Volume 126 Treatises 101: Rivers and Canals 1, Huang He

志一百一

Treatise 101

河渠一

Rivers and Canals 1

黃河

The Yellow River

中國河患，歷代詳矣。有清首重治河，探河源以窮水患。聖祖初，命侍衛拉錫往窮河源，至鄂敦塔拉，即星宿海。高宗復遣侍衛阿彌達往，西逾星宿更三百里，乃得之阿勒坦噶達蘇老山。自古窮河源，無如是之詳且確者。然此猶重源也。若其初源，則出蔥嶺，與漢書合。東行為喀什噶爾河，又東會葉爾羌、和闐諸水，為塔里木河，而匯於羅布淖爾。東南潛行沙磧千五百里，再出為阿勒坦河。伏流初見，輒作黃金色，蒙人謂金「阿勒坦」，因以名之。是為河之重源。東北會星宿海水，行二千七百里，至河州積石關入中國。經行山間，不能為大患。一出龍門，至滎陽以東，地皆平衍，惟賴堤防為之限。而治之者往往違水之性，逆水之勢，以與水爭地，甚且因緣為利，致潰決時聞，勞費無等，患有不可勝言者。

The history of China's river calamities is exhaustively documented across the ages. The Qing dynasty made river control a foremost concern and sent expeditions to trace the Yellow River to its source in order to confront flooding at its root. Early in the Kangxi reign, the emperor dispatched the guardsman Lasix to trace the Yellow River to its source; he reached O'dun Tara, the Sea of Star Lodges (Xingxiu Hai). The Qianlong emperor then sent the guardsman Amida, who traveled three hundred li west of the Star Lodges and located the source on Altan Gada Sulao Mountain. Never in history had an expedition to the river's source yielded findings so detailed and reliable. Even so, this was still only the river's secondary source. Its primary source, by contrast, rises in the Pamirs, in agreement with the Han shu. Flowing east it becomes the Kashgar River; farther east it receives the Yarkand, Khotan, and other streams to form the Tarim, which empties into Lop Nur. It then runs underground through the sands for some fifteen hundred li to the southeast before re-emerging as the Altan River. Where the river first breaks surface after its subterranean course, the water gleams golden yellow; Mongols call gold altan, and the river took its name from that. This is the Yellow River's secondary source. Flowing northeast, it joins the Star Lodges Sea and runs twenty-seven hundred li before entering China proper at Jishi Pass in Hezhou. While it runs through the mountains it poses no great flood threat. Below Dragon Gate, and eastward as far as Xingyang, the country is flat and open, and the river is held in check only by levees. Those charged with controlling it often fought the river's nature and defied its current to seize land from the water; some even turned flood work to private profit. Breaches became routine, costs mounted without limit, and the toll in suffering defied description.

自明崇禎末李自成決河灌汴梁，其後屢塞屢決。順治元年夏，黃河自復故道，由開封經蘭、儀、商、虞，迄曹、單、碭山、豐、沛、蕭、徐州、靈壁、睢寧、邳、宿遷、桃源，東逕清河與淮合，歷雲梯關入海。秋，決溫縣，命內祕書院學士楊方興總督河道，駐濟寧。二年夏，決考城，又決王家園。方興言：「自遭闖亂，官竄夫逃，無人防守。伏秋汛漲，北岸小宋、曹家口悉衝決，濟寧以南田廬多淹沒。宜乘水勢稍涸，鳩工急築。」上命工部遴員勘議協修。七月，決流通集，一趨曹、單及南陽入運，一趨塔兒灣、魏家灣，侵淤運道，下流徐、邳、淮陽亦多衝決。是年孟縣海子村至渡口村河清二日，詔封河神為顯佑通濟金龍四大王，命河臣致祭。明年，流通集塞，全河下注，勢湍激，由汶上決入蜀山湖。五年，決蘭陽。

After Li Zicheng breached the Yellow River to flood Kaifeng in the final years of Chongzhen, the river was plugged and broke out again many times. In the summer of Shunzhi 1 (1644), the Yellow River returned to its old channel on its own, running from Kaifeng through Lan, Yi, Shang, Yu, and on through Cao, Shan, Dangshan, Feng, Pei, Xiao, Xuzhou, Lingbi, Suining, Pi, Suqian, and Taoyuan; it went east via Qinghe to meet the Huai and reached the sea through Yunti Pass. That autumn the river broke at Wen County. The court appointed Grand Secretariat academician Yang Fangxing director-general of rivers and canals, with his headquarters at Jining. In the summer of the second year it broke at Kaocheng and again at Wangjiayuan. Fangxing reported: "Since the rebel disorders, officials have fled and corvée laborers have scattered, leaving no one to guard the works. During the summer-autumn flood season the north-bank breaches at Xiaosong and Caojiakou gave way, and farmlands and dwellings south of Jining were largely submerged. We should take advantage of the slight drop in water level to mobilize labor and repair the dikes at once." The emperor ordered the Ministry of Works to select officials to survey the damage, deliberate on repairs, and coordinate the work. In the seventh month the river broke at Liutongji. One branch ran toward Cao, Shan, and Nanyang and entered the Grand Canal; another ran toward Ta'er Bay and Weijia Bay, damaging and silting the transport channel. Downstream, Xuzhou, Pi, and Huaiyang also suffered many breaches. That year the river ran clear for two days between Haizi Village in Meng County and Dukou Village. An edict ennobled the river god as the Manifestly Auspicious, Universally Beneficent Golden Dragon Four Great Kings, and ordered river officials to offer sacrifice. The following year Liutongji was sealed and the full current poured downstream with violent force; at Wenshang it broke through into Shushan Lake. In the fifth year the river broke at Lanyang.

七年八月，決荊隆硃源寨，直往沙灣，潰運堤，挾汶由大清河入海。方興用河道方大猷言，先築上游長縷堤，遏其來勢，再築小長堤。八年，塞之。九年，決封丘大王廟，沖圮縣城，水由長垣趨東昌，壞平安堤，北入海，大為漕渠梗。發丁夫數萬治之，旋築旋決。給事中許作梅，御史楊世學、陳斐交章請勘九河故道，使河北流入海。方興言：「黃河古今同患，而治河古今異宜。宋以前治河，但令入海有路，可南亦可北。元、明以迄我朝，東南漕運，由清口至董口二百餘里，必藉黃為轉輸，是治河即所以治漕，可以南不可以北。若順水北行，無論漕運不通，轉恐決出之水東西奔盪，不可收拾。今乃欲尋禹舊跡，重加疏導，勢必別築長堤，較之增卑培薄，難易曉然。且河流挾沙，束之一，則水急沙流，播之九，則水緩沙積，數年之後，河仍他徙，何以濟運？」上然其言，乃於丁家寨鑿渠引流，以殺水勢。

In the eighth month of the seventh year it broke at Zhuyuan Stockade in Jinglong, rushed straight to Shawan, burst the canal levees, and carried the Wen River into the sea via the Daqing River. Fangxing followed the advice of river-bureau officer Fang Dayou: first build long thread dikes upstream to check the flood's momentum, then construct smaller long dikes. In the eighth year the breach was sealed. In the ninth year it broke at the Great King Temple in Fengqiu and destroyed the county seat. The flood ran from Changyuan toward Dongchang, destroyed the Ping'an Dike, and entered the sea to the north, severely blocking the grain transport canal. Tens of thousands of laborers were mobilized to repair it, but the dikes were built and breached again in quick succession. Supervising secretary Xu Zuomei and censors Yang Shixue and Chen Fei submitted memorial after memorial asking that the old course of the Nine Rivers be surveyed so the Yellow River could be directed north to the sea. Fangxing argued: "The Yellow River has always been a scourge, but the right way to control it differs from age to age. Before the Song, river control meant only ensuring the river could reach the sea, whether south or north. From the Yuan and Ming through our dynasty, the southeastern grain transport from Qingkou to Dongkou for more than two hundred li has depended on the Yellow River as a conveyor. To control the river is to control the transport route: the current must be kept south, not turned north. If the river were sent north, grain transport would fail in any case, and the floodwaters released from breaches might surge east and west beyond all control. To follow Yu's ancient course and dredge it anew would require building entirely new long dikes—a far harder task than merely raising low sections of existing levees. Moreover, the river carries silt. Confined to one channel, water runs fast and sand moves; spread among nine channels, water slows and sand deposits. In a few years the river would shift course again—how would that serve transport?" The emperor accepted his reasoning and ordered a diversion canal cut at Dingjia Stockade to bleed off the flood's force.

是年，復決邳州，又決祥符硃源寨。戶部左侍郎王永吉、御史楊世學均言：「治河必先治淮，導淮必先導海口，蓋淮為河之下流，而濱海諸州縣又為淮之下流。乞下河、漕重臣，凡海口有為奸民堵塞者，盡行疏濬。其漕堤閘口，因時啟閉，然後循流而上。至於河身，剔淺去淤，使河身愈深，足以容水。」議皆不果行。十一年，復決大王廟。給事中林起龍劾方興侵冒，上解方興任，遣大理卿吳庫禮、工科左給事中許作梅往按。起龍坐誣，復方興任。十三年，塞大王廟，費銀八十萬。

That year the river broke again at Pizhou and again at Zhuyuan Stockade in Xiangfu. Left vice minister of revenue Wang Yongji and censor Yang Shixue both argued: "To control the Yellow River one must first control the Huai; to guide the Huai one must first open the sea mouth. The Huai is the Yellow River's lower reach, and the coastal prefectures and counties are the Huai's lower reach in turn. We ask that senior river and transport officials be ordered to dredge every sea mouth that unscrupulous locals have blocked. Canal levees and sluice gates should be opened and closed according to the season; only then can one work upstream along the current. As for the river bed itself, shoals should be scraped and silt removed so the channel grows deeper and can hold more water." None of these proposals was adopted. In the eleventh year the river broke again at the Great King Temple. Supervising secretary Lin Qilong impeached Fangxing for embezzlement. The emperor dismissed Fangxing and sent Court of Judicial Review president Wu Kuli and left supervising secretary of works Xu Zuomei to investigate. Qilong was found guilty of false accusation, and Fangxing was reinstated. In the thirteenth year the Great King Temple breach was sealed at a cost of eight hundred thousand taels of silver.

十四年，方興乞休，以吏部左侍郎硃之錫代之。是年決祥符槐疙疸，隨塞。十五年，決陽柴溝姚家灣，旋塞。復決陽武慕家樓。十六年，決歸仁堤。先是御史孫可化疏陳淮、黃堤工，事下總河。之錫言：「桃源費家嘴及安東五口淤淀久，工繁費鉅。且黃河諺稱『神河』，難保不旋濬旋淤，惟有加意修防，補偏救弊而已。」之錫陳兩河利害，條上工程、器具、夫役、物料八弊。又言：「因材器使，用人所亟。獨治河之事，非澹泊無以耐風雨之勞，非精細無以察防護之理，非慈斷兼行無以盡群夫之力，非勇往直前無以應倉猝之機，故非預選河員不可。」因陳預選之法二：曰薦用，曰儲才；諳習之法二：曰久任，曰交代。又條上河政十事：曰議增河南夫役，曰均派淮工夫役，曰察議通惠河工，曰建設柳園，曰嚴剔弊端，曰釐覈曠盡銀兩，曰慎重職守，曰明定河工專職，曰申明激勸大典，曰酌議撥補夫役。均允行。

In the fourteenth year Fangxing asked to retire and was replaced by left vice minister of personnel Zhu Zhixi. That year the river broke at Huaigetan in Xiangfu and was quickly sealed. In the fifteenth year it broke at Yaojia Bay in Yangchaigou and was soon repaired. It broke again at Mujia Tower in Yangwu. In the sixteenth year it broke the Guiren Dike. Earlier, censor Sun Kehua had memorialized on Huai and Yellow River dike works, and the matter was referred to the director-general of rivers. Zhixi reported: "At Feijiazui in Taoyuan and the five mouths at Andong, silt has accumulated for a long time; dredging would be laborious and enormously costly. Moreover, the Yellow River is proverbially called the 'Divine River'—one cannot be sure that dredging will not be followed at once by renewed silting. All we can do is devote extra care to maintenance and patch failures as they arise. Zhixi outlined the interests at stake on both rivers and submitted eight categories of abuse in engineering, equipment, labor, and supplies. He also argued: "Matching talent to task is always urgent in government service. River control alone demands officials who are detached enough to endure exposure in all weather, meticulous enough to grasp the logic of flood defense, firm yet humane enough to mobilize labor fully, and bold enough to meet sudden crises—hence river officers must be chosen in advance. He proposed two methods of advance selection: recommendation for appointment, and building a reserve of talent; and two methods of building expertise: long tenure in post, and orderly handover. He also submitted ten items on river administration: increasing corvée in Henan, equalizing Huai labor assignments, reviewing Tonghui River works, establishing willow plantations, strictly rooting out abuses, auditing misappropriated funds, enforcing official responsibility, defining specialized river posts, clarifying reward statutes, and allocating labor supplements. All were approved.

十七年，決陳州郭家埠、虞城羅家口，隨塞。康熙元年五月，決曹縣石香爐、武陟大村、睢寧孟家灣。六月，決開封黃練集，灌祥符、中牟、陽武、杞、通許、尉氏、扶溝七縣。七月，再決歸仁堤。河勢既逆入清口，又挾睢、湖諸水自決口入，與洪澤湖連，直趨高堰，衝決翟家壩，流成大澗九，淮陽自是歲以災告。二年，決睢寧武官營及硃家營。三年，決杞縣及祥符閻家寨，再決硃家營，旋塞。四年四月，河決上游，灌虞城、永城、夏邑，又決安東茆良口。

In the seventeenth year it broke at Guojiabu in Chenzhou and Luojiakou in Yucheng and was quickly sealed. In the fifth month of Kangxi 1 (1662) it broke at Shixianglu in Caoxian, Dacun in Wuzhi, and Mengjia Bay in Suining. In the sixth month it broke at Huanglianji in Kaifeng and flooded seven counties: Xiangfu, Zhongmu, Yangwu, Qi, Tongxu, Weishi, and Fugou. In the seventh month the Guiren Dike broke again. The river's current reversed into Qingkou and, carrying the Sui, Hu, and other waters through the breach, joined Hongze Lake and rushed straight at Gaoyan. It burst Zhaijia Dam and carved nine great channels; from then on Huaiyang reported flood disasters year after year. In the second year it broke at Wuguan Camp and Zhujia Camp in Suining. In the third year it broke at Qi County and Yanjia Stockade in Xiangfu, broke again at Zhujia Camp, and was soon repaired. In the fourth month of the fourth year the river broke upstream and flooded Yucheng, Yongcheng, and Xiayi; it also broke at Maoliang Mouth in Andong.

五年，之錫卒，以貴州總督楊茂勛為河道總督。六年，決桃源煙墩、蕭縣石將軍廟，逾年塞之。又決桃源黃家嘴，已塞復決，沿河州縣悉受水患，清河沖沒尤甚，三汊河以下水不沒骭。黃河下流既阻，水勢盡注洪澤湖，高郵水高几二丈，城門堵塞，鄉民溺斃數萬，遣官蠲賑。冬，命明珠等相視海口，開天妃、石闥、白駒等閘，毀白駒奸民閉閘碑。

In the fifth year Zhixi died, and Guizhou governor-general Yang Maoxun was appointed director-general of rivers and canals. In the sixth year it broke at Yandun in Taoyuan and the Stone General Temple in Xiao County; the breaches were sealed more than a year later. It broke again at Huangjiazui in Taoyuan—sealed once, it broke open again. Every county along the river suffered flooding; Qinghe was washed away worst of all, and below Sanhe River the water stood above knee height. With the lower Yellow River blocked, the entire flood poured into Hongze Lake. At Gaoyou the water rose nearly two zhang (about twenty feet); city gates were sealed, and tens of thousands of villagers drowned. Officials were sent to grant tax relief and distribute grain. That winter the emperor ordered Mingzhu and others to inspect the sea mouth, opened the Tianfei, Shita, and Baiju sluice gates, and destroyed the stele by which local profiteers at Baiju had kept the sluice closed.

八年，決清河三汊口，又決清水潭。副都御史馬紹曾、巡鹽御史李棠交章劾茂勛不職，罷之，以羅多為河道總督。九年，決曹縣牛市屯，又決單縣譙樓寺，灌清河縣治。是歲五月暴風雨，淮、黃並溢，撞卸高堰石工六十餘段，衝決五丈餘，高、寶等湖受淮、黃合力之漲，高堰幾塌，淮陽岌岌可虞。工科給事中李宗孔疏言：「水之合從諸決口以注於湖也，江都、高、寶無歲不防堤增堤，與水俱高。以數千里奔悍之水，攻一線孤高之堤，值西風鼓浪，一瀉萬頃，而江、高、寶、泰以東無田地，興化以北無城郭室廬。他如淥陽、平望諸湖，淺狹不能受水。各河港疏濬不時，范公堤下諸閘久廢，入海港口盡塞。雖經大臣會閱，嚴飭開閘出水，而年深工大，所費不貲，兼為傍海奸灶所格，竟不果行。水迂迴至東北廟灣口入海，七邑田舍沈沒，動經歲時。比宿水方消，而新歲橫流又已踵至矣。」御史徐越亦言高堰宜乘冬水落時大加修築。於是起桃源東至龍王廟，因舊址加築大堤三千三百三十丈有奇。臘後冰解水溢，沿河村舍林木剷刷殆盡。

In the eighth year it broke at Sanhekou in Qinghe and again at Qingshuitan. Vice censor-in-chief Ma Shaozeng and salt censor Li Tang impeached Maoxun in successive memorials for incompetence. He was dismissed and Luo Duo was appointed director-general of rivers and canals. In the ninth year it broke at Niushitun in Caoxian and at Qiaolou Temple in Shan County, flooding the Qinghe county seat. That May a violent storm caused the Huai and Yellow to overflow together, knocking loose more than sixty sections of stonework on the Gaoyan embankment and breaching a gap of more than five zhang. Gaoyou, Baoying, and other lakes received the combined flood surge of both rivers; Gaoyan nearly collapsed and Huaiyang stood in grave peril. Supervising secretary of works Li Zongkong memorialized: "As water from the various breaches pours into the lakes, Jiangdu, Gaoyou, and Baoying raise their dikes year after year, keeping pace with the rising water. Thousands of li of raging flood assault a single narrow levee standing high above the plain; when a west wind whips up the waves, ten thousand qing of water can pour through at once—and east of Jiangdu, Gaoyou, Baoying, and Taizhou there would be no farmland, north of Xinghua no towns or dwellings. Other lakes such as Luyang and Pingwang are too shallow and narrow to hold the flood. River mouths are not dredged on schedule; the sluice gates below Fan Gong's Dike have long been abandoned; and the sea outlets are entirely blocked. Although senior ministers inspected the works and ordered the sluices opened to release water, the projects were old and vast, the cost prohibitive, and coastal salt interests blocked them—so in the end nothing was done. The water was forced to wind around to the sea at Northeast Miaowan Mouth; seven districts' fields and houses lay submerged, often for a year or more at a time. Hardly had the standing flood begun to recede when the next year's torrent arrived in its wake. Censor Xu Yue also urged that Gaoyan be heavily repaired while winter low water permitted. Work was then undertaken from east of Taoyuan to Dragon King Temple, raising a major levee of more than three thousand three hundred thirty zhang on the old alignment. After the twelfth month the ice broke and the flood rose, scouring away villages, houses, and trees along the river almost entirely.

十年春，河溢蕭縣。六月，決清河五堡、桃源陳家樓。八月，又決七里溝。以王光裕總督河道。光裕請復明潘季馴所建崔壩鎮等三壩，而移季太壩於黃家嘴舊河地，以分殺水勢。是歲，茆良口塞。十一年秋，決蕭縣兩河口、邳州塘池舊城，又溢虞城，遣學士郭廷祚等履勘。十二年，桃源七里溝塞。十三年，決桃源新莊口及王家營，又自新河鄭家口北決。十四年，決徐州潘家塘、宿遷蔡家樓，又決睢寧花山壩，復灌清河治，民多流亡。十五年夏，久雨，河倒灌洪澤湖，高堰不能支，決口三十四。漕堤崩潰，高郵之清水潭，陸漫溝之大澤灣，共決三百餘丈，揚屬皆被水，漂溺無算。上遣工部尚書冀如錫、戶部侍郎伊桑阿訪究利病。是歲又決宿遷白洋河、於家岡，清河張家莊、王家營，安東邢家口、二鋪口，山陽羅家口。塞桃源新莊。

In the spring of the tenth year the river overflowed Xiao County. In the sixth month it broke at Wubao in Qinghe and Chenjialou in Taoyuan. In the eighth month it broke again at Qiligou. Wang Guangyu was appointed director-general of rivers and canals. Guangyu asked to restore the three dams that Pan Jixun had built in the Ming, including Cuiba Town Dam, and to relocate the Jitai Dam to the old riverbed at Huangjiazui to split and reduce the flood's force. In that year Maoliang Mouth was sealed. In the autumn of the eleventh year the river broke at Lianghekou in Xiao County and at Tangchi Old City in Pizhou, flooded Yucheng, and the emperor sent Academicians Guo Tingzuo and others to conduct an on-site survey. In the twelfth year Qiligou in Taoyuan was closed. In the thirteenth year the river broke at Xinzhuang Mouth and Wangjiaying in Taoyuan, and broke again north of Zhengjiazui on the New River. In the fourteenth year it broke at Panjiatang in Xuzhou and Caijialou in Suqian, then at Huashan Dam in Suining; Qinghe's county seat was flooded again and many people fled their homes. During the summer of the fifteenth year, weeks of rain drove the river back into Hongze Lake; Gaoyan Embankment could not withstand the pressure, and thirty-four breaches opened. The Grand Canal levees gave way; at Qingshuitan in Gaoyou and Dazewan at Luman Ditch, more than three hundred zhang of dike collapsed; every district under Yangzhou was flooded, and the toll in lives lost to drowning was incalculable. The emperor sent Minister of Works Ji Ruxi and Vice Minister of Revenue Esangga to investigate the problems and propose remedies. That same year the river broke again at Baiyang River in Suqian, Yujia Gang, Zhangjiazhuang and Wangjiaying in Qinghe, Xingjiakou and Erpukou in Andong, and Luojiakou in Shanyang. Taoyuan Xinzhuang was sealed.

十六年，如錫等覆陳河工壞潰情形，光裕解任勘問。以安徽巡撫靳輔為河督。輔言：「治河當審全局，必合河道、運道為一體，而後治可無弊。河道之變遷，總由議治河者多儘力於漕艘經行之處，其他決口，則以為無關運道而緩視之，以致河道日壞，運道因之日梗。河水裹沙而行，全賴各處清水並力助刷，始能奔趨歸海。今河身所以日淺，皆由從前歸仁堤等決口不即堵塞之所致。查自清江浦至海口，約長三百里，向日河面在清江浦石工之下，今則石工與地平矣。向日河身深二三四丈不等，今則深者不過八九尺，淺者僅二三尺矣。河淤運亦淤，今淮安城堞卑於河底矣。運淤，清江與爛泥淺盡淤，今洪澤湖底漸成平陸矣。河身既墊高若此，而黃流裹沙之水自西北來，晝夜不息，一至徐、邳、宿、桃，即緩弱散漫。臣目見河沙無日不積，河身無日不加高，若不大修治，不特洪澤湖漸成陸地，將南而運河，東而清江浦以下，淤沙日甚，行見三面壅遏，而河無去路，勢必衝突內潰，河南、山東俱有淪胥沈溺之憂，彼時雖費千萬金錢，亦難剋期補救。」因分列大修事宜八：曰取土築堤，使河寬深；曰開清口及爛泥淺引河，使得引淮刷黃；曰加築高家堰堤岸；曰周橋閘至翟家壩決口三十四，須次第堵塞；曰深挑清口至清水潭運道，增培東西兩堤；曰淮揚田及商船貨物，酌納修河銀；曰裁併河員以專責成；曰按里設兵，畫堤分守。廷議以軍務未竣，大修募夫多，宜暫停。疏再上，惟改運土用夫為車運，餘悉如所請。

In the sixteenth year Ji Ruxi and his colleagues reported back on the state of the failed river works; Wang Guangyu was dismissed and put under investigation. The Anhui governor Jin Fu was appointed director-general of rivers. Jin Fu argued: "River control must take the full picture into account—the river channel and the Grand Canal must be treated as one integrated system; only then can management succeed without fatal flaws. Shifts in the river's course came chiefly because those who debated river policy focused their efforts on stretches where grain barges traveled, while treating other breaches as irrelevant to transport and giving them low priority—so the river channel deteriorated day by day and the canal grew more obstructed by the day. The Yellow River carries its load of silt downstream; only when clear-water tributaries combine to scour the channel can the current rush unimpeded to the sea. The channel grows shallower each year because breaches such as that at Guiren Dike were not closed promptly. From Qingjiangpu to the estuary—a span of roughly three hundred li—the river surface once lay below the stonework at Qingjiangpu; now that stonework stands level with the surrounding land. Once the channel ran anywhere from two to four zhang deep; today the deepest stretches reach only eight or nine chi, and the shallowest no more than two or three. As the river silted, so did the canal—and today Huai'an's city walls stand lower than the riverbed itself. The canal silted up; Qingkou and Lan'nixian are completely choked with sediment, and the bed of Hongze Lake is slowly turning into dry land. With the channel bed raised so high, the silt-laden Yellow River current still pours in from the northwest without pause; by the time it reaches Xuzhou, Pizhou, Suqian, and Taoyuan, it slows and spreads aimlessly. I have watched silt deposit day after day and the riverbed rise without letup. Without major repairs, Hongze Lake will gradually become dry land; the Grand Canal to the south and the reach below Qingjiangpu to the east will grow ever more choked with sediment. Before long the river will be penned in on three sides with nowhere to go, and it will inevitably burst inward—putting Henan and Shandong at risk of wholesale devastation. By then, even millions in silver will not restore order within any fixed deadline." He then set out eight major repair items: first, excavate earth to build levees and widen and deepen the channel; second, open diversion channels at Qingkou and Lan'nixian to draw Huai River water to scour Yellow River sediment; third, raise and strengthen the levees at Gaojiayan; fourth, seal in order the thirty-four breaches between Zhouqiao Sluice and Zhaijiaba Dam; fifth, dredge deeply the canal from Qingkou to Qingshuitan and raise the levees on both sides; sixth, levy appropriate river-repair fees on Huai-Yang farmland and on commercial shipping; seventh, consolidate river staff to clarify accountability; eighth, post troops at measured intervals and assign each section of levee to a dedicated garrison. The court decided that with military campaigns still underway and major repairs requiring large numbers of conscripted laborers, the project should be postponed for the time being. When he resubmitted his memorial, the court agreed to transport earth by cart rather than conscripted porters, but approved everything else he had proposed.

於是各工並舉。大挑清口、爛泥淺引河四，及清口至雲梯關河道，創築關外束水堤萬八千餘丈，塞於家岡、武家墩大決口十六，又築蘭陽、中牟、儀封、商丘月堤及虞城周家堤。明年，創建王家營、張家莊減水壩二，築周橋翟壩堤二十五里，加培高家堰長堤，山、清、安三縣黃河兩岸及湖堰，大小決口盡塞。優詔褒美。十八年，建南岸碭山毛城鋪、北岸大谷山減水石壩各一，以殺上流水勢。二十年，塞楊家莊，蓋決五年矣。是歲增建高郵南北滾水壩八，徐州長樊大壩外月堤千六百八十九丈。

All the projects were then launched at once. Work began on a broad front: major dredging at Qingkou and four diversion channels at Lan'nixian, plus the channel from Qingkou to Yunti Pass; a new eighteen-thousand-zhang levee outside Yunti Pass to confine the current; sixteen major breaches sealed at Yujia Gang and Wujiadun; and auxiliary moon dikes raised at Lanyang, Zhongmou, Yifeng, Shangqiu, and Yucheng Zhoujia. The following year two spillway dams were built at Wangjiaying and Zhangjiazhuang, a twenty-five-li levee was raised at Zhouqiao-Zhaiba, the long levee at Gaojiayan was reinforced, and every breach large and small on both banks of the Yellow River and on lake embankments in the three counties of Shanyang, Qinghe, and Andong was sealed. The emperor issued a laudatory edict in praise of the work. In the eighteenth year spillway stone dams were built on the south bank at Maochengpu in Dangshan and on the north bank at Dagushan to ease the force of upstream floods. In the twentieth year Yangjiazhuang was finally sealed, five years after the breach. That year eight overflow dams were added north and south of Gaoyou, and a 1,689-zhang auxiliary levee was built outside Xuzhou's Changfan Great Dam.

大修至是已三年，河未盡復故道，輔自劾。部議褫職，上命留任。二十一年，決宿遷徐家灣，隨塞。又決蕭家渡。先是河身僅一線，輔盡堵楊家莊，欲束水刷之，而引河淺窄，淤刷鼎沸，遇徐家灣堤卑則決，蕭家渡土松則又決。會候補布政使崔維雅上河防芻議，條列二十四事，請盡變輔前法。上遣尚書伊桑阿、侍郎宋文運履勘，命維雅隨往。維雅欲盡毀減水壩，別圖挑築。伊桑阿等言輔所建工程固多不堅，改築亦未必成功。輔亦申辨「工將次第告竣，不宜有所更張」。並下廷議。因召輔至京，輔言「蕭家口明正可塞，維雅議不可行」，上是之，命還工。二十二年春，蕭家渡塞，河歸故道。明年，上南巡閱河，賜詩褒美。

Three years into the major repair program the river had not fully returned to its old course, and Jin Fu submitted a self-impeachment. The Ministry of Personnel recommended dismissal, but the emperor ordered him to remain in office. In the twenty-first year the river broke at Xujiawan in Suqian and was promptly sealed. It broke again at Xiaojiadu. Previously the channel had been scarcely a thread of water; Jin Fu had fully sealed Yangjiazhuang, hoping to concentrate the current for scouring, but the diversion channel was too shallow and narrow and sediment churned violently. Where the dike at Xujiawan was low, the river broke through; where the soil at Xiaojiadu was loose, it broke through again. About this time the acting provincial treasurer Cui Weiya submitted a draft plan on river defense with twenty-four recommendations, calling for a complete reversal of Jin Fu's approach. The emperor sent Minister Esangga and Vice Minister Song Wenyun to inspect on site, with Cui Weiya ordered to accompany them. Cui Weiya wanted to demolish all the spillway dams and pursue an entirely different dredging and construction program. Esangga and his colleagues reported that many of Jin Fu's structures were indeed poorly built, but that Cui's alternative approach might not succeed either. Jin Fu defended his record, arguing, "The projects are nearing completion in sequence, and wholesale changes would be ill-advised." Both positions were referred to the court for deliberation. The emperor summoned Jin Fu to the capital; Jin Fu argued that Xiaojiakou could clearly be sealed and Cui Weiya's plan was unworkable. The emperor agreed and ordered him back to the works. In the spring of the twenty-second year Xiaojiadu was sealed and the river returned to its former channel. The following year the emperor toured the south to inspect the river and conferred a poem of commendation.

二十四年秋，輔以河南地在上游，河南有失，則江南河道淤淀不旋踵。乃築考城、儀封堤七千九百八十九丈，封丘荊隆口大月堤三百三十丈，滎陽埽工三百十丈，又鑿睢寧南岸龍虎山減水閘四。上念高郵諸州湖溢淹民田，命安徽按察使于成龍修治海口及下河，聽輔節制。旋召輔、成龍至京集議。成龍力主開濬海口；輔言下河海口高內地五尺，應築長堤高丈六尺，束水趨海。所見不合，下廷臣議，亦各持一說。上以講官喬萊江北人，召問，萊言輔議非是。因遣尚書薩穆哈等勘議，還言開海口無益。會江寧巡撫湯斌入為尚書，詢之，斌言海口開則積水可泄，惟高郵、興化民慮毀廬墓為不便耳。乃黜薩穆哈，頒內帑二十萬，命侍郎孫在豐董其役。時又有督修下河宜先塞減水壩之議，上不許。召輔入對，輔言南壩永塞，恐淮弱不敵黃強，宜於高家堰外增築重堤，截水出清口不入下河，停丁溪等處工程。成龍時任直撫，示以輔疏，仍言下河宜濬，修重堤勞費無益。議不決。復遣尚書佛倫等勘議，佛倫主輔議。二十七年，御史郭琇劾輔治河無績，內外臣工亦交章論之，乃停築重堤，免輔官，以閩浙總督王新命代之，仍督修下河，鐫在豐級，以學士凱音布代之。

In the autumn of the twenty-fourth year Jin Fu noted that Henan lay upstream—if control failed there, the Jiangnan channel would silt up almost immediately. He then built 7,989 zhang of levee at Kaocheng and Yifeng, a 330-zhang auxiliary levee at Jinglongkou in Fengqiu, 310 zhang of revetment at Xingyang, and cut four spillway sluices at Longhushan on Suining's south bank. Concerned that lake overflow in Gaoyou and neighboring prefectures was drowning farmland, the emperor ordered Anhui provincial judge Yu Chenglong to work on the estuary and lower river under Jin Fu's command. Soon afterward Jin Fu and Yu Chenglong were summoned to the capital for a joint conference. Yu Chenglong strongly favored dredging open the estuary; Jin Fu countered that the estuary of the lower river stood five chi above the inland plain and that a sixteen-chi levee should be built to confine the current and drive it to the sea. Unable to agree, they referred the matter to the full court—and each faction stuck to its own view. Because the lecturer Qiao Lai was a native of the north Jiangsu region, the emperor summoned him; Qiao Lai declared Jin Fu's plan unsound. The emperor then sent Minister Samuha and others to investigate; they returned reporting that opening the estuary would serve no purpose. When Jiangning governor Tang Bin was appointed to the Ministry and consulted, he argued that opening the estuary would drain the standing flood—but that people in Gaoyou and Xinghua worried about damage to homes and ancestral graves. Samuha was then dismissed, two hundred thousand taels were allocated from the imperial treasury, and Vice Minister Sun Zaifeng was put in charge of the work. At the same time some argued that repairing the lower river should begin by sealing the spillway dams; the emperor refused. Summoned to audience, Jin Fu warned that permanently sealing the southern spillways would leave the weak Huai unable to withstand the mighty Yellow River; he proposed building a secondary levee outside Gaojiayan to divert water through Qingkou and keep it out of the lower river, and suspending work at Dingxi and elsewhere. Yu Chenglong, then governor-general of Zhili, was shown Jin Fu's memorial but still maintained that the lower river should be dredged and that a secondary levee would waste labor and money to no purpose. No decision was reached. Minister Folun and others were sent out again to investigate; Folun sided with Jin Fu. In the twenty-seventh year Censor Guo Xiu impeached Jin Fu for lack of results, and officials inside and outside the capital piled on with their own critiques. Construction of the secondary levee was halted, Jin Fu was dismissed, and Min-Zhe governor-general Wang Xinming replaced him while continuing oversight of lower-river repairs; Sun Zaifeng was demoted and Academician Kaiyinbu took his place.

明年，上南巡，閱高家堰，謂諸臣曰：「此堤頗堅固，然亦不可無減水壩以防水大衝決。但靳輔欲於舊堤外更築重堤，實屬無益。」並以輔於險工修挑水壩，令水勢回緩，甚善。車駕還京，復其官。三十一年，新命罷，仍令輔為河督。輔以衰疾辭，命順天府丞徐廷璽副之。輔請於黃河兩岸值柳種草，多設涵洞，俱報可。是冬，輔卒，上聞，嘆悼，予騎都尉世職。以于成龍為河督。

The following year on his southern tour the emperor inspected Gaojiayan and told his ministers, "This levee is fairly solid, but spillway dams are still needed to prevent catastrophic breach when floods run high. Jin Fu's plan to build a second levee outside the existing one, however, would truly serve no purpose." He also praised Jin Fu's diversion dams at critical sections for slowing the current—an excellent measure. After the imperial tour returned to the capital, Jin Fu's office was restored. In the thirty-first year Wang Xinming was dismissed and Jin Fu was again appointed director-general of rivers. Jin Fu begged off citing age and illness, and Shuntian vice magistrate Xu Tingxi was appointed his deputy. Jin Fu proposed planting willows and grass along both banks and installing numerous culverts—all were approved. That winter Jin Fu died; the emperor mourned his passing and granted his family the hereditary rank of Cavalry Commandant. Yu Chenglong was appointed director-general of rivers.

越二年，召詢成龍曰：「減水壩果可塞否？」對曰：「不宜塞，仍照輔所修而行。」上曰：「如此，何不早陳？爾排陷他人則易，身任總河則難，非明驗耶？」三十四年，成龍遭父憂，以漕督董安國代之。明年，大水，決張家莊，河會丹、沁偪滎澤，徙治高埠。又決安東童家營，水入射陽湖。是歲築攔黃大壩，於雲梯關挑引河千二百餘丈，於關外馬家港導黃由南潮河東注入海。去路不暢，上游易潰，而河患日亟。三十六年，決時家馬頭。明年，仍以成龍為河督。三十八年春，上南巡，臨視高家堰等堤，謂諸臣曰：「治河上策，惟以深浚河身為要。河底浚深，則洪澤湖水直達黃河，興化、鹽城等七州縣無汎濫之患，田產自然涸出。若不治源，治流終無裨益。今黃、淮交會之口過於徑直，應將河、淮之堤各迤東灣曲拓築，使之斜行會流，則黃不致倒灌矣。」

Two years later the emperor summoned Yu Chenglong and asked, "Can the spillway dams truly be sealed?" He answered, "They should not be sealed. Continue along the lines of what Jin Fu built." The emperor said, "If that is your view, why did you not say so sooner? You found it easy to undermine others, but hard to bear the responsibility of director-general yourself—is that not proof enough?" In the thirty-fourth year Yu Chenglong entered mourning for his father, and grain transport director Dong Anguo replaced him. The next year brought catastrophic flooding: the river broke at Zhangjiazhuang, the Dan and Qin rivers combined to press on Xing Marsh, and the county seat was relocated to higher ground. It broke again at Tongjiaying in Andong, and floodwater poured into Sheyang Lake. That year the great Yellow-blocking dam was built; a diversion channel of more than 1,200 zhang was cut at Yunti Pass; and at Majia Gang outside the pass the Yellow River was directed east through the Nanchao River to the sea. With the outlet choked, upstream breaches became frequent and the river crisis grew more acute by the day. In the thirty-sixth year the river broke at Shijiama Tou. The following year Yu Chenglong was again appointed director-general of rivers. In the spring of the thirty-eighth year, on a southern tour the emperor personally inspected Gaojiayan and other levees and told his ministers, "The best approach to river control is to dredge the channel deep. Deepen the riverbed and Hongze Lake will drain straight into the Yellow River; the seven prefectures and counties including Xinghua and Yancheng will be free of flooding, and submerged farmland will naturally re-emerge. Treat the symptoms without addressing the source and all downstream efforts will prove futile. At present the Yellow-Huai confluence is too straight; the levees on both rivers should be extended eastward in curves so the currents meet at an angle—and the Yellow River will no longer back up into the Huai."

明年，成龍卒，以兩江總督張鵬翮為河督。是歲塞時家馬頭，從鵬翮先疏海口之請，盡拆雲梯關外攔黃壩，賜名大清口；建宿遷北岸臨黃外口石閘，徐州南岸楊家樓至段家莊月堤。四十一年，上謂永定河石堤甚有益，欲推行黃河兩岸，自徐州至清口皆修石堤。鵬翮言「建築石工，必地基堅實。惟河性靡常，沙土鬆浮，石堤工繁費鉅，告成難以預料」。遂作罷。四十二年，上南巡，閱視河工，制河臣箴以賜鵬翮。秋，移建中河出水口於楊家樓，逼溜南趨，清水暢流敵黃，海口大通，河底日深，黃水不虞倒灌。上嘉鵬翮績，加太子太保。四十六年八月，決豐縣吳家莊，隨塞。明年，鵬翮入為刑部尚為，以趙世顯代之。四十八年六月，決蘭陽雷家集、儀封洪邵灣及水驛張家莊各堤。

The following year Yu Chenglong died, and Liangjiang governor-general Zhang Penghe was appointed director-general of rivers. That year Shijiama Tou was sealed; acting on Zhang Penghe's earlier proposal to open the estuary, the Yellow-blocking dam outside Yunti Pass was entirely removed and given the name Daqingkou; A stone sluice was built at the outer Yellow-facing outlet on Suqian's north bank, and an auxiliary levee from Yangjialou to Duanjiazhuang on Xuzhou's south bank. In the forty-first year the emperor noted that stone levees on the Yongding River had proved highly effective and proposed extending them along both banks of the Yellow River from Xuzhou to Qingkou. Zhang Penghe replied, "Stone construction requires a solid foundation. But the Yellow River is inherently capricious, its banks of loose sand and silt offer no firm footing, stone levees demand enormous labor and expense, and whether any project can be brought to completion remains impossible to predict." The plan was accordingly dropped. In the forty-second year of the Kangxi reign, the emperor toured the south, inspected the river works, composed an admonition for river officials, and presented it to Zhang Penghe. That autumn the outlet of the Central Canal was relocated to Yangjialou, deflecting the current southward so that clear water ran freely enough to hold the Yellow River in check; the estuary opened wide, the channel bed grew deeper day by day, and backflow of muddy water was no longer feared. The emperor commended Zhang Penghe's accomplishments and promoted him to Grand Guardian of the Heir Apparent. In the eighth month of the forty-sixth year, the levee at Wujiazhuang in Feng County breached and was promptly sealed. The following year Zhang Penghe was recalled to the capital as Minister of Justice, and Zhao Shixian succeeded him as river commissioner. In the sixth month of the forty-eighth year, breaches opened at Leijiaji in Lanyang, Hongshaowan in Yifeng, and Zhangjiazhuang at the courier station.

六十年八月，決武陟詹家店、馬營口、魏家口，大溜北趨，注滑縣、長垣、東明，奪運河，至張秋，由五空橋入鹽河歸海。自河工告成，黃流順軌，安瀾十餘年矣，至是遣鵬翮等往勘。九月，塞詹家店、魏家口；十一月，塞馬營口。世顯罷，以陳鵬年署河道總督。六十一年正月，馬營口復決，灌張秋，奔注大清河。六月，沁水暴漲，沖塌秦家廠南北壩台及釘船幫大壩。時王家溝引河成，引溜由東南會滎澤入正河，馬營堤因無恙。鵬年復於廣武山官莊峪挑引河百四十餘丈以分水勢。九月，秦家廠南壩甫塞，北壩又決，馬營亦漫開；十二月，塞之。

In the eighth month of the sixtieth year, breaches at Zhanjiadian, Mayingkou, and Weijiakou in Wuzhi sent the main current rushing north through Huaxian, Changyuan, and Dongming, cutting across the Grand Canal to Zhangqiu, whence it entered the Salt River by the Wukong Bridge and flowed to the sea. More than ten years of calm had followed the reported completion of the river works, with the Yellow River running in its proper channel; now Penghe and others were sent to investigate. In the ninth month, Zhanjiadian and Weijiakou were sealed; In the eleventh month, Mayingkou was sealed. Zhao Shixian was removed from office, and Chen Pengnian was appointed acting Director-General of Rivers. In the first month of the sixty-first year, Mayingkou breached again, flooding Zhangqiu and sending the waters rushing into the Daqing River. In the sixth month a violent flood on the Qin River destroyed the north and south dam platforms at Qinjiachang and the great nailed-boat revetment. By then the Wangjiagou diversion channel had been completed, drawing the current southeast through Rongze into the main channel, so the Maying levee remained intact. Chen Pengnian also cut a diversion channel of more than one hundred forty zhang at Guanzhuangyu on Guangwu Mountain to split the force of the current. In the ninth month, the south dam at Qinjiachang had barely been sealed when the north dam breached again, and Maying overflowed as well; In the twelfth month, all were sealed.

雍正元年六月，決中牟十里店、婁家莊，由劉家寨南入賈魯河。會鵬年卒，齊蘇勒為總河，慮賈魯河下注之水，山盱、高堰臨湖堤工不能容納，亟宜相機堵閉，上命兵部侍郎嵇曾筠馳往協議。七月，決梁家營、詹家店，復遣大學士張鵬翮往協修，是月塞。九月，決鄭州來童寨民堤，鄭民挖陽武故堤泄水，並衝決中牟楊橋官堤，尋塞。是歲建清口東西束水壩以御黃蓄清。二年，以嵇曾筠為副總河，駐武陟，轄河南河務，東河分治自此始。六月，決儀封大寨、蘭陽板橋，逾月塞之。

In the sixth month of the first year of the Yongzheng reign, breaches at Shilidian and Loujiazhuang in Zhongmou sent the river south from Liujiazhai into the Jialu River. Chen Pengnian died about this time, and Qisule succeeded him as river commissioner. Fearing that the water pouring down the Jialu River would overwhelm the lake-facing levees at Shanxu and Gaoyan, he urged that the breach be closed as soon as practicable; the emperor dispatched Vice Minister of War Ji Zengyun to confer on the spot. In the seventh month, breaches opened at Liangjiaying and Zhanjiadian; Grand Secretary Zhang Penghe was again sent to supervise repairs, and both were sealed that same month. In the ninth month the civilian levee at Laizhai in Zhengzhou gave way; local people dug through the old Yangwu levee to drain the flood, which also breached the official levee at Yangqiao in Zhongmou; all were soon repaired. That year water-confining dams were built east and west of Qingkou to hold back the Yellow River and preserve the clear waters. In the second year Ji Zengyun was appointed Deputy Director-General of Rivers, stationed at Wuzhi to oversee Henan river affairs—the beginning of separate administration for the Eastern River. In the sixth month, breaches opened at Dazhai in Yifeng and Banqiao in Lanyang; both were sealed after more than a month.

三年六月，決睢寧硃家海，東注洪澤湖。明年四月，塞未竣，河水陡漲，沖塌東岸壩台，睢寧、虹、泗、桃源、宿遷悉被淹，命兩廣總督孔毓珣馳勘協防，十二月塞。是月河清，起陝西府谷訖江南桃源。五年，齊蘇勒以硃家海素稱險要，增築夾壩月堤、防風埽，並於大溜頂沖處削陡岸為斜坡，懸密葉大柳於坡上，以抵溜之汕刷。久之，大溜歸中泓，柳枝沾掛泥滓，悉成沙灘，易險為平，工不勞而費甚省。因請凡河崖陡峻處，俱仿此行。六年，曾筠內遷禮部尚書，副總河如故，命署廣東按察使尹繼善協理江南河務。

In the sixth month of the third year, a breach at Zhujiahai in Suining sent the river east into Hongze Lake. The following April, before repairs were finished, a sudden rise in the river destroyed the east-bank dam platform; Suining, Hong, Si, Taoyuan, and Suqian were all flooded. Liangguang Governor-General Kong Yuxun was dispatched to inspect and organize defenses, and the breach was sealed in December. That month the river ran clear from Fugu in Shaanxi all the way to Taoyuan in Jiangnan. In the fifth year Qisule, knowing Zhujiahai's long reputation as a danger point, added flanking moon dikes and windbreak revetments, cut the steep bank where the main current struck head-on into a slope, and planted large willows with dense foliage on the incline to resist scour. In time the main current returned to the central channel, willow branches trapped silt until sandbars formed everywhere, danger gave way to level ground, and the work required little labor at modest cost. He therefore proposed that the same method be applied at every stretch of steep riverbank. In the sixth year Ji Zengyun was recalled to the capital as Minister of Rites while retaining his deputy commission; Acting Guangdong Provincial Judge Yin Jisan was appointed to assist with Jiangnan river affairs.

七年，改河道總督為江南河道總督，駐清江，以孔毓珣任，省副總河。以曾筠為山東河道總督，駐濟寧。上以明臣潘季馴有每歲派夫加高堤身五寸之議，前靳輔亦以為言，計歲費不過三四萬，下兩河總督議。毓珣等請酌緩急，分年輪流加倍，約歲需二萬餘金，下部議行。八年，毓珣卒，曾筠調督南河，田文鏡兼署東河總督。五月，敕建河州口外河源神廟成，加封號。是月，河清，起積石關訖撒喇城查漢斯。是歲決宿遷及桃源沈家莊，旋塞。以封丘荊隆口大溜頂沖開黑堈口至柳園口引河三千三百五十丈。十年，增修高堰石堤成。十一年，揀派部院司員赴南河學習，期以三年。授曾筠文華殿大學士兼吏部尚書，督南河如故，命兩淮鹽政高斌就習河務。曾筠旋遭母憂，斌署南河總督。

In the seventh year the post of Director-General of Rivers was reorganized as Jiangnan Director-General of Rivers, stationed at Qingjiang under Kong Yuxun, and the deputy directorship was abolished. Ji Zengyun was appointed Shandong Director-General of Rivers, stationed at Jining. The emperor noted that the Ming official Pan Jixun had proposed dispatching corvée labor each year to raise levees by five cun, a measure Jin Fu had also advocated at an estimated annual cost of no more than thirty or forty thousand taels, and referred the plan to the two river commissioners for discussion. Kong Yuxun and his colleagues proposed prioritizing urgent sections and doubling the height in rotation over successive years, at an estimated annual cost of more than twenty thousand taels; the plan was referred to the ministry and approved. In the eighth year Kong Yuxun died; Ji Zengyun was transferred to the Southern River, and Tian Wenjing was appointed acting Eastern River commissioner. In the fifth month, by imperial decree the temple to the River Source God outside the Hezhou mouth was completed and granted an enhanced title. That month the river ran clear from Jishi Pass to Sala Chengchahan Si. That year breaches opened at Suqian and Shenjiazhuang in Taoyuan; both were promptly sealed. Where the main current struck head-on at Jinglongkou in Fengqiu, a diversion channel three thousand three hundred fifty zhang long was cut from Heikou to Liuyuankou. In the tenth year, reinforcement of the Gaoyan stone levee was completed. In the eleventh year, selected officials from the ministries and boards were sent to the Southern River for training, for a term of three years. Ji Zengyun was appointed Grand Secretary of the Hall of Literary Glory and concurrent Minister of Personnel while continuing to direct the Southern River; Lianghuai Salt Controller Gao Bin was ordered to train in river affairs on site. Ji Zengyun soon entered mourning for his mother, and Gao Bin served as acting Southern River commissioner.

乾隆元年四月，河水大漲，由碭山毛城鋪閘口洶湧南下，堤多衝塌，潘家道口平地水深三五尺。上以下流多在蕭、宿、靈、虹、睢寧、五河等州縣，今止議濬上源而無疏通下游之策，則水無歸宿，下江南、河南各督撫暨兩總河委勘會議，並移南副總河駐徐州以專督率。旋高斌請濬毛城鋪迤下河道，經徐、蕭、睢、宿、靈、虹至泗州安河陡門，紆直六百餘里，以達洪澤，出清口會黃，而淮揚京員夏之芳等言其不便。明年，召斌詢問，斌繪圖呈覽，乃知之芳等所言失實，令同總督慶復確估定議，並將開濬有利無害，曉喻淮揚士民。初，斌疏濬毛城鋪水道，別開新口塞舊口，以免黃河倒灌。至三年秋，河漲灌運，論者多歸咎新開運口。斌言：「十月後黃水平退，湖水暢流，新淤隨溜刷去，可無虞淺澀。」四年，斌又言「上年清水微弱，時值黃水異漲，並非開新口所致」，而南人言者不已。上遣大學士鄂爾泰馳勘，亦言新口宜開。明年，黃溜仍南逼清口，仿宋陳堯佐法，制設木龍二，挑溜北行。

In the fourth month of the first year of the Qianlong reign, the river rose sharply; pouring south through the sluice at Maochengpu in Dangshan, it destroyed many levees, and at Panjiadao the flat ground stood three to five chi under water. The emperor observed that the lower course lay chiefly through Xiao, Su, Ling, Hong, Suining, Wuhe, and neighboring counties, yet officials discussed only dredging the upper reaches with no plan to open the lower course—leaving the floodwaters nowhere to go. He ordered the governors-general of Jiangnan and Henan and the two river commissioners to inspect and confer, and relocated the Southern Deputy Director-General to Xuzhou to supervise the work directly. Gao Bin then proposed dredging the channel below Maochengpu through Xuzhou, Xiaoxian, Suining, Suqian, Lingbi, and Hong to the Anhe sluice at Sizhou—a winding course of more than six hundred li—to reach Hongze Lake and discharge at Qingkou to meet the Yellow River; but Huai-Yang officials in the capital, including Xia Zhifang, objected that the plan was impracticable. The following year Gao Bin was summoned to court, presented a map, and showed that Xia Zhifang's objections were groundless. He was ordered to work with Governor-General Qing Fu on a precise cost estimate and decision, and to explain to the gentry and people of Huai and Yang that dredging would benefit them without harm. Gao Bin had originally proposed dredging the Maochengpu channel, opening a new outlet and closing the old one to prevent backflow from the Yellow River. By the autumn of the third year, rising waters had flooded the Grand Canal, and many critics blamed the newly opened outlet. Gao Bin replied, "After the tenth month the Yellow River subsides, lake water runs freely, and fresh silt will be scoured away by the current—there is no reason to fear shoaling." In the fourth year he added that "last year the clear waters were weak and the Yellow River rose to an unusual height—the new outlet was not the cause," yet critics in the south would not be silenced. The emperor dispatched Grand Secretary Ortai to inspect on site; he too concluded that the new outlet should remain open. The following year, with the Yellow River current still pressing south toward Qingkou, two wooden dragons were installed by the method of the Song official Chen Yaozuo to deflect the current northward.

六年，斌以宿遷至桃源、清河二百餘里，河流湍激，北岸只縷堤六，並無遙堤，又內逼運河，將運河南岸縷堤通築高厚，作黃河北岸遙堤，更於縷堤內擇要增築格堤九。未成，斌調督直隸，完顏偉繼之。先是上以河溜逼清口，倒漾為患，詔循康熙間舊跡，開陶庄引河，導黃使北，遣鄂爾泰會勘。議甫定，以汛水驟漲停工，斌亦去任。至是，完顏偉慮引河不就，於清口迤西、黃河南岸設木龍挑溜北走，引河之議遂寢。厥後四十一年，上決意開之，逾年工竣，新河直抵周家莊，會清東下，倒漾之患永絕。

In the sixth year Gao Bin noted that for more than two hundred li from Suqian through Taoyuan to Qinghe the river ran swift and fierce, the north bank had only six secondary levees and no outer levee, and the current pressed dangerously close to the Grand Canal. He proposed linking and raising the secondary levees on the canal's south bank into an outer levee for the Yellow River's north bank, and building nine check levees at critical points within them. Before the work was finished, Gao Bin was transferred to Zhili, and Wanyan Wei succeeded him. Earlier, troubled by the river current pressing on Qingkou and causing back-surge flooding, the emperor had ordered the Taozhuang diversion channel opened along its Kangxi-era course to guide the Yellow River northward, and dispatched Ortai to inspect jointly. The plan had barely been settled when a sudden flood halted construction, and Gao Bin also left office. Wanyan Wei, doubting that the diversion channel could be completed, instead installed wooden dragons west of Qingkou on the south bank to deflect the current northward, and the diversion-channel project was abandoned. Forty-one years later the emperor resolved to open it; the work was finished within a year, the new channel ran straight to Zhoujiazhuang to carry clear water eastward, and the plague of back-surge flooding was ended for good.

七年，決豐縣石林、黃村，奪溜東趨，又決沛縣縷堤，旋塞。完顏偉調督東河，改白鍾山南河總督。初豐、沛決時，大學士陳世倌往勘，添建滾水石壩二於天然南北二壩處，以分泄水勢。十年，決阜寧陳家浦。時淮、黃交漲，沿河州縣被淹。漕督顧琮言：「陳家浦逼近海口，以下十餘里向無堤工，每遇水漲，任其散溢。若仍於此堵塞，是與水爭地，費多益少，應於上流築遙堤以束水勢。」事下訥親、高斌，仍議塞舊決口。十一年，鍾山罷，顧琮署南總河，建木龍三於安東西門，逼溜南趨，自木龍以上皆淤灘，化險為平。十三年，琮調督東河，詔大學士高斌管南河事。斌以雲梯關下二套漲出沙灘，大溜南趨，直逼天妃宮辛家盪堤工，開分水引河，並修補徐州東門外蟄裂石堤。琮亦以祥符十九堡南岸日淤，大溜北趨逼堤根，建南北壩台，並於壩外卷埽簽椿。十六年六月，決陽武，命斌赴工，會琮堵築，十一月塞。十七年，上以豫省河岸大堤外有大行堤一，連接直、東，年久殘缺，在直隸者，令方觀承勘修，其山東界內，有無汕刷殘缺，令鄂容安查修。鄂容安言曹、單二縣大行堤大小殘缺三千四百三十丈，並加幫卑薄，補築缺口三百三十餘丈，疏濬堤南泄水河以宣坡水。

In the seventh year, breaches at Shilin and Huangcun in Feng County diverted the current eastward, and a secondary levee in Peixian also gave way; all were soon sealed. Wanyan Wei was transferred to the Eastern River, and Bai Zhongshan was appointed Southern River commissioner. When the Feng and Pei breaches first opened, Grand Secretary Chen Shiguang inspected the site and added two overflow stone dams at the Natural North and South Dams to divide and discharge the flood. In the tenth year, a breach opened at Chenjiapu in Funing. The Huai and Yellow Rivers rose together, flooding counties all along the course. Grain Transport Director Gu Zong argued, "Chenjiapu lies near the estuary; for more than ten li downstream there has never been any levee work, and whenever the waters rise they are simply allowed to spread. To seal the breach here would mean fighting the river for land at great cost for little gain; an outer levee should be built upstream to confine the flood." The matter was referred to Neqin and Gao Bin, who still recommended sealing the old breach. In the eleventh year Bai Zhongshan was removed, Gu Zong served as acting Southern River commissioner, and three wooden dragons were installed at the west gate of Andong to deflect the current southward; upstream of the dragons silt shoals formed, turning danger into level ground. In the thirteenth year Gu Zong was transferred to the Eastern River, and by edict Grand Secretary Gao Bin was placed in charge of Southern River affairs. Gao Bin, finding that sandbars had risen below Yunti Pass in the second reach and the main current was pressing south toward the levee at Xinjia Dang by Tianfei Palace, cut a diversion channel to split the flow and repaired the cracked stone levee outside Xuzhou's east gate. Gu Zong, noting daily silting on the south bank at the nineteen forts of Xiangfu and the main current pressing north against the levee base, built north and south dam platforms and added rolled revetments with piled stakes outside them. In the sixth month of the sixteenth year a breach opened at Yangwu; Gao Bin was ordered to the site, and working with Gu Zong he sealed it in November. In the seventeenth year the emperor noted that beyond Henan's main river levees ran the Taixing levee, linking Zhili and Shandong but long neglected and broken. Fang Guancheng was ordered to inspect and repair the Zhili section, and E Rong'an to survey and repair any scoured or damaged stretches within Shandong. E Rong'an reported that in Cao and Shan counties the Taixing levee had deficiencies totaling three thousand four hundred thirty zhang, low thin sections were raised, more than three hundred thirty zhang of gaps were filled, and the drainage channel south of the levee was dredged to discharge hillside runoff.

十八年秋，決陽武十三堡。九月，決銅山張家馬路，沖塌內堤、縷越堤二百餘丈，南注靈、虹諸邑，入洪澤湖，奪淮而下。以尹繼善督南河，遣尚書舒赫德偕白鍾山馳赴協理。同知李焞、守備張賓侵帑誤工，為學習河務布政使富勒赫所劾，勘實，置之法。高斌及協理張師載坐失察，縛視行刑。是冬，河塞。

In the autumn of the eighteenth year, a breach opened at the thirteen forts in Yangwu. In the ninth month a breach at Zhangjia Malu in Tongshan destroyed more than two hundred zhang of inner and secondary overflow levees, poured south through Lingbi, Hong, and neighboring districts into Hongze Lake, and cut across the Huai River downstream. Yin Jisan was appointed Southern River commissioner, and Minister Suhede was dispatched with Bai Zhongshan to assist on site. Subprefect Li Chun and garrison commander Zhang Bin were impeached by Provincial Judge Fulehe, then training in river affairs, for embezzling funds and delaying the work; the charges were verified and both were punished by law. Gao Bin and co-supervisor Zhang Shizai were punished for failure of oversight and bound to witness the executions. That winter the breach was sealed.

方銅山之始決也，下廷議，吏部尚書孫嘉淦獨主開減河引水入大清河，略言：「自順、康以來，河決北岸十之九。北岸決，潰運者半，不潰者半。凡其潰道，皆由大清河入海者也。蓋大清河東南皆泰山基腳，其道亙古不壞，亦不遷移。前南北分流時，已受河之半。及張秋潰決，且受河之全，未聞有沖城郭淹人民之事，則此河之有利無害，已足徵矣。今銅山決口不能收功，上下兩江二三十州縣之積水不能消涸，故臣言開減河也。上游減則下游微，決口易塞，積水早消。但河流湍急，設開減河而奪溜以出，不可不防，故臣言減入大清河也。現開減河數處，皆距大清河不遠。計大清河所經，只東阿、濟陽、濱州、利津四五州縣，即有漫溢，不過偏災，忍四五州縣之偏災，可減兩江二三十州縣之積水，並解淮、揚兩府之急難，此其利害輕重，不待智者而後知也。減河開後，經兩三州縣境，或有漫溢，築土埂以御之，一入大清河，則河身深廣，兩岸堵築處甚少，計費不過一二十萬，而所省下游決口之工費，賑濟之錢米，至少一二百萬，此其得失多寡，亦不待智者而後知也。計無便於此者。」上慮形勢隔礙，不能用。

When the Tongshan breach first opened, the matter was referred to court deliberation. Minister of Personnel Sun Jiaqing alone advocated opening a flood-reduction channel to divert water into the Daqing River, arguing in summary: "Since the Shunzhi and Kangxi reigns, nine out of ten Yellow River breaches have been on the north bank. When the north bank gave way, half the floods cut across the Grand Canal and half did not. Every path by which those floods reached the sea ran through the Daqing River. The Daqing River runs along the foothills of Mount Tai; its channel has been stable since antiquity, neither breaking nor shifting. Even when the river previously divided north and south, the Daqing channel already carried half its flow. When Zhangqiu breached it carried the river's full force, yet there were no reports of cities destroyed or people drowned—proof enough that this channel does more good than harm. Today the Tongshan breach cannot be closed, and the standing floodwaters in twenty or thirty counties of the upper and lower Yangtze region cannot be drained—that is why I propose opening a flood-reduction channel. Reduce the flow upstream and the lower reaches weaken; the breach becomes easier to seal and the flood recedes sooner. But the river runs swift and fierce; opening a diversion that steals the main current requires caution—hence my proposal to divert into the Daqing River. Several flood-reduction channels already open lie not far from the Daqing River. The Daqing River passes through only four or five counties—Dong'e, Jiyang, Binzhou, Lijin, and the like. Even if it overflowed, the damage would be local. To accept localized flooding in four or five counties in order to drain the standing waters of twenty or thirty counties in the Two Jiangs and relieve the crisis in Huai and Yang prefectures—the balance of costs and benefits requires no sage to discern. Once the channel is opened, any overflow in the two or three counties it crosses can be contained with earthen ridges; once the water enters the Daqing River, its bed is deep and wide and levees are needed at few points. The project would cost no more than one or two hundred thousand taels, while savings on downstream breach repairs and relief grain and silver would amount to at least one or two million—the arithmetic of gain and loss requires no sage to calculate. No plan could be more advantageous." The emperor, concerned that geography made the plan impracticable, rejected it.

自銅山塞後，月堤內積水尚深七八尺至丈八九尺。上命於引河兜水壩南再開引河分溜，使新工不受衝激。二十一年，決孫家集，隨塞。明年二月，上南巡至天妃閘閱木龍。時鍾山調總南河，偕東河總督張師載言：「徐州南北岸相距甚迫，一遇盛漲，時有潰決。請挑濬淤淺，增築堤工，並堵筑北岸支河，為南北分籌之計。」制可。二十三年，命安徽巡撫高晉協理南河。秋七月，決竇家寨新築土壩，直注毛城鋪，漫開金門土壩。晉言：「土壩過高，阻遏水勢，以致壅決，不須再築。」上不許，並令開蔣家營、傅家窪引河仍導入黃。二十六年七月，沁、黃並漲，武陟、滎澤、陽武、祥符、蘭陽同時決十五口，中牟之楊橋決數百丈，大溜直趨賈魯河。遣大學士劉統勛、公兆惠馳勘，巡撫常鈞請先築南岸。上謂河流奪溜，宜亟堵楊橋，鈞言大謬，調撫江西，以胡寶瑔為河南巡撫，並令高晉赴豫協理。十一月塞，上聞大喜，命於工所立河神廟。

After the Tongshan breach was sealed, standing water inside the auxiliary levee remained seven or eight chi deep, in places nearly two zhang. The emperor ordered a second diversion channel opened south of the water-capture dam on the existing channel to split the current and protect the new works from scour. In the twenty-first year a breach opened at Sunjiaji and was promptly sealed. The following February, on his southern inspection tour, the Emperor visited Tianfei Sluice to review the wooden dragon structures. Bai Zhongshan had been transferred to head the Southern River commission; he and Eastern River Governor-General Zhang Shizai memorialized: "At Xuzhou the levees on the north and south banks stand very close together, and whenever the river rises sharply, breaches are frequent. We ask that silted shallows be dredged, the levees strengthened, and branch channels on the north bank blocked off—a plan to manage the north and south banks separately. The memorial was approved. In the twenty-third year Gao Jin, governor of Anhui, was appointed to assist in Southern River affairs. In the seventh month, a newly built earthen dam at Doujiazhai gave way; the main current rushed straight toward Maochengpu and broke through the Jinmen earthen dam as well. Gao Jin argued: "The earthen dam was built too high, damming the current and causing water to back up until the levee failed—it should not be rebuilt. The Emperor refused and ordered the Jiangjiaying and Fujiawa diversion channels opened to channel water back into the Yellow River. In the seventh month of the twenty-sixth year the Qin and Yellow Rivers rose together; fifteen breaches opened simultaneously at Wuzhi, Xingze, Yangwu, Xiangfu, and Lanyang; at Yangqiao in Zhongmou a gap hundreds of zhang wide opened, and the main current surged toward the Jialu River. Grand Secretary Liu Tongxun and Duke Zhao Hui were sent to inspect the site, while Governor Chang Jun proposed strengthening the south bank first. The Emperor held that the river had diverted its main current and Yangqiao must be closed at once. He judged Chang Jun's advice gravely mistaken, transferred him to serve as governor of Jiangxi, appointed Hu Baoyu governor of Henan, and ordered Gao Jin to Henan to assist. The breach was sealed in the eleventh month. Delighted at the news, the Emperor ordered a temple to the River God erected at the work site.

三十年，上南巡，祭河神，閱清口東壩木龍惠濟閘。三十一年，決銅沛廳之韓家堂，旋塞。三十三年，豫撫阿思哈請以豫工節省銀加築堤岸，總河吳嗣爵言：「豫省河面寬，溜勢去來無定，旋險旋平，若將土埽劃為成數，恐各工員視為年例額支，轉啟興工冒銷之弊。」議遂寢。明年，嗣爵言：「銅瓦廂溜勢上隄，楊橋大工自四五埽至二十一埽俱頂沖迎溜。請於桃汛未屆拆修，加鑲層土層柴，鑲壓堅實。兩岸大堤外多支河積水，汛發時，引溜注堤，宜多築土壩攔截。」上俱可其奏。三十七年，東河總督姚立德言：「前築土壩，保固堤根，頻歲安瀾，已著成效。請俟冬春閒曠，培築土壩，密栽柳株，俾數年後溝槽淤平，可永固堤根。」上嘉獎之。

On his thirtieth-year southern tour the Emperor offered sacrifices to the River God and inspected the east dam at Qingkou, the wooden dragons, and Huiji Sluice. In the thirty-first year a breach opened at Hanjiatang in the Tongpei jurisdiction and was promptly sealed. In the thirty-third year Henan Governor Asiha proposed applying savings from Henan river works to strengthen the levees. River Director-General Wu Sijue objected: "In Henan the river channel is wide and the current shifts unpredictably—today's danger becomes tomorrow's calm. If fascine revetments were budgeted as fixed annual allotments, clerks would treat them as routine payouts and the fraud of needless construction and padded accounts would follow. The proposal was dropped. The following year Wu Sijue reported: "At Tongwaxiang the current is riding up the levee, and from the fourth and fifth fascines through the twenty-first at Yangqiao the great works all face the full force of the current head-on. He asked that repairs be made before the spring flood season, layering earth and fascines and packing them firm. Many branch channels beyond the main levees on both banks hold standing water; when floods rise they divert the current against the embankments, and more earthen dams should be built to intercept them. The Emperor approved all of these proposals. In the thirty-seventh year Eastern River Governor-General Yao Lide reported: "The earthen dams previously built to protect the levee foundations have kept the river quiet for years—a proven success. He proposed using the winter and spring lull to raise the earthen dams and plant willows densely so that within a few years the trenches would silt over and the levee foundations would be permanently secured. The Emperor commended him.

三十八年五月，河溢朝邑，漲至二丈五尺，民居多漂沒。三十九年八月，決南河老壩口，大溜由山子湖下注馬家盪、射陽湖入海，板閘、淮安俱被淹沒，尋塞。四十一年，嗣爵言黃水倒灌洪湖、運河，清口挑挖引河恐於事無濟。會內遷，薩載署南總河，上命偕江南總督高晉勘議。晉等言：「臣晉在工二十餘年，歷經倒灌。惟有將清口通湖引河挑挖，使得暢流，匯黃東注，並力刷沙，則黃河不濬自深，海口不疏自治，補偏救弊，惟此一法。」又言：「清口西所建木龍，原冀排溜北趨，刷陶庄積土，使黃不逼清。但驟難盡刷，宜於陶庄積土之北開一引河，使黃離清口較遠，至周家莊會清東注，不惟可免倒灌，淤沙漸可攻刷，即圩堰亦資穩固，所謂治淮即以治黃也。」明年二月，引河成。上喜成此鉅工，一勞永逸，可廢數百年藉清敵黃之說，飭建河神廟於新口石壩，自製文記之。

In the fifth month of the thirty-eighth year the river flooded Chaoyi to a depth of two zhang and five chi, sweeping away countless homes. In the eighth month of the thirty-ninth year the Old Dam Mouth on the Southern River gave way; the main current poured through Shanzihu into Majiadang and Sheyang Lake en route to the sea, inundating Banyan Sluice and Huai'an before the breach was sealed. In the forty-first year Wu Sijue reported that Yellow River water was backing up into Hongze Lake and the Grand Canal, and warned that dredging a diversion channel at Qingkou would likely accomplish nothing. Wu Sijue was transferred inland, Sa Zai served as acting Southern River commissioner, and the Emperor ordered him and Jiangnan Governor-General Gao Jin to survey the situation and propose remedies. Gao Jin and his colleagues reported: "Your servant Jin has spent more than twenty years on these works and has witnessed backflow many times. The sole remedy is to dredge the diversion channel at Qingkou that connects to the lake so water runs freely, gather the Yellow River current to flow east, and scour silt together—the river will deepen without dredging, the estuary will clear without dredging. To redress this chronic ill, there is no other way. They added: "The wooden dragons west of Qingkou were meant to deflect the current northward and scour the silt buildup at Taozhuang so the Yellow River would no longer press on the clear water. But the silt cannot be cleared at once. A diversion channel should be cut north of the Taozhuang buildup so the Yellow River stands farther from Qingkou, meeting the clear current at Zhoujiazhuang and flowing east—preventing backflow, allowing silt to be scoured over time, and stabilizing the polder dikes as well. To govern the Huai is to govern the Yellow. The diversion channel was completed the following February. The Emperor hailed the great project as a lasting solution that could finally lay to rest centuries of debate over using clear water to hold back the Yellow River. He ordered a River God temple built at the new stone dam and composed the commemorative inscription himself.

四十三年，決祥符，旬日塞之。閏六月，決儀封十六堡，寬七十餘丈，地在諸口上，掣溜湍急，由睢州、寧陵、永城直達亳州之渦河入淮。命高晉率熟諳河務員弁赴豫協堵，撥兩淮鹽課銀五十萬、江西漕糧三十萬賑恤災民，並遣尚書袁守侗勘辦。八月，上游迭漲，續塌二百二十餘丈，十六堡已塞復決。十二月再塞之。越日，時和驛東西壩相繼蟄陷。遣大學士公阿桂馳勘。明年四月，北壩復陷二十餘丈。上念儀工綦切，以古有沈璧禮河事，特頒白璧祭文，命阿桂等詣工所致祭。四十五年二月塞。是役也，歷時二載，費帑五百餘萬，堵築五次始合，命於陶庄河神廟建碑記之。六月，決睢寧郭家渡，又決考城、曹縣，未幾俱塞。十一月，張家油房塞而復開。

In the forty-third year a breach opened at Xiangfu and was sealed within ten days. In the intercalary sixth month the levee failed at Yifeng's Sixteen Forts, opening a gap more than seventy zhang wide upstream of the other breaches. The diverted current raced through Suizhou, Ningling, and Yongcheng and reached the Guo River at Bozhou, where it entered the Huai. Gao Jin was sent to Henan with experienced river officers to close the breach. Five hundred thousand taels from Lianghuai salt revenues and three hundred thousand piculs of Jiangxi tribute grain were allocated for disaster relief, and Minister Yuan Shoudong was dispatched to supervise. In the eighth month repeated rises upstream caused another two hundred twenty zhang of levee to collapse, and the Sixteen Forts breach, once sealed, opened again. It was sealed again in the twelfth month. The next day the east and west dams at Shihe Station collapsed in succession. Grand Secretary Duke Agui was sent to inspect the site. The following April the north dam failed again, losing more than twenty zhang. Deeply concerned over the urgency of the Yifeng repairs, the Emperor recalled the ancient rite of casting a jade disk into the river, issued a sacrificial text for a white jade offering, and ordered Agui and his colleagues to perform the rite at the work site. The breach was closed in the second month of the forty-fifth year. The campaign lasted two years, cost more than five million taels from the treasury, and required five attempts at closure before the levee held. The Emperor ordered a commemorative stele erected at the Taozhuang River God temple. In the sixth month breaches opened at Guojiadu in Suining and at Kaocheng and Caoxian—all were sealed before long. In the eleventh month the Zhangjiayoufang breach was sealed, then broke open again.

四十六年五月，決睢寧魏家莊，大溜注洪澤湖。七月，決儀封，漫口二十餘，北岸水勢全注青龍岡。十二月，將塞復蟄塌，大溜全掣由漫口下注。四十七年，兩次堵塞，皆復蟄塌。阿桂等請自蘭陽三堡大壩外增築南堤，開引河百七十餘里，導水下注，由商丘七堡出堤歸入正河，掣溜使全歸故道，曲家樓漫口自可堵閉。上從其言。明年二月，引河成，三月塞。四十九年八月，決睢州二堡，仍遣阿桂赴工督率，十一月塞。

In the fifth month of the forty-sixth year a breach at Weijiazhuang in Suining sent the main current pouring into Hongze Lake. In the seventh month Yifeng failed again, opening more than twenty overflow points as the entire force of the north-bank current poured into Qinglonggang. In the twelfth month, just as the breach was nearly closed, the levee subsided and collapsed again and the full current was diverted through the overflow points. In the forty-seventh year two closure attempts both ended in subsidence and renewed collapse. Agui and his colleagues proposed building a south levee beyond the great dam at Lanyang's Three Forts and cutting a diversion channel more than one hundred seventy li long to draw the water down, rejoining the main channel at Shangqiu Seven Forts—forcing the current back into its old course so the overflow at Qujialou could be closed. The Emperor agreed. The diversion channel was finished the following February and the breach sealed in March. In the eighth month of the forty-ninth year a breach opened at Suizhou's Two Forts; Agui was again sent to supervise the repairs, and the gap was closed in November.

先是上念豫工連歲漫溢，堤防外無宣洩之路，欲就勢建減水壩，俾大汛時有所分泄，下阿桂及河、撫諸臣勘議。至是，阿桂等言：「豫省堤工，滎澤、鄭州土性高堅，距廣武山近，毋庸設減壩。中牟以下，沙土夾雜，或系純沙，建壩不能保固。至堤南泄水各河，惟賈魯河系泄水要路。經鄭州、中牟、祥符、尉氏、扶溝、西華至周家口入沙河。又惠濟系賈魯支河，二河窄狹淤墊，如須減黃，應大加挑浚，需費浩繁，非一時所能集事。惟蘭、儀、高家寨河勢坐灣，若挑濬取直，引溜北注，河道可以暢行。」上然之。五十一年秋，決桃源司家莊、煙墩，十月塞。明年夏，復決睢州，十月塞。十二月，山西河清二旬，自永寧以下長千三百里。五十四年夏，決睢寧周家樓，十月塞。五十九年，決豐北曲家莊，尋塞。

Earlier the Emperor, troubled that Henan levees had overflowed year after year with no outlet beyond the embankments for releasing floodwater, had proposed building flood-reduction dams to divert excess water during the high season and ordered Agui and the river and provincial officials to survey and deliberate. Agui and his colleagues now reported: "In Henan the levees at Xingze and Zhengzhou rest on high, firm ground near Guangwu Mountain—flood-reduction dams are unnecessary there. Below Zhongmou the soil is sandy or mixed sand and earth—dams built there cannot be made to hold. Of the channels south of the levee that carry off floodwater, only the Jialu River is the critical outlet. It runs through Zhengzhou, Zhongmou, Xiangfu, Weishi, Fugou, and Xihua to Zhoujiakou, where it enters the Sha River. The Huiji channel is a branch of the Jialu; both are narrow and silt-choked. To reduce the Yellow River's load would require extensive dredging at enormous cost—not work that could be finished at once. At Lanyang, Yifeng, and Gaojiazhai, however, the river runs in sharp bends; dredging a straighter course to draw the current north would allow the channel to run freely. The Emperor agreed. In the autumn of the fifty-first year breaches opened at Sijiazhuang and Yandun in Taoyuan; both were sealed in October. The following summer Suizhou failed again; the breach was closed in October. In the twelfth month the Shanxi section of the river ran clear for twenty days—a stretch of one thousand three hundred li from Yongning downstream. In the summer of the fifty-fourth year a breach opened at Zhoujialou in Suining and was sealed in October. In the fifty-ninth year a breach opened at Qujiazhuang north of Feng County and was soon sealed.

嘉慶元年六月，決豐汛六堡，刷開運河余家莊堤，水由豐、沛北注山東金鄉、魚台，漾入昭陽、微山各湖，穿入運河，漫溢兩岸，江蘇山陽、清河多被淹。南河總督蘭錫第導水入藺家山壩，引河由荊山橋分達宿遷諸湖，又啟放宿遷十家河竹絡壩、桃源顧家莊堤，泄水仍入河下注，並於漫口西南挑挖舊河，引溜東趨入正河，繪圖以聞。上令取直向南而東，展寬開挖，俾溜勢直注正河，較為得力。命兩江總督蘇凌阿、山東布政使康基田會勘籌辦。十一月，復因凌汛蟄塌壩身二十餘丈，時蘇凌阿按事江西，改命東河總督李奉翰赴工會辦。明年二月塞，加奉翰太子太保，調督兩江，兼管南河事。是年七月，河溢曹汛二十五堡。

In the sixth month of the first year of Jiaqing the levee failed at Feng's Six Forts, scouring open the Yujiazhuang embankment on the Grand Canal. Water from Feng and Pei counties poured north into Jinxiang and Yutai in Shandong, spread into Zhaoyang and Weishan lakes, broke into the Grand Canal, and flooded both banks—inundating much of Shanyang and Qinghe in Jiangsu. Southern River Governor-General Lan Xidi channeled the water into Linjiashan Dam and through a diversion at Jingshan Bridge toward the lakes around Suqian. He also opened the bamboo-net dam at Shijiahe in Suqian and the levee at Gujiazhuang in Taoyuan to release water back into the river, dredged the old channel southwest of the overflow point to divert the current east into the main course, and submitted a map with his report. The Emperor ordered the channel widened and cut straight south then east so the current would drive directly into the main river—a more effective course. Two Jiangs Governor-General Su Ling'a and Shandong Provincial Administer Kang Jitian were ordered to survey the site jointly and plan the work. In the eleventh month the ice-flood season caused another twenty zhang of the dam to subside and collapse. Su Ling'a was away on business in Jiangxi, so Eastern River Governor-General Li Fenghan was sent to the site instead. The breach was sealed the following February. Li Fenghan was promoted to Grand Guardian of the Heir Apparent, appointed governor of the Two Jiangs, and given concurrent charge of Southern River affairs. That July the river overflowed at Cao's Twenty-five Forts.

三年春，壩工再蟄，奉翰自劾，遣大學士劉墉、尚書慶桂履勘，並責問奉翰等因循。墉等言漫口已跌成塘，眴屆凌汛，請展至秋後興工。八月，溢睢州，水入洪澤湖。上游水勢既分，曹工遂以十月塞。明年正月，睢工亦塞。三月，以河南布政使吳璥署東河總督。璥言：「豫東兩岸堤工丈尺加增，而淤墊如故，病在豐、曹、睢疊經漫溢，雖塞後順軌安瀾，然引河不能寬暢，且徐城河狹，旁泄過多，遂成中梗。去淤之法，惟在束水攻沙，以堤束水。聞江南河臣康基田培築堤工，極為認真，應令酌看堤埽情形，守護閘壩，宣洩有度，自可日見深通。」上命與基田商辦。八月，決碭汛邵家壩。十二月，已塞復滲漏，又料船不戒，延燒殆盡，基田奪職留工，調璥督南河，以河南布政使王秉韜為東河總督，移東河料物迅濟南河。

In the spring of the third year the dam subsided again. Li Fenghan submitted a self-impeachment. Grand Secretary Liu Yong and Minister Qing Gui were sent to inspect on site, and Fenghan and his staff were rebuked for delay. Liu Yong and his colleagues reported that the overflow had already eroded into a deep pool and the ice-flood season was imminent; they asked to defer construction until after autumn. In the eighth month Suizhou flooded and water poured into Hongze Lake. Once upstream pressure eased, the Cao breach was sealed in October. The Suizhou breach was closed the following January. In the third month Henan Provincial Administer Wu Jing was appointed acting Eastern River Governor-General. Wu Jing reported: "Levees on both banks in eastern Henan have been raised again and again, yet siltation persists. The root of the trouble is repeated flooding at Feng, Cao, and Su—though the river runs quietly after each repair, the diversion channels cannot be kept wide and clear, and the channel at Xucheng is so narrow that too much water escapes sideways, creating a blockage in the middle. The way to clear silt is to confine the water so it scours the channel—that is, to use the levees to harness the current. I understand that Kang Jitian, the Jiangnan river officer, has been rebuilding levees with great diligence. He should be directed to review the levees and fascines, maintain the sluices and dams, and regulate discharge so the channel grows deeper day by day. The Emperor ordered Wu Jing to consult with Kang Jitian on the matter. In the eighth month a breach opened at Shaojiaba in the Dang flood section. In the twelfth month the sealed breach began leaking again, and a fire from careless handling of materiel boats destroyed nearly all the supplies. Kang Jitian was stripped of rank but kept on the works; Wu Jing was transferred to head the Southern River; Wang Bingtao, Henan provincial administer, became Eastern River Governor-General; and Eastern River supplies were rushed to aid the south.

五年冬，邵家壩塞。六年九月，溢蕭南唐家灣，十一月塞。八年九月，決封丘衡家樓，大溜奔注，東北由范縣達張秋，穿運河東趨鹽河，經利津入海。直隸長垣、東平、開州均被水成災。上飭布政使瞻住撫恤，復遣鴻臚卿通恩等治賑，兵部侍郎那彥寶赴工，會同東河總督嵇承志堵築。明年二月塞。

Shaojiaba was sealed in the winter of the fifth year. In the ninth month of the sixth year Tangjiawan south of Xiao overflowed; it was sealed in November. In the ninth month of the eighth year a breach at Hengjialou in Fengqiu sent the main current racing northeast through Fan County to Zhangqiu, across the Grand Canal and east into the Salt River, reaching the sea at Lijin. Changyuan in Zhili, Dongping, and Kaizhou were all stricken by flood. The Emperor ordered Provincial Administer Zhan Zhu to oversee relief, dispatched Honglu Secretary Tong En and others to manage aid, and sent Vice Minister of War Nayinbao to the works to join Eastern River Governor-General Ji Chengzhi in closing the breach. The breach was sealed the following February.

十年閏六月，兩江總督鐵保言：「河防之病，有謂海口不利者，有謂洪湖淤墊者，有謂河身高仰者。此三說皆可勿論。惟宜專力於清口，大修各閘壩，借湖水刷沙而河治。湖水有路入黃，不虞壅滯，而湖亦治。」上嘉其言明晰扼要。「至謂清水敵黃，所爭在高下不在深淺，所論固是，但湖不深，焉能多蓄？是必蓄深然後力能敵黃。俟大汛後，會商南河總督徐端，迅將高堰五壩，及各閘壩支河，酌量施工。」時有議由王營減壩改河經六塘河入海者，鐵保偕南河總督戴均元上言：「新河堤長四百里，中段漫水甚廣，急難施工，必須二三年之久，約費三四百萬。堵築減壩，不過二三月，費只二百餘萬。且舊河有故道可尋，施工較易。」上從之。十一年四月，兵部侍郎吳璥再督東河。六月，復置南副總河，降徐端為之。七月，決宿遷周家樓。八月，決郭家房。先後塞之。

In the intercalary sixth month of the tenth year Two Jiangs Governor-General Tie Bao memorialized: "Commentators on river defense cite three ills—that the estuary is unfavorable, that Hongze Lake is choked with silt, and that the riverbed sits too high. All three theories may be set aside. Efforts should focus on Qingkou: repair the sluices and dams and use lake water to scour silt—that is how the river will be brought under control. If the lake has a clear path into the Yellow River, neither river nor lake need fear stagnation—and both will be restored. The Emperor praised the memorial for its clarity and precision. As for the doctrine that clear water counters the Yellow River—the dispute turns on elevation, not depth. That point is well taken. But if the lake is not deep, how can it hold enough water? It must be filled deep before it can have force enough to hold the Yellow River in check. After the great flood season, consult with Southern River Governor-General Xu Duan and promptly undertake measured work on the five Gaoyan dams and all sluice and branch-channel works. About that time some proposed rerouting the river through the Wangying flood-reduction dam and the Liutang River to the sea. Tie Bao and Southern River Governor-General Dai Junyuan memorialized: "The new levees would stretch four hundred li, the middle reach is broad flood country, and urgent construction would be impossible—it would take two or three years and cost three to four million taels. Sealing the flood-reduction dam would take only two or three months at a cost of just over two million taels. Moreover the old channel still has a traceable former course, which would make the work comparatively straightforward. The Emperor agreed. In the fourth month of the eleventh year Wu Jing, vice minister of war, was again appointed to direct the Eastern River. In the sixth month the Southern River vice commissionership was restored and Xu Duan was demoted to fill it. In the seventh month a breach opened at Zhoujialou in Suqian. In the eighth month a breach opened at Guojiafang. Both were sealed in turn.

十二年六月，漫山、安馬港口、張家莊，分流由灌口入海，旋塞。七月，決雲梯關外陳家浦，分流強半由五辛港入射陽湖注海。十三年二月，陳家浦塞。鐵保等請復毛城鋪石壩、王營減壩，培兩岸大堤，接築雲梯關外長堤，及培高堰、山盱堤后土坡。遣大學士長麟等馳勘。太僕寺卿莫瞻菉言：「河入江南，惟資淮以為抵禦。淮萃七十二河之水匯於洪澤，以堰、盱石堤五壩束之，令出清口匯黃入海，此即束水攻沙之道。今治南河，宜先治清口，保守五壩。五壩不輕啟泄，則湖水可並力刷黃。黃不倒灌，運河自可疏通。今河臣請接築雲梯關外長堤二百餘里，則於坐灣取直處，必須添築埽段以為防護。既設修防，必添建廳營，多設官兵。是徒多糜費之煩，未必收束刷之效。至謂修復毛城滾壩，挑挖洪、濉，為減黃流異漲，以保徐城則可，若恃此助清濟運則不可。自黃水入湖淤停，水勢奔注，堰、盱五壩且難防守，又何能使之暢出清口？故加培五壩，使湖水暢出，悉力敵黃，順流直下，即可淘刷河身以入海。」御史徐亮言：「鐵保等條陳修防各事，惟於原議高堰石坦坡，未曾籌及蓄清刷黃，專在固守高堰，實得全河關鍵，以柔制剛，其法最善。風浪衝擊，至坡則平。然全堰俱得坦坡外護，則五壩可永閉不開，清水可全力刷黃，淮陽可長登袵席，此萬世永圖而目前急務也。海口，尾閭也。清口，咽喉也。高堰則心腹也。要害之地，宜先著力。」敬亦以為言。長麟等覆稱：「毛城壩易致衝決，應無庸議。王營減霸積水太深，難以施工。請改建滾壩於其西，並添築石壩。至碎石坦坡，工段綿長，時難猝辦，先築土坡。」餘如鐵保言。均元病免，端復督南河。

In the sixth month of the twelfth year the current split at Manshan, Anmagangkou, and Zhangjiazhuang and reached the sea through Guankou before the breaches were soon sealed. In the seventh month a breach opened at Chenjiapu outside Yuntiguan; more than half the diverted current poured through Wuxingang into Sheyang Lake on its way to the sea. Chenjiapu was sealed in the second month of the thirteenth year. Tie Bao and his colleagues proposed restoring the stone dam at Maochengpu and the Wangying flood-reduction dam, raising the main levees on both banks, extending the long embankment beyond Yuntiguan, and building up earthen slopes behind the Gaoyan and Shanxu dikes. Grand Secretary Chang Lin and others were sent to inspect the site. Minister of the Court of the Imperial Stud Mo Zhanlu argued: "Once the river enters Jiangnan, the Huai alone serves as its defense. The Huai collects the waters of seventy-two rivers in Hongze Lake; the five dams on the Gaoyan and Xuyi stone embankments confine it and send it out at Qingkou to meet the Yellow River and reach the sea—that is the method of harnessing water to scour silt. To govern the Southern River today, Qingkou must come first and the five dams must be held secure. If the five dams are not opened lightly for discharge, the lake can combine its force to scour the Yellow River. If the Yellow River no longer backs up, the Grand Canal will clear naturally. The river officials now propose extending the long levee beyond Yuntiguan for more than two hundred li; wherever a bend is cut straight, fascine revetments would have to be added for protection. Once such maintenance works are in place, new bureau offices and camps must follow, along with more garrison troops. That would only multiply waste without necessarily achieving the confining and scouring effect sought. Restoring the rolling dam at Maocheng and dredging the Hong and Sui channels to bleed off unusual Yellow River surges and protect Xuzhou is acceptable; relying on them to feed clear water into the transport route is not. Once Yellow River water entered the lake and settled as silt, the current rushes in full force; even the five Gaoyan and Xuyi dams are hard to hold—how could it be made to run freely out at Qingkou? The five dams should therefore be raised further so lake water can run out freely, meet the Yellow River at full strength, and scour the channel straight to the sea. Censor Xu Liang submitted: "Among Tie Bao's various repair proposals, only the stone slope at Gaoyan originally discussed did not yet address storing clear water to scour the Yellow River. To concentrate on holding Gaoyan firm truly seizes the key to the whole river—using softness to control hardness—and is the best method. Wind and waves strike, but when they reach the slope they flatten. If the whole embankment is shielded by stone slopes, the five dams can stay closed permanently, clear water can scour the Yellow River at full force, and Huaiyang can long live in peace—a plan for the ages and the urgent task of the day. The estuary is the tail outlet. Qingkou is the throat. Gaoyan is the heart. At such critical points effort must come first. Others at court also respectfully submitted similar views. Chang Lin and his colleagues replied: "The Maocheng dam is prone to breach and need not be discussed. At Wangying the flood-reduction dam site holds water too deep for easy construction. They proposed rebuilding the rolling dam to the west and adding a stone dam. The stone slope sections are long and cannot be finished at once; earthen slopes should be built first. On the remaining points they followed Tie Bao's proposals. Dai Junyuan was dismissed on grounds of illness, and Xu Duan again directed the Southern River.

初，陳家浦漫溢，由射陽湖旁趨入海。鐵保等以挑河費鉅，徑由射陽湖入海，較正河為近，因有改河道之議。至是，命璥等履勘。璥等言：「前明及康熙間所有灌河入海之路，覆轍俱在。現北潮河匯流馬港口、張家莊漫水尚在，壅積可見。去路不暢，又不能刷出河槽，此外更無可另闢海口之路。仍請修復故道，接築雲梯關外大堤，束水東注。」上如其言。是年六月，決堂子對岸千根棋桿及荷花塘，掣通臨湖磚百餘丈，堂子對岸及千根棋桿隨塞，荷花塘既堵復蟄。端再降副總河，以璥總南河。明年正月塞。是年冬，築高堰碎石坦坡。十五年八月，端復督南河，省副總河。十一月，大風激浪，決山盱屬仁、義、智三壩磚石堤三千餘丈，及高堰屬磚石堤千七百餘丈。端啟高郵車邏大壩及下游歸江各閘壩，並先堵仁、智壩以泄水勢。時璥養病家居，上垂詢辦法。璥言義壩應一律堵築，高堰石工尤須於明年大汛前修竣。上嘉所論切要。未幾，仁、義、智三壩及馬港俱塞，河歸正道入海。

When Chenjiapu first overflowed, the current ran alongside Sheyang Lake toward the sea. Tie Bao and his colleagues, finding channel dredging too costly, argued that entering the sea through Sheyang Lake was closer than the main river—and so the proposal to change the river course arose. Wu Jing and his colleagues were ordered to survey the site on the ground. Wu Jing and his colleagues reported: "Every route to the sea via the Guan River under the Ming and in the Kangxi reign ended in failure—the precedents are all before us. At present the north Chaoyang River converges at Magangkou and Zhangjiazhuang, where standing overflow water and visible silting remain. The outflow is not free and no channel can be scoured out; beyond this there is no other way to open a new estuary. They still proposed restoring the old course and extending the great levee beyond Yuntiguan to confine the water flowing east. The Emperor agreed. In the sixth month that year breaches opened at Qiangen Qigan on the Tangzi opposite bank and at Hehuatang, dragging through more than a hundred zhang of lakeside brickwork. The Tangzi site and Qiangen Qigan were soon sealed, but Hehuatang, once closed, subsided again. Xu Duan was again demoted to vice commissioner, and Wu Jing was placed in overall charge of the Southern River. The breach was sealed the following February. That winter the stone slope at Gaoyan was built. In the eighth month of the fifteenth year Xu Duan again directed the Southern River and the vice commissionership was abolished. In the eleventh month fierce wind and waves breached more than three thousand zhang of brick and stone dike at the Ren, Yi, and Zhi dams under Shanxu and more than seventeen hundred zhang of brick and stone dike under Gaoyan. Xu Duan opened the Cheluo great dam at Gaoyou and the downstream sluices returning water to the Yangtze, and first closed the Ren and Zhi dams to release pressure. Wu Jing was then convalescing at home, and the Emperor personally asked his advice. Wu Jing replied that the Yi dam should be closed like the others and that the Gaoyan stone works in particular must be finished before the great flood season the following year. The Emperor praised the advice as precisely to the point. Before long the Ren, Yi, and Zhi dams and Magang were all sealed, and the river returned to its proper course to the sea.

明年四月，馬港復決。五月，王營減壩蟄陷。七月，決邳北綿拐山及蕭南李家樓。十二月，王營減壩塞。十七年二月，李家樓亦塞。十八年九月，決睢州及睢南薛家樓、桃北丁家莊，褫東河總督李亨特職，以均元代之。明年正月，均元內召，起璥再督東河，董理睢工。二十年二月塞。二十三年六月，溢虞城。二十四年七月，溢儀封及蘭陽，再溢祥符、陳留、中牟，奪葉觀潮職，以李鴻賓督東河。璥時為刑部尚書，偕往會籌。未幾，陳留、祥符、中牟俱塞，而武陟縷堤決，觀潮連堵溝槽五。又決馬營壩，奪溜東趨，穿運注大清河，分二道入海。儀封缺口尋涸。上命枷示觀潮河干。均元以大學士偕侍郎那彥寶履勘。那彥寶留督馬營壩工。久之，壩基不定，鴻賓被斥責，遂以不諳河務辭。上怒，奪其職，觀潮復督東河。二十五年三月，馬營口塞，加河神金龍四大王、黃大王、硃大王封號。是月儀封又漫塌，削觀潮及豫撫琦善職。宣宗立，仍命璥及那彥寶赴工會辦，十二月塞。

The following April Magang failed again. In the fifth month the Wangying flood-reduction dam subsided. In the seventh month breaches opened at Mianguaishan north of Pi County and Lijialou south of Xiao County. The Wangying flood-reduction dam was sealed in the twelfth month. Lijialou was sealed in the second month of the seventeenth year. In the ninth month of the eighteenth year breaches opened at Suizhou and at Xuejialou south of Sui and Dingjiazhuang north of Tao; Eastern River Governor-General Li Hengte was stripped of rank and replaced by Dai Junyuan. The following January Dai Junyuan was recalled to the capital, Wu Jing was again appointed Eastern River director, and put in charge of the Suizhou repairs. The breach was sealed in the second month of the twentieth year. Yucheng flooded in the sixth month of the twenty-third year. In the seventh month of the twenty-fourth year the river overflowed at Yifeng and Lanyang, then again at Xiangfu, Chenliu, and Zhongmou; Ye Guanchao was stripped of rank and Li Hongbin was appointed Eastern River director. Wu Jing was then minister of justice and went to consult jointly. Before long Chenliu, Xiangfu, and Zhongmou were all sealed, but the thread dike at Wuzhi gave way; Guanchao closed five channel troughs in succession. Maying Dam also failed; the main current was diverted east, crossed the Grand Canal into the Daqing River, and split into two routes to the sea. The gap at Yifeng soon dried up. The Emperor ordered Guanchao paraded in the cangue at the river works as a warning. Dai Junyuan, as grand secretary, surveyed on site together with Vice Minister Nayinbao. Nayinbao remained to supervise the Maying Dam repairs. After a long time the dam foundation still would not hold; Hongbin was reprimanded and resigned on grounds that he did not understand river affairs. The Emperor was enraged, stripped Hongbin of rank, and Guanchao again directed the Eastern River. In the third month of the twenty-fifth year Maying mouth was sealed, and enhanced titles were granted to the river deities Jinlong Sida Wang, Huang Dawang, and Zhu Dawang. That month Yifeng eroded and collapsed again; Guanchao and Henan Governor Qishan were both stripped of rank. When Emperor Xuanzong acceded, Wu Jing and Nayinbao were again ordered to the works jointly, and the breach was sealed in the twelfth month.

道光元年，禮部右侍郎吳烜言：「據御史王雲錦函稱，去冬回籍過河，審視原武、陽武一帶，堤高如嶺，堤內甚卑。向來堤高於灘約丈八尺，自馬營壩漫決，灘淤，堤高於灘不過八九尺。若不急於增堤，恐至夏盛漲，不免有出堤之患。」上命河督張文浩偕豫撫姚祖同履勘。三年，江督孫玉庭。河督黎世序加培南河兩岸大堤，令高出盛漲水痕四五尺，除有工及險要處堤頂另估加寬，餘悉以丈五尺及二丈為度。五月工竣。四年十一月，大風，決高堰十三堡，山盱周橋之息浪菴壞石堤萬一千餘丈，奪文浩職，以嚴烺督南河，遣尚書文孚、汪廷珍馳勘。侍講學士潘錫恩言：「蓄清敵黃，相傳成法。大汛將至，則急堵御黃壩，使黃水全力東趨。今文浩遲堵此壩，致黃河倒灌，釀成如此巨患。且欲籌減泄，當在下游。乃輒開祥符閘，減黃入湖。壩口既灌於下，閘口復灌於上，黃無出路，湖墊極高，為患不可勝言。」尋文孚等亦以為言。文浩遣戍。玉庭褫職留任。十二月，十三堡、息浪菴均塞。

In the first year of Daoguang, Minister of Rites Wu Xuan reported: "Censor Wang Yunjin writes that last winter, returning home, he crossed the river and inspected the Yuanyang and Yangwu stretch—the levees stand high as ridges while the ground within is very low. Formerly the levees stood about one zhang eight chi above the floodplain; since Maying Dam overflowed the plain has silted up, and the levees now stand only eight or nine chi above it. Unless the levees are raised urgently, I fear that when the summer flood peaks the river will inevitably top them. The Emperor ordered River Director Zhang Wenhao and Henan Governor Yao Zutong to survey on site. In the third year Sun Yuting served as Jiangsu governor. River Director Li Shixu raised the great levees on both banks of the Southern River four or five chi above the high-water mark; except where existing works and danger points required separate widening estimates for the crest, the rest were built to one zhang five chi and two zhang. The work was completed in the fifth month. In the eleventh month of the fourth year a great wind breached Gaoyan Thirteen Forts and destroyed more than eleven thousand zhang of stone dike at the Xilang'an in Zhouqiao, Shanxu. Zhang Wenhao was stripped of rank, Yan Lang was appointed Southern River director, and Ministers Wen Fu and Wang Tingzhen were sent to inspect. Hanlin Academy reader Pan Xien argued: "Storing clear water to counter the Yellow River is a transmitted settled method. When the great flood season approaches, the Yellow-blocking dam must be closed at once so the Yellow River can drive east at full force. Wenhao delayed closing this dam, causing the Yellow River to back up and producing so great a disaster. Moreover, if flood discharge is to be planned, it should be downstream. Yet he opened Xiangfu Sluice and diverted Yellow River water into the lake. The dam mouth flooded from below and the sluice from above—Yellow River water had no outlet, the lake silted to an extreme height, and the harm is beyond words. Before long Wen Fu and others submitted similar views. Zhang Wenhao was sent into exile. Sun Yuting was stripped of rank but kept in office. In the twelfth month Thirteen Forts and Xilang'an were both sealed.

五年十月，東河總督張井言：「自來當伏秋大汛，河員皆倉皇奔走，救護不遑。及至水落，則以現在可保無虞，不復求疏刷河身之策，漸至清水不能暢出，河底日高。堤身遞增，城郭居民，盡在水底之下。惟仗歲積金錢，抬河於最高之處。」上嘉所言切中時弊。初，琦善等有改移海口以減黃，拋護石坡以蓄清之議。至是，井言灌河海口屢改屢決，自不可輕易更張，即碎石坦坡，亦有議及流弊者。尤不可不從長計議。是月增培河南十三廳、山東漕河、糧河二廳堤堰壩戧各工，皆從井請也。

In the tenth month of the fifth year Eastern River Governor-General Zhang Jing reported: "From of old, during the great summer and autumn flood seasons river officials rush about in alarm with no time to spare. But when the water falls they decide the present situation is secure and no longer seek policies to dredge and scour the channel—until gradually clear water cannot run freely and the riverbed rises day by day. The levees are raised again and again while towns and their people sink ever deeper beneath the waterline. They rely year after year on ever-growing sums of money simply to hold the river at its highest points. The emperor praised Zhang Jing's memorial for cutting straight to the root of the problem. Earlier Qishan and others had proposed relocating the estuary to reduce the Yellow River's force and building stone revetments to hold back clear water. At this point Zhang Jing argued that the Guan River estuary had been moved repeatedly only to breach repeatedly and could not be changed again on a whim; even the stone-slope protection scheme, he noted, had been criticized for creating its own abuses. Above all, any change demanded careful long-term deliberation. That month additional raising and strengthening were ordered for dikes, weirs, dams, and spur embankments across Henan's thirteen river offices and Shandong's Transport and Grain Canal offices—all at Zhang Jing's request.

六年春，河復漲，命井偕琦善、烺會勘海口。琦善、烺知海口不能改，乃條上五事，皆一時補苴之計。井言：「履勘下游，河病中滿，淤灘梗塞難疏，海口無可移改，請由安東東門工下北岸別築新堤，改北堤為南堤，相距八里十里，中挑引河，導河由北傍舊河行至絲網濱入海。河水高堤內灘丈五六尺，引河挑深一丈，則水勢高下幾三丈，形勢順利。自東門工至御黃壩六十里，去路既暢，上游可落水四五尺。黃落則御壩可啟，束清壩，挑清水，外出刷黃，底淤攻盡，黃可落至丈餘。湖水蓄七八尺，已為建瓴，石工易保。」上善其策。於是烺坐堰、盱新工掣卸，降三品調署東河，而以井督南河，淮揚道潘錫恩副之，使經畫其事。而琦善以改河非策，請啟王家營減壩，將正河挑挖深通，放清水刷滌，再堵壩挽黃歸正河。已允行矣，給事中楊煊言：「嘉慶中王家營減壩開，上下游州縣俱災。如止減黃不奪溜，何必奏籌撫恤？今奏啟減壩，至預及撫血卩堵口事宜，即與從前情形無異。下壅上潰，不可不防。」事下江督、河督會議。井初議安東改河，時撓之者謂東門工埽外有舊拋碎石，正當咽喉，恐有阻遏。井謂有石處可啟除其吳工碎石千餘方，但上下掣通，亦斷不致礙全河。然議者終以為疑。及井見煊奏，復言：「嘉慶間減壩遇水後，次年黃仍倒灌，今河底淤高丈四五尺，豈如當時深通。兼以洪湖石工隱患甚多，本年二月，存水丈二尺八寸，遇風已多掣卸。秋後湖水止能蓄至三丈，冬令有耗無增，來年重運經行，必黃水止存二丈八九尺，清方高於黃一尺。若黃加高，即成倒灌。御黃壩外河底墊高，淤運淤湖，為害不小。且海州積水未消，鹽河遙堤地高，去路不暢，啟壩後河必抬高，徒深四邑之災，無補全河之病。請於減壩迤下安東門工上山安廳李工遙隄外筑北堤，斜向趨東，仍與前議改河堤工相連，增長七千餘丈，挑河至八套即入正河。李工至八套舊堤長四萬一千丈，取直築堤，僅長三萬二千餘丈，可避東門碎石之阻。河減清高，漕行自利。督臣意以開放減壩已經奏定，不得以旁觀一言輒思變計，並臚列七難駁臣所議。臣已逐條致覆。」疏入，上終以改河為創舉，從琦善議。

In the spring of the sixth year the river rose again, and Zhang Jing was ordered to join Qishan and Yan Lang in surveying the estuary. Qishan and Yan Lang, knowing the estuary could not be moved, submitted five proposals—all temporary stopgaps. Zhang Jing reported: "Surveying the lower reaches, I find the river choked with silt mid-channel—shoals block the flow and resist dredging, and the estuary cannot be moved. I propose building a new levee on the north bank below the East Gate work site at Andong, converting the north levee into a south levee with eight to ten li between them, dredging a diversion channel between them, and guiding the river north along the old course to Siwang Shore and the sea. The river stands five or six chi above the inner shoal of the levee; dredging the diversion channel one zhang deep would create nearly three zhang of head—the gradient would favor a smooth flow. From the East Gate work site to the Yellow-blocking dam, sixty li of clear outlet would let upstream levels drop four or five chi. Once the Yellow River subsides the Yellow-blocking dam could be opened, the clear-water dam closed, and clear water released to scour the Yellow River silt—eventually lowering the Yellow by more than a full zhang. With the lake holding seven or eight chi of water—the force of water pouring from a height—stone defenses would be easier to protect. The emperor approved his plan. Yan Lang was punished for the failures at Gaoyan and the new Shanxu works and demoted three ranks to acting Eastern River director, while Zhang Jing took charge of the Southern River with Huai-Yang intendant Pan Xien as his deputy to manage the project. Qishan, arguing that rerouting the river was no solution, proposed opening the Wangying flood-reduction dam, dredging the main channel deep and clear, releasing clear water to scour it, then closing the dam again to draw the Yellow River back into its proper course. After this had been approved, supervising secretary Yang Xuan memorialized: "When the Wangying flood-reduction dam was opened in the Jiaqing era, prefectures and counties up and down the river were all inundated. If the plan merely reduced the Yellow River without diverting the main current, why would you need a memorial requesting relief funds? Yet this memorial to open the flood-reduction dam already anticipates relief payments and breach closure—exactly the same as before. Blockage downstream and rupture upstream—this danger cannot be ignored. The matter was referred to the Jiangsu governor-general and the river governor for joint deliberation. When Zhang Jing first proposed rerouting the river at Andong, opponents warned that old dumped rubble outside the East Gate fascine sat squarely at the choke point and would obstruct the flow. Zhang Jing replied that the rubble could be removed—more than a thousand cubic fang of broken stone from the Wu work site—and that once the channel was connected upstream and downstream it would not block the river's flow. His critics remained unconvinced. After reading Yang Xuan's memorial, Zhang Jing responded: "During the Jiaqing era, after the flood-reduction dam was tested by floodwaters the Yellow River still backed up the following year. Today's riverbed is silting one and a half to four or five chi higher than it was then—how could opening the dam achieve the same deep clearance? Moreover, the stone works at Hongze Lake harbor many hidden defects. This February the lake held only one zhang two chi eight cun of water, yet windstorms had already caused extensive sloughing. After autumn the lake could hold at most three zhang; in winter levels would drop with no replenishment. During next year's peak transport season the Yellow River water would stand at only two zhang eight or nine chi, with clear water a mere chi above it. If the Yellow River rose further, it would back up immediately. Siltation outside the Yellow-blocking dam was raising the riverbed, choking both the transport channel and the lake—a serious harm. Moreover, Haizhou still stood under water, the Salt River's distant levee sat on high ground with no free outlet, and opening the dam would only raise river levels further—deepening flood damage in four counties without curing the river's underlying disease. He proposed instead building a north levee below the flood-reduction dam, slanting eastward outside the distant embankment at the Li work site in Shang'an Office below Andong's East Gate work—connecting it to the previously proposed rerouting levee for an additional seven thousand-plus zhang, with a channel dredged to Batou where it would rejoin the main river. The old levee from the Li work site to Batou ran forty-one thousand zhang; a straightened embankment would require only thirty-two thousand-plus zhang and would bypass the rubble at East Gate. With the Yellow River reduced and clear water high, grain transport would proceed smoothly. The governor argued that opening the flood-reduction dam had already been approved and that one bystander's objection should not prompt a change of plan, listing seven objections to Zhang Jing's proposal. I have answered each point in turn. When the memorial reached the throne, the emperor decided that rerouting the river was too radical an experiment and sided with Qishan.

十一年七月，決楊河廳十四堡及馬棚灣，十二月塞。十二年八月，決祥符。九月，桃源奸民陳瑞因河水盛漲，糾眾盜挖於家灣大堤，放淤肥田，致決口寬大，掣全溜入湖。桃南通判田銳等褫職遣戍。是月祥符塞。明年正月，於家灣塞。十五年，以栗毓美為東河總督。時原武汛串溝受水寬三百餘丈，行四十餘里，至陽武汛溝尾復入大河，又合沁河及武陟、滎澤諸灘水畢注堤下。兩汛素無工，故無稭料，堤南北皆水，不能取土築堤。毓美試用拋磚法，於受沖處拋磚成壩。六十餘壩甫成，風雨大至，支河首尾決，而壩如故。屢試皆效。遂請減稭石銀兼備磚價，令沿河民設窯燒磚，每方石可購二方磚。行之數年，省帑百三十餘萬，而工益堅。會有不便其事者，持異議。於是御史李蓴請停燒磚。上遣蓴隨尚書敬徵履勘，卒以溜深急則磚不可恃，停之。十九年，毓美復以磚工得力省費為言，乃允於北岸之馬營、滎原兩堤，南岸之祥符下汛、陳留汛，各購磚五千方備用。

In the seventh month of the eleventh year the river breached at Fourteen Forts in Yanghe Office and at Mapeng Bay; both were sealed by the twelfth month. In the eighth month of the twelfth year the river failed at Xiangfu. In the ninth month Chen Rui, a rogue of Taoyuan, took advantage of high water to organize a mob that illegally dug into the great levee at Yujiawan, letting silt out to fertilize their fields. The breach widened until the full current was diverted into the lake. Tian Rui, the south subprefect of Taoyuan, and others were stripped of rank and exiled to frontier service. Xiangfu was sealed that same month. Yujiawan was sealed in the first month of the following year. In the fifteenth year Li Yum was appointed Eastern River governor-general. At that time a linked ditch at Yuanyuan Flood Station carried a channel three hundred-plus zhang wide for more than forty li before rejoining the main river at the tail of the Yangwu Flood Station ditch, where it also received the Qin River and floodwater from the shoals of Wuzhi, Xingze, and elsewhere—all pouring under the levee. Neither station had ever had official works and so had no stock of fascine materials; with water on both sides of the levee there was no dry ground from which to dig earth for embankments. Li Yum experimented with a brick-throwing method, dumping bricks at the point of impact to form a dam. More than sixty of these dams had just been completed when a violent storm broke auxiliary channels at both ends, yet the brick dams held. Repeated trials proved equally effective. He then requested reallocating straw-and-stone funds to cover brick costs, ordering riverside communities to open kilns; for the price of one cubic fang of stone they could buy two fang of bricks. Over several years the method saved more than 1.3 million taels from the treasury while strengthening the works. When critics who found the scheme inconvenient raised objections, censor Li Chun memorialized to halt brick production. The emperor sent Li Chun with Minister Jingzheng to inspect the site, and they concluded that where the current ran deep and fast bricks could not be trusted—the practice was discontinued. In the nineteenth year Li Yum again argued that brick works were effective and economical, and permission was granted to stock five thousand fang of bricks each at the Maying and Xingyuan levees on the north bank and at the lower Xiangfu and Chenliu flood stations on the south bank.

二十一年六月，決祥符，大溜全掣，水圍省城。河督文沖請照睢工漫口，暫緩堵築。遣大學士王鼎、通政使慧成勘議。文沖又請遷省治，上命同豫撫牛鑒勘議。時河溜由歸德、陳州折入渦會淮注洪澤湖，拆展御黃、束清各壩，尚不足資宣洩，並展放禮、智、仁壩，義河亦啟放。八月，鑒言節逾白露，水勢漸落，城垣可無虞，自未便輕議遷移。鼎等言：「河流隨時變遷，自古迄無上策，然斷無決而不塞、塞而不速之理。如文沖言，俟一二年再塞，且引睢工為證。查黃水經安徽匯洪澤，宣洩不及，則高堰危，淮揚盡成巨浸。況新河所經，須更築新堤，工費均難數計。即幸而集事，而此一二年之久，數十州縣億萬生靈流離，豈堪設想。且睢工漫口與此不同。河臣所奏，斷不可行。」疏入，解文沖任，枷示河干，以硃襄繼之。

In the sixth month of the twenty-first year the river failed at Xiangfu, the full current was diverted, and floodwater surrounded the provincial capital. River governor Wen Chong proposed following the precedent of the Sui work overflow breach and temporarily deferring closure and reconstruction. Grand Secretary Wang Ding and Secretariat of Deliberative Affairs Huicheng were sent to inspect the site and deliberate. Wen Chong also proposed moving the provincial capital; the emperor ordered him and Henan Governor Niu Jian to inspect and report. The river was then running from Guide and Chenzhou into the Guo River to join the Huai and pour into Hongze Lake. The Yellow-blocking and clear-water dams were dismantled and opened, yet still could not release enough water; the Li, Zhi, and Ren dams were also opened and extended, and the Yi River outlet was opened as well. In the eighth month Niu Jian reported that White Dew had passed, water levels were falling, and the city walls were no longer in danger—relocating the capital should not be discussed lightly. Wang Ding and his colleagues argued: "The Yellow River shifts its course with the seasons; no perfect remedy has ever existed—yet there is no precedent for leaving a breach open or for delaying closure once work begins. Wen Chong proposes waiting a year or two before closing the breach, citing the Sui work as precedent. Consider that Yellow River water gathers at Hongze after passing through Anhui: if it cannot be discharged, the Gaoyan levee is endangered and all of Huai-Yang becomes a vast lake. Moreover, the new channel would require entirely new levees—the cost of construction is incalculable. Even if the project succeeded, a year or two of delay would mean tens of millions of displaced people across dozens of prefectures and counties—a catastrophe beyond imagining. Moreover, the Sui work overflow breach is not comparable to this case. The river governor's proposal was absolutely unacceptable. When the memorial reached the throne, Wen Chong was dismissed, paraded in the cangue along the riverbank, and Zhu Xiang was appointed in his place.

二十二年，祥符塞，用帑六百餘萬，加鼎太子太師。七月，決桃源十五堡、蕭家莊，溜穿運由六塘河下注。未幾，十五堡掛淤，蕭家莊口刷寬百九十餘丈，掣動大溜，正河斷流。河督麟慶意欲改道，遣尚書敬徵、廖鴻荃履勘。敬徵等言，改河有礙運道，惟有汛堵漫口，挽歸故道，俟明年軍船回空後，築壩合龍，從之。十一月，以吏部侍郎潘錫恩總督南河。二十三年，御史雷以諴言，決口無庸堵塞，請改舊為支，以通運道。下錫恩勘議。錫恩言灌口非可行河之地，北岸無可改河之理，不敢輕議更張，漕船仍由中河灌塘。上然之，更命侍郎成剛、順天府尹李德會勘。六月，決中牟，水趨硃仙鎮，歷通許、扶溝、太康入渦會淮。復遣敬徵等赴勘，以鍾祥為東河總督，鴻荃督工。旋以尚書麟魁代敬徵。二十四年正月，大風，壩工蟄動，旋東壩連失五占，麟魁等降黜有差，仍留工督辦。七月，上以頻年軍餉河工一時並集，經費支絀，意欲緩至明秋興築。鍾祥等力陳不可。十二月塞，用帑千一百九十餘萬。二十九年六月，決吳城。十月，命侍郎福濟履勘，會同堵合。

In the twenty-second year Xiangfu was sealed at a cost of more than six million taels, and Wang Ding was made Grand Preceptor of the Heir Apparent. In the seventh month the river breached at Fifteen Forts in Taoyuan and at Xiajiazhuang, cutting through the Grand Canal and running down the Liutang River. Before long Fifteen Forts silted shut while the breach at Xiajiazhuang scoured wider to more than one hundred ninety zhang, drawing off the main current until the proper channel ran dry. River governor Lin Qing favored rerouting the river and sent Ministers Jingzheng and Liao Hongquan to inspect the site. Jingzheng and his colleagues argued that rerouting would obstruct the transport route; the only course was to block the overflow breach during the flood season, draw the current back to the old channel, and wait until the grain boats had returned empty the following year before building a closure dam. The court agreed. In the eleventh month Vice Minister of Personnel Pan Xien was appointed Southern River governor-general. In the twenty-third year censor Lei Yijian argued that the breach need not be closed and proposed converting the old channel into a branch canal to serve the transport route. The proposal was referred to Pan Xien for inspection and report. Pan Xien replied that the breach was no place to run a river, that the north bank offered no feasible rerouting, and that he dared not entertain such a change—the grain boats would continue through the middle canal by the pond-filling method. The emperor accepted this view and again ordered Vice Minister Cheng Gang and Shuntian prefect Li Dehui to inspect the site. In the sixth month the river failed at Zhongmou, sending water toward Zhuxian Town and on through Tongxu, Fugou, and Taikang into the Guo River to join the Huai. Jingzheng and others were again sent to inspect the site; Zhong Xiang was appointed Eastern River governor-general and Liao Hongquan was put in charge of construction. Minister Lin Kui soon replaced Jingzheng. In the first month of the twenty-fourth year a great windstorm shifted the dam works; the east dam promptly lost five sections in succession. Lin Kui and others received varying demotions and dismissals but remained on site to supervise construction. In the seventh month the emperor, finding military pay and river works competing for funds in successive years, intended to defer construction until the following autumn. Zhong Xiang and his colleagues strongly urged that this could not be done. The breach was sealed in the twelfth month at a cost of more than 11.9 million taels. In the sixth month of the twenty-ninth year the river failed at Wucheng. In the tenth month the emperor ordered Vice Minister Fu Ji to inspect the site and oversee closure of the breach.

咸豐元年閏八月，決豐北下汛三堡，大溜全掣，正河斷流。時侍郎瑞常典試江南，命試竣便道往勘，又命福建按察使查文經馳赴會辦。三年正月，豐北三堡塞，敕建河神廟，從河督楊以增請也。五月大雨，水長溜急，豐北大壩復蟄塌三十餘丈。上責以增及承修各員加倍罰賠。

In the intercalary eighth month of the first year of Xianfeng the river breached at Third Fort in the lower Fengbei flood station, diverting the full current and leaving the main channel dry. Vice Minister Ruichang was then conducting civil examinations in Jiangnan and was ordered to inspect the breach on his return; Fujian surveillance commissioner Zha Wenjing was also dispatched to assist. In the first month of the third year Fengbei Third Fort was sealed; the emperor ordered a River God temple built at Yang Yizeng's request. In the fifth month heavy rains raised water and accelerated the current; the great Fengbei dam subsided and collapsed again across more than thirty zhang. The emperor ordered Yang Yizeng and all officials responsible for the works to pay double indemnities.

五年六月，決蘭陽銅瓦廂，奪溜由長垣、東明至張秋，穿運注大清河入海，正河斷流。上念軍務未平，餉糈不繼，若能因勢利導，使黃流通暢入海，則蘭陽決口即可暫緩堵築。事下河督李鈞察奏。鈞旋陳三事：「曰順河築埝。東西千餘里築堤，所費不貲，何敢輕議。除河近城垣不能不築堤壩以資抵禦，餘擬就漫水所及，酌定埝基，勸民接築，高不過三尺，水小藉以攔阻，水大聽其漫過。散水無力，隨漫隨淤，地面漸高，且變沙磧為沃壤矣。曰遇灣切灘。河性喜坐灣，每至漲水，遇灣則怒而橫決。惟於坐灣之對面，勸令切除灘嘴，以寬河勢，水漲即可刷直，就下愈暢，並可免兜灘衝決之虞。曰堵截支流。現在黃流漫溢，既不能築堅堤以束其流，又不能挑引河以殺其勢，宜乘冬令水弱溜平，勸民築壩斷流，再於以下溝槽跨築土格，高出數尺。漫水再入，上無來源，下無去路，冀漸淤成平陸。」東撫崇恩亦以為言。上令直隸、山東、河南各督撫妥為勸辦。

In the sixth month of the fifth year the river breached at Tongwaxiang in Lanyang, seizing the current through Changyuan and Dongming to Zhangqiu, cutting through the Grand Canal into the Daqing River and the sea, while the main channel ran dry. The emperor, mindful that the war was not yet won and grain supplies were running short, reasoned that if the Yellow River could be guided advantageously to the sea, the Lanyang breach might be left open temporarily. The matter was referred to river governor Li Jun for investigation and report. Li Jun soon submitted three proposals. The first: building embankments along the river course. Building levees for more than a thousand li east and west would cost an enormous sum—he dared not propose it lightly. Except where the river threatened city walls and levees and dams were unavoidable for defense, he proposed setting embankment foundations wherever floodwater spread, encouraging people to build them up to three chi high—enough to hold back small floods but allowed to overflow in major ones. The dispersed water would lack force; as it spread it would deposit silt, gradually raising the ground and turning sandy wastes into fertile fields. The second: when the river met a bend, cut back the shoal bars. The river by nature settles into bends; at every flood, when the current hits a bend it turns violent and breaks the banks. On the bank opposite each bend, he urged cutting away the shoal tip to widen the channel—so rising water could scour it straight, run more freely downhill, and avoid the risk of shoal deflection and sudden breach. The third: blocking off tributary channels. With the Yellow River spreading everywhere, solid levees could not bind it and diversion channels could not tame it. He proposed using the winter slack, when water was low and currents gentle, to urge people to dam off branches; below each cutoff, earthen barriers several chi high would span the channel trough. Once trapped floodwater entered again, it would have no source above and no outlet below—and might gradually silt up into level ground." Shandong governor Chong'en made the same argument. The emperor ordered the governors-general and governors of Zhili, Shandong, and Henan to promote the plan properly among the people.

十一年，御史薛書堂言：「南河自黃水改道，下游已無工可修，請省南河總督及廳員。」下廷臣議。侍郎沈兆霖言：「導河始自神禹，九河故道皆在山東，入海處在今滄州，是禹貢之河，固由東北入海。自漢王莽時河徙千乘入海，而禹之故道失。歷東漢迄隋、唐，從無變異。宋神宗時，河分南北兩派並行，北派由北清河入海。即今大清河。至元至元間，會通河成，懼河北行礙運，而北流塞。歷今五六百年，河屢北決，無不挽之使南。說者謂河一入運，必挾泥沙以入海，而運道亦淤，故順河之性，北行為宜。乾隆朝，孫嘉淦請開減河入大清河一疏，言之甚詳，足破北行礙運之疑。夫河入大清，由利津入海，正今黃河所改之道。現在張秋以東，自魚山至利津海口，皆築民堰，惟蘭儀之北、張秋之南，河自決口而出，奪趙王河及舊引河，汎濫平原，田廬久被淹浸。張秋高家林舊堰殘缺過多，工程最鉅。如東明、長垣、菏澤、鄆城，其培築較張秋為易。宜乘此時順水之性，聽其由大清河入海，諭令紳民力籌措辦，或應開減河，或應築堤堰，統於水落興工。河慶順軌，民樂力田，缺額之地丁可復，歷年之賑濟可停，就此裁去南河總督及廳員，可省歲帑數十萬，而歸德、徐、淮一帶地幾千里，均可變為沃壤，逐漸播種升科，似亦一舉而兼數善者矣。」下直督恆福、東撫文煜、豫撫慶廉、東河總督黃贊湯勘議。六月，省南河總督，及淮揚、淮海、豐北、蕭南、宿南、宿北、桃南、桃北各道廳，改置淮揚徐海兵備道，兼轄河務。

In the eleventh year, censor Xue Shutang argued: "Since the Yellow River changed course, there is no downstream work left to maintain in the Southern Rivers district. I ask that the Southern Rivers governor-general and his bureau staff be abolished." The memorial was referred to the court ministers for deliberation. Vice Minister Shen Zhaolin replied: "River control began with Yu the Great. The old courses of the Nine Rivers all lay in Shandong, entering the sea at what is now Cangzhou—that is the river of the Yugong, which naturally reached the sea through the northeast. In Wang Mang's Han the river shifted to enter the sea at Qian Cheng, and Yu's old channel was lost. From Eastern Han through Sui and Tang it never changed course again. Under Emperor Shenzong of Song the river split into parallel north and south branches; the northern branch reached the sea through the North Qing River. That is today's Daqing River. When the Huitong Canal was completed in the Zhiyuan era of Yuan, officials feared northward flow would obstruct grain transport and blocked the northern branch. For five or six hundred years since, the river has breached north again and again—and every time it was forced back south. Some argue that once the river enters the Grand Canal it carries silt to the sea and clogs the transport route as well; better, they say, to follow the river's nature and let it run north. In the Qianlong reign Sun Jiagan submitted a detailed memorial on opening a diversion channel into the Daqing River—enough, he argued, to lay to rest the fear that a northern course would ruin transport. For the river to enter the Daqing River and reach the sea through Lijin is precisely the course the Yellow River has taken today. East of Zhangqiu, from Yushan to the Lijin estuary, civilian dikes had been raised everywhere—except north of Lanyi and south of Zhangqiu, where the river still poured from the breach, seizing the Zhao Wang River and old diversion channels and drowning fields and homes that had long lain under water on the plain. The old embankment at Gaojialin in Zhangqiu was riddled with breaches—the heaviest work of all. At Dongming, Changyuan, Heze, and Yuncheng, strengthening and building would be easier than at Zhangqiu. This was the moment to follow the water's nature and let it reach the sea through the Daqing River. Gentry and commoners should be urged to raise funds—opening diversion channels where needed, building levees and dams where needed—all to begin once the water fell. With the river running smoothly, farmers would return to their fields; missing tax quotas could be restored and years of famine relief ended. Abolishing the Southern Rivers governor-general and his bureaus would save hundreds of thousands of taels a year, and thousands of square li in the Guide, Xu, and Huai region could become fertile land again, gradually replanted and restored to the tax rolls—a single stroke accomplishing several goods at once." The proposal was referred to Zhili governor Hengfu, Shandong governor Wen Yu, Henan governor Qing Lian, and Eastern River governor-general Huang Zantang for field survey and deliberation. In the sixth month the Southern Rivers governor-general was abolished, along with the Huai-Yang, Huai-Hai, Fengbei, Xiaonan, Sunan, Subei, Taonan, and Taobei bureau stations. In their place a Huai-Yang-Xu-Hai military circuit was created, with river affairs folded into its jurisdiction.

同治二年，復省蘭儀、儀睢、睢寧、商虞、曹考五廳。六月，漫上南各廳屬，水由蘭陽下注，直、東境內涸出村莊，復被淹沒。菏澤、東明、濮、范、齊河、利津等州縣，水皆逼城下。署河督譚廷襄上言：「河已北行，攔水惟恃民埝，從未議疏導，恐漸次淤墊，海口稍有扞格阻滯，事更為難。查濮、范一帶舊有金堤，前臣任東撫時，設法修築，未久復被沖缺，上游毗連直隸開州處亦有沖缺。開州不修，濮、范築亦無益。東、長之埝，開、濮之堤，須設法集貲督民修築，庶可以衛城池而保廬墓。此外既未專設河員，要在沿河地方官督率修理，並勸助裒集，以助民力之不逮。請飭下直督、東撫迅將蘭陽下游漫溢地方，揀員會同該州縣妥辦。」從之。十二月又言：「今年夏秋陰雨，來源之盛，迥異尋常。一股直下開州，一股旁趨定陶、曹、單。豫省以有堤壩，幸獲保全。直、東則無，不能不聽其汎濫。迄今半載，直隸未聞如何經畫。開州缺口，亦未興工。至山東被害尤深。或欲培築堤埝，或欲疏濬支河，議無一定。濮州金堤，亦因開未動工。不能興辦。瞬屆春汛，何以御之？臣遣運河道宗稷辰履勘，直至利津之鐵門關，測量水勢，深至六七丈，去路不為不暢，而上游仍到處旁溢，則大清河身太狹不能容納之故。如蒲台、齊東、濟陽、長清、平陰、肥城民埝缺口，寬數丈或數十丈，不下三四十處，不加修築，則來歲依然漫淹。是欲求下游永奠，必先開支渠以減漲水，而後功有可施。必將附近徒駭、馬頰二河設法疏濬，庶水有分泄，再堵各缺口，並築壩以護近水各城垣，此大清河下游之當先料理者也。至開、濮金堤及毗連菏澤之史家堤，當先堵築，並加培舊堰，擇要接修，此大清河上游之當先經畫者也。」復下直督劉長佑、東撫閻敬銘會籌。明年三月，以濮州當河沖，允敬銘請，移治舊城，並築堤捍禦。

In the second year of Tongzhi five more bureaus were abolished: Lanyi, Yisui, Suining, Shangyu, and Caokao. In the sixth month, throughout the upper-south bureaus where floodwater had spread, the current pouring down from Lanyang submerged villages in Zhili and Shandong that had only just re-emerged as the water fell. In Heze, Dongming, Pu, Fan, Qihe, Lijin, and other prefectures and counties, water pressed to the foot of the city walls. Acting river governor Tan Tingxiang memorialized: "The river has already turned north, and holding back water depends entirely on civilian embankments. No one has yet discussed dredging. I fear gradual silting—and if the estuary should meet even a slight obstruction, the problem will grow far worse. The Pu and Fan region once had Golden Dikes. When I served as Shandong governor I managed to repair them, but they were breached again before long; upstream, where the line adjoins Kaizhou in Zhili, there were breaches too. Unless Kaizhou is repaired, work at Pu and Fan will come to nothing. The embankments of Dongming and Changyuan and the dikes of Kaizhou and Puzhou must be funded and rebuilt under official supervision if cities, homes, and graves are to be protected. Since no dedicated river officials remain, local magistrates along the river must lead repairs and help raise funds wherever the people's strength falls short. I ask that the Zhili and Shandong governors be ordered at once to select officials and, together with the local prefectures and counties, manage the flooded areas downstream of Lanyang." The request was approved. In the twelfth month he memorialized again: "Autumn and summer brought unbroken rain this year, and the volume coming from upstream was unlike anything ordinary. One branch ran straight to Kaizhou; another veered toward Dingtao, Cao, and Shan. Henan, protected by dikes and dams, was fortunately spared. Zhili and Shandong had no such defenses and could only let the water spread where it would. Half a year has passed, and still no word has come of how Zhili intends to manage the crisis. No work has even begun on the breach at Kaizhou. Shandong suffered worst of all. Some wanted to raise levees and embankments, others to dredge tributary channels—and no plan was settled. Work on Puzhou's Golden Dike likewise could not begin because Kaizhou had not moved. Nothing could be undertaken. The spring flood season is almost here—how will it be met? I sent grain-transport circuit intendant Zong Jichen to inspect the line as far as Tiemen Pass at Lijin. He measured depths of six or seven zhang—the outlet was not blocked—yet upstream the water still spilled everywhere. The Daqing River channel is simply too narrow to hold it. At Putai, Qidong, Jiyang, Changqing, Pingyin, and Feicheng, civilian embankments were broken open in thirty or forty places, some several zhang wide and some several tens of zhang. Unless these are repaired, next year's flooding will be the same. To secure the lower reach for good, branch channels must first be opened to bleed off floodwater; only then can the rest of the work succeed. The nearby Tuhai and Majia rivers must be dredged by every means so water can be diverted; then each breach must be closed and dams raised to shield riverside city walls. That is the first priority on the lower Daqing River. The Golden Dikes at Kaizhou and Puzhou and the Shijia Dike near Heze should be closed and rebuilt first, with old embankments strengthened and linked at critical points. That is the first priority on the upper Daqing River." The memorial was again referred to Zhili governor Liu Changyou and Shandong governor Yan Jingming for joint planning. The following March, because Puzhou stood directly in the river's path, Yan Jingming's request was granted to move the seat back to the old city and build defensive levees.

五年七月，決上南廳胡家屯。長佑言：「溜勢趨重西北，新修金堤，概被沖刷。開州沖開支河數道，自開、滑之杜家寨至開、濮界之陳家莊，險工五段，長九千六百餘丈，均須加厚培高，方資捍禦。惟上游在豫，下游在東，非直隸一省所能辦理。應會同三省統籌全修，再行設汛，撥款備料，庶可一勞永逸。自河流改道，直隸堤工應並歸河督管轄，作豫、直、東三省河督，以專責成。」疏入，命河督蘇廷魁履勘，會同三省督撫籌議。

In the seventh month of the fifth year the river breached at Hujiatun in the Upper South bureau. Liu Changyou reported: "The current bore hard toward the northwest, and newly repaired Golden Dikes were washed away entirely. At Kaizhou several branch channels were torn open. From Dujiazhai on the Kaizhou-Hua border to Chenjiazhuang on the Kaizhou-Pu border lie five critical sections totaling more than 9,600 zhang—all must be thickened and raised before they can hold. The upstream lies in Henan and the downstream in Shandong—Zhili alone cannot manage the whole line. All three provinces should plan a full repair together, then establish flood-season posts and allocate funds and materials—only then can the work be made to last. Since the river changed course, Zhili levee works should be placed under the river governor as well, creating a single river governor for Henan, Zhili, and Shandong so responsibility is clear." When the memorial arrived, river governor Su Tingkui was ordered to inspect the site and consult with the governors-general and governors of all three provinces.

七年六月，決滎澤十堡，又漫武陟趙樊村，水勢下注潁、壽入洪澤湖。侍郎胡家玉言：「不宜專塞滎澤新口、疏蘭陽舊口，宜仿古人發卒治河成法，飭各將領督率分段挑濬舊河，一律深通，然後決上游之水，掣溜東行，庶河南之患不移於河北，治河即所以治漕。」下直督曾國籓、鄂督李瀚章、江督馬新貽、漕督張之萬，及河督，江蘇、河南、山東、安徽各巡撫妥議。國籓等言：「以今日時勢計之，河有不能驟行規復者三。蘭陽漫決已十四年，自銅瓦廂至雲梯關以下，兩岸堤長千餘里，歲久停修，堤塌河淤，今欲照舊時挑深培高，恐非數千萬金不能蕆事。且廳營久裁，兵夫星散，一一復設，仍應分儲料物，廂辦埽壩，並預籌防險之費，又歲須數百萬金。當此軍務初平，庫藏空虛，安從籌此鉅款？一也。滎澤地處上游，論形勢自應先堵滎澤，蘭工勢難並舉。使滎口掣動全黃，則蘭工可以乾涸。今滎口分溜無多，大溜仍由蘭口直注利津入海，其水面之寬，跌塘之深，施工之難，較之滎工自增數倍。滎工堵合無期，蘭工更無把握。原奏決放舊河，掣溜東行，似言之太易。且瞬交春令，興工已難。二也。漢決酸棗，再決瓠子，為發卒治河之始。元、明發丁夫供役，亦以十數萬計。現在直、東、江、豫捻氛甫靖，而土匪游勇在在須防。所留勇營，斷難盡赴河干，亦斷不敷分挑之用。若再添募數十萬丁夫，聚集沿黃數千里間，駕馭失宜，滋生事端，尤為可慮。三也。應俟國庫充盈，再議大舉。因時制宜，惟有趕堵滎工，為保全豫、皖、淮揚下游之計。」上然之。八年正月，滎澤塞。

In the sixth month of the seventh year the river breached at Tenth Fort in Xingze and flooded Zhaofan Village in Wuzhi; the water poured down through the Ying and Shou rivers into Hongze Lake. Vice Minister Hu Jiayu argued: "We should not fixate on blocking the new breach at Xingze while dredging the old mouth at Lanyang. Follow the ancient method of mobilizing troops for river work: commanders should dredge the old channel section by section until it runs deep and clear, then release the upstream water and drag the current east. Then Henan's disaster will not simply move to Hebei—and to govern the river is to govern the grain route." The proposal was referred to Zhili governor Zeng Guofan, Huguang governor Li Hanzhang, Jiangsu governor Ma Xinyi, grain-transport governor Zhang Zhiwan, the river governor, and the governors of Jiangsu, Henan, Shandong, and Anhui for deliberation. Zeng Guofan and the others replied: "Given present conditions, there are three reasons the old course cannot be restored at once. The Lanyang overflow has already lasted fourteen years. From Tongwaxiang to below Yunti Pass, levees on both banks stretch more than a thousand li, long neglected—banks collapsed and the channel silted up. To dredge deep and raise high as in former times would cost tens of millions of taels before the work could be finished. The bureau camps were abolished long ago and laborers scattered. Restoring them would mean stockpiling materials by section, preparing fascine dams, and budgeting for flood defense—millions more every year. Military affairs have only just settled and the treasury is empty. Where would such enormous sums come from? That is the first. Xingze lies upstream; by terrain logic it should be blocked first—and the Lanyang works cannot easily be pursued at the same time. If the Xingze breach could draw off the full Yellow current, the Lanyang site could be drained dry. Now the Xingze breach carries only a small share of the flow; the main current still runs straight from the Lanyang mouth to the sea at Lijin. There the channel is wider, the drop pool deeper, and the work several times harder than at Xingze. With no fixed date for closing Xingze, the Lanyang works are even less assured. The original proposal—to breach the old channel and drag the current east—sounds far too easy. Spring is almost here, and starting work is already difficult. That is the second. When the Han dynasty faced breaches at Suanzao and again at Huzi, that was the beginning of mobilizing troops for river work. Yuan and Ming conscripted corvée labor in the hundreds of thousands as well. In Zhili, Shandong, Jiangsu, and Henan the Nian rebels have only just been suppressed, and bandits and demobilized soldiers must be watched everywhere. The remaining volunteer camps could hardly all be sent to the riverbanks, nor would they suffice for sectional dredging. Recruit another few hundred thousand laborers and gather them along thousands of li of the Yellow River, and mismanagement could easily spark trouble—that is especially worrisome. That is the third. Wait until the treasury is full, then discuss a major undertaking. For the present, the only practical course is to rush closure of the Xingze breach to protect downstream Henan, Anhui, and Huai-Yang." The emperor approved. In the first month of the eighth year Xingze was sealed.

十年八月，決鄆城侯家林，東注南旺湖，又由汶上、嘉祥、濟寧之趙王、牛朗等河，直趨東南，入南陽湖。時廷魁內召，命新河督喬松年會同東撫丁寶楨勘辦。寶楨方以病在告，乃偕護撫文彬至工相度。文彬言：「河臣遠在豫省，若往返咨商，恐誤要工。一面飛咨河臣遴派掌壩，並管理正雜料廠員弁，及諳習工程之弁兵工匠，帶同器具，於年內來東，一面由臣籌購應需料物，以期應手。」上責松年剋期興工，松年言已飭原估委員並熟習工程人員赴東聽遣，並飭購備竹纜，及覓雇綑鑲船隻備提用。惟已交立春，春水瞬生，辦工殊無把握。並移書文彬主持其事。文彬不能決。寶楨力疾視事，上言；「河臣職司河道，疆臣身任地方，均責無旁貸。乃松年一概諉之地方，不知用意所在。現在已過立春，若再候其的信以定行止，恐誤要工。且此口不堵，必漫淹曹、兗、濟十餘州縣。若再向南奔注，則清、淮、里下河更形吃重。松年既立意諉卸，臣若避越俎之嫌，展轉遷延，實有萬趕不及之勢。惟有力疾銷假，親赴工次，擇日開工，俟松年所遣員弁到工，即責成該工員等一手經理，剋期完工，保全大局。應請破格保獎，以昭激勸。倘敢陽奉陰違，有心貽誤，一經驗實，應請便宜行事，即將該員弁正法工次，以為罔上殃民者戒。」上嘉其勇於任事，並諭松年當和衷共濟，不遽加責也。

In the eighth month of the tenth year the river breached at Houjialin in Yuncheng, pouring east into Nanwang Lake; it then ran southeast through the Zhao Wang and Niulang rivers in Wenshang, Jiaxiang, and Jining straight into Nanyang Lake. Tingkui was then recalled to the capital, and the new river governor Qiao Songnian was ordered to inspect the breach jointly with Shandong governor Ding Baozhen. Baozhen was on sick leave at the time; acting governor Wen Bin went with him to survey the works. Wen Bin said: "The river governor is far off in Henan. If we must consult back and forth, I fear the critical work will be delayed. Urgently ask the river governor to dispatch a chief of dam works, officers for the primary and supplementary material stores, and skilled officers, soldiers, and craftsmen with their tools—all to reach Shandong within the year. At the same time I will procure the needed materials so everything is ready when they arrive." The emperor ordered Songnian to begin work by the deadline. Songnian replied that he had already sent the original estimate commissioners and experienced engineering staff east to await orders, and had ordered bamboo cables purchased and bound bamboo boats hired for hauling. But the Beginning of Spring had already passed, and spring floods would rise in an instant—he had little confidence the work could succeed. He also wrote to Wen Bin asking him to take charge. Wen Bin could not decide. Baozhen forced himself back to duty despite his illness and memorialized: "The river governor governs the channel; the provincial governor bears local responsibility—neither can evade his duty. Yet Songnian has shifted everything onto local officials. I cannot see what he intends. The Beginning of Spring has already passed. If we wait again for his reply before deciding whether to go or stay, I fear the critical work will be lost. If this breach is not sealed, floodwaters will inevitably spread over more than ten prefectures and counties in Cao, Yan, and Ji. Should it turn south again, the burden on the Qing, Huai, and Lixiahe drainage will become far worse. Songnian has already resolved to pass the burden elsewhere. If I shrink from acting lest I be accused of overstepping, and keep putting things off, we will be too late to catch up no matter how we hurry. I can only cancel my leave despite my illness, go to the works in person, choose a day to begin, and when Songnian's officers arrive, put the work officers in sole charge so they finish on schedule and the larger situation is preserved. I ask that exceptional rewards be granted, to make encouragement plain. If anyone openly agrees but secretly defies, deliberately causing harm, once verified I ask leave to act at discretion and execute the offender on the spot at the works, as a warning to those who deceive their superiors and ruin the people." The emperor praised his willingness to take responsibility and told Songnian to cooperate in harmony, without immediately censuring him further.

十一年二月，侯家林塞，予寶楨優敘。先是同知蔣作錦條上河、運事宜，朝廷頗韙其議，下河、漕、撫臣議奏。未幾，侯家林決，松年、寶楨意見齟齬。及寶楨塞侯家林，松年上言：「作錦所陳，卓然有見，可以採取。並稱東境黃水日愈汎濫，運道日愈淤塞，宜築堤束黃，先堵霍家橋諸口，並修南北岸長堤，俾黃趨張秋以濟運。挑濬張秋迤南北淤塞，修建閘壩，以利漕行。」上以松年意在因勢利導，不為無見，令寶楨、文彬詳議，毋固執己見。旋覆稱；「目前治黃之法，不外堵銅瓦廂以復淮、徐故道，與東省築堤即由利津入海兩策。顧謂二者之中，以築堤束黃為優，而上下游均歸緩辦，臣實未見其可。自銅瓦廂至牡蠣嘴，計千三百餘里，創建南北兩堤，相距牽計，約須十里。除現在淹沒不計外，尚須棄地數千萬頃，其中居民不知幾億萬，作何安插？是有損於財賦者一也。東省沿河州縣，自二三里至七八里者不下十餘。若齊河、齊東、蒲台、利津，皆近在臨水，築堤必須遷避，是有難於建置者二也。大清河近接泰山麓，山陰水悉北注，除小清、溜瀰諸河均可自行入海，餘悉以大清河為尾閭。置堤束黃以後，水勢抬高，向所泄水之處，留閘則虞倒灌，堵遏則水無所歸，是有妨於水利者三也。東綱鹽場，坐落利津、霑化、壽光、樂安等縣，濱臨大清河兩岸。自黃由大清入海，鹽船重載，溯行於湍流，甚形阻滯，而灘地間被漫溢，產鹽日絀，海灘被黃淤遠，納潮甚難，東綱必至隳廢，私梟亦因而蜂起。是有礙於鹺綱者四也。臣寶楨身任地方，於通省大局所關，固宜直陳無隱。然使於治運漕果有把握，則京倉為根本至計，猶當權利害之輕重，而量為變通。臣等熟思審計，實未見其可恃，而深覺其可慮。似仍以堵合銅瓦廂使復淮、徐故道為正辦。」並陳四便。御史游百川亦言河、運並治，宜詳籌妥辦。疏入，廷議不能決。

In the second month of the eleventh year the Houjialin breach was sealed, and Baozhen received special commendation. Earlier, Assistant Prefect Jiang Zuojin had submitted a detailed memorial on river and transport matters; the court largely approved his proposal and ordered the river, grain transport, and provincial governors to discuss and report. Soon Houjialin breached again, and Songnian and Baozhen found themselves at odds. When Baozhen sealed Houjialin, Songnian memorialized: "What Zuojin proposed shows real insight and ought to be adopted. He also argued that Yellow River water in the east was flooding more severely every day while the transport channel silted up more every day. Levees should be built to confine the Yellow River, beginning by sealing breaches such as Huojia Bridge and repairing long levees on both banks, so the river could be directed toward Zhangqiu to aid grain transport. The silted stretches north and south of Zhangqiu should be dredged and sluices and dams built to aid grain transport." The emperor saw that Songnian meant to work with the terrain and thought his view not without merit. He ordered Baozhen and Wen Bin to discuss the matter carefully and not stubbornly cling to their own opinions. They soon submitted a reply: "At present, methods for controlling the Yellow River come down to two: sealing Tongwaxiang to restore the old Huai and Xu channel, and building levees in Shandong so the river enters the sea through Lijin. Yet to say that of the two, building levees to confine the Yellow River is the better course while treating both upstream and downstream as matters to defer—I truly do not see how that can work. From Tongwaxiang to Muli Mouth stretches more than thirteen hundred li. Building new levees on both banks would require, on average, about ten li between them. Apart from what is already submerged, tens of millions of qing of land would still have to be abandoned. How many tens of millions of people live there—where would they be resettled? This is the first harm to state revenue. In Shandong, more than ten counties and prefectures along the river stand anywhere from two or three li to seven or eight li from the water. Qihe, Qidong, Putai, and Lijin all stand close to the riverbank. Building levees there would require relocating them—this is the second difficulty of construction. The Daqing River lies near the foot of Mount Tai. Waters from the northern slopes all flow north; apart from the Xiaoqing, Liuni, and other rivers that reach the sea on their own, the rest all drain through the Daqing as their final outlet. Once levees are built to confine the Yellow River, the water level rises. At the places where water formerly drained off, keeping sluices open risks backflow, while sealing them leaves the water nowhere to go—this is the third harm to water management. Eastern-gauge salt works lie in Lijin, Zhanhua, Shouguang, Le'an, and other counties along both banks of the Daqing River. Since the Yellow River now enters the sea through the Daqing, heavily laden salt boats struggle upstream against the current. Tidal flats are intermittently flooded, salt output dwindles daily, and beaches are pushed far from the sea by Yellow silt, making it very hard to draw tide. The eastern salt monopoly would collapse, and smugglers would swarm in its place. This is the fourth obstacle to the salt monopoly. I, Baozhen, bear local responsibility, and what touches the welfare of the whole province should be stated plainly without concealment. Yet if controlling the river truly offered a sure way to restore grain transport, the capital granaries would remain the fundamental concern, and one would still have to weigh lesser and greater harms and adapt accordingly. We have considered this carefully and see nothing reliable in it, yet deeply feel how troubling it is. The proper course still seems to be sealing Tongwaxiang and restoring the old Huai and Xu channel." They also set forth four advantages. Censor You Baichuan also argued that river and transport should be managed together and ought to be carefully planned and properly carried out. When the memorial was submitted, court discussion could not reach a decision.

下直督李鴻章。鴻章因遣員周曆齊、豫、徐、海，訪察測量，期得要領。十二年六月，上言：「治河之策，原不外恭親王等『審地勢，識水性，酌工程，權利害』四語，而尤以水勢順逆為要。現在銅瓦廂決口寬約十里，跌塘過深，水涸時猶逾一二丈。舊河身高，決口以下，水面二三丈不等。如欲挽河復故，必挑深引河三丈餘，方能吸溜東趨。查乾隆間蘭陽青龍岡之役，費帑至二千餘萬。阿桂言引河深至丈六尺，人力無可再施，今豈能挑深至三丈餘乎？十里口門進佔合龍，亦屬創見。國初以來，黃河決口寬不過三四百丈，且屢堵屢潰，常閱數年而不成。今豈能合龍而保固乎？且由蘭陽下抵淮、徐之舊河，身高於平地三四丈。年來避水之民，移住其中，村落漸多，禾苗無際。若挽地中三丈之水，跨行於地上三丈之河，其停淤待潰、危險莫保情形，有目者無不知之。歲久堤乾，即加修治，必有受病不易見之處。萬一上游放溜，下游旋決，收拾更難。議者或以河北行則穿運，為運道計，終不能不強之使南以會清口。臣查嘉慶以後清口淤墊，夏令黃高於清，已不能啟壩送運。道光以後，御黃壩竟至終歲不啟，遂改用灌塘之法，自黃浦泄黃入湖。湖身頓高，運河水少，灌塘又不便，遂改行海運。今即能復故道，亦不能驟復河運，非河一南行，即可僥倖無事。此淮、徐故道勢難挽復，且於漕運無益之實在情形也。至河臣所請就東境束黃濟運一節，查清口淤墊，即借黃濟運之病。今張秋運河寬僅數丈，兩岸廢土如山，若引重濁之黃，以閘壩節宣用之，水勢抬高，其淤倍速。人力幾何，安能挑此日進之沙？且所挑之沙，仍堆積於積年廢土之上，兩淋風盪，河底日高，閘亦壅塞，久之黃必難引。明弘治中，荊龍口，銅瓦廂屢次大決，皆因引黃濟張秋之運，遂致導隙濫觴。臨清地勢低於張秋數丈，而必以後無掣溜奪河之害，臣亦不敢信也。至霍家橋堵口築隄，工尤不易。該處本非決口、乃大溜經行之地，兩頭無岸，一望浮沙，並無真土可取。勉強堆築，節節逼溜下注，恐浮沙易塌，實足攖河之怒，而所耗實多。一遭潰決，水仍別穿運道，而不專會張秋，豈非全功盡棄？至作錦擬導衛濟運，原因張秋以北無清水灌運，故為此議。查元村集迤南有黃河故道，地多積沙，施工不易。且以全淮之水不能敵黃，尚致倒灌停淤，豈一清淺之衛，遂能御黃濟運耶？其意蓋襲取山東諸水濟運之法。不知泰山之陽，水皆西流，因勢利導，十六州縣百八十泉之水，源旺派多，自足濟運。衛水來源，甚弱最順，今必屈曲使之南行，勢多不便。此借黃濟運及築堤束水均無把握，與導衛濟運之實在情形也。惟河既不能挽復故道，則東境財賦有傷，水利有礙，城池難以移置，鹽場間被漫淹，如寶楨所陳，誠屬可慮。臣查大清河原寬不過十餘丈，今已刷寬半里餘，冬春水涸，尚深二三丈，岸高水面又二三丈，是不汛時河槽能容五六丈，奔騰迅疾，水行地中，此人力莫可挽回之事，亦祀禱以求而不可得之事。目下北岸自齊河至利津，南岸齊東、蒲台，皆接築民埝，雖高僅丈許，詢之土人，遇盛漲出槽不過數尺，尚可抵禦。岱陰、綉江諸河，亦經擇耍築堤，汛至則漲，汛過則消，受災不重。至齊河、濟陽、齊東、蒲台、利津各城，近臨河岸十九，年來幸防守無患，以後相勢設施。若驟議遷徙，經費無籌，民情難喻，無此辦法。東省鹽場在海口者，雖受黃淤產鹽不旺，經撫臣南運膠濟之鹽時為接濟，引地無虞淡食，惟價值稍昂耳。河在東省固不能無害，但得設法維持，尚不至為大患。昔乾隆中，銅山決口不能成功，孫嘉淦曾有分河入大清之疏。其後蘭陽大工屢敗垂成，嵇璜又有改河大清之請。此外裘曰修、錢大昕、胡宗緒、孫星衍、魏源諸臣議者更多。其時河未北流，尚欲挽之使北。今河自北流，乃欲挽使南流，豈非拂逆水性？大抵南河堵築一次，通牽約七八百萬，歲修約七百餘萬，實為無底之壑。今河北徙，近二十年未有大變，亦未多費巨款，比之往代，已屬幸事。且環拱神京，尤得形勝。自銅瓦廂東決，粵、捻諸逆竄擾曹、濟，幾無虛日，未能過河一步，而北岸防守有所憑依，更為畿輔百世之利。此兩相比較，河在東雖不亟治而後患稍輕，河回南即能大治而後患甚重之實在情形也。近世治河兼言治運，遂致兩難，卒無長策。臣愚以為天庾正賦，以蘇、浙為大宗，國家治安之道，尤以海防為重。今沿海洋舶駢集，為千古創局，已不能閉關自治。正不妨借海運轉輸之便，逐漸推廣，以擴商路而實軍儲。蘇、浙漕糧，現既統由海運，臣前招致華商購造輪船搭運，漸有成效，由海船解津，較為便速。至海道雖不暢通，河務未可全廢，此時治河之法，不外古人『因水所在，增立堤防』一語。查北岸張秋以上，有古大金堤可恃以為固，張秋以下，岸高水深，應由東撫隨時飭將民埝保護加培。至侯家林上下民埝應仿照官堤辦法，一律加高培厚，更為久遠之計。又銅瓦廂決口，水勢日向東坍刷，久必汎濫南趨。請飭松年察看形勢，量築堤埝，與曹州之堤相接，俾資周防而期順軌。至南河故道千餘里，居民占種豐收，並請查明升科，以免私墾爭奪之患。」疏入，議乃定。

The matter was referred to Li Hongzhang, governor-general of Zhili. Hongzhang sent officers to tour Shandong, Henan, northern Jiangsu, and the coast, to investigate and survey the terrain in hopes of grasping the essentials. In the sixth month of the twelfth year he memorialized: "The strategy for controlling the river has never gone beyond the four phrases of Prince Gong and others—'examine terrain, know the water's nature, measure the works, weigh harm and benefit'—and above all the direction of the current matters. At present the Tongwaxiang breach is about ten li wide. The scour pool is excessively deep—even at low water it still exceeds one or two zhang. The old channel bed is high; below the breach the water surface varies by two or three zhang. To turn the river back to its old course, a diversion channel more than three zhang deep would have to be dredged before the current could be drawn eastward. The Lanyang Qinglong Ridge project in the Qianlong reign cost the treasury more than twenty million taels. Agui said that when the diversion channel reached one zhang six chi deep, human labor could go no further—how can we now dredge to more than three zhang? Closing a ten-li breach by advancing and joining the ends would also be unprecedented. Since the founding of the dynasty, Yellow River breaches have been no wider than three or four hundred zhang, and even those were blocked and breached again and again, often taking years without completion. How can we now close the breach and make it hold? Moreover, from Lanyang down to the old Huai and Xu channel, the riverbed stands three or four zhang above the surrounding plain. In recent years people fleeing the water have moved into the old channel bed; villages grow more numerous and crops stretch without end. To channel three zhang of water below ground across a three-zhang-high river above ground—the siltation, the waiting to burst, the impossibility of securing it—anyone with eyes can see it. Years later, as the levees dry, even with repairs there will surely be hidden weaknesses not easily seen. If the upstream releases the current and the downstream breaks at once, recovery will be even harder. Some argue that if the river runs north of the canal it will cut through the transport route, and that for the canal's sake it must ultimately be forced south to meet Qingkou. I find that after the Jiaqing reign Qingkou silted up. In summer, when the Yellow River stood higher than the Qing, the sluice could no longer be opened to send grain transport. After the Daoguang reign the Imperial Yellow Dam was not opened all year. The pond-filling method was adopted instead, discharging Yellow River water from Huangpu into the lake. The lake bed rose sharply, canal water grew scarce, pond-filling became impractical, and sea transport was adopted instead. Even if the old channel could be restored now, canal transport could not be restored at once. It is not that once the river turns south all will be well. This is the real situation: the old Huai and Xu channel is hard to restore, and doing so would not help grain transport. As for the river governor's proposal to confine the Yellow River in the east to aid transport—Qingkou's silt buildup is precisely the disease caused by borrowing Yellow River water for transport. Today the Zhangqiu canal is only a few zhang wide, with waste earth piled like mountains on both banks. If heavy, muddy Yellow River water is brought in and regulated by sluices and dams, the water level rises and silting doubles in speed. How much labor is there—how can we dredge sand that grows daily? Moreover the dredged sand is piled again atop years of waste earth. Rain and wind wear it away, the riverbed rises daily, sluices silt up, and in time the Yellow River can no longer be drawn in. In the Hongzhi reign of the Ming, Jinglong Mouth and Tongwaxiang breached repeatedly—all because Yellow River water was drawn to aid Zhangqiu transport, opening a crack that became a flood. Linqing's terrain lies several zhang lower than Zhangqiu. That afterward there will be no harm of the current being seized and the channel stolen—I dare not believe it. As for sealing Huojia Bridge and building levees, the work is especially difficult. That place is not originally a breach but the path of the main current. There are no banks at either end—only floating sand as far as one can see, with no real earth to be had. Forced piling will press the current section by section. Floating sand easily collapses, truly provoking the river's wrath, and the cost is great. Once it bursts, water will cut another path through the canal rather than meeting only at Zhangqiu—is not all the work lost? As for Zuojin's plan to divert the Wei River to aid transport, it arose because north of Zhangqiu there is no clear water for the canal. South of Yuancunji there is an old Yellow River bed with much accumulated sand—construction would not be easy. When the full Huai cannot match the Yellow River and still backflows and silts up, how can one shallow, clear Wei River hold off the Yellow River and aid transport? His idea apparently copies the method of using Shandong's streams to aid transport. He does not know that south of Mount Tai the waters all flow west. Guided by the terrain, the waters of one hundred eighty springs in sixteen counties are abundant in source and branch, sufficient on their own to aid transport. The Wei River's source is very weak and its flow most direct. Now it must be bent south by force—much is inconvenient in that course. This is the real situation: borrowing Yellow River water for transport, building levees to confine water, and diverting the Wei River for transport are all unreliable. Since the river cannot be turned back to its old course, harm to eastern revenue, obstruction to water management, difficulty of relocating cities, and intermittent flooding of salt works—as Baozhen stated—are truly troubling. I find the Daqing River was originally no more than ten-odd zhang wide; it has now scoured to more than half a li. In winter and spring at low water it is still two or three zhang deep, with banks two or three zhang above the surface—meaning that in normal times the channel holds five or six zhang of water, racing swiftly underground. This is what human effort cannot reverse and what prayer cannot obtain. At present on the north bank from Qihe to Lijin and on the south at Qidong and Putai, private dikes have been joined. Though only about a zhang high, locals say that at peak flood overflow from the channel is no more than a few chi—they can still hold. The Daiyin, Xiujiang, and other rivers have also had levees built at chosen points. They rise when floods come and subside when floods pass—damage is not heavy. As for the cities of Qihe, Jiyang, Qidong, Putai, and Lijin—all close to the river—the past nineteen years have fortunately passed without disaster from defense; later measures can follow the terrain. To suddenly propose relocation—funds cannot be found, the people cannot be persuaded; there is no such way. Shandong salt works at the estuary, though Yellow silt dulls production, receive intermittent relief when the governor transports Jiaodong and Jining salt south. Consumption districts need not fear a salt shortage—only prices are somewhat higher. The river in Shandong certainly cannot be harmless, but if measures are maintained it need not become a great calamity. In the Qianlong era, when the Tongshan breach could not be sealed, Sun Jiagan submitted a memorial proposing dividing the river into the Daqing. Later, when the great Lanyang works repeatedly failed near completion, Ji Huang requested diverting the river to the Daqing. Beyond them Qiu Yuexiu, Qian Daxin, Hu Zongxu, Sun Xingyan, Wei Yuan, and other officials offered still more proposals. At that time the river had not yet flowed north; they still wished to turn it north. Now that the river flows north, they wish to turn it south—is this not going against the water's nature? Generally one closure on the southern river costs altogether about seven or eight million taels; annual maintenance about seven million more—a bottomless pit. Now that the river has shifted north, in nearly twenty years there has been no great change and no vast expense—compared with earlier ages, this is already fortunate. Moreover it encircles the sacred capital—a strategic advantage. Since Tongwaxiang broke east, the Taiping and Nian rebels ravaged Cao and Ji almost without pause yet could not cross the river a single step. Defense on the north bank had something to rely on—a benefit to the capital region for generations. Comparing the two, the real situation is this: a river in the east, though not urgently treated, brings lighter later harm; a river turned south, even if greatly treated, brings very heavy later harm. In recent times river control has been coupled with transport control, producing a dilemma and in the end no lasting plan. I humbly believe the imperial granary's regular tribute comes chiefly from Jiangsu and Zhejiang, and the way to national security depends above all on coastal defense. Today foreign ships crowd the coast—a situation unprecedented in history. Closed-border self-sufficiency is no longer possible. We may as well use the convenience of sea transport, gradually expand it, widen trade routes, and fill military stores. Jiangsu and Zhejiang tribute grain is already shipped by sea. I previously recruited Chinese merchants to purchase steamships for transport with gradual success—delivery to Tianjin by sea is faster and more convenient. Though the sea route is not fully open, river work cannot be wholly abandoned. At present the method is nothing beyond the ancients' phrase: 'wherever water lies, add levees.' On the north bank above Zhangqiu the ancient Great Gold Levee can be relied on for solidity. Below Zhangqiu the banks are high and water deep—the Shandong governor should order protection and reinforcement of private dikes as needed. As for private dikes above and below Houjialin, they should follow official levee practice—raised and thickened uniformly—as a more lasting plan. Moreover at the Tongwaxiang breach the current erodes eastward daily; in time it will inevitably flood southward. He requested that Songnian inspect the terrain, build dikes and levees as appropriate, and connect them with Caozhou's levees, so as to provide comprehensive protection and keep the current in its proper course. As for the old southern channel, more than a thousand li long, where residents have occupied land and reaped abundant harvests, he also requested that the land be surveyed and registered for taxation, to prevent illegal reclamation and the disputes that follow. The memorial was submitted, and the plan was settled.

是年夏秋，決開州焦丘、濮州蘭庄，又決東明之岳新莊、石莊戶民埝，分溜趨金鄉、嘉祥、宿遷、氵術陽入六塘河。寶楨勘由鄆城張家支門築堤堵塞。旋乞假展墓。十三年春，溜益南趨，潰漫不可收拾，江督累章告災。九月，寶楨回任，改由菏澤賈庄建壩。十二月興工。

That summer and autumn, breaches opened at Jiaoqiu in Kaizhou and Lanzhuang in Puzhou, and again at Yuexinzhuang and the Shizhuang private dike in Dongming. Split currents ran toward Jinxiang, Jiaxiang, Suqian, and Shuyang and into the Liutang River. Baozhen surveyed the site and had dikes built to block the breach at the Zhangjia branch gate in Yuncheng. Soon afterward he requested leave to tend his ancestral graves. In the spring of the thirteenth year the current turned increasingly southward, broke its banks, and flooded beyond control. The Jiangsu governor-general repeatedly memorialized to report the disaster. In the ninth month Baozhen returned to his post, and the plan was changed to building a dam at Jiazhuang in Heze. Construction began in the twelfth month.

光緒元年三月，東明決塞，並築李連莊以下南堤二百五十里。時河督曾國荃請設南岸七廳。部議俟直、東、豫籌有防汛的款再定。二年春，署東撫李元華言：「黃河南堤，自賈庄至東平二百餘里均完固，惟上游毗連直、豫，自東明謝寨至考城七十餘里，並無堤岸，此工刻不可緩。昔年侯家林塞，後怵於費多，未暇顧問，遂至賈庄決口。此次賈庄以下堤雖完固，上游若不修築，設有漫決，豈惟前功盡棄，河南、安徽、江蘇仍然受害，山東首當其衝無論已。臣擬調營勇，兼雇民夫，築此七十餘里長堤。深恐呼應不靈，已商直督、豫撫協力襄辦。至濮、范之民，自黃河改道，昏墊十有餘年。賈庄決後，稍有生機，及賈庄塞，受災如故。查南堤距北面金堤六七十里，以屏蔽京師則可，於濮、范村莊田畝則不能保衛。該處紳民原修北堤，惟力有未支，請酌加津貼，既成以後，派弁勇一律修防，濮、范、陽穀、壽張、東阿五縣地畝可涸出千餘頃。又查濮、范以上，有黃水二道。擬於壽張、東阿境內新河尾閭，抽挑引河二，冀歸併一渠。於南堤之北、黃河之南，再立小堤以束水，又可涸出地畝千餘頃。至北堤上游內有八里系開州轄，若不一律修築，不惟北堤徒勞無功，即畿輔亦難保不受其患。已商直督遣員協助，妥速蕆功。惟所壓直、豫地畝，該處居民無甚大益，而山東百姓受益無窮，自應由山東折償地價。上游收束既窄，下游水溜勢急，不可不防。自東平至利津海口九百餘里，已飭沿河州縣就民堤加培，酌給津貼，以工代賑。各項通計需費二千餘萬。此黃河大段擬辦情形也。」事下所司。

In the third month of the first year of Guangxu the Dongming breach was sealed, and a south levee two hundred fifty li long was built from Lilianzhuang downstream. At the time River Commissioner Zeng Guoquan requested the establishment of seven offices on the south bank. The ministry decided to wait until Zhili, Shandong, and Henan had secured flood-control funds before making a final decision. In the spring of the second year, Acting Shandong Governor Li Yuanhua stated: "The Yellow River's south levee from Jiazhuang to Dongping, more than two hundred li, is complete and solid throughout. Only the upstream stretch adjoining Zhili and Henan—from Xiezhai in Dongming to Kaocheng, more than seventy li—has no levee at all. This work brooks no delay. In former years Houjialin was sealed, but afterward, deterred by the expense, it was left unattended until the Jiazhuang breach opened. This time, though the levee below Jiazhuang is complete, if the upstream is not built and an overflow breach occurs, not only will all prior work be lost—Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu will still suffer, and Shandong will bear the brunt first, to say nothing of the rest. Your subject proposes to mobilize garrison troops and hire laborers to build this levee of more than seventy li. Fearing that coordination would falter, I have already consulted the Zhili governor-general and the Henan governor to assist jointly. As for the people of Pu and Fan, since the Yellow River changed course they have been submerged in mire for more than ten years. After the Jiazhuang breach there was slight relief, but once Jiazhuang was sealed they suffered as before. Investigation shows the south levee stands sixty or seventy li from the north Great Gold Levee. It can shield the capital, but it cannot protect the villages and fields of Pu and Fan. The local gentry and people had originally planned to build the north levee but lacked the means. I request appropriate subsidies. Once the work is complete, officers and troops should be assigned for uniform maintenance. In Pu, Fan, Yanggu, Shouzhang, and Dong'e counties, more than a thousand qing of land can be drained dry. Further investigation shows that above Pu and Fan there are two channels of Yellow River water. I propose to dredge two diversion channels at the tail of the new river within Shouzhang and Dong'e, hoping to merge them into a single canal. North of the south levee and south of the Yellow River, smaller dikes should be erected to confine the water, and another thousand-odd qing of land can be drained dry. As for the north levee, eight li of upstream work lies within Kaizhou's jurisdiction. If it is not built uniformly, not only will the north levee prove wasted effort, but the capital region also cannot be kept safe from harm. I have already consulted the Zhili governor-general to send officers to assist, so that the work may be completed properly and without delay. However, the land in Zhili and Henan that will be submerged brings little benefit to local residents, while Shandong's people benefit without end. Shandong should therefore compensate the land prices proportionally. Since the upstream is constricted, the current runs fiercely downstream. This cannot go unguarded. From Dongping to the Lijin estuary, more than nine hundred li, I have already ordered the counties along the river to reinforce private dikes, with appropriate subsidies, using work-for-relief. All items together will require more than twenty million taels. This is the proposed plan for the major Yellow River section. The matter was referred to the responsible offices.

五年，決歷城溞溝。明年，復決。八年，決歷城桃園，十一月塞。九年，東撫陳士傑創建張秋以下兩岸大堤。時山東數遭河患，朝士屢以為言。上遣侍郎游百川馳往會勘。百川言：「自來論河者，分持南行北行二說。臣詳察形勢，將來遇伏秋盛漲，復折而東，自尋故道，亦未可知。若挽以人力，則勢有萬難。一則北堤決後，已沖刷淨盡，築堤進佔，工已甚鉅。且全河正流北行，中流堵御以圖合龍，必震駭非常，辦理殊無把握。一則故道旁沙嶺勢難挑動，且徐、海一帶河身涸出淤地千餘里，民盡墾種，一旦驅而之他，民豈甘心失業？此南行之說應無庸議也。至大清河本汶、濟交會，自黃流灌入，初猶水行地中，今則河身淤墊，既患水不能泄，自濟河上下，北則濟陽、惠民、濱州、利津，南則青城、章丘、歷城至鄒、長、高、博，漫決十一處。竊惟河入濟瀆已二十八年，其始誤于山東無辦河成案，誘民自為堤埝，縱屢開決，未肯形諸奏牘，貽患至斯。今則泛濫數百里，漂沒數百村，遍歷災區，傷心慘目。謹擬辦法三。一，疏通河道。黃初入濟，尚能容納，淤墊日高，至海口尤日形淤塞。沙淤水底，人力難施，計惟多用船隻，各帶鐵篦混江龍，上下拖刷，使不能停蓄，日漸刮深。疏導之方，似無逾此。一，分減黃流。濟一受黃，其勢岌岌不可終日。查大清河北，徒駭最近，馬頰較遠，鬲津尤在其北。大清河與徒駭最近處在惠民白龍灣，相距十許里。若由此開築減壩，分入徒駭河，其勢較便。再設法疏通其間之沙河、寬河、屯民等河，引入馬頰、鬲津，分疏入海，當不復虞其滿溢。一，亟築縷堤。民間自築縷堤，近臨河干，多不合法，且大率單薄，又斷續相間，屢經塌陷，一築再築，民力困竭。今擬自長清抵利津，南北岸先築縷堤，其頂沖處再築重堤，約長六百餘里，仍借民力，加以津貼，可計日成功，為民捍患，民自樂從。至謂治水不與水爭地，其法無過普築遙堤。然濟、武兩郡，地狹民稠，多佔田畝，小民失業，正非所原。且其間村鎮廬墓不可數計，兼之齊河、濟陽、齊東、蒲台、利津皆城臨河干，使之實逼處此，民情未免震駭。價買民田，需款不下四五百萬，工艱費鉅，可作緩圖。臣所以請築縷堤以濟急，而不敢輕持遙堤之議者此也。」士傑持異議。會海豐人御史吳峋言徒駭、馬頰二引河不可輕開，命直督李鴻章偕士傑會勘，亦如峋言。乃定議築兩岸長堤。

In the fifth year a breach opened at Saogou in Licheng. The next year it breached again. In the eighth year a breach opened at Taoyuan in Licheng; it was sealed in the eleventh month. In the ninth year Shandong Governor Chen Shijie began building great levees on both banks below Zhangqiu. At the time Shandong had suffered repeated river disasters, and court officials spoke of it often. The emperor sent Vice Minister You Baichuan posthaste to join in the survey. Baichuan stated: "Those who discuss the river have always held two views: southward flow and northward flow. I have closely examined the terrain. When future flood season brings peak rise, the river may turn east again and find its old course by itself—this cannot be ruled out. If forced by human effort, the obstacles are innumerable. For one thing, after the north levee breached it was scoured completely away. Building levees advancing into the river channel—the work is already enormous. Moreover the main current runs north. Blocking midstream to attempt closure would cause extraordinary upheaval, with no assurance of success. For another, sand ridges beside the old channel are hard to move. Moreover, along northern Jiangsu and the coast the riverbed has dried to silt land for more than a thousand li, fully reclaimed by the people. Drive them elsewhere at once—would the people willingly accept losing their livelihood? The southward-flow view should need no further debate. As for the Daqing River, originally where the Wen and Ji met, since Yellow River water poured in, at first the water still ran underground. Now the channel is silted and raised, and water cannot discharge. From the Ji River up and down—north: Jiyang, Huimin, Binzhou, and Lijin; south: Qingcheng, Zhangqiu, Licheng, and on to Zou, Chang, Gao, and Bo—there were eleven overflow breaches. I consider that the river entered the Ji channel twenty-eight years ago. At first Shandong erred in having no completed river plan and induced people to build private dikes. Though breaches opened repeatedly, this was not put in memorials, and harm reached this state. Now floods stretch for hundreds of li and have swept away hundreds of villages. To traverse the disaster zone is heartbreaking to behold. Respectfully, I propose three measures. First: dredge the channel. When Yellow River water first entered the Ji it could still be held, but silt rose daily, and at the estuary silting worsens by the day. Sand silts the riverbed where human labor cannot reach. The plan is to use many boats, each bearing iron rakes and River-Sweeping Dragons, dragging up and down so water cannot stagnate and the channel is gradually scraped deeper. For dredging, there seems no better method. Second: divert and reduce Yellow River flow. The Ji River receiving the Yellow River alone—the situation is perilous and cannot last. Investigation shows that north of the Daqing River the Tuhai is nearest, the Majia farther away, and the Gejin still farther north. Where the Daqing and Tuhai are nearest is at Bailongwan in Huimin, about ten li apart. If a reduction dam is opened here to divide flow into the Tuhai River, the advantage would be greater. Further devise methods to dredge the Sha, Kuan, Tunmin, and other rivers between, drawing them into the Majia and Gejin, dividing discharge to the sea—then overflow need not be feared. Third: urgently build thread levees. The thread levees people built privately stand close to the riverbank, mostly not built to regulation, generally thin, and broken and intermittent. They have repeatedly collapsed, been rebuilt once and then again, until the people's strength is exhausted. Now I propose that from Changqing to Lijin, on both banks, thread levees be built first, with double levees at head-on points, about six hundred-odd li in all. Still using people's labor with subsidies, the work can succeed on schedule. Defending the people from calamity, they will gladly follow. As for the saying 'in controlling water, do not fight water for land,' the method is nothing but building distant levees everywhere. But the Ji and Wu prefectures are narrow and densely populated. Much farmland would be taken and common people would lose their livelihood—this is precisely not what is desired. Moreover the villages, towns, and graves between are beyond count. Moreover Qihe, Jiyang, Qidong, Putai, and Lijin all have cities on the riverbank. Placing them in such straits, public sentiment cannot but be alarmed. Buying people's land would require no less than four or five million taels. The work is arduous and the cost enormous—this can be a long-term plan. This is why your subject requests thread levees for urgent relief and dares not lightly advance the distant-levee proposal. Shijie held a dissenting view. Meanwhile Haifeng native Censor Wu Xun stated that the Tuhai and Majia diversion channels should not be lightly opened. The emperor ordered Zhili Governor-General Li Hongzhang and Shijie to survey jointly, and they agreed with Wu Xun. Then the decision was made to build long levees on both banks.

是年決利津十四戶，十年三月塞。閏五月，決歷城河套圈、霍家溜，齊河李家岸、陳家林、蕭家莊，利津張家莊、十四戶，先後塞之。是年兩岸大堤成，各距河流數百丈，即縷堤也，而東民仍守臨河埝，有司亦諭令先守民埝，如埝決再守大堤，而堤內村廬未議遷徙，大漲出槽，田廬悉淹，居民遂決堤泄水，官亦不能禁，嗣是只守埝不守大堤矣。十一年，蕭家莊、溞溝再決，又決齊河趙莊。十二月，溞溝、趙莊塞。明年二月，蕭家莊塞。六月，再決河套圈，又決濟陽王家圈、惠民姚家口、章丘河王莊、壽張徐家沙窩，惟王家圈工緩辦，餘皆年內塞。東境河雖屢決，然皆分溜少奪溜，每堵築一次，費數萬或數十萬，多亦不過一二百萬，較南河時所省正多，被淹地畝亦較少，地平水緩故也。

That year a breach opened at Shihu in Lijin; it was sealed in the third month of the tenth year. In the intercalary fifth month breaches opened at Hetaoquan and Huojialiu in Licheng, at Lijia'an, Chenjialin, and Xiaojiazhuang in Qihe, and at Zhangjiazhuang and Shihu in Lijin—all were sealed in turn. That year great levees on both banks were completed, each several hundred zhang from the river—these were the thread levees. Yet the eastern people still guarded riverbank private dikes, and officials also ordered them to guard private dikes first, and only the great levees if the private dikes breached. But villages and dwellings within the levees were not yet considered for relocation. At peak flood the water overflowed the channel, fields and dwellings were all inundated, and residents then breached the levees to release water—and officials could not stop them. After this they guarded only the private dikes, not the great levees. In the eleventh year Xiaojiazhuang and Saogou breached again, and Zhaozhuang in Qihe also breached. In the twelfth month Saogou and Zhaozhuang were sealed. The next year, in the second month, Xiaojiazhuang was sealed. In the sixth month Hetaoquan breached again, and Wangjiaquan in Jiyang, Yaojiakou in Huimin, Hewangzhuang in Zhangqiu, and Xujiashawo in Shouzhang also breached. Only the Wangjiaquan work proceeded slowly; the rest were sealed within the year. Though the eastern river breached repeatedly, each time was split flow with little main-channel seizure. Each closure cost tens of thousands or hundreds of thousands of taels, at most one or two million—much saved compared with southern river times, and flooded land was also less, because the terrain is flat and the water slow.

十三年六月，決開州大辛庄，水灌東境，濮、范、壽張、陽穀、東阿、平陰、禹城均以災告。八月，決鄭州，奪溜由賈魯河入淮，直注洪澤湖。正河斷流，王家圈旱口乃塞。鄭州既決，議者多言不必塞，宜乘此復故道。戶部尚書翁同龢、工部尚書潘祖廕同上言：「河自大禹以後，行北地者三千六百餘年，南行不過五百餘年，是河由雲梯關入海，本不得謂故道。即指為故道，而現在溜注洪澤湖，形北高南下，不能導之使出清口，去故道尚百餘里，其勢斷不能復。或謂山東數被水害，遂以河南行為幸。不知河性利北行。自金章宗後，河雖分流。有明一代，北決者十四，南決者五；我朝順、康以來，北決者十九，南決者十一。況淮無經行之渠，黃入淮安有歸宿之地？下流不得宣洩，上游必將復決，決則仍入東境，山東之患仍未能弭。至黃水南注，有二大患、五可慮。黃注洪澤，而淮口淤墊，久不通水，僅張福口引河，闊不過數丈，大溜東注，以運河為尾閭，僅恃東堤為護，已岌岌可危。今忽加一黃河，必不能保。大患一。洪澤淤墊，高家堰久不可恃，黃河勢悍，入湖後難保不立時塌卸。不東沖里下河，即南灌揚州，江、淮、河、漢並而為一，東南大局，何堪設想！大患二。里下河為產米之區，萬一被淹，漕米何從措辦？可慮一。即令漕米如故，或因黃挾沙墊運，不能浮送。或因積水漫溢，纖道無存，漕艘停滯。且山東本借黃濟運，黃既遠去，沂、汶微弱，水從何出？河運必廢。可慮二。兩淮鹽場，胥在范公堤東。范堤不保，鹽場淹沒，國課何從徵納？可慮三。潁、壽、徐、海，好勇鬥狠，小民盪析，難保不生事端。可慮四。黃汛合淮，勢不能局於湖瀦，必別尋入海之道，橫流猝至，江鄉居民莫保旦夕。可慮五。至入湖之水，亦須早籌宣洩。里下河地勢，西北俯、東南仰，宜順其就下之勢，由興化以北，歷朦朧、傅家塢入舊河，避雲梯關淤沙，北濬大通口，入潮河以達淮河，海口則取徑直，形勢便，經費亦不過鉅。」

In the sixth month of the thirteenth year a breach opened at Daxinzhuang in Kaizhou. Water flooded the eastern territory, and Pu, Fan, Shouzhang, Yanggu, Dong'e, Pingyin, and Yucheng all reported disaster. In the eighth month a breach opened at Zhengzhou. The main current was seized and entered the Huai via the Jialu River, flowing straight into Hongze Lake. The main channel cut off, and the Wangjiaquan dry breach was then sealed. Once Zhengzhou breached, debaters mostly said there was no need to seal it and that this opportunity should be seized to restore the old course. Ministers of Revenue Weng Tonghe and Works Pan Zuyin jointly memorialized: "Since Yu the Great the river ran north for more than 3,600 years; southward flow lasted no more than 500 years. The river entering the sea at Yunti Pass cannot properly be called the old course. Even if it were called the old course, the current now pours into Hongze Lake. The terrain is high in the north and low in the south; it cannot be guided out through Qingkou. The old course still lies more than a hundred li away—the current absolutely cannot be restored. Some say that because Shandong has repeatedly suffered water harm, they therefore consider a Henan course fortunate. They do not know that the river's nature favors northward flow. Since Emperor Zhangzong of Jin the river has divided its flow. In the Ming dynasty there were fourteen north breaches and five south breaches; In our dynasty since Shunzhi and Kangxi there have been nineteen north breaches and eleven south breaches. Moreover the Huai has no regular channel—when the Yellow River enters the Huai region, where can it find a place to settle? If the downstream cannot discharge, the upstream must breach again. When it breaches it will still enter the eastern territory, and Shandong's calamity still cannot be ended. As for Yellow River water flowing south, there are two great calamities and five causes for concern. Yellow River water pours into Hongze while the Huai mouth is silted and long unable to pass water. Only the Zhangfukou diversion channel, no more than several zhang wide, remains. The main current flows east, with the Grand Canal as its tail end and relying only on the east levee for protection—already perilously threatened. Now suddenly adding a Yellow River, it cannot be preserved. Great calamity one. Hongze is silted, the Gaojia Weir has long been unreliable, and the Yellow River's current is fierce. After entering the lake, there is no guarantee it will not collapse at once. If it does not flood east into the Lixiahe region, it will inundate Yangzhou to the south—the Yangtze, Huai, Yellow, and Han merged as one. The great situation of the southeast—how can one bear to imagine it! Great calamity two. The Lixiahe region is the rice-producing area. If it were flooded, where would tribute grain come from? Cause for concern one. Even if tribute grain could still be procured as before, Yellow River water carrying sand might silt the transport route so that grain could not be floated and delivered. Or accumulated water might overflow, leaving no towpaths, and the grain boats would be stalled. Moreover Shandong originally relied on the Yellow River to aid transport. With the Yellow River gone far away, the Yi and Wen rivers would run weak—where would the water come from? The Grand Canal transport system would have to be abandoned. Cause for concern two. The salt fields of the two Huai regions all lie east of the Fan Gong Dike. If the Fan Dike could not be preserved and the salt fields were submerged, how would state revenue be collected? Cause for concern three. In Ying, Shou, Xu, and Hai the people are fierce and quarrelsome. With common folk scattered abroad, it would be hard to guarantee that no trouble would arise. Cause for concern four. When Yellow River flood merged with the Huai, it could not be confined to the lake marshes and would have to seek another path to the sea. Sudden cross-flows would arrive, and riverside residents could not count on surviving from one day to the next. Cause for concern five. As for the water entering the lake, plans for discharge must also be made early. The terrain of the Lixiahe region slopes down in the northwest and rises in the southeast. It is fitting to follow its downward tendency: from north of Xinghua, passing Menglong and Fujiawu to enter the old channel, avoiding the silt at Yunti Pass, dredging north at Datongkou and entering the Chaohu River to reach the Huai. The estuary should take the straight route—the terrain is favorable and the expense would not be excessively great."

上命江督曾國荃、漕督盧士傑籌議。適國荃、士傑亦言：「捍河匯淮東下，其危險百倍尋常。查治水不外宣防二策，而宣之用尤多。洪湖出路二，皆由運入江。今大患特至，不能不於湖之上游多籌出路，分支宣洩，博採群議。桃源有成子河，南接洪湖，北至舊河，又北為中運河。若加挑成子河，使通舊河，直達中運河，兩岸築堤，即可引漫水由楊庄舊河至雲梯關入海，此洪湖上面新辟一去路也。清河有碎石河，西接張福口，引河東達舊河，大加挑挖，亦可引漫水由楊庄舊河至雲梯關入海，此洪湖下面新辟一去路也。詢之耆舊，僉謂舍此別無良法。是以臣等議定即勘估興工，不敢拘泥成規，往返遷延，致誤事機。」上韙之，並遣前山西布政使紹諴、降調浙江按察使陳寶箴、前山東按察使潘駿文迅赴鄭工，隨同河督成孚、豫撫倪文蔚襄理河務。時工賑需款鉅且急，戶部條上籌款六事：一，裁防營長夫；一，停購軍械船隻機器；一，停止京員兵丁米折銀；一，酌調附近防軍協同工作；一，令鹽商捐輸給獎；一，預徵當商匯號稅銀。議上，詔裁長夫、捐鹽商及預徵稅銀，餘不允。九月，命禮部尚書李鴻藻偕刑部侍郎薛允升馳勘，鴻藻留督工。時黃流漫溢，河南州縣如中牟、尉氏、扶溝、鄢陵、通許、太康、西華、淮寧、祥符、沈丘、鹿邑多被淹浸，水深四五尺至一二丈，特頒內帑十萬，並截留京餉三十萬賑撫。而河工需款急，允御史周天霖、李世琨請，特開鄭工新捐例，奪成孚職，以李鶴年署河督。

The emperor ordered Jiangsu Governor-General Zeng Guoquan and Grain Transport Commissioner Lu Shijie to deliberate. Just then Guoquan and Shijie also stated: "Blocking the river and converging the Huai eastward—the danger is a hundred times greater than usual. Upon investigation, water control admits of no methods beyond discharge and defense, and discharge is used most often. Hongze Lake has two outlets, both entering the Yangtze via the Grand Canal. Now that great calamity had arrived, they could not but plan many outlets above the lake, branch discharge, and gather opinions broadly. Taoyuan has the Chengzi River, which joins Hongze Lake to the south, reaches the old channel to the north, and farther north becomes the Middle Grand Canal. If the Chengzi River were further dredged to connect with the old channel and reach the Middle Grand Canal directly, with dikes built on both banks, overflow water could be drawn via the Yangzhuang old channel to the sea at Yunti Pass—this would be a newly opened outlet above Hongze Lake. Qinghe has the Suishi River, which connects with Zhangfukou to the west, and its diversion channel reaches the old channel to the east. With major dredging, overflow water could also be drawn via the Yangzhuang old channel to the sea at Yunti Pass—this would be a newly opened outlet below Hongze Lake. When elders were consulted, all agreed that apart from this there was no better course. Therefore your subjects decided to survey, estimate, and begin work at once, not daring to cling to established rules, go back and forth, and delay until the opportunity was lost." The emperor approved, and also sent former Shanxi Financial Commissioner Shao Xian, demoted Zhejiang Judicial Commissioner Chen Baozhen, and former Shandong Judicial Commissioner Pan Junwen posthaste to the Zhengzhou works, together with River Commissioner Cheng Fu and Henan Governor Ni Wenwei to assist in river affairs. At the time work relief required funds that were enormous and urgent. The Ministry of Revenue listed six fund-raising measures: first, cut flood-defense garrison long-term laborers; second, halt purchases of arms, boats, and machinery; third, stop grain-to-silver conversion payments for capital officials and soldiers; fourth, appropriately mobilize nearby defense troops to work jointly; fifth, order salt merchants to donate with rewards given; sixth, advance-collect tax silver from registered merchant houses. When the plan was submitted, an edict approved cutting long-term laborers, salt merchant donations, and advance tax collection—the rest was not approved. In the ninth month, Minister of Rites Li Hongzao was ordered with Vice Minister of Justice Xue Yunsheng to survey posthaste. Hongzao remained to supervise the work. At the time Yellow River water overflowed, and Henan prefectures and counties such as Zhongmou, Weishi, Fugou, Yanling, Tongxu, Taikang, Xihua, Huaining, Xiangfu, Shenqiu, and Luyi were largely inundated, with water from four or five chi to one or two zhang deep. The inner treasury specially issued one hundred thousand taels, and thirty thousand taels in capital stipends was held back for relief. But river works needed funds urgently. Granting Censors Zhou Tianlin and Li Shikun's request, a new donation statute for the Zhengzhou works was specially opened, Cheng Fu was stripped of office, and Li Henian was appointed acting River Commissioner.

十月，東撫張曜言：山東河淤潮高，黃流實難容納，請乘勢規復南河故道。下鴻藻、鶴年議。鴻藻等遂請飭迅籌合辦。上以「黃河籌復故道，迭經臣工條奏，但費鉅工繁，斷難於決口未堵之先，同時並舉。此奏於故道宜復，止空論其理，語簡意疏。一切利害之輕重，地勢之高下，工用之浩大，時日之迫促，並未全局通籌，縷晰奏覆。如此大事，朝廷安能據此寥寥數語，定計決疑？故道一議，可暫從緩。至所稱一切工作，先自下游開辦，南河舊道現在情形如何，工程能否速辦，經費能否立籌，有無滯礙，著國荃、士傑、崧駿迅速估奏。」國荃言：「黃流東注，淮南北地處下游，宜籌分泄之策。請就楊庄以下舊河二百餘里挑濬，以分沂、泗之水，騰出中運河，預備洪河盛漲，挾黃北行，堪以容納，是上游籌有去路。而淮由三河壩直趨而東，則運堤極為吃重，勢不能不開壩宣洩，里下河如臨釜底，而枝河頗多，若預先疏導，使水能順軌，則田廬民命亦可保全。同龢、祖廕所言，洵得水性就下之勢，業經遣員履勘，並請調熟悉河工之江蘇臬司張富年督理。」制可。先是侍郎徐郙有通籌黃河全局之疏。文蔚言：「郙所陳口門北岸上游酌開引河，上南廳以下河內挑川字河，及築排水壩，三者皆河南必辦之事，即前人著效之法。臣前請於河身闊處切灘疏淤，即郙酌開引河及川字河之意。河員以近日河勢略變，須更籌辦法，且有引河不可挑之說。而此項土夫，皆系應賑之人，無論何工，皆系應辦之事，將來或幫挑運河，或幫築河身，應就商河臣隨時調度。」報聞。

In the tenth month, Shandong Governor Zhang Yao stated that Shandong's river was silted and tides were high, the Yellow River current truly could not be contained, and requested seizing the opportunity to plan restoration of the southern river's old course. The matter was referred to Hongzao and Henian for deliberation. Hongzao and others then requested orders to plan jointly without delay. The emperor stated: "Planning to restore the Yellow River's old course has been repeatedly memorialized by officials, but the expense is enormous and the work complex—it absolutely cannot be undertaken simultaneously before the breach is sealed. This memorial on restoring the old course states only the principle in empty terms—the language is brief and the meaning sparse. All the weight of benefits and harms, the terrain's highs and lows, the vastness of labor and materials, and the urgency of time had not been comprehensively planned and reported in detail. On so great a matter, how could the court decide plans and resolve doubts on the basis of these few sparse words? The old-course proposal might temporarily be deferred. As for the stated plan to begin all work from the downstream first—what was the present condition of the southern river's old channel, could the project be completed quickly, could funds be raised at once, were there impediments—the emperor ordered Guoquan, Shijie, and Song Jun to estimate and memorialize promptly." Guoquan stated: "Yellow River water flows east. Lands north and south of the Huai are downstream—it is fitting to plan measures to divide and discharge. He requested dredging the old channel below Yangzhuang for more than two hundred li to divide Yi and Si water, free the Middle Grand Canal, and prepare for Hongze's peak rise carrying Yellow River water northward—it could be contained, and thus the upstream would have an outlet. When the Huai ran straight east from Sanhe Dam, the canal levee bore the heaviest strain—there was no choice but to open the dam for discharge. The Lixiahe region was like facing the bottom of a cauldron, yet branch rivers were many. If dredged in advance so water could follow its course, fields, dwellings, and people's lives could also be preserved. What Tonghe and Zuyin stated truly accorded with water's nature to seek the lower level. Officers had already been sent to survey on site, and he requested transferring Jiangsu Judicial Commissioner Zhang Funian, who was familiar with river works, to supervise." The emperor approved. Earlier Vice Minister Xu Yi had submitted a memorial on comprehensively planning the Yellow River situation. Wenwei stated: "What Yi proposed—opening diversion channels upstream on the north bank at the mouth, dredging chuan-shaped channels below Shangnan Hall within the river, and building drainage dams—all three are matters Henan must undertake, and are methods that proved effective for predecessors. Your subject's earlier request to cut shoals and dredge silt at wide points in the river channel was precisely Yi's intent in opening diversion and chuan-shaped channels. River officials said the river's force had changed slightly of late and methods must be reconsidered, and there was also talk that diversion channels could not be dredged. But these laborers were all people eligible for relief—whatever the work, it was work that must be done. In future they might help dredge the canal or help build the river channel; they should be deployed as the River Commissioner advised at any time." The report was received.

十二月，國荃、士傑言：「同龢等所陳二患五慮，不啻身歷其境，將臣等所欲言者，代達宸聰。當經派員分投履勘。自傅家塢入舊黃河，過雲梯關至大通口，測量地勢，北高丈五七尺，揆諸就下之性，殊未相宜。不敢不恪遵聖訓，於興化境內別籌疏淤。查下河入海河道，以新陽、射陽兩河為最，斗龍港次之。祗以支河阻塞，未能通暢。查興化屬之大圍閘、丁溪場屬之古河口小海，均極淤淺。疏濬以後，如果高郵開壩，可冀水皆順軌，由新陽等河宣暢歸海。其閘門窄狹過水不暢者，另於左右開挖越河，俾得滔滔直注。此外干支各河，再接續擇要興挑，以期逐節通暢，核與同龢、祖廕之奏事異功同。」

In the twelfth month, Guoquan and Shijie stated: "What Tonghe and others stated—the two calamities and five concerns—was as if they had personally experienced the scene, speaking on our behalf what we wished to say to the imperial ear. Officers had been dispatched to survey on site in separate directions. From Fujiawu entering the old Yellow River, passing Yunti Pass to Datongkou, terrain was measured—the north was one zhang five to seven chi higher. Judging by water's nature to seek the lower level, this was quite unsuitable. Not daring to fail to respectfully follow the imperial instruction, within Xinghua territory other dredging plans were made. Investigation showed that among lower-river channels to the sea, the Xinyang and Sheyang rivers were foremost, with Doulong Harbor next. Only because branch rivers were blocked, flow could not be smooth. Investigation showed Dawwei Sluice in Xinghua and Guhekou Xiaohai in Dingxichang were both extremely silted and shallow. After dredging, if Gaoyou opened its dam, it could be hoped that all the water would follow its course and discharge smoothly to the sea via the Xinyang and other rivers. Where the sluice gates were narrow and water passage was not smooth, overflow channels should be dug to the left and right so the water could pour straight through. Beyond this, trunk and branch rivers should continue to be selectively dredged where important, hoping for smooth flow section by section—essentially the same aim as Tonghe and Zuyin's memorial though the work differed."

十四年正月，國荃等又言：「徐郙通籌河局疏，稱淮揚實無處位置黃河，宜先籌宣洩之方，再求堵合之法，洵屬確中肯綮。至請挑天然及張福口引河，本系由淮入黃咽喉，昔人建導淮之議，皆從引河入手。祗以張福淤墊太高，挑不得法，且恐沂、泗倒灌。又順清河為清江三閘來源，曩時堵築以資自衛。自河北徙，此壩久廢。今既引淮入黃，仍須堵築順清壩，庶三閘可保無虞。經臣等派員審度河底，雖北高南低，加工挑深，尚可配平。順清河雖水深溜急，多備料土，亦可設法堵築。又經臣士傑履勘，陳家窯可開引河，上接張福口，下達吳城七堡，與碎石河功用相同。已於十月分段興挑，自張福口、內窯河起，至順清河止，開深丈四尺至二丈，冀上游多泄一分之水，下河即少受一分之災。其工段亦間調哨勇幫同挑濬，以補民夫之不足。以上辦法，與該侍郎所陳江南數條，不謀而合。」

In the first month of the fourteenth year, Guoquan and others again stated: "Vice Minister Xu's memorial on comprehensively planning the river situation said the Huai-Yang region truly had no place to accommodate the Yellow River—it was fitting first to plan discharge, then seek closure methods. This struck exactly at the crux of the matter. As for requesting dredging of the Tianran and Zhangfukou diversion channels—these were the throat where the Huai enters the Yellow. When predecessors proposed guiding the Huai, all began with diversion channels. Only because Zhangfukou was silted too high, dredging could not be done properly, and there was fear of Yi and Si backflow. Moreover the Shunqing River was the source of the three Qingjiang sluices—in former times it was blocked and built up for self-defense. Since the river moved north, this dam had long been abandoned. Now that the Huai was being drawn into the Yellow, the Shunqing dam must still be blocked and built so the three sluices could be kept safe. Your subjects dispatched officers to examine the riverbed—though it was high in the north and low in the south, with added dredging depth it could still be leveled. Though the Shunqing River was deep and the current fierce, with ample materials and earth it could also be blocked and built by devising methods. Further, your subject Shijie surveyed on site—Chenjiayao could open a diversion channel, connecting upward with Zhangfukou and downward reaching Wucheng Qibao, with the same function as the Suishi River. Work was begun in sections in the tenth month, from Zhangfukou and Neiyao River to Shunqing River, dredged one zhang four chi to two zhang deep, hoping that for each portion of water discharged upstream, the lower river would suffer one portion less disaster. At work sections garrison troops were also intermittently deployed to help dredge, to supplement insufficient civilian labor. The above methods coincided without prior consultation with the several Jiangnan proposals that the vice minister had stated."

先是上以將來河仍北趨，有「趁湍流驟減，挑濬東明長堤，開州河身，加培堤埝」之諭。至是，鴻章言：「直境黃河長八九十里，一律挑濬，工鉅費煩。即酌挑北面數處，亦需二三十萬。兩岸河灘高於中洪一二丈，河身尚可容水。惟東明南堤歷年沖刷，亟應擇要修築，已調派大名練軍春融赴工，並募民夫同時力作。開州全堤殘缺已甚，亦經派員估修。至長垣南岸小堤，離河較遠，尚可緩辦。北岸民埝，飭勸民間修培，不得逼束河流，致礙大局。」

Earlier the emperor, considering that in future the river would still trend north, had issued an instruction to "seize the moment when the turbulent current suddenly lessens, dredge Dongming's long levee, the Kaizhou river channel, and reinforce dikes and levees." At this point Hongzhang stated: "The Yellow River in Zhili territory runs eighty or ninety li—uniform dredging would mean enormous work and troublesome expense. Even selective dredging at several points on the north would require two or three hundred thousand taels. River beaches on both banks were one or two zhang higher than mid-channel flood level—the river channel could still hold water. Only Dongming's south levee had been scoured year after year—it urgently should be selectively repaired. Daming training troops had been mobilized to go to work when spring thaw arrived, and civilian laborers were also being hired to work simultaneously. Kaizhou's entire levee was badly broken and missing—officers had also been dispatched to estimate repairs. As for Changyuan's south-bank small levee, it was farther from the river and could still be deferred. As for north-bank private dikes, the people were ordered and encouraged to repair and reinforce them, but not to forcibly constrain the river current and thereby harm the overall situation."

六月，小楊庄塞。是月，鴻藻言鄭工兩壩，共進佔六百一十四丈，尚餘口門三十餘丈，因伏秋暴漲，人力難施，請緩俟秋汛稍平，接續舉辦。上嚴旨切責，褫鶴年職，與成孚並戍軍台。鴻藻、文蔚均降三級留任。以廣東巡撫吳大澂署河道總督。大澂言：「醫者治病，必考其致病之由，病者服藥，必求其對症之方。臣日在河干，與鄉村父老諮詢舊事，證以前人紀載，知豫省河患非不能治，病在不治。築堤無善策，鑲埽非久計，要在建壩以挑溜，逼溜以攻沙。溜入中洪，河不著堤，則堤身自固，河患自輕。廳員中年久者，僉言咸豐初滎澤尚有磚石壩二十餘道，堤外皆灘，河溜離堤甚遠，就壩築埽以防險，而堤根之埽工甚少。自舊壩失修，不數年廢棄殆盡，河勢愈逼愈近，埽數愈添愈多，廳員救過不遑，顧此失彼，每遇險工，輒成大患。河員以鑲埽為能事，至大溜圈注不移，旋鑲旋蟄，幾至束手。臣親督道廳趕拋石垛，三四丈深之大溜，投石不過一二尺，溜即外移，始知水深溜激，惟拋石足以救急，其效十倍埽工，以石護溜，溜緩而埽穩。歷朝河臣如潘季馴、靳輔、栗毓美，皆主建壩挑溜，良不誣也。現以數十年久廢之要工，數十道應修之大壩，非一旦所能補築竣工。惟有於鄭工款內核實撙節，省得一萬，即多購一萬之石垛，省得十萬，即多做十萬之壩工，雖系善後事宜，趁此乾河修築，人力易施，否則鄭工合龍後，明年春夏出險，必至措手不及。雖不敢謂一治而病即愈，特愈於不治而病日增。果能對症發藥，一年而小效，三五年後必有大效。」上嘉勉之。

In the sixth month Xiaoyangzhuang was sealed. That month Hongzao stated that at the two Zhengzhou dams, advance closure totaled six hundred fourteen zhang, with more than thirty zhang of mouth remaining. Because of sudden rise in the flood season, human labor could not be applied—he requested deferral until the autumn flood slightly subsided, then continuing the work. The emperor issued a stern edict of sharp rebuke, stripped Henian of office, and sent him with Cheng Fu to serve at a frontier garrison post. Hongzao and Wenwei were both demoted three ranks but retained in office. Guangdong Governor Wu Dacheng was appointed acting River Commissioner. Dacheng stated: "A physician treating illness must investigate the cause of the disease; the patient taking medicine must seek the prescription that matches the symptoms. Your subject is daily on the riverbank, consulting village elders about old events and verifying against predecessors' records—I know Henan's river calamities are not untreatable; the disease lies in not treating them. Building levees is no good strategy; revetting with fascines is no long-term plan—the key lies in building dams to divert the current, forcing the current to attack sand. When the current enters mid-channel flood level and the river does not touch the levee, then the levee body is naturally firm and river calamity is naturally light. Among bureau officers of long standing, all said that in the early Xianfeng era Xingyang still had more than twenty brick and stone dams, outside the levee all was beach, the river current was far from the levee, and revetments were built at the dams to guard against danger—yet revetment work at the levee base was very little. Since the old dams fell into disrepair, within a few years they were nearly all abandoned. The river's force pressed closer and closer, fascine revetments were added more and more, bureau officers could not save one crisis before the next and looked after this while losing that—whenever a dangerous work site was encountered, it became a great calamity. River officials took fascine revetting as their specialty. When the main current swirled and held without shifting, they revetted again and again only to see it sink again, until they were nearly at their wits' end. Your subject personally supervised the circuit bureau in rushing stone riprap into place. In a main current three or four zhang deep, stones thrown in barely sank a chi or two before the current shifted outward. Only then did I learn that where water runs deep and the current runs fierce, only stone throwing can meet the emergency. Its effect is ten times that of fascine work: stone protects the current, the current slows, and the fascines hold firm. River commissioners of past dynasties such as Pan Jixun, Jin Fu, and Li Yumei all advocated building dams to divert the current—and they were not wrong. Now there are critical works abandoned for decades and dozens of major dams needing repair—they cannot all be restored and completed at once. Only by rigorously economizing within the Zhengzhou works budget—saving ten thousand taels means buying ten thousand taels' worth of stone riprap, saving one hundred thousand means doing one hundred thousand taels' worth of dam work. Though this is follow-up work, while the river runs dry repairs are easy to execute; otherwise, after the Zhengzhou works are joined, when dangers emerge next spring and summer we will surely be caught unprepared. Though I dare not say that one course of treatment will cure the disease at once, it is still better than leaving it untreated while the disease grows day by day. If the right medicine can be applied to the symptoms, there will be modest effects within a year and great effects in three to five years." The emperor commended and encouraged him.

大澂又言：「向來修築壩垛，皆用條磚碎石，每遇大汛急溜，壩根淘刷日深，不但磚易衝散，重大石塊亦即隨流坍塌。聞西洋有塞門德土，拌沙黏合，不患水侵。趁此引河未放，各處須築挑壩，正在河身乾涸之時，擬於磚面石縫，試用塞門德土塗灌，斂散為整，可使壩基做成一片，足以抵當河溜，用石少而工必堅，似亦一勞永逸之法。」報聞。十二月，鄭工塞，用帑千二百萬，實授大澂河督，詔於工次立河神廟，並建黃大王祠，賜扁額，與黨將軍俱加封號。是年七月，決長垣范庄。未幾塞。十五年六月，決章丘大寨庄、金王莊，分溜由小清河入海。又決長清張村、齊河西紙坊，山東濱河州縣多被淹浸。是冬塞。

Dacheng also stated: "In the past, dam construction used brick strips and crushed stone. Whenever the great flood season brought fierce currents, the dam roots were scoured deeper day by day—not only were the bricks easily scattered, but heavy stone blocks also collapsed with the flow. I hear that the West has a substance called cement, which when mixed with sand bonds together and does not fear water erosion. While the diversion channel has not yet been opened and dams must be built everywhere to divert the current—the river channel being dry—I propose trial application of cement coating and grouting on brick surfaces and stone seams, consolidating the loose into a whole so the dam foundation becomes one piece able to withstand the river current, using less stone yet making the work firm. This also seems a method of working once for lasting benefit." The report was received. In the twelfth month the Zhengzhou works were sealed, using one million two hundred thousand taels from the treasury. Dacheng was formally appointed River Commissioner. An edict ordered a River God temple erected at the worksite and a Huang Dawang shrine built, with inscribed plaques bestowed; both Huang Dawang and General Dang received elevated titles. That year in the seventh month Fanzhuang in Changyuan breached. Before long it was sealed. In the sixth month of the fifteenth year Dazhaizhuang and Jinwangzhuang in Zhangqiu breached, dividing the flow to enter the sea via the Xiaoqing River. Zhangcun in Changqing and Xizhifang in Qihe also breached, and many riverside prefectures and counties in Shandong were inundated. That winter they were sealed.

十六年二月，東撫張曜言：「前南總河轄河工九百餘里，東總河轄五百餘里。自決銅瓦廂，河入山東，遂裁南總河，而東河所轄河工僅二百餘里。今東河縣長九百里，日淤日高，全恃堤防為保衛。本年臣駐工二百餘日，督率修防，日不暇給。請將自菏澤至運河口河道二百餘里，歸河督轄，與原轄之河道里數相等。」部議以此段工程，向由巡撫督率地方官兼管，河督恐呼應不靈。曜又言：「向來沿河州縣，本歸河臣兼轄，員缺仍會河臣題補，遇有功過，河臣亦應舉劾，尚無呼應不靈之患。請並下河督籌議。」先是大澂遣員測繪直、東、豫全河，至是圖成上之。五月，決齊河高家套，旋塞。

In the second month of the sixteenth year Shandong Governor Zhang Yao stated: "Formerly the Southern River Director supervised more than nine hundred li of river works, and the Eastern River Director more than five hundred li. Since the breach at Tongwaxiang, when the river entered Shandong, the Southern River Director was abolished, and the Eastern River's jurisdiction covered only a little over two hundred li. Now the Eastern River route is nine hundred li long, silting and rising day by day, wholly relying on levees for protection. This year your subject has been stationed at the works for more than two hundred days, supervising repairs and defense, with never a spare day. I request that the more than two hundred li of channel from Heze to the Grand Canal mouth be placed under the River Commissioner's jurisdiction, equal to his original jurisdiction in mileage." The ministry deliberated that this section of works had long been supervised by the governor directing local officials jointly, and the River Commissioner might fear unresponsive coordination. Yao also stated: "Riverside prefectures and counties have long been under the River Commissioner's concurrent jurisdiction. Vacancies were still jointly proposed by the River Commissioner. When merit or fault occurred, the River Commissioner also should memorialize for impeachment—there was no worry of unresponsive coordination. I request that this also be referred to the River Commissioner for study and report." Earlier Dacheng had dispatched officers to survey and map the entire river in Zhili, Shandong, and Henan. At this point the map was completed and submitted. In the fifth month Gaojiatao in Qihe breached; it was soon sealed.

十八年六月，決惠民白茅墳，奪溜北行，直趨徒駭入海。又決利津張家屋、濟陽桑家渡及南關、灰壩，俱匯白茅墳漫水歸徒駭河。七月，決章丘胡家岸，夾河以內，一片汪洋，遷出歷城、章丘、濟陽、齊東、青城、濱州，蒲台、利津八縣災民三萬三千二百餘戶。初，河督許振禕請於歲額六十萬內，提十二萬歸河防局，籌添料石，先事預防，由河督主之，至是部令分案題銷。振禕言：「河工大險，恃法不如用人。如以恃法論，則從來報銷例案，工部知之，河工亦知之，故自每年添款及鄭工報銷之千數百萬，未聞其不合例也。如以用人論，則臣近此改章從事，比年大險橫生，亦均次第搶補，幸奏安瀾，至添料添石，固有不盡合例者矣。原臣立河防局，意有二端。一則恐廳員遇險推諉，藉口無錢無料，故提此鉅款先事預防之資。一則恐廳員不實不盡，故添委官紳臨時匡救之用，而限十二萬纖悉到工，不準絲毫入局，並不准開支薪水。河南官紳吏民罔不知之。即如今歲之得保鉅險，就買石一款，已用過十一萬數千兩，餘則補鄭工金門沈裂之堤，此不能分案題銷者也。又多方買石，隨處搶堵，險未平必加拋，險已過即停止，此不能繪圖貼說者也。」上如所請行。是年白茅墳各口塞。

In the sixth month of the eighteenth year Baimaofen in Huimin breached, seizing the current northward and rushing straight to the sea via the Tuhai River. Zhangjiawu in Lijin, Sangjiadu in Jiyang, and Nanguan and Huiba also breached, all converging floodwater from Baimaofen to return to the Tuhai River. In the seventh month Hujia'an in Zhangqiu breached. Within the river banks all was a vast lake. More than thirty-three thousand two hundred disaster-stricken households were relocated from eight counties: Licheng, Zhangqiu, Jiyang, Qidong, Qingcheng, Binzhou, Putai, and Lijin. Earlier River Commissioner Xu Zhenyi had requested that within the annual quota of six hundred thousand taels, one hundred twenty thousand be set aside for the River Defense Bureau to procure additional materials and stone for preventive work under the River Commissioner's authority. At this point the ministry ordered separate case memorialization for settlement. Zhenyi stated: "River works are highly dangerous. Relying on regulations is not as good as relying on people. If one speaks of relying on regulations, the reimbursement precedents are known to the Ministry of Works and to river officials alike. From annual supplemental funds to the millions reimbursed for the Zhengzhou works, none were ever said to be out of compliance. If one speaks of relying on people, your subject has recently amended procedures and worked accordingly. In recent years great dangers arose repeatedly, yet all were patched in turn, fortunately reporting calm waters. As for adding materials and stone, there were indeed some that did not fully comply with precedent. Your subject originally established the River Defense Bureau with two aims. First, fearing that bureau officers facing danger would shirk blame by pleading no money or materials, this large sum was set aside for preventive resources in advance. Second, fearing bureau officers would not be thorough or honest, additional officials and gentry were appointed for emergency rescue, while the one hundred twenty thousand was limited entirely to the works—not a single coin to enter the bureau account, and no salaries permitted. Henan officials, gentry, clerks, and people all know this. Even this year's preservation from great danger: on stone purchases alone, more than one hundred ten thousand odd taels have been spent; the remainder repaired the sunken and cracked levee at the Golden Gate of the Zhengzhou works—this cannot be settled by separate case memorialization. Moreover stone was purchased from many sources and emergency repairs made wherever needed—adding riprap before danger subsided, stopping once danger passed—this cannot be documented with diagrams and attached explanations." The emperor approved as requested. That year all breaches at Baimaofen were sealed.

二十一年六月，決壽張高家大廟、齊東趙家大堤。未幾，決濟陽高家紙坊、利津呂家窪、趙家園、十六戶。是冬次第塞。明年六月，決利津西韓家、陳家。御史宋伯魯條上東河積弊：一，冒領矇銷，宜嚴定處分；一，收發各料，宜設法稽查；一，申明賠修舊例，以防隨意改名；一，武弁宜認真巡察。詔東撫嚴除積弊，並令有河務各督撫查察，遇有劣員，嚴參懲辦。二十三年正月，決歷城小沙灘、章丘胡家岸，隨塞。十一月凌汛，決利津姜家莊、扈家灘，水由霑化降河入海。二十四年六月，決山東黑虎廟，穿運東泄，仍入正河。又決歷城楊史道口、壽張楊家井、濟陽桑家渡、東阿王家廟，分注徒駭、小清二河入海。遣鴻章偕河督任道鎔、東撫張汝梅會勘。未幾，省東河總督，尋復置。

In the sixth month of the twenty-first year Gaojiadamiao in Shouzhang and Zhaojiadadi in Qidong breached. Before long Gaojiazhifang in Jiyang, Lvjiwa, Zhaojiayuan, and Shiliuhu in Lijin breached. That winter they were sealed in succession. In the sixth month of the following year Xihanjia and Chenjia in Lijin breached. Censor Song Bolu listed accumulated abuses of the Eastern River: first, false claims and concealment in accounts—strict penalties should be set; second, receipt and dispatch of materials—methods for inspection should be devised; third, restore the old rule on compensatory repairs to prevent arbitrary renaming; fourth, military officers should conduct diligent patrols. An edict ordered the Shandong governor strictly to eliminate accumulated abuses, and all governors and governors-general with river duties to investigate. When inferior officials were found, they were to be sternly impeached and punished. In the first month of the twenty-third year Xiaoshatan in Licheng and Hujia'an in Zhangqiu breached; they were soon sealed. In the eleventh month during the ice-break flood Jiangjiazhuang and Hujiatan in Lijin breached; water entered the sea via the Zhanhua Jianghe River. In the sixth month of the twenty-fourth year Heihumiao in Shandong breached, piercing east through the Grand Canal to discharge, yet still entering the main channel. Yangshidaokou in Licheng, Yangjiajing in Shouzhang, Sangjiadu in Jiyang, and Wangjiamiao in Dong'e also breached, dividing flow into the Tuhai and Xiaoqing rivers to enter the sea. Li Hongzhang was dispatched together with River Commissioner Ren Daorong and Shandong Governor Zhang Rumei to survey jointly. Before long the Eastern River Governor-General post was abolished; soon it was restored.

二十五年二月，鴻章等言：「山東黃河自銅瓦廂改道大清河以來，時當軍興，未遑修治。同治季年，漸有潰溢，始築上游南堤。光緒八年後潰溢屢見，遂普築兩岸大堤。乃民間先就河涯築有小埝，緊逼黃流。大堤成後，復勸民守埝，且有改為官守者。於是堤久失修，每遇汎漲埝決，水遂建瓴而下，堤亦隨決，此歷來失事病根也。上游曹、兗屬南北堤湊長四百餘里，兩堤相距二十里至四十里，民埝偶決，水由堤內歸入正河，大決則堤亦不保。計南北埝工二十四，同治以來，決僅四五見，此上游情形也。中游濟、泰屬兩岸堤埝各半，湊長五百里，南岸上段傍山無堤，下段守埝，北岸上守堤，下守埝，參差不一，無非為堤內村莊難遷，權為保守計。下游武、定屬南岸全守堤，北岸全守埝，湊長五百餘里，地勢愈平，水勢愈大，險工七十餘處，二十五年來，已決二十三次，此中下游情形也。東省修防事本草創，間有興作，皆因費絀，未按治河成法。前撫臣李秉衡歷陳山東受河之害，治河之難，謂近幾無歲不決，無歲不數決。朝廷屢糜鉅金，閭閻終無安歲。若不按成規大加修治，何以仰答愛養元元之意？臣等詳考古來治河之法，惟漢賈讓徙當水沖之民，讓地於水，實為上策。前撫臣陳士傑建築中下游兩岸大堤，湊長千里，兩堤相距五六里至八九里，就此加培修守，似不失為中策。惟先有棄堤守埝處，如南岸濼口上下，守埝者百一十里，上段近省六十里，商賈輻輳，近險工稍平，暫緩推展；下段要險極多，十餘年來，已決九次，擬遷出埝外二十餘村，棄埝守堤，離水稍遠，防守易固。此南岸酌擬遷民廢埝辦法也。至北岸堤工，自長清至利津四百六十里，埝外堤內數百村莊。長埝逼近湍流，河面太狹，無處不灣，無灣不險。河脣淤高，埝外地如釜底，各村斷不能久安室家。且埝破堤必破，欲保埝外數百村，並堤外數千村同一被災，尤覺非計。但小民安土重遷，屢被沈災，不肯遠去，非可旦夕議定。今擬北岸自長清官莊至齊河六十餘里，河面尚寬，利津至鹽窩七十餘里，地皆斥鹵，不便徙民，均以埝作堤，埝外之民，無庸遷徙。其齊河至利津尚有三百二十里，民埝緊逼河干，竟有不及一里者，勢不得不廢埝守堤。但北堤殘缺多半，無可退守，且需款過鉅，遷民更難，應暫守舊埝，此北岸分別守埝作堤，及將來再議廢埝守堤辦法也。至南北大堤，為河工第一重大關係。既處處卑薄，擬並改埝之堤，及暫定之民埝，照河工舊式，一律修培，總期足御汛漲。至下口入海尾閭，尤關全河大局。查鐵門關故道尚有八十餘里，愈下愈寬深，直通海口，形勢較絲網口、韓家垣為順，工費亦較省。然建攔河大壩、挑引河、築兩岸大堤，需費頗鉅，下口不治，全河皆病，不得不核實勘估，此又加培兩岸堤工、改正下口辦法也。約估工費需九百三十萬有奇，分五六年可告竣。」朝議如所請，先發帑百萬，交東撫毓賢督修。

In the second month of the twenty-fifth year Hongzhang and others stated: "Since the Yellow River in Shandong changed course to the Daqing River after the breach at Tongwaxiang, the times were ones of military uprising and there was no leisure for repair. In the late Tongzhi years breaches gradually appeared, and the upstream south levee was first built. After the eighth year of Guangxu breaches were seen repeatedly, and great levees were built on both banks. Yet the people had first built small private dikes along the river bank, pressing close to the Yellow River current. After the great levees were completed, the people were again encouraged to maintain the private dikes, and some were converted to official maintenance. Thus the levees long went unrepaired. Whenever flood season brought private dike breaches, water poured down from on high like water from a eaves—and the levees also breached in turn. This is the root disease of failures through the ages. In the upstream Cao and Yan prefectures, north and south levees together total more than four hundred li; the two levees stand twenty to forty li apart. When private dikes occasionally breach, water returns through the interior to the main channel; with major breaches the levees also cannot be preserved. Counting twenty-four north and south private dike works, since the Tongzhi era breaches have occurred only four or five times—this is the upstream situation. In the middle reach Jin and Tai prefectures, levees and private dikes each half on both banks, together five hundred li. On the south bank the upper section has no levee along the mountains; the lower section maintains private dikes. On the north bank the upper section maintains levees, the lower private dikes—all irregular, solely because villages inside the levees cannot be relocated, a temporary measure for protection. In the downstream Wu and Ding prefectures, the south bank wholly maintains levees, the north bank wholly private dikes, together more than five hundred li. The terrain grows flatter and the water force greater; there are more than seventy dangerous work sites. In twenty-five years there have been twenty-three breaches—this is the middle and downstream situation. Shandong's repair and defense arrangements were originally makeshift. Occasional projects occurred, but all for lack of funds fell short of established river-control methods. Former Governor Li Bingheng repeatedly memorialized on Shandong's sufferings from the river and the difficulty of controlling it, saying that in recent years scarcely a year passed without a breach, and scarcely a year without multiple breaches. The court repeatedly spent vast sums, yet the common people never had a year of peace. If repairs are not made on a large scale according to established practice, how can we live up to the intent of cherishing and nurturing the people? Your subjects have thoroughly researched river-control methods through the ages. Only Han Jia Yi's proposal to relocate people in the path of the water and yield land to the water is truly the superior strategy. Former Governor Chen Shijie built great levees on both banks in the middle and lower reaches, together a thousand li, with the two levees five or six to eight or nine li apart. To strengthen, repair, and defend these would seem not to fall short of a middle strategy. Only where levees were abandoned in favor of private dikes, such as above and below Luokou on the south bank—the private dike section is one hundred eleven li. The upper section near the provincial capital is sixty li; merchants gather there and dangerous works are somewhat mild—expansion may temporarily be deferred; The lower section has extremely many critical points. In more than ten years there have been nine breaches. It is proposed to relocate more than twenty villages outside the private dikes, abandon the private dikes and maintain levees, stand somewhat farther from the water, and make defense easier and firmer. This is the proposed south-bank method of relocating people and abandoning private dikes. As for north-bank levee works, from Changqing to Lijin is four hundred sixty li, with hundreds of villages outside the private dikes and inside the levees. Long private dikes press close to the turbulent current; the river surface is too narrow—nowhere without bends, no bend without danger. The river lip is silted high; land outside the private dikes is like the bottom of a cauldron. The villages absolutely cannot long maintain their homes in peace. Moreover when private dikes break the levees must break. To preserve hundreds of villages outside the private dikes along with thousands outside the levees suffering disaster together seems especially ill-advised. But common people cling to their native soil and are reluctant to move. Repeatedly submerged in disaster, they are unwilling to go far—this cannot be decided overnight. Now on the north bank from Guanzhuang in Changqing to Qihe—more than sixty li—the river surface is still wide; from Lijin to Yanwo—more than seventy li—the land is all saline and unsuitable for relocating people. In both cases private dikes are to be converted to levees; people outside the private dikes need not be relocated. From Qihe to Lijin there remain three hundred twenty li where private dikes press tight against the river bank—in places less than one li. The situation compels abandoning private dikes and maintaining levees. But north-bank levees are mostly broken and missing with nowhere to fall back; funds required are excessive and relocating people is even harder. The old private dikes should temporarily be maintained. This is the north-bank method of separately maintaining private dikes, converting to levees, and the future method of again discussing abandoning private dikes for levees. As for the great north and south levees, they are the foremost major concern of river works. Since they are weak and thin everywhere, it is proposed to repair and strengthen both converted private-dike levees and temporarily designated private dikes according to the old river-work style, altogether aiming to withstand flood rise. As for the estuary tail where the river enters the sea, this especially concerns the overall situation of the entire river. Investigation showed the old channel at Tiemen Pass still has more than eighty li, growing wider and deeper downstream, reaching the sea mouth directly. The terrain is more favorable than Siwangkou and Hanjiayuan, and the expense comparatively less. Yet building a major river-blocking dam, dredging diversion channels, and constructing great levees on both banks requires considerable expense. If the lower mouth is not treated, the whole river is afflicted—it cannot but be rigorously surveyed and estimated. This is also the method of strengthening both-bank levees and correcting the lower mouth. Estimated project expense requires more than nine million three hundred thousand taels; completion could be reported in five or six years." The court deliberated and approved as requested, first issuing one million taels from the treasury for Eastern Governor Yu Xian to supervise repairs.

毓賢言：「黃河治法，誠如部臣所云，展寬河面、盤築堤身、疏通尾閭三事為扼要。查尾閭之害，以鐵板河為最。全河挾沙帶泥，到此無所歸束，散漫無力，經以風潮，膠結如鐵，流不暢則出路塞而橫流多，故無十年不病之河。擬建長堤直至淤灘，防護風潮，縱不能徑達入海，而多進一步即多一步之益。至堤埝卑薄，擬修培時，土方必足，夯硪必堅，尤加意保守。其坐灣處，一灣一險，如上游賈庄、孫家樓，中流坰家岸、霍家溜、桑家渡，下游白龍潭、北鎮家集鹽窩，均著名巨險，餘險尤多，固非裁灣取直不可，然亦須相度形勢，必引河上口能迎溜勢、下口直入河心方得。蒲台迤西魏家口至迤東宋庄，約長四十里，河水分流，納正河之溜三分之。若就勢修堤建壩挑溜，使歸北河，正河如淤，蒲台城垣永免水患。此裁灣取直之最有益者，擬即勘估興辦。」報聞。

Yu Xian stated: "Yellow River treatment methods, truly as the ministry officials said, consist of three essentials: widening the river surface, bundling and building the levee body, and clearing the estuary tail. Investigation showed that among estuary harms, the Tieban River was worst. The whole river carrying sand and mud, arriving here has nowhere to be confined. Dispersed and weak, when acted upon by wind and tide it bonds like iron. When flow is not smooth the outlet is blocked and cross-flows multiply—thus there is no river that is not afflicted within ten years. It is proposed to build a long levee straight to the silt shoal to guard against wind and tide. Even if it cannot reach the sea directly, each further step forward brings one further step of benefit. As for weak and thin levees and dikes, when repair and strengthening are undertaken earth must be sufficient and tamping firm—especially careful preservation is needed. At bend locations, each bend is one danger—such as Jiazhuang and Sunjialou upstream, Jiongjia'an, Huojialiu, and Sangjiadu in the middle reach, Bailongtan and Beizhenjiaji Yanwo downstream—all famous major dangers, with yet more dangers besides. Cutting bends to straighten is certainly indispensable; yet the terrain must also be surveyed so that the diversion channel's upper mouth can meet the current's force and the lower mouth enters straight into the river heart. From Weijiakou west of Putai to Songzhuang east, about forty li long, the river divides; it takes in one-third of the main channel's current. If levees are built, dams constructed, and the current diverted according to the terrain, making it return to the north channel, when the main channel silts up Putai's city walls will forever be free of flood disaster. This bend-cutting straightening would be the most beneficial measure; he proposed to survey and estimate costs and begin work immediately. The memorial was received and noted.

二十六年，拳匪亂作，未續請款。嗣時局日艱，無暇議及河防矣。是年凌汛，決濱州張肖堂家。明年三月塞。六月，決章丘陳家窯、惠民楊家大堤，隨塞。黃河之初北徙也，忠親王僧格林沁有裁總河之請。嗣東河改歸巡撫兼轄，河督喬松年復以為請。至是，河督錫良言：「直、東河工久歸督撫管轄，豫撫本有兼理河道之責。請仿山東成案，改歸兼理，而省東河總督。」制可。二十八年夏，決利津馮家莊。秋，決惠民劉旺庄。逾年二月，劉旺庄塞。六月，決利津寧海庄，十二月塞。三十年正月，凌汛，決利津王莊、扈家灘、姜庄、馬庄，隨塞。六月，河溢甘肅皋蘭，淹沒沿灘村莊二十餘。又決山東利津薄庄，淹村莊、鹽窩各二十餘。

In the twenty-sixth year the Boxer uprising broke out, and no further appropriations were sought. As the political situation grew steadily worse, there was no longer time to discuss flood control. That year's spring ice flood broke the levee at Zhang Xiaotang's home in Binzhou. The breach was sealed the following March. In the sixth month it broke at Chenjiayao in Zhangqiu and the Yang family levee in Huimin; both breaches were quickly repaired. When the Yellow River first shifted northward, Prince Sengge Rinchen had proposed abolishing the post of director-general of rivers. Later the Eastern River works were placed under the governor's jurisdiction, and River Commissioner Qiao Songnian renewed the request. At this point River Commissioner Xiliang memorialized: "Zhili and Shandong river works have long been under provincial governors, and the Henan governor already shares responsibility for the river channel. We ask that the Shandong precedent be followed—works placed under joint provincial management and the Eastern River governor-general post abolished. The court approved. In the summer of the twenty-eighth year the river broke at Fengjiazhuang in Lijin. That autumn it broke at Liuwangzhuang in Huimin. More than a year later, in the second month, the Liuwangzhuang breach was sealed. In the sixth month it broke at Ninghaizhuang in Lijin; the breach was sealed in the twelfth month. In the first month of the thirtieth year a spring ice flood broke the levees at Wangzhuang, Hujiatan, Jiangzhuang, and Mazhuang in Lijin; all were quickly repaired. In the sixth month the river overflowed at Gaolan in Gansu, flooding more than twenty villages along the riverbank. It also broke at Bozhuang in Lijin, Shandong, flooding more than twenty villages and more than twenty salt pans.

先是山東屢遭河患，當事者皆就水立堤，隨灣就曲，水不暢行。張秋以下，堤卑河窄，又無石工幫護。利津以下，尾閭改向南，形勢益不順。巡撫周馥請帑三百萬，略事修培，部臣靳不予。不得已，自籌二十萬添購石料，又給貲遷利津下民之當水沖者，而民徙未盡。又於堤南增建大堤，以備舊堤壞、民有新居可歸。至薄庄決，水東北由徒駭河入海。馥言：「舊河淤成平陸，若依舊堵合，估須九十萬有奇，鉅款難籌。且堵合之後，防守毫無把握，漫口以下，水深丈餘至二三丈，奔騰浩瀚，就下行疾，入徒駭後，勢益寬深，較鐵門關、韓家垣、絲網口尤暢達。與其逆水之性，耗無益之財，救民而終莫能救，不如遷民避水，不與水爭地，而使水與民各得其所。依此而行，其益有三：尾閭通順，流暢消速，益一；舟楫便利，商貨流通，益二；河流順直，險輕費省，益三。所省堵築費猶不計也。然補救之策，費財亦有三：一，遷民之費；二，築埝之費；三，移設鹽垣之費。約需五十萬金，較堵築費省四之三，而受益過之。」制可，遂不堵。嗣是東河安瀾，數年未嘗一決。

Shandong had long suffered repeated floods; officials built levees along the water's edge, bending with every meander, so the current could not run freely. Below Zhangqiu the levees were low and the channel narrow, with no stone revetment for protection. Below Lijin the estuary turned southward, making the hydraulic situation still worse. Governor Zhou Fu requested three million taels from the treasury for basic repairs, but the ministry refused to grant it. With no alternative he raised two hundred thousand taels himself for stone and paid relocation subsidies to residents below Lijin in the flood path, but not all had moved. He also built a new major levee south of the old one so that if the old levee failed, residents would have somewhere to relocate. When Bozhuang broke, the flood ran northeast to the sea via the Tuhai River. Zhou Fu argued: "The old channel has silted up into dry land. Sealing it by the old method would cost more than nine hundred thousand taels—a sum nearly impossible to raise. Even if sealed, defense would be uncertain. Below the breach the water stands one to three zhang deep, rushing with enormous force. Downstream it runs fast, and after entering the Tuhai it spreads wider and deeper—more unobstructed than Tiemen Pass, Hanjiayuan, or Siwangkou. Rather than fight the river, waste money, and fail to save the people in the end, it is better to relocate residents away from the floodplain, stop competing with the water for land, and let river and people each take their proper place. If this policy is adopted, there are three benefits: first, a clear estuary with swift, free-flowing water that carries silt away quickly; second, easier navigation and freer commerce; third, a straighter channel with lighter hazards and lower maintenance costs. The savings on sealing and construction costs would be enormous besides. The remedial plan would still require three kinds of expenditure: first, relocation costs; second, building overflow embankments; third, relocating the salt works. About five hundred thousand taels would be needed—three-quarters less than the cost of sealing the breach, with greater overall benefit. The court approved, and the breach was left open. Thereafter the Eastern River ran peacefully, with no breach for several years.

宣統元年，決開州孟民庄。明年塞。三年，東撫孫寶琦言：「自黃入東省，河道深通，初無修防。積久淤溢，始築民埝，緊逼黃流。嗣經普築大堤，而復令民守埝。埝有漫決。官無處分，直、東兩省，定例皆然。元年開州決，水循東省上游埝外堤內下注，至中游始歸正河，濮﹑范、壽張受災甚重。臣會商直督，遣員協款堵築，上年始告成功。如能通籌，分別勘治，改歸官守上游橫決，為患何堪設想！臣昔隨李鴻章來東勘河，時比工程司建議築堤伸入海深處為最要辦法，卒以費鉅不果。如由主治者統籌經費，分年築堤，藉束水為攻沙之計，再酌購外洋挖泥輪機，往來疏濬，尾閭可望深通，全局皆受其益。河工為專門之學，非久於閱歷，不能得其奧竅。亟宜仿照豫省定章，改定文武額缺為終身官，三省互相遷調。臣上年設立河工研究所，招集學員講求河務，原為養成治河人材；如設廳汛，此項人員畢業，即可分別試用，於工程大有裨益。以上四端，必應興辦。臣愚以為宜設總河大員，歷勘會商，將三省常年經費百數十萬，統歸應用，俟議定大治辦法，隨時請撥，俾免掣肘而竟事功。」疏入，詔會商直督、豫撫通籌。未及議覆，而武昌變作，遂置不行。

In Xuantong 1 (1909) the river broke at Mengminzhuang in Kaizhou. It was sealed the following year. In the third year Shandong governor Sun Baoqi memorialized: "Since the Yellow River entered Shandong, the channel was deep and unobstructed and at first required no flood works. Over time silt built up and spills began; only then were private overflow embankments built, pressing tight against the Yellow River current. Later major levees were built throughout the province, yet residents were again made responsible for guarding the private overflow embankments. When those embankments overflowed, officials had no authority to punish anyone—a standing rule in both Zhili and Shandong. When Kaizhou broke in the first year, floodwater ran outside the upstream private embankments and inside the outer levees through Shandong; only in the middle reach did it rejoin the main channel. Pu, Fan, and Shouzhang were hit especially hard. I consulted with the Zhili governor-general, sent officials to coordinate funding for repairs, and only last year was the work declared complete. If we could coordinate a comprehensive survey and place the works under official control, what might an upstream breach cost us to imagine! I once accompanied Li Hongzhang to survey the river in the east. The engineering bureau then proposed extending levees far out to sea as the essential remedy, but the cost proved too great and the plan was abandoned. If the responsible authorities could coordinate funding, build levees over successive years, confine the current to scour silt, and purchase foreign dredging steamers for regular clearing, the estuary might run deep again and the entire system would benefit. River engineering is a specialized discipline; without long practical experience one cannot master its essentials. We should urgently follow Henan's regulations, making civil and military river posts lifetime appointments with rotation among the three provinces. Last year I established a River Engineering Research Institute to train students in river affairs and cultivate flood-control talent; if bureau posts are created, graduates could be assigned to trial posts and greatly strengthen the engineering corps. These four measures should all be adopted. I believe a senior river commissioner should be appointed to survey all three provinces and coordinate funding—their combined annual appropriations of one to two million taels—under a unified plan. Once a comprehensive remedy is agreed, funds could be requested as needed, avoiding bureaucratic obstruction and allowing the work to succeed. The memorial was received; the throne ordered the Zhili governor-general and Henan governor to consult on a unified plan. Before any reply could be drafted, the Wuchang uprising broke out, and the proposal was abandoned.

Cite this Chapter