash as one tael—with no allowance anywhere for meltage loss. For land and poll taxes subject to transfer, allow payment in official notes mixed with silver; for meltage not subject to transfer, still demand hard silver." The Board, finding the two schemes incompatible, asked that regular and miscellaneous dues alike be paid in combined official notes, as the original rule provided. Local officials still took silver from taxpayers while passing cheap notes to the provincial treasury; the Emperor ordered the practice stopped.
28
沿
In Tongzhi 1 the provinces undertook a general audit of grain taxes. In the second year, Governor-General Zeng Guofan and Jiangsu Governor Li Hongzhang wrote: "Suzhou, Songjiang, and Taicang are grossly over-assessed—trace the quotas back and they exceed Yuan rates threefold and Song rates sevenfold; compare them sideways and they are triple Changzhou next door, four or five times Zhenjiang and other Jiangsu prefectures, and ten to twenty times provinces elsewhere. The root of the evil is carrying forward old official-field rents, so the burden falls unevenly. Since the founding, long peace had made the realm richer than any age on record; from mid-Qianlong on full tribute was collected for decades for no reason but the people's wealth. The guìwèi flood of Daoguang drained the land's strength at a stroke, yet for ten years the system still barely held. After the guǐsì flood came year after year of dearth and county after county of deferral, until the throne's generous remissions became routine. Board officers are bound to uphold the law and keep the name of the quota intact; frontier governors must keep the people quiet and so resort to quiet cuts. Former Governor-General Tao Shu and former Governor Lin Zexu were the first to do so. The category called 'official advance for private arrears' only shuffled miscellaneous dues to cover regular ones, slow items to cover urgent ones, new debts to cover old, silver to cover grain—official cash finishing official grain on the books, later remitted or spread among officials, all ending nowhere. Yearly grain ledgers therefore had to strip out padded arrears before the true collection could be seen. Suzhou's full tribute quota stood at 1.6 million shi; thereafter it shrank year by year. In the ten years after Daoguang xīnmǎo, once official advances for private arrears were removed, only seven or eight tenths of the regular quota was actually collected; in the ten years after xīnchǒu, five or six tenths; in Xianfeng's xīnhai decade, only four tenths. Since the Cantonese rebels took Suzhou and Changzhou, burning, killing, and looting beyond words. I have walked the newly recovered districts myself—market towns are ash, and smoke from hearth-fires is scarce. Where recovery has begun it is so; where it has not, one need not ask. Yet we would still demand several times the burden borne elsewhere—the magistrates who once squeezed the people have no bone left to break and no marrow left to drain. Go through the yearly totals: in ten Xianfeng years only one year topped a million shi, six topped eight hundred thousand—and each of those figures hid more than a hundred thousand in official advances for private arrears; even in the best year the people actually paid no more than nine hundred thousand. The records say so; the people's strength says so. We ask only that Suzhou, Songjiang, and Taicang grain quotas be cut, taking the seven heavier Xianfeng years as the benchmark, balancing the figure against the old quotas of Changzhou and Zhenjiang, and fixing the result as the permanent levy. From the year collection resumes, let the new quota stand forever, and forbid any further category of official advance for private arrears. Hereafter, except in flood or drought, no fabricated disaster deferrals—strip the useless paper from the rolls and collect what is truly owed. Once Suzhou and Songjiang tribute is cut, abolishing the large- and small-household categories must be the root of ending overcharge, and cutting corrupt customary fees the surest way to enforce the ban." The throne approved." Earlier, Vice Minister of Rites Pan Zuyin and Censor Ding Shouchang had each petitioned for tax cuts; both petitions went to the Board for deliberation. The Board's reply approved cutting Suzhou and Songjiang by one-third and Changzhou and Zhenjiang by one-tenth. Broadly speaking, per-mu dues in Suzhou, Songjiang, and Taicang ran as high as nearly two dou and as "low" as one. Reign after reign had debated verified cuts, and reign after reign the Board had blocked them. Under Yongzheng, at Prince Yi's request, quota silver collection in Suzhou and Songjiang was remitted. Under Qianlong Jiangsu's excess grain assessments were cut again—but only in silver, never in grain. When the edict came down, the people rejoiced.
29
仿
In the third year, at Governor-General Zuo Zongtang's request, Shaoxing's eight counties and six salt fields were ordered to collect and remit all regular and miscellaneous dues by silver reckoning, abolishing every apportioned levy and corrupt fee—cutting overcharge by more than 220,000 strings of cash and 360 shi of grain. In Ningbo's one department, five counties, and six salt fields, overcharge was cut by more than 104,000 strings of cash and over 800 shi of grain. In the fourth year, Zhejiang Governor Ma Xinyi asked that excessive collection be remitted in Jinhua—more than 150,000 strings of cash and 500 shi of grain; in Quzhou more than 100,000 strings and 60 shi; in Yanzhou more than 60,000 strings, 6,000 shi of grain, 80 foreign silver dollars, and 100 shi of grain—and the request was granted. That year, after Zongtang took Huzhou, he reported that southern tribute was grossly over-collected and begged deep cuts. The matter went to the Board. The Board's reply on Hangzhou, Jiaxing, and Huzhou tribute proposed following Jiangsu's example—cutting the original quota by eight thirtieths, auditing tax schedules by light and heavy categories, and abolishing every overcharge and corrupt fee. Southern craftsman grain quotas were not to be reduced. The three prefectures' original quotas for tribute, white rice, monthly allowances, and other grain totaled more than a million shi; at eight thirtieths, the cut came to more than 266,000 shi. Guo Fan asked that land tax, poll tax, and tribute in Suzhou, Songjiang, and their districts be reduced together; the request was denied.
30
西
Since Qianlong and Jiaqing, magistrates had often commuted grain dues to cash on their own terms—one shi sometimes priced at twenty thousand cash. Under Xianfeng, Hu Linyi first capped verified tribute collection at six thousand cash per shi. Shandong later fixed the same six thousand. Jiangsu set four thousand five hundred cash per shi if paid within the year, five thousand if after. Jiangxi collected three thousand four hundred. In Henan each shi was commuted at three taels of silver. Anhui fixed the rate at two taels two mace. Overcharging on tribute grain was an old story. Both river and sea transport carried their own surcharges. In Jiaxing alone, surcharges on a single shi of tribute could run above seven mace. Tribute collection also carried a customary surplus levy, varying with whether a district's quota was padded thin or fat. Collectors had long taken grain and commuted silver together, yet overcharge in commuted form weighed heavier than in kind. Once official quotas were cut and commutation prices fixed, the worst overcharge abuses began to ease.
31
Zhili and Fengtian held much untaxed land called "black land"—banner estates lost to the records over the years, or freshly opened fields at mountain's edge and along the coast. In Xianfeng's last years Bao Jun and others found more than four hundred forty qing of black land in Changping and began trial assessment for taxation. The throne ordered the Governor-General of Zhili, the General of Mukden, and the Shuntian and Fengtian commissioners to proceed in the same manner. Early in Tongzhi, black-land holders were told to register at their local office for taxation and promised secure title if they did. Censor Chen Jun wrote that outside Changping scarcely anyone in Zhili and Fengtian had come forward—local officials pocketed the revenue, stalled the reports, and in the worst cases extorted and tortured those who tried to register. The Emperor sent senior ministers to investigate by region. Grand Secretary Woren reported that magistrates dragged their feet on black-land assessment out of fear and complacency, and asked that rewards and punishments be made explicit. Rewards followed: magistrates who uncovered more than twenty qing of hidden land earned preferential mention, and those who brought large areas onto the rolls were commended; connivance at hidden reclamation or clerkly bribery would be treated as dereliction of duty; and ruffians posing as commissioners to shake down landowners would be punished to the full letter of the law.
32
西
In the early years of Guangxu's reign, recovering Xinjiang and building coastal defenses sent state expenses ever upward. The Board of Revenue proposed a plan to overhaul tax collection, noting that nearly twenty years after the rebellion's pacification, regular and miscellaneous revenues ought by now to be nearing their old quotas. Yet on audit the scheduled regular and miscellaneous taxes exceeded thirty-four million taels a year while actual collection came to a mere 1.45 million—such was the deficit. The money sat neither in the treasury nor with the taxpayers—for the most part greedy officials and ink-stained clerks had eaten it. In brief, five abuses prevailed: bogus famine claims, unreliable disaster reports, cooked books of paid and unpaid taxes, collections never remitted, and endless delays at handover. Recent audits found the worst shortfalls in Anhui and Jiangning in Jiangsu, followed by Suzhou and Jiangxi, then Henan. Some provinces collected less than half; even the best fell short by ten or twenty percent. The Board asked every governor and provincial treasurer to audit and purge the rolls, so that revenue might again meet the budget. The throne assented. Yet to the dynasty's end those abuses were never fully uprooted.
33
西
In the twentieth year of Guangxu, the Sino-Japanese War brought a two-hundred-million-tael indemnity. In the twenty-sixth year the Boxer disaster brought another four hundred fifty million in indemnities to the powers. New armies, new schools, and new police forces followed, demanding ever more money—mostly raised locally. Sichuan, paying its share of indemnities, added new indemnity levies on top of grain surcharges. Liangjiang, Min-Zhe, Hubei, Henan, Shaanxi, and Xinjiang piled indemnity levies, "cash restoration," corvée restoration, and extra meltage fees on top of poll tax and tribute—different names, but little different from a general tax hike.
34
Where records allow a tally of national tax quotas: at Shunzhi's close the annual levy ran to more than 21.5 million taels of silver and 6.4 million shi of grain; mid-Kangxi, more than 24.4 million taels and 4.3 million shi; early Yongzheng, more than 26.3 million taels and 4.7 million shi; at the close of Qianlong's reign, more than 29.9 million taels and 8.3 million shi—the empire's fiscal high water mark.
35
沿
I. Corvée law. At first the dynasty kept the Ming practice of assigning corvée by male head, reviewing registers every three years, later every five. Every li held one hundred ten households: the ten men with the largest quota of adult males became li heads, and the remaining hundred households were grouped into ten tithings of ten men apiece. Each year one of the ten li heads took turn managing the li. Urban districts were fang, suburban wards xiang, and villages li. The ten li heads took yearly turns collecting taxes and coordinating local business in a ten-year cycle ranked by quota of males, charged to press payment without loading corvée on top. Registration review verified the empire's male population and entered every name in the household registers. Men over sixty dropped off the rolls, those over sixteen were added, and the poll tax rose and fell with the count. Registers distinguished townsfolk, villagers, landowners, tenants, and sojourners. Beyond civilian males the rolls listed military, artisan, salt, garrison-colony, courier-station, and native categories.
36
西 沿 滿退
Provinces assessed corvée by three grades and nine schedules, by the single-whip method, by land, or by head—each province its own rule. Later seven tenths of provinces shifted to land-based apportionment. Provincial corvée dues in silver ran to more than three million taels nationwide, with grain and beans levied here and there. Rates ran from as little as one fen five li per head to more than a tael. Shanxi levied over four taels in places; Gongchang eight or nine. Each place set rates to local conditions—not every province matched. Three grades and nine schedules came down from the Ming, as did the single-whip method. It rolled equalized corvée and fee silver into one levy, erasing the old split between cash and labor obligations—the "single whip." Tithing quotas rolled up to the li, li quotas to the county, county to prefecture, prefecture to the provincial treasurer. A province's male tax quota became the basis for apportioning its corvée—the lijia system and the land tax merged into one. Counties remitted corvée silver to the magistrate, who hired labor for the year's projects—less disturbance for the people, faster completion for the state. Every office, capital and province alike, kept a fixed staff of clerks and runners drawn from lawful commoners. Clerks were first assigned by local levy, later by examination or open recruitment. Terms ran five years; those who stayed on were expelled. Prefectures and counties kept salaried attendants, jailers, and constables exempt from extra corvée. Runners, lictors, gatekeepers, and warehouse clerks were likewise recruited to fixed quotas. Unlicensed extras were called "white service" and forbidden. Yet busy counties still leaned on extra hands and never quite stamped the practice out. Regulations also fixed courier stations and constabulary, banning private impressment. Commoners were forbidden to serve privately as brokers or wharf agents.
37
沿
Riverfront districts owed corvée labor for embankment work by custom. In Shunzhi 4, at Censor Tong Fengcai's urging, Zhili established riverside dike crews. In the ninth year the river burst at Fengqiu; tens of thousands of laborers from Daming, Dongchang, Yanzhou, and Henan were mobilized to plug the breach. In the twelfth year river workers' rations were raised. River work drew on the people in two ways: forced levy and paid recruitment. Levies were raised per mu of land; recruits were paid market wages. Quota crews were eventually all rationed; the shift from impressment to hire paid the people for their labor—a clear improvement on older practice. In the seventeenth year private lijia levies by magistrates were banned.
38
西
In Kangxi 1, Suzhou and Songjiang were ordered to adopt equalized land-and-corvée assessment. Supervising Secretary Ke Song of the Household wrote: "Tax follows the land and corvée follows the fields—that law has never changed. But households rose and fell and holdings shifted—which is why registers were reviewed every ten years so corvée tracked the land. The rich could not slip free; the poor were not crushed under another's load. I see runner extortion and crushing corvée at root in unfair levy rolls and unreformed abuse. A county's land quota determined its li heads: ten tithings per li, holdings tallied per tithing. Large holders served alone, small ones shared a slot, and the scattered minnows at the tithing's tail were called "flower households"—standard procedure. Li heads rotated duties tithing by tithing, so no one bore the full weight and business got done. Suzhou and Songjiang alone nominally tapped "substantial households" without checking acreage—men who had sold every field still drew duty, while holders of vast estates drew none. Yearly mini-audits bred endless shuffling and a tangle of abuses. Land ended up with families exempt from duty while the landless bore the load—until the poor were gutted and fled across county lines. At this major register revision, order both prefectures to levy corvée by land, not hollow nomination—and stop the trade of selling duty to the rich and dumping it on the poor. Scattered sub-holdings, fraudulent exemptions, cross-county registration, purchased clerkships—all these should be banned outright." The memorial went to the Board, which approved it. In the sixth year Jiangxi's practice of forwarding tithing quotas was strictly banned. "Forward tithing"—in Ming times "forward registration"—meant that once the current year's quota was met, the next tithing was pulled forward and forced to prepare ahead. In Guangxin and elsewhere several tithings could be pulled forward at once—no different from a straight surcharge. At Censor Ge Ying's petition, the practice was abolished.
39
In the seventh year regulations fixed courier relay labor. Every post station kept runners scaled to the route's traffic, paid daily rations from the regular tax rolls. Stations mostly hired commoners; when workloads spiked they added temporary hands. River posts followed the same rule. In the twelfth year Henan ended impressment of river labor, levying silver per mu in lieu of wages. In the sixteenth year River Superintendent Jin Fu wrote: "River works used to force counties to impress li commoners—one part's work at ten parts' cost. With both rivers under repair and more than a hundred thousand men needed daily, he shifted from impressment to paid hire—and finished in months." Large-scale hired river labor began with Jin Fu. That same year magistrates were forbidden to use penal labor on city walls. In year twenty-nine, at the urging of Shandong Governor Foloron, the throne ordered that gentry and commoners' land alike throughout the provinces bear corvée on the same terms.
40
In year fifty-one, an edict declared: "The empire has known peace so long that population rises daily while land does not grow. The present household rolls should be fixed as the permanent quota; newly born persons after that shall pay no grain or silver tax. At each five-year review, officials need only verify and report actual numbers." The court resolved: "Persons born after the fiftieth year—the so-called prosperous-era new births—shall never be taxed again. Household review would still be held every five years." The Ministry of Revenue added: "Shortfalls in registered persons should be covered by new members of the same household; if that was not enough, from relatives with surplus registered members; and if still insufficient, from households in the same lijia unit with the heaviest tax assessments."
41
仿 西 西 西 西
Early in the Yongzheng reign, every province was ordered to fold poll tax into land tax for collection and remittance under the single name "land-poll." Sichuan, Guangdong, and other provinces had already done so in Kangxi's last years. Now, accepting Zhili Governor Li Weijun's proposal, poll silver was collected with land tax at 2 mace 2 candareens per tael of land tax; afterward every province adopted the same practice. Henceforth, per tael of land tax, Fujian added poll silver from 5 candareens 2.7 hao to 3 mace 1 candareen 2 hao; Shandong added 1 mace 1 candareen 5 hao; Henan added from 1 candareen 1 hao 7 fen to 2 mace 7 candareens; in Gansu, 1 mace 5 candareens 9 hao 3 fen east of the river and 1 candareen 6 hao west of it; Jiangxi added 1 mace 5 candareens 6 hao; Guangxi added 1 mace 3 candareens 6 hao; Hubei added 1 mace 2 candareens 9 hao 6 fen; Jiangsu and Anhui added per mu from 1 candareen 1 hao to 2 candareens 2 hao 9 fen; and Hunan, on each shi of land grain, levied from 1 hao to 8 mace 6 candareens 1 hao. After that, corvée and land tax became one levy: once the people paid land-poll, they owed no further corvée. Only Fengtian and Guizhou, where household registration was still unsettled, kept poll and land taxes separate. Shanxi's Yangqu and forty-one other prefectures and counties also kept poll silver on separate rolls.
42
西 西
In year two, Jiangxi Governor Pei Du asked to abolish the office of village head. Some officials then reported that in offices large and small, whenever routine business required supplies, unauthorized levies were imposed at will, with headmen colluding with corrupt clerks to skim the proceeds; artisan labor was assigned through headmen who fixed turns for official service; and there was the "substitute service" fee, by which those who would not report for duty were forced to pay silver—a grave burden on the people. An edict banned all of it. But over time neglect bred abuse, and the harassment only worsened. In Qianlong 1, another edict restated the ban. The throne also ordered an end to the old practice of funding annual repairs—the Zhili and Shandong canals, Jiangnan sea walls, Sichuan dikes, the Henan Qin River works, the Meng County Small Gold Dike, and the like—by per-mu levies on farmland, which managing headmen had often extorted. All future labor would be paid entirely from the treasury. In year ten, Sichuan-Shaanxi Governor-General Qing Fu proposed rebuilding city walls across his jurisdictions and asked prefectures and counties to donate from their integrity stipends. The Emperor replied: "Officials' integrity stipends rarely leave a surplus; what is called 'joint repair' is in truth levied on the people, and the abuse is worse still." The request was denied. Regulations were then set: provincial city repairs under one thousand taels would be spread over several years; minor earthworks might use local labor where appropriate, and the rest would come from public funds. In year twenty-two, Jiangxi's corvée rules for dike repair were revised. For earthen dikes, the whole county shared the cost; labor fees were collected with grain tax, and officials apportioned them by dike section and hired workers. This followed Governor Hu Bao'en's proposal. In year twenty-five, Censor Ding Tianshu wrote: "Since poll tax was folded into land assessment, corvée and military requisitions were supposed to be paid at fixed rates, with no more labor levies. Lately, when prefectures and counties received superiors or exchanged visits with colleagues, they sealed and seized carts and boats; corrupt runners used tickets to extort levies, official prices paid less than half the market rate, and waiting and empty return trips went uncompensated, so travelers stayed away and prices soared. Henceforth, except for major official assignments and transport of government goods, officials must not cut official prices or issue tickets to seize carts and boats; violators would be severely punished." The throne approved. In year thirty-two, the Burma campaign drew heavily on local labor for transport; the court issued one hundred thousand taels per province from the treasury to compensate the people.
43
西 仿
Land tax and corvée had fixed systems: broadly, the southeast paid heavy taxes and light corvée, the northwest the reverse. In Zhili, corvée was levied by oxen and donkeys in some places, by village in others, by pai-jia household rolls in others, and sometimes by land area. Yet the wealthy could hide land while the poor were taxed to the last fraction; the rules were chaotic and the burden unjust. Worst of all was the split between gentry and commoners. Sometimes gentry bore three parts and commoners seven; sometimes gentry bore none while commoners bore all; small farmers were driven to hardship and flight with no recourse. Some then proposed following the poll-to-land precedent: reduce corvée and equalize service at one fen per mu, assessing gentry and commoners alike by land. Zhili Governor-General Yan Jian strongly opposed this, writing: "As proponents say, one fen of corvée silver per mu aims to use taxation to reduce corvée in fact; in truth it would only add a nominal tax through corvée, burdening officials and harming the people while the abuse remained." Once the memorial was in, the proposal was dropped.
44
西調
During Xianfeng, rebellion broke out in western Guangdong; requisitions came without warning and local labor could not be avoided. For each tael of grain tax, corvée silver several times that amount was levied. After the crisis, heavy corvée continued; grain taxes might be remitted or deferred in bad years, but corvée silver was still collected.
45
西西 使 西
In Guangxu 4, Shanxi Governor Zeng Guoquan wrote that the province's wounds were slow to heal and asked to reduce and equalize corvée to ease the people's distress. He summarized: "Shanxi borders the capital and opens west to Qin and Shu; military requisitions, pay requisitions, and Tibetan missions pass continuously, and prefectures and counties are so burdened with supply they can scarcely keep up. Horses and carts came from the people, and laborers were charged to lijia headmen. Yet each jurisdiction handled matters differently. Some had the whole county's lijia share the year's burden collectively—a method still relatively fair. Some divided by li and jia in rotating years: one jia and one li the first year, two the next, with corvée varying yearly so even within lijia the burden fell unevenly. Crafty and powerful men, exploiting the abuses by which one jia was charged for another and one household for another, sold their land at high prices while verbally claiming the tax burden themselves. Three to five years later they would slip away; then the original jia would both make up ownerless grain tax and accept ownerless corvée—a harm without end. Only by reducing corvée and equalizing service could some remedy be found. Except for major requisitions with official summons and verification documents, supplied as usual, all other pretexts for harsh levies were forbidden. Anyone who seized horses or carts without authority would be punished accordingly." The request was approved. In year five, Yan Jingming submitted eight proposals: first, cut routine and temporary requisitions; second, have the provincial judicial commissioner issue stamped tickets for horses and carts; third, Lama travel must follow fixed schedules; fourth, imperial envoys on business should be barred from excessive demands; fifth, strictly remove yamen parasites and local bullies; sixth, let the people pay transport fees in cash while yamens handle arrangements themselves; seventh, strictly verify that relay horses were kept at full quota; eighth, give long carts to provincial garrison troops and let the camps handle them themselves. The matter was referred to the relevant offices for deliberation and implementation. In year eight, Shanxi Governor Zhang Zhidong wrote again: "Shanxi's policies that torment the people lie not in taxation but in corvée. By former practice each county's corvée silver ran from fifty or sixty thousand strings in large counties to ten thousand or more in small ones, apportioned by grain tax while officials divided the proceeds. On major routes counties set up cart depots, rounding up livestock from the countryside and detaining travelers' carts and horses, collecting fees year after year or extorting prices on the spot—residents and travelers alike suffered. He proposed raising funds for interest-bearing investment, establishing official corvée bureaus, fixing corvée regulations, and forbidding corvée agents from unauthorized disbursements." The abusive cart-depot custom was then abolished.
46
Earlier, tomb households had been assigned to imperial tombs of former dynasties for patrol and sweeping, and by precedent they were exempt from corvée. At shrines to former sages, wherever there were sacrificial fields, poll and grain taxes were exempted. Soldiers and commoners aged seventy or above were allowed one son to remain for support and were exempt from miscellaneous corvée.
47
沿
In Shunzhi 2, the capital artisan levy in all provinces was remitted and artisan registration was abolished. Preferential exemption rules for gentry were fixed: capital officials of rank one were exempt from thirty shi of grain and thirty poll-tax persons, rank two from twenty-four shi and twenty-four persons, and so on downward; officials serving in the provinces received half those amounts. In year fourteen, the ministry ruled that preferential corvée exemption applied only to the person himself. In Yongzheng 4, Sichuan Governor Luo Yintai wrote that in Sichuan poll tax followed grain burden and asked that preferential exemptions for gentry, tribute students, and licentiates be abolished. The ministry rejected this. The matter went again to the Nine Ministers, who ruled that gentry were exempt only for themselves; descendants, clansmen, or households who claimed exemptions improperly, and those who privately established scholar or official households, would be punished. In Qianlong 1, the order exempting licentiates, tribute students, and students from miscellaneous corvée was reiterated. In year thirty-seven, household compilation, review, and register-making were stopped. By then poll silver had been merged into land grain tax and new births were no longer taxed; the five-year review had become empty form with no benefit to governance, and on Li Han's recommendation it was abolished. The next year, Chen Huizu asked that poll silver from newly reclaimed civilian and military colonies be apportioned yearly. The Emperor held that the proposal haggled with common people over fractions of cash and was not true care for the people; he ordered that hereafter all provinces handling poll and grain tax follow the old system and not lightly propose changes.
48
The first section is entitled "Remission of Taxes." Remission took two forms: grace remission and disaster remission. Grace remission came when the state marked a celebration, an imperial tour, or war, and then remitted land taxes.
49
西 西西 西 西西西西
When the Founding Emperor entered the pass, he first remitted three years of taxes and corvée for capital residents harmed by war. In Shunzhi 2, with Shanxi newly recovered, half that year's land rent was remitted. In year three, once Jiangnan was subdued, one-third of the tribute grain levy was remitted. In year eight, once the Shunzhi Emperor assumed direct rule, the throne returned extra levies imposed on nine provinces, remitted quota grain on fifteen thousand qing of wasteland in Shanxi, and waived quota taxes for devastated districts of Zhili, Shandong, Henan, and Shaanxi. Edicts of grace remission and disaster remission went out four times a year. On his eastern tour in Kangxi 10, the emperor remitted that year's land tax along the imperial procession route. In year thirteen, tax arrears from years eight and nine—principal levies and converted payments still owed by taxpayers in every province—were remitted. By then the realm was fully pacified; an edict remitted every tax arrear accumulated since the wars had begun. On his southern tour in year twenty-seven, he remitted Jiangnan's accumulated land-and-poll taxes, garrison grain levies, reed duties, and miscellaneous taxes on rice, wheat, beans, and other grains. In year thirty-three, land-and-poll taxes in silver and grain due from Guangxi, Sichuan, Guizhou, and Yunnan were remitted. In year forty-five, accumulated taxes for the current year in Zhili and Shandong were remitted; for Shanxi, Shaanxi, Gansu, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi, all outstanding land-and-poll silver before Kangxi 43—more than 2.12 million taels—and more than 105,000 shi of grain were remitted in full.
50
西西
After decades of peace the population swelled while arable land did not, and livelihoods seemed at risk; from Kangxi 50 the throne ordered each province to remit taxes in rotation over three years until every quota had been waived once. Over those three years, land-and-poll grain taxes remitted nationwide totaled more than thirty-eight million. In year fifty-six, more than 2.39 million taels in carried-over land-and-poll and garrison taxes for Zhili, Anhui, Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Jiangxi, Huguang, Xi'an, and Gansu were remitted; for Anhui and Jiangsu, carried-over tribute payments—more than 490,000 taels of silver and more than 140,000 shi of rice, wheat, and beans—were remitted by half. In year fifty-seven, to support the campaign against Galdan, more than 1.8 million in next year's land-and-poll taxes for Shaanxi and Gansu were remitted. The Kangxi Emperor once read Emperor Wen of Han's edict remitting the people's field rent and sighed: "Remitting rent is the greatest benevolent policy in all history; even the remotest valley and the most desolate corner receives real benefit. Yet unless the court itself rigorously practices frugality, such a policy cannot be carried out. Accordingly, over sixty years on the throne he issued grace edicts again and again—sometimes remitting several provinces in a single year, sometimes the same province for years in a row—and the total remitted likely exceeded one hundred million.
51
西西
When the Yongzheng Emperor ascended the throne, more than 12.1 million taels in accumulated civilian and garrison land-and-poll taxes and reed duties still unpaid across Jiangsu were remitted. After Tibet and the Miao frontier were pacified, field rents in Gansu, Sichuan, Guangxi, Yunnan, and Guizhou were remitted. He also declared that state revenue was already ample and wealth ought to be spread among the people; then, province by province, four hundred thousand taels of quota taxes were remitted. In Qianlong 1, an edict remitted field rents nationwide, successively wiping out overdue taxes in every province before Yongzheng 13 and Jiangnan taxes lost to official embezzlement and clerk skimming. In year four, nine hundred thousand taels in Zhili, one million in Jiangsu, and six hundred thousand in Anhui were remitted for the current year; principal levies and surcharges were remitted together. In year ten, more than 28.24 million taels in taxes nationwide were universally remitted; following the Kangxi 51 precedent, the provinces were divided into three groups and remitted in rotation over three years. In year thirty-one, an edict ordered each province's tribute grain remitted in succession over five years until all had been covered; cases normally collected as converted silver were remitted as well. In year thirty-five, with the emperor's sixtieth birthday at hand and the empress dowager's eightieth the next year, the throne followed the year-ten precedent and remitted each province's quota taxes in rotation over three years until every quota had been waived once.
52
西西
In year forty-two, taxes nationwide were universally remitted; beginning the next year, remission would proceed in rotation over three years, totaling more than 27.59 million taels. Each province's tribute grain received one universal remission beginning in year forty-five. In year forty-nine, more than 1.6 million taels in Gansu's backlog of forwarded grain-silver was remitted; taxpayer arrears in silver and grain under the retained share and in fodder bundles under the forwarded share were all remitted. In year fifty-five, for the Qianlong Emperor's eightieth birthday, an edict ordered each province's quota silver allocated among its prefectures, departments, and counties in three successive rounds, remitted year by year over three years until complete; within each province, districts deferred the previous year because of disaster were remitted first. In year fifty-nine, tribute grain due from every province was universally remitted. In year sixty, accumulated arrears nationwide and disaster-deferred payments—more than 15.5 million taels of silver and more than 3.8 million shi of grain—were universally remitted; Fengtian, Shanxi, Sichuan, Hunan, Guangxi, and Guizhou, which had no accumulated arrears, had next year's principal tax reduced by two-tenths. Also, because he would abdicate the next year, land-and-poll taxes due from every province in Jiaqing 1 were remitted; in provinces where the imperial procession would pass, quota taxes were reduced by three-tenths.
53
When the Jiaqing Emperor ascended the throne, because White Lotus rebels and Miao unrest were spreading in Hubei and Hunan, next year's taxes in both provinces were remitted, along with war-afflicted areas of Sichuan and Shaanxi. In year four, after the suburban sacrifice elevation ceremony was completed, accumulated deferred land-and-poll surcharges nationwide were universally remitted, along with seed grain, rations, tribute grain silver, and accumulated deferred grain, rice, and fodder bundles borrowed by the people. In year ten, on a visit to the imperial ancestral tombs, half the taxes in prefectures and counties along the imperial procession route were remitted. In year twenty-four, on his sixtieth birthday, principal-and-surcharge arrears owed by taxpayers nationwide and deferred silver and grain were remitted, totaling more than 21.29 million taels of silver and more than four million shi of grain and rice. Sichuan and Guizhou had no taxpayer arrears; next year's principal tax was reduced by two-tenths.
54
使
Disaster remission took several forms: exemption, deferred collection, relief distribution, loans, and remission of all overdue payments. Under early Qing regulations, whenever disaster remission applied, both forwarded and retained portions were reduced. If the retained portion was insufficient, the forwarded portion was reduced instead. In early Shunzhi, it was fixed that where disaster reached eight to ten tenths of a district, three-tenths of the tax were remitted; where it reached five to seven tenths, two-tenths were remitted; where it reached four tenths, one-tenth was remitted. In Kangxi 17 this was changed: at six tenths one-tenth was remitted; at seven tenths or more, two-tenths; at nine tenths or more, three-tenths. In Yongzheng 6 it was changed again: at ten tenths, seven-tenths were remitted; at nine tenths, six-tenths; at eight tenths, four-tenths; at seven tenths, two-tenths; at six tenths, one-tenth. Yet where disaster was severe, remission was usually complete. Whenever disaster was reported, summer disasters were reported by the sixth month and autumn disasters by the seventh. Once disaster was reported, the governor-general personally went to the affected area, led his subordinates to open granaries and distribute relief first, and only then reported upward. In Kangxi 3 the Ministry of Revenue memorialized that in disaster areas, quota taxes should first be suspended by three-tenths pending formal remission approval. In year four, Censor Hao Weina requested that wherever field tax in disaster areas was remitted by a given amount, poll tax should be remitted likewise. Thereafter poll tax was assessed with land; whenever disaster or famine occurred, land and poll were remitted together. From the day the edict was issued, if prefectures and counties did not promptly post public notices, remitted less than ordered, or failed to allow credit offsets on payment, they were charged with embezzlement and fraud. In Qianlong 1, Anhui Fiscal Commissioner Yan Sisheng requested: "Hereafter, in every province the amount of taxes to be remitted because of flood or drought should be reported within two months from the day the relief memorial is submitted, and poll silver should be calculated together with land grain silver for remission." The request was approved. Under the Kangxi and Qianlong emperors, universal remissions of taxes nationwide were repeated many times; edicts remitting taxes because of partial disasters are too numerous to list in full. In the Jiaqing era there were no universal remissions but many disaster remissions; sometimes one disaster led to remission in several provinces, sometimes one disaster led to remission over several years. After the Xianfeng Emperor, state expenses grew vast and the treasury could not meet them; yet whenever frontier officials memorialized reporting disaster or famine, remission was always granted at once. If disaster was extraordinary, or famine continued year after year, remission and relief were applied together.
55
祿 西 便
Granaries existed in the capital and in every province. In the capital there were fifteen granaries. Those under the Board of Revenue and the Imperial Household Department were called the Inner Granary and Enfeng; besides these there were Lumi, Nanxin, Jiutai, Fuxin, Xingping, Haiyun, Beixin, Taiping, Benyu, Wan'an, Chuji, Yufeng, and Fengyi. At Tongzhou there were the West Granary and the Central Granary. Tribute grain from the provinces was stored here in distribution. In the provinces there were seven riverside granaries: Dezhou, Linqing, Huai'an, Xuzhou, and Jiangning, one each; only Fengyang had two. These supplied monthly grain for transport troops and provisions for garrison troops and officials and soldiers passing through. From provincial capitals down to prefectures, departments, and counties, ever-normal granaries were built everywhere, and some also had reserve granaries. Villages had community granaries, market towns had charity granaries, the Northeast had banner granaries, frontier areas had garrison granaries, and coastal areas had salt charity granaries—some for the people's convenience, some to supply the army. Generally, rice issued from the Beijing and Tongzhou granaries included official salaries and official grain, also called jia rice; together these took six-tenths of the full tribute transport. One portion fed artisans and was called artisan rice. One portion went to the nine princes: at the founding six imperial clansmen were enfeoffed as princes of the first rank, two as princes of the second rank, and one younger brother of the Yongzheng Emperor was enfeoffed as a prince of the first rank; descendants of these nine princes, apart from the direct heirs, all held titles of nobility that descended with each generation; collectively this was called grace rice; together these two categories took one-hundredth of the capital granaries. Hence before Yongzheng, grain in the Great Storehouse often ran to surplus.
56
西
In Qianlong 28, Vice Minister of Revenue Ying Lian memorialized: "In recent years, because relief has repeatedly diverted tribute transport, and whenever grain grew dear in the capital the Inner Granary was opened for fair-price sale, stores have gradually diminished. Please open purchase-of-office contributions for jian and jian supervision degrees in grain-producing regions of Huguang, Jiangxi, Jiangnan, and Zhejiang, collecting grain in kind uniformly and storing it separately once the quota is met. In years when tribute transport is diverted, the amount should be made up and transported to the capital granaries the next year." The memorial was sent to the Nine Ministers for deliberation and approved, but was soon stopped again. By the Jiaqing era, bandits had risen in Sichuan and Huguang and flood and drought occurred intermittently; artisans had doubled in number compared with earlier times, and the descendants of the nine princes had also grown ever more numerous. After Xianfeng, the Taiping rebellion broke out again, transport routes were cut, granary stores grew ever more depleted, and after order was restored the old arrangements were only partly restored.
57
Fair-price sale in the capital was handled by the Five Cities grain bureaus and the Eight Banners grain bureaus. The Five Cities grain bureaus began in the Kangxi reign. In Yongzheng 4, depots were added in the inner city, and one depot each was added for the Five Cities and Tongzhou. In Qianlong 2, the Five Cities depots were increased to ten, and eight more depots were soon added in the four suburban districts. In year nine, four depots were established under the four-route sub-prefects. There were twenty-four Eight Banners grain bureaus, and two bureaus for the left and right wings at Tongzhou; all were established in Yongzheng 6. In Qianlong 1 they were merged into eight bureaus, but were soon restored to the old arrangement. In year fifteen, the twenty-four bureaus were ordered managed by left and right wings without regard to banner affiliation. In year seventeen, because grain prices had not stabilized and there was the abuse of forced purchase, an edict ordered the two Tongzhou bureaus stopped as well.
58
西
For ever-normal, reserve, and other granaries in the provinces, in Shunzhi 11 circuit intendants were ordered to manage them exclusively and submit annual registers to the ministry. In Shunzhi 17 the Ministry of Revenue fixed that ever-normal granary grain should be sold in spring and summer and repurchased in autumn and winter at fair prices to earn interest; in famine years it should be distributed to poor households according to quota. In Kangxi 6, Gansu Governor Liu Dou memorialized: "Grain stored for many years may grow damp and spoil; please sell it at market price and buy new grain." The request was approved. In year seven, Shaanxi Governor Jia Hanfu requested that accumulated grain be sold at market price to earn interest. The emperor instructed that selling old grain and buying new was originally for the people's benefit; if interest were reported to the ministry, it would instead burden the people, and earning interest was ordered stopped. In year nineteen, an edict ordered ever-normal granaries kept in the prefecture, department, or county for relief, and charity and community granaries kept in the village or market town for relief. In year thirty, the Ministry of Revenue ordered that donated grain in Zhili be stored at five thousand shi in large counties, four thousand in medium counties, and three thousand in small counties; later it was also ordered that storage be doubled. In year thirty-one, it was fixed that accumulated grain in prefectures and counties should be handed over like regular tax silver and grain; shortages would be treated as deficit and embezzlement. In year thirty-four, it was fixed that in Jiangnan accumulated grain each year seven-tenths would remain in store and three-tenths would be sold, and this was established as a general rule. In year forty-three, it was fixed that where granary grain in prefectures and counties grew moldy and spoiled, the official would be dismissed from office but retained in post, with one year to make full restitution before restoration; if restitution was not complete after one year, he would be removed from office; Failure to make good the deficit after three years brought criminal penalties and recovery from the official's family estate.
59
西 西
At that time, provincial grain-storage quotas were set by district size: in Shandong and Shanxi, large districts held twenty thousand shi, medium districts sixteen thousand, and small districts twelve thousand; in Jiangxi, large districts twelve thousand shi; Jiangsu and Sichuan generally held no more than five or six thousand shi; Fujian, by contrast, had two hundred seventy thousand shi in donated grain and another five hundred sixty thousand shi in Ever-Normal reserves; Taiwan held the largest combined reserves of donated grain and Ever-Normal grain—more than eight hundred thousand shi in all. An order went out to retain enough grain for three years of military needs and sell the surplus for rations. In the forty-seventh year, magistrates who bought grain beyond quota and stored it properly were to receive favorable mention in their evaluations. If a donor reported less grain than claimed, or if rice already in store was falsely recorded as a fresh donation and the fraud came to light in a crisis, the prefect shared liability—and the governor-general or governor who had approved the original report faced discipline as well. Officials who lent granary grain privately to commoners were charged with custodial self-theft according to the embezzled amount, and made to repay every shi. In the fifty-fourth year, grain donors among gentry and commoners were to receive commemorative plaques scaled to the size of their gifts—from the governor-general down through the district magistrate—and were permanently exempt from corvée duties.
60
In Yongzheng 3, the damp southern climate prompted a shift in storage practice: one shi of rice on the books was replaced with two shi of unhusked grain. In the fourth year, Gao Qipei, Grand Coordinator of Zhejiang and Fujian, wrote: "Fujian's Ever-Normal system suffers from two grave disorders. First, handover audits never clear up the books: when offices changed hands, cash balances remained on paper but grain did not, and the funds were too little to buy replacements; second, Ever-Normal sale prices are set far too low—sometimes as little as one tael per shi, sometimes less. Subordinate districts want to restock but cannot afford to; meanwhile profiteers cite high market prices, stir up the poor, and push the sale season earlier every year while driving official prices lower year after year. I ask that rice hereafter be priced by grade at one tael two qian or one tael three qian per shi, and grain fixed at six qian five fen or six qian, using post-harvest stabilized prices as the benchmark. The Emperor endorsed his proposal. Regulations soon followed: magistrates whose granaries fell into disrepair and whose grain molded or rotted were prosecuted under the embezzlement code and removed from office. They were given one year to recover the grain themselves; beyond that deadline, punishment applied. In the fifth year, each province's Ever-Normal granaries were ordered audited at year's end by the prefecture and department concerned. Spring loans unpaid by the tenth month, or falsified on the books, brought impeachment and full restitution. In Fujian, audits also found subordinate offices with neither silver nor grain on hand, or cash on the books but no grain in the bins. Verified shortfalls led to the replacement of the magistrates responsible. In Yongzheng 13, Grand Secretary Fang Bao proposed three reforms to Ever-Normal grain sales: "First, the rule of retaining seven parts and selling three each year means that when prices spike, officials must wait for memorials and approved prices before selling—so the poor gain nothing in time of need. Let each district set an official price at its discretion, open sales at once, and report upward afterward. Second, south of the Yangtze and Huai the air is low and damp. A rigid seven-to-three rule would, within a few years, leave millions of shi to rot. Terrified of punishment, officials would dump spoiled grain on rural households. Instruct southern governors to inspect stored grain by quality and color, and set retain-and-sell ratios by region and year; and in the five northern provinces, in lean years, do not insist on the seven-three rule. Third, stored grain suffers rat damage; audits deduct shrinkage; transport costs accrue; sales, purchases, and guarding all consume labor and supplies. Any small surplus from spring sales barely covers these expenses. Instruct circuit intendants and prefects to audit at year's end. If totals are sound, they must not extort officials on false pretenses. When autumn purchase prices are low and a genuine surplus remains after expenses, report it to superiors and set it aside for lean years. The ministry reviewed the proposal and put it into effect.
61
巿
In Qianlong 3, Nasutu, Governor-General of Liangjiang, argued that Ever-Normal sales need only undercut market prices by one or two tenths. E Mingda, Governor-General of Liangguang, added: "Ever-Normal prices should not be cut sharply. Ordinary people count every coin. If official sale prices diverge sharply from the market, shopkeepers hoard grain and wait; the poor, who depend on cheap grain to cook their meals, must then rely entirely on the granaries. Granary stocks are finite, yet merchants corner the market—so the effort to stabilize prices stabilizes nothing. When supply piles up, prices fall. If people can buy official grain, they need not depend wholly on shop rice; and when shops see only a modest official discount, they too will lower prices to keep goods moving. Cut prices only one-tenth below market, tapering further over a year and then stopping. Shopkeepers lose their leverage, and official stocks are not drained. Both memorials were approved. In the seventh year, an edict recalled Zhang Qu's earlier proposal to sell grain below market: in good harvest years, five fen per shi below market; in scarce years, one qian. Yet in lean years a one-qian reduction still leaves the poor struggling to buy rice. Henceforth governors-general and governors shall decide reductions case by case, report their reasoning, and seek the throne's approval. Anyone who buys cheap official grain and resells at a profit shall be seized and punished severely."
62
西 西西西 西 西西 西
In the thirteenth year, the Qianlong Emperor told the Grand Secretaries and the Ministry of Revenue: "Ever-Normal quotas have been swelling and squeezing the food supply. Hereafter use the Yongzheng-era quotas as the standard. Officials then ruled that Yunnan, far from water transport, and Shaanxi and Gansu, burdened with military needs and never given fixed quotas, should keep their present levels. Those levels were Yunnan at seven hundred thousand shi, Xi'an at two million seven hundred thousand, and Gansu at three million seven hundred thousand, each with a fractional remainder. Fujian, hemmed in by mountains and sea with poor commercial transport; Guangdong, a tangle of coast and ridge with little surplus grain; and Guizhou, without river shipping—all needed generous reserves at current levels: Fujian over two million five hundred thousand shi, Guangdong over two million nine hundred thousand, Guizhou five hundred thousand. All other provinces reverted to Yongzheng quotas: Zhili two million one hundred thousand shi; Fengtian one million two hundred thousand; Shandong two million nine hundred thousand; Shanxi one million three hundred thousand; Henan two million three hundred thousand; Jiangsu one million five hundred thousand; Anhui one million eight hundred thousand; Jiangxi one million three hundred thousand; Zhejiang two million eight hundred thousand; Hubei five hundred thousand; Hunan seven hundred thousand; Sichuan one million; Guangxi two hundred thousand—each with a fractional remainder. Nineteen provinces together would hold some three million three hundred seventy thousand shi, down from the old aggregate of four million four hundred thousand—a cut of roughly one million four hundred thousand. After that, many provinces simply stopped filling quota gaps. In the twenty-third year, an imperial order commanded provinces to buy grain and restock the granaries. In the thirty-first year, provincial accounts showed actual stocks; only Jiangxi, Henan, and Guangdong still matched the quotas fixed in the thirteenth year. Provinces above their old quotas included Hunan at one million four hundred thirty thousand shi, Shanxi at two million three hundred thousand, Sichuan at one million eight hundred fifty thousand, Guangxi at one million eight hundred thirty thousand, and Yunnan and Guizhou each at over eight hundred thousand. Zhejiang had fallen two million two hundred thousand shi below quota; Fengtian by one million; Gansu by one million four hundred thousand; and Zhili, Jiangsu, Anhui, Fujian, Hubei, Shandong, and Shaanxi had each lost two hundred thousand or five to six hundred thousand shi. So it went: hoarding was arduous, dissipation effortless.
63
西西
Early in the Jiaqing reign, the emperor repeatedly ordered provinces to buy grain and make up shortfalls. In the fourth year, an edict asked: "Ever-Normal granaries exist so the state holds grain, not merely cash equivalents on the books. In a sudden crisis, what good is silver alone? Provinces were ordered to buy grain and return it to the bins. In the seventeenth year, the ministry's Zhejiang office counted three million three hundred fifty thousand eight hundred seventy-five shi in Ever-Normal stores—still close to the Qianlong quota. By Daoguang 11, Liu Chonglin and Bian Shiyun had warned in separate memorials that across the empire Ever-Normal granaries mostly showed cash on the ledgers but empty bins—and even that cash was often diverted. The throne commanded governors-general and governors to audit ruthlessly and punish offenders. Yet a ministry report in the fifteenth year put actual provincial stocks at only two million four hundred thousand shi—already far below Jiaqing levels, and that was before the chaos of the Xianfeng era. In Tongzhi 3, an edict lamented: "War spreads and bandits swarm; towns fall when grain runs out because magistrates raid the granaries, leaving nothing in a crisis. Henceforth governors-general and governors must take personal responsibility for restoring Ever-Normal granaries in their provinces. In early Guangxu, drought struck Zhili, Henan, Shaanxi, and Shanxi in turn; famine killed nearly ten thousand people daily. In Guangxu 4, Cui Muzhi, and in Guangxu 8, Wu Chungu petitioned again for granary restoration—only then did provincial leaders begin to take the matter seriously.
64
西西 西 使
Community and benevolent granaries dated from Kangxi 18. The Ministry of Revenue approved village community granaries and market-town benevolent granaries, managed by locally chosen men who rotated old stock for new. Grain was lent in spring and repaid after harvest at one dou interest per shi; at year's end districts reported totals upward to the ministry. In the sixtieth year, Zhu Zhi, Left Censor-in-Chief on assignment in Shanxi, asked to establish community granaries there. The emperor replied: "When Li Guangdi proposed community granaries, I said the idea was easier announced than done. Several years of trial proved him right: nothing came of it. Zhang Boxing too praised the system; I let him test it in Yongping. He has never reported whether it worked. Any community granary requires sober, reliable local leaders. They are not officials—who will enforce repayment when loans come due? Even in good years collections fail; in lean years, how could they succeed? Grain is taken from households and stored without proper guards. When bins go empty, managers must pay—so the community's grain is wasted and innocent stewards bankrupted. Community granaries may work in small towns and villages; run by officials, they help no one. Zhu Zhi asks again; let him stay in Shanxi and try—but do not expect miracles. In Yongzheng 2, the throne wrote Yang Zongren, Naqika, Wei Tingzhen, and other Huguang officials: "Community granaries were ordered for the people's benefit. Ask for donations only in good harvest years; defer quotas in bad ones. Keep officials out of the rules, or community granaries become government granaries overnight. Yet you now require one shi of community grain for every tael of regular tax. I hear grain in Huguang now costs four or five qian a shi. That is no different from slapping four or five qian of surcharge on every tael of tax. Regulations followed: magistrates would only supervise. Donors earned rewards from floral banners and plaques up to the cap and sash of an eighth-rank honor. Headmen who managed a granary faultlessly for ten years could receive the same eighth-rank honor. Interest was set at two dou per shi lent, collected in winter. In mild shortages, interest was halved; in severe ones, waived—only principal was collected. After ten years, when interest equaled principal, only one further increment of interest was charged.
65
In the third year, at He Tianpei's request, five community-granary rules were issued: first, relief loans required door-by-door registers prepared in advance and kept on file; second, besides chief and deputy headmen, a third reputable man was to oversee operations; third, magistrates must not meddle in receipts and disbursements; fourth, stationery costs must come from voluntary donations or official fines; fifth, when stocks grew large, grain should be sold at reduced Ever-Normal prices between summer and autumn and repurchased after harvest at market rates.
66
In the fifth year, after Huguang's community granaries showed massive deficits, an edict noted: "Of recent governors, none pushed community granaries harder than Yang Zongren in Huguang. Fu Min's audit now shows the original reports wildly inflated and almost nothing left in store. I have always known this scheme is hard to make work. Kangxi understood it well—hence Li Guangdi's petition was denied and Zhang Boxing's trial was cut short. The rich need no granary and will not give; the poor have nothing to give. And how many magistrates are truly honest stewards? If Huguang's shortfall came from official theft, pursue restitution ruthlessly. If grain was never delivered, or deliveries fell short of reported totals, demanding full payment may exceed people's means—handle such cases with discretion. In the sixth year, the Yongzheng Emperor explained Yue Zhongqi's plan: temporarily keep five fen of each tael from the province's two-percent surcharge, use it to buy grain for community granaries, then cut the levy once stocks were full. The surcharge was the people's money; grain bought with it was the people's reserve. Shaanxi officials treated stored grain as government property. Clerks who controlled the bins then forced purchases and forced loans. Let this be carved in stone and published abroad: any official who repeats those abuses will be punished for sabotaging policy and harming the people."
67
西
In Qianlong 4 the Board of Revenue approved Shaanxi Governor Zhang Kai's regulations for communal granaries: communal chiefs would rotate every three years; at spring lending, half the grain was to be held back against a poor autumn harvest; loans had to be fully repaid every year; borrowers' names and grain amounts were to be posted publicly; local officials were to audit handovers and assign liability for shortfalls. In the fifth year Shaanxi and Gansu communal grain that was truly private property could be managed by granary chiefs chosen by the community. Communal grain drawn from the five-fen surcharge on the two-fen levy was placed under official management and entered into turnover records. Thereafter county and prefectural officials treated communal grain as state property. Every loan required layered reports, and even at the hungry gap between spring sowing and autumn harvest, commoners could not borrow until superiors signed off. It was then proposed that after the annual sealing of accounts, each county set its lending season, disbursing grain while filing reports, with earlier planting regions borrowing first. The throne approved the proposal.
68
使便使
In the eighteenth year Zhili Governor-General Fang Guancheng wrote: "Charity granaries began with Chang Sunping in the Sui; by the Song, Zhu Xi had worked out the scheme in full. Though called communal granaries, in practice they followed the charity-granary precedent. The point is proximity: people who know the land and the work. Officials planning for villagers cannot match villagers planning for themselves, so granaries should be kept by the people, not by the state. One city store cannot match many village stores, so grain should be kept in the countryside, not in town. Let magistrates set up granaries across the four quarters of each district, storing grain or millet as local custom dictates, with chosen chief and deputy managers—and no clerks or runners in the accounts. Reports already showed more than 285,300 shi donated, spread across 144 prefectures, counties, garrisons, and posts, 35,210 villages, and 1,500 granaries. 」The emperor praised the plan. In the thirty-seventh year the Board of Revenue again placed communal granaries under official control of receipts and disbursements.
69
西
In Jiaqing 4 communal and charity granaries were again managed by their chief and deputy heads, who need only register accounts with the magistrate. In Daoguang 5 Anhui Governor Tao Shu argued: "To keep charity granaries clean, let people donate what they can after the autumn harvest, choose trustworthy elders to manage them, forbid cut-rate sales, cash exchanges, and loans, and store grain only for relief. 」The court approved his plan. When war came, every province let them lapse. In Tongzhi 6 an edict ordered their revival. In the Guangxu period Shaanxi Governor Feng Yuji led the field, it is said, with more than 1,600 granaries rebuilt.
70
沿
Banner granaries in the Three Eastern Provinces originally held twenty million shi apiece. Garrison granaries date from Kangxi 22. Granaries were then built at Shanhaiguan and the frontier passes, reaching Mo'ergen on the Amur. In the thirtieth year Jiangning, Jingkou, and other posts were each told to set aside 100,000 shi of tribute grain. In the thirty-sixth year frontier garrisons and forts such as Yulin were ordered to store grain. In the forty-ninth year, when Hunan's Zhenqian unit was upgraded from cooperative to garrison, 3,000 taels were lent from the treasury to buy grain for storage. In the fifty-fourth year grain stores were established at Miyun and Gubeikou. In Yongzheng 3 grain was stored at Tula, outside Guihua. In the forty-seventh year Guangdong's provincial brigade camps and garrison cooperatives were ordered in turn to store grain, and the practice later spread to Guizhou, Sichuan, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Henan. In the eleventh year grain was stored at Xifengkou.
71
仿
In Qianlong 1 river-brigade garrison granaries were established. In the eleventh year Shandong's river brigade was ordered to do the same. Salt charity granaries began in Yongzheng 4. Merchants of the Lianghuai salt region then donated 240,000 taels to buy grain and build granaries in Jiangnan. Salt Censor Ga'ertai reported the gift and added 80,000 taels of public funds, for 320,000 in all. The throne rewarded Ga'ertai with 30,000 taels and, as he had asked, applied the rest to granaries named "Salt Charity." Soon Zhejiang merchants donated another 100,000 taels, and Governor Li Wei was ordered to build a granary at Hangzhou. In Qianlong 9 Shandong's ticket merchants were allowed to follow suit.
72
使 使 使
Capital treasuries under the Imperial Household were run by the Directorate of Imperial Manufactories. In Shunzhi 16 this office became the Department of Broad Storage. In the eighteenth year separate treasuries were set up for brocade, silver, furs, and clothing. In Kangxi 18 tea and porcelain treasuries were added, for six in all. Treasuries under the Board of Revenue were the silver, brocade, and pigments stores—three altogether. The Mukden Board of Revenue silver treasury, besides these, held gold, silver, silks, and pigments for sacrifices at the two imperial tombs and for pay and rewards to troops in the Three Eastern Provinces. Each provincial general, lieutenant-general, and garrison commander kept a treasury for troop pay and for grain bought with miscellaneous taxes and revenue from official estates. The fiscal commissioner's provincial treasury held land and miscellaneous tax silver collected yearly from counties and prefectures. The judicial commissioner's treasury held fines and confiscated property. The grain-route treasury held tribute-transport tax silver and funds for relay horses and couriers. The river conservancy treasury held funds for river works. The military preparedness circuit treasury held military pay. Salt levies under the salt transport commissioner and various tax offices dispatched by the Board had superintendent treasuries. Where circuit, prefectural, subprefectural, departmental, county, and post officials jointly handled tax affairs, there were joint customs treasuries holding transit duties. Treasuries at strategic circuit posts, in prefectures and directly administered departments, and with subprefects and prefects stationed in Miao country all received provincial silver in amounts scaled to local importance and distance from the capital of the province. Department, county, and garrison treasuries held land and miscellaneous tax silver on hand; what was kept locally was spent there, and what was forwarded went to the fiscal commissioner.
73
使 西
Every treasury sent annual account books to the Board of Revenue for review; only fines went routinely to the Board of Punishments. River works and military pay were also reported to the War and Works boards. The Board of Revenue divided provincial reserves into five kinds. Sealed reserves. Silver retained at each fiscal commissioner's office and jointly sealed by governor and governor-general: if urgently needed, it could be drawn only by memorial; unauthorized use was capital crime. The rule was set in Yongzheng 5. Zhili alone, being near the capital, at first kept no reserve. Other provinces kept reserves of 300,000, 200,000, or 100,000 taels in three grades. Later Zhili received reserves too. Only the Mukden Board of Revenue silver treasury, from Qianlong 42, received ten million taels from the capital for permanent storage. In the forty-third year the general was again placed in charge. Distributed reserves. Sealed silver kept in circuit and prefectural treasuries: when a county urgently needed funds it could draw them at once while reporting to the fiscal commissioner and governor, but still had to account for every expenditure. Later busy counties and prefectures also received operating balances on the model of capital counties, though without fixed amounts. In Yongzheng 8 fixed quotas were set for circuit, prefectural, departmental, and county reserves, from 300,000 down to 100,000 taels in four grades. Retained reserves. Silver kept in subordinate treasuries for local spending, allocated and paid out without remitting to the provincial treasury. Forwarded reserves. The fiscal commissioner's treasury, holding land and miscellaneous tax silver forwarded from prefectures, departments, counties, and garrisons; the judicial commissioner's treasury, receiving fines; and treasuries of generals, lieutenant-generals, garrison commanders, and grain-route officials, receiving transferred military pay, tribute funds, and the like. Allocated reserves. Military preparedness circuit treasuries held yearly troop pay allocated by the fiscal commissioner or neighboring provinces; river conservancy treasuries held local and neighboring military pay plus routine and emergency repair funds; and pay for Ili, new funds for Tarbagatai, stipends for Tibet, copper capital for Yunnan, and lead capital for Guizhou all came by provincial allocation. The Board of Revenue supervised the whole system and required careful handling. Land tax silver sent to the capital had to be melted into fifty-tael ingots to the Board's standard weights, without shaved drip beads.
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使 使 使使
Whenever pay silver left the province, the fiscal commissioner personally joined the escort officer to verify seals and tally marks, had treasury officers seal the cases in open court, and issued military travel warrants. For magistrates' cash and grain handovers, the incoming officer drew up receiving registers and certificates with the inventory supervisor; superiors added their seals and forwarded them to the commissioner and then the Board, all within statutory deadlines. When a fiscal commissioner was promoted or departed, he memorialized that the treasury showed no shortage; his successor reported receipt in the same way and still filed full accounts within the time allowed. Judicial commissioner handovers were audited by the governor together with the fiscal commissioner. Governors and governors-general were also to inspect on schedule, and when fiscal treasuries were closed at turnover they had to inspect in person, certify, and report. New governors and governors-general were subject to the same rule. When prefectural, departmental, and county treasuries were closed, the supervising circuit intendant or prefect had to inspect in person and report. Delegation, advance warning of inspection dates, and connivance at concealment were forbidden.
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At the Board of Revenue silver treasury, Kangxi 45, because stocks had grown large, newly received silver was stored separately each year and old silver was spent first. In Qianlong 41 the Board required all provincial silver sent to the capital, whether large ingots or small sycee, to be stamped with the county, year, month, and silversmith's name. In Jiaqing 19 provincial silver sent to the Board had to be delivered as soon as it arrived. In Daoguang 12 the court again required official dispatch and official delivery. Capital pay and donated funds had long been paid in through private banks, and the abuses proved hard to uproot. In Tongzhi 3 the Board ruled that bank deliveries must be full-standard silver with the house mark stamped on each ingot; fraud would bring a tenfold penalty on the original sum. In Guangxu 4 the Board again required provincial governors and field commanders drawing pay at the ministry to follow the rules for sealed requisitions—safeguarding the treasury and blocking leakage and fraud.
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