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Volume 127 Treatises 102: Rivers and Canals 2, Yun He

Chapter 127 of 清史稿 · Draft History of Qing
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1
Treatise 102.
2
The Grand Canal runs from the capital through Zhigu and Shandong to the Yangzi estuary—a north–south stretch of over two thousand li—and from Jingkou to Hangzhou a further eight hundred li or so; together these waterways are known as the Grand Canal.
3
Under the Ming, grain transport was divided into Bai, Wei, lock, river, lake, Jiang, and Zhe routes. In the Kangxi era Jin Fu cut the Middle Canal to skirt the hazards of the Yellow River: grain fleets now sailed only a few li on the Yellow River before entering the new channel, and the old hundred-and-eighty-li river transport route fell into disuse. Bai transport still drew on the Bai River, Wei transport on the Wei River, and lock and lake transport on the lakes of Shandong and the lower Yangzi region—much as in Ming times. Late in the Jiaqing reign repeated breaches silted the canal, and the state again used Yellow River water to keep transport moving. Early in the Daoguang reign the court experimented with shipping grain by sea. In the twenty-eighth year of his reign, Daoguang ordered one more sea shipment to cut escort costs. Under Xianfeng the Yellow River veered north, turmoil spread across the north China plain, and the canal corridor was cut. For the rest of the dynasty, sea transport became the regular practice.
4
西沿
When the Yellow River turned south, the Huai bore the first damage—and a sick Huai meant a sick transport system. River control, Huai regulation, and canal relief therefore converged on Huai'an and Qingkou. Nowhere else matched the relentless works, the vast outlays of silver, or the yearly ruin of farms and homes. At Qingkou the aim was to hold clear water against the Yellow River. A strong Huai could scour the Yellow, but too much water threatened the canal dikes; a weak Huai could not feed transport, while Yellow backflow remained a constant fear. Bai and Wei routes chiefly required dredging and breach repair; lock and lake routes needed only balanced storage and release—far simpler problems. Jiang and Zhe transport, by contrast, were regarded as comparatively easy to maintain. Jiang grain came down the Han, Mian, and Poyang from Huguang and Jiangxi into the Yi River, then steamed upstream. South of Jingkou only a few counties such as Tu, Yang, and Yangwu needed periodic dredging; from Wuxi to Suzhou and on to Jiaxing and Hangzhou the water ran clear and true, with little need for labor. This chapter records the stretches that suffered most and demanded the heaviest works.
5
簿
In the summer of Shunzhi 4 prolonged rain breached the Jiangdu canal dike; it was repaired soon after. In the summer of the sixth year the Gaoyou canal dike gave way for several hundred zhang. In the seventh year the canal dike failed and Wen River water rushed out to sea via the salt route. In the eighth year the government hired laborers for a large-scale canal dredging. In the fourteenth year Director-General of Rivers Zhu Zhixi reported: 'From Nanwang the fall to Taizhuang is one hundred twenty chi and to Linqing ninety. Locks must follow statute: do not open until six or seven chi have built up, lest the channel drain empty. Close the lower gate and open the upper—even sluggish water runs deep; close the upper and open the lower—even a full current can prove shallow. Do not open gates lightly for northbound grain fleets, nor close them lightly for empty southbound craft.' The court approved. In the fifteenth year Dongkou silted up. Zhixi cut a new channel two hundred fifty zhang south of Shipai, linking it to the main stream so rapid transport could pass. Earlier, in the ninth year, the Zhang River had shifted north from Qiu County and reached the sea via Qing County. In the spring of the seventeenth year weak Wei flow stalled grain transport; officials dammed Zhang River water that had been split for irrigation and diverted it into the Wei to feed the canal. Hebei had suffered drought for years. Board official Jiang Tian'ai argued: 'Former Vice Commissioner Jiang Liangcai once proposed diverting the river into the Wei to open another transport line—why not reverse that plan and send Wei water into the river?' Zhixi adopted the plan, appointed a chief clerk for the Wei River, and codified the practice.
6
In Kangxi 1 the court set liability periods for canal works: breaches within three years implicated the building official; after three years, the defending official; if neglect of maintenance caused a breach, both were punished together. In the autumn of the fourth year flooding at Gaoyou breached the canal dike. In the fifth year the canal from Yizheng to the Huai shoaled; Magistrate He Chonglun hired laborers to dredge it. Grain Transport Commissioner Lin Qilong urged: 'Northbound fleets meet locks and shallows at every turn. Order river officials to survey the Anshan and Mata lakes, every lock, auxiliary dike, and sluice, and the springs of Dongping and Wenshang for blockages, and dredge springs and lakes until the route is clear.' In the sixth year the dike failed at the Lujin Temple in Jiangdu. The following year it was repaired. In the tenth year Qingshui Pool at Gaoyou breached. It broke again the next year and was not sealed until the thirteenth year. In the fourteenth year the dike failed at Shaobo Town in Jiangdu. In the summer of the fifteenth year prolonged rain collapsed the canal dike at Qingshui Pool and Luman Ditch in Gaoyou and Datang Bay in Jiangdu—over three hundred zhang in all.
7
In the sixteenth year Jin Fu was appointed Director-General of Rivers. Flooding in the southeast worsened while the grain route shoaled further. Jin Fu argued: 'River control and grain transport must be treated as one system. Canal blockages usually follow shifts in the river channel. Past river planners focused only where grain fleets sailed and neglected other breaches as irrelevant to transport; the main channel deteriorated and the canal followed. Upstream and downstream must never be managed in isolation. From Qingkou to Qingshui Pool, roughly two hundred thirty li, Yellow backflow had raised the bed: villagers faced flooding and grain ships constant delay. He asked the throne to order every governor to move this year's tribute grain entirely across the Huai by the third month of the coming year. Once the fleet had passed, close the Tongji dam, mobilize labor, and dredge the canal to eleven zhang wide at the surface, three at the bottom, and one zhang two chi deep—about thirty-four thousand seven hundred men a day for three hundred days. Six breaches at Qingshui Pool and Datang Bay and others from Zhaijiaba to Wujiadun would also be closed, at a cost of some nine hundred eighty thousand taels. He added: 'Silt had made towing and lightering endlessly arduous. Deepening Qingkou would let ships run freely and save large sums. He proposed that merchants pay a small shallow-water levy on passing cargo for one year, using the savings to fund river works once dredging opened the route. The court approved all of it.
8
西西
In the seventeenth year workers built the Jiangdu canal dike and closed the Qingshui Pool breach. Qingshui Pool lay beside Gaoyou Lake and had breached repeatedly; repairs collapsed as fast as they rose, until the gap exceeded three hundred zhang and plagued grain fleets. Two years earlier Minister Ji Ruxi had estimated the repair at five hundred seventy thousand taels, with labor and fascines levied on the people, yet doubted it could succeed. Jin Fu inspected the breach and, fifty or sixty zhang out in the lake, built a crescent embankment closing both ends—six hundred five zhang of west dike plus an eight-hundred-forty-zhang bypass to the west—for only ninety thousand taels. The project finished the following year. The emperor commended the work and named the channel Yong'an ('Ever Peace') and its dike the Yong'an Embankment. That year the canal was dredged across five counties—Shanyang, Qingjiangpu, Gaoyou, Baoying, and Jiangdu—and thirty-two breaches were sealed. He also asked to post troops along the dike from Qingkou to south of Shaobo, each man responsible for ninety zhang on both banks, planting willows, grass, lotus, and reeds as a permanent revetment. He warned: 'Once the canal is deepened, unless the Huai is channeled to feed transport and Yellow backflow is stopped, it will silt up again. He asked to buttress thin sections of the Gaoyan dike with gentle slopes for lasting protection. All was approved and implemented.
9
西西 宿
In the eighteenth year the dike failed at Qijia Bridge in Shanyang and was repaired at once. Early in the Ming, Jiangnan grain from Guazhou and Yizheng to Qingjiangpu entered the Yellow River at the Tianfei Lock. When Yellow water backed in, Pan Jixun moved the transport entrance to Xinzhuang Lock to draw clear water and avoid the Yellow, while keeping the Tianfei name. Yet the mouth lay only two hundred zhang from the Yellow–Huai confluence; Yellow water still backed in, raising the canal bed and forcing endless annual dredging. Where the two rivers met, swirling currents made the outlet for northbound grain fleets especially dangerous. Jin Fu then proposed shifting the southern entrance above Lanni Shoal: one cut southwest from Xinzhuang to Taiping Dam, another from Wenhua Temple on the Yongji River south through Qili Lock and southwest to the same dam—both routes bypassing Lanni Shoal. Two parallel channels served as mutual bypasses to ease the current; two-tenths of Lanni Shoal's flow fed transport while eight-tenths was aimed at the Yellow, keeping Yellow water out and away from the transport mouth. Northbound grain fleets could then cross the Huai under sail as on open water. That year an overflow dam was opened at Qiuyu Bone in Jiangdu and six relief dams were built at Suqian, Taoyuan, Qinghe, and Andong.
10
宿 宿 宿 便
In the nineteenth year one relief dam was built at Fengyang Works, works were done at Maochengpu and Dagu Mountain in Dangshan, at Lanma River and Guiren Dike in Suqian, and eleven relief dams on the east bank of Pizhou at Majiaji. Early in Kangxi, grain fleets reaching Suqian continued north through Dongkou. When Dongkou silted up, they routed through Luoma Lake. The lake was shallow and broad: towlines could not grip, boats stuck in mud, and digging and hauling them through threw Suqian into turmoil. Jin Fu therefore cut the forty-li Zao River, linking the Si River above to the Yellow below, and eased grain transport. Heavy rains that year raised both the Huai and Yellow, breached the Xinghua canal dike, flooded Gaoyou, and damaged Sizhou; overflow dams were built eight li south of Gaoyou and at Ziying Ditch in Baoying.
11
使
In the seventh month of the twentieth year a Yellow flood silted the Zao River and blocked navigation. Many urged returning to Luoma Lake, but Jin Fu refused, personally supervised dredging more than one zhang deep until the Yellow dropped and clear water restored the channel. He then closed the Yellow-blocking dam at the Zao mouth and cut a new channel of over three thousand zhang from Longgang east to Zhang Family Village so clear water from Shikan reached the Yellow at Zhangzhuang—the Zhangzhuang transport entrance. Eight overflow dams were added north and south of Gaoyou, each with a bypass channel to ease navigation, and hazardous stretches of the old dike were faced in stone. In the ninth month of the twenty-second year Yellow water poured in at Longgang and the new channel silted again. A Yellow-blocking dam was built at Shikan and dredging resumed; within ten days the new channel was open again. In the twenty-third year the emperor toured the south, inspected the river at Qingkou, and ordered a stone lock added at the Qinghe transport mouth because the current ran too fast.
12
宿 使 便 便
In the twenty-fifth year Jin Fu, finding the route through the Yellow River too dangerous, cut a channel from Luoma Lake through Suqian and Taoyuan to Zhong Family Village in Qinghe—the Middle Canal. Northbound grain ships left Qingkou, sailed only a few li on the Yellow River, entered the Middle Canal, and reached Zhangzhuang—avoiding a hundred eighty li of Yellow River hazards. Many held that this feat ranked with Chen Xuan's opening of the lower Qingkou under the Ming. Yet Surveillance Commissioner Yu Chenglong and Grain Transport Commissioner Mu Tianyan impeached Jin Fu for burdening the people; the emperor rebuked them for obstruction. In the twenty-seventh year Ministers Zhang Yushu and Tuna and Censor-in-Chief Ma Qi inspected the works and reported that the Middle Canal ran smoothly and navigation was easy. They noted that hugging the Yellow River left little room to widen the channel, while water from the local canal and Luoma Lake all fed into it and might overflow; relief dams should be built at Xiaojiadu, Yang Family Village, and Xinzhuang to discharge excess flow; and the straight Zhong Family lock mouth risked backflow, so the outlet should be cut obliquely southeast to avoid the Yellow current. The emperor decreed that these matters would be decided when he inspected in person. Heavy rains that year breached the Middle Canal and flooded several thousand acres of farmland in Qinghe.
13
宿 便
The following spring, on his southern inspection of hydraulic works, the emperor reached the Suqian branch channel and told his ministers that the waterway governed both the grain transport and the welfare of the people, and that landforms and currents had to be managed flexibly as conditions changed. He observed that the channel was constricted and hugged the Yellow River levee, warning that a breach of the Yellow embankment could merge the Middle Canal with the Yellow River entirely. Merchants and townspeople had welcomed the new route, he noted, yet no one could foresee what troubles the future might bring. Tuna and Ma Qi replied that during their survey a major flood had convinced them the narrow channel could not carry the full volume, so they had proposed three relief dams on the northern distant embankment to send excess water to the sea along the old river course. Jin Fu argued that the canal had been cut to drive water seaward and that, once dredged, grain barges had indeed been able to use it. Strengthening the distant levee to protect the Yellow River embankment, he maintained, would remove any remaining risk. Wang Xinming, the river superintendent, warned that a single Zhenkou sluice at the branch mouth could not withstand the immense discharge from Weishan Lake and would inevitably fail in a major flood. He recommended relief works at Luoma Lake to spill floodwater into the Yellow River, together with rebuilding the Yuwang Terrace at Tancheng to turn the Baima and Yi rivers away from the lake and into the Shu River, thereby securing the Middle Canal. The emperor ruled that the branch channel should remain in service while the Yellow River shipping route was also preserved. After Zhang Yushu had earlier petitioned to close the Lanma River, Wang Xinming now urged keeping that spillway to vent exceptional Yellow River surges, opening it only in flood and closing it when levels fell so the Middle Canal would not silt up. On Luoma Lake's three relief dams, Zhang Yushu's plan to leave two inside the levee feeding the Middle Canal struck him as self-defeating if the canal could not hold the flow; they had therefore also proposed new spill dams eastward at Xiaojiadu, Yangjiazhuang, and Xinhekou. Wang Xinming objected that diverting two dams into an already overloaded Middle Canal, only to build more dams downstream, was needlessly convoluted. He preferred placing all three dams beyond the distant levee so floodwater reached the sea along the old channel, with two regulated gaps at Xiaojiadu opened or closed according to the current. He also urged sealing the Yuwang Terrace site at Tancheng, where the Baima and Yi rivers had been forced into Luoma Lake and caused uncontrollable flooding, and restoring their former course to the sea. The emperor ordered the ministers in his entourage to deliberate and settle the dispute. They adopted Zhang Yushu's plan for the Luoma Lake relief dams but otherwise followed Wang Xinming's recommendations.
14
便
In year thirty-two the Zhili canal broke in thirteen places, five near Tongzhou's Lijia Mouth and eight around Tianjin's Shua'er Ferry. The feeble Wei River depended entirely on Zhang River water diverted at Guantao to feed the transport channel. During the late Ming the Zhang had shifted north into the Fuyang River, cutting off the Guantao diversion. In year thirty-six the Zhang unexpectedly split anew and once more supplied the Wei and the canal through Guantao. Two years later the court replaced Gaoyou's relief dams and six others, including Maojiayuan, with rolling overflow dams and raised the Gaoyan stonework by five feet. In year thirty-nine, worried that silting at Qingkou would trap grain barges and that the coastal route to Tianjin was treacherous, the emperor proposed loading grain onto sand junks at the Yangtze, sailing to the Yellow estuary, and transshipping into the Middle Canal to shorten the sea leg. He referred the scheme to Zhang Penghe, superintendent of rivers, for evaluation. Zhang Penghe reported that the breaches were closed, clear water had been restored, and the grain fleet could sail unimpeded. Switching to sand junks and hiring seamen, he argued, would merely waste money. The passage from the Yangtze through the open sea and the Yellow estuary into the Middle Canal, he added, was too exposed to storms to be practicable. The emperor accepted his advice. Yu Chenglong had earlier abandoned the lower Middle Canal where it hugged the Yellow River and, from Shengjiadao in Taoyuan to Qinghe, excavated a sixty-li bypass called the New Middle Canal. Zhang Penghe found the New Middle Canal too shallow and its head at Shengjiadao too tortuous for towing; he built a blocking embankment at Sanyi Dam, merged the upper old channel with the lower new cut, dredged the whole line, and restored an easy transport route.
15
使
In year forty, with clear water again issuing at the lake mouth, the court approved Zhang Penghe's plan to cut a third diversion between Zhangfukou and Peijiazhuang to bolster the fight against Yellow River backflow. When the Yellow surged after the grain convoy had cleared, the blocking dam would be closed to prevent reverse flow; if the flood caught the fleet still moving, the Peijiazhuang intake would be shut and clear water routed through the San Cha River to Wenhua Temple to sustain shipping. That year they completed a masonry sluice on the south bank of the Middle Canal entrance. In year forty-two, eddying at Zhongzhuang near the clear-water outlet was deflecting the current south and hindering traffic; the court relocated the Middle Canal shipping mouth to Yangjiazhuang on the former main clear-water channel, benefiting both grain and salt transport. A year later he ordered a Yangcun spill dam on the Zhili canal to split flood pressure.
16
使
In year forty-four officials warned that keeping the Gaoyan and canal spillways closed endangered the levees, while opening them flooded farmland; they proposed channel works below the three Gaoyan overflow dams to send water into the Gaoyou and Shaobo lakes, and similar works below the relief dams to discharge through Chuanchang Creek into the Baiju, Dingxi, and Caoyan rivers to the sea. The Jiangsu, grain-transport, and river governors were told to survey the works, estimate costs, and oversee construction. Thereafter the Huai and Yang regions were largely freed from catastrophic flooding. In year forty-five Zhang Penghe added two straw dams on the Middle Canal transverse levee and one at the Baojiaying diversion, operating them as needed to keep the canal from silting. When rising canal levels threatened the banks, he built a stone sluice at Wenhua Temple with a fourteen-thousand-eight-hundred-zhang bypass to Baima Lake through Yangjiamiao and Danyangkou, opened in flood and sealed in drought. That year Zhang Boxing, intendant of the Jining circuit, petitioned to divert the Zhang from Cheng'an through the Tongzhang New River into the Sha River at Guantao along the ancient Majia channel, clearing obstructions so it could feed the Wei. The plan was debated but not implemented. Two years on the full Zhang flow returned to Guantao, combining with the Wei in a violent torrent that battered En and De; spill dams at Dezhou's Shaomaying and En County's Sinv Temple and branch channels were built to tame it.
17
西 西
In year sixty Shandong governor Li Shude petitioned to open the Pengkou New River. A Jining official had earlier reported that sand spitting from Zhaoyang, Weishan, and West lakes kept choking the channel inside Sandong Bridge despite repeated dredging, blocking grain traffic; a new cut was needed to bypass the sand fan. Li Shude now renewed that petition. The emperor replied that the Shandong canal depended on water from West Lake. Locals had long opened or closed channels as they saw fit. What did they hope to gain by opening it? And what did they hope to gain by blocking it? Until those motives were understood, he said, no decision to open the river could be made. Otherwise public funds would be squandered for nothing." He added that the Shandong canal lived entirely on lake and spring water. Widespread rice cultivation and upstream diversions for irrigation, he warned, left the lakes empty and unable to feed the canal. He had once refused a similar eastern petition for fear of flooding downstream. Now they were asking again. With Weishan Lake on one flank and the Yixian hills on the other, he asked, where could a new channel even be cut? Zhang Penghe should convey these orders to the governor, discipline local officials, survey springs, and hoard lake water so the grain transport would run smoothly—a simple matter, he concluded." Thus ended the imperial address.
18
使 便
In Yongzheng 1 Qi Sule and Zhang Dayou described Shandong's chain of storage lakes—from Nanwang, Mata, and Shushan to Weishan and beyond—as ancient "water cabinets" that filled from the river in flood and fed the canal in drought. Decades of encroachment had turned much of Zhaoyang, Anshan, and Nanwang into private farmland. They would not dispossess established fields but would survey the remaining lakebed after drawdown, mark boundaries, forbid further encroachment, and restore storage capacity. Mata, Shushan, Machang, and Nanyang still had sluice towers and could be deepened behind earthen dams to stock water for the coming transport season. Dushan Lake alone, pressed against the canal by a thin, broken embankment, needed special attention. When the river ran high, they would let it fill Dushan; when levels equalized, they would seal the embankment; and as the river fell they would hold every drop in the lake. Stored water could then be released whenever the canal ran shallow. Maintaining the traditional sluice regimen, they argued, would keep the lakes full and the transport channel open." The court referred the plan to the appropriate agencies for action.
19
西便 西西西
In Yongzheng 2 Qi Sule reinforced Luoma Lake's low eastern shore with a rolling dam west of Tongning Bridge on the Lutang River and a six-hundred-zhang spill embankment with a thirty-zhang outlet. He also helped repair five hundred ten zhang of west-bank works at the canal intake, more than five thousand zhang of levees around Gaoyou and Baoying, and five hundred seventy zhang of revetment south from Qili Lock to Liuyuantou.
20
西 西 使 西 西
In year four Qi Sule relocated the old Pengkou below Zhongjiadu to the Cross River, but sand continued to choke the mouth as before. After Jiang Chenxi's memorial on transport and He Guozong's inspection of the Henan-Shandong canal, the reviewers reported that Shandong shipping depended on lake storage and urged dredging and embanking Anshan Lake; they called for heightening the Nanwang and Mata levees and Guanjia Dam and installing timed stone sluices; water-channeling dams were needed below each split on the sandy banks; the Dai Village Dam on the southern Wen should be strengthened; a stone spill dam should be built on the northern Wen at Kan River; a training dam was needed at En County's Sinv Temple; two west-bank intake locks should be restored and an east-bank overflow dam added; the Puzhou junction of the Sha and Zhao Wang rivers needed its old earthen diversion repaired, with voluntary west-bank channels feeding the Sha to aid both transport and irrigation; and diversion cuts should be dug on the north banks of Wucheng and En County. South of Beiquan the Henan canal's five locks—Ren, Yi, Li, Zhi, and Xin—encouraged locals to tap and steal water illicitly. They proposed demolishing those locks, building a stone weir at the spring outlet with three gated channels, and small levees to prevent side leakage; east and west branch canals would each carry five sluices for farmland irrigation. The Xiaodan below Qinghua should be dredged with ponds, stone sluices, and three channels—the center for the state, the flanks for the people. Ruined Huan River stone dams should be rebuilt as training works. Every spring head should be deepened to feed the Wei and the canal." The court again ordered the responsible agencies to act on the report. In year five Governor Saileng'e, finding the Willow Long River silting despite its continuity, cut two diversions around Jinqian Ridge—one north into Anshan Lake, one south through the lock to feed the canal.
21
宿 西西
In year eight Ji Zengjun recalled that Suqian's Cross River mouth on Luoma Lake had once fed the canal and scoured the Yellow River. Later, fearing Yellow backflow as the lake waned, they sealed the mouth and built a blocking dam west of Xining Bridge, forcing the canal to depend on muddy Yellow water that silted the Middle Canal. That autumn mountain floods, with no outlet, spilled across the landscape. He asked to reopen the Cross River mouth to flush the Middle Canal with lake water, widen the blocking dam, and send surplus upstream water to the sea via Liutang River." The court approved. That year also saw the first patrol posts every two li along the Yellow and canal banks, each manned by two guards who could call on neighbors for help.
22
In year nine Tian Wenjing reported that the southern Wen, which fed the canal, had once been regulated by the Linglong, Luanshi, and rolling overflow dams. At summer peak, floodwater spilled into the Salt River through the rolling dam while sand escaped through the Linglong and Luanshi gaps. He Guozong's stone dams within the three works had sealed them entirely, eliminating both spillways and silt vents so the Wen drove sand into the canal and the bed rose relentlessly. They proposed replacing the dam with wing structures, fifty-six spur cores, fifty-five central sluices, and adjustable boards for controlled release. Since the works still could not be operated, they added a separate earthen berm called the Spring-Autumn Dam. The court approved as petitioned. In year eleven Governor Yue Jun reported that Dongping's Anshan Lake once had four derelict reservoir gates in Shandong. After He Guozong's plan to revive Anshan as a reservoir, crews rebuilt river and ring dikes, restored two locks, and installed the Anji stone gate between Baliwan and Shilipu; none of it held water for the canal. The porous lake bed could not be impounded by ring dikes, so protective maintenance was needed throughout. Filling gaps in the ring dike should stop entirely to avoid wasted labor. The court approved. In year twelve Li Wei of Zhili, noting that Gucheng's bend beside Dezhou and Wucheng had no levees and flooded habitually, organized labor-for-rice dike repairs among local farmers. Governor Yue Jun, facing a head-on current at Dezhou, cut a new channel on the east bank, built a rolling dam and flanking remote dikes, and added culverts for overflow.
23
使 殿 滿 便 殿 調 簿
In Qianlong year two Censor Ma Qiyuan warned that the Zhili and Shandong canal sections were silting badly. Minister Laibao urged a terrain survey to balance Wei water between the grain fleet and farmland irrigation. The throne dispatched Zhao Dianzui and Anning, with the canal, river, and provincial governors, to inspect and report jointly. The ministry found Shandong's 439 springs clear and most works sound, but eight locks from Daimiao to Dunzhuang needed wing-wall and stone-face repairs, including the sunken wings at Sankong Bridge—all assigned to the river superintendent. Reed farming on Mata, Shushan, and other lakes must be banned; Nanwang-style reservoirs should drain only; the silted Xiaoqing needs phased restoration. Wei water should be regulated with a gauge at Guantao and Linqing, opened and closed according to measured depth. Ma Qiyuan added that the Tongzhou–Tianjin reach was too shallow for grain barges. Zhao Dianzui and Gu Cong were sent to investigate. Inquiry found soldiers posted on the Tianjin upstream reach but no civil superintendent. They proposed a new transport vice magistrate at Zhangjiawan solely for dredging; with two sergeants and four deputies under his command. Puji Temple's four Tongzhou locks would gain a clerk; Daxing's seven Qingfeng locks a registrar; dredging would be verified through the grain bureau. On Ortai's advice they built a rolling dam east of Duliucun with a diversion into Zhongtangwa to ease Jinghai flooding and Tianjin's triple-mouth current conflict. That year they undertook a major dredging of over three hundred li of the Huai-Yang canal from the transport mouth to Guazhou.
24
殿 調 使 使
In year three Bai Zhongshan argued that Wei water must be managed by flexible gate operation. Zhao Dianzui's proposed Guantao and Linqing gauges were unnecessary. With balanced rainfall, springs and sluices again split state and local use as before. In drought, private channels would close temporarily for the grain fleet. When water was ample and the fleet had passed, state sluices could lower boards for irrigation. That year crews restored the Santang overflow dam and cleared branch channels into the Majia River. They also rebuilt the Sankong Bridge overflow and opened a branch into the Tuhei River. Work added Peijiakou culverts, Fangjiakou and Majia dikes, and an eight-hundred-li towpath from Taizhuang to Linqing, shielding riverside farms and homes.
25
During Maochengpu dredging, Gao Bin had shifted the canal mouth seventy zhang upstream after Yellow backflow, linking it to Sancha River. Next year Yellow water still invaded the canal; critics blamed the new mouth, and Grand Secretary Ortai was ordered to inspect. Ortai reported the mouth faced Qingkou directly; clear water from Peijia field ran northeast to Qingkou while canal inflow remained a gentle eddy. The new training dam was too short for peak clear-water flow; he recommended extending it rather than reopening the old outlet. Until the new locks opened, grain boats should use the straighter old channel for easier towing. The new route would have Tongji and Fuxing locks below Tianfei, operated as conditions required. After the grain fleet passed, full canal water would divert through the new channel; during lake floods both old and new locks would close until levels fell, alternating the two routes. Thus ended Ortai's memorial.
26
西 西 使
Ortai also mapped two Zhang River courses: one through Qiu county west to the Fuyang and Dalu Marsh, then the Ziya to Tianjin and the sea. The other followed the old Sha River east of Qiu county through Hebei towns, the Qianqing marsh, and into the canal toward the sea. The western route lay far from the Wei and its traces were drowned, making reopening impractical. The Fuyang–Ziya junction could not absorb the Zhang's full discharge either. The old Sha River, the ancient Majia, offered a broad channel: reopen it from He'erzhai to Zhangdong to rejoin the old bed with minimal work. A lock at the new cut's Wei outlet would feed the canal when Wei water ran low and send surplus back to the old course when it did not. Locks below Qing county would keep the northern canal clear and protect downstream farms from flooding. He asked Zhili and Shandong to survey and budget the work jointly. In year five Shandong's canal office became a transport-canal bureau under Bai Zhongshan, charged with impoundment, dredging, and locks while keeping the river treasury.
27
In year twenty-two Gaoyou gained an east-bank stone dam with gauges set to open and close with the flood level. Censor Hai Ming urged dredging Taoyuan's gravel bar and the three-thousand-plus zhang shallow stretch from Yangzhou's Wantou Lock to the Fan shrine south of the Yellow River. The Zhenjiang–Changzhou reach has no headwaters and depends on Yangzi tides, so winter and spring left it shallow. Daily tidal silting and loose banks required a full dredging every six years, or selective shallow dredging every three. Shallow stretches below Dantu and in Wujin and neighboring counties needed the same treatment. The throne warned that canal dredging invited fraud and ordered officials to inspect in person rather than delegate to staff. Thus ended the imperial edict.
28
使 耀 使 西西
In year twenty-four Hai Ming, Zhang Shizai, and Governor Aertai were commissioned to inspect the Zhili and Shandong canals together. Canal floods had earlier inundated Dezhou and silted roads around Jingzhou. Hai Ming's party now urged extra spillways for summer floods on the Zhang and Wei. Over two hundred fifty winding li from Linqing to Sinv Temple, an old Yellow River trace—the Sha River—ran east from Tawan through Dezhou and Gaotang to the Majia and the sea. They proposed dredging it into a rolling stone dam where the Wen and Wei could merge and split the flood. Widening the Sinv Temple and Shaomaying branches, the Wen and Wei's old spillways, would protect Dezhou downstream from flash floods. In year twenty-five Censor Yao Hai and Shizai argued that north of Nanwang only Mata Lake could not buffer floods. Dushan's Jinxian Lock sent water only south, while Liji could feed the north. They asked to relocate Jinxian Lock above Liulin so Dushan's lakes would supply the northern canal entirely. The throne approved. In year twenty-seven two scoured outlets north of Yutai's Xinzhuang Bridge, impossible to control, were replaced with a rolling dam as Shizai proposed. That year crews dredged a forty-zhang diversion at Dezhou's Xifang'an, built Qijiazhuang training works, extended Qingkou's east-west dams, and repaired Lijiawu stone lock. In year twenty-eight, on Aertai's advice, five cuts were opened where the Linqing canal hugged villages to split the current.
29
調
In year thirty-three, with Yellow water in the canal, Liu Tongxun's party opened the Linhuang dam and dredged shoals along the route. In year thirty-seven Yao Lide reported that a Si River stone dam at Dongjiakou, built to split flow, now blocked the river as it shifted south. He asked to remove the dam and widen the old stone bridge at Mengjia Bridge. The court approved as petitioned. In year fifty Grand Secretary Agui was sent to survey the river works in person. Agui wrote that on arrival he found most engineers, including Shang Saizai and Li Fenghan, still favored diverting Yellow water into the lakes. That year the lakes nearly dried: after the sixth month no clear water issued at all, while a swollen Yellow River backed up through the canal to Huai and Yang. His only remedy was to use stored muddy Yellow water for the return fleet while hoarding whatever clear water remained for the loaded southbound run. The southbound second fleet had crossed the Huai and Yellow on Yellow water alone; empty northbound hulls, drawing little draft, might still follow one another home if carefully managed. Using Yellow River water for the grain transport began here. In year fifty-one a canal flood wrecked Huai'an's Jing River stone sluice on the east bank, its walls undermined so the gates would not work. Five years on, local gentry in Shanyang and Baoying rebuilt it.
30
穿 西
In Jiaqing year one a summer breach at Feng scoured through the South Canal dike at Shejiazhuang, flooding north through Feng and Pei into the lakes and back into the canal. The gap closed that winter but failed again in the spring ice run. The following year both east and west dams gave way; repairs lasted until the second month. After Feng, breaches at Cao, Sui, and Heng became almost annual. In year nine the silt-choked Shandong canal was heavily dredged; and Weishan's lakes were impounded early to feed the route. Thereafter the Yellow stood above the clear channel; the fleet depended on muddy water while silt piled up—gaining little at enormous cost. In year twelve Dewen sought to reopen Zhangjiawan's main channel and seal Kangjiagou; Censor Jia Yunsheng wanted the relief river dredged—both sent to Governor Wen Chenghui. Chenghui proposed dredging the Wenyu upstream. The throne sent Tuojin, Yinghe, and Dewen to reinspect. They reported that years of grain traffic had depended on backflow from the lower Wenyu, which filled the channel with sand. Deep dredging upstream to the stone dam would work with the natural grade. They urged a full longitudinal survey so the entire reach ran free. The throne approved.
31
使 宿
In year thirteen a Tongzhou flood broke Kangjiagou into a new river and silted Zhangjiawan's channel. Director Daqing asked to route next year's fleet through Kangjiagou for a trial year and postpone restoring Zhangjiawan. Minister Wu Jin inspected, agreed with Daqing, and the trial was allowed. The following year Censor Shi Hu declared Kangjiagou unworkable and urged reopening Zhangjiawan's main channel. The case went to Governor Wen Chenghui of Zhili. Governor Wen Chenghui wrote that at Kangjiagou the current ran fierce, forcing grain fleets upstream at enormous cost in tracking lines and haulers. The ground there stood high, and in drought years the channel might drain dry altogether, making navigation still harder. Yet Zhangjiawan's sandy shores made dam footings impossible, and the main channel's long buildup of silt meant dredging would be painfully slow. The throne sent Works Minister Dai Junyuan to inspect; he agreed that no dam could be founded in time and that the fleet might arrive before the old channel reopened, so he urged keeping Kangjiagou for another year while watching conditions. The court approved his request. With over three hundred li of the Huai-Yang canal shoaled shut, Salt Controller Akedang'a asked to wait until September's grain convoy had cleared, then seal Qingjiang's three dams, cut the flow, and dredge section by section down to Guazhou. The proposal went to the ministries for review. They answered that recent shoaling owed to repeated breaches, breaches to Yellow River backflow, backflow to a raised riverbed that blocked clear water—forcing reliance on muddy Yellow River water for transport, which bred silt, collapses, and every other ill at once. The canal was where the symptoms showed, not where the disease began. Let clear water discharge freely against the Yellow River and feed the transport route, and fresh silt would not lodge at the junction while old deposits could be flushed away. Without cutting off backflow at the source, frantic dredging would only refill overnight; deeper cuts would invite fiercer backflow, breached dikes, sucking currents, and worse troubles still. Minister Tuojin and colleagues were ordered to inspect the works with the river governor. In year eighteen Director Ruan Yuan, finding the Pi-Su canal short of locks and choked with shallow sand, asked for two new locks above and below Huize. Governor Baoling of the lower Yangtze was told to review and report.
32
滿
Daoguang year one brought concurrent mountain floods in Shandong: north of Daicun Dam the levee breached over sixty zhang, thirty more of fascine work washed away, and three leaks opened on the Sinvsi branch where Wen River water escaped. On Governor Yao Zutong's advice they cut a channel in the old riverbed beside the main stream to feed transport and refill the lakes. Year three saw a breach at Wangjiazhuang in Zhili, repaired at the expense of the local river offices. That same year four stone revetment dams were added on the official levee north of Daicun. Year four Lecturer Pan Xien warned against using Yellow River water for transport, noting that holding clear water against the Yellow River had long been settled practice. This year Zhang Wenhao's delay in sealing the Yellow River control dam let backflow settle into silt and swell into disaster. To draw more Yellow River water into the canal would fill it with mud, choke every reach, and invite new breaches. Ministers Wen Fu and colleagues were ordered to deliberate the proposal.
33
Since late Jiaqing the Yellow River had broken repeatedly, silting the Grand Canal ever higher, while year after year muddy water was used to float grain—a policy critics knew was unsound, which is why some began to urge sea transport. Year five, as Director Wei Yuanyu and others studied sea transport, most officials called it impractical; only Grand Secretary Yinghe proposed a coordinated river-and-canal plan to charter seagoing ships for part of the backlog and trim grain quotas to pay for river works, and the throne told every yamen and province to work out details. Seeing both rivers too far gone for quick repair, the court decreed a one-year trial of sea transport the following year.
34
退 西
The new Governor-General of the Two Jiangs, Qishan, reported: "On reaching Qingjiang I immediately walked the canal and inspected every dam on the transport and clear-water lines. Since Yellow River water had been used for transport, the canal bed had risen more than a zhang, both banks were heaped with silt, and the fairway had shrunk to a thread. Reaches once thirty or forty zhang across now measured ten down to five or six; depths that had been a zhang and a half held only three or four chi of water, and some spots barely five cun. Vessels grounded everywhere; they could neither advance nor withdraw. Lake water behind the transport dam was rising, yet the head feeding downstream barely three cun and could not run freely. Thirty li around Huai'an were the same, and the canal above Gaoyou and Baoying depended entirely on lake water—one could guess the rest. He asked the river and grain directors to widen and deepen the shoals, then release lake water to help towing so the northbound fleet would not miss its schedule." The emperor thundered that using Yellow River water had always been a stopgap: Sun Yuting had seen the fleet struggle yet failed to propose a new plan; former director Wei Yuanyu and Yan Jian had watched the crisis worsen in silence, wasting revenue and burdening the people—what were they thinking? He ordered the canal dredged throughout at the personal expense of Sun Yuting, Wei Yuanyu, and Yan Jian. Qishan added that once the Yellow River dam was sealed the canal bed had stopped rising, Hong Lake held over a zhang of clear water adequate to float the fleet, and he hesitated to dredge recklessly. Even a minimal estimate topped a million taels—far beyond anything Sun Yuting and the others could pay from their estates. Worse, dredging required first sealing the clear-water dam to cut the supply and dry the bed—only then could digging proceed. Lake water now poured down fiercely; below the clear-water dam the plunge pool ran deep with clear water that would not hold mud or seal properly. If dredging began and the clear-water dam burst, the project would halt halfway and every expense would be wasted. He asked to halt dredging on the Li-Yang canal to avoid slipshod work and needless cost. The court agreed. That year revetment works went up at Guoqu Village on the upper Wenyu River. Year seven Governors Zhang Jing and Pan Xien sought to restore the Liulaojian roller dam on the northern canal, tracking dikes south of the central river office and east and west of the Yang grain offices, outer stone revetments, and to move Zhaoguan Dam. Yinghe was sent to inspect quickly; Zhaoguan Dam was fixed south of Sanyuan Palace, and the other repairs proceeded as proposed.
35
使 使 西
Year eleven floodwater at Mapeng Bay and Fourteen Forts merged Gaoyou Lake with the canal into one sheet of water. Governor Tao Shu asked, as in Jiaqing times, to route loaded and empty grain ships around the lake when the canal broke. In the eighth month the breach at Fourteen Forts was sealed. That winter Mapeng Bay was closed as well. Earlier as Jiangsu governor Tao Shu had found the Zhenjiang canal sourceless and dependent on Yangtze tides; with Lower Lian Lake long choked, he moved Huangni Lock to Zhanggu Ferry to catch lake outflow, turn it back upstream, and supplement the tides—a scheme that had worked well. After becoming Jiangsu governor in year fourteen he and Lin Zexu surveyed again, building double storage dams at Huangjin Dam on the lake crest and at East Mound, raising 2,880 zhang of embankment so water could feed the lake. Two stone spill dams on the eastern levee let sudden floods escape safely. At the canal junction they restored the old Nianqijia culvert as a sluice and added a stone lock to feed transport water. When work finished that winter, water through the culvert backed upstream for dozens of li, and grain junks could sail south in close procession. Two years later shifting currents bent the channel, so Huangni Lock was moved two hundred zhang upstream as paired main and spill locks with a rock core, and Lücheng Lock sixty li below Zhanggu was rebuilt the same way to ease grain traffic. Year fifteen, on Governor Wu Bangqing's request, the Nangsha intake sand dam was rebuilt beyond the west bank to improve storage.
36
Year eighteen, with the canal shoaled, Director Li Yumei's plan closed Linqing Lock, added nine sod dams below it to pond water in stages, and built a great barrier south of Zhujizhuang above Hanzhuang to divert springs and southbound canal flow into Weishan Lake. Six rules were issued for impounding water to feed transport. Year nineteen Yumei raised low Daicun Dam to the old height to stop Wen River water escaping sideways. Earlier Censor Cheng Guan argued that dams on the Huai-Yang Mangdao lock and Renzi River would block outflow, and the case went to Tao Shu and colleagues. They now replied that these dams had long stored water without blocking the Yangtze and should not be altered lightly. The court concurred. The Wei River had run so low that it could barely feed the transport canal. Shandong Governor Jing'e'bu asked to revise the rule giving transport three days of water to one for irrigation. An edict opened every official canal and lock on the Baimen Spring and Xiaodan River lines, bypassing private works for the moment, and promised harsh punishment for selling water, blocking transport, or illegal diversions. The following year Grain Director Zhu Shu warned again that the Wei River could not feed downstream and was hurting transport. River Director Wen Chong and Henan Governor Niu Jian were told to investigate. Wen Chong replied that the season when the Wei was needed for transport was exactly when farmers needed it for irrigation. Food was the people's heaven; they could not stand by while crops withered. When rains were normal and the Wei merely low, delaying ships slightly, the old rule should stand. But in severe drought, with grain ships stalled for long stretches, transport outweighed irrigation and private canals and locks might be shut to favor the fleet. The throne agreed.
37
西 穿
Xianfeng year one, thirty zhang of levee at Ganquan Lock gave way; the Yellow River broke at Feng County, flooded Shandong, drowned the canal, and grain ships were rerouted across lake flats. Earlier Household Minister Sun Ruizhen had called Shizi River the chief obstacle to transport, proposing a wider new channel west of the old line with the old bed as a sand trap and a roller dam at Pengkou to take muddy water while clear water ran free—freeing ships and saving two hundred thousand taels in lighterage. The plan went to Eastern River Governor Yan Yixun for review. Yixun now replied that cutting a new channel was too uncertain to justify reopening the debate. The court took note. Year two the Beisizhuang levee on the northern canal broke; Ministers Jia Zhen and Li Jun were sent to seal it, and the next year's tribute grain was ordered by sea to Tianjin. Sea transport thereafter became routine. After Tongzhi steamers carried grain by sea more cheaply and quickly; a tenth of Jiangbei tribute still trial-ran the canal, mainly to keep the route alive. Year five the river broke at Tongwaxiang, cut east through the canal, and smashed the levees. With war urgent, crews could only patch breaches on both banks north of Zhangqiu. Broken civilian levees got emergency revetment heads; where muddy water backed up, barrier dams were thrown up—nothing more could be done. Year ten brought a breach at Mapeng Bay on the Huai-Yang line.
38
穿
Tongzhi year five the river broke at Qingshuitan. Year eight a break at Lanyang sent floodwater down the line, leaving the canal levees even more shattered. North of Zhangqiu there was no other water source; year after year transport relied solely on Yellow River water. Year nine Director Zhang Zhiwan asked for solid north and south dikes where the Yellow River crossed the canal, a controlled mouth for grain ships, and sod dams kept closed against backflow in normal times. The proposal was under review when Zhang Zhiwan moved to Jiangsu; his successor Zhang Zhaodong warned that binding the flow while leaving a gate and also building closing dams might slow the current while upstream water hammered new works beyond endurance. If the river seized the canal and ran north, Dongchang, Linqing, Tianjin, and Hejian would inevitably flood and the northern Wei River route would be ruined. Better to hold the Yellow River eastward near Yuncheng's Ju River, keep the southern canal open, and dredge silt at Zhangqiu and Bali Temple to let tribute move north—a plan with more substance than merely penning water behind dikes. The throne approved.
39
使 滿 穿椿 西
Year ten the river broke at Houjialin and poured into Nanyang, Zhaoyang, and neighboring lakes until Yuncheng nearly became a swamp. Grain Director Su Fengwen wrote that north of Anshan the canal depended entirely on Wen River water, and only above Linqing did the Wei River help. Now the Yellow River lay across the route, dragging the Wen east; north of Anshan there was no supply. He proposed locks where the Wei entered the canal and where clear and Yellow waters met at Zhangqiu to pond Wei water south for the fleet, then after ships passed Shandong open the new Linqing lock and release water north again to float them onward. He also urged dredging more than a zhang through Zhangqiu's shoals and the canal south of Anshan so that before the Yellow River rose, the channel would be deep enough for easy sailing. Governor Zeng Guofan added that river transport was blocked everywhere: at Yixian's Dafankou silt had piled until depth fell below two chi, requiring four or five chi of dredging and leveling shore stone heaps with the bed before ships could pass. Northward, the narrow throat at Teng County's Xishankou into the lakes, the Wangjialou, Manjiakou, and Anjiakou crossings on Weishan Lake, Lijian lock on Dushan Lake, Xindian, Huajia Shoal, and Shifo locks north of Nanyang Lake, and Liulaokou and Yuankou north of Nanwang's Dragon King Temple—all were shoaled for tens or hundreds of zhang and needed uniform deepening. These were the bottlenecks to clear before the fleet reached the Yellow River crossing. Where the Yellow River had cut across the canal and shifted south, fifty-five li of levee from Anshan to Bali Temple lay ruined; Shilipu, Jiangjiazhuang, and Daoren Bridge were badly shoaled. He urged dredging while driving rows of piles linked by heavy ropes at breaches so towlines would have something to grip. These were the works to prepare in advance for the hard passage where the canal crossed the Yellow River. Beyond the Yellow River crossing, the two hundred-odd li from Zhangqiu to Linqing had an uneven bed and needed leveling cuts. While the river remained swollen, locks should pond water against waste—or spur dikes east of the Pingshui South Lock could divert the Yellow River into the Grand Canal. These were the works to prepare in advance for the canal's tendency to run dry after the Yellow River crossing. West of the Dongping canal lay the Salt River, the principal channel for Shandong's salt fleet. Grain boats could enter the Salt River near Anshan and rejoin the canal at Bali Temple—a run of just over a hundred li—far easier than crossing the Yellow River itself, with gap breaches and heavy current above and jumbled rocks and snags below. If the fleet reached Anshan and the Yellow River ran too hard, an alternate route should be used—but the channel had to be surveyed and marked first. This too was an alternate route after the Yellow River crossing that needed advance planning. The Lower River office, the grain transport commissioner, and the Shandong governor then held joint consultations.
40
西 使便 沿便
In the eleventh year of Tongzhi, River Commissioner Qiao Songnian proposed a lock at Zhangqiu to feed the canal with Yellow River water. Sub-Prefect Jiang Zuojin urged diverting the Wei River instead. The emperor asked Zhili Governor Li Hongzhang, who replied that the silting of Qingkou in earlier times had itself been caused by using the Yellow River to float grain boats. At Zhangqiu the channel was only a few zhang across; forcing muddy Yellow River water through locks and dams would raise the level and double the rate of silting. Zuojin's Wei diversion arose because no clear water reached the canal north of Zhangqiu. Even the full force of the Huai could not hold back the Yellow River and still suffered backflow and choking silt—how could the clear, shallow Wei hope to feed the canal against it? He was simply copying the old Shandong practice of feeding the canal from local streams. He overlooked that south of Mount Tai the streams all run west: guided with the slope, the waters of a hundred and eighty springs, broad at source and many in branch, had long been enough for transport. The Wei was a weak stream whose natural course ran north; bending it south would split one supply two ways and create endless inconvenience. Diverting the Qin into the Wei to boost its headwaters was worse still: the Qin ran fierce and muddy, and once loosed could not be recalled—an error warned against since antiquity. Modern river work had tried to serve transport as well, only to trap policy between two impossible goals with no durable remedy. When a policy is exhausted, it must change; change opens a way forward. Foreign shipping now crowded thousands of li of coast in a pattern unknown to any earlier age; the sea route from Shanghai to Tianjin was not only permissible but faster. The memorial was received, and the court ordered that roughly one hundred thousand shi of Jiangsu and Anhui tribute grain each year would still travel by canal while the rest continued by sea. In Guangxu 3, Shandong Governor Li Yuanhua submitted three graded plans for the canal and, gauging provincial finances, proposed the middle option: dredge the northern canal throughout, restore its old alignment, and rebuild the north lock. With famine abroad he folded relief into the project and pared costs repeatedly, yet the work would still need somewhat more than three hundred thousand taels. The proposal was sent down for departmental review.
41
便 使 使 西
In the fifth year of Guangxu, memorials appeared urging a return to canal transport. Jiangsu Governor Shen Baozhen argued that, viewed in the large, every dynasty had turned to canal transport only when it had no choice. Han and Tang at Chang'an and Song at Kaifeng had no alternative to the waterways. Even so the route was perilous and wore down state and people alike until mid-route granaries were built and grain relayed in stages—only then did waste fall somewhat. The Yuan relied on sea transport alone and suffered no Yellow River crises for the whole dynasty. From the Ming onward the state clung to canal transport. River defense therefore became unavoidable. No sooner were transport regulations fixed than the river shifted its bed. As the river wandered, grain policy wandered with it, and the Qing had done the same. Earlier governors had devised sea transport to keep the grain system from collapsing when canal policy reached a dead end. Critics of abandonment argued that the canal linked north and south, carried grain boats, and irrigated fields—that water works lived or died with the transport route. In my view, water management is easy if transport is set aside and nearly impossible if transport must be served at the same time. Farmland and the canal were fundamentally at odds. After two weeks without rain farmers wanted culverts opened for irrigation while officials had to keep them shut to float boats. When the canal rose, officials opened locks and dams to save the levee and fields below were instantly drowned—agriculture could scarcely be spoken of. Others lamented that missing funds and missing fleets had doomed canal transport to fail. Even if every taels of Daoguang repair money and every government grain boat still survived, I see no way to move tribute grain on a channel fed by the Yellow River. Recent hired craft on the north bank numbered less than half the old fleet, yet still needed the Yellow River in flood and thousands of haulers to warp them along—after a few dozen boats the channel silted shut again. Each year's silt was worse than the last, and each year's silver bought nothing for the next. What use were larger or more numerous boats? Because the northwest had suffered drought after drought and the Yellow River ran low, men had grown careless and contemptuous of it. Extremes turn back: if transport works diverted the current north, the capital region would suffer; if south, Huai and Xu would suffer—what then of the people? What then of the state's finances? He closed his memorial.
42
使
In the eighth year a summer flood cut a new seven-hundred-zhang channel through the Zhangjiawan canal from Suzhuang to Yaoxinzhuang, both ends tying into the old bed along a straight line that carried the main current. The old six-thousand-four-hundred-zhang reach above and below lay dry, while the new cut, opened by the flood itself, was not uniformly deep. The following year Zhili Governor Li Hongzhang had new iron-mouthed mud-scrapers built and hauled along both banks until the channel ran clear throughout. In the twelfth year the Chaobai River broke through at Pingjiatun near Tongzhou and poured east into the Jian'gan River. Soon the breach was closed and the canal's old course restored. In the sixth month of the thirteenth year flood again scoured the small levee east of Beishizhuang below the Pingjiatun repair; the old levee collapsed for another hundred-odd zhang into one gap that carried eight-tenths of the flow east. It was soon closed again. That year the Yellow River broke at Zhengzhou and its Shandong reach ran dry; grain boats could not move south, and advocates of borrowing the river for transport were left without recourse. Dredging then cleared the silt at Linqing mouth so empty boats could at last pass from the Yellow River into the canal. In the fifteenth year Shandong Governor Zhang Yao argued that canal transport could not remain suspended long and asked that two hundred thousand shi now sent by sea be returned to the river route. The court agreed.
43
椿宿
In the sixteenth year, on the advice of Jiangsu Governor Zeng Guoquan, the southern canal levees, locks, and culverts in the Yangzhou region were repaired, along with brick revetments at towns and cities. On the advice of Grain Transport Commissioner Song Chun, the canal through Pi and Su counties was dredged. In the nineteenth year the Chaobai River flooded, opening more than seventy breaks along the canal levees and seven more at the upstream Wuguan office. All were closed that winter. In the twentieth year the canal was dredged through Jining, Wenshang, Teng, Yi, Chiping, Yanggu, and Dongping. The following year more than two hundred li from Taochengbu to Linqing were cleared. In the twenty-fourth year Hanlin Reader Ruixun urged commuting southern tribute grain to cash, arguing it would help rather than harm, and asked that commutation funds each year buy rice at Tianjin to fill the granaries. Censor Qin Kuiyang likewise argued that canal transport cost too much in labor and money and asked that northern Jiangsu river carriage be halted. Both proposals were denied; the court instead ordered thorough dredging and the usual sailing season. In the twenty-sixth year allied troops entered Beijing, granaries were seized and emptied, and northern Jiangsu grain boats that had reached Dezhou had their cargoes sent overland to Shanxi and Shaanxi. In the twenty-seventh year Prince Qing Yikuang and Grand Secretary Li Hongzhang memorialized that half of tribute storage depended on transport, that times had changed, and that all provincial tribute grain should be commuted to cash while grain and granary officials divided the work of purchase, delivery, receipt, and storage. Thereafter canal transport was abandoned, and upkeep of the Grand Canal's water works was left to the provinces separately.
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