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卷122 志九十七 食货三 漕运

Volume 122 Treatises 97: Food and Money 3, Grain Transport

Chapter 122 of 清史稿 · Draft History of Qing
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Treatise 97
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=Food and Money 3=
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便 便
At the beginning of the Qing, canal transport policy continued the Ming arrangement, relying on garrison troops for long-haul convoy duty. Under long-distance transport, military grain boats from Guazhou and Huai'an were sent to county landings to take over civilian grain, with cross-river portage and spoilage allowances scaled to distance; Grain destined for the Huai'an, Xuzhou, Linqing, and Dezhou granaries that civilians still hauled to the warehouses was likewise shifted onto military boats—the so-called redirected exchange. By mid-Qing the Huitong Canal had silted shut, and the ancient Jiao–Lai waterway could not be reopened overnight; stopgap schemes such as routing grain via the Yellow River proved no less corrupt. The Daoguang Emperor therefore took up memorials from Yinghe, Tao Zhu, He Changling, and others to revive sea transport, appointed officers to assemble grain, and chartered merchant ships at Shanghai to carry tribute rice to Beijing—an arrangement the populace widely welcomed. Canal transport was abandoned from that point on. Canal shipment meant paying to lighter cargo in shallows, paying again at locks and at the Huai crossing, and paying yet again to rush grain to the Tongzhou warehouses. The throne already spent over a million taels on canal tribute, while local levels extracted another million-plus in surcharges; commoners were squeezed ever tighter and the treasury grew poorer. Sea carriage avoided inland waterways, spared the endless feeding of convoy hands, eliminated the burden of building fleets and drafting crews, and served both treasury and populace—no policy could have been more advantageous. Once maritime restrictions eased and steamers plied the coast, southeastern grain poured in without need for state convoys; canal transport was fully discontinued, and converting tribute quotas to silver payments became permanent policy. This chapter treats grain transport in order: tribute grain, white-rice tribute, supervisory transport, transport vessels, transport finances, performance review, rewards and relief, and finally sea transport.
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西 西
Early Qing transport policy copied the Ming entirely, distinguishing regular exchange, redirected exchange, redirected levy, and commutation. These four categories defined the basic framework for converting transport obligations between grain and cash. In 1645 the Board of Revenue set the annual tribute-grain quota at four million piculs. Grain bound for Beijing warehouses counted as regular-exchange rice, originally 3.3 million piculs: Jiangnan 1.5 million, Zhejiang 600,000, Jiangxi 400,000, Huguang 250,000, Shandong 200,000, and Henan 270,000. Grain routed to Tongzhou counted as redirected-exchange rice, originally 700,000 piculs: Jiangnan 294,400, Zhejiang 30,000, Jiangxi 170,000, Shandong 95,600, and Henan 110,000. Subsequent reigns saw frequent quota adjustments and commutations. By 1753 actual collections stood at roughly 2.75 million piculs of regular-exchange grain and just over 500,000 piculs of redirected-exchange grain, excluding amounts temporarily held back or remitted. Beyond their main tribute quotas, Shandong and Henan also assessed wheat and black beans, both provinces folding these into regular-exchange collections. Converted wastage wheat totaled 69,561 piculs plus 8 dou 4 sheng odd; black beans 208,199 piculs plus 3 dou 1 sheng odd—all consigned to Beijing warehouses. Black-bean levies were converted from millet quotas and carried no fixed ceiling. Redirected collections always came by imperial order and never followed a fixed rule.
5
Commutation took four forms: permanent silver payment, lime-and-stone grain conversion, reduced levy, and official purchase on behalf of taxpayers. Permanent commutation fixed 70,000 piculs each for Shandong and Henan, payable at six to eight mace of silver per picul; Jiangsu 106,492 piculs odd, at six mace per picul; Anhui 75,961 piculs odd, from five to seven mace per picul; Hubei 32,520 piculs and Hunan 5,212 piculs odd, each commuted uniformly at seven mace per picul. Commutation silver was reported to the Board as part of land-tax receipts. Lime-and-stone grain conversion assessed Jiangsu 29,424 piculs and Zhejiang 18,653 piculs, plus 4,015 piculs in leap years, at 1.6 taels per picul to fund Ministry of Works supplies—a practice dating from 1660.
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西 ( )
The following year governors of Jiangnan, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi were instructed to collect commutation only at statutory rates and to impeach immediately any official who used transport quotas as a pretext for illegal surcharges. Because the four prefectures of Suzhou, Songjiang, Changzhou, and Zhenjiang differ ( in each case) in heavy land-tax burden, tribute rice was commuted at one tael per picul; surcharges for light cargo, matting, timber, gifts, and deductions still came as wastage grain, while monthly rations, gifts, and transport wastage for the convoy troops were likewise commuted at market rates. In 1669 Henan tribute grain was fixed at eight mace of silver per picul. In 1670 flood-stricken Jiaxing and Huzhou in Zhejiang were allowed one tael commutation per picul. In 1719 the court approved that for Henan counties near river landings, of the eight-mace rate one mace five candareens still went to the treasury in silver while the remaining six mace five candareens was collected in grain for shipment. Counties far from landings still paid eight mace per picul in silver—one mace five candareens to the Board, the balance to the grain intendant for procurement. In 1723 disaster in Jiaxing and Huzhou subordinate counties prompted an edict requiring half the tribute in grain and half in silver at the 1670 rate. In 1728 counties moderately distant from Henan landings were ordered to pay grain in kind, but jurisdictions under Nanyang and Runing, Lushi, Song, and Yongning, Guang and Ru prefectures, and the remotest counties Lingbao and Minxiang—where haulage was hardest—received a combined reduction of over 15,000 piculs. Five nearer counties (Neihuang, Jun, Hua, Yifeng, and Kaocheng) covered the shortfall from land-tax receipts: at the statutory eight mace rate, six mace five candareens funded transport and the saved one mace five candareens went to the grain intendant. Nanyang and Runing jurisdictions instead paid eight mace per picul to the provincial treasury to offset the five counties' land-tax deductions—the so-called reduced levy.
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In 1737, to fund major canal dredging, Shanyang, Yancheng, and Funing in Huai'an prefecture and Jiangdu, Ganquan, Gaoyou, and Baoying in Yangzhou prefecture each
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西
had its tribute grain commuted at one tael per picul. Haizhou and Ganyu were later added to the same rule. Converted black-bean quotas in Shandong and Henan no longer met demand, so Henan was directed to convert another 20,000 piculs and Shandong 40,000. In 1738 Governor-General De Pei noted that Pingjiang lay more than 500 li from river landings and asked to pay silver instead, with Hengyang and Xiangtan buying and shipping the grain; the court agreed. In 1742 Luxi, Jiangxi, found eight mace inadequate for procurement; thereafter each August the provincial treasury advanced funds for county purchase, with taxpayers reimbursing at actual market price. Jiading, Baoshan, Haizhou, and Ganyu in Jiangsu; Ningguo, Jingde, Taiping, and Yingshan in Anhui; and Tongshan and Dangyang in Hubei later adopted the same rule. In 1746 forty Henan counties including Xiangfu were required to convert 10,000 piculs of their millet quota annually to wheat, shipped with tribute rice and black beans to Tongzhou.
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In 1751, to feed horses and camels for the capital garrison, Henan and Shandong had since 1732 been converting millet tribute to black beans, delivering over 209,000 piculs yearly, with each province directed to add another 10,000–20,000 piculs as needed. Shandong was soon set at 30,000 piculs and Henan at 20,000, with millet quotas reduced accordingly and the one mace five candareens transport savings still levied. In 1753 Granary Superintendent He Nian reported that Beijing warehouses held over 600,000 piculs of black beans—three years' supply—and asked that from the following year Henan and Shandong convert half their bean quota to millet for storage in Beijing and Tongzhou, preventing spoilage and stabilizing grain prices." The court approved.
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宿 仿
In 1761 four Jiangsu counties that grew no rice or millet were ordered to have the treasury buy grain at market rates in advance, with taxpayers repaying in silver—the so-called official procurement on commuted payments. Funing, Jingde, Taixing, Ningguo, Taiping, Yingshan, and other counties later followed suit.
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In 1756 an edict declared: "Tribute grain feeds the imperial granaries each year and must normally be collected in kind. Forcing commutation to silver has always been strictly forbidden. In a bumper year when grain is cheap, forcing peasants to sell at low prices to pay silver tribute means most of a year's harvest goes to market for the state—draining meager stores to feed endless exactions, a grave injury to the people. Governors of all tribute provinces are to order their subordinates to accept grain in kind only and forbid forced commutation and its abuses. Officials who profit at the people's expense are to be impeached on verified evidence." Yet counties still used commutation as a cover for illegal surcharges, and clear edicts could not stop the practice.
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西 西
Besides regular exchange, redirected exchange, and commutation, the system also included retention of tribute grain and allocated shipments. When provinces held back transport boats between sailing seasons, rules for monthly rations owed or recoverable had never been standardized. From 1736 retained boats in Jiangsu, Anhui, and Zhejiang were to receive full monthly rations and repair allowances in kind or silver. Travel grain, measuring wastage, gift silver, and load allowances were paid out station by station. When auxiliary boats were held for the current voyage—whether unloading immediately or settling months later—gift grain was prorated monthly. Jiangxi's larger, heavier boats often exhausted annual repair funds, drawing the balance from travel and monthly rations. Upon retention, previously issued wastage allowances, travel and monthly rations, gift silver and grain, and measuring grain were not clawed back. Later, given transport troops' accumulated debts, the court remitted all pre-1734 recoveries from retained boats nationwide. In 1742, because retained boats had already sailed after exchange, standard rules required clawbacks; supplemental allowances were set by distance and cargo volume. Shandong and Henan boats received fifty taels each. Jiangnan and Zhejiang received sixty taels, Huguang seventy, and Jiangxi ninety—for repairs, equipment, and hiring crews while boats waited. Allowances were deducted from commuted travel and monthly ration payments. In 1753 an edict noted that 200,000 piculs of southern tribute held at Tianjin risked adulteration and short-weighting by banner troops and extortion by local clerks, and ordered Fang Guancheng to supervise storage in person. Thereafter provinces retaining tribute grain had to assign nearby circuit officials to inspect, not county magistrates. This was made permanent regulation."
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西
Allocated transport diverted Shandong and Henan grain bound for Jizhou to supply imperial tombs and garrison rations. In 1695 the annual requirement of 30,600 piculs was set; Shandong millet was retained and lightered from Tianjin to Xinhekou, then 150 Tianjin barges carried it to Jizhou's Wuliqiao bridge at 100 piculs per boat and 1.32 taels per hundred li, funded from lock and warehouse portage accounts. In 1706 Miyun garrison rations were allocated from Henan and Shandong Jizhou grain stores, with the county collecting at Tongzhou each spring. Normally grain moved by water; in emergencies, by land. Portage came from land-tax revenues. The following year each province added 100 piculs to cover spoilage. Baoding and Xiong County garrisons received grain by exchange at Xigu to reduce transport losses. Early in the Jiaqing reign, with Shandong on rotating tribute exemption, Henan shipped first; shortfalls could be drawn from Jizhou reserves and public grain stocks. When Henan later suffered famine, Jizhou granary stocks could also be milled to cover shortages. County allocations included Jizhou 58,600 piculs, Yizhou 38,600 odd, Miyun 11,500-plus, Baoding and Xiong County 3,100-plus combined, Liangxiang and Daxing's Caiyu 300-plus, Shunyi and Changping 200-plus, Bazhou, Dong'an, Gu'an, and Baodi 300-plus, Yutian and Qian'an's Lengkou 500-plus each, and Cangzhou 2,700-plus. Qingzhou's 2,100-plus picul garrison ration came from retained Jizhou grain; Dezhou could draw on reserves when its quota fell short. Such was the general scheme of allocated transport.
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Provincial tribute collection had long relied on direct military-civilian exchange, with transport troops routinely extorting civilians. In 1652 the system shifted to official collection and exchange, with gift and subsidy payments levied with tribute grain and paid out by officials. In 1728, given Jiangsu and Zhejiang's huge quotas, requiring polished rice alone would have made payment unaffordable; thereafter only dry, clean grain was required, accepting both red and white and both glutinous and non-glutinous varieties. Early in Qianlong's reign officials ordered tribute rice accepted on arrival and forbade corrupt clerks from delaying collection. In 1739 an edict noted that Hubei's 151,000-plus piculs shipped to Tongzhou as northern tribute and 126,000-plus piculs as Jingzhou official grain called southern tribute could have been collected jointly and divided. Yet corrupt counties opened separate collection points, forcing taxpayers to pay twice to skim surplus profits, doubly burdening the people. The province was ordered to combine both tribute categories permanently." In 1742 all tribute provinces were required to print detailed tax notices at year-end and distribute them by household to prevent illegal surcharges. In 1745 Minister Fan Can reported that lower Jiangnan collectors had taken eight or nine-tenths under transport-fee pretexts until Governor Yin Jishan capped fees at six fen per picul and ended the abuses. Before long clerks again harassed taxpayers during rush collection, and peasants who could not wait were forced to accept discounted payment." Officials in all tribute provinces were ordered to root out these entrenched abuses. In 1803 the court banned counties from privately converting tribute grain to silver and stopped corrupt students and clerks from monopolizing collection and subcontracting delivery.
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西
All tribute grain carried wastage levies paid in grain—2.5 to 4 dou per picul for regular exchange, 1.7 to 4 dou for redirected exchange—delivered with the principal grain to Beijing and Tongzhou granaries and for transport wastage conversion. Southern tribute also included shipboard wastage grain ranging from five sheng to two or three sheng, scaled to shipping distance. Under Jiaqing, Jiangsu's wastage grain for winnowing was set at just over four sheng per picul. Thereafter just over two sheng went to banner soldiers and two sheng was submitted to granaries with the tribute grain. Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Huguang adopted the same rule. When transport rules changed, provinces switching to silver commutation also converted wastage grain to cash levied with principal grain, and the separate "transport wastage" category was abolished.
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西 沿
When tribute collection shifted to official exchange, regional subsidy names differed—Shandong and Henan called them moisture wastage, Jiangsu and Anhui transport subsidies, Zhejiang transport deductions, Jiangxi and Huguang shipping allowances—levied with grain, listed on tax notices, with penalties for unauthorized diversion. Later Jiangnan counties illicitly skimmed over a hundred taels per hundred piculs, and Zhejiang over thirty. Grain Intendant Liu Chaojun was impeached for embezzling over 12,000 taels in transport subsidies, and Censor Xu Xulin also reported abuses in gift-wastage payments. Yet corrupt officials continued the practice through entrenched habit that no prohibition could break. In 1671 Jiangning and other prefectures bundled wastage grain with principal tribute as subsidies, while Suzhou, Songjiang, and Changzhou converted lime-and-stone obligations and all supplementary transport subsidies were waived. In 1685 provinces were told to pay transport-deduction silver directly to counties rather than routing it through intendant treasuries. In 1742 Jiangnan's tribute gift-wastage was permanently exempted from suspension. Beyond standard wastage grain, monthly rations, and transport gifts, tribute counties collected additional wastage silver and grain in varying amounts—extra grain used for military exchange costs and local administrative expenses.
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西 西
Light carriage silver dated from the mid-Ming period. Granary exchange transport required route fees and wastage levies; grain was measured flat and sharp—the sharp portion counted as shipboard wastage and the remainder converted to silver as light carriage. The Qing retained the system. For regular-exchange grain, Jiangxi, Huguang, and other provinces added 4.6 or 6.6 dou wastage per picul, with sharp grain always one dou. Where 4.6 dou wastage applied, three dou became shipboard wastage and the remaining 2.6 dou including sharp grain converted to 1.3 mace of silver; Where 6.6 dou wastage applied, four dou became shipboard wastage and 3.6 dou including sharp grain converted to 1.8 mace of silver—the "three-six light carriage." Jiangsu and Anhui added 5.6 dou wastage and one dou sharp grain per picul; after four dou shipboard wastage, the remaining 2.6 dou converted to 1.3 mace of silver—the "two-six light carriage." Shandong and Henan added wastage and one dou sharp grain per picul; after 2.5 dou shipboard wastage, 1.6 dou converted to eight candareens of silver—the "one-six light carriage." Redirected exchange included only wastage grain ranging from 3.2 to 1.7 dou, paying shipboard wastage in kind while two sheng remaining grain exchanged for one fen of silver—the "converted light carriage." All conversions were collected at five candareens per sheng and remitted to the granary depot's Tongji treasury. In 1708 the annual quota of 384,000 taels light-carriage silver from Jiangnan and other provinces was divided: 246,900 taels from Shandong, Henan, Huguang, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and Jiangnan stayed at the Tongji treasury while the Suzhou-Songjiang grain intendant's 137,000 taels went directly to the Board of Revenue. If granary depots lacked funds, they could request disbursement from the Board of Revenue. Later 50,000 taels from the Suzhou-Songjiang grain intendant's quota was reallocated to the Tongji treasury reserves. Light-carriage silver was officially used for grain exchange and transport support; additionally mats, timber, bamboo, and planks submitted with tribute all had prescribed dimensions.
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便
In 1849 Li Xingyuan, Governor-General of the two Jiangs, reported that southern tribute commutation rates set by the Board of Revenue were too low, opening opportunities for corrupt counties to extort. Jiangsu Governor Lu Jiayuan also argued against the arrangement. Commutation to silver was therefore abolished. In 1865 Zeng Guofan and Li Hongzhang requested commutation for Zhenjiang and Taicang counties in Jiangsu but were denied. In 1884 Hanlin Reader Wang Bangbi memorialized five abuses, three difficulties, five advisable reforms, and three things that should not be done regarding land tax and tribute grain. Provincial tribute arrears were chronic at the time, prompting Wang's memorial. In 1897 Reader Rui Xun argued that southern tribute commutation would benefit the state without harm. Previously Jiangsu-Zhejiang tribute shipped roughly 1.2 million piculs by sea annually, beyond 120,000 to 130,000 piculs via canal. In 1894, to fund coastal defense, Jiangsu and Zhejiang each commuted 50 to 60 percent of tribute to silver. The following year Governor-General Zhang Zhidong proposed that Jiangsu counties collect commutation or grain in kind as before while the government converted everything to silver. The Board ordered continued shipment in grain. Zhang memorialized again that full Jiangsu commutation would save 800,000 taels in transport costs; full Zhejiang commutation with Huguang procurement stopped would allow cuts to lighterage, dredging, transport offices, and officials—saving 1.5 million taels annually. Later the Board of Revenue, citing treasury shortfall, requested temporarily reducing Jiangsu sea transport by 300,000 piculs, yielding over 980,000 taels in silver. Yi Kuang and others argued: "Southern tribute has fixed annual quotas vital to military and civilian livelihood; the capital as the nation's foundation requires ample reserves. Reformers claiming commutation would yield five or six million taels yearly actually meant only a little over one million—reform should not be undertaken lightly." The court approved.
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祿 祿 仿 仿
Beyond regular tribute, Suzhou, Songjiang, and Changzhou prefectures, Taicang department, and Jiaxing and Huzhou in Zhejiang annually delivered glutinous rice to the Imperial Household Department for imperial use and official salaries—white rice tribute. The original principal quota was 217,472 piculs and a fraction. Wastage for Suzhou, Songjiang, Changzhou, and Taicang: three dou per picul, with five or three sheng submitted with principal grain and the remainder as shipboard wastage—totaling 20,707 piculs and a fraction; Jiaxing and Huzhou: four dou wastage per picul, with five or three sheng with principal grain and the remainder as shipboard wastage—totaling 13,488 piculs and a fraction. Early in Kangxi's reign white rice was collected entirely in kind; only the Imperial Household Department commuted 30,000 piculs at 1.5 taels per picul. In 1675 Jiangnan white rice followed Zhejiang precedent: selected tribute boats received 69.3 piculs monthly rations and 56.76 taels silver per boat. Zhejiang's old expense allowance of 457.11 taels was reduced by 126.24 taels and 28 piculs. Since transport of tribute and white rice was unified, white-rice expense funds were cut and travel-gift silver paid by tribute precedent. White rice was entirely bagged for transport without wastage conversion, received at Tongzhou per regulation.
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祿 祿
Previously Jiangsu and Zhejiang delivered over 220,000 piculs white rice; the Sacrifice and Household departments' guest halls needed 2,000-plus; princes' and officials' salaries about 150,000 to 160,000; Forbidden City soldiers and eunuchs 10,000—leaving roughly 50,000 piculs surplus. In 1737 the Qianlong Emperor stated: "The Imperial Household Department and related agencies' receipts and expenditures for sacrifices and guest halls are essential. Princes' and officials' salary rice should halve the white rice quota, supplemented with polished non-glutinous rice. Grain for Forbidden City soldiers and eunuchs should substitute polished rice for white rice to ease the people's burden." Actual white glutinous rice collected thereafter did not exceed 100,000 piculs and a fraction. Songjiang and Taicang white glutinous quota was also converted to regular tribute within the 100,000 picul white-rice allocation to balance reductions and shipments. Zhejiang does not produce glutinous rice; the glutinous white-rice quota was collected as coarse non-glutinous grain with tribute and officials exchanged it for glutinous rice for transport. Both provinces' white-rice expense cuts were restored to former collection rules. Jiangsu collected 186,985 taels, 18,889 piculs, and 21,399 piculs husked; Zhejiang 45,075 taels, 3,969 piculs, and 13,290 piculs husked—totaling 232,061 taels and 55,748 piculs actually collected. After paying transport officers and troops and the Tongji treasury for Beijing-Tongzhou cartage, surplus silver and commuted grain were registered and sent to the Board for allocation. By Jiaqing white-rice expenses had fallen further: Jiangsu 60,000 taels and 10,000-plus piculs each of grain and husked; Zhejiang 50,000 taels and 3,000 piculs with 10,000-plus husked—totaling 114,518 taels and 53,729 piculs, more than half below Qianlong levels.
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沿 便 調調
Jiangsu-Zhejiang white-rice transport initially followed the Ming civilian-transport system. Late civilian boat hiring caused delays, so it shifted to official transport; Still burdening the people, tribute boats were ordered to carry white rice jointly to spare official and civilian labor. In 1664 Zhejiang's tandem-carry method required 126 boats—62 from tribute fleets plus 64 new boats in levy transport—later followed by Jiangsu. Each boat carried 500 piculs on sturdy military vessels, rotated every five years. Before annual exchange the grain intendant inspected convoys; exhausted troops or unsound boats were replaced with stronger crews. In 1677 Grain Transport Governor Hu Bao reported that Jiangsu's five-year white-rice boat rotation was too long and requested three-year rotation per tribute-boat precedent." Approved. White-rice fleets were organized as Suzhou-Taicang, Songjiang, Changzhou, Jiaxing, and Huzhou convoys, each with two transport lieutenants and one military licentiate. After official transport, prefectural vice commissioners headed convoys with county assistants and clerks as deputies and record clerks as escorts. Escort posts were soon abolished. When white rice shifted to tandem tribute transport, chief and assistant convoy posts were cut. Suzhou, Songjiang, and Changzhou each added two lieutenants rotating leadership; each convoy had one centurion escorting empty returns. Zhejiang added four lieutenants and two convoy centurions; Suzhou-Taicang's 118-boat fleet split into front and rear convoys with two lieutenants and one centurion added. After white-rice quota cuts both convoys merged and lieutenant and centurion posts were abolished.
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沿 西 西
Early Qing grain-transport officials followed the Ming system with adaptations. The Grain Transport Governor-General oversaw all transport affairs. Grain Storage intendants handled regional jurisdictions. Subprefects and vice commissioners supervised exchange and convoy escort. Route commanders and garrison officers along the canal urged convoys forward. Based at Huainan, the governor-general selected transport officers, maintained boats, issued allocation orders, opened convoys, inspected at the Huai crossing, urged laden convoys, verified empty returns, investigated losses, and pursued arrears over seven provinces. Each province had one grain intendant—Shandong, Jiang'an, Suzhou-Songjiang, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Hubei, and Hunan. Henan combined grain duties with the Kaigui Salt-Post intendant. Intendants managed provincial grain stores, appointed convoy officers, and coordinated with clear-army officials and transport officers to select troops. After exchange they personally escorted convoys to the Huai without delegating to assistants. Only urgent military matters with governor and transport governor approval permitted substitute commissioners.
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西 西
Exchange supervision originally fell to legal evaluators. After evaluators were abolished, vice commissioners took over. Shandong assigned the Wuding subprefect, Dongchang clear-army subprefect, four prefectural vice commissioners, and Jining and Linqing subprefectures; Henan assigned three vice commissioners at Guide, Weihui, and Huaiqing; Jiangnan assigned grain vice commissioners at Jiangning and Suzhou, tribute supervisor at Songjiang, Fengyang subprefect, eight grain vice commissioners, plus a temporary Taicang assistant; Zhejiang assigned the Huzhou subprefect, Hangzhou grain vice commissioner, and Jiaxing vice commissioner; Jiangxi assigned Nanchang, Ji'an, and Linjiang vice commissioners; North Huai and south Xiang annually detailed three vice commissioners from the province for exchange supervision. Jiangxi, Huguang, and Anhui Huai-escort exchange posts were soon abolished.
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When exchange began, supervising officers stayed at the landing to load each boat with the full quota of regular, wastage, travel-month, and supplementary rice, certify the grain was clean, and deliver it personally to escort officers. When grain boats set out, supervisors still escorted them personally to the Huai for inspection by the transport director-general. Short shipments or adulterated grain were penalized. Circuits, prefectures, and departments that failed to report were punished for negligence. Officials who deliberately shielded offenders were punished for favoritism.
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西 西
Escort duty belonged to grain-route commissioners, but southern commissioners were already fully occupied with transport affairs and could not manage both. Jiangsu and Zhejiang grain-route commissioners were required only to escort convoys to the Huai for inspection, then return home. The transport director-general and provincial governor jointly appointed a grain vice commissioner to supervise escorts, discipline transport troops, and prevent theft, pilferage, and adulteration. Shandong and Henan each had one vice commissioner; Jiangnan seven; Zhejiang three; Jiangxi two; and Hubei and Hunan one apiece. Later, because vice commissioners lacked rank and authority, grain-route commissioners were again assigned escort duty. Empty return voyages of transport boats remained under vice-commissioner escort. Crossing the Huai had to meet fixed deadlines; delays were punished under the heavy-transport violation statute. Jiangnan, Zhejiang, and Jiangxi soon restored vice-commissioner escort duty.
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After escorting subprefects and vice commissioners reached Tongzhou, they submitted sealed certificates of no grain loss, and the Granary Commissioner forwarded them to the ministry for imperial audience. Grain-route commissioners who completed three escort tours were also eligible, on gubernatorial recommendation, for ministry audience through the Granary Commissioner. Officers, commanders, and gentry who accompanied escorts to Tongzhou could also be commended for outstanding service as encouragement. Afterward provincial governors often used transport service to promote favorites, and the court had no way to investigate.
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沿 沿 沿 沿
Riverine commanders north and south of the Huai drove incoming transport boats forward within their patrol sectors; ineffective urging could be impeached by the local governor. At the Jingkou–Guazhou crossing in Jiangning, the Zhenjiang circuit intendant led civil and military officials in urging boats forward, while the regional commander patrolled the riverbank to assist the crossing. After the regional commander post was abolished, a brigade commander assumed the duty. In 1725 Transport-Circuit Censor Zhang Tanlin proposed northern transport reforms: first, patrol sectors from Tongzhou to Tianjin were too far apart; he asked that when boats reached a sector, officers who watched delays without reporting be impeached for ineffective urging, following the five-li dry-season patrol rule; second, about thirteen or fourteen shallow stretches along the route exceeded the Grain-Sitting Office's capacity; he proposed assigning dredging to patrol commanders while leaving expenditure under that office's control. The court approved. Transport-Circuit Censor Yilaqi impeached Henan grain commissioners for abusive advance urging; Governor Yin Jishan also asked to abolish customary fees that counties paid exchange and escort officers. Empty transport boats returning to a province were the governor's and grain commissioner's responsibility until exchange opened; after departure they fell to the transport governor and route officials; at Tianjin the Granary Commissioner, Grain-Sitting Office, Tianjin regional commander, and Tongzhou brigade commander conducted strict inspection. Violators were to be arrested and punished.
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沿 沿
In 1783 Transport Governor Yu Qi reported: "Of provincial escort supervisors, only Shandong's grain commissioner reached Tongzhou; the rest stopped at Huai'an. Henceforth each province's grain commissioner would escort its convoy to Linqing, certify no grain loss, and return home. From Linqing to Tongzhou the Shandong grain commissioner would handle all urging. Each year on the first day of the eleventh month the Shandong canal dam was closed and shallows dredged. The dam opened once southern transport boats reached Taizhuang. Lakes such as Weishan stored spring water as Shandong's transport reservoir; private diversion was forbidden. In spring and summer low water, sluice operation had to follow transport regulations. Transport boats could pass a sluice only after tally tokens from both upstream and downstream had arrived. When water was ample, sluices could be opened as needed to speed transport, but both gates must never be opened together and waste the current. Boats caught in high winds on the river could safely anchor and wait, but urging officials pressed on regardless, sending military boats into danger of capsizing. On empty return trips transport managers and troops often grew negligent, dismissed skilled boatmen to save wages, and left inexperienced hands at the helm, while escort officers returned to office instead of staying aboard—leading to frequent wind disasters." The emperor ordered route officials to read wind and water conditions and avoid excessive pressure that caused accidents, yet not use the edict as excuse for arbitrary delay beyond fixed deadlines. Early on, copper-lead boats and timber rafts on the canal often bullied their way through, and civilian boats usually yielded in fear. Northbound grain boats were blocked as well. The Transport-Circuit Censor then ordered route officials to send grain boats first and other vessels after in sequence; those who forced their way ahead were punished.
29
沿
Convoy leaders: provincial grain boats were divided into convoys, each led by one or two guard-unit battalion commanders with one military licentiate attached. In 1649 the court selected the most capable men from transport guard units as battalion commanders to escort convoys, promoting on merit and punishing shortages with repayment. Later, externally delegated company commanders were abolished in favor of convoy-attached officers. In 1712 thirty candidate battalion commanders were sent to the southern transport banner; when convoy-leader posts opened, the transport director-general could appoint them, and those who reached Tongzhou with full shipments were immediately confirmed through the Granary Commissioner and Board of War. Military licentiates awaiting battalion-commander posts who had served as convoy officers could register at headquarters and fill vacancies by succession; after three error-free years they were promoted to guard battalion commanders. In 1724 Transport Director-General Zhang Dayou reported that Shandong and Henan rotated grain shipments to Jizhou, Zunhua, and Fengrun troops, with escort vice commissioners responsible for route supervision and return urging; he asked for two Jizhou-grain battalion commanders on rotating duty, and the court agreed. Although guard units already had convoy battalion commanders, transport commissioners annually added separate escort officers for loaded and empty runs—heavy loads costing two or three thousand taels and empty runs over a thousand—until convoy labor was bled dry and surcharges multiplied. In 1807 the throne ordered transport governors not to multiply delegates and forbade transport officers from accepting gifts. In 1809 the Transport-Circuit Censor again requested major cutbacks. After river transport halted in 1853, boats vanished and the convoy-leader post was abolished.
30
The Transport-Circuit Censor was a Ming office abolished early in Shunzhi. In 1729, because grain boats crossing the Huai were rife with corrupt fees and smuggled contraband, two censors were sent to Huai'an for dedicated inspection. Two censors also inspected grain boats at Tongzhou. In 1737 four Transport-Circuit Censors were established: one at Huai'an, inspecting from the Jiangnan river mouth to the Shandong border; one at Jining, from Shandong's Taizhuang to the Zhili border; one at Tianjin, to the Shandong border; one at Tongzhou, to Tianjin. Tribute grain collection opened granaries in the tenth month and finished exchange by the twelfth. Only Shandong boats inside the Linqing sluice exchanged and departed in the second month of the following year to reach Tongzhou on time; boats outside the sluice still exchanged and departed in winter. During Qianlong, boats inside and outside the sluice were uniformly ordered to exchange and depart in spring at Transport Governor Yang Xifu's request. In 1799 an edict stated: "Winter exchange and winter departure make the schedule too tight. Henceforth eastern tribute grain would still be levied under the old rule and delivered to landings, with exchange completed and convoys opened after the Beginning of Spring; the next year this became winter exchange and spring departure." In 1810 convoy boats inside and outside the canal sluice were ordered to follow the spring-exchange, spring-departure rule. North-of-the-Yangtze winter transport opened exchange on the first day of the twelfth month and had to finish exchange and depart by the second month of the following year.
31
使
In transport exchange, grain quality came first. If granary fraud, adulteration, or damp spoilage occurred, prefectures and counties were responsible before acceptance and officers and troops afterward; exchange supervisors verified quality. When counties and guard units disputed grain quality, the grain under exchange was sealed and sent to the transport director-general and governor; if damp or adulterated, all parties had to compensate and replace it, samples were sealed for the director-general, and after the Huai crossing comparisons led to impeachments. Yet transport troops extorted counties using grain quality as a pretext. Within ten days of opening granaries, counties had more grain than storage space and had to exchange immediately. Transport troops nitpicked each boat and refused exchange, leaving grain households with nowhere to deliver and provoking disturbances. Transport troops seized the chance to extort freely; if refused, boats simply sailed off, forcing counties to chase convoys and complete exchange. After exchange was complete, transport officers were to issue clearance passes. Clearance passes came from lead transport laborers. Lead transport laborers were veteran transport hands whom other troops and officers obeyed. Lead laborers demanded fees from counties; if denied, they withheld clearance passes and counties suffered penalties for delay. Transport troops and officers colluded, and counties fearing missed exchange had no choice but to over-collect and squeeze deductions to meet their demands. Superiors knew the abuses but feared reform. They also feared that cutting transport troops would disrupt grain transport, so they tolerated the abuses and no one stopped them. With so much over-collection, counties could not carefully select grain quality. Once transport troops received side payments, they no longer scrutinized exchange closely. At Tongzhou they bribed granary clerks and brokers to arrange improper delivery, and most cases of damp, adulterated grain stemmed from this. Abuses piled up beyond reversal, and transport administration deteriorated daily. During Qianlong, Transport Director-General Gu Cong proposed seven transport reforms: first, counties should collect tribute grain personally to prevent clerks from burdening the people; second, stop the rich hiding while the poor contracted to substitute for transport labor; third, urge convoys that had not yet opened to depart quickly; fourth, after grain boats crossed the Huai, assign officers to urge transport separately and speed convoys; fifth, dredge old cross-channel shallows in advance to prevent blockage; sixth, all locks should open and close per transport regulations, and Jiangsu and Guangdong boats carrying bamboo and timber should unload at designated places; seventh, promptly give the three sheng five he of surplus grain from empty returns to assistant transport laborers for food on the return journey. The court approved his proposal.
32
西 西
At the beginning of Shunzhi, provincial tribute grain crossing the Huai had fixed deadlines: north-of-the-Yangtze counties by the twelfth month; Jiangnan's Jiangning, Suzhou, and Songjiang by the first month; Jiangxi and Zhejiang by the second month; and Shandong and Henan to depart fully within the first month. Huai-crossing delays were penalized by how many days the deadline was missed, with governors, grain commissioners, exchange supervisors, and evaluators demoted accordingly. Convoy leaders were bound, beaten, dismissed, and made to escort convoys while under penalty. Regular Tongzhou arrival deadlines were: Shandong and Henan by the first day of the third month; north of the Yangtze by the fourth month; Jiangnan by the fifth month; and Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and Huguang by the sixth month. Provincial grain boats at Tongzhou had to complete delivery within three months and return empty within ten days. The granary field issued deadline certificates requiring convoy escort officers to reach the Huai on time; late arrivals were impeached under regulation.
33
調
As peace endured, transport abuses multiplied daily. Southeastern taxpayers handling transport were squeezed dry by transport officers and banner laborers with no recourse for complaint, yet those officers and laborers were themselves under pressure. When transport boats reached Tongzhou, filing documents at the granary office, grain office, Board of Revenue's Yunnan Bureau, and elsewhere cost ten taels per boat through guarantor households, who charged three taels more on top. Runners also collected fees on their behalf. Passing sluices added old delegate fees, squad-leader charges, and loading and unloading costs—another ten-plus taels per boat. Granary delivery brought standing fees for granary officers and assorted demands from grain-office clerks, costing dozens of taels more. Such were the hardships of reaching Tongzhou. Crossing the Huai brought apportioned rest levies, corrupt clerk fees, and costs for filing documents and passing through offices. Each convoy cost five or six hundred taels, or as much as a thousand. Such were the hardships of crossing the Huai. When the canal ran deep and clear, transport supervisors only required loaded convoys to reach Tongzhou on time and did not inspect closely. On departure transport laborers carried southern goods to sell at Tongzhou for a small profit. After 1785 repeated Yellow River irrigation silted the canal; fearing overloaded boats, transport commissioners strictly limited cargo, cutting off transport laborers' livelihood. The shallow canal added lightering costs; at each critical lock hundreds of men were needed to tow; long routes and tight deadlines exhausted transport labor. Despite governors' careful adjustments, deep-rooted abuses prevented real improvement.
34
滿
Provincial transport boats originally numbered 10,455. By 1809, after commuted shares and wasteland cutbacks, 6,242 boats remained. One-tenth were rebuilt annually as routine construction; boats replacing sunk or lost vessels counted as supplementary rebuilds, with a ten-year service limit. Payment varied by age of the boat and distance of the location. Boat-building costs were initially levied seven-tenths from civilian land and three-tenths from military land for materials. If insufficient, guard-unit transport laborers' fields were levied to subsidize boat construction. After ten years the transport director-general personally inspected; only unfit boats were rebuilt; repairable boats received supplementary funds and sailed again. If usable old boats sailed without inspection, investigating governors impeached the offenders. Officials who falsely claimed decay, reported unfinished boats complete, concealed decay in registers, missed deadlines, supervised poorly, or failed to report decayed boats—all received graded demotions and penalties.
35
沿使 滿
Timberless Zhili, Shandong, and Fengyang established a shipyard at Qingjiang Pass under a ship-administration subprefect. Jiangning's convoys, over 1,200 boats, were also built at Qingjiang. From Yizheng upstream to the Huai, four hundred li of towing was required; finished boats then crossed the Yangtze on a thousand-li journey. Delayed arrivals made county officials eager for performance reviews and banner laborers eager to extort; exchange began before boats arrived—called transferred-granary exchange—multiplying gifts, fees, compensation, and exactions until transport troops suffered. Later the ship-administration subprefect was abolished and the grain commissioner took over; transport troops received material funds to build at the shipyard, drawing from stored transport silver if needed. Xuzhou Guard and Henan rear-convoy boats had also been built at Qingjiang and sailed to Henan landings—a distant route that easily missed exchange deadlines. Soon a shipyard was established at Linqing in Shandong instead. In full-register years each guard unit drew funds from Jiangsu-Anhui circuit treasuries to build boats. Jinan's front convoy was built at Xiacheng in Jiangnan, later moved to a shipyard at Hujiawan in Linqing.
36
滿 滿 滿 滿 沿
Finished boats were inspected nine ways: timber, planks, bottom, beams, decking, nails, seams, hold, and bow and stern. Beyond quota boats, Shandong convoys formerly kept thirty reserve boats. Yangzhou in Jiangsu also kept twenty-four reserve boats. Reserve boats were gradually cut; Yangzhou Guard's cutbacks replaced impoverished boats in Jiangning and Xinghua guards. In 1743 Transport Director-General Gu Cong proposed transport-boat reforms: first, in major construction years, if convoys were reduced, stop building for one year so service years would stagger and future construction need not coincide; second, compensation-built boats that had sailed repeatedly were often flimsy; henceforth they would count toward the original boat's term, and boats still seaworthy after ten years could be sold at Tongzhou; third, full-register boats had been built in rotation; sturdy ones selected by the transport director-general could be repaired, sail once more, and then be sold openly. The court approved. In 1764 Transport Governor Yang Xifu proposed: "When provincial transport boats completed ten voyages and reconstruction was due, if grain reached Tongzhou, boats could be sold there. Replacement boats that had not completed full service, or boats lost to wind or fire en route, should be permitted local sale." The court approved his proposal. Dahe and Huai'an convoy boats frequently sank in storms. Agui reported that oversized boats made steering and towing difficult and asked to reduce dimensions below the original specifications. In 1810 Jiangsu and Guangdong transport-boat dimensions were again reduced. Transport laborers profited from passenger and merchant cargo and built ever-larger hulls, unaware that overload slowed travel, caused jams, and blocked civilian boats—some waiting weeks just yards apart; They also forcibly seized lightering work and beat victims repeatedly; public outrage filled the roads—not only the risk of capsizing. In 1812, because Zhejiang boat construction losses worsened daily, each boat received over 590 taels beyond the statutory 280 to relieve transport labor. Building and repairing transport boats cost millions from the treasury annually in regular and extra expenses. On transport duty they extorted tens of millions more from counties. Urging and hauling kept them busy year-round; smuggled cargo grew; even Suzhou and Songjiang inland waterways saw annual lightering extortion. Lightering still seized boats along the route, even blocking rivers for fees, seizing boats and destroying equipment, harming merchants and defying officials, citing imperial granaries and the transport governor as protection; civil and military officials feared their power and none investigated.
37
Transport boats could carry no more than five hundred piculs of grain. Beyond regular and wastage grain, sixty piculs of local products were permitted; in 1729 forty more were added for a permanent total of one hundred piculs. Soon each boat's foreman, helmsman, and crew were allowed three piculs of local products, and sailors twenty piculs per boat. In 1799 each boat was allowed an additional twenty-four piculs of local products. Garrison troops hauling tribute grain departed and returned in winter under extreme hardship, with daily expenses far exceeding home life—leading to smuggling. At landings brokers immediately arranged passenger cargo; at busy cities boats lingered hoping to take more freight for a small profit. Transport officers profited from gifts; unscrupulous merchants hid aboard grain boats to evade state duties. At first the canal ran smoothly and transport supervisors did not inspect harshly. When repeated Yellow River backflow silted the canal, transport commissioners strictly enforced smuggling bans and transport labor grew more distressed.
38
When commerce flourished, empty military boats crossing the Huai often smuggled salt. Transport Director-General Zhang Dayou proposed six measures: first, at Changlu and Two Huai salt areas, smugglers colluded with saltern workers to load salt onto empty grain boats; strict prohibition was requested and violators punished under the private-salt statute; second, empty grain boats should be searched at Guazhou and the river mouth with garrison and office staff cooperating; third, transport commissioners who captured private salt should be rewarded under the specialized-jurisdiction statute; fourth, convoy officers specializing in empty returns who captured private salt three times, or whose convoys returned clean three times, should be promoted to battalion commanders; fifth, each boat might carry forty jin of table salt; excess was punished under the private-salt statute; sixth, beyond permitted local products, contracting merchant boats and timber rafts was punished as tax evasion with confiscation of goods. From then on prohibitions grew ever tighter. Distressed convoy laborers prompted talk of subsidies. Among Jiangsu transport boats, Songjiang convoy labor was most exhausted. Songjiang, Taicang, and related districts received three hundred taels subsidy per boat by regulation, soon raised to five hundred. Convoy laborers treated this as fixed pay yet still sought more subsidies; delayed departures made counties fear penalties and give private gifts—subsidies grew and abuses never ceased.
39
沿調 西
Grain transport at Tongzhou and in shallows required lighter boats. Early Qing established six hundred red lighter boats, each granted forty qing of tax-exempt fields whose rent supported the boat. Capital-area counties far from the river constantly hired civilian boats; riverbank vagrants profited; grain handoffs often involved theft and adulteration; sometimes nearly all grain was stolen and boats deliberately capsized; transport officers still held local households liable, ruining families. Boat owners leading boats fell under Tianjin customs board runners; each year before the ice melted, board runners urged them through offices and waiting—all involving fees and severe hardship. In 1774 red lighter boats were abolished; original rent was apportioned to provinces, levied on tribute grain, remitted to grain commissioners' treasuries, and disbursed. In 1737 each boat received two taels of red-lighter silver from convoy battalion commanders; in shallows transport troops hired civilian boats at prices set by the Grain-Sitting Office. In 1748 sixty additional lighter boats were established; construction, equipment, labor, and rations came from red-lighter silver, with the remainder distributed to transport troops. After southern grain entered the northern canal, the government hired lighters; boats waited days before grain arrived, also obstructing merchant salt transport. In 1785 the throne ordered separate lighter boats built; southern grain reaching the northern canal was immediately lightered to Tongzhou; civilian boats must no longer be commandeered; violators were punished. Soon 1,200 government lighters were assigned to eighteen nearby riverine counties including Tianjin; they could carry merchant goods and salt; after the fourth month they reported to landings and must not stray far. The next year three hundred more were built in Jiangxi and Huguang, sent to Tianjin, and rotated with original lighters at Yangcun. Henan and Shandong, blocked by shallow water, built three hundred lighters assigned to Dezhou, En, Wucheng, Xiajin, and Linqing.
40
沿 使 便 便 便
Early Qing followed the Ming guard-unit system, granting garrison fields to troops for tenant farming and abolishing miscellaneous corvée. Soon guard troops became garrison laborers barred from civilian registers; the grain commissioner conducted registration every five years. Early in Kangxi each guard unit was fixed at ten transport laborers. In 1696 each sailing boat conscripted one transport laborer; the remaining nine were skilled boatmen. Conscripting transport laborers was the grain commissioner's duty; nomination fell to guard defense commanders, selection to transport officers, and guarantees to the whole convoy. Soon one native son of the unit was conscripted as assistant soldier. Early in Yongzheng literary licentiates were exempted from transport conscription. Earlier Jiangsu provincial judge Hu Wenbo, because ten Jiangsu-Anhui guard units were far from Suzhou and Songjiang landings and replacing laborers required time-consuming trips to guard units, requested pre-conscripting reserve laborers, compiling registers for the grain commissioner and transport director-general. The Board of Revenue approved. Transport Governor Yang Xifu memorialized in opposition, stating: "Pre-conscripting idle laborers is unnecessary for two reasons and inconvenient for two reasons. Provincial guard convoys differed in wealth. Wealthy convoys had no need to prepare idle laborers in advance; impoverished convoys, when laborers needed replacement, could scarcely find one or two wealthy men—how could dozens of idle laborers be prepared? That is the first reason it is unnecessary. Moreover prosperous garrison laborers might become impoverished within a year or two of poor harvests; once registered, when needed they might already be exhausted— that is the second reason it is unnecessary. Sending them to the grain commissioner for inspection wasted time and disrupted livelihood on the road—the first inconvenience. Guard-unit and county clerks welcomed the extra business; the rich bribed their way out and the poor were conscripted—the second inconvenience. He requested stopping advance selection and registration of idle laborers." The court approved.
41
沿 沿
Under the old system each transport boat had ten banner laborers, each with five qing of assigned fields. Later half the laborer fields passed to civilians; transport laborers grew impoverished; the Board of Revenue ordered investigation and forbade civilian encroachment. Early in Qianlong, Transport-Circuit Censor Wang Xingwu memorialized: "Garrison-field registers had long been lost and could not be verified. Some registers survived but boundaries were hard to confirm; or garrison laborers mortgaged fields to civilians, which were then resold repeatedly. Clearing fields and returning them to transport would only increase disturbance and burden. Subsidies had already become common practice: civilians paid to support laborers, who received funds to undertake transport—a long-standing custom that did not hinder grain transport. Moreover, laborers who received fields could not farm them themselves and would hire tenants for rent—the same income as subsidies, with no visible benefit." In 1760 Yang Xifu memorialized: "Exhausted convoys in grain transport truly arose from transport laborers' debt burdens. Among Zhejiang convoys of Jinhua, Quzhou, Yanzhou, Wenzhou, Chuzhou, Shaoxing, Taizhou, and Jiaxing, and Jiangnan convoys of Jiangning, Huai'an, Xinghua, Wujiang, Fengyang, and Dahe, debts were especially heavy and exhaustion especially severe. To remove private debt burdens, nothing was better than lending from the public treasury. He requested withdrawing sixty thousand taels each from the Zhejiang and Jiangsu-Anhui circuit treasuries for exhausted convoys to borrow. Each year transport-supervising circuit officials calculated silver needed along the route and at Tongzhou, submitted it to escort officers, disbursed on schedule, and deducted repayment from the following year's allotments until exhausted convoys recovered.
42
調
Provincial counties and guard convoys conscripting transport laborers had two months from the dispatch date to deliver them, with fields and property investigated and registers filed with the transport director-general. Shortages or outstanding debts required compensation. If after conscription the rich bought their way out and the poor were assigned, or laborers fled, dismissed men were re-conscripted, or garrison laborers were shifted to civilian registers through favoritism, the conscripting officer was demoted two ranks without offset. Their superiors were penalized for negligence. This followed a request from Transport Governor Yu Qi. In 1833 Supervising Secretary Jin Yinglin memorialized: "Transport boats along Jiangsu and Zhejiang inland waterways extorted merchants under names such as passage purchase and convoy blocking. Counties, fearing nitpicking over exchange grain, ignored the abuses; transport delays harmed the people greatly." The throne ordered Lin Zexu and Funiyang'a to strictly investigate and prohibit the practice.
43
西
Transport troops traveling between the Huai and Tongzhou toiled all year; garrison-field income was limited; thus separate travel-month grain funds were provided, varying by province. Jiangnan transport troops each received two piculs four dou to two piculs eight dou travel grain and eight to twelve piculs monthly grain. Zhejiang, Jiangxi, and Huguang received three piculs travel grain and nine piculs six dou monthly grain. Shandong received two piculs four dou travel grain and nine piculs six dou monthly grain. Transport laborers of Tongzhou, Tianjin, and other guards assisting Henan transport boats received the same travel-month amounts as Shandong. Provincial convoy-leader battalion commanders and other officers often additionally received travel grain beyond their salary rations. For travel and monthly grain, formerly little grain and much silver conversion were given at only three to five qian per picul; officials and laborers everywhere petitioned about unfair distribution. The throne ordered the transport governor to fix payment at half grain and half silver conversion per old travel-month quotas, with conversion at 1.4 taels per picul as for transport arrears, permanently as regulation. In 1690 travel-month funds used easy-receipt vouchers listing all payments; each laborer received one slip and was paid accordingly. If officials or runners embezzled or extorted, laborers could record the matter on the slip and petition at the Huai crossing.
44
In 1723 when transport boats arrived, grain-form travel-month funds were converted to silver within three days; the guard defense commander issued a sealed receipt, the convoy battalion commander affixed his seal, and the grain commissioner carried half to the Huai for the transport director-general to supervise disbursement; deadline violators were punished. In 1740 from the half of funds verified at Huai release, return-voyage expenses were set aside—one-third for larger amounts, eight taels for smaller—the grain commissioner sealed them separately, handed them to escort officers at the Huai, and disbursed them after Tongzhou delivery. Empty return voyages often lacked travel funds and could not reach destinations on time. In 1745 Transport Governor Gu Cong reported: "Convoys escorted by the grain commissioner differ in size and timing; he must wait for the last convoy to open before supervising, while the first convoy waits to receive silver. He asked that the grain commissioner again seal funds after verifying exchange and give them to convoy battalion commanders to send to the Huai for inspection and disbursement." The court approved.
45
西
When transport boats halted, monthly grain was halved; when civilian boats halted transport, one-quarter of the monthly quota was given. In 1765 during the southern tour, Jiangsu and Zhejiang each retained one hundred thousand piculs of winter-exchange tribute grain; halted boats received an additional twenty percent beyond monthly grain as sympathy. Transport troops' monthly grain in leap years was evenly disbursed in grain and silver conversion; this was soon abolished. Later, because leap-month funds were calculated daily and troops departed in spring and returned in winter, stopping one month left them hungry. Shandong, Henan, Zhejiang, Jiangning, Fengyang, and other guards with leap-month grain still received full quotas. Shandong, Zhejiang, and Suzhou-Taicang guards had fixed leap-year silver levies; Jiangning and Xinghua guards drew leap-year funds from circuit treasury reserves. Jiangxi, Hubei, and Hunan were paid according to grain on departing boats. Henan also had no leap-year levy silver; it had been permitted to pay like Shandong; the ministry initially rejected and demanded repayment, then approved continued payment.
46
Registered transport troop numbers varied by province. Jiangsu and Zhejiang had eleven or twelve men per boat. Later each boat was fixed at ten soldiers for transport, with travel-month paid by name. Anqing Guard formerly assigned travel and monthly grain by name according to troops used for transport. After uniform reduction to ten soldiers per boat, Anqing boats still carried double the tribute grain and should receive travel-month pay by grain volume. Shandong guards such as Dezhou that hired civilian boats to load transport grain received travel-month funds equally. Jiangning guards had no garrison fields supporting transport; reduced boats received settlement monthly grain like boats on transport duty. The Huaijiang and Xingwu guards had originally
47
had two steering soldiers cut; they were permitted to restore them with travel and monthly grain; by regulation the provincial treasurer ordered counties to disburse funds; each boat gave clerks six or seven taels in gifts, otherwise distant hard-to-collect funds were assigned; county grain clerks also demanded two or three taels per boat. Of ten taels' worth of grain, transport laborers actually received less than half.
48
Tribute grain was the regular supply of the imperial granaries; transport officials faced extremely strict performance review. In 1655 performance-review regulations were fixed for the transport and grain circuits. Collecting officials who missed tribute-grain deadlines received salary fines, suspension, demotion, or dismissal, and supervised urging under penalty until completion. In 1663 travel-month grain, light-cargo funds, and other transport items, calculated as ten parts, gave impeached officials one year to collect arrears while collecting officials had only half a year—quite unfair. Thereafter collecting officials had one year, grain commissioners and prefects one and a half years, and governors two years. If still incomplete, penalties followed the original impeachment proportions. Performance-review regulations for white-rice tribute officials were the same as for tribute grain. Reduced stored operating silver under white-rice items must not be used without authorization; violators were impeached and ordered to repay. When grain commissioners completed stored funds, spring and autumn registers went to the ministry awaiting allocation for capital funds. At year-end and on departure, provincial treasurers audited and reported embezzlement or loss to governors for impeachment.
49
沿
All transport arrears, regardless of amount, were strictly pursued by grain commissioners; pursuing officials investigated officers' and troops' property, sold assets, and compensated. If transport troops embezzled grain and fled, the Board of Revenue was notified and governor-generals ordered to arrest and prosecute. If recovered grain did not match the convoy's original shortage, the transport director-general who failed to reject substitution at the Huai, transport supervisors, transport officers, and procurement personnel were all impeached. Arrived grain was accepted in full to avoid burdening transport troops. As peace endured, laws grew lax; grain commissioners and exchange and escort officers no longer attended landings; at the Huai the transport director-general did not inspect strictly; officers and troops converted grain to silver and sold along the route, accumulating debts at the customs pass.
50
In 1780 wastage, gift, transport, and intercept silver and grain were temporarily stored in grain commissioners' granaries; upon empty return the granary field deducted according to outstanding amounts. If insufficient, travel grain made up the difference. Soon officers and troops with arrears from less than one to six percent were punished; the transport director-general and grain commissioner were penalized proportionally; outstanding grain was borne by transport officials, exchange supervisors, escort officers, conscripting officials, guard officers, and transport laborers, all required to repay within fixed deadlines. If incomplete, the transport director-general and grain commissioner were referred to the ministry; transport officers and troops were punished separately; the transport director-general and grain commissioner remained liable for compensation. Full repayment earned preferential commendation.
51
When grain boats reached Tongzhou and unloaded tribute grain, surplus grain from other convoys was routinely purchased to cover shortages. In 1725 if tribute grain was insufficient, officials were impeached and made to repay separately; surplus grain from other convoys could no longer be purchased to supplement. Transport troops' daily surplus grain could be sold; all else was forbidden.
52
沿 調
When transport boats crossing lakes and rivers were sunk by wind and waves, route urging officials and patrol civil and military officials personally inspected and certified; the transport director-general and governor re-inspected and memorialized for exemption. If officers falsely reported sinking, or after limited loss embezzled up to six hundred piculs, decapitation was proposed; if less than six hundred piculs, exile to the frontier; tribute grain was repaid in full. Civil and military officials who failed to report sinkings, and escort officers who inspected carelessly and allowed fire to destroy boats, were all demoted one rank and transferred. Local officials who failed to assist rescue and allowed fire to spread to other boats were fined one year's salary. Early in Yongzheng, transport boats lost to wind on inland waterways were not exempted; escort officers were fined one year's salary for failure to guard. Fabricated cases were severely punished; certifying officers were penalized heavily. When wind swept boats away on sea or river, surviving convoy officers and troops were promoted and given gold for meritorious service in preserving supplies. Those swept away and killed—officers received posthumous honors and enfeoffment; transport troops received funeral silver.
53
沿 滿 滿
In 1742 when transport boats met wind or fire but had not sunk, whether or not they had crossed the Huai, they were repaired and reloaded to reach Tongzhou. If already sunk and hard to pump out, civilian boats carried the grain, crossing the Huai with the convoy for inspection to Tongzhou. If the accident occurred after the Huai in mid-Yellow River where civilian boats were hard to hire, Tongzhou convoys first carried part of the grain while civilian boats were hired along the route. Each Tongzhou convoy laborer issued mutual guarantees; any shortage required compensation. When Jiangsu and Guangdong transport boats sank, if beyond repair, local officials verified, reported to the transport director-general, sold locally, and transport officers carried the silver to the grain commissioner for disbursement. Empty return transport boats meeting disaster were handled the same way. Later Jiangsu, Zhejiang, Shandong, Henan, and other provinces were permitted to purchase replacement boats; if the register was full and wind disaster occurred, local sale was permitted and silver was carried back by officers to the grain commissioner for new transport. When transport boats were damaged by ice floes or destroyed by lightning fire with grain lost, compensation was waived.
54
沿沿
Each province's tribute grain had annual quotas; for unlevied wasteland, governors investigated and reported exemption, and accompanying transport silver and grain were exempted equally. In disaster areas, tribute grain due and converted transport prices were adjusted by disaster severity, with deferred or arrears collection. In arrears-collection years struck again by disaster, collection was spread over years with deferred supplementary payment. Fields along rivers and coasts that collapsed into water were reported with guarantee for exemption. Civilian land suffering partial flood or drought was exempt by regulation; only boat-service obligations, even in severe disaster, still required repair, hiring, and recruitment and could not claim the same leniency. In 1698 fields held by red-lighter boat households in Tongzhou, Wuqing, Baodi, Xianghe, Dong'an, and Yongqing in the capital region were exempt alike in flood and drought. Flooded fields were surveyed at year-end; if dried, collection began; if still flooded, collection was suspended and exempted. In 1732 flooded-field tribute grain followed deferred-collection rules; after winter survey, dried fields were collected in arrears and flooded fields were exempted.
55
仿
Suzhou, Songjiang, and Taicang were the southeastern revenue region with the heaviest tax quotas. Since Yongzheng, exemptions and deferrals were repeatedly discussed, yet compared with other prefectures and counties in the province they still bore four to ten times the burden. During Daoguang, after two great floods, annual famine exemptions and reductions became yearly precedent in each county. Thereafter, aside from official advances for civilian arrears, annual collection reached only fifty to eighty percent of the regular quota. After military campaigns began, the two prefectures and one department suffered especially severely. In 1863 the Jiangsu governor-general and governor were ordered to investigate balanced reductions, reconcile with lighter-quota Changzhou and Zhenjiang, and fix permanent quotas. Gentry manipulation, county over-collection, and other abuses were permanently forbidden. In 1865 the Board of Revenue followed deliberation: "Registered levy grain of Changzhou, Zhenjiang, and Taicang in Jiangsu was collected together with transport gifts, travel-month, southern relief bureau grain, and other items. Following Li Hongzhang's memorial, regardless of shipment or retention, all should be reduced together by tax-rate severity; originally 2.02 million piculs were registered, reduced by 540,000 piculs." Popular hardship was somewhat eased. Zeng Guofan again requested balanced reduction of Suzhou and Songjiang land transport grain funds. The ministry replied that transport funds were essential; reduction would leave funds insufficient and require added subsidies, still without benefit to the people. The throne ordered Guofan and Hongzhang to follow Zhejiang precedent, cut verified excess collection, and strictly forbid large-household contracting and short delivery. That year Zhejiang's Hangzhou, Jiaxing, and Huzhou districts reduced grain by over 260,000 piculs.
56
沿
Sea transport began in the Yuan; when the Huitong Canal was completed in Ming Yongle, it was abandoned. The Qing followed the Ming long-distance transport system. During Jiaqing, excessive discharge from Hongze Lake shallowed the canal, and Jiangsu and Zhejiang officials were ordered to plan sea transport as well. Governor-General Lebao and others jointly memorialized twelve reasons sea transport would not work, stating: "If sea transport began, river transport still could not be abandoned, merely increasing costs. Moreover, the open ocean had numerous sandbars and reefs, dangerous and hard to navigate; the imperial granary supply must not be tried in unpredictable waters. Banner laborers did not know sea routes, boat owners were scattered and unregistered, and delay would have serious consequences." The emperor said: "Sea transport has many obstacles; predecessors' methods must be kept and the canal diligently repaired; if surplus and deficit do not balance, only lightering, lock passage, or measured retention may serve as temporary expedients; change must not be lightly discussed—if benefit is not a hundredfold, do not change the law." From then until the end of Jiaqing, none dared propose sea transport.
57
In 1824 Yellow River water in the Southern Canal surged; the Gaoyan dam breached; from Gaoyou and Baoying to Qingjiangpu the canal was shallow and blocked and transport was extremely difficult. Minister Wen Fu and others requested diverting the Yellow River into the canal and adding locks and dams to constrain the swollen flow. Yet Yellow River water carried silt; over time silting accumulated and the harm deepened. The emperor also knew borrowing the Yellow River to aid transport was no solution; thus sea transport was proposed again. The throne ordered Wei Yuanyu, Yan Jian, Zhang Shicheng, and Huang Hongjie each to plan according to conditions in their jurisdictions. The officials feared change and memorialized that obstacles made implementation difficult. Meanwhile Sun Yuting, because Yellow River crossing was difficult, with forty military convoys requiring lock passage and transshipment, requested up to 1.2 million taels from the treasury. Before long, because water was insufficient and hauling was difficult, he again requested retaining one million piculs of grain. The emperor ordered Qishan to investigate; he reported that among boats crossing the Yellow, some had not departed after a month, some were silt-blocked between Yellow-control dams, and military boats that should have been lightered could not move. The emperor was greatly angered; Yuanyu, Yuting, and Jian were all punished.
58
便 使使 西
Associate Grand Secretary Yinghe submitted advice: "When governance lasts long it reaches exhaustion; when exhausted it must change. Since the canal was blocked and heavy transport halted, river and canal transport could not both be managed; river transport must temporarily halt to repair the canal while hiring sea boats to aid transport—urgent though temporary. If stalled tribute were entirely passed through locks and lightered, the people would be exhausted and treasury costs not saved; temporarily hiring sea boats for divided transport would ease the people and restore vitality. The state had enjoyed peace long; voyages from eastern Wu to the Liaodong sea passed back and forth like inland routes. Using merchant transport for sea transport, storms, bandits, and mold or damp spoilage need not be feared. Using merchant transport instead of official transport, boats need not be built, crews need not be recruited, and prices need not be arranged. Resettling garrison troops, auditing granary clerks, and managing river affairs all depended on personnel. Moreover, borrowing the Yellow River was already harmful and lock passage also harmful—without change, what policy could be followed? Your subject believes nothing is as convenient as sea transport." The throne again sent the matter to transport-province officials for deliberation. Qishan supervised the Two Jiangs and Tao Zhu governed Anhui; both requested that grain from Suzhou, Songjiang, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, and Taicang all go by sea transport. Provincial treasurer He Changling was sent to the port to supervise local officials in recruiting merchant boats and planning lightering, exchange, and loading. Later Tao Zhu reported: "One thousand sand boats and several dozen 'three-unlike' boats are hired, loaded in two batches, estimated to transport 1.5 to 1.6 million piculs. Anhui, Jiangxi, and Huguang were farther from port; Zhejiang's Zhapu and Ningbo ports either could not anchor or lightering costs were huge; they still went by river transport." The throne then ordered a Sea Transport General Bureau at Shanghai and a bureau at Tianjin. The throne ordered Minister Mujangga and the Granary Commissioner stationed at Tianjin to inspect receipt and supervise exchange, stopping broker demands and obstruction.
59
沿
In the first month of 1826, grain lightered by each county reached Shanghai in sequence for exchange and departed in batches. The sea route totaled over four thousand li and was completed in little over ten days. After grain reached Tongzhou, it was transferred to Beijing granaries under inspection by civil and military officers from the Metropolitan Banner commander's office. Sand-boat wastage grain was drawn from the 180,000 piculs statutorily given to banner laborers; the 60,000 piculs saved still departed with the shipment. Transported tribute grain received eight sheng wastage per picul; white-rice tribute received one dou wastage per picul to supplement shortfalls. Merchant wastage was calculated at twenty percent and white-rice wastage at thirty percent, purchased by the Tianjin bureau and delivered with principal grain. If tribute grain was short or moldy without cause, it was made up from reserve wastage grain; if insufficient, purchase to supplement was ordered. If masts were cut, hulls loosened, or people injured, exemption was granted. Boat owners' freight, rice rations, silver conversion, and subsidies were disbursed seventy percent after exchange; the remaining thirty percent was held by escort officers and fully paid only after reaching the dam with no abuses found. Sand-boat surplus grain was at least one hundred thousand piculs; initially Tianjin residents could purchase at market price under southern-grain precedent. Later, because merchants sought cheap purchase, the government bought instead and Jiangnan commissioners forwarded silver to boat owners; afterward merchant boats sold on their own again.
60
沿 沿
Each sea transport season, coastal naval commanders dispatched patrol boats and soldiers by sector for escort, and two senior military officers accompanied boats to Tianjin. At Shanghai exchange, Zhejiang naval commanders patrolled Zhaobao and Chenqian, Jiangnan commanders patrolled Greater and Lesser Yangshan, meeting at Matsu Island; Shandong's regional commander patrolled Chengshan and Shidao, meeting at Yingyou Gate. On Shandong waters, brigade and garrison commanders searched islands and protected escort reception. Later, following Shao Can's advice, senior escort officers were discontinued; coastal naval forces relayed escort stage by stage. Later Ningbo and Shanghai merchants each placed one steamship to patrol key points when new tribute exchange departed.
61
便
Zhili originally had 2,500 lighter boats; 200 were distributed to Gucheng and elsewhere, 800 kept at Yangcun, and 1,500 gathered at Tianjin for reserve. Later five hundred civilian boats capable of loading 250 piculs were hired for loading. When merchant boats first reached Tianjin, only three hundred thousand piculs were unloaded at county granary annexes and temples; the rest went directly to Tongzhou granaries by lighter. Then tribute grain stored at Tianjin granary annexes and temples was transported to Tongzhou, avoiding transfer to the northern granary and extra complications. When merchant boats reached Tianjin a second time, if lighters were insufficient, grain was first stored at county granary annexes and temples; if still insufficient, it was lightered to the northern granary. Then the original lighters transported all stored grain to Tongzhou. If lighters sufficed, the first-arrival method was followed without storing at the northern granary, for simplicity. One hundred sixty lighters formed one group; brokers dispatched escorts in groups to deliver to granaries, reported to the granary field, then returned to escort later grain boats. Brokers need only lead measuring hands to boats for unloading; obstruction or demands for fees were severely punished by local officials.
62
County-managed lighters received five taels repair silver annually; minor repair every three years received twenty taels; at year-end boats were inspected; sturdy hulls received measured repair; severe damage was valuated and funded from circuit-treasury oil-and-caulking silver. During river closure and ice-guard periods, each boat received fifteen taels labor rations; per hundred piculs transported, freight was eight taels four qian and rations one picul one dou five sheng. Later five taels freight per hundred piculs was added. Li Hongzhang, because official lighter households grew impoverished and abuses multiplied, noted statutory fifteen-tael labor rations were only half received; he requested five taels subsidy per boat from Jiangsu and Zhejiang transport funds; the ministry rejected it. Hongzhang memorialized in opposition; the court approved his proposal. Merchant boats transporting tribute grain swiftly and without error: under ten thousand piculs received a plaque; fifty thousand piculs received honorary rank; each commendation memorial was limited to 120–130 persons.
63
In 1827 Jiang Yohuan requested that new tribute still go by sea transport. The emperor, because rivers and lakes had gradually become navigable and military boats could proceed smoothly, did not permit it. Thereafter each province's annual transport quota gradually shrank; Taicang stored grain was drawn down until none remained. In 1846 an edict restored sea transport. In 1847 tribute and white-rice grain from Suzhou, Songjiang, and Taicang would change to sea transport from the following year. In 1850 white-rice principal and wastage grain from Suzhou, Songjiang, and Taicang was again ordered to Tianjin by sea transport under established precedent. In 1851 Minister Sun Ruizhen requested combined river and sea transport. Censor Zhang Xiangjin requested extending Jiangsu new tribute by precedent to Changzhou, Zhenjiang, and Zhejiang, all by sea transport. The matter was sent to Governor-General Lu Jianying, Governor Yang Wending, and Zhejiang Governor Chang Dachun for deliberation. They replied that the following year tribute and white-rice grain from Suzhou, Songjiang, Changzhou, Zhenjiang, and Taicang should uniformly change to sea transport. Zhejiang tribute found sea transport difficult and requested continuing old regulations; the court agreed. In 1852 Jianying submitted ten items for organizing sea transport; sent to the ministry for implementation. That year, because Zhejiang transport boats opened exchange too late and empty returns missed deadlines, the following year's new tribute was changed to sea transport at Governor Huang Zonghan's request. In 1855 the river breached at Tongwaxiang, entered the Daqing River from Zhangqiu, carried the Wen eastward, and the transport route grew more blocked. In 1856 two hundred thousand piculs of Jiangsu tribute grain were retained for military pay; actually transported were tribute, white-rice principal and wastage, and surplus wastage for laborers totaling over 755,000 piculs; famine-deferred southern tribute was collected and transported to Tongzhou by deadline.
64
In 1868 trial use of decked boats for purchased grain was discussed; freight followed sand-boat rates at five qian five fen per picul to Zizhulin in Tianjin; merchant directors stored grain nearby for inspection and lightering; lightering, warehouse rent, and porterage at seven fen per picul were managed by merchant directors. Three fen insurance silver per picul was also given; wind losses required compensation. Per thousand piculs, eighty piculs wastage accompanied shipment, twenty piculs reserve surplus was carried, and lighters consumed eleven piculs five dou wastage grain. Per hundred piculs, Tianjin and Tongzhou lightering cost eight taels one qian four li and Tongzhou granary handling two taels—all under sea transport regular tribute and purchase precedents. That year, because the Tianjin river was narrow and boats often sank with grain lost, an outer sea transport bureau was added at Dagu.
65
沿
In 1870 Zhejiang Governor Yang Changjun proposed fourteen sea transport regulations for next year's tribute: first, commissioners divide duties for specialized responsibility; second, new tribute still exchanges at Shanghai and departs to sea; white rice still follows precedent in hemp sacks and goes to Shanghai first; third, prepare ample merchant boats and allocate extra sand boats from Jiangsu to assist Zhejiang; fourth, route wastage grain is still disbursed in full; merchant wastage must carry grain in kind plus surplus wastage and declared coarse grain to granaries; fifth, increase Tianjin lighter wastage grain to cover shortages; sixth, Tianjin and Tongzhou operating funds are carried per precedent; surplus and other items are still remitted in full; seventh, merchant boats may carry arms, merchants donate steamships for escort, and coastal naval forces remain charged with effective patrol; eighth, after Tianjin delivery, brokers remain responsible as before; later boats are still inspected by the Tianjin circuit; ninth, increase sea transport operating funds per precedent; tenth, when grain boats reach Tianjin, add more convoy groups and prepare ample lighters; eleventh, merchant-boat freight is verified and paid per precedent, with twenty percent tax-free cargo, and rewards and penalties set; twelfth, merchant boats' twenty percent tax-free private cargo is still counted by picul weight; bamboo and timber are tax-free per precedent; thirteenth, merchant boats loading cargo on empty return are tax-free per usual regulations; fourteenth, when grain boats reach Tianjin for delivery, brokers, measuring hands, and lighters are strictly forbidden from demanding excess fees. Sent to the ministry for implementation. In 1871 Hongzhang reported: "Lighter boats waiting is burdensome; please add five taels freight per hundred piculs loaded, and twelve thousand taels ration silver for waiting civilian white-rice boats from Jiangsu and Zhejiang transport funds; if insufficient, the provincial treasury may lend funds flexibly." End of Hongzhang's memorial.
66
仿
In 1872 Changjun requested steamship tribute transport; the court agreed. Merchants borrowed two hundred thousand strings as bureau capital for steamship recruitment; profit and loss were entirely borne by merchants. Three sturdy steamships were purchased; each year two hundred thousand piculs were allocated for merchant steamships to Tianjin; freight, wastage, and other items still followed usual regulations. When steamships reached Tianjin, the Zhili governor-general prepared lighters for transshipment and the Granary Commissioner inspected at warehouses; following white-rice precedent, Jiangsu and Zhejiang officials transported to Tongzhou to stop loss and theft. Steamships assisting Jiangsu and Zhejiang tribute marked each province's tribute and white-rice labels on grain sacks. When grain was stored in warehouses, the Shanghai bureau dispatched officers to supervise exchange; after exchange, the steamship merchant bureau issued receipts; thereafter loading and departure were handled by the merchant bureau, and the Shanghai bureau was no longer involved. Warehouse fees and labor were also borne by the merchant bureau. For tribute grain assigned to steamships, merchant bureau agents with the Shanghai bureau inspected quality; only dry clean grain was accepted, then escorted to the Pudong warehouse for measuring and receipt. At Tianjin, bureau officers were ordered to inspect receipt in advance to avoid blockage. Each steamship carried three thousand piculs; chain documents were audited by the Tianjin bureau; all silver and grain receipt documents were abolished. Steamships transporting grain received tax-exemption licenses from the Shanghai circuit intendant and could carry twenty percent cargo by precedent. Opium and cargo beyond the twenty percent still required tax payment.
67
西 西
Qiao Songnian memorialized that within Shandong Yellow River flooding worsened and the canal silted shut; he proposed guiding the flow so Yellow River water would first reach Zhangqiu. North and south of Zhangqiu, universal dredging and sluice dams were to aid transport. Ding Baozhen and Wen Bin memorialized requesting restoration of the old Huai and Xuzhou route. The matter was sent to court ministers for deliberation. They replied that after the Tongwaxiang breach, the old riverbed was silted too high and the Huai-Xuzhou route could not be restored. Borrowing the Yellow River to aid transport by building dikes was equally impracticable with guiding the Wei to aid transport. Hongzhang requested continued sea transshipment, ordering each province to allocate grain in kind to Shanghai for sea delivery to Tianjin, with the remainder commuted to silver to save transport costs. Transport-commutation silver was to be allocated as needed to purchase grain for relief; he also requested stopping river-transport grain purchases and expanding sea transport. Still sent to the ministry for deliberation. Earlier north-of-the-Yangtze tribute grain went by river to Tongzhou; now sea transport was also trial-operated. In 1874 Jiangxi was approved to purchase eighty thousand piculs at Shanghai for the Merchant Steamship Bureau to deliver to Tianjin by sea at two taels seven qian freight per picul. In 1875 Hunan purchased 20,345 piculs principal and wastage tribute grain and Hubei thirty thousand piculs; all went to the Merchant Steamship Bureau for sea delivery to Tianjin. Jiangxi and Hunan soon stopped.
68
沿 便 沿
Baozhen memorialized that canal ruin came entirely from the Yellow River; managing transport must first manage the Yellow River. Weishan Lake's twin outlet gates and all reduction sluices should first be quickly repaired to store water and preserve the lake reservoir; the canal trunk itself must also be dredged. Later Guiqing, Bi Daoyuan, Guangshou, He Shouci, and others also requested raising funds to restore the canal. Huang Yuanshan again stated: "Since the Yellow River shifted north, the canal was blocked and transport changed to sea route—originally a temporary expedient. At the time Jiangsu's tribute quota used river-transport funds for sea transport expenses, not exceeding seven qian per picul. Later because funds were insufficient, increases were repeatedly requested. Jiangsu's addition was nearly one tael; Zhejiang had reached one tael—quite contrary to 1848 and 1852 sea transport funds that still returned savings to the treasury. Moreover sea transport crossed the open ocean where winds and waves were unsettled; unforeseen events were possible—the stakes were high. River transport, though circuitous and slow, was stable along the route with evenly distributed funds. From each province to the capital granaries, countless people lived by this labor. Enriching state and benefiting people—no plan was better. Transport has halted not long; timely restoration is still not too late. Delay a few more years and the canal silts daily, requiring even greater expense. Your subject believes river transport is circuitous but safe, sea transport convenient but dangerous; for full security, river transport must be restored." The emperor ordered the river governor, transport governor, and route governors to plan and memorialized in detail. Shen Baozhen rebutted Guiqing and Bi Daoyuan's proposals to allocate transport items from tribute provinces and shift sea-transport grain back to river transport, stating: "River transport absolutely cannot be restored. The canal was dredged then immediately silted again; transport rules were just fixed when the river changed course; rivers shifted constantly and transport routes shifted with them. Borrowing the Yellow River to aid transport caused especially severe harm. Before previous silt was cleared, the next year's transport already arrived stern to stern; heights differed vastly and passage was impossible. Thus every method reversed the water's nature and forcibly constrained it, wasting previous repair funds while silt accumulated again. If aiding transport diverted the current, northward flow would harm the capital region and southward flow Huai and Xuzhou; millions would face disaster—not merely wasting vast funds without aiding transport." In 1881 the Zhili governor-general was ordered that when the Merchant Steamship Bureau assisted tribute transport, circuit officials should verify exchange at Tianjin and the grain commissioner should strictly supervise exchange inspection. This was because the Merchant Steamship Bureau's assisted Jiangsu and Zhejiang tribute transport had adulteration and broken-grain abuses.
69
宿 宿
In 1884 France provoked conflict and sea transport was obstructed. Court of Imperial Sacrifices Minister Xu Shuming said: "Tribute grain should wholly return to river transport; dredge rivers along the route, repair locks and dams, and hire civilian boats to aid transport." The following year, Zeng Guoquan said: "Next year add fifty thousand piculs of Jiangsu tribute to river transport and estimate dredging shallow sections of the Pi and Su route." The court approved. Lu Shijie said: "At Zhengzhou the Yellow River overflowed and seized the current; outside Shili Fort gate on the Shandong canal silt widened daily; empty return transport boats could not reach the gate. Ningbo and Suzhou new tribute awaits boats; Pi and Su dredging and dam building must wait until empty boats pass." The emperor ordered swift dredging of accumulated silt so transport boats could go south early. In 1889, following Shandong Governor Zhang Yao's request, two hundred thousand piculs reallocated from sea transport to river transport. Zeng Guoquan and Huang Pengnian memorialized: "Jiangsu-Anhui river-transport grain has already been retained for relief. One hundred thousand piculs of Suzhou tribute had already changed to sea transport and all counties had reached Shanghai; suddenly changing to river transport would be obstructed and impractical. Moreover nearly a thousand boats would need hiring—not achievable overnight. Please wait until this year's winter transport, then follow the edict to advance river transport and restore old regulations." The emperor approved.
70
便
In 1893 upstream Chaobai and other rivers surged, water several feet above dike tops; upper dams were submerged; the canal had over seventy breaches; over a thousand grain boats from Tianjin to Beijing were blocked at Yangcun; Hongzhang was ordered to block openings, dredge the canal, store water, and aid navigation. In 1896 Wang Wenshao memorialized: "Southern tribute changed to sea transport, but north-of-the-Yangtze tribute still went by river; one hundred thousand piculs were again allocated from Suzhou and Songjiang into river transport. Boats were many and the route distant; from the Yellow into the canal and canal into guard units, blocked at every stage; destitute boat owners stole grain and added water; abuses multiplied. This year transport boats reached Tianjin two or three months late; there was real fear of missing empty return. Orders were already issued to urge simultaneously and complete exchange on schedule. But the fifty thousand piculs of north-of-the-Yangtze tribute retained this time still had acceptable grain quality. Jiangsu's fifty thousand piculs had uneven quality, some steamed and spoiled; sorting and drying required great trouble—transport via the Yellow River could no longer be remedied by human effort. It is proposed that from this year, the reallocated one hundred thousand piculs of Suzhou tribute uniformly return to sea transport. Jiangsu winter transport would still operate river transport to preserve the transport route." Sent to the ministry for implementation. Censor Qin Kuiyang, because north-of-the-Yangtze river transport was excessively costly, memorialized requesting cessation and commutation to the ministry. The ministry deliberated that tribute grain concerned capital granary reserves and old regulations should not be hastily changed.
71
西 退
In 1900, because war had begun, following Chen Bi's request, a Grain Transport General Bureau was established at Qingjiangpu. When the court fled west, the transshipment bureau moved to Hankou and Qingjiang became a branch bureau. That year southern tribute was carried by train from Tianjin to Beijing. In 1901, because finances were depleted, an edict ordered that from that year all provincial river and sea transport uniformly convert to silver collection; provincial governors were to investigate and rectify affairs, economize bureau and transport costs, recover excess county collections, and accumulate a large treasury sum. Yikuang requested that beyond required white rice, one million piculs of tribute grain be purchased annually using only non-glutinous rice, with no routine retention requests; the court agreed. In 1902 the ministry decided that Jiangsu and Zhejiang tribute grain would wholly be carried by Merchant Steamship Bureau steamships, with costs reduced as much as possible. Sheng Xuanhuai memorialized: "In recent years Shanghai-bureau steamships departed too late, warehouse wastage was huge, and at Tanggu the allied armies had not yet withdrawn; costs doubled the usual amount. In 1900 and 1901 freight received by the Merchant Steamship Bureau was insufficient for expenditures. This year Butterfield & Swire cut prices to solicit cargo; Britain and Japan both wanted tribute transport listed in commercial treaties; your ministers forcefully refused. The Merchant Steamship Bureau is a Chinese company; Li Hongzhang had approved that tribute and military grain all be carried by it—this contained deep intent. After examining domestic and foreign conditions, it is proposed that from 1902 winter transport, five fen be permanently cut from the precedent rate of three qian eight fen eight li one hao per picul for steamship freight, insurance, and other tribute-grain charges." The court approved.
72
Jiangsu and Zhejiang tribute grain carried by sea to Tianjin formerly used lighters to Tongzhou granaries, disbursing one sheng one he five shao wastage grain per picul, called "Tianjin lighter ration wastage." Since southern tribute changed to trains to Beijing, this wastage grain was delivered together with principal grain to granaries. Later, because losses often occurred after transport was complete, payment under the old rule was permitted to offset train-transport losses.
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