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卷124 志九十九 食货五 钱法 茶法 矿政

Volume 124 Treatises 99: Food and Money 5, Coinage, Tea Administration, Mining Administration

Chapter 124 of 清史稿 · Draft History of Qing
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1
Treatise 99
2
==
Food and Money, Part Five
3
滿滿 西西西 使
On coinage: In his early reign Taizu first cast Tianming Tongbao coins in two denominations distinguished by Manchu and Han inscriptions; the Manchu-inscription coin was the larger of the two. The Tiancong reign continued the same arrangement. After Shunzhi made Beijing the capital, minting was greatly expanded and a single standard denomination was adopted. The Baoquan mint was placed under the Board of Revenue and the Baoyuan mint under the Board of Works. Shunzhi Tongbao coins were specified to be cast from an alloy of seventy parts red copper to thirty parts brass. One thousand coins counted as ten thousand for accounting; two thousand strings constituted one production cycle (mao), and thirty such cycles were minted annually. Each coin weighed one mace (about 3.8 grams). In Shunzhi year 2 the weight was raised by two fen, seven new coins were set equal to one fen of silver, and old coins counted at half that rate. Because the public found cash too dear, the rate was revised to ten coins per fen of silver. Provinces and garrison towns opened mints to the prescribed standard; over time mints were established in Shanxi, Shaanxi, Miyun, Ji, Xuanfu, Datong, Yansui, Linqing, Shengjing, Jiangxi, Henan, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shandong, Huguang, and the prefectures of Jingzhou, Changde, and Jiangning. In year 5 the Shengjing and Yansui mints were shut down. In year 6 the Datong mint was relocated to Yanghe. In year 7 mints were opened in the prefectures of Xiangyang and Yunyang. In year 8 provincial and garrison minting was suspended. In year 10 the Miyun, Ji, Xuanfu, Yanghe, and Linqing mints were reopened. At first the Board of Revenue judged the new coinage sufficient; only Chongzhen coins from the Ming were temporarily permitted to circulate, while other old copper had to be surrendered to the state for compensation, and private minting, small coins, and counterfeits were banned along with a renewed prohibition on old currency. When surrender lagged, an empire-wide order set a three-month deadline for delivery; anyone who continued to use old coin after that was liable to punishment.
4
滿 使
That year the court debated reform of the currency. The weight adopted in year 8—one mace two fen five li—became the standard. The reverse bore the Han characters for "one li" on the left; Baoquan coins showed the character for Revenue (hu), Baoyuan for Works (gong), and provincial mints one character for the locality, as Taiyuan with yuan or Xuanfu with xuan. One thousand cash equaled one tael of silver, fixed as the uniform standard of circulation. Private mints were outlawed; offenders were prosecuted under the statute on official corruption. Official coin had piled up in treasury, so a contraction-and-release policy was applied, allocating mint output from Beijing and the provinces to salary payments. The old grain-tax rate of seven mace three of silver per picul was codified in regulations. Provincial mints produced inferior coin, inviting counterfeiting until circulation stalled entirely. Provincial minting was abolished; only Baoquan and Baoyuan were retained to cast refined coins of one mace four fen with Manchu reverse inscriptions, making private forgery harder. Coins then in circulation had to be withdrawn and melted within three months. Penalties for private minting were tightened: ringleaders and craftsmen were beheaded and their property confiscated; accomplices and knowing buyers were punished by degree, as were neighborhood heads and ten-household chiefs who failed to report and local officials who knew but did nothing. Informants received fifty taels of silver.
5
滿
In year 17 provincial minting resumed on the heavy-coin standard, with both Manchu and Han on the reverse. In Kangxi 1 reign-title coins were introduced; thereafter every new reign cast coins in the same way. When Qianlong abdicated in favor of Jiaqing, twelve Qianlong denominations and eighteen Jiaqing denominations were cast—an exceptional departure from precedent. Once the one-mace-four-fen coin was introduced, illicit melting became common, and the law made clandestine melting punishable on the same terms as private minting. Copperware manufacture was therefore banned to curb illicit melting. In year 18 the ban was tightened; only military weapons, musical instruments, and similar items under five jin were exempt. Heavy coins were melted less often, and their value rose painfully. In year 23 the court approved Vice Minister Chen Tingjing's memorial to restore the one-mace standard. Cash soon became dear again. A price floor was reissued: one tael of silver must buy at least one thousand cash—but the exchange rate never stabilized. By the end of the reign one tael bought only 880 to 770 cash. Relief funds from the Five Wards were used to sell cash for silver in order to stabilize the rate.
6
使便 使
Although old coin had been banned again, remote Fujian still circulated mixed old currency. In year 24 Governor Jin Qiao raised the issue. Academician Xu Qianxue memorialized: "From antiquity old and new coin have circulated side by side for the people's convenience." He cited historical precedents: "Since the Han wushu, no dynasty has abolished old coin in favor of the new alone. The Sui melted old coin; after Tianqi the Ming seized all old coin for recasting—each was a disruption of the currency. When the currency is debased, old coin can help sift out bad money, which is why each new dynasty has allowed old coin to circulate. Fujian lies beyond the mountains; the people there should be allowed to use old coin freely." The emperor approved, and restrictions on old and demonetized coin were broadly relaxed. That year Banner subjects who privately minted or melted were made subject to the same penalties as commoners. In year 41 a return to the lighter standard revived private minting. Ministers asked to abolish small coin and restore the one-mace-four-fen standard, with old and new circulating together at 1000 new or 700 old cash per tael of silver. The edict approved. Private minting nevertheless could not be stopped.
7
In year 45 Shandong petitioned to cast large-denomination coins. When a private mint was uncovered at Changshan, the emperor reasoned that large coins would only encourage more illicit melting unless copper were collected first. Grain tax was henceforth collected at 2000 cash per tael of silver, then in copperware once cash ran out. The Board of Revenue, finding new coin insufficient, asked to postpone withdrawal of old coin for five years. Two years later, privately minted Xiangyang coin was found hidden aboard grain boats bound for the capital. Chief Minister Ta Jintai investigated and memorialized for stricter collection and destruction. Repeat offenders in minting and trafficking were punished by statute; boatmen and transport officers were treated as minters; knowing local officials were beheaded and their families confiscated; failure to detect led to dismissal. Penalties grew still harsher.
8
便 滿
From year 44 official mints partly drew copper from Yunnan. In Yongzheng 1 Governor Yang Mingshi petitioned for annual shipment of Yunnan copper to Beijing. The court decided that minting locally was cheaper. Four Yunnan mints were opened at Dali and Zhan Yi to cast coin for shipment to the capital, inscribed yunquan on the reverse. The emperor, treating coin as a national treasure, renamed the mint Baoyun and ordered all provincial coins to show bao followed by the province name in Manchu script alone. Thereafter coin minted for shipment to the capital was intermittently suspended.
9
In Qianlong 2, because the cash rate had long been unstable, Daxing and Wanping counties were ordered to set up official money brokers to stabilize it. The emperor judged illicit melting the greater evil and tightened the ban on copperware. Officials below third rank were forbidden copperware; existing pieces had to be surrendered within three years, after which possession was a crime; continued manufacture after the ban was punished as complicity in illicit minting. A general ban on copperware manufacture followed. Restrictions soon tightened further: only first-rank officials might keep copperware; all others were forbidden, and concealment was a punishable offense. In year 12 the emperor observed that heavy coin encouraged melting and light coin encouraged counterfeiting, and restored the one-mace-two-fen standard. In year 13 clipping coin edges was made a capital offense with reprieve (jiao jianhou). Earlier Minister Haiwang had memorialized that the copper ban harmed the people in four ways; Qianlong agreed and lifted both the copper ban and compulsory copper collection.
10
使 使 使 便便使
Cash in the capital rose again to only 800 per tael of silver; an edict released Board of Works treasury coin to stabilize the rate. Censor Tao Zhengjing blamed brokers for distorting the cash rate; they were immediately abolished. Zhejiang Commissioner Zhang Ruozhen argued that dear cash was caused by illicit destruction. If coins were alloyed with copper, lead, and a trace of tin to produce green cash, melters would find no profit in destroying them. Trials succeeded; his proposal was adopted, and green cash circulated alongside yellow cash. Penalties for private lead coin were set: ringleaders and craftsmen received strangulation with reprieve; accomplices and knowing buyers one degree less. Trafficking and hoarding of demonetized coin were strictly forbidden; hoarding above one hundred strings was a regulatory offense. The emperor told the court: "Today's prohibitions only patch symptoms; they do not address the root cause. Goods are properly valued in silver, not cash, yet officials and commoners alike prefer cash to silver. Profiteers manipulate the rate for gain—how inverted are the true and false standards of value! Henceforth silver should be emphasized: all provincial public works and large private purchases should be settled in silver."
11
使 滿 西
In year 22 Liangguang Governor-General Li Shiyao petitioned to ban old and counterfeit coin. The emperor noted that Wu Sangui's Liyong, Honghua, and Zhaowu counterfeits circulated among the people; voluntary surrender would be exchanged for official coin to be recast, while old coin might still circulate. In year 24, after the Muslim regions were pacified, the standard was issued at Yarkand: Qianlong Tongbao of two mace, reverse with the Yarkand name in Manchu on the left and Uighur on the right, cast in red copper from melted old Pul coin. Two years later Aksu petitioned to mint on the Yarkand model. Tibet was also permitted to mint silver coins of one mace and five fen, inscribed Qianlong Baozang, with Tangut script on the reverse and the year on the rim. These two types circulated only in the Muslim west and Tibet, not in China proper. In year 29 the Muslim regions were ordered to use the Qianlong reign title permanently on their coinage.
12
仿
By mid-dynasty cash was dear; provinces added furnaces and increased output, and the rate briefly stabilized. When copper shipments lagged, speculators hoarded and raised prices, harming the currency. Governors were ordered not to suspend mints or cut production cycles without strong cause. By the late reign private minting flourished, centered in Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou and spreading to the lower Yangtze. Official minting in Yunnan and Guizhou was also suspended for poor quality. Although private minting was strictly forbidden, lenient collection policies let criminals exploit the gap, and counterfeit coin proliferated daily. In year 57 Huguang Governor-General Bi Yuan petitioned for open-ended purchase of private coin. The emperor replied that Hubei was the main conduit for private coin and that Bi was planning evasion rather than suppression; he ordered strict inspection of trafficking but granted a two-year grace period. In year 59 official and private coin became indistinguishable and cash depreciated; provincial minting was suspended and private coin ordered collected within one year—but clerks exploited the policy for graft. In Jiaqing 1 provincial minting resumed. By year 10 many provinces had not restored full production cycles; cash rose again, and all governors were ordered to meet their minting quotas. Thereafter official and private minting alike deteriorated: Beijing coin had blurred rims and thin, brittle metal; Jiangsu Baosu coin mixed in sand and shattered when dropped; private minting flourished in Guizhou and Huguang while Jiangsu hid both official and illicit operations. By the Daoguang era Fujian and Guangdong circulated foreign coins such as Guangzhong, Jingzhong, Jingxing, and Jialong; criminals profited by imitating them. The Guiyang and Dading mints also cast thick-based large coins, and the currency deteriorated further.
13
仿 使 沿沿
As Sino-Western trade exchanged goods for silver, foreign ships smuggled out tens of millions of taels annually; Censors Huang Zhongmo and Zhang Yuan both memorialized on the matter. Various foreign silver dollars—large and small queue, disheveled head, bat, double pillar, and horse sword types—were also smuggled inland for profit, spreading from Fujian and Guangdong to all regions south of the Yellow River. Foreign merchants also carried them to every coastal port, ostensibly trading goods but secretly buying silver, until foreign dollars proliferated and sycee grew scarce and costly. The emperor was alarmed and ordered the Guangdong governor to tighten enforcement, but foreign silver was not banned; counterfeit Guangban, Fuban, Hangban, Wuzhuang, and Xingzhuang types continued to drain domestic silver as before. Censor Huang Juezi petitioned to ban silver export entirely and establish a separate statute with heavier penalties. In year 17 an edict ordered coastal governors and customs officials to crack down on smuggling with merit-based rewards and punishments, but domestic silver was exhausted and one tael often bought only 2000 cash. Ministers debated strengthening cash to curb silver, but the proposal never took effect.
14
西 滿 滿 便 便
Earlier in mid-Daoguang, as silver drained abroad and rose in value, both court and public favored issuing large-denomination coins as a remedy. Guangxi Governor Liang Zhangju memorialized in favor of the policy. When Xianfeng ascended the throne, Sichuan Education Commissioner He Shaoji strongly urged large coins to restore ancient practice and save the currency. The emperor was initially unconvinced but eventually authorized official notes and treasure notes alongside large coins. Paper notes had been issued in Shunzhi 8, with annual production exceeding 128,000. They were abolished after ten years. During Jiaqing, Hanlin Bachelor Cai Zhiding petitioned to issue paper notes. In Xianfeng 2 Fujian Governor Wang Yide made the same request. The court judged it impracticable and rejected both petitions. Silver was scarce, cash exhausted, and military and river works consumed over twenty million taels; fiscal planners overwhelmingly urged official notes. The following year the Board of Revenue was ordered to deliberate. Prince Hui and others urged the ministry to issue cash notes alongside silver notes. Notes were printed on parchment, headed "Board of Revenue Official Note" in Manchu on the left and Han on the right; the center stated the amount in standard sycee of two taels; the footer read "Official Note Issued by Memorial of the Board of Revenue." Official notes were redeemable for silver or cash on the same terms as silver itself and could be used for official payments per ministry regulations. Counterfeiting was punishable by statute. The border bore a dragon design. Treasure notes were headed "Great Qing Treasure Note"; the center stated the amount in standard cash; the margin bore eight characters: "Treasure circulating under Heaven, balanced in and out"; the footer declared that the note substituted for regulated cash and was acceptable for land tax, grain tax, and all levies at every treasury. The border design matched that on the official note. Large coins ranged from 1000-cash to 10-cash denominations in five grades, weight decreasing from two taels to four mace four fen. The 1000- and 500-cash denominations were cast in pure copper with a purple tint; the 100-, 50-, and 10-cash denominations were cast from copper-lead alloy with a yellow tint. Coins of 100 cash and above were inscribed Xianfeng Yuanbao; lower denominations read Zhongbao; the reverse bore the mint name in Manchu. In year 4, for lack of copper, 5-cash iron coins and standard cash were also minted. Lead standard cash was added later. Under Qianlong the capital mints drew on Yunnan and imported copper; later only Yunnan shipments were used. Blocked transport routes delayed copper shipments, making these expedients necessary. One tael of note silver equaled 2000 cash; 2000 in notes equaled one tael of silver; notes and cash notes were mutually convertible. Private tax payments and all official dues could be paid half in notes; treasury disbursements followed the same rule. Large coins circulated like notes at the standard cash rate; thirty percent of official payments could be in large coins; iron coins circulated on the same terms. Obstruction was a regulatory offense; counterfeiting notes carried the death penalty with reprieve; private minting penalties were tightened. Capital and provinces were ordered to establish official money bureaus. When provinces delayed compliance, note bureaus were proposed for each prefecture and large coins distributed to shops for exchange. Land tax accepted notes; small taxpayers with fractional balances paid in copper and iron large coins—Zhili and Shandong implemented first. Official extortion and unfair trading were severely punished. In year 7 Zhili grain tax from the first harvest season was payable forty percent in silver, thirty percent in treasure notes, and thirty percent in 10-cash copper and iron large coins; all official payments followed the same ratio. Following Board deliberation, from the second harvest season Zhili collected seventy percent silver and thirty percent notes, with large coins counted within the thirty-percent note quota; payers could choose notes or cash.
15
便 便
When notes were first issued, military pay and river works disbursements in notes were widely resisted, and public confidence was low. Provinces that accepted fifty percent in notes found large-sum settlement difficult and stopped accepting notes in disbursement. The public hoarded notes as worthless. In the capital, note-holders faced inflated prices or hidden goods; official shops paid out only the four large-coin types, which were hard to use. Notes thus harmed soldiers and civilians alike. Later Beijing shops issued notes at seventy percent of face value; the rate fell further until even reduced issuance could not meet demand, and notes ceased to circulate. The 1000- and 500-cash large coins were abolished first as overvalued; the 100- and 50-cash followed; iron coins were driven out by private notes; only the 10-cash denomination remained. Counterfeiting proliferated despite daily death sentences. Official coin deteriorated until it was indistinguishable from counterfeits; merchants exploited the confusion with arbitrary discounts. Merchants refused large coins; the thirty-percent acceptance rule remained on paper only, and repeated prohibitions failed. The law was broken and widely evaded; nothing was achieved. Only the 10-cash coin circulated for long, worth two standard cash per mace, but it did not circulate outside the capital. In late Xianfeng copper was desperately scarce, and copper bans and collection orders were renewed. In early Tongzhi minting relied only on merchant and scrap copper; the 10-cash coin was reduced to three mace two fen. In Guangxu 9 it was further reduced to two mace six fen.
16
便 西
Empress Dowager Cixi was determined to restore standard coinage. With Yunnan copper shipments below quota, foreign copper was purchased for trial minting at the machine bureau. The Board of Revenue objected to machine-bureau and capital minting; the empress dowager blamed their evasion and ordered Li Hongzhang to mint at Tianjin at one mace weight. Tang Jiong was given governor rank to supervise Yunnan copper. In year 14 Guangdong trial-minted machine coins marked on the reverse with a weight of seven fen treasury scale. In year 24 provinces were ordered to mint eight-fen coins. Beijing, short of standard cash, continued the 10-cash coin as before. In year 32 copper 10-cash coins were minted but rejected by the public. Silver and copper dollars and banks were then introduced to unify the currency and compete with Western powers.
17
西 西 西 西便
When foreign merchants gathered in Guangdong, Spanish and British silver flooded in. Governor Lin Zexu planned domestic coinage to counter it but abandoned the effort as impractical. Mexico and Japan then flooded the market with their national coinage. In Guangxu 14 Zhang Zhidong as Guangdong governor began machine trial minting; Li Hongzhang completed it. The coin read "Guangxu Yuanbao, seven mace two fen treasury scale, made in Guangdong Province" with a coiled dragon on the reverse. Four subsidiary silver denominations were also minted: 3 mace 6 fen, 1 mace 4 fen 4 li, 7 fen 2 li, and 3 fen 6 li. This marked the beginning of China's machine-minted silver coinage. Hubei, Jiangxi, Zhili, Zhejiang, Anhui, Fengtian, and Jilin opened mints in turn. Guangdong, Hubei, and Jiangxi coin proved most acceptable and were allowed to use capital tribute funds as minting capital. Provinces without mints were ordered to contract with existing ones. Treasury receipts and payments could include thirty percent in the new coinage. Liu Kunyi, Zhang Zhidong, and Tao Mo were ordered to plan minting at three bureaus. The Board of Revenue then found that the seven provinces' coins varied in size and fineness, hindering circulation. When the central mint was completed, three provincial mints were to close, leaving Jiangnan, Zhili, and Guangdong as branches. The initial heavy ink-round design was widely criticized. Zhang Zhidong first trial-minted one-tael silver coins in Hubei. The Board fixed the main coin at one treasury-scale tael, with five-mace and one-mace subsidiary silver, copper dollars, and standard cash, and ordered central and branch mints to produce accordingly.
18
沿沿 西
Copper dollars were first minted in Fujian and Guangdong, then Jiangsu. With capital minting suspended, provinces were ordered to ship hundreds of thousands to Beijing for Board distribution. Coastal provinces were also ordered to fund contracted minting. Provinces opened mints one after another while the central mint was completed later. The central mint planned three metals: gold, silver, and copper. Copper was minted first. Denominations ranged from 20 to 2 cash, weight from four mace to four fen, in four types; inscriptions varied slightly by province. Provincial coins read Guangxu Yuanbao; the central mint initially matched them, then adopted Da Qing Copper Coin; all bore the mint name and a dragon reverse in purple copper, though some provinces used brass. Private copper minting and paper counterfeiting carried penalties one degree heavier than for standard cash. Copper dollars were first minted to supplement scarce standard cash, but mints soon competed for profit; New Policy military funds depended on them until minting costs could not be covered. Liangjiang Governor-General Zhou Fu first memorialized on the abuses; the Board legislated restrictions. Eight remedial measures were then submitted to the Bureau of Government Affairs. With seventeen provinces operating two or three mints each, unification seemed impossible. Shandong merged into Zhili, Hubei into Hunan, Jiangnan and Anhui into Jiangning, Zhejiang into Fujian, Guangxi into Guangdong; Fengtian, Henan, Sichuan, and Yunnan-Guizhou formed nine mints under joint ministry management, with grand ministers inspecting and coordinating with the Board. Copper dollars depreciated until 10-cash coins traded at half value; private mints proliferated with fraud. Payments due in silver converted to copper dollars at a loss; prices soared and livelihoods deteriorated. Provinces obstructed one another until their coins would not circulate across borders. Shandong Governor Yuan Shuxun then memorialized ten further harms. When the central mint began copper coinage, Baoquan still minted six-fen standard cash. Guangdong petitioned to mint one-wen coins under a standard issued by the central mint. In year 34 all copper-dollar mints were ordered to add one-wen coins in the dollar style, preserving the old denomination as a remedy for copper-dollar inflation.
19
西 使 調 使
After Sheng Xuanhuai's memorial for a commercial bank, reformers noted that Western nations all had national banks sustaining domestic and foreign finance. In year 29 the Board's request was approved: an official bank with four million in official and merchant capital would manage national coinage, paper notes, official funds, and public bonds. It soon issued paper notes and opened paper and printing factories. When the Board of Revenue became the Board of Finance, the bank was renamed Da Qing with chief and deputy superintendents; the central mint followed suit. A savings bank was attached within the main bank. Currency unification was written into newly concluded commercial treaties. The ministry held that silver coin should be standardized first; once proven, the three-metal system could be unified. Only the question of yuan versus tael accounting remained unresolved. Emperor Guangxu referred the matter to provincial governors. A petition to implement commercial treaties and fix the currency promptly went to the Bureau of Government Affairs; governors submitted opinions in turn. Eleven provinces favored the tael; only eight favored the yuan. The Board of Finance had already mandated the tael, so one tael was adopted as the main coin. The ministry also established a Currency Investigation Bureau to deliberate carefully on minting, circulation, and standardization of fineness and weight. By Xuantong 2 the name yuan was retained: one silver yuan as the main coin, with subsidiary denominations of fifty, twenty-five, and ten cents in silver; five cents in nickel; and two, one, five-li, and one-li in copper. The silver yuan weighed seven mace two fen; subsidiary silver coins decreased proportionally. The Zhili mint was closed, leaving Hankou, Guangdong, Chengdu, and Yunnan. Previously minted silver dollars circulated at market rates pending exchange and recasting by the central mint and bank.
20
仿 使
In the three-metal system, gold ranked first, silver second. In mid-Guangxu the British gold pound rose yearly from about 4.165 taels of Chinese silver to over eight taels. Censor Wang Pengyun and Secretariat Councillor Yang Yizhi once proposed accumulating gold for minting. In year 30 the Board memorialized for gold reserves for minting and accepted gold for official payments. Envoy Wang Daxie strongly advocated adopting gold. Sun Baoqi urged silver domestically but gold reserves for foreign transactions. Ministers debating national currency held that without a gold standard the system was incomplete and urged rapid adoption—but gold never was implemented.
21
西
On tea administration: China's chief tea-producing provinces were Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Fujian, Sichuan, Huguang, Yunnan, and Guizhou. Under the Ming there were three tea systems: official tea, stored on the frontier to trade for horses; merchant tea, licensed and taxed; and tribute tea for imperial use. The Qing followed the same arrangement. In Shaanxi and Gansu tea was traded for frontier horses. Other provinces licensed merchants and collected duties; some merchants obtained licenses from the ministry, others from local counties. When no merchant was available, counties issued licenses to tea-garden households and brokers. The Board's Baoquan Bureau printed license forms with statutory provisions; provinces requested them annually for issue and cancellation. One license covered one hundred jin; fractional lots received a separate transit permit. Used licenses were surrendered to the ministry. Forging licenses, trafficking fake tea, and private trade with foreigners were all punishable by statute.
22
沿 西西西 西使
Tea officials initially followed the Ming system. Shaanxi had five tea-horse inspecting censors: Xining at Xining, Taozhou at Minzhou, Hezhou at Hezhou, Zhuanglang at Pingfan, and Ganzhou at Lanzhou. The post was later filled by dispatched ministry officials, then supervised by the Gansu governor, and finally by the Shaanxi-Gansu governor-general. Sichuan established a Salt and Tea Circuit intendant. Jiangxi had a tea-license inspection commissioner under Jiangning prefecture.
23
西 使 西西 西 西西
Jiangsu issued licenses at the Jiangning distribution office and the Zhangzhu and Hucha inspection posts under Jingxi county. Anhui issued licenses in seventeen counties including Qianshan, Taihu, She, Xiuning, Yi, Xuancheng, Ningguo, Taiping, Guichi, Qingyang, Tongling, Jiande, Wuhu, Lu'an, Huoshan, Guangde, and Jianping. Jiangxi issued licenses to Huizhou merchants and local peddlers. These three provinces collected duties at transit customs posts per regulations. Zhejiang's provincial commissioner issued licenses at one mace per license; Beixin Pass collected 2.928 fen of tax silver remitted as customs revenue. Over 110 baskets of imperial and mausoleum yellow tea were supplied annually from license purchase funds. Hubei issued licenses in seven counties—Xianning, Jiayu, Puqi, Chongyang, Tongcheng, Xingguo, and Tongshan—to tea-garden households and brokers for local sale. Jianshi county issued licenses to merchant firms. Local sale paid one tael per license; transit sale paid 2.5 fen tax and 1.25 mace duty, totaling over 230 taels. Transit tea still paid tax at customs posts. Hunan issued to transit merchants in seventeen counties totaling 240 taels in tax. Shaanxi and Gansu issued through Xining, Ganzhou, and Zhuanglang tea bureaus, with seven prefectures and Shenmu also distributing. Each license required fifty jin of official tea; merchants sold the remaining fifty jin as their margin. Each hundred jin equaled ten baskets of two packets each; total tea levy was 136,480 baskets. In commutation years each packet paid three mace of silver. Those exempt from tea delivery paid over 5,730 taels in commutation silver. Areas without licenses collected over 530 taels from garden households selling locally. Sichuan had interior, frontier, and native-territory license types. Interior licenses served inland markets, frontier licenses the borderlands, native licenses tribal territories. Frontier licenses divided into three routes: those for Dajianlu were southern frontier licenses; those for Songpan were western frontier licenses; those for Qiongzhou were Qiongzhou frontier licenses. All paid duties totaling about 14,340 taels and taxes about 49,170 taels. Yunnan collected 960 taels in tax. Guizhou collected over 60 taels in duties and taxes. Ministry licenses charged paper fees at 3.3 hao per license. Shengjing, Zhili, Henan, Shandong, Shanxi, Fujian, Guangdong, and Guangxi issued no licenses and collected no tea duties. Tea merchants paid transit customs, minor landing taxes attached to customs reports, or miscellaneous taxes remitted to the ministry. Such were the tea regulations before Jiaqing.
24
西 西西 西 西 西
Western trade thereafter transformed the tea business. The three major markets were Hankou, Shanghai, and Fuzhou. Hankou tea came from Hunan, Jiangxi, and Anhui plus local production, shipped up the Han to Henan, Shaanxi, Qinghai, and Xinjiang. Exports to Russia were all brick tea. Shanghai was the largest market, drawing tea from Huguang, Jiangxi, Anhui, Zhejiang, and Fujian as well as local production. Jiangxi and Anhui red and green tea sold mainly to Europe and America. Shaoxing tea went to the United States; Ningbo tea to Japan. Fuzhou black tea exported mainly to the Americas and Southeast Asia. Guangzhou, Tianjin, and Zhifu also attracted foreign merchants. Tea thrives in warmth and moisture and cannot endure cold, dryness, or fierce wind—conditions found chiefly in China. Though Western commerce flourished, their lands could not grow tea; they depended on China, and Chinese tea spread worldwide.
25
西西西西
The trade included wholesale merchants and retailers. Licensed merchants each had fixed sales territories. Some regions used ticket systems; Sichuan introduced irrigation-work tea tickets in Qianlong 52 with many variants, but only in productive or high-volume areas. Gansu merchants were formerly divided into eastern and western guilds: eastern merchants from Shanxi and Shaanxi, western merchants mostly Hui. After Hui rebellions in mid-Xianfeng and widespread banditry, neither guild could fulfill tax contracts. After pacifying the province, Governor-General Zuo Zongtang memorialized to replace licenses with tickets. New merchants were selected to transport Huguang tea as the southern guild. Initially only about 800 tickets were issued. A three-year cycle was adopted; ticket quotas could increase but not decrease. From Guangxu 13 to 27 quotas increased each cycle. In year 30 Shanxi tickets for Ili and Tacheng were added beyond Huguang tickets. By Xuantong 2 the tea trade was thriving.
26
滿
Tea administration resembled salt administration in broad outline. Salt was a major revenue source, so fiscal officials grouped tea revenue under salt accounts. Initially only duties were collected; except Jiangsu and Zhejiang with variable customs collection, other provinces yielded at most over 1,000 taels annually, some only hundreds or tens. Even Shaanxi, Gansu, and Sichuan frontier licenses yielded less than 100,000 taels. Since Xianfeng provinces imposed likin; Fujian reported over 190,000 taels in Guangxu 12; other provinces' receipts grew but soon declined again. The Xuantong 3 budget listed tea tax at only about 1.3 million taels.
27
西 滿西
In early Shunzhi tea-horse regulations were established. Superior horses received twelve baskets of tea, medium horses nine, inferior horses seven. In year 2 a censor was dispatched to supervise five tea-horse bureaus. Merchants often smuggled tea across borders; frontier peoples flocked to buy at low prices. Tibetan monks traveling by courier also smuggled tea through passes beyond official control. The Board of Revenue memorialized: "Shaanxi trades tea for horses; the Ming issued gold plaques and tallies for this purpose. These need no longer be used; fix prices instead. Where Tibetan monks travel, officials who connive at private tea purchases shall be investigated by touring censors." Tea-horse censor Liao Panlong also memorialized: "The old quota was 11,088 horses; Chongzhen 3 added 2,000; I request permanent exemption from the addition." The memorial was approved. In the fourth year, one Manchu and one Han tea-horse censor were appointed. The Hebao garrison camp in Zhili, west of Zhangjiakou, had been a Ming-era tea-horse market for the Ordos tribes before it was shut down. The Board of Revenue then sent an official to inspect the site and report back. The court authorized the market to reopen. In the seventh year, under Gansu's old rules, large licenses covered brick tea split evenly between the state and merchants; on small licenses, thirty percent of the levy went to the government and seventy percent to the merchant. Thereafter all licenses were to be issued by the Board of Revenue under the large-license rule for horse procurement. Under the old rule, a large license also permitted sixty supplementary tea bricks and a small license sixty-seven jin of supplementary tea. The rule was set at one hundred forty jin of supplementary tea per thousand jin of licensed tea, which merchants could sell on their own.
28
西
In the thirteenth year, with Gansu's horse quota already met, surplus aged tea was ordered sold for cash to cover military pay. In the fourteenth year, with herds again overflowing at the seven pastures of Guangning, Kaicheng, Heishui, Anding, Qing'an, Wan'an, and Wu'an, private horses and smuggled tea were confiscated and sold off. Tea previously reserved for horse procurement was converted entirely to cash payments for military pay. In the eighteenth year, at the request of the Dalai Lama and Gendu Taiji, a horse-for-tea market was opened at Beisheng Prefecture in Yunnan. In Kangxi 4, Shaanxi's horse pasture offices were abolished and the tea-horse market was moved to Beisheng Prefecture. In the seventh year, the tea-horse censors were abolished and tea affairs passed to the Gansu governor. In the nineteenth year, an emergency levy of 359 taels was added to Fujian's tea duty; by the twenty-sixth year it was waived, along with newly imposed Huguang tea taxes. As Sichuan tea production and consumption grew, the Board of Revenue approved more licenses; by the end of Kangxi, quotas had been raised for Tianquan, Yazhou, Qiong, Rongjing, Mingshan, Xinfan, Dayi, Guanxian, and other districts.
29
西 西 西 西
In the twenty-fourth year, Supervising Secretary Qiu Yuanpei of the Penalty Section reported that the allotted tea of more than 300,000 bricks in the Tao and Min districts could supply 10,000 horses. Annual sales from aged stock could supply tens of thousands more horses. He asked that a dedicated official be appointed to oversee the trade. In the thirty-sixth year, a Board of Revenue commissioner was sent to oversee tea-horse affairs. In the fortieth year, with smuggled tea flooding Shaanxi, travelers were strictly inspected: private tea of ten jin or less was ignored, but loads above ten jin without an official license were penalized. In the forty-fourth year, merchants exploited the ten-jin exemption by splitting loads, and smuggling increased; enforcement was tightened, the ministry commissioner was withdrawn, and tea affairs reverted to the Gansu governor. From Kangxi 32, moldy tea bricks long stored by the Five Bureaus of Xining were approved for sale by the Board of Revenue. Later, with no horses available at Lanzhou, old tea stockpiled at Ganzhou was used to pay the five garrisons in a seven-to-three mix of silver and tea. Horse exchange at Xining and elsewhere was then halted; new tea was commuted at four mace per brick and aged tea at six mace to cover military pay. By the sixty-first year, tea licenses were expanded at Xining, Zhuanglang, Minzhou, and Hezhou, and all remaining old stock was ordered sold.
30
西 西 西
In Yongzheng 3, it was decided that from Kangxi 61, tea duties would be collected in kind for five years, after which old stock would be sold off. Thereafter aged tea was rotated out and replaced with new stock on a five-year cycle. In the fourth year, Shaanxi tea transport rules were revised: producing districts issued shipping permits matching licensed quantities; extra permits or excess supplementary tea were punished like smuggled salt, and negligent or conniving inspectors were penalized as well. In the eighth year, Shaanxi merchants carrying official tea were granted an additional fourteen jin of wastage allowance on top of the usual fourteen jin per hundred jin. An edict also noted: "Sichuan's tea tax is levied by garden or by tree, but trees and gardens vary widely—how can one rate fit all? Using that as the standard would be unfair. Collect by weight instead, and let the governor submit a detailed plan." A follow-up proposal held: "The old rate was two and a half li per jin, but the current levy is only four si nine hu—a huge gap. Cut the rate in half: all frontier, local, and interior licenses should pay one liang two hao five si of silver per jin." Sichuan tea sales still outran available licenses, so quotas were raised again and reissued across the province. In the ninth year, the Five Bureaus of Xining resumed horse procurement. In the tenth year, tea for horse procurement was again to be drawn from stock on hand. Anhui also raised its quotas; following Sichuan's example, surplus licenses were held in treasury and issued when demand exceeded supply. In the thirteenth year, horse procurement in Gansu was suspended again. Yunnan's tea regulations were established at seven jin per tube and thirty-two tubes per license, with duties collected under the usual rules.
31
西 西 西 西 西 西
In Qianlong 1, Gansu official tea duties were commuted to silver at five mace per brick. With aged tea overflowing at the Five Bureaus of Xining, each package was discounted two mace and ordered sold by deadline. In the second year, licenses were suspended or cut and duties waived in thirty-two Jiangxi counties that produced no tea and in Sichuan districts such as Chengdu, Peng, and Guan where sales had stalled. In the seventh year, tea duties were waived in earthquake-stricken parts of Gansu, and the Five Bureaus of Xining resumed collection in kind. In the eighth year, Tianquan was forgiven surplus license fees owed before Qianlong 7, along with unpaid duties in Chengdu, Peng, Guan, and other counties. In the eleventh year, Gansu Governor Huang Tinggui reported: "At Xining, Hezhou, and Zhuanglang, where frontier peoples and settlers live side by side, tea is indispensable. In recent years more than 65,500 packages of tea have been traded for over 38,100 shi of grain; I ask that this arrangement be made permanent." The request was approved. In the thirteenth year, Gansu tea duties were set at twenty percent in kind and eighty percent in silver, with license verification rules for land and water transport extended to Anhui, Zhejiang, Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou. In the twenty-fourth year, following Gansu Governor Wu Dashan, tea packages from the Five Bureaus of Xining were again used to pay garrison troops under the Kangxi 37 rule. In the twenty-fifth year, Wu Dashan added: "Gansu's tea levies were originally meant for horse procurement. That system has ended. Gan and Zhuang stand on major routes, and Xi and He near Qinghai still have markets; only Taozhou is remote. Merchants sell through other bureaus, yet official tea packages still go to Taozhou's warehouse, where stock often reaches hundreds of thousands before a clearance sale is requested. Taozhou's license quota should be reassigned to Gan and Zhuang for merchant issue and tax collection; once Taozhou's stored tea for pay is cleared out, the bureau should be abolished."
32
滿 沿
In the twenty-seventh year, Governor-General Yang Yingju proposed four measures to clear surplus stock, beginning: "First, official tea should be commuted to cash. When Gansu's official tea stores grew excessive, precedent allowed commutation to silver. By Qianlong 24, the Five Bureaus already held more than 1.5 million packages accumulated since Qianlong 7. Former Governor Wu Dashan had them valued at three mace each for military pay; more than 400,000 packages have already been distributed that way. Official tea is flooding the market; clearing it all would take at least ten years. Merchants are also allotted another 240,000 packages each year, which only adds to the glut of official tea. Better to commute the 54,000-odd packages of the twenty-percent official tea levy at three mace each, and resume collection in kind once aged stock is cleared. Second, merchant tea allotments should be cut. Under Gansu law, merchants pay fifty jin of tea per license in kind or cash—that is the fixed duty. There is also an annual confiscation levy of more than 39,000 taels, no less binding than the regular duty. Merchants should receive only fifty jin of principal tea per license for their own sale; with supplementary tea, allotments totaled more than 300,000 packages, which merchants used to pay their duties. Wu Dashan had extra allotments approved to ease merchants' burdens, without adding any new levy. But as allotments grew and official tea was also used for military pay, stock piled up and merchants faced mounting losses. Merchants originally received five packages per license; cut 158,316 duty-free packages, leaving 409,440 in allotments. Since the twenty-percent in-kind levy is to be commuted to cash, those packages need no longer be issued. Third, accumulated aged tea should be sold off to merchants at reduced prices. Every bureau holds aged tea, but Taozhou has the largest stock. At four mace per package, buyers stay away. Restore the original price of three mace per package and invite merchants to buy up the stock. Fourth, tea should be apportioned for pay in the interior and Xinjiang alike. In Qianlong 24, Wu Dashan had tea packages approved as pay for Manchu and Han garrisons. Xinjiang's tea supply has always depended on the interior. Official tea now moves by relay cart without porter fees; transport from Suzhou is folded into the cost and still undercuts merchant prices." The memorial was submitted and approved.
33
使 西
In the twenty-ninth year, the Gansu governorship was abolished and tea affairs passed to the Shaanxi-Gansu governor-general. In the thirty-fourth year, with Gansu's official tea stores running low, collection of ten percent in kind was restored. In the thirty-sixth year, tea packages granted to resettled Torghuts at Ili and elsewhere led to a return to the old twenty-percent levy. In the thirty-eighth year, Governor-General Liu Bingtian limited native offices at Sanzagu and elsewhere to one thousand jin of tea each—enough for subsistence but not for private resale. Sichuan issued frontier licenses for taxed transport to markets such as Songpan; native offices and frontier merchants alike could obtain border permits to trade. In Jiaqing 7, with Shenmu's official tea licenses long reassigned to Gansu merchants, old surplus categories on the books were canceled. During the White Lotus rebellion in Sichuan, tea taxes were waived in Daning, Guangyuan, Taiping, Tongjiang, and Nanjiang. In the tenth year, factory and office levies were again waived in Daning, Taiping, Tongjiang, and Wushan. In the seventeenth year, with Gansu's tea warehouses overflowing, merchants' official tea duties were commuted entirely to silver. In the twenty-second year, an edict noted: "Merchants from Fujian, Anhui, and Zhejiang who ship Wuyi and Songluo tea to Guangdong formerly used inland waterways; many now take the sea route and smuggle contraband. Tea merchants must return to inland routes; sea transport is permanently banned, with violators punished and their tea confiscated."
34
便
In Daoguang 3, an edict cited Nayancheng's Xinjiang tea regulations: after Board of Revenue review, brick tea from Uliastai and Kobdo was barred from competing in Xinjiang's cities. Generals Guolefeng'a and others replied that this brick tea has entered with ministry licenses and taxes paid from Guihua and Zhangjiakou for more than sixty years and cannot be banned overnight. But since Xinjiang is reserved for official tea licenses, private trade does cut into them. Henceforth merchants may carry about a thousand boxes of brick tea annually to Gucheng under the usual permits, and nowhere else." In Daoguang 6, an edict recalled: "Earlier, generals in Xinjiang had asked to issue licenses and recruit merchants to collect tea duties. Qingxiang and others report that Xinjiang's cities lack wealthy merchants; forcing them to serve as official tea contractors would ruin both transport and revenue. Northern-route merchants alone should supply miscellaneous tea; a tax office at Gucheng will collect duties to offset Lanzhou merchants' levies. After a three-year trial, permanent quotas can be set. Supplementary tea will still be supplied by Gansu merchants." In Daoguang 8, Imperial Commissioner Nayancheng reported: "Under annual quota, more than 200,000 packages of Gansu official tea should cross the frontier. Sales now reach four or five hundred thousand packages, mostly smuggled tea passed off without licenses; prices keep climbing, with supplementary tea selling for seven to ten taels per package or more. I ask that prices be capped at four taels per package in Aksu and five in Kashgar, with inspection offices set up beyond Jiayu Pass and in Aksu and elsewhere." The throne approved the request. In Daoguang 9, responsibility for Gansu tea administration was assigned to the Zhendi Circuit intendant for overall supervision, with Qitai County handling local management.
35
西
In Xianfeng 3, Min-Zhe Governor-General Wang Yide asked that commercial tea in Fujian be taxed at customs checkpoints. In Xianfeng 5, Fujian Governor Lü Qiansun submitted a further memorial: "Fujian tea has never been licensed or taxed. Since Daoguang 29, Zhili Governor Neerjing'e had proposed that, because Fujian merchants' traffic made official and private tea hard to tell apart, licenses be issued in tea-producing Chong'an County, with taxes verified at passes before release. Tea was soon grown in many counties, and merchants bought it locally and routed it around the checkpoints. Governor Wang Yide memorialized again that from Xianfeng 3 onward, all exporting counties—including Sha, Shaowu, Jian'an, Ouning, Jianyang, Pucheng, and Chong'an—should collect tea tax on the spot and issue transport licenses; the Board approved this in stages. The previous year, with Cantonese rebels on the move and Jiang and Huguang tea traders staying away, the maritime ban was briefly lifted. Tea merchants then brought tea straight to the province without passing the usual checkpoints, cutting not only Fujian's revenue but also leaving Zhejiang, Guangdong, and Jiangxi short. Since taking office, I have found tea merchants' profits running many times higher than before. Merchants were prospering while regular tax revenue suffered. The Cantonese rebels are still active and military needs are urgent; wealthy merchants would scarcely feel a ten-percent levy. The levy would fall on traveling merchants, not the poor; Chinese merchants would pay it, without entangling foreign-duty disputes; and turning nature's bounty into regular state revenue is nothing like raising the land tax. But Fujian tea is not confined to a few counties; checkpoints must be set at strategic points near the capital, with stamped licenses for inspection. Neighboring provinces should do the same to prevent merchants from routing around the tax. I ask that from Xianfeng 5 all transported tea be taxed, with the proceeds reserved for this province's military pay. At first the yield cannot be known; after a year or two of operation, fixed quotas can be set by comparison. From then on, Fujian's tea taxes grew stringent. Even by Xianfeng 10, however, returns had not reached the Board; only after repeated orders from the Board were reports filed on schedule. In Xianfeng 6, Ili General Zhala Fengtai's request was approved: an office was set up to tax tea produced in Ili for local military pay. In Xianfeng 11, Guangdong Governor Jioluo Qiling asked to levy a local tea tax at the point of sale.
36
西 西 西 便 西
In Tongzhi 1, the throne ordered the governors of Hunan, Hubei, Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, and Fujian to survey tea production and brokerage sites in each province and submit proper regulations. In Tongzhi 2, Liangjiang Governor-General Zeng Guofan wrote in summary: "Since Xianfeng 9, Jiangxi has distinguished tea surtax from tea contributions. Besides two mace of inland surtax and one mace five candareens on export per hundred catties, contributions had been solicited at production sites and brokerages at one tael four mace or one tael two mace per hundred catties, with receipts issued and totals submitted for fundraising rewards under precedent. I continued to follow the old rules. This year Acting Jiujiang Customs Superintendent Cai Jinqing reported that, following the Board of Revenue's approved plan, unified customs duties on salt, tea, bamboo, and timber had begun in the third month. Tea from Jiangxi reaching Jiujiang was handled differently for Chinese and foreign merchants. Foreign merchants paid transit half-duty and were exempt from surtax; Chinese merchants paid regular Jiujiang duty and could not reasonably be surtaxed again. I therefore opened a local landing tax in Yining Prefecture under the Board's rules. The original tariff for large-chest net tea was somewhat high and was reduced by category. Drawing on past contribution rates, one tael four mace per hundred catties was levied at Yining and elsewhere, and one tael two mace five candareens at Hekou Town, all for my camp's military pay; I issued tax receipts and transit passes for collection by appointed officers. Growers might pay directly, or brokerages might pay and take receipts; on resale, brokerages would surrender the tax receipts. Chinese merchants received transit passes; foreign merchants used transport permits to sell wherever they traded. Once Chinese merchants had paid Jiujiang duty and foreign merchants transit half-duty, they passed Jiangxi and Anhui surtax stations on verification alone. This arrangement matched the Board of Revenue's original plan and the Zongli Yamen treaties point for point. Brokerages handled the receipts, but growers paid the tax. Foreign transit half-duty could not be used as a pretext to exempt Chinese growers from local Chinese taxes. Chinese merchants, freed from repeated checkpoint surtaxes, would no longer buy foreign transport permits in secret and pose as foreign traders. The throne approved the plan.
37
西 西 仿
In Tongzhi 5, the Board approved temporary official tea shops in Shaanxi— a main store in the provincial capital and branches at Tong Pass, Shangzhou, and Hanzhong—because Gansu licenses lagged and duties were in arrears. Unlicensed tea brought by merchants was reported on arrival in Shaanxi. Top-grade tea was taxed one tael per hundred catties, middle grade six mace, and lower grade four mace. Proceeds were sent to Gansu to cover arrears. In Tongzhi 7, Guihuacheng merchants carrying tea to Kyakhta via Russia to trade with Western countries were allowed Board licenses at half the Zhangjiakou rate—twenty-five taels per permit, capped at twelve thousand catties. In Tongzhi 11, it was ruled that Gansu's accumulated old duties would still be collected from the original merchants. Newly recruited merchants would pay under the new schedule. Miscellaneous duties, integrity-support fees, confiscation payments, and official courtesy fees were deferred. In Tongzhi 13, Gansu was approved to follow the Huai salt model, replacing transport permits with tickets; merchants from any province had to pay regular duty before receiving a ticket. Miscellaneous fees were folded into the surtax. Separate fee categories were abolished. For domestic sale, besides three taels of regular duty, surtax was paid where tea was sold—generally one-odd taels per permit, never more than two. Export tea paid one additional surtax at frontier checkpoints to mark the distinction.
38
便
In Guangxu 10, coordinating finances, the Board of Revenue summarized tea law: "The Zongli Yamen reported that in Guangxu 8–9 export tea exceeded 1.9 billion catties. In the Daoguang era Britain collected about fifty taels of tea tax per hundred catties, while China's export duty was only two taels five mace—less than one-eleventh as much. It was proposed to follow the Gansu tea-package model and levy three mace per fifty catties directly on growers. With a substantial increase, foreigners would have no grounds for complaint. Alternatively, following Ningxia, Yan'an, Yulin, and Suide, where each permit drew three taels nine mace, inspection offices at production sites would issue Board licenses at three taels nine mace per hundred catties; inland checkpoints would collect surtax separately, stamp the license, and forbid duplicate evasion. Licenses would be requested annually from the governor in advance and expire after one year. Alternatively, at production sites tea would be inspected and Board licenses issued: three taels of regular duty plus another three taels nine mace, seven taels eight mace in total, with all miscellaneous fees abolished. Foreign duties at maritime customs and frontier stations would still be paid under existing rules. For domestic sale and transport, no further levy would be collected at any provincial surtax station or pass. Converting surtax into regular duty and scattered levies into a single payment would ease inspection and curb extortion. Each province should decide how to prevent evasion by growers and traders and report back with regulations."
39
西
In Guangxu 12, Shanxi merchants were obtaining Lifan Yuan tickets claiming Mongol destinations while smuggling Hunan tea into both northern and southern Xinjiang. A single ticket might circulate for years, repeatedly evading surtax and duty. The Board approved that future tickets must bear the notation "private tea not permitted." Merchants handling official tea had to obtain Gansu tickets and pay duty and surtax there. Private tea found in transit would be confiscated.
40
西 西
Western nations had grown tea-mad; Japan, India, and Italy, drawn by the profits, studied cultivation carefully despite inferior climate and soil, and their output rose sharply. India began planting tea in Daoguang 14; it did not flourish until Guangxu 3. Ceylon and Italy followed. After France took Vietnam, it ordered tea planted at estates such as Dongshan, Jianji, and Fuhua. In Xianfeng 8 the United States bought ten thousand tea seedlings from China for its farmers; purchases soon rose to twelve thousand seedlings a year, enough for domestic supply. China's exports were enormous before Guangxu 10, but were soon overtaken. India sent about 732,000 piculs of tea to Britain each year, worth roughly 2.4 million taels. China sent 898,000 piculs, worth about 18.68 million taels. India sent less tea than China, yet fetched higher prices. By Guangxu 22 China's shipments had fallen to just over 219,400 piculs. Most Japanese tea went to the United States, though some reached China. In Guangxu 13 China exported a little over 12,000 piculs of tea to Japan while importing over 16,000 piculs of Japanese tea. Only Russia still relied heavily on Chinese tea. With Kazakhstan and Kokand newly under Russian rule, its territory and population grew, demand rose, and tea above all remained essential. The Guangxu 7 treaty made Jiayu Pass a trading port, and traffic flourished. Ten years on, Chinese tea still accounted for one-third of Russia's supply. In Guangxu 13, including miscellaneous goods, exports were worth over 9.2 million taels against imports of just over 118,000 taels—a net outflow from China of 8.9 million taels. In Guangxu 12 tea was scarce and prices high; in Guangxu 13 supply rose and prices fell. Chinese merchants were already under pressure, and as Russia also bought elsewhere, China's tea profits collapsed. China had long treated tea as a sideline crop, grown on spare plots, picked at the wrong season, and poorly processed; being overtaken was inevitable.
41
西
In Guangxu 33 the Tea Guild petitioned the Ministry of Finance, and the Tax Bureau reported falling tea revenues; the court ordered remedial measures drawn up. In early Xuantong the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce proposed tax and surtax relief. Hankou and Fuzhou imported tea-processing machinery and hired skilled instructors from India. The Jiangxi governor also raised funds to lend to tea growers. Sales to Europe and North Africa then improved somewhat.
42
使西 使 使
Chinese tea was inherently superior: its astringency often carried a fragrance that left a sweet aftertaste on the palate—what Westerners call "tanin"—a quality rarely matched elsewhere. Japan still had to buy Chinese tea despite its own production, and Dutch envoy Kolff declared Java, Indian, and Ceylon teas far inferior to China's. Encouragement and protection are needed so that nature's bounty is not lost to foreign industry—and much must be expected of those who speak for commerce today.
43
使
Mining administration: Early in the Qing, mindful that the Ming had chased mining profits through eunuch agents who extorted the people, the court allowed private extraction with tax paid to the state at fixed rates. Mines were closed when they threatened protected mountains, geomantic sites, farmland, homes, or tombs; when crowds caused disorder; or when famine drove grain prices up.
44
西西 西使
Early in Shunzhi's reign silver mines at Linqu and Zhaoyuan in Shandong were opened; they were shut in Shunzhi 8. In Shunzhi 14 iron mines at Gubei, Xifeng, and other passes were opened. Under Kangxi, officials supervised silver mining at Yingzhou in Shanxi, Lintong in Shaanxi, and Laiyang in Shandong. In Kangxi 22 all were shut down. The court also ruled that mining did local communities no good and denied all future petitions to open mines. When the Yongzheng Emperor ascended the throne, many officials urged the profit to be had from mining. Guangdong governor-general Kong Yuxun, Guangdong governor Yang Wenqian, Hunan governor Bulate, Guangxi military commander Tian Jun, Guangdong treasurer Wang Shijun, and Sichuan military commander Huang Tinggui petitioned in turn to open mines; all were refused, some with stern imperial rebukes. In Yongzheng 13, Guangdong governor-general E Midar petitioned to open mines in Huizhou, Chaozhou, Shaozhou, Zhaoqing, and other prefectures; the memorial was sent to the Nine Ministers, who recommended approval. The emperor halted the plan, holding that mining would distract from essential governance. Guangdong had more mountains than arable land and the richest mineral deposits; locals were skilled miners. At mining sites hundreds or thousands gathered, often mining illegally in bands that looted and pillaged. Opening mines in Guangdong was therefore banned more strictly than anywhere else.
45
西 西西西
Yunnan copper was initially state-managed; later the government supplied operating capital. Early in Yongzheng annual output was eight or nine hundred thousand jin; within a few years it rose to two or three million, supplying local mints. Shipments to Huguang and Jiangxi totaled just over one million jin. Early in Qianlong the state advanced one million taels of capital yearly; within four or five years output reached six to nine million jin annually, peaking at twelve or thirteen million. The Revenue and Works boards and nine provincial mint routes—Jiangnan, Jiangxi, Zhejiang, Fujian, Shaanxi, Hubei, Guangdong, Guangxi, and Guizhou—needed over nine million jin yearly, all drawn from Yunnan. The leading mines were Tangdan, Lulu, Dashui, Maolu, Lion Mountain, and Dagong; Ningtai, Jinchai, Yidu, Fagushan, Jiudu, and Wanxiang came next. Major works employed sixty or seventy thousand miners; smaller ones still had more than ten thousand. Locals and, from as far as Guizhou and Guangdong, those who lived off mining profits flocked there in steady streams. When main pits ran out, subsidiary mines were opened at once to meet quotas. Yunnan's copper administration, built up over generations, stood alone among mining enterprises.
46
西西西西西 西西谿
That year the coastal-defense debate began; Zhili governor-general Li Hongzhang and naval minister Shen Baozhen petitioned to open coal and iron mines for military supply; the emperor agreed and ordered trial operations at Cizhou in Zhili and in Taiwan, Fujian. In Guangxu 8, Liangjiang governor-general Zuo Zongtang argued that northern coastal defense, shipbuilding, artillery, and the coal and iron consumed by provincial steam machinery made mining the top priority, and petitioned to open the Liguo postal station coal and iron works in Jiangsu. The memorial was noted. As railways were built one after another, coal and iron became more urgent than ever. Coal mines opened across the empire: in Jilin at Dashidingzi, Luannigou, Banlawo, Jigou, Erdaohe, Taojiatun, and Shipailing; in Heilongjiang at Taiping Mountain and Chahan Aolakalun; in Zhili at Kaiping and Tangshan; and at scores of sites in Neiqiu, Linqiu, Xuanhua, Fuping, Quyang, Zhangjiakou, Wanping, Chengde, Fengtian, Jinzhou, Jinxi, Benxi, Xingjing, Liaoyang, Jiangxi, Shandong, Anhui, Hubei, Henan, Shanxi, Zhejiang, Jiangsu, Hunan, Guangxi, and Shaanxi—as named in the text. Iron mines opened in turn at Qian'an County and Luanzhou in Zhili, Daye in Hubei, Yongning in Guangxi, Yongxin in Jiangxi, Kai and Guang prefectures in Yunnan, and Qingxi in Guizhou; small-scale mining by merchants from Shaanxi and Shanxi was too scattered to count.
47
西 西
In Guangxu 22 an edict called for gold and silver mines to be opened in every province. Before the edict, only a few were known from early Guangxu: the Yaogou silver mine in Zhili; gold mines at Xining, Gan, and Liang in Gansu; and at Guanyin Mountain and Qi Gan River in Mohe, Heilongjiang. After the edict took effect, gold mines opened across Zhili—including Zhuanshanzi in Pingquan, Jinchanggou in Jianchang, Shuangshanzi in Funing, Kuangou in Luanping, Dayingzi and Xinianzigou in Fengning, and Honghuagou, Shuiquangou, and Guaibanggou in Ongniud Banner—with Qian'an County proving especially productive. Further gold mines opened in Fengtian (Fenghuang, Andong, Liaoyang, Tonghua, Kuandian, Huairen, Tieling, Kaiyuan, Haicheng, and Jin County), Mongolia (numerous sites including Heliangou, Daxiao Cao, and Tushiyetu Khan), Sichuan (Miangou), Hunan (Pingjiang), Zhejiang (Zhuji), Heilongjiang (Heihe), and Xinjiang (Hotan and Yanqi). Silver mines at Tianquan, Lushan, and Daxue Shantou in Sichuan were all registered and opened.
48
西 西西 西 西 西 西 西
Copper, tin, lead, antimony, petroleum, sulfur, realgar, and other mines followed in quick succession. Copper: in eastern Yunnan, Tangdan and Maolu had six main mines and eleven subsidiaries. In western Yunnan, Huilong and Debao had eight main mines and nine subsidiaries. Yongbei in Chuxiong, Wanbao and Shuanglong under Yunwu, and mines at Yong'an, Shunning, Lin'an, Kaihua, and Qujing all recruited merchant contractors. Copper works also operated at Ganzhou in Jiangxi, Zhen'an in Shaanxi, Suining in Hunan, and Baicheng and Kuche in Xinjiang. Tin: Danzhou in Guangdong; Nandan, Fuchuan, and Hexian in Guangxi. Lead: Changning, Xiangxiang, and Linwu in Hunan; Huili in Sichuan; and Zhenhai, Fenghua, Xiangshan, Ninghai, and Taiping in Zhejiang. Antimony: Hunan (Yiyang, Shaoyang, Xinhua, Yuanling, Cili, Xiangxiang, Qiyang, Xin'an, Xupu); Tongren in Guizhou; Xiushan in Sichuan; Qujiang, Fangcheng, and Ruyuan in Guangdong; and Nantai, Sizhen, and Lingyangdu in Guangxi. Petroleum: Yanchang in Shaanxi, Yumen in Gansu, and Kuerkala Wusu in Xinjiang. Sulfur: Yangqu in Shanxi; Liaoyang and Jinzhou in Fengtian. Realgar: Cili in Hunan. Operations were government-run, merchant-run, or joint ventures. Some used traditional methods, others Western technology.
49
西
In Guangxu 9 an edict called on provinces to develop coal mines through merchant investment and shareholding. Yunnan and Sichuan set up merchant-recruitment and mining bureaus; Guizhou a public-merchant mining bureau; and Shanxi a mining company. Copper mines at Qiongzhou in Guangdong and lead mines at Ningbo in Zhejiang were opened through merchant syndicates. After decades of operation, only Kaiping and Pingxiang coal and Daye iron had achieved true scale. Gold at Pingjiang, antimony at Yiyang, and lead at Changning also served the public good, though on a smaller scale. Despite rich output, the Mohe gold mine sent only two hundred thousand taels a year to the capital. Since Tang Jiong was put in charge in Guangxu 13, Yunnan copper shipped to Beijing never exceeded about one million jin; provinces still paid premium prices for imported copper to keep mints running. Hanyang's steelworks turned iron into rails, barely meeting railway demand. Guangdong, Guangxi, and Shanxi produced plenty of iron, but poor refining meant domestic industry still relied heavily on British mills.
50
西 西西 西 西
In Guangxu 24 a General Bureau of Mining and Railways was established in Beijing under Wang Wenshao and Zhang Yinhuan. Twenty-two regulations were approved, allowing Chinese merchants to mine, borrow foreign capital, enter Sino-foreign partnerships, and form companies. Pingxiang coal in Jiangxi took German loans; Daye iron in Hubei Japanese loans; Baochang Company in Zhejiang Italian loans; and Lincheng coal in Zhili Belgian loans. Loan contracts went beyond interest and collateral—foreign engineers had to be hired, and in the worst cases they controlled personnel and management. Chinese-foreign joint ventures at Jingxing coal in Zhili, Xuancheng in Anhui, Shanxi's Yu-Ping-Ze-Lu-Pingyang coal and iron, Jiangbei in Sichuan, Tacheng in Xinjiang, Huojiadi and Changzigou gold in Zhili, Shangsi and Zheng'an lead and iron, Fujian's Shaowu-Jianning-Tingzhou mines, Badaohe in Zhili, Weimingshan in Fengtian, and old and new Jilin mines all led to recurring disputes once contracts were signed. The Fu Company's grip on Shanxi mining was the worst case of all. In Guangxu 24 Henan's Yufeng Company—holding exclusive rights to mines north of the Yellow River around Huaiqing—and Shanxi's Bureau of Commerce—holding rights to coal and iron in Yu, Ping, Ze, Lu, and Pingyang—simultaneously transferred their concessions. A single company monopolized mining in two provinces and proposed a railway from Shanxi to Kaifeng; linking mines to rails cost China dearly; after three years of dispute joint operation was grudgingly allowed. In Henan it eroded Chinese official authority; in Shanxi it interfered with local mining. Shanxi gentry and commoners united to demand cancellation of the contract. Only after prolonged delay was the concession bought back for more than 2.7 million taels. Similar disputes arose over oil at Yanchang in Shaanxi and Fushun, Ba, and Wan in Sichuan; mines at Dragon King Mountain in Changning, Hunan, and Dragon Horn Mountain in Xingguo, Hubei—all from private transfers among merchants that led to diplomatic rows.
51
西西
The Jiaoji and Eastern Qing railway treaties barred Chinese from mining within thirteen li of the tracks. The Kaiping coal mine and Mohe's Guanyin Mountain gold mine were also seized by foreigners during domestic turmoil. Li Hongzhang had organized Kaiping as a joint official-merchant venture in Guangxu 1; after twenty years it was highly successful. After the Boxer uprising in Guangxu 26, foreign adviser Detring—entrusted by supervisor Zhang Yi to protect the mine—signed a secret sale with engineer Hoover; Zhang signed it over and reported a Sino-foreign joint venture with expanded foreign shares. Thereafter British interests controlled Tangshan mines at Xishan, Banbodian, Majiagou, Wushuizhuang, Zhaogezhuang, and Linxi, plus the Chengping, Jianping, and Yongping gold and silver mines tied to the Qinhuangdao port. Imperial orders demanded recovery and a lawsuit was filed in Britain, but the matter was never resolved. In Guangxu 34 plans for the Luanzhou coal mine were blocked by the British company. A compromise joint venture was imposed, creating the Kailuan Mining Administration. Guanyin Mountain gold mine was also seized by Russians during the Boxer crisis. It was finally repurchased in Guangxu 32 for twelve thousand rubles.
52
西
In Guangxu 28 the Ministry of Foreign Affairs revised mining law: Chinese and foreign merchants could operate mines on equal terms, but only with ministry approval. That year Anhui governor Nie Zhigui granted the Englishman Caldwell rights to mines at She, Tongling, Datong, Ningguo, Guangde, and Qianshan—later narrowed to Tongguanshan in Tongling—under a hundred-year lease covering more than 384,000 mu. Anhui gentry and citizens mobilized against it and bought the concession back for four hundred thousand taels to run themselves. That year the Frenchman Milie petitioned the Yunnan governor and Foreign Ministry to survey all Yunnan mining; though rebuffed at the top, he still walked away with rights in Chenjiang, Lin'an, Kaihua, Yunnan, Chuxiong, Yuanjiang, Yongbei, and other districts. English merchant Raede then failed to partner on gold and silver mines in Dong and Zhao prefectures; citing Milie's precedent, he demanded seven prefectures—Guangnan, Qujing, Lijiang, Dali, Shunning, Pu'er, and Yongchang—and was firmly refused. For a time the whole country rallied around preserving mineral resources. Sichuan therefore set up the Baofu Company to handle Sino-foreign mining ventures and land purchase and leasing. Fujian created a commercial bureau and then a general mining company with authority to approve or reject all mining applications. Shanxi's Baojin Company and Anhui's mining bureau both pooled capital from wealthy investors to launch operations. Hunan and Hubei surveyed and preemptively purchased mining lands under their jurisdiction to block private sales.
53
調 西
In Guangxu 25 Jiangnan planned schools for agriculture, industry, mining, and railways; Hunan and Hubei planned advanced mining academies. In Guangxu 31 the Ministry of Commerce, citing foreign encroachment on mines, asked that treaty provisions be clarified to protect sovereignty. It then proposed provincial mining survey bureaus to map national resources and strictly ban unauthorized sales. Hubei governor-general Zhang Zhidong submitted seventy-four main mining regulations with seventy-three supplementary articles. Mining regulations had changed repeatedly since Guangxu 24; foreign merchants seized every dispute as a pretext. In Guangxu 29 commercial commissioner Lü Haihuan negotiated treaties granting mining rights—but only under Chinese mining law. Chinese mining law was to be drafted by Zhang Zhidong using international standards as reference. Drawing on British, American, German, French, Belgian, and Spanish mining codes, he distinguished surface from subsurface rights, set boundaries and taxes, defined land and capital shares, and imposed exhaustive limits on Chinese and foreign operators— with special emphasis on sovereignty, Chinese livelihoods, and local administration. Completed after several years and sent to ministries for enactment, China's mining code was finally in place.
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