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卷123 志九十八 食货四 盐法

Volume 123 Treatises 98: Food and Money 4, Salt Administration

Chapter 123 of 清史稿 · Draft History of Qing
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1
Treatise 98
2
Food and Money, Part Four
3
Salt Administration
4
Qing salt policy largely took the Ming system as its basis, adjusting it where needed. Mongolia and Xinjiang contain many salt-producing areas, yet the eleven inland salt districts mattered most for state finance. The eleven districts were Changlu, Fengtian, Shandong, the Two Huai, Zhejiang, Fujian, Guangdong, Sichuan, Yunnan, Hedong, and Shaanxi-Gansu.
5
西 西 西西 西 西西西 西
Changlu once had twenty salterns, later cut to eight, supplying Zhili and Henan. Fengtian once had twenty salterns, later nine; after Japan seized the Jinchuan tidal flats, only eight remained, supplying Fengtian, Jilin, and Heilongjiang. Shandong once had nineteen salterns, later reduced to eight, supplying Shandong, Henan, Jiangsu, and Anhui. The Two Huai once had thirty salterns, later twenty-three, supplying six provinces: Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Hubei, Hunan, and Henan. Zhejiang had thirty-two salterns on ground split between Zhejiang and Jiangsu, supplying those two provinces plus Anhui and Jiangxi. Fujian had sixteen salterns, supplying Fujian and Zhejiang. Taiwan had five more salterns serving the island itself until it passed to Japan. Guangdong had twenty-seven salterns supplying seven provinces from Guangdong and Guangxi east to Yunnan and Guizhou. Twenty-four Sichuan counties with productive brine wells supplied Tibet and six provinces: Sichuan, Hunan, Hubei, Guizhou, Yunnan, and Gansu. Yunnan's twenty-six principal brine wells served only the province itself. Hedong's salt pans were split into eastern, central, and western works, supplying Shanxi, Henan, and Shaanxi. The chief Shaanxi-Gansu salt pan was Huama Great Pond at Lingzhou in Gansu, supplying Shaanxi and Gansu.
6
Changlu, Fengtian, Shandong, the Two Huai, Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong drew sea salt; Sichuan and Yunnan, well salt; Hedong and Shaanxi-Gansu, pan salt. Sea salt could be boiled or sun-evaporated; pan salt was always sun-evaporated; well salt was always boiled. In flavor, sea salt ranked first; pan and well salt followed. Among sea salts, beach-evaporated ranked highest, plank-evaporated next, and boiled last. In cost, sun-evaporation was cheapest; boiling with reed fuel came next, then coal, and wood made production most expensive. Such was the broad comparison.
7
使
Initially salt affairs fell under the Ministry of Revenue's Shandong Bureau. In Xuantong 2 (1910), the revenue minister was also named commissioner of salt policy, with touring censors sent to the regions. The post was later abolished and authority reverted to governors-general and governors. The dedicated agency was the Directorate of Salt Distribution. Where no salt directorate existed, a salt-law, salt-grain, courier-salt, or tea-salt intendant usually handled affairs.
8
Seven distribution systems existed: official supervision with merchant sales; official transport with merchant sales; merchant transport and sales; merchant transport with retail sales; popular transport and sales; and official supervision with popular sales. Only official supervision with merchant sales was used broadly and for the longest period. Merchants fell into two types: field merchants, who bought salt at the salterns; and transport merchants, who distributed it. Chief merchants oversaw the network and collected duties from smaller dealers. They later bred extortion and graft; Kangxi and Qianlong tried to abolish the office but never fully succeeded. Only in the Two Huai did Tao Zhu's Daoguang reforms abolish quota registers and have the Ministry's Baojuan Bureau print tickets from copper plates. In Shunzhi 3, because Huai and Zhejiang quota offices lay far from Beijing, a chief quota officer was posted at Yangzhou; the post was abolished in Shunzhi 7. In Shunzhi 15 quotas were issued through the directorates, but soon commissioners again had to collect them at the ministry; tickets too were issued in Beijing.
9
西 西
To buy salt, merchants first obtained a payment slip from the directorate—also called a permit, a time-limit slip, or a leather ticket—and presented it at the saltern. Purchased salt went into state depots—cang in Fengtian, tuo in Changlu. Unchecked stock was raw salt; inspected stock was mature salt, and only mature salt could be sold. The Two Huai central depot began under merchant management but later became a government warehouse. In Sichuan, salt for Guizhou and Yunnan used the border shore; for the province and Hubei, the accounting shore; Tongchuan had its own Tong shore. Hedong's main distribution shore was set up early in the Xianfeng reign. Salt for Shaanxi converged at Sanhekou. Salt for Henan converged at Huixing Town. In Shanxi, shores were set up at Yuncheng in Anyi for the Pu and Xie routes, with additional shores at Ze, Lu, and elsewhere.
10
Beyond active shores lay stagnant markets; authorities might extend deadlines, cut quotas, halt transport, or apply combined-quota sales, unified write-offs, or cross-shore blending. Combined-quota attached sales let merchants move backlog salt by attaching three quotas' volume to one quota's clearance. Merchants might pay duty on half a quota to move a full quota, or duty on three quotas to move two. Unified sales voided backlog quotas and let merchants pay regular and miscellaneous taxes in installments. Blended sales shifted surplus from active shores to sluggish markets.
11
沿
Quotas included large Ming-era units of well over two thousand jin. Small quotas split a Ming quota in half or into as many as ten parts. Types included regular, revised, surplus, gang, food, land, and water quotas. Zhejiang added shoulder quotas and resident quotas beyond the gang quota. Quotas differed from tickets: quota merchants held exclusive territories called quota lands. Initial registration cost a fortune, so families kept quota rights as hereditary nests. Later they could be sold to transport contractors. The transfer document was a nest slip; the price, nest price. In Daoguang 10 Tao Zhu at the Two Huai capped nest premiums at 0.12 tael per quota, then banned them outright. Tickets had no fixed territory but still carried a market price. Between Daoguang and Xianfeng a Two Huai ticket cost only five hundred taels. Later official and private buyers bid prices above ten thousand taels by Guangxu times. Quota sales volumes varied with territory size; tickets in the same distribution zone carried identical volumes. Before Jiaqing quotas dominated and tickets were rare; afterward tickets proliferated—policy shifted with the times.
12
祿
Annual salt revenue before Daoguang came only from the salt duty. With the Xianfeng wars came the new salt lijin levy. Salt duties fell into field levies and quota levies. Field levies included beach, stove, cauldron, and well taxes. Changlu collected border cloth; Fujian, mound conversion fees. Border cloth dated from the Ming, when saltern households paid salt tax per male and merchants delivered grain to the frontier for silver vouchers—border salt. Remote salterns with no merchant buyers required three zhang two chi of cloth per eight hundred jin of salt. Later the cloth payment became a three-mace silver levy called cloth salt. Stove tax had once been split between land and household registers. Not every registered male held land, however. In Yongzheng, following censor Zheng Chanbao, household tax was folded into land tax nationwide, though Changlu still kept the name border cloth. Mound conversion was the land tax paid on salt pans, called conversion price. Production-schedule payments were called salt mound tax. Kangxi ended most palace and capital salt deliveries, leaving only two hundred thousand jin for the inner palace and the Court of Imperial Entertainments, commuted to silver paid to the ministry. Quota levies included regular, bundled, and miscellaneous duties. Salt lijin comprised exit, entry, and local landing taxes. In the dynasty's final decades price surcharges made salt revenue rival land and national taxes. At the start of Shunzhi, 1.7 million quotas moved and duty yielded just over 560,000 taels. After unification, quotas and revenue both climbed steadily. In Qianlong 18 the total exceeded 7,014,941 taels. In Jiaqing 5 it was 6,081,517 taels odd. In Daoguang 27 it reached 7,502,579 taels odd. By late Guangxu duty and lijin together exceeded 24 million taels. The Xuantong 3 budget projected annual salt revenue at about 45 million taels. Revenue rose with the times in the same way.
13
In Shunzhi 2 every directorate was ordered to collect salt from the first day of the sixth month at Ming accounting-record rates. Soon afterward the court remitted late-Ming surcharges for new levies, training pay, and miscellaneous additions. In Shunzhi 16 the ministry required merchant salt boats to be fire-branded on the bow, forbade arbitrary seizure, and limited pass dues to boat fees—extortion was punished as corruption. In Shunzhi 17, on censor Li Zanyuan's advice, empty grain barges returning north were barred from carrying contraband salt. In Kangxi 9 censors Xi Tena and Xu Xuling reported: "The Two Huai suffer six chronic abuses: first, the burden of tax payment; second, bridge tolls; third, travel-permit fees; fourth, river-opening charges; fifth, pass and ferry dues; sixth, port exactions. Taken together, the six abuses each cost merchants tens of thousands of jin of salt every year; the censors asked that they be abolished. They also reported three abuses in bridge weighing: first, padding the scales; second, withholding weight on the books; third, falsifying and altering the recorded weight. These three abuses, they argued, could be curbed only by strictly enforcing standard weights; they asked that the ministry be instructed to consider the matter. A regulation was enacted: at every bridge weighing station, surplus weight was to be cut and confiscated—no less than three or four jin, no more than seven or eight—and never beyond the permitted margin. If merchants carried too much contraband, or inspectors falsely recorded excessive weight, merchants were to be punished by the number of certificates involved and officials by the jin involved as embezzlement—so that weighing would be fair and the law credible. The emperor ordered the rule carved in stone and set up at bridge weigh stations and at every pass, ferry, and port along the route. Xi Tena further reported: "Since Kangxi 7, delays in appointing salt commissioners have allowed outgoing commissioners, after collecting the year's quota, to levy again on salt not yet sold. Before a single certificate of salt had been sold, more than two hundred thousand taels in tax had already been collected. Merchants hounded for this money had no way to pay except at usurious interest or by pawning their goods to satisfy the collectors; he asked that the practice be stopped. The court approved his request. In Kangxi 16, on the advice of supervising secretary Yu Guozhu of the Household Section, the emperor abolished forever the practice of adding twenty-five jin per certificate at inspection and a surcharge of two mace five candareens, and made the abolition statutory. In Kangxi 20 the court ordered an end to the Three Feudatories' unauthorized salt levies.
14
竿 西
After rebellion broke out in Yunnan and Guizhou, uprisings flared everywhere; salt had nowhere to be sold, and merchants would not venture out. Salterns stood abandoned in wasteland as far as the eye could see, with no buyers at all. Finance officials, relying on salt revenue for military supplies, issued requisition orders fast as wildfire, and merchants were driven to ruin. Nationwide the Two Huai paid the largest salt levy and suffered the most; only the care of censors Liu Xi and Wei Shuangfeng kept merchants paying without collapsing from exhaustion. By then the empire had grown prosperous; Ningguo, Taiping, Chizhou, and other prefectures in south Huai, together with the Two Zhes, Shandong, Guangdong, and Fujian, successively increased quota certificates, and profits tripled. They not only sold beyond quota as before but also asked that previously reported tax silver be credited and suspended certificates restored. Sichuan, ravaged in the late Ming, saw settlers from the middle Yangzi flood in; salt consumption rose daily, and merchants requested several times the old quota of certificates; wells opened to supply Yunnan and Guizhou moved salt without delay by land or water. Meanwhile Fujian, Guangdong, and the Two Zhes recruited saltern workers, reclaimed saltern land and salt pans, and memorials to the ministry for higher levies never stopped. The Two Zhes also reported more than 22,700 mu of reclaimed tidal saltern land; Guangdong ports added seventy jin per certificate; Nan and Gan prefectures in Jiangxi sought salt certificates—and by year 36, extra-weight levies were applied there as well. Because the empire was at peace, the emperor remitted half of Zhejiang's added-weight levy, more than 31,380 taels of silver in all. On his southern tour in Kangxi 38 he again told the salt commissioners: "Because of military needs you have been taking surplus profits beyond the regular quota; that practice is to cease. The Two Huai levy, previously raised by four hundred thousand taels, is to be cut by half. In Kangxi 43, on the advice of Jiangnan governor-general Ashan, miscellaneous Two Huai charges totaling hundreds of thousands of taels were abolished and permanently banned by stone inscription. In Kangxi 56 Changlu censor Tian Wenjing asked that Shandong's reduced quota certificates be restored to meet the tax target; the ministry approved. The emperor held that raising quotas and taxes would do no good and refused.
15
西
Earlier, in Shunzhi 2 the Shizu Emperor established inspection of Changlu, the Two Huai, the Two Zhes, and Hedong salt administration, assigning one supervising censor to each post with annual rotation. Shandong salt was placed under Changlu's concurrent jurisdiction and Shaanxi under Hedong's. In Shunzhi 10 the posts were abolished and salt affairs were left solely to the distribution directorates. Soon afterward, because the directorates lacked sufficient authority, censorial inspection was restored. In Kangxi 11 salt inspection was again suspended. The following year Zhili governor Jin Shide, citing the province's heavy workload, asked that censors be sent again. Thereupon the Two Huai, the Two Zhes, and Hedong all returned to the former arrangement. Later Liangguang and Fujian likewise gained salt-inspection censors. In Kangxi 59 responsibility was again turned over to governors-general and governors.
16
Only Guangdong and Yunnan chronically fell short of their salt-tax quotas. In early Kangxi Guangdong merchants were enrolled through local communities and rotated every three years in a system called paishang, 'rotating merchants,' which bred endless abuses. Later the rotating-merchant fee of more than ten thousand taels was absorbed into the regular levy, and wealthy households were nominated as head merchants at salterns and ports—but with thin capital they could not buy all production, and private sales at the salterns multiplied. In Kangxi 57 saltern merchants were abolished; the distribution treasury advanced 360,000 taels of government capital for saltern officers to buy salt. Lighters were provided for freight, salt was moved to Chaobridge at Dong Pass, and stored in warehouses pending allocation. Port merchants received allocated salt, paid by the bundle, and kept any surplus as changxian, 'saltern surplus.' Leftover salt from brine loss was collected beyond the allotted certificates as yuyan, 'surplus salt,' and released to merchants for transport. Other categories followed—ziyan subsidiary salt, jingxian capital surplus, yuyan surplus salt, xianyin surplus silver, and the like. Later surplus salt was converted to formal certificates, remaining surpluses were folded into the regular quota, and Guangdong salt acquired the practice of banxian, 'handling surplus.' Eventually more than fifty Guangdong ports saw merchant failures. Yunnan salt moved on merchant-acknowledged tickets, but without roads or waterways everything depended on porters, and without coal or reeds boiling depended wholly on firewood—so transport and production costs were crushing, and even a nominal rate of one fen bore harder than levies elsewhere. Rich merchants refused the trade outright, and villagers were press-ganged to fill the posts. When merchants failed and nothing could be recovered, the shortfall was apportioned household by household within the community. By the Qianlong reign the system could not be revived, and successive governors-general and governors were ordered to cover the losses from their own funds.
17
沿
Early in the Yongzheng reign the salt-inspection censors for Fujian and Zhejiang were abolished. The emperor was then paying close attention to salt policy. Hedong salt ponds lay low and were often flooded; by custom repairs to walls and dikes were assigned as corvée to the people of thirteen prefectures and counties in Pu and Jie. On censor Shuose's advice, six thousand taels a year were appropriated—three thousand for annual repairs and three thousand held in the distribution treasury for major work—and the people's burden eased. He also held that nothing in salt law was more urgent than suppressing smuggling—saltern smuggling, merchant smuggling, and gang smuggling—but smuggling across boundaries and official complicity did the greatest harm. To stop saltern smuggling, saltern households had to be relieved and regulations strictly enforced. Thus in Yongzheng 2, when the Fan Dike in the Two Huai broke and tides flooded twenty-nine coastal salterns, the court issued treasury funds for relief. In Yongzheng 5, after Huai merchants donated funds for charity granaries at the salterns, the court ordered more granaries built near the salterns to meet emergencies among saltern households. These were measures to relieve saltern households.
18
In Yongzheng 6 Jiangnan governor-general Fan Shiyue proposed: "For salt boiling in the Two Huai, merchants should nominate several capable agents, saltern heads and patrol runners should be appointed to verify quantities and deliver salt into merchant depots, and private sales stopped. Two Huai censor Dai Yinbao reported: "Boiling equipment at the salterns—deep pans and shallow pans—has fixed quotas; one day and night counts as a firing cycle, and patrols must inspect after fires are banked to prevent illicit boiling. Lately households have installed extra shallow pans and fire cycles go unchecked, so output far exceeds the quota. He asked that salt officials be ordered to enforce the old rules strictly. As for sun-dried salt in south Huai, only merchants may buy and distribute it, with an appropriate surcharge on the certificate levy. All were enacted as permanent regulations. This was how the prohibitions were tightened.
19
To stop merchant smuggling, merchants had to be relieved and regulations strictly enforced. Thus in Yongzheng 2, when disaster cut saltern output in the Two Huai and merchants' costs doubled, censor Gaertai persuaded the court to let purchase prices reflect that year's costs together with freight, adjusted to current market value. Where salt was hard to sell, if a distribution zone could not move its quota, redistribution was also allowed. Minister of War Lu Xun asked that extra weight be added to certificates without added tax so prices could undercut smugglers; Changlu and the Two Huai were ordered to add fifty jin per certificate and remit the corresponding tax. These were measures to relieve merchants. In Yongzheng 11, on Jiangnan governor-general Yin Jishan's advice, a Huainan salt circuit was re-established to oversee salt at Yangzhou, Tongzhou, and elsewhere, and a dedicated anti-smuggling garrison was posted at Qingshantou near Yizheng.
20
滿
To curb official smuggling: since the Ming, salt commissioners returning to the capital routinely presented gifts; only after the emperor's strict ban did they begin to report and surrender their gains. Governor-general Manbao alone uncovered more than eighty thousand taels in Fujian; salt officials were then abolished and salterns placed under prefectural and county supervision. Later Guangdong governor-general Yang Lin argued: "When local officials collect the levy they delegate to servants and runners, who either set up shops, skim the proceeds, and sell salt piecemeal, or levy the community by force. Fearing insufficient capital, they may even divert land-tax payments. Saltern merchants should be abolished, treasury funds issued, and officials appointed to buy salt; port merchants should remain to transport, sell, and pay the levy. The court agreed.
21
使
The emperor then placed exceptional trust in salt official Li Wei. In Zhejiang, Wei's greatest achievement was the government salt purchase system. Under this system, because salterns in Songjiang, Taizhou, and Wenzhou produced heavily but leaked much salt privately, Wei asked for eighty thousand taels of treasury silver for saltern officers to buy the output. He also proposed a Yuhuan subprefect to manage purchases, and appointed officials to handle receipt and distribution at Zhoushan's inner harbors and seas, Xiushan and Changtu near Daishan, and Feichao on the Pingyang border. Chongming saltern salt was placed under the county magistrate. Purchased salt was sold chiefly to local fishermen and jellyfish processors; fishery salt could also be moved by licensed and government merchants elsewhere, each paying tax by statute plus operating fees of one to three mace; after capital and expenses were covered, the remainder counted as surplus. Smuggling fell away and official sales flourished; when annual quotas could not be filled, an extra 150,000 surplus certificates were granted. Merchants moving surplus certificates paid four-tenths rent per certificate; tax paid on these, together with government-salt surpluses, was reported jointly in annual memorials totaling more than one hundred thousand taels.
22
After the emperor's purge of salt administration, long-standing abuses were swept away. Yet even as shabby fees were abolished and folded into the regular levy, the emperor warned: "If surcharges are absorbed into the quota, new surcharges may appear beyond it—how can merchants endure that?" He already saw the danger. In Yongzheng 13 acting vice censor-in-chief Chen Shiguang argued: "Salt levies have fixed quotas per certificate and fixed weight per jin. Collecting by certificate rarely yields extraordinary profit; even small gains should be left with merchants to strengthen their capital. Yet lately many officials have seized 'windfall profits for the state'—which in practice means secretly squeezing merchants for more. Every extra coin the state took meant another exacted from merchants—merchants bore that harm. Memorialized 'donations' offered as public service likewise forced merchants to pay collective levies in secret. When no funds could be found, quotas went unpaid, extra weight was added secretly, or salt prices were driven up—state and people suffered alike. He asked that thereafter only the certificate levy be collected and that all 'profits to the state,' 'donations,' and similar labels be abolished forever. The emperor referred the matter to Prince Zhuang for deliberation. The reply soon approved his request.
23
西 使
Meanwhile Jiangxi courier-salt intendant Shen Qiyuan wrote to Jiangnan governor-general Zhao Hong'en: "Old informal fees were not all collected; now clerks' private graft is reported to the ministry as regular revenue. Senior officials may no longer take gifts, but can their staffs truly have no other dealings? The burden on merchants is severe indeed." When the Qianlong Emperor later learned of this, he abolished the Two Huai salt commissioners' public expenses and the distribution commissioner's salary, as well as the standard levy silver for Yunnan's black, white, and Lang wells.
24
便
At the outset, acting on Zhao Hong'en's recommendation, the Yongzheng Emperor ordered rotating numbered tallies for the poor, allowing them to hawk up to forty jin of salt per day for their livelihood. In the first year of Qianlong, the Board of Revenue approved a rule whereby those over sixty, under fifteen, disabled adults, and destitute elderly women could register in their home county, receive stamped waist-plaques and wooden tallies, and buy salt at the market once a day. Then Yin Huiyi, censor of salt for the Two Huai, and E Mi'da, governor-general of the Two Guangs, memorialized in turn: "Rascals plead poverty while forming gangs to smuggle salt. We have inspected the runner posts in both regions and find it inadvisable to abolish them wholesale." Salt tallies were then discontinued because the poor had grown too numerous; each person received ten to twenty-four cash per day in lieu of salt.
25
西 仿
The Zhejiang governor was soon made governor-general with concurrent charge of salt affairs. The court ordered measured increases in certificate weight and reform of the quota system: Hang, Jia, and Shao certificates were to match the old Two Huai standard with fifty extra jin per lot; Song was to follow the Wen-Tai precedent, converting to more than ninety thousand ticket certificates of four hundred jin each—all without added levy, to restore former volumes. Another edict trimmed Yunnan's surplus charge, bringing its price below three taels; Guangxi kept its two-candareen reduction; and the Two Guangs were exempted from the twenty-five-tael surplus-balance levy per thousand jin of salt. In the third year the post reverted from governor-general to governor of Zhejiang, who still oversaw salt affairs. In the sixth year, because Huainan furnace salt wasted heavily in summer, the court ordered fifteen extra jin per certificate in the fifth and sixth months, tapering by five jin in the seventh and eighth. Huaibei adopted the same rule in the thirteenth year. The Two Huai were also granted ten extra jin per certificate above the fixed quota.
26
輿
In the sixteenth year, responding to requests from officials across the provinces, the court granted the Two Huai transport and table-salt certificates ten extra jin per lot above quota. Earlier, at the start of Yongzheng, fifty jin per certificate had been added because Changlu's arrears were enormous. The ministry later recalculated the added weight at a median rate, yielding more than eighty-six thousand taels of additional annual revenue. Emperor Qianlong, concerned for the merchants' plight, ordered them to pay only half the added levy. In the twenty-eighth year the transport merchants' support payments were cut. At Yunnan governor Liu Zao's request, fuel subsidies for the black and white wells were restored. In the forty-second year, because Hedong salt shrank in overland carriage, the court ordered five jin of wastage allowance for every jin transported. With steady prices and brisk sales, the Two Huai sought advance drawing of later transport-zone certificates, and yearly intake reached five or six million taels. Yet the emperor's repeated tours made Tianjin the chief staging ground, and Changlu merchants' provisioning costs dwarfed even the Two Huai burden.
27
西
The custom of merchants making voluntary contributions for military needs began in Yongzheng, when Changlu merchants gave one hundred thousand taels. Thereafter, through Qianlong's two Jinchuan wars, the pacification of the west, Yili colonization, the Taiwan rebellion, the Tibet campaign, and the Sichuan-Hubei turmoil at the opening of Jiaqing, merchants of the Huai, Zhe, Lu, and eastern zones gave sums from hundreds of thousands to eight million taels—more than thirty million in all. Contributions for other purposes, down to Guangxu and Xuantong, are beyond counting. Salt merchants sometimes enjoyed imperial favor—called to audience, feasted, and lavished with gifts rivaling those of senior officials; and from this the taste for extravagance only grew. In emergencies the inner palace would lend them several million taels for working capital. On top of treasury principal they paid interest called treasury profit—sometimes one or several million, sometimes hundreds of thousands or tens of thousands of taels a year. Merchant capital was drained by this; the Two Huai and Hedong were hit hardest.
28
使
In the fifty-first year, because the Two Huai had not drawn certificates in advance for four years, the emperor ordered the Jiangsu governor to investigate. They soon asked that advance drawing be limited to once every other transport zone thereafter. The emperor replied that regular certificates selling smoothly mattered most, and that fixed intervals were unnecessary. Afterward the practice occurred only in the fifty-seventh year and again in Jiaqing 5. From the thirty-third year, moreover, when merchants owed more than one hundred thousand taels in interest on advance-drawn certificates, Jiangsu governor Zhang Bao was sent to investigate; salt commissioners Gao Heng and Pu Fu and distribution intendant Lu Jianceng were all heavily punished, and merchants were compelled to make restitution. Not until the forty-seventh and forty-ninth years were 3,632,700-odd taels successively remitted. Later, when major expenses arose, merchants pledged contributions in installments, yet after one or two payments they typically defaulted.
29
西 使 便
In the fifty-sixth year Jiangxi governor Yao Fen wrote: "Jianchang borders Fujian and has many routes; only added smuggling checkpoints and patrols will make enforcement effective." The emperor replied: "Salt boundaries should keep people from bypassing nearby cheap salt for distant dear salt—that is sound policy. Jianchang lies near Fujian, where salt must be cheaper—why not market it locally? If levies and tax were reassessed and collected on the spot, the people would benefit and smuggling would stop without further effort." Soon Jiangnan governor-general Aisin Gioro Changlin and Huguang governor-general Bi Yuan argued: "Commoners chase profit and always want more. If Jianchang were transferred to Fujian, smugglers could reach Fuzhou—a serious breach in the overall scheme." The court ordered the status quo maintained. Changlin then asked for a main depot at Jianchang and county sub-depots, selling tax certificates at Fujian's market price minus two cash per jin to undercut smugglers, with tightened patrols at every pass. The emperor ordered prompt execution.
30
西 退 西調使西使 使 西使便 調 西西 西西 使 西 西
At Hedong, from the tenth year the salt guild fixed the long-term quota at prevailing low prices, and merchants began to struggle. When pool output fell short, salt from Changlu, Mongolia, and Huamachi was mixed in, and a small pool sixty li west of Yuncheng was opened. Salt was scarce for the people yet no merchant would contract; outgoing merchants had to nominate replacements on five-year turns, and the wealthy mostly tried to evade service. In the forty-seventh year Governor Nong Qi won approval to restore long-term merchants, divide certificate territories into three grades for even allocation, and trial a two-candareen price increase for three years before review. The ministry initially rejected the plan, but the emperor overruled and allowed it. In time merchant capital was exhausted all the same. In the fifty-sixth year Feng Guangxiong became Shanxi governor and Gansu administration commissioner Jiang Zhaokui was moved to the same post in Shanxi. Earlier, when Zhaokui came to court as Hedong transport intendant, the emperor asked how to handle Lu salt; he proposed folding the levy into land-and-poll tax. When Guangxiong arrived in the capital he was told to discuss the matter with the Grand Council. Before they decided, acting Shanxi governor Zheng Yuanluan memorialized forcefully against it. The emperor said: "I foresaw that officials who had profited from salt squeeze-money would oppose folding the levy into land-and-poll tax. Zheng Yuanluan has proved it. He is being sent to Henan, which also markets Hedong certificates. If he obstructs the reform there, he will be punished without mercy." In the eighth month Guangxiong wrote: "Hedong salt is chronically crippled; only by folding the levy into land-and-poll tax and letting people carry their own salt can matters improve. Without official surcharges, runner shakedowns, or barrier delays, trade is bound to flourish. He asked that from Qianlong 57 the tax quotas of Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Henan be spread across 172 districts in the three provinces' certificate territories within the land-and-poll rolls. Shanxi was assessed 281,102-odd taels, Shaanxi 146,037-odd, Henan 86,633-odd, and ten rules were set: tax silver went to each provincial treasury and could not be waived even when land-and-poll tax was forgiven; ministry certificates ceased and paper-and-vermilion fees were abolished; local officials were forbidden private tax collection; all posts from salt commissioner and transport intendant down were cut; the Hedong circuit was moved to Yuncheng to oversee three salterns; salt ponds were maintained annually as before; official scales and brokerages remained at the three fields; surplus and accumulated surplus silver in the levy were separately apportioned and remitted; grain in transport granaries was merged for storage and lending; salt-administration expenses were drawn from nearby provincial treasuries. The court approved. In the fifty-seventh year, during the emperor's visit to Wutai, Guangxiong and Zhaokui reported that since salt restrictions were lifted the people bore no apportioned levy and enjoyed cheap salt. Shaanxi governor Qin Zong'en and Henan governor Mu Helan likewise reported lower salt prices. The emperor was greatly pleased. Gansu's salt levy had been folded into land-and-poll tax in Yongzheng 1, merchants were recruited again in Yongzheng 9, and the old method still applied. Shaanxi consumers of Huamachi salt in Hanzhong, Yan'an, and Yizhou were likewise folded into land-and-poll tax.
31
西 西
In Jiaqing 4 the court ended Mid-Autumn tribute from provincial salt commissioners. In Jiaqing 5, because Yunnan's quota ran chronic deficits, Governor Chu Pengling's plan shifted to on-site boiling and sale with free transport and retail by the people. Merchants and commoners alike could obtain tickets. Salt could come from any well and be sold anywhere; once tax was paid, carriers went where they pleased. Actual output at each well determined an even apportionment of the fixed quota; surplus became overflow tax, collected and remitted on the spot. Ticket issuance and tax collection were managed by well officers. In the eighth year the arrangement became permanent law. In the tenth year the Two Huai received ten extra jin per certificate beyond cost to offset wastage. Earlier the Alashan Mongol prince held the Jilantai pool; private traders sold at Tokto for Shanxi's native-salt districts but could not ship downstream. Enforcement later slackened until salt flowed downstream, seizing not only pool markets but encroaching on Changlu and the Two Huai. In the fourteenth year Shaan-Gan governor-general Nayancheng reported on smugglers and asked the Alashan prince to surrender the Han and Hui rascals he sheltered. Fearing punishment, the prince surrendered the pool; the court granted him eight thousand taels a year in compensation. Soon Vice Minister Yinghe joined Shanxi and Shaan-Gan governors in memorializing: "Lu merchants lose money because the long quota was fixed at low prices. We ask to price at the current-year rate as before Qianlong 10. Lu merchants cannot also run Jilantai—recruit separate contractors." In the fifteenth year new merchants ran deficits, so the state took over transport. Works Vice Minister Ruan Yuan warned: "State transport is easy; state sale is hard. Shortfalls will land on prefectures and counties—either granaries will be plundered or households squeezed; forced sale harms more than no sale." The ministry then ordered Jilantai certificates returned to the Alashan prince and ended the compensation payment. Fixed quotas became Lu salt certificates; the remainder were called Jilantai flexible certificates.
32
In the Two Guangs, since Kangxi the state had advanced treasury funds to buy salt and collected tax only after resale. In Qianlong 53 Governor Sun Shiyi, citing merchant debt of 698,000-odd taels, asked to end treasury advances and have merchants fund themselves through river bureaus in the province. In Qianlong 54 the new governor-general Fuk'ang-an and Shiyi finalized rules: the 150 ports of both Guangs became one bureau with ten lead merchants and six sub-counters; leads allocated quotas by sales difficulty; former ports recruited carriers who drew salt at bureau or counter after paying tax—twenty-nine ports unchanged. This was the reform known as merging ports into transport zones. After twenty-odd years under the new system, the ten lead merchants scorned port dealers whose outlets had no quota left to sell. Initially they were allowed to ship surplus salt in bulk to cover interest on state advances. Later they sold surplus salt regardless of whether regular quotas were met, undercutting the main trade. Moribund ports fell behind on pay; salt capital was used to cover arrears until losses swelled. Even after the bureau merchants made good the debt, port dealers still paid per quota—and the ten leads were dead, their estates gone. In Jiaqing 11 Governor Jiang Yoji memorialized the throne; the bureau merchants were abolished and the public bureau became a public office. Six port merchants were chosen to run the six treasury chests, each with his own port and his own capital, so funds were not squandered. A three-year rotation was also set to prevent monopoly—the reform was called returning the transport zones to the office. In the twenty-fifth year the court ordered an end to converting Two Huai imperial-tribute salt into discounted silver payments.
33
便
In Daoguang 1 the Two Jiangs governor-general Sun Yuting argued that Huai salt on the Chu markets had never been sold by sealed rotation until Salt Commissioner Quande introduced it; he asked that salt be sold openly instead. Huguang governor-general Chen Ruolin replied that stocks were still large; a full release might outrun demand and invite price-cutting and credit sales by dealers and boat peddlers. The court ordered that the backlog be cleared first, then salt sold as it arrived. In year 2 the Two Huai salt censor Zeng Yi reported that once rotation rules were relaxed, merchants raced to undercut one another, and some lost their principal. Sun Yuting denied that any such thing had happened. Chen Ruolin countered that sales this year had in fact exceeded the previous figure by more than 260,000 quotas. On that basis the court agreed to reopen rotation sales. Soon Huguang governor-general Li Hongbao warned that rush selling was unavoidable; in year 8 sealed rotation was restored.
34
( ) 祿仿 使
Smugglers in the Two Huai region multiplied daily, and the salt administration decayed with them. The Two Huai were supposed to move more than 1.6 million transport quotas of salt each year. By year 10 Huainan sold only 500,000 quotas, leaving a shortfall of 5.7 million taels in accumulated levy. Huaibei sold 20,000 quotas, with a loss of 600,000 taels. The emperor recalled Jiang Yoji to the capital and appointed Jiangsu governor Tao Shu in his place. Soon Minister of Revenue Wang Ding and Vice Minister Bao Xing were dispatched to investigate. Tao Shu reported: "The evils stem first from costs that have piled up over time, and second from officials using public carriage for private gain. Only by slashing overhead, stopping scattered surcharges, and allowing merchants to sell freely can sales revive, prices stabilize, and smuggling die down." The court abolished the salt inspection censor and placed the trade under the governor-general. From the ninth year on, Censor Wang Zengfang, Hanlin Lecturer Gu ( Chun) , and Director of Imperial Sacrifices Liang Zhongjing all urged levying tax at the salterns; Grand Secretariat Associate Zhuo Bingtian proposed copying Wang Shouren's factory tax at the Gan Pass. The proposals were sent to Tao Shu for review. Tao Shu consulted Transport Commissioner Yu Deyuan and found the schemes unworkable. He answered: "Placing the levy on the salterns faces three obstacles. First, collecting from the furnace households themselves. Huainan boils salt in furnaces; Huaibei dries it in ponds—each household owes roughly a hundred taels. The workers are poor; if tax is collected before salt is made, they cannot pay; if tax follows salt, a bad harvest leaves tax unpaid and workers flee. That is why collection from furnace households will not work. Second, having yard merchants pay the levy. Pooling many small producers is in principle more manageable. Yet workers who own their own trade will resent taking orders from merchants. Merchants care only for profit: they force overweight at the scale and charge usurious interest on loans. Workers will not willingly hand salt to the yards, and merchants will lack funds to meet the full levy. That is why yard-merchant collection is equally impracticable. Third, having field officials buy the salt. Apportioning the levy by each field's output quota sounds exact on paper. But the Huai levy is enormous—junior officials cannot handle it. If they collect and remit at will, concealment and embezzlement are inevitable. That is why purchase and tax by field officials will not work either." He added: "At the saltern salt sells for only a cash or two per catty; tax there would raise the price and multiply profiteers. Coastal villages and salterns intermingle, and illicit boiling is easy—every household would turn private, and revenue would shrink further. Factory taxation might be tried in a limited area. Yet not every province has mountain passes to guard. Smuggling would exceed saltern evasion. In short, no officials and no smuggling require no levy and no tax. Where there is levy and tax, officials and smuggling follow. To claim that saltern levies or salt factories will turn smugglers into law-abiding traders is wishful thinking." The emperor endorsed his analysis.
35
便 便 西宿
The following year Tao Shu inspected every saltern and proposed ticket salt for Huaibei, submitting ten regulations. First: the transport commissioner issues triplicate tickets—one stub, one for the sub-office, one for the peddler. A time limit to reach the market is set; ticket salt may not be separated from its holder or sold outside the designated shore. Second: 400 catties make one quota, with 6.4 mace of silver in tax plus fees totaling 1.878 taels. Third: peddlers in each district obtain a county license before buying at the saltern. Those near Haizhou may apply there instead. Fourth: central depot factories at each field receive salt from producers and tax from peddlers. Fifth: peddlers leaving the field are checked by card officers, then sent to assigned markets. Sixth: commissioners are posted at Qingkou. Seventh: civil and military authorities are ordered to crack down on gangsters. Eighth: river patrols are strengthened. Ninth: transport merchants are bound to acknowledge sales to keep markets supplied. Tenth: corrupt customary fees are abolished. Officials and clerks who lived on salt profits protested loudly; Tao Shu held firm and sent commissioners to lead the first shipments. Soon the profits were plain; buyers flocked from afar; salt boats lined the quays in numbers unseen for decades. Within four months more than 300,000 quotas had been booked for shipment. That year Haizhou suffered famine; the poor lived on porterage wages from the trade—countless lives were saved. Costs were low, the salt pure, and retail prices cheap; smugglers could not compete, and all switched to ticket salt. The trial covered only lake-route backlog markets—thirty-one counties in Anhui, Henan, and Jiangsu listed above—while eleven counties that had been flourishing markets in Anhui and Henan still followed the old rules. In year 13 ticket salt was extended everywhere; though the proposed rate was below the old quota, the levy was reset at 1.551 taels per quota plus fees, fixed at 2.551 taels forever, with no further increases. Only counties served by the Yangtze or Gaoyou Lake routes were left unchanged, lest peddlers flood Huainan and invite water damage where territories overlapped.
36
仿
The reform changed routes, not bundle sizes. Huaibei quotas were never high, yet moving salt from depot to market cost more than ten taels per quota—official salt could not compete with smuggled salt. Ticket salt bypassed the old Gang Dam route, crossed at Wangying into the lake in 100-catty packs without repacking, and reached markets with only two taels of freight atop tax—about five taels per quota, far below transport-quota cost. Tens of thousands of Yangtze quotas followed the same pattern. After the reform levies came in with surplus; canals, charity granaries, and examination halls were revived—the light tax beat smuggling, sales exceeded quota, and one transport cycle moved two cycles' salt while collecting two cycles' revenue. There was talk of extending ticket salt to Huainan, but it did not happen.
37
退 使 西
In year 29 a fire at Tangjiao in Wuchang destroyed more than four hundred salt boats and 5 million taels of principal; merchants asked to withdraw. Governor-general Lu Jianying then adopted Acting Transport Commissioner Tong Lian's plan for a Huainan ticket system more detailed than Huaibei's. Transport office clerks' abuses were ended by having merchants take quotas and pay tax directly. A general bureau at Yangzhou was set up to manage the trade. Hankou "box fees" were trimmed but gifts remained—so ticket salt went to Jiujiang for verification and resale; hold fees at bridge passes were replaced by a single check at Longjiang, with other stops abolished. Lighterage from saltern to river mouth and extortion by porters were ended; merchants hired their own labor. Customary fees worth millions yearly were cut; 300,000 stagnant quotas were dropped; only 1.09 million quotas ran annually at 1.752 taels main tax, 1.92 miscellaneous, and 0.658 operating fee—consumer markets paid the same main tax and half the miscellaneous fees. The key was attaching "Yi salt" as bonus weight on each new quota. "Yi salt" was salt lost in the yisi-zone fire after tax was paid; each new quota therefore carried 200 extra catties (600 per quota), repacked at Yizheng into ten 60-catty bundles. With fees cut and an extra 200 catties shipped free, costs fell by more than half. Within months a full transport cycle cleared; prices along the Chu markets plunged, and farmers rejoiced. The Two Huai collected five million taels that year, though backlog returned after two cycles because ticket sizes from ten to a thousand quotas let small dealers undercut large ones. Tao Shu had likewise begun Huaibei tickets at ten quotas minimum. Huaibei was compact; Huainan vast—the same rule had different effects. The Taiping rebellion then shattered the salt trade, but remedies were still possible.
38
調
In Changlu, since Qianlong, main and miscellaneous levies together brought in more than 700,000 taels. From Jiaqing 14, after the Southern River works, two cash per catty was added—called the river-works surcharge. In year five another surcharge was levied for the Gaoyan works; after three years half went back to the merchants and half to the government. In year eight the government's one-cash share was again returned to merchants, but accumulated arrears had already reached many millions of taels. Silver had risen sharply and merchant losses deepened, so further surcharges of one or two cash per catty were added as relief. Officials then proposed reducing quotas and consolidating bundles: a Changlu quota was 300 catties but weighed 340 with packing and cord; transport and bundling fees had risen yearly and still burdened merchants. Ten quotas were now packed into nine bundles, cutting quotas by ten percent. In year twenty-one quotas were cut another twenty percent with the same repacking rule. In year twenty-four 150,000 allotted quotas were suspended, cutting revenue by over 60,000 taels, but the distress did not ease. Heavy overhead had bred arrears, arrears had bred surcharges, and dear official salt let smugglers thrive; in the Jizhou and Zunhua districts smugglers openly rivaled the government, worst in Yongping's seven counties, until official operation was unavoidable. By year twenty-eight merchants were ruined and quotas idle; in twenty Henan and twenty-four Zhili counties over a million quotas lay undelivered and arrears exceeded twenty million taels. Prince Ding Zaiquan, granary-route superintendent Ji Zhichang, and Zhili governor-general Ne'erjing'e were ordered to conduct a joint investigation. Each quota now cost over five taels in fees; revenue was reclassified into main levy, treasury interest, miscellaneous charges, and arrears; retail price was cut two cash per catty to match smuggled salt; each quota gained 150 extra catties for merchants; and abusive county fees were ruthlessly abolished. Where quotas had stalled, Zhili recruited new merchants and Henan switched to tickets, both requiring tax before shipment. Suspended quotas, originally capped at five years but repeatedly extended, now averaged just over two taels per quota.
39
調
In Shandong since Qianlong the main quota and ticket levy had been about 189,880 taels and miscellaneous charges about 101,800. From early Jiaqing treasury interest alone rose to over 210,000 taels, double the main levy. In year fourteen the Southern River works added two cash per catty; annual shortfalls reached 290,000 taels, again doubling the main and miscellaneous levies. In year seventeen another one-cash surcharge was proposed, half for merchants and half to cover their arrears. That year's quotas could not be filled and were carried forward for collection the next year. When carryover still failed, arrears were split into twelve- or twenty-year installment plans, extended annually. In Daoguang 1 the river-works surcharge was halted; arrears already exceeded 5.3 million taels, yet the full quota was still nominally met. In year five the Gaoyan works brought another two-cash surcharge, half to revert to merchants after three years—but only half was paid, and the main levy fell further behind. By year seven the entire merchant guild failed; arrears were consolidated, to be repaid after the dam surcharge reverted to merchants, with 1.29 million taels left at interest and 270,000 remaining. From year twelve arrears were paid in twenty installments; southern quotas gained 25 catties and northern 20; half the dam surcharge for old debt went back to merchants; and thirteen southern counties plus six ticket counties including Linqu were exempted from the dam surcharge to undercut smugglers. Old and current treasury interest still went unpaid, so in Daoguang 15 the full one-cash dam surcharge was returned to merchants and treasury interest cut by 0.03 fen per quota.
40
便
Silver kept rising and losses mounted; when ticket merchants in Linqu and eight other counties failed, the trade was placed under official transport. In year seventeen salt was placed under the governor, and another two-cash surcharge was soon proposed. In year twenty-three quotas were cut twenty percent to an eighty-percent total, and surplus quotas were suspended. In year twenty-seven quota lands gained a two-cash surcharge and ticket lands one cash. Within a year more than twenty markets had collapsed. New and old arrears totaled over eight million taels; post-1815 main and miscellaneous shortfalls exceeded 900,000; post-1819 arrears over 800,000; and years 27–28 went unaudited. Prince Ding, Xu Zechun, and others won approval to waive two years of audit reports, halt backlog quotas, and stop collecting old arrears. From year twenty-nine tax came before salt; most counties went to official transport; every quota gained 70 catties; treasury interest fell one mace per quota; and the 1838 two-cash surcharge was cut by one cash to ease the cost of salt.
41
In Zhejiang the touring salt censor was abolished in Daoguang 1 and Governor Shuai Chengying took charge of salt. Chengying reported: "Before 1810 Governor Jiang Youtie's audit found only 550,000 taels of padding in the Zhejiang transport treasury; within ten years it had reached 1,730,300. Quotas were congested: old cycles unfinished while new ones opened, so levies from one cycle could not fund that cycle's sales. Annual audits required only the main levy to declare completion, while attached transport and outside expenses went uncollected and river funds still had to be paid—forcing padding from collected balances. Merchants' voluntary contributions were also inflated whenever officials assigned tasks. I have ordered the transport commissioner to stop payment when the designated fund has no balance. If padding is unavoidable, only external funds may cover internal ones—never the reverse." Thereafter through year six sales met quota and the treasury held 1.28 million taels. From years seven to ten sales fell short again, leaving only 110,000 taels. Governor Cheng Hanzhang's request to raise surplus price had made salt dear and sales sluggish. After the surcharge was halted in year eleven, sales recovered to ninety percent of quota. In year twenty-nine Ji Zhichang was sent to investigate; sales had fallen to fifty or sixty percent. He proposed recruiting merchants for stalled districts and adding weight per quota.
42
西 西 西
Guangdong also raised substantial surplus levies. Guangdong salt sent west declared over ten extra catties per bundle; later 10,000 bundles of surplus salt were sold at ports at a ten-percent discount—"scale-head" surplus, about 27,000 taels. Five prefectures including Qingyuan on the Miao frontier had no quotas and moved bundled surplus salt through nearby ports—"Tusi" surplus, about 5,000 taels. Sea transport loss was covered by saltern producers, bought by officials and resold—"flower-bonus" surplus, about 4,000 taels. Guangdong's mints used over 100,000 catties of Yunnan copper yearly; Guangnan in Yunnan took over 90,000 bundles of Guangdong salt; commissioners exchanged them at Baise—the "copper-salt swap." Guangzhou garrison and Yuying Hall salt, dozens of bundles each from surplus, funded outside expenses—hence no miscellaneous levy. Main tribute included ministry rice, level-head, and paper vermilion silver; east-province boat tolls about 4,000 and west-province about 40,000; treasury interest over 80,000. Items fell chronically behind; early delays came from heavy loss allowances on the provincial river route. After 1844 the Chaozhou route stagnated worse than the provincial river. Despite war ravaging Guangxi and leaving Huai salt unsold, Guangdong still collected eighty to ninety percent of its levy.
43
穿 滿滿 滿 綿西
Sichuan salt was strongest first at Shehong and Pengxi in Tongchuan, then at Qianwei, Leshan, and Rong in Jiading and Fushun in Xuchuan. Within a few years Shehong and Pengxi fell behind Qianwei, Leshan, Fushun, and Rong. Around Qianlong 49 salt wells everywhere were failing. Salt-tea commissioner Lin Jun let people sink wells without extra tax, and Sichuan salt revived. Only Tongchuan stayed as difficult as before. Its brine was mostly coarse "flower" salt; grass-fuel costs caused 70,000 taels of arrears; Tong merchants partnered with Qian merchants for twelve years to clear debt, renewed twice, then resumed self-management. After one year they owed over 20,000 again and sought another partnership term. By Daoguang 8 three terms had ended; output kept falling and only the main levy was met, not surplus or corner-cut payments. Surplus means surplus remainder. Corner-cut fees were paid when levy salt was trimmed at submission. Thirty-one counties where brine failed and merchants collapsed saw locals buy from nearby wells while salt tax was folded into the land-tax assessment. Extravagant salt merchants leased their quotas to wealthy designation merchants as their fortunes declined. Designation merchants paid levies to quota merchants for sealing, but quota merchants often embezzled the funds, sometimes with official collusion. By year thirty the entire guild had collapsed. Governor-general Xu Zechun found 237,000 taels of surplus and corner-cut arrears and 228,581 unpaid quota tickets. Substitute sales were arranged and designation merchants were registered to seal payments themselves. Only Qianwei, Fushun, Chengdu, and Huayang merchants remained solvent; the rest stagnated, Tong worst of all. Guizhou border water quotas were withdrawn and assigned to Qianwei and Fushun merchants.
44
西
After the regulatory change Yunnan had rampant smuggling, chronic quota shortfalls, especially in the far west and south. The northeast ate Sichuan salt and the southeast Guangdong salt—both hard to supply on schedule. In Daoguang 6 Governor Zhao Shenzhe proposed assigning sales by well output. Censor Liao Dunxing argued that expanding subsidiary wells beat zoning sales by region. The emperor ordered the new governor Ruan Yuan to try it. When major wells failed, subsidiary wells kept Yunnan salt alive.
45
In Xianfeng 8, when Prince Sengge Rinchen garrisoned Tianjin, the two-cash cut of 1848 was reversed as the "salt-catty restoration," yielding over 180,000 taels. Taiping rebels blocked routes; salt piled at Daokou in Jun county and moved south by peddlers. Carriers saved shore fees; local seated merchants used official cover for private trade and profited most. In Tongzhi 5 Henan's governor added two cash per catty on Henan quotas for river defense, raising 80,000 taels to withdraw troops. In year seven the Xingyang works cost over a million taels and the surcharge was renamed the Xingyang works levy. Revenue thus rose 260,000 taels above late Daoguang levels. Shandong could not ship south because of Nian rebels. In Tongzhi 3 over 1.3 million backlog quotas were spread over eight years; though the one-cash surcharge of 1838 was diverted to Beijing funds at 70,000 taels yearly, the main levy still could not be fully met.
46
西西
Hedong's Jiaqing 14 Southern River surcharge of one cash per catty had raised the Qianlong quota by over 160,000 taels. In year seventeen active Jilantai quotas added another 60,000-plus taels. Hedong salt had long encroached on Huai markets; after Huaibei went to tickets in 1831 it flowed back into Hedong and merchants grew weaker. Active quotas were halved and the river surcharge cut twenty percent; recruitment gave way to recommendation, then signed merchants—and bankruptcies multiplied. In Xianfeng 2 Vice Minister Wang Qingyun was sent to investigate. Wang fixed ticket merchants and general shores, cut 270,000 taels of county fees and 70,000 of Yuncheng guild charges; pond shares rented out reached 120–130 taels as early renters stole brine from the pans. Caps were set at 60 taels for white salt and 40 for green; Ze and Lu savings were spread at 0.9 fen per quota and office funds at 0.7 fen; extra weight cut cost to 1.6 taels per quota; merchants accepted and paid the halved active quotas and twenty-percent surcharge. Soon over ninety wealthy merchants donated three million taels for permanent exemption from mandatory merchant service, shifting to free transport and sale. Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Henan went to official transport and sale, dropping Hedong fee categories at 0.035 taels per catty and 105 taels per share—70,000 taels above the old rate—in Xianfeng 4. With the Yangtze blocked, Hedong boomed on Huai markets and added 300 quotas at Henan's Lingbao crossing.
47
西 西 調西 便 西
Thirteen Shanxi counties on native salt had 2,494 quotas; only the Shaanxi-Gansu ponds had been under Hedong. In Kangxi 28 the Huama small pond passed to Gansu's governor while the great pond stayed unchanged. In Xianfeng 5 Shaanxi Governor Wang Qingyun proposed folding the salt levy into the land tax. Qingyun was soon transferred to Shanxi. Wu Zhenqi memorialized: "Shaanxi people are destitute; if salt duty is levied they cannot bear it—commoners would pay tax without receiving salt while brokers sell untaxed salt. This is wholly improper. He asked that Henan be instructed to revert to recruitment instead. The court directed him to consult with Qingyun. It was soon changed to joint official and private transport. With the treasury short, the ministry proposed levies on Hedong salt to fund the army. The governor found this impracticable and instead added extra quotas on the regular allotment, taking surplus per share—about 50,000 taels. The Zhili governor-general, citing coastal defense, also sought added weight and price; the Gengshen cohort added 600 quotas and the Xinyou cohort 500—480,000 taels in all—but only the Xinyou cohort was fully collected. When Shaanxi's Muslim rising broke out and Nian bands raided Henan and Shaanxi, markets suddenly closed and the extra quotas were suspended.
48
西西
In Xianfeng 3, with river routes cut, no merchants bought southern salt and smuggling flourished; the ministry ordered field collection at the salterns. In year four salt quotas were again sent to the camps of Qi Shan and Xiang Rong for rations. Yi Liang soon proposed replacing quotas with a weight tax of 300 cash per hundred jin—240 for allocation and 60 for out-of-region sales expenses. Huguang and Jiangxi, lacking Huai quotas, asked to import Sichuan and Guangdong salt for the Taihu region; Jiangxi turned to Fujian, Zhejiang, and Guangdong salt. The ministry held that legalizing trade beat official loans; Sichuan and Guangdong salt entered Hubei with merchant sale allowed, taxed once at choke points and released on license.
49
西 西 西 西 西 便 西
Northern salt drawn by armies for pay fell under military monopoly. Li Shizhong's troops took salt at the barrier; when depot stocks ran short they bundled at the salterns themselves—smuggling beyond investigation. In Tongzhi 3 Censor Liu Yuhuai memorialized for reform. The matter went to Jiangsu Governor-General Zeng Guofan. Guofan wrote: "Huainan salt faces blocked transport and two fundamental difficulties. First, neighboring salt has encroached for too long. The west shore took Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Fujian smuggled salt; the Chu shore Sichuan and Shanxi smuggled salt. Quota grounds have been lost for ten years; people depend on it for food and officials for levies—it cannot be cut off at once. Second, too many levy stations have been set up. Huai salt from Yizheng westward passes station after station; armies live on these levies and stations cannot all be abolished. My policy rests on four points: expand sales, lighten cost, stabilize price, and suppress smuggling. Neighboring salt in Huai territory is cheap and profitable; Huai salt cannot compete. Strict inspection is burdensome and blocking invites unrest. The plan is to tax neighboring smuggled salt heavily so its price rises and Huai salt can advance as contraband is legalized. He had already asked Huguang and Jiangxi to raise levies on smuggled salt; when Huai shipments and sales grow, neighboring salt can be expelled and the prohibition enforced—this is his sales policy. Recently western Chu salt paid over fifteen taels in levies per quota. Collection at each station was changed to a single levy after shore sale. Levies fell from over fifteen taels to 11.98 on the Chu shore, 9.44 on the west shore, and 4.4 in Anhui. Lower levies let merchants sell first and pay later—this lightens cost. Merchants want high prices but often undercut to rush sales. At first a few traders sold off stock quickly rather than hold for daily profit. Others followed; prices fell until cost could not be recovered. Supervision bureaus on western Chu shores register merchants, post fixed prices, and rotate sales so scarcity does not raise retail prices and glut does not ruin merchants—this stabilizes price. Salt law above all stresses anti-smuggling. Large smuggling rings are easily caught; the hardest leaks are overweight bundles and boatmen's concealed cargo. Daoguang 30 rules were restored: each 600-jin quota in eight 86-jin bundles (including brine and cord allowance), with great tickets issued and corners clipped at Dasheng, Datong, and Anqing; overweight or concealed cargo was confiscated. Shores selling neighboring salt also receive tax receipts; selling without one is punished by law—this stops smuggling." End of quoted memorial.
50
便 宿 西 西
He added: "In Huaibei salt there are three practices that must end and four that need urgent reform. The grain commissioner, for Qinghuai defenses, had saltern merchants donate five jin per bundle (twenty per quota), then five bundles per hundred; though Wu Tang had these dues and sales assigned to Qinghuai troops, such petty exactions were unworthy of proper administration. This is the first practice to end. Xuzhou was Shandong quota territory; when Nian unrest blocked quotas, Tian Zaitian allowed scattered northern salt with eastern duties recorded—over time merchants bought at salterns and sold into Anhui. Eastern quotas now flow normally; the borrowed-transport pretense can no longer mask encroachment on sales. This is the second practice to end. Northern salt must be rebundled as net salt, not gross salt, and pay duty before leaving the lake. Smugglers lately colluded with garrison officers to sell gross salt; strict blocking brought official cover, lax enforcement let contraband displace official quotas. This is the third practice to end. In the salt monopoly, remove abuses and revenue revives of itself. My reforms would follow the removal of these abuses and guide affairs by circumstance. Huaibei gang quotas had been carried through the Wuwu year. The Jiwei cohort opened in the fifth month, but postwar population loss made 460,000 quotas impossible to sell. He asked to handle only 296,982 regular quotas at 1.51 taels regular duty, 0.2 mace miscellaneous duty, 0.4 mace operating funds, and 0.1 fen each for granary, river, and patrol costs—deleting all other charges. This is the first reform now planned. Army pay lately depended on salt levies, but stations everywhere made trade a ordeal for merchants. Formerly each bundle paid over 2,000 cash in levies. He proposed one 500-cash levy at Wuhe when salt left Xiba and another 500 at Zhengyang Pass en route to Shanghai. Other stations may only inspect tickets, not collect again. Levies must be cut to lighten cost and stations abolished to aid merchants. This is the second reform now planned. Huaibei pay funds had been split in ten shares. Linhuai camp took four-tenths, Chuzhou four-tenths, and the Anhui governor's camp two-tenths. Linhuai and Chuzhou camps were abolished; the grain commissioner should still contribute, with future shares at five-tenths to the governor-general, four to the provincial governor, and one to the grain office. Troop numbers changed little; the old ratio was not greatly altered. This is the third reform now planned. Northern salt was fixed at 400 jin per quota in four 110-jin bundles including brine allowance. Lately depot salt was rebundled at Xiba into 130-jin lots that did not match the tickets. He forbade this and required hold manifests listing each ship's bundles besides the usual great tickets, to stop under-reporting weight. This is the fourth reform now planned. The court approved all his requests.
51
西
Guofan's salt reforms differed from Tao Shu: Shu favored scattered cohorts, as did Yuting and Ruolin. Guofan favored unified cohorts, as did Quande and Zeng Shuang. Yet Yuting and Ruolin's scattered cohorts required the first two months' salt to sell out before opening the next arrivals—scattering that embodied order, which Shu followed. Guofan, seeing the harm of rushed sales, upheld unified cohorts and established general depots and supervision bureaus to stabilize saltern and shore prices. The general depot was first at Guazhou because Yizheng was hard to restore; when the shore eroded it returned to Yizheng. Supervision bureaus sat at Hankou for Hubei, Changsha for Hunan, Nanchang for the west shore, and Datong for Anhui. Soon Guofan became Zhili governor-general and Li Hongzhang succeeded him. His chief addition was cyclical quota assignment. Quota claims were placed under supervision sales so that selling one cohort's salt entitled merchants to the next cohort's quotas. It began in Huainan and later reached Huaibei. It blended gang-quota methods with the ticket system, keeping established merchants and not replacing them. Hereditary merchants gave officials clear accountability and fewer abuses than capital tests and lot-drawing; successors followed the practice.
52
In Guangxu 5 proposals to increase quotas arose. The increase meant 80,000 added quotas for Huaibei per ministry notice. Governor-General Shen Baozhen wrote: "Lately merchants, seeing high ticket prices, have coveted quota increases. No salt official matched Guofan, who weighed decades of gains and losses on each reform as if inside the trade itself. Yet he fixed Huaibei at only 290,000-odd quotas—hardly ignoring state revenue and merchant conditions. Salt administration fails when quotas exceed sales; at first deadlines are barely met, then affairs collapse. Then old and new quotas were stacked; soon came unified write-offs, then attached collections and halted transport. Fewer quotas mean fewer merchants, easier reform, and easier sales. In year eight Zuo Zongtang as Two Jiangs governor sought increases of 160,000 for Huaibei, 110,000 for Huainan on the Hubei shore, 40,000 for Hunan, and 42,000-odd for Anhui. The ministry approved Huaibei fully but only 30,000 for Hubei, 10,000 for Hunan, and 17,000-odd for Anhui.
53
When Zeng Guoquan took office he memorialized to cancel the Huaibei increase. Two Huai regular revenue originally combined weaving, river works, and copper funds at 1.8 million taels—just over one tael per quota. Weaving, river, and copper charges arose because salt commissioners had large nurture-integrity salaries and many fees—22,000 taels yearly for weaving and 50,000 for river works. After the Three Feudatories rebellion Yunnan copper was cut off and salt agents were charged to procure it, with 50,000 taels for freight. Under Yongzheng nurture-integrity and fees were cut and made regular revenue, then extended to other charges. Regular and miscellaneous charges inside and out grew until each quota reached six or seven taels; only the ticket reform eased the burden. During Tongzhi, franchised marketing areas had not been restored, yet likin already more than made up for salt duty; there was no need to increase quotas.
54
使
Southern salt had long sold most heavily on the Hubei shore. After Sichuan salt took over, in Tongzhi 7 Guofan sought restoration of quota districts; the ministry proposed halting Sichuan salt in Hubei. Huguang Governor-General Li Hanzhang argued against a full halt and proposed a Shashi bureau blending sales eighty percent Sichuan and twenty percent Huai salt. Counted by bundle, Huai packs weighed less than Sichuan; the nominal twenty percent share was under ten percent. In year ten Guofan wrote again: "Sichuan salt encroaches on Huai territory; Huai salt should have eighty percent and Sichuan twenty, or seventy and thirty. The Hubei governor, citing huge provincial revenue needs, fears Sichuan salt will not sell through and receipts will drop sharply. I seek only free sale of Huai salt on Hubei shores to revive the trade; I would assign most or all of the likin to Hubei. The court ordered the Sichuan and Hubei governors and governors-general to confer. Guofan and others proposed returning Wuchang, Hanyang, Huangzhou, and De'an to Huainan; keeping Anlu, Xiangyang, Yunyang, Jingzhou, Yichang, and Jingmen on provisional Sichuan salt; limiting Hunan to Yue, Chang, and Li for Sichuan salt while restoring Yuezhou and Changde to Huai and allowing Li to sell Sichuan salt temporarily. The Board approved the plan. In Guangxu 2, after Guizhou was pacified, Censor Zhou Shengshu reported that Sichuan salt districts were restored and asked that all northern Hunan prefectures return to Huainan. The ministry approved as requested. Baozhen then reported that Hubei Sichuan likin came to over 1.5 million strings a year—under 900,000 taels of silver—and asked that Huai merchants pay it in a lump sum. But Huguang officials, citing fixed Sichuan likin receipts and doubting a lump payment, jointly favored Sichuan salt and blocked Huai. By year eight Zuo Zongtang raised the matter again in correspondence, but it never took effect.
55
Changlu salt duty from early Shunzhi was only about 202,000 taels. In year twelve, following Ming practice, Ning payments, merchant compensation, drip-bead shortfalls, and other items were recovered and levied as before. Under Kangxi, duties and quotas rose again to about 426,000 taels. Late in Qianlong, repeated shortfalls led to many dismissals; merchants then agreed to pay two qian per quota above the regular duty as a reserve fund, called reference duty. By late Daoguang quotas and suspended shores had multiplied; a suspended-shore surcharge of four fen per quota was added, but revenue still fell short. Then as Zhili governor Guofan proposed: where merchants had posted over 1,000 taels in escrow, guarantors should face a three-year limit—two-tenths chased from the principal debtor, one-tenth split between the guild head and bonding merchants, with no liability after the term, to avoid evasion. The proposal was approved.
56
便便
Among salt officials of the day, only Zuo Zongtang and Ding Baozhen rivaled Guofan, Li Hongzhang, and Shen Baozhen in reputation. Early in Tongzhi, as Zhejiang governor Zongtang reported: after Nanjing fell, Huai salt flooded Hang, Jia, and Song, and only Shaoxing held the line. Later most marketing areas were lost and Zhejiang too fell. After eastern Zhejiang was recovered he ordered provisional ticket salt in Shaoxing, then Hangzhou, Jiaxing, and Huzhou; old merchants could not supply the trade, so he sought ticket salt throughout the four districts with bureaus to track sales. The Board approved the plan. In year ten Censor Qichen charged that eastern Zhejiang prefectural bureaus depressed prices when merchants arrived so guilds could buy cheap, then raised them on resale, pocketing the margin. They should be abolished. The ministry ordered Governor Yang Changjun to investigate and report. He soon replied: "The Two Zhejiangs had long collected duty before salt. Under ticket transport, weak merchants paid only half the duty upfront and the rest after sales. He proposed abolishing salt guilds but keeping prefectural bureaus to collect the balance of duty. The memorial was approved.
57
西 西 便 西 西西 西 西
Under Qianlong in Fujian, fifteen counties in Yanping, Jianning, and Shaowu on the west, five in Funing on the east, and two in Minhou on the south were merchant-run as the Merchant Gang. Twenty-one jurisdictions in Fuzhou, Xinghua, Zhangzhou, and Quanzhou on the south were official-run as the Official Gang or County Anchorage Official Gang, with contractors called Pu households. Later western merchants were assigned substitute sales quotas, hence the term substitute quota. Merchants welcomed the light duty but the principal revenue fell into arrears. Early in Jiaqing attached collections and quota reductions were introduced. Substitute quotas were soon abolished, and bankruptcies followed in succession. In Daoguang 1 the system shifted to contracted merchants. Old debts were loaded onto new contractors; with yards neglected, officials in Fuzhou allowed coastal ships to trade salt privately as convenient-sea traffic, and abuses multiplied. By year twenty-nine contractors failed again and official transport was tried, but contractors pocketed half the transport capital. In Qianlong Fujian used the gang steelyard: each 100 jin was declared as 160 jin on the ministry scale, with 30 jin allowed for loss. Under Jiaqing the ministry steelyard was adopted without loss salt; burden and folded-sail quotas delivered only 42 jin per nominal 100 jin for sale while full substitute-quota duty was still due, so losses mounted. Later reforms only made matters worse. In Tongzhi 4, as Fujian governor Zongtang sought ticket transport and ordered yard officials to remain on site. On the west, quota merchants became ticket merchants; at county anchorages Pu households became retailers, using salt-route tickets instead of quotas, called sales slips. The west issued tickets per thirty quotas and the southeast and anchorages per hundred, because a western quota was 675 jin and a southern or anchorage quota 100 jin. Miscellaneous charges were cut; one tael of regular duty plus one qian for loss was paid when tickets were issued. Five qian likin was collected at bureaus along marketing routes. The west paid about 4.5 taels per quota; the southeast and anchorages about 4.4 taels. Because the western duty was heavy, they memorialized a cut of one tael per duty with four qian likin attached. All old arrears were remitted. Treasury interest was forgiven and principal was to be repaid over time. That year over 400,000 taels in duty, loss, and likin were collected, plus 190,000 in old arrears; 400,000 was fixed as the regular quota. Within a few years merchants were content and smuggling dwindled.
58
西使 西 西
Shaanxi Huamachi salt duty had long been collected by the provincial treasurer. In Tongzhi 12 Zuo Zongtang as Shaanxi-Gansu governor-general, for frontier warfare, converted duty to likin at a Dingbian bureau, called Huading salt likin. Shaanxi salt revenue then passed to Gansu.
59
Sichuan salt originally marketed chiefly in Yunnan and Guizhou. The Guizhou shore had four routes: from Yongning (Yong shore), from Hejiang to Renhuai (Ren shore), from Fuzhou (Fu shore), and from Qijiang (Qi shore). Transport merchants were now exhausted and relied only on sales into Hubei. When Huainan sought to restore quota districts, backlog quotas reached over 80,000 and surplus skims owed millions of taels. Early in Guangxu, as Sichuan governor Ding Baozhen instituted official transport with merchant sales, beginning on the Guizhou shore, he drafted fifteen rules: cut overhead, clear backlog quotas, audit substitute sales, bureau transport with merchant sales, manage plan shores jointly, allocate quotas through bureaus, extend memorial clearance deadlines, tighten handover audits, control receipts and payments, enforce Guizhou likin, pay fair freight, and abolish quota-base fees—by which transport merchants rented quotas from seated merchants for about twenty taels each, covering surplus skims, quota fees, official extractions, bureau costs, and two taels to seated merchants. Years of surplus skims already paid by transport merchants should have been abolished entirely. Because of long usage, one tael was temporarily kept for ticket handling, allowances, and rewards. A headquarters was opened at Luzhou with branch bureaus on each shore, and Circuit Intendant Tang Jiong was appointed supervisor. He later took the Yunnan shore, where Sichuan salt entered only Zhaotong and Dongchuan through Zhangwo and Nanguang bureaus, called the great and small Yunnan frontiers. The Yunnan shore was harder than Guizhou because Yunnan had its own salt and smuggling was easy. Baozhen devised blocking measures, and transport opened only in year five.
60
便
Under official transport with merchant sales, that year frontier quotas were fully cleared and over 10,000 backlog quotas were sold, with over a million taels in taxes, skims, likin, and fees—yet local rackets were disrupted. The court sent En Cheng and Tong Hua to inspect other shores; in Sichuan the Fushun magnate Wang Yuzhao, posing as a saltern owner, petitioned to replace the system with official supervision and merchant sales. The throne sought comment. Baozhen replied: "Official supervision with merchant sales benefits officials and merchants alike; official transport with official sales concentrates power in officials—both invite serious abuse. Only official transport with merchant sales lets government and merchants restrain one another. When the case was tried, he memorialized for Wang's arrest. By late Guangxu most plan shores had shifted to official transport as well.
61
滿
Elsewhere, Fengtian had shifted from tax payment to quota salt in Kangxi and then gone without salt duty for over 170 years. In Tongzhi 6 General Duxing'a won approval for monopoly likin of 1,000 eastern cash per salt unit for local military expenses. In Guangxu 3 General Chonghou sought an additional 2,400 wen. In year eight General Chongqi added another 2,400 wen as the four-eight salt likin for troop training. In year seventeen the Board of Revenue added 2,400 wen as the two-four salt likin for remittance to Beijing. In year twenty-four General Yiktangga added 1,200 wen as the one-two salt likin for schools. Together these three were called the eight-four salt likin. In year twenty-eight General Zengqi proposed a supervision sales bureau with a four-cash-per-jin surcharge as official capital. The plan was for official bureaus to buy, warehouse, and sell salt—called supervision sales but effectively official transport. The Russo-Japanese War prevented implementation. In year thirty-two General Zhao Erxun abolished supervision sales, opened an Official Salt General Bureau in Fengtian with branches in Jilin and Heilongjiang, and let merchants pay at the salterns and market salt freely. In year thirty-three, with provincial government in the northeast, Governor-General Xu Shichang renamed the bureau the Three Eastern Provinces Salt Affairs General Bureau, and Jilin and Heilongjiang then began official transport. Annual revenue had been 240,000 or 400,000 taels; under Zhao Erxun it passed one million and later 1.4 million.
62
西
Mongolian salt had long been managed by the banners. Salt sold in Shaanxi and Gansu came chiefly from Jilantai in Alashan Banner, known as red salt. Before Daoguang private transport was permitted. In Xianfeng 8 merchants were contracted at eight taels per hundred jin. During Tongzhi, Muslim rebellions ruined merchants and revenue; Zongtang converted duty to likin with a five-cash surcharge per jin. In Shanxi too red salt predominated. Early in Jiaqing the Alashan prince offered Jilantai; the government contracted merchants and marked outlying departments, Datong and Shuoping, and native-salt counties around Taiyuan and Fenzhou as Ji-shore quota districts. The arrangement was abolished in year seventeen. All salt entering through Shanhaiguan Pass was taxed at one fen five li per jin. Three other types were also marketed: Ordos Banner salt, Sunit Banner salt, popularly known as white salt, and Ujimqin Banner salt, called blue salt. At first they were sold inland under the laoshao salt precedent. Taxes were imposed late in the Jiaqing reign. By the Guangxu era all had shifted to likin collection.
63
In Zhili, blue and white salt were likined in Guangxu 28 at four cash per jin, yielding about 120,000 taels a year. The next year Rehe followed suit at five cash per jin. That year the Zhili governor asked for a supervision bureau at Zhangjiakou and collection depots beyond the pass, with contractors paying two taels per thousand jin, about 30,000 taels annually. In year thirty-three Rehe opened a bureau charging four qian per hundred jin. In Xuande 1 the rate fell to two qian five fen, yielding about 60,000 taels a year.
64
Xinjiang had long permitted private boiling and sale. After Guangxu 34 taxes began at 14,400 taels at Jinghe, 5,100 at Dihua, and 2,400 at Shanshan, while other areas remained untaxed.
65
Salt likin began in north and south Huai at heavy rates. State reorganization of salt administration brought modest reductions. Restoring the Huai salt framework was followed by proposals to raise Sichuan likin again. In Xianfeng 5 flower salt was likined at eight taels per ten-thousand-jin quota; when merchants quietly inflated loads to 17,000 jin, Governor Luo Bingzhang added seventeen taels per quota, making proper likin twenty-five taels. Other provinces soon followed suit. By Guangxu copper coins had already raised salt prices covertly, yet surcharges beyond likin were still debated.
66
西
This policy dated to the Yongzheng reign. Changlu salt prices had been set in Kangxi 27 between 1.4 hao and 1.26 li of silver per jin. In Yongzheng 6 Salt Censor Zheng Chanbao reported that merchants paid duties in silver while consumers bought salt in cash. In Kangxi one tael bought 1,400 to 1,500 cash and salt sold at sixteen cash per jin. Now one tael fetched 2,000 cash while salt prices stayed put or fell to thirteen or fourteen cash, so cash could not meet the original silver quotas. He asked the ministry and provincial governors to consider the matter jointly. In year ten approval came for a one-li silver markup per jin. Qianlong extended the practice elsewhere, ostensibly to protect merchants. In Jiaqing 5 Changlu Censor Guan Yu sought a salt surcharge to fund operations in unsettled Sichuan and Huguang. Emperor Renzong replied: I will not trouble households to meet military pay. A household's daily salt costs only a cash or two; a markup would burden everyone. High prices would only invite smuggling. Yet river-works costs later revived the practice, especially after Daoguang. In Guangxu 2 Vice President Yuan Baoheng proposed a two-cash surcharge nationwide for the western campaign, but Governor-General Shen Baozhen blocked it.
67
New policies thereafter drew on salt revenue for nearly every purpose. In year 20 coastal defense against Japan added two cash per jin nationwide. In year 27 indemnity repayment added four cash. In year 34 a four-cash levy offset opium taxes, half for training troops and half for producing provinces, the most notable surcharge. Governors and merchants alike feared stagnation yet could not halt the levies; revenue now ran several times above the Daoguang baseline. Changlu merchants lost capital in the Boxer turmoil and even borrowed foreign loans. Shandong's ticket system, partly reverted to official management in Tongzhi 6, was riddled with abuse. Hedong kept mixed official-private transport but sales still languished. Fujian's ticket transport and Sichuan's official transport fared no better. Guangdong's Chaoyang and Qiaotou salt, once state-run, was handed to merchants with the six warehouses but yielded little. Yunnan's brine wells were barely viable. Huai and Zhejiang salt declined worst of all.
68
便 西 沿 西 西 西 駿 西
In Xuande 1 Minister Zai Ze reported that as the sea receded in southern Huai, brine weakened: Shigang, Liuzhuang, and other yards produced little, and Jinsha produced none. Northern Huai's three yards, nearer the sea, still had strong brine; refined salt came from brick pools and quotas were fixed per pool. Recently new pools spread beyond the brick basins while old salterns went unmarked, so production lost all limits. Southern firm Tongdechang opened pools in northern Huai, which northern merchants especially resented. Zhejiang's strongest production was at Yuyao and Daishan, then Songjiang's Yuanpu, Qingcun, and Hengpu yards, all sun-dried on boards. Boiling yards under Hangzhou, Jiaxing, Ningbo, and Shaoxing bought brine from Yuyao. Dear brine and firewood raised costs, so merchants favored sun-drying and stove households abandoned boiling. Boiling dwindled, leaving Longtou, Changting, and Changlin short of supply while Yuyao and Daishan dominated. Yuyao's beaches lay far from official yards and Daishan sat offshore without yards; bureaus and sheds could collect only a fraction while private drying went unchecked. Such was the state of production everywhere. Huai and Zhejiang salt each had allotted territories, yet Henan's Xiping and Suiping had long been abandoned shores; Hunan's Hengzhou, Yongzhou, and Baozhou prefectures and Jingzhou, though Huai territory, sold Guangdong salt; Hubei's Anxiang, Xiangyang, Yunzhou, Jingzhou, and Yichang prefectures and Jingmen subprefecture, though Huai territory, sold Sichuan salt; while Wenzhou, Taizhou, Ningbo, and Chuzhou in Zhejiang levied likin but had not yet issued quotas. In northern Huai the three-tier trade often lost touch with shore conditions, so ticket merchants ignored sales clearance, Henan merchants blamed lake merchants, and provincial levies all hurt the trade. Southern Huai's four shore supervision offices rivaled the transport commissioner, who could not control them and distributors obeyed them only loosely; official authority was fragmented and merchants were equally dispersed. Nearby Zhejiang yards distinguished shoulder quotas from resident quotas. Distant yards divided framework territories from quota territories. Mixed official management and merchant contracting produced a patchwork of incompatible rules. Bundled salt leaving the yards faced holdups at stations and smuggling by boatmen. Such was the marketing situation everywhere. Huai salt sold in Jiangsu and Anhui bordered Zhejiang and Shandong quota districts. On the Henan shore it bordered Shandong and Changlu districts. On the western shore it bordered Zhejiang, Fujian, and Guangdong districts. On the Hunan and Hubei shores it bordered Sichuan and local Hubei salt. Xiangyang and Fancheng in Hubei were flooded with Changlu and Shanxi smuggled salt; Hengzhou, Yongzhou, and Baozhou in Hunan were held by Guangdong smugglers; Zhejiang quota lands on the Jiangsu, Anhui, and western shores all neighbored Huai, and even Wenzhou and Taizhou within the province were invaded by Fujian smugglers, so boundaries interlocked and disputes arose constantly. Since the Beijing-Hankou railway opened through Henan, the contest between Huai and Changlu salt grew fiercer. When the Tianjin-Pukou and Canton-Hankou lines were completed, Huai territory would be beset on every side, yet these were still neighboring smuggled salt. Worse still, Anhui and Henan were both Huai territory, yet Yingzhou in Anhui bordered Runan and Guangzhou prefectures and undercut the Henan shore with lighter surcharges; Taizhou and Chuzhou were both Zhejiang, yet Jinyun in Chuzhou was contracted by Taizhou merchants who undercut Chuzhou with lower bundled likin. Jianchang in Jiangxi had long been an abandoned shore; a new official transport bureau sought recovery by undercutting smuggled salt. Fuzhou already feared backflow, Shanghai concessions had been a smugglers' haven, and a new affairs office for official sales crossed boundaries and drew complaints from Jiangsu, so Huai encroached on Huai and Zhejiang on Zhejiang. Profit drew competition that was hard to stop; only strict anti-smuggling enforcement was relied on. Yet troops were slack, failed to curb ringleaders, and harassed civilians instead. Local officials, seeing the quota framework long abandoned, shirked responsibility and looked on indifferently. Such was the state of adjoining quota boundaries. Recent fund-raising leaned heavily on salt, and Huai and Zhejiang at the empire's center mattered most for the whole system. Reform required unified authority. He proposed placing salt affairs under his ministry, with governors of producing provinces as co-managing salt ministers and governors of marketing provinces bearing the same title. The throne approved. His reference to southern merchants opening pools concerned Guangxu 33, when southern Huai, short of sales, added new pools at Laozikou in northern Huai called the Jinan salt pools. In year thirty-four northern merchants claimed the new pools hurt old outlets, and Governor Zhang Renjun capped them at 100,000 quotas to match southern Huai's shortfall. The three-tier trade moved northern Huai ticket salt from the saltern to Xiba for lake merchants, then to Zhengyang Pass, and by rotation to shore merchants.
69
西退 西
After Zai Ze was appointed supervising salt minister, he opened a Salt Administration Office divided into eight departments and began with northern Huai. Four measures were drafted: restore the western Suiping abandoned shores, withdraw Changlu shops on the Huai border, ease merchants' road levies, and bundle Henan likin payments. He consulted Henan Governor Wu Chongxi, who alone insisted on keeping the last item unchanged. Zai Ze also ordered a likin general bureau at Xiba and an inspection office at Linhuai Pass, abolished other stations, replaced the three-tier trade with shore merchants, and required one payment at the bureau of 2.2 silver dollars per quota, converted to 1.6-something taels treasury silver. Native sales districts received a reduction of four silver dollars, collected as 1.2 taels, thirty percent below the original quota. This was enacted in the seventh month of year two.
70
Mongol salt fields beyond Zhangjiakou in Zhili, long merchant-contracted, were reorganized as companies in Xuande 1. They were then replaced with official stacks, with departments and counties as quota shores under merchant contract for 20,000 quotas a year at 157,000 taels. Sichuan's ticket transport under the ding-tax system spread after Xianfeng to sixty-eight departments and counties and often blocked official transport. A memorial then fixed quotas to existing wells and stoves, forbade illicit sales, and aimed to end ticket smuggling. In year three seven million taels from the Da Qing Bank and six hundred thousand from the Zhili Bank repaid Changlu merchants' foreign debt, thirty-six quota districts reverted to official management, and a bureau was opened at Tianjin. The seven Yongping subordinates had been managed by local officials in the Daoguang era. In Guangxu 29 an official transport bureau was established. Xinhe and Pingxiang counties, which had no merchant contractors, were then placed under the Tianjin bureau.
71
滿 西西
When foreign trade began, prohibited goods including salt were barred from import and export. Yet Japanese salt appeared at Dalian and Lushun in Fengtian and at Changchun in Jilin. Korean salt appeared at Hunchun and Yanji in Jilin. Russian salt appeared at Manzhouli and Heihe in Heilongjiang and at Dongning in Jilin; French salt at Zhennanguan in Guangxi and Mengzi in Yunnan; and salt from Hong Kong and Macao flooded the market. When Germany leased Jiaozhou Bay in Shandong, it encroached on the Jimo saltern; Russia leased the Liaodong Peninsula in Fengtian, then Japan took it over and seized the Jinzhou salt flats; along with Jiaoliu and Fengming islands off Fuzhou, officials debated contracting surplus salt or posting officers to suppress smuggling. The anti-smuggling plan was adopted, but the purchase scheme failed. France leased Guangzhou Bay in Guangdong and took the Maohui saltern in Wuchuan, shipping salt through Hong Kong and Vietnam into the interior—each case shattered the salt monopoly. Those charged with salt policy would need sound remedies for what followed.
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