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卷128 志一百三 河渠三 淮河、永定河、海塘

Volume 128 Treatises 103: Rivers and Canals 3, Huai He, Yong Ding He, Hai Tang

Chapter 128 of 清史稿 · Draft History of Qing
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Chapter 128
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1
Treatise 103.
2
Rivers and Canals, Part 3.
3
The Huai River, the Yongding River, and the Sea Dikes.
4
西 西
The Huai rises on Mount Tongbai, flows southeast through Suizhou, then bends north again east of Tongbai. It passes Xinyang, Queshan, Luoshan, Zhengyang, Xi, Guangshan, Gushi, Fuyang, Huoqiu, and Yingshang, where its tributaries merge and run east to Zhengyang Pass. Downstream tributaries include the Sha, the eastern and western Fei, the Luo, the Er, the Qian, and the Tian Rivers, all of which flow into the Huai. Beyond Fengyang come the Wo and Xie Rivers, the eastern and western Hao, and the Chong, Hui, Tuo, and Tong streams, all of which join the Huai and pour into Hongze Lake. It then runs northeast through Qinghe, Shanyang, and Andong, and reaches the sea by way of Yunti Pass. Its course of more than seventeen hundred li crossed Hubei, Henan, Anhui, and Jiangsu, and in itself the Huai was no great menace. After the Northern Song, when the Yellow River shifted south and took over the Huai's lower channel to reach the sea, the Huai bore the brunt of the damage. Once the Huai sickened, its tributaries spilled in every direction, and both Jiangsu and Anhui suffered alike. Block the lower reach and the upper will break out—that is the nature of water. To manage the Huai one must manage the Yellow River, and managing the Huai begins with managing the river. Throughout the Qing, work at the Huai–Yellow River confluence was pursued with extraordinary diligence at enormous cost to the treasury. In the Xianfeng period the breach at Tongwaxiang sent the Yellow River north again, transforming the channel pattern that had held since Song and Yuan times. Yet the river's shift left silt behind, and efforts to guide the Huai could not be abandoned. What follows records in full the Huai's sources and branches, the storage and release at Qingkou, and the dikes and dams built on Hongze Lake.
5
In the summer of Shunzhi 6, the Huai flooded Xi County and destroyed farmland and homes. In Kangxi 1, residents of Xuyi and Sizhou illegally cut eight small channels south of Gugou Town and north of Gujia Bridge, diverting more than half the Huai into the Gaoyou and Baoying lakes. At Qingkou the Huai ran too weak to hold back the Yellow River. In Kangxi 6–7 the Huai swelled, broke through Gugou and Zhaijiadun, and poured from the Gaoyou and Baoying lakes straight into the Grand Canal. It breached Qingshui Tan and flooded Wujiadun and Gaoliangjian; Qingkou silted shut while the Yellow River backed up. In Kangxi 15 the Huai rose again, joined by Sui Lake and other waters driving east together. Twenty-six breaches opened in the plank revetments at Gaoliangjian and seven in the stone works at Gaoyan, and not a drop passed Qingkou. The Yellow River, riding high, broke out in four directions. One stream entered Hongze Lake, met the Huai through the Gaoyan breaches, and all poured toward Qingshui Tan as the lower course silted ever deeper.
6
西 椿 使
Director-General Jin Fu reported: "The lower reach of Hongze, from Gaoyan west to Qingkou—about twenty li—was once a vast sheet of water where the entire Huai met the Yellow River. After the Huai broke east and the Yellow River flooded in, that stretch of lakebed has silted into level ground, leaving only a channel ten-odd zhang wide and five or six chi deep—or as little as one or two. Tens of thousands of mu of silt make dredging extremely difficult. The only remedy is to dig a diversion channel on each bank about twenty zhang from the waterline so they can scour separately. Then the Huai descending can cut through the silt, run straight to Qingkou, meet the Yellow River and scour away sand, without risk of blockage or spreading." Fu added: "Once the lower course is repaired, the Huai can run straight to meet the Yellow River and scour sand. But along the lakeshore, apart from the breach sites, every dike is broken and thin—dangerously unsafe. Plank revetments fail easily, and even the stone works that have collapsed are beyond counting. Earthen slopes below the dike resist even major floods. To save cost and build solidly, earth should be taken from the lakeside face of the dike and built into supporting slopes. For each zhang of dike, build a five-chi-wide slope and densely sow grass roots and seed on it; once they grow thick, the earth will bind firmer still. At Gaoyan's stone works, supporting slopes should be built as well, with the stonework buried inside for greater stability. Compared with planks, stone, and fascines, this saves more than 210,000 taels and avoids the hazard of impact and collapse." He also said: "From Zhoujia Sluice through Gugou and Tang'eng to south of Zhaijiaba, building thirty-two li of dike, blocking the nine channels cut by earlier floods, and repairing the thirty-four breaches large and small at Gaoliangjian, Gaojiayan, and Wujiadun is estimated at more than 705,000 taels—all in fascines that rot within three years. I have weighed alternatives: fascines are needed only for edging and capping. Elsewhere rows of piles should be set closely, with extra plank cables, earth wrapped in rushes and bound with rope—halving the cost while lasting longer. The plan is to replace fascines with wrapped earth and still build supporting slopes." The court approved. In Kangxi 18, Qingkou and the diversion channels at Lanniqian, Peijiachang, and Shuaizhuang were heavily dredged so the full Huai discharge reached Qingkou and joined the Yellow River flowing east.
7
使
In Kangxi 35, Director-General Dong Anguo, following Sizhou Prefect Mo Zhihan's proposal, asked to open the Yuwang River at Shengren Mountain in Xuyi to divert the Huai toward the Yangtze. He summarized: "The ancient Yuwang channel from Shengren Mountain in Xuyi through Heilin Bridge, Tongcheng, Yangcun, and Tianchang to Bali Bridge in Liuhe still shows traces—streams, ravines, and ridges in varying degrees. If opened to the Yangtze, the branches at Tianchang, Yangcun, and Tongcheng could carry floodwater without pouring into Gaoyou Lake, easing overflow and reducing pressure on the lower river. At the ancient mouth, which no longer connects to the Huai, sluice gates must be built: closed when water is low to aid the grain transport, opened when it rises to discharge flood, easing the Huai's surging force." Court deliberation rejected the plan. The following year the throne ordered that the Gaoyan dams be sealed. Two years later Director-General Yu Chenglong petitioned to seal the six dams. He fell ill and died before the work was finished. That year floods returned; three dams had been sealed, but they soon gave way to the torrent. In Kangxi 39 Zhang Penghe became Director-General, sealed them all so the Huai had no escape, and sent the full discharge to Qingkou; he also opened seven diversion channels—Zhangfu, Peijiachang, Zhangjiazhuang, Lanniqian, Sancha, and the Natural and Heavenly Gift channels—to guide the Huai and scour Qingkou; Because the Qingkou diversion was only thirty-odd zhang wide—too narrow to release the full lake discharge—he widened it further. Clear water cut off for more than ten years burst forth at once, and the Huai stood more than a chi above the Yellow River. In Kangxi 40 the great Gaoyan dike was built.
8
穿 使 西
In Kangxi 44 the Kangxi Emperor toured south, inspected the Gaoyan works, and ordered dredging and dikes below the three dams to confine water in Gaoyou, Shaobo, and the other lakes. Hongze Lake also rose, flooding Sizhou and Xuyi; dikes should be built proportionately at the points receiving water to confine it. In Kangxi 45 Liangjiang Governor-General Ashan and others proposed cutting a new channel at Liuhuaitao in Sizhou straight to Zhangfukou to split the Huai's force, at an estimated cost of more than 3.1 million taels. The Ministry rejected the plan. Court officials, deeming the project too momentous, asked the emperor to inspect in person. The next year the emperor toured south to inspect the river and said: "Survey shows Liuhuaitao lies very high; even if a channel were cut, it could not reach Qingkou directly. Moreover the survey stakes stand mostly on graves. Opening a channel on this line would ruin fields and homes—and destroy tombs as well. Why add this needless work? Opening Liuhuaitao would require cutting through mountains and ridges—surely impossible—and flood-season overflow would bypass Hongze Lake and burst the Grand Canal instead." He ordered the stakes removed and punished Ashan, Penghe, and others accordingly. The emperor also said: "In Ming times the Huai and Yellow River bore no resemblance to today. In the Ming the Huai was weak, hence the fear of the Yellow River backing up into it. Now the Huai is strong and the Yellow River weak. Rather than opening the useless Liuhuaitao channel, dredge Hongze Lake's outflow wider and deeper so clear water runs more freely—the benefit would be considerable." In Kangxi 49 the western Yellow River-control dam was extended, at River Director Zhao Shixian's request.
9
西
In Yongzheng 1 the eastern and western clear-water retention dams at Qingkou were rebuilt before the Fengshen Temple to store clear water, each more than twenty zhang long. In Yongzheng 3 Director-General Qi Sule, after Zhujiahai burst and the lakebed silted, fearing Gaoyan could not hold, lowered the three dams' sills by one chi five cun to release lake water—a stopgap measure. He did not realize that as the water level dropped, the Huai could discharge even less—too weak to hold back the Yellow River. Year after year the river backed up and split currents rushed onward. Li Wei strongly disapproved. Previously the Gaoyan stonework had not been uniformly solid. In the winter of Yongzheng 7 a million taels were issued, and Director-General Kong Jixun and Governor-General Yin Jishan were ordered to rebuild every low, thin, or collapsed section until the dike was uniformly solid. In the autumn of Yongzheng 10 the Gaoyan stonework was completed.
10
宿便 西 使便 使
In Qianlong 2, following Director-General Gao Bin's proposal, orders went out to dredge the channel from Maochengpu downstream through Xu, Xiao, Sui, Su, Ling, and Hong to Anmen Douhe in Sizhou—a winding six-hundred-li course to Hongze Lake and Qingkou—while Huai-Yang capital officials Xia Zhifang and others objected that it was impracticable. The matter was referred to the governors-general, governors, and river and grain transport directors for conference, and Bin was summoned for questioning. Bin arrived, presented maps and explained, and it became clear that Fang and others were describing conditions that no longer held. In the end Bin's plan was adopted. The following year the Maochengpu channel works were completed. In Qianlong 4 the Qianlong Emperor, since the three Gaoyan dams had been lowered and overtopping water could be fully discharged, following Grand Secretary Ortai permanently forbade opening the two Natural dams. In the autumn of Qianlong 5 a violent west wind raised surging lake waves; the old dike at the eighth bastion of the Gaoyan flood section was struck and fourteen sections collapsed, and were soon repaired. In Qianlong 6 Bin reported: "The San Cha River at Jiangdu is the mouth of the Guazhou and Yizhen channels. Guazhou lies low, so little Huai water enters it; the current is too slow to scour deep, and the channel silts daily. A dam should block the old Guazhou mouth; below Yangzi Bridge camp a new overflow channel should be cut to reduce Huai water entering Guazhou so Yizhen can divide flow and scour silt. The old overflow at Guazhou's Guanghui Sluice should be blocked and a new one opened below the sluice to balance the currents, easing the Huai's direct rush into the Yangtze and aiding the transport route." In Qianlong 7 river and lake rose together; advocates again argued that all upstream Huai waters gathered in Hongze Lake and that below Shaobo more outlets to the Yangtze should be opened. Bin agreed. The old Shiyang Gou channel was dredged straight to the Yangtze and a forty-zhang rolling dam built. The streams at Dongjiayoufang below Mangdao Sluice and Kongjiahan on Baita River were opened and rolling dams added so Huai water could flow freely. In Qianlong 8 the Huai rose more than a zhang in a sudden flood, threatening Linhuai city; the seat of government was moved to Zhouliang Bridge.
11
西 便
In Qianlong 16 the emperor, noting that the Natural Dam at the tail of Gaoyan was opened in every major flood and devastated downstream counties, ordered a stone inscription permanently forbidding its opening. Following Bin's advice, the Zhi and Xin dams were added beyond the three dams to aid discharge. In the seventh month of Qianlong 18 the Huai flooded Gaoyou, destroying the Cheluo Dam and the two Shaobo sluices; many fields and homes in the lower river were submerged. In Qianlong 22, since lake water issued at Qingkou only because the eastern and western dams confined it to scour the Yellow River together, excessive lake water spilled over the five dams—a feared calamity for the lower river. A rule was fixed: one cun over the five dams, the eastern dam opened two zhang wide, increasing by that ratio, and the rule was carved on the eastern dam. Thereafter whenever lake water rose, the eastern dam was widened to release major floods—sometimes to sixty or seventy zhang. In Qianlong 27 the emperor said: "In Jiangnan's lake-border regions, every major flood season brings prolonged rain and inundation; Hongze Lake above all is the critical valve. To secure this water country, nothing matters more than broadly dredging Qingkou—that is the first priority now. At present the five Gaoyan dams stand more than seven chi above water and the Qingkou mouth is thirty zhang wide—plans should be fixed accordingly at once. When water at the two dams rises one chi, widen Qingkou ten zhang; as water rises, widen the mouth proportionally—that shall be the rule." That year in the sixth month the flood mark at the five dams exceeded one chi. River Director Gao Jin followed the edict and widened Qingkou ten zhang; discharge ran very freely. In Qianlong 32 Southern Rivers Governor-General Li Hong reported: "The old flood mark at Sanguan Temple at Zhengyang Pass no longer matches downstream conditions—the rise and fall reported this year do not agree. Please add flood marks between Jing Mountain and Tu Mountain and at Linhuai Town to verify water levels throughout the system." The request was approved. In Qianlong 34 the emperor feared the earthen caps on the five Gaoyan dams could not withstand wind and waves, and ordered stone reinforcement. Gao Jin and others said stone was impracticable, and brush and willow were added instead. In Qianlong 40 major repairs were made to the dams at Yan and Xu and the riverside brick and stonework.
12
使 西 西使
Earlier, because of backflow at Qingkou, the emperor ordered dredging along the old Taozhuang diversion trace opened by Zhang Penghe in Kangxi times to divert the Yellow River north. Ortai and Bin were sent to survey, but work stopped when flood-season water arrived suddenly. Soon Wanyan Wei succeeded Bin as River Director. Fearing the diversion would be hard to complete, he adopted Bin's plan to set wooden deflectors west of Qingkou to turn the current north, but Taozhuang was never proposed again. The following year Southern Rivers Director Wu Sijue was summoned to court and urgently reported the harm caused by backflow. Sa Zai succeeded him and also advocated changing the river outlet. The emperor then resolved to open it. The eastern and western dam foundations at Qingkou were moved down 160 zhang to Pingcheng Terrace, a 130-zhang Yellow River-blocking dam was built, and a diversion channel was opened north of Taozhuang so the Yellow River stood farther from Qingkou, clear water could flow freely, and scour silt with force. In the second month of the following year the diversion was completed. The Yellow River flowed straight to Zhoujiazhuang, met the clear current flowing east, and Qingkou was spared backflow for nearly ten years.
13
使 西西
In Qianlong 50 Hongze Lake dried in drought and Yellow River silt reached Qingkou. Henan Governor Bi Yuan was ordered to sacrifice at the Huai channel and dredge the Jia Lu, Huiji, and other rivers to aid clear water, but lake water still would not discharge and the Yellow River backed in again. The emperor wished to open the reduction dams at Maochengpu and Wangjiaying and referred the matter to Grand Secretary Agui and others. Agui said: "To cure Qingkou's ailment, silt below the old dam works must be removed, and above all the Yellow River must be drawn lower so clear water can issue freely and scour sand—the problem will right itself without forced effort." The four diversion channels at Zhangfukou were closed, lake branch rivers dredged, clear water stored above seven chi, the Wangying reduction dam opened to release Yellow River water, all channels opened, clear water issued at Qingkou to wash sand, the Qingkou water-catching dam was repaired and renamed the Clear-Water Retention Dam. The eastern and western clear-water retention dams before the Huiji Temple were moved down 300 zhang to Fushen Lane; the eastern dam was lengthened to repel the Yellow River and the western shortened to release clear water, and the structure was renamed the Yellow River-Control Dam.
14
使 西
In the first year of Jiaqing lake water was weak; clear water stood more than a zhang below the Yellow River, and the Huai was blocked from discharging. When the Huai rose, the five dams at Shanxu and the seven forts at Wucheng were opened; when the Yellow rose, reduction dams might release water into the lake to relieve backflow at Qingkou. In the fifth year, acting on Yangtze Governor-General Fei Chun and Canal Governor Wu Jing's proposal, the diversion channel at Wucheng's seven forts was opened to discharge lake water into the Yellow River and reduce excessive flooding. In the eighth year the Yellow River's passage to the sea was obstructed, and it poured straight into Hongze Lake. Jing went to survey the river mouth and requested vigorously closing all dams at the transport junction, leaving only the outlet gates—clear water, though too weak to issue freely, could at least keep the Yellow River from entering again. In the seventh month the Huai swelled; the high weir was in grave danger, and the Xin and Yi dams were opened to release water. A strong west wind arose; the Ren and Zhi dams were destroyed, and the Huai south of the embankments rushed toward Qingkou. The emperor reproached Jing and dismissed him from office. In the spring of the ninth year lake water issued somewhat, but during the summer flood season the Yellow River still backed in. Canal Governor Xu Duan argued that the Clear-Water Retention Dam north of the transport junction diverted flow into the canal and left clear water unable to match the Yellow River; he asked to rebuild it south of the lake outlet. The request was approved. In the eleventh year Yangtze Governor-General Tie Bao said: "Pan Jixun and Jin Fu devoted their river works to Qingkou—rightly so, for when Qingkou discharges freely the river channel scours deeper, the estuary runs smoothly, and Hongze need not overflow. For the present plan, sluices and dams must be heavily repaired, clear water must be used to scour sand, and lake water must be stored in greater volume—there is no avoiding it. Nor can stone embankments go unprotected; above all, outlets for discharge must be urgently planned." He also joined Xu Duan in submitting several river projects: first, Fangjiamatou and the Three Old Dams in the outer-river office district, bulwarks of Huai and Yangzhou, should be filled and armored with rubble; second, the Yi dam should be closed and rebuilt; third, the four Ren, Zhi, Li, and Xin dams, damaged in places, should be dismantled and repaired. The court deliberation granted the requests. The emperor feared that repairing all four dams at once would discharge too much clear water and ordered them carried out in sequence.
15
In the fifteenth year, tenth month, gale-driven waves breached the Yi dam and tore more than a thousand zhang from the works at Yan and Xu. Some proposed building rubble-covered gentle slopes, but the cost was deemed too great and the plan was not carried out. Jing and Xu Duan asked to heighten the two embankments Jin Fu had built outside the main dike as a second line of defense; the court discussion also rejected this. When Chen Fengxiang took charge of the Southern Canal, he renewed the request for the two embankments. The matter was referred to Yangtze Governor-General Bai Ling for deliberation. Bai Ling said strengthening the main dike was preferable. In the seventeenth year Coordinating Grand Secretary Songyun was sent on an inspection tour and also upheld Bai Ling's view. Thereupon a subsidiary weir was built along the main dike from the end of the Clear-Water Retention Dam southward to the Xin Dam. Fengxiang was impeached by Bai Ling for opening the Zhi and Li dams before clear water was stored while the lake had not yet risen, causing the Li dam to burst, flooding downstream, depleting clear water, and harming the whole river system; he was stripped of office and sent into exile. In the eighteenth year Bai Ling and Southern Canal Governor Li Shixu reported that the Ren, Yi, and Li dams, opened repeatedly, had ruined foundations and scoured plunge pools; they asked to relocate the three dams to a hilly site south of Jiangjiaba, each with a diversion channel, building Ren and Yi first and replacing the Li foundation with a straw dam for that year's release. The emperor ordered the Yi dam built first; if regulation proved satisfactory, the rest would be repaired year by year. In the twenty-third year a second Clear-Water Retention dam was added north of the first to store lake water.
16
In Daoguang 2 the stone works of the high weir were further repaired. In the winter of the fourth year the river rose; Hongze Lake stored water to 1.7 zhang yet still stood about a chi below the Yellow River; the crest of the thirteen forts at the high weir was torn by flood, Xilang'an at Zhouqiao in Shanxu took eight or nine chi of water, and every dam suffered damage. The emperor sent Ministers Wen Fu and Wang Tingzhen on inspection and dismissed Canal Governor Zhang Wenhao from office. The breach at the thirteen forts was soon closed. Vice Minister Zhu Shiyan said: "In the high-weir stone works the officials concerned sought only economy and executed the work carelessly. They also took earth from the nearby secondary dikes for emergency repairs to the main dike and did not restore them afterward. As for the five Shanxu dams, meant to release Hongze's peak floods, they failed to observe the old regulations and open according to conditions, so the stone works were torn away. The memorial was also sent down to Wen Fu and others to verify on inspection. The following spring, following Wen Fu's recommendation, earthen slopes on the lake dike were converted to rubble, and stone roller dams were added at the old Ren, Yi, and Li dam sites against extraordinary floods.
17
In the eighth year the emperor noted more than a zhang of silt above and below the Yellow River-Control Dam, clear water could not be stored in quantity, and that dam could never be opened; he referred the matter to Southern Canal Director-General Zhang Jing and others for deliberation. Jing and others said: "Under Qianlong the lake stood seven or eight chi, sometimes more than a zhang, above the river; in summer the Yellow River-Control Dam was dismantled and extended to release clear water and scour silt, and was closed only in winter. In Jiaqing, because the river had silted, the practice was changed to closing in summer and opening in autumn. Yet whenever the Yellow rose even briefly, backflow followed at once. Now silt has accumulated for years; even if clear water can issue, it stands only a few cun or a chi or so above the Yellow; the dam is opened briefly then closed—enough to avoid backflow but not to scour silt effectively." The emperor was displeased and said: "Judging the present by the past, the situation has become incurable. Canal governors know only to release clear water to protect the weir and close the control dam to prevent backflow, adding works and requesting funds while caring for the moment alone and not for the long term—what of state finances? What of the people's livelihood? What of days to come?"
18
西 西
In the tenth year Jing said: "The Huai's path to the sea is obstructed. I propose cutting diversion channels at Batapu and Shangjiagou in the Yangzhou grain office district to join the Yangtze and split flood peaks, and removing the eastern and western sluices of the Mangdao River while dredging silt bars—equal to opening a new channel." The proposal was approved. In the twelfth year the Xin dam was relocated to Xiajiaqiao. In the fourteenth year, because the Yi-character diversion had scoured three or four zhang deep and was hard to close, Canal Governor Lin Qing's request was granted to recut the head of the Yi-character channel. In the twenty-first year the river breached at Xiangfu; the diverted current poured into Hongze Lake, tidal floods on the Yangtze backed it up again, and the Yellow River-Control, Clear-Water Retention, and Li, Zhi, and Ren dams were dismantled and extended, along with Cheli and other dams, to release lake water. In the twenty-third year the river breached at Zhongmou; the entire current poured into Hongze Lake; more than four thousand zhang of high-weir stonework was torn away; the Clear-Water Retention, Yellow River-Control, Zhi, and Xin dams were opened in turn, along with the Shunqing, Li, and Yi channels, the old Jinwan dam, and the eastern and western bay dams together, reducing water into the Yangtze.
19
In Xianfeng 5 the river breached again at Tongwaxiang and flowed east via the Daqing River to the sea. Since the Northern Song the Yellow River had broken once at Huazhou and again at Danzhou, dividing toward the southeast and joining the Si to enter the Huai. For more than seven hundred seventy years the Huai's lower reaches had been seized by the river; when the river was sick, the Huai was sick too. Now it shifted north, and the calamity south of the Yangtze subsided. Each year there were petitions from scholars and commoners to restore the Huai's old course.
20
使
In Tongzhi 8 Yangtze Governor-General Ma Xinyi dredged the Zhangfukou diversion, and the Huai then reached the Grand Canal via Qingkou. Later the silted Yellow River channel below Yangzhuang was also cut to release floods on the Middle Canal. In the ninth year Ma Xinyi and others said: "Surveying the channel below Yuntiguan and the lake bed at Chengzihé, Zhangfukou, and Gaoliangjian, we found the Yellow River bed one to one-and-a-half zhang higher than Hongze's; the silted Yellow River must be heavily dredged so the Huai can reach the sea, then Qingkou opened to guide it into the old Yellow River channel, then the three rivers blocked to stop side leakage and aid storage. Yet without restoring the Yan and Xu stonework and solidly building both Grand Canal dikes, we dare not hastily block the three rivers or open Qingkou. Coordinating all works will require several million taels before they can be brought together. We propose sorting urgent from deferred tasks and proceeding step by step—seeking not great gain but reduced calamity, inch by inch, with gradual progress."
21
沿 便 使 使
In Guangxu 7 Yangtze Governor-General Liu Kunyi said: "On this tour of rivers and lakes I have learned that Huai-Yang waterworks bear on state finances and the people's livelihood. The plan to guide the Huai must not be abandoned midway. Since the old Yellow River below Yangzhuang has silted level, water from Shandong's Zhaoyang, Weishan, and other lakes runs straight down the Middle Canal into the Southern Canal; in summer and autumn the three locks are heavily strained. Hongze Lake has shoaled; the Huai cannot gather its current; the north stands higher than the south; little water enters the Zhangfu diversion; the main current rushes via the Li channel toward Gaoyou and Baoying lakes. After last year's dredging of the old Yellow River, Shandong floodwaters erupted repeatedly and were split here to discharge to the sea. After the Li dam was built, lake water pooled deeper, and the flow into the canal mouth via Zhangfu grew strong. Thus dredging the old channel and building the Li dam have had some small effect. Yet Zhangfu remains shallow; lake water still favors the Li channel, and overtopping the dam remains a worry. If the lake floods, even without overtopping, the Li channel cannot absorb it; the Xin and Zhi dams must open, sending water from Gaobao into the Southern Canal, and Cheli, Nanguan, and other dams must open to the sea via the Lixiahe—fields and homes flooded along the way at no small loss. We now propose widening and deepening Zhangfu to draw Hongze Lake water, reopening the rubble channel to split Zhangfu's flow, and joining Shunqing via Wucheng's seven forts. When water is low it enters the canal via Shunqing—the route is winding and the force gentler; when water is high it reaches the sea via the old Yellow River—the route is direct and the force naturally runs true. In about three or four years the work can be finished at no excessive cost. Some argue that guiding the Huai to the sea means draining Hongze entirely, harming grain transport and private fields. I hold that opening a separate diversion might indeed bring such harm. Following Zhangfu and the rubble channel's old course back to Shunqing, unless the Huai rises one or two zhang, how could Shunqing's water stand above the Middle Canal and spill into the old Yellow River? If the Huai surged violently, there would indeed be fear of breach—but the very fear is that water has no outlet; that is precisely the purpose of guiding the Huai. Others say drawing more lake water into the canal may overwhelm the three locks. They forget that before Hongze shoaled the lake was level and deep; beyond Zhangfu four diversion channels aided transport. Then the Yellow had not shifted north; when transport fleets passed the locks clear water was stored to repel the Yellow—all five diversions poured into the canal mouth, yet the three locks stood firm; today with only Zhangfu, there is no reason the three locks should fail. Moreover last year's dredging of the old Yellow River already splits Middle Canal flow; what reaches the Southern Canal is scarcely thirty or forty percent. Though lake water increases, it is much as before; even in great floods the old Yellow River can divide the volume—it need not all pass the three locks. Others again say that thus guided the Huai has neither harm nor benefit—why waste the treasury? That view is not entirely so. The art of water control demands comprehensive planning and foresight against future shifts. South of Hongze Lake lies the Li River; to the north is the Zhangfu River—both serve to divert and discharge the Huai. Water seeks the lower course, so the Li River often bears too much flow. The Li River dam holds back water for Zhangfu; dredging Zhangfu's mouth protects the Li River dikes—the two works depend on each other. If the Li River took the entire lake's force, the new dam might not stand; endless repairs would cost a fortune, yet leaving it unrepaired would deepen the damage—the low growing lower, the high higher, until Zhangfu River slowly silted shut. Moreover, the whole purpose of guiding the Huai was to guard against catastrophic floods at peak rise. If lake water were routed through Zhangfu to Shunqing and then down the old Yellow River to the sea, occasional overflow would hit open country with few people—evacuation would still be manageable. If Zhangfu did not run freely and the whole lake turned south instead, the teeming Huai-Yang heartland and its millions would face the old cry of men becoming fish beneath the flood. The gains from guiding the Huai may look modest now, but they will prove far greater in years to come. The memorial was submitted, and the ministry took note.
22
便 使
In the eighth year, the governor-general of the Jiang provinces, Zuo Zongtang, wrote: "Dredging the Yi and Si rivers as the first step in guiding the Huai is sound doctrine. Yet for more than two hundred li below Yunti Pass the channel bed stands high and steep, littered with sandbars built up over many years. What the full force of the Yellow River once could not cut through, one now hopes to open with only the divided flow of the Yi and Si—a very hard prospect indeed. Datong lies just over ten li below Yunti Pass on the north bank of the old Yellow River—a Jiaqing-era breach that ran northeast for forty-odd li to Xiangshui mouth, linked the Chao River, and reached the sea at Guanhe mouth. Widening and deepening that stretch would make the outlet to sea far easier. The Yi and Si headwaters should be sharply reduced: even before the Huai is restored the Grand Canal would gain some relief, and once restored the river could reach the sea without fear of obstruction. Clearing the lower reach to discharge the Yi and Si is the true first step in guiding the Huai—a matter that brooks no delay. The Huai, gathering countless tributaries into Hongze Lake, was once a vast inland sea spanning Jiangsu and Anhui. Since the Daoguang era Yellow silt has left the lake higher in the north and lower in the south; for nearly thirty years the Huai has reached the canal only via the Li River into the Gaobao lakes. To guide it back to its old course now is little short of forcing water uphill. From Zhangfu mouth by way of Datong and Xiangshui mouth to the sea is more than three hundred fifty li, choked at every stage—unless the lower course opens an outlet and the upper course stops every leak, it is plain that water cannot leave the low for the high, enter the Yellow, and reach the sea. Survey shows that Zhangfu mouth and the natural diversion both run north to the great Chong at Chenjiaji, then via the rubble channel to Wucheng's seven forts, and north again to Shunqing mouth, where they join the old Yellow River at Yangzhuang. Zhangfu River is over sixty zhang across and should be widened and deepened; the natural channel needs dredging all the more. Near Wucheng's seven forts the bed stands one zhang six or seven chi above Zhangfu's bottom and must be cut down hard so lake water can truly enter the Yellow—only then can the Li River be sealed to block side escapes and Shunqing River closed to keep the Grand Canal from stealing the channel. This work of drawing the Huai to the sea should be taken up step by step in proper order. If the lake level is too low, water cannot enter the Yellow River. If it is too high, not only are the Yan and Xu embankments at risk and the canal mouth locks hard to hold, but farmland near the lake at Xuyi and Wuhe would also suffer. We propose restoring the Zhi, Xin, and other dams to bleed off lake floods, and building a sluice at Chong so the lake level can be managed deliberately—sending more water into the Huai and less into the canal. This too is advance planning to handle what comes afterward."
23
駿使 沿 西便 駿 駿
In the thirty-fourth year, Governor Duanfang of the Jiang provinces jointly inspected the Huai's old channel, argued forcefully for four difficulties in guiding the Huai, and set up an office at Qingjiangpu where selected local gentry were to deliberate. After a long time with no clear lead, the office was abolished. In the first year of Xuantong the Jiangsu Consultative Assembly convened; Governor-General Zhang Renjun put guiding the Huai on the agenda. It was resolved to found the Jiang-Huai Water Conservancy Company, begin with surveying, and restore the Huai to its old course so it would run straight to the sea. In the second year, Academician Reader Yun Yuding, alarmed that floods along the Huai were worsening by the day, memorialized: "Since Wei and Jin times, fields along the Huai mostly drew water and dug channels for irrigation until the land became rich cropland. Lately the Huai-border prefectures report floods every year—towns submerged, fields and homes swept away. From Zhengyang to Gaobao all has become a water wilderness, truly because over the past century the channel silted up, the lower reach would not run, water had nowhere to go, and inundation spread. That is the harm done by the Gaoyan dam. In earlier times, when the Yellow and Huai ran together with a southward thrust, river engineers tried to pin the Huai against the Yellow and so built the Gaoyan dam head solid, forcing the Huai through Tianfei Lock to feed the transport canal. Today the Yellow has long shifted north; the dam no longer serves its purpose, and another route to the sea must be planned. There are two possible routes; the more convenient runs from Qingkou's west dam along the Salt River to the North Chao River. Once the lower outlet is open and water has somewhere to go, not only will Ying, Shou, Feng, and Si be freed from chronic flooding—even Gaobao, Xing, and Tai could sleep easy for a century. The matter was referred to Governor-General Zhang Renjun, Jiangsu Governor Cheng Dequan, and Anhui Governor Zhu Jiabao for survey and deliberation. Renjun and the others replied: "Survey work is under way; once the survey is finished, officials will be chosen to begin implementation. The court took note of the report. In the third year, Censor Shi Changxin wrote: "On guiding the Huai, every consultation ends in unanimous agreement. The American Red Cross also plans to send engineers to China for a survey. Our own efforts to think ahead and prevent disaster must be all the more urgent. Since the Jiangsu Water Conservancy Company has accepted ministry funding, Anhui should also set up a survey office as part of a plan to avert catastrophe. The ministry deliberated and approved.
24
使 使穿使
The effort to guide the Huai began in the sixth year of the Tongzhi reign. At that time Zeng Guofan governed the two Jiang provinces and said: "I dare not claim the great benefit of restoring the old channel will come quickly, but the great harm to Huai and Yangzhou cannot go unaddressed—we must at least ease it somewhat." Once the Yellow River shifted north, advocates multiplied, but the debate still boiled down to two main strategies. One camp held that the three diversion rivers should be sealed, Qingkou opened, the old channel dredged, and Yunti Pass cleared so the Huai could reach the sea along its former course. The other held that guiding the Huai must start upstream: Hongze Lake is where the Huai ends, not where it begins. A new channel should be cut upstream along the Su and Bian rivers northward so that before the Huai even reaches the lake half its volume is already discharged; then through Chenzi River at Taoyuan it would pierce the old Yellow River, pass Shuangjin Lock on the Middle Canal into the Salt River, and reach the sea at Andong—splitting the whole Huai into northern and southern courses that take in less and release more, so Huai floods could finally be eased. The two schools disagreed on the essentials. Yet from the Tongzhi and Guangxu reigns onward, dredging the Chenzi, rubble, Yi, and Si rivers and clearing the old channel from Yangzhuang down to Yunti Pass had already tested both approaches in modest ways. In the end centuries of Yellow silt left the Huai without a passable channel; forcing it through the canal into the Yangtze was a current too strong to reverse. Down to the fall of the dynasty, little was ever truly achieved.
25
西西 西
The Yongding River, also known as the Wuding or "Restless" River, is the lower course of the Sanggan. It rises at Heaven Pool near Taiyuan in Shanxi, runs underground, re-emerges at Shuozhou and Mayi, gathers tributaries, passes Xining and Huailai in Zhili's Xuanhua prefecture, and enters Wanping in Shuntian. Below Lushitai it first takes the name Lugou River; farther down it joins the Feng River and reaches the sea. Where it passes Datong and joins the muddy Sanggan it flows northeast and is also called the Hun River; the Yuan History names it the Little Yellow River. Until modern times no government office was charged with managing it. The name Yongding, "Forever Settled," was granted in the Kangxi reign. The Yongding gathers frontier streams and rushes down laden with sand and mud like water tipped from a rooftop jar; steep mountains hem it in on both sides, so breaches were rare. But forty li west of the capital, from Shijingshan southward past Lugou Bridge, the slope steepens and the soil turns loose; the river surges and wanders without fixed course, and the damage grows severe. There dikes and dams were built, diversion channels dredged, and flood-control work became urgent.
26
西 西 使
In the eighth year of Shunzhi the river shifted from Yongqing to Gu'an and joined the Baigou River. The following year the breach was first closed. In the eleventh year it left Xigong Village in Gu'an, joined the Qing River, passed east of Bazhou, and issued at Qinghe; It broke again at Jiuhuatai, Nanli, and other points, and southwest Bazhou became a vast inland sea. In the seventh year of Kangxi the Lugou Bridge dike burst; Vice Minister Luo Duo and others were ordered to repair it. In the thirty-first year, as the channel drifted steadily north and Yongqing, Bazhou, Gu'an, and Wen'an suffered floods year after year, Zhili Governor Guo Shilong's plan was adopted: the old channel northeast of Yongqing was dredged so the river could run smoothly into the marshes.
27
西 西 椿
In the thirty-seventh year, because the streams south of Baoding and the muddy Hun could not be held in one channel and often spilled over, the Kangxi Emperor inspected the river in person. Governor Yu Chenglong combined dredging with dike-building from the old mouth at Laojuntang in Liangxiang through Shilipu north of Gu'an and Zhujiazhuang southeast of Yongqing, joining Dong'an's Langcheng River and issuing at Liuchakou in Bazhou into the Sanjiao marshes and on to Xigu and the sea. He dredged 145 li of channel and built more than 180 li of north and south dikes, and the river was granted the name Yongding. From then the muddy current ran northeast and did not shift course for nearly forty years. In the thirty-ninth year the Langcheng marsh channel silted nearly flat and the upper reach backed up. River Director Wang Xinming was ordered to cut a new channel, making the old south bank the north bank; the south bank's west dike was extended from Guojiawu and the north bank's east dike from Hemazi Camp, both ending at Liuchakou. In the fortieth year distant pile dikes on the south bank were strengthened and the Jinmen Sluice was repaired. In the forty-eighth year the dike broke at Wanghuzhuang in Yongqing and was soon closed again. In the fifty-sixth year sand dikes and main dikes on both banks were repaired, but Heyaoying burst. In the sixty-first year Heyaoying broke again and was promptly sealed.
28
使 穿
In the second year of Yongzheng the main dike at Guojiawu was repaired, a moon dike built at Qingliang Temple, Jinmen Sluice restored, and the south dike breach at Tang'erpupu in Bazhou closed. In the third year, because the banks below Guojiawu narrowed sharply and Yongqing suffered especially hard, Prince Yi Yunxiang and Grand Secretary Zhu Fushi were ordered to send the muddy river to sea by a separate route and keep it out of the marshes. The outlet was moved slightly north of Liuchakou, a new channel cut from Guojiawu to Changhe for seventy li, reaching Tianjin through the Sanjiao marshes and then the sea, with ring dikes built around the marshes to block northward spill. A south dike was built from Wujiazhuang to Wangqingtuo and a north dike from Hemazi Camp to Fankou, while the dike works from Bingjiao to Liuchakou were abandoned. In the twelfth year breaches opened at Lianggezhuang, Sishengkou, and elsewhere for more than three hundred zhang; the Huangjiawan current was wholly diverted; water cut through below Yongqing's city wall and via Bazhou's Jinshuipo back into the marshes. Overall River Director Gu Zong supervised troops and laborers in closing the breaches. In the thirteenth year Zhujiazhuang on the south bank and Zhaojialou on the north bank burst; water still returned to the Sanjiao marshes by way of the small dike at Liudaokou.
29
仿 沿 檿
In the second year of Qianlong Overall River Director Liu Kan surveyed and repaired the north and south dikes, opened diversion channels at Huangjiawan, Qiuxianzhuang, and Caojiaxinzhuang, and dredged Shuangkou, the lower outlet, and Huanghuatao. In the sixth month floodwaters spread over more than forty villages, including Tie'gou on the south bank and Zhangke on the north; the main current was seized and ran down through the breach at Zhangke into the Feng River. Minister of Personnel Gu Zong was ordered to inspect the damage and proposed following the Yellow River practice of building distant protective dikes. Grand Secretary Ertai objected and proposed instead: "North of the intercepting dike on the north bank, cut a new channel, treat the north dike as the south dike, and follow it east; downstream build several tidal discharge embankments; and on both banks erect four stone overflow dams, each with a diversion channel: one on the north bank at Zhangjia mouth, using the scoured channel as the diversion, east into the Feng River; one on the south bank at Satai, using the old civilian drainage channel that entered the Xiaoqing River; one on the south bank at Jinmen Sluice, using the old Hun River channel that joined the Zhenniu River; one on the south bank at Guojiawu, using the old riverbed itself as the diversion channel. Clear water and muddy water kept apart—the plan is self-evident." An edict approved his proposal.
30
西 涿 宿
In the fourth year Zhili Governor Sun Jiaxing asked to move the Satai dam to Caojiawu and the Zhangke dam to Qiuxianzhuang. Grass overflow dams were also added at Jinmen Sluice and Chang'ancheng, set to pass one quarter of the flow. Gu Zong reported that at Jinmen Sluice and Chang'ancheng a single channel could barely carry the discharge and might fail in flood season; he proposed splitting the diversion into two branches, one through Nan'wa into the Zhongting River and one through Yangqing mouth into Jinshuipo. He also reported that near Guojiawu and Xiaoliangcun an old distant channel 1,700 zhang long had silted up over the years and asked that treasury funds be allocated for its restoration. All proposals were approved. In the fifth year Sun Jiaxing asked to open the heavy dike at Jinmen Sluice, dredge the western diversion channel, open the south dike, and release water back into the old course. In the sixth year spring ice floods spilled over and inundated much of Gu'an, Liangxiang, Xinhe, Zhuo, Xiong, and Bazhou. Following Ertai's plan, the new diversion was sealed off, Shuangkou and other channels were widened, the Geyucheng riverbed was excavated, moon dikes were built at Zhangke and Caojiawu, and the dams at Guojiawu and elsewhere were rebuilt. In the eighth year the lower outlet of the new channel was dredged, along with the Dongjia River, Sandaohe mouth, and other points, and dikes on the south bank of the new channel and east of the Feng River were repaired. The channel was also dredged from below Mukou to Dongxiaozhuang and the Feng River bank, a distance of a little over twenty li. In the ninth year the reach below Fanweng Kou was arranged to discharge into the Sha and Ye marshes; water from both flood seasons mostly ran into Ye Marsh, so the route to Sha Marsh was cleared and the old relief channels on both banks were dredged back into the Feng River.
31
檿 使 西 調
In the fifth month of the fifteenth year the river rose abruptly; the main current broke out through the fourth gully on the south bank, ran below Gu'an city to Niutuo, followed the Huangjia River into Jinshuipo, while another branch entered the Zhongting River by way of the Zhenniu River. Vice Minister Sanhe and the Zhili governor were ordered to block the breach together; below the mouth they cut a new diversion channel, intercepted the current, built dams to hold back southward overflow, and sent the water back into the old course. In the sixteenth year the spring ice flood broke loose; the entire river surged toward the Bingjiao dike mouth; a diversion was opened just south of Wangqingtuo to lead the current into Ye Marsh in accord with the water's natural tendency. In the nineteenth year water on the south embankment topped the dike; the old east and west dikes at the lower outlet gave way; the main current was seized southward, spread through Shengfang's old marsh, and ran by way of Wujia Factory and Sanshengkou in Yongqing and the Xin'an mouth in Bazhou. The following year the Gaozong Emperor inspected the works in person; the lower course was redirected to reach the sea through Tiaohe Tou; a diversion channel more than twenty li long was cut, and more than 2,200 zhang were added to the embankment body. In the twenty-first year Zhili Governor Fang Guancheng proposed building a further distant dike outside the north embankment to reserve space for flood flow, and extending the Feng River's east dike to the end of the distant embankment. The proposal was approved. In the twenty-fourth year heavy rains raised every river in Zhili at once; the lower reach emptied entirely into the marshes; the Daqing River could not carry the discharge; water backed up through the Feng River and checked the muddy current, and the fourth-section dike on the south bank burst. Imperial Bodyguard He'er Jing'e was ordered to join the Zhili governor in closing the breach and rebuilding the dike within a fixed deadline.
32
調 調 使 西
In the thirty-fifth and thirty-sixth years breaches opened repeatedly on both banks. In the thirty-seventh year Ministers Gao Jin and Qiu Yuexiu were sent with Zhili Governor Zhou Yuanli to inspect the river on site and reported: "Since dikes were first built in the Kangxi reign, the Yongding River has changed course six times. The only way to remedy the damage is to dredge the central channel, open the lower outlet to ease the swift current, build bank dikes against impact, and dredge relief channels to divide peak floods." A major project was then launched at a treasury cost of a little over 140,000 taels. From then on the river ran from Tiaohe Tou through Maojiawa and Shajia Marsh to Tianjin and the sea. In the thirty-eighth year Tiaohe Tou silted up; its clearer water spread downstream and separately ran straight from Xiangshui village in Dong'an to Shajia Marsh. In the fortieth year the overflow breaches at the north third section and the south head section were sealed. In the forty-fourth year the new north dike was extended, the old transverse dike was raised, the old riverside dikes were abandoned, and the river channel was widened. In the forty-fifth year the west bank at Lugou Bridge overflowed and the north head section was breached; water spread from Qiangguanying in Liangxiang through the Qiuxianzhuang relief channel to Huanghuadian; an eight-hundred-zhang diversion ditch was then cut to lead the current back into the main river. In the fifty-ninth year the north second-section dike burst; the current poured into the Qiuxianzhuang diversion and reached the sea by way of the lower Yongding River. The flow soon cut off again; then the south head-section dike overflowed; water entered the Daqing River through Laojuntang and Zhuangmatou; in all more than one hundred zhang of south dike were built. A deflection dam was also built in front of Yuhuang Temple.
33
西 西
In the sixth year of Jiaqing four stone sections and eighteen earth sections of the Lugou Bridge banks on east and west gave way; Vice Ministers Nayinbao and Gao Qi were ordered to take separate posts to close the breaches and rebuild, dredge the lower reach, and mobilize more than fifty thousand laborers for the work. The emperor composed the "Lament on the River Breach" and circulated it among his ministers. The work was finished in a little over two months. In the fifteenth year both banks of the Yongding River overflowed at once; Zhili Governor Wen Chenghui stayed on the works to seal the breaches. In the seventeenth year the river turned northward; Geyucheng silted up; water discharged through Huanghuadian. A diversion channel was cut within the old silted bed; grass overflow dams were built upstream; the current was turned east; and a ring dike was added to guard against widespread flooding. In the twentieth year civilian embankments along the east dike of the Feng River were removed to clear downstream obstruction. In the sixth month heavy rains caused the seventh section on the north bank to overflow and collapse; a diversion was cut slightly south of the old bed as far as Huanghuadian and east to Xizhou, 5,690 zhang in length. In the ninth month the water returned to the old course. In the twenty-fourth year the second section on the north bank overflowed and the head section soon after; water poured through the mouth for more than three hundred zhang; villages in Daxing and Wanping were flooded. In the ninth month the breach was sealed and the northern diversion channel was dredged anew.
34
西
In the third year of Daoguang the river burst south at the end of the south eighth-section dike and ran directly toward Wang'er Marsh. In the fourth year Vice Minister Cheng Hanzhang inspected the river and proposed dredging to restore the old course, but the plan was not implemented. In the tenth year Zhili Governor Nayancheng asked to cut a diversion channel at Dafanweng Kou and to raise and thicken the distant embankment south of the new dike. The request was approved. In the spring of the eleventh year the current shifted northeast, passed through Dou Marsh and Liudaokou into the Daqing River; the Wang'er Marsh outlet was then sealed, and water through the new channel at Fanweng Kou returned to the old course at Wangqingtuo. In the fourteenth year breaches opened in Wanping at the north middle and north lower flood sections; water from Panggezhuang followed the old relief channel to Huanghuadian in Wuqing and still reentered the sea through the main river's lower outlet. On the Liangxiang border the south second section burst; water entered the Qing River through the Jinmen Sluice relief channel and returned to the Daqing River by way of the Baigou River. A diversion channel was then cut from the overflow point down to Danjiagou, with sectional construction totaling more than 27,400 zhang. In the twenty-fourth year the south seventh section overflowed; Hexiying, about three li to the north, was made the new river head; a diversion more than seventy li long was cut straight to the Feng River. In the fifth month of the thirtieth year mountain runoff poured in from upstream and the river rose abruptly; the north seventh section overflowed for more than thirty zhang; water ran through Muzhubo into the Feng River by way of the old relief channel. After inspection a diversion was cut at the north bend of the river at Fengjiachang; the project was completed in the tenth month.
35
During the Xianfeng reign the north and south dikes burst four times. Military affairs were then urgent; project funds were reduced; repairs could do no more than patch the worst gaps.
36
涿 檿
In the third year of Tongzhi, because the river was shifting steadily northward and its outlet had silted up, a dam was built at Liutuo to cut off the northward flow and return the water to the old course; the beds at Zhangtuo and Hujiafang were widened and deepened, and the river again reached the sea through Dong'an, Wuqing, and Tianjin. After the sixth year breaches continued to occur from time to time. In the eighth year Zhili Governor Zeng Guofan proposed building a major intercepting dam at the south seventh section, ring embankments on both flanks, and dredging the central channel while clearing the lower outlet to prevent backup and collapse. The proposal was approved. In the tenth year the stone dike on the south bank overflowed; the main current was diverted through Liangxiang and Zhuo into the Daqing River and on to the sea. The following year Li Hongzhang's request as Zhili governor was approved: the Jinmen Sluice dam was repaired, the diversion channel dredged, and water led from Tongcun into the Xiaoqing River. The breach in the stone dike was sealed. In the twelfth year the south fourth section overflowed; water ran east through the Zhenniu River in Bazhou. The diversion channel was lengthened and another deflection dam was built.
37
使
In the first year of Guangxu the south second flood section overflowed and was sealed at once. In the fourth year the north sixth flood section burst; after the breach was closed, civilian embankments were extended from the end of the Tanpo embankment down to below Qingguang. In the tenth year, because the Feng River bore the full force of the Yongding and had silted up over many years, public works were used for famine relief; from Wukong Sluice in Nanyuan to Goushang village in Wuqing the channel was dredged in sections, and breaches in dikes and dams were raised and sealed. In the sixteenth year catastrophic floods raised every river in the capital region at once; the north upper and south third flood sections of the Yongding overflowed and burst together. The Zhili governor was ordered to plan blocking and rebuilding at once, add deflection dams and bank dikes, and dredge a diversion channel more than sixty li long. In the summer of the eighteenth year heavy rains sent the river up abruptly; the lime dam in the south upper flood section overflowed for more than forty zhang. Supervising Secretary Hong Liangpin reported that the north bank head section was the most critical point and asked that stone dikes be added continuously below Shijingshan for protection. The matter was referred to the responsible offices for deliberation. Because the work was arduous and the cost enormous, eight li of stone dike were built at the most critical points and stone grids were added. In the winter of the nineteenth year, because repeated breaches had plagued the river for years, River Director Xu Zhenyi was ordered to inspect the works jointly with the Zhili governor and draw up a plan. Zhenyi proposed five measures: regulate the lower course, secure the nearest danger points, dredge the central channel, build relief dams, and manage the upper reach. Zhili Judicial Commissioner Zhou Fu also proposed building a major stone flood-relief dam on the south bank at Lugou, set so that when the water reached the lintel of the culvert it would be discharged. An edict approved the proposals. In the twenty-second year the north sixth section and the north middle flood section overflowed in turn; water collected at Hanjiashu into the Daqing River; more than twenty li of accumulated silt in the Daqing were then dredged.
38
祿 祿 穿 西 西
In the twenty-fifth year an edict ordered Zhili Governor Yulu to survey the entire river in detail so as to relieve flood damage. Yulu reported: "In the capital region hundreds of streams cross the plain, all converging on the five trunk rivers—the North and South Canal, Daqing, Yongding, and Ziya—and reaching the sea through the Hai River; only the Yongding runs muddy, silts easily, and shifts without a fixed course. Formerly the distant dike at the lower outlet was more than forty li wide and divided the flow into south, north, and central channels. Later, when the south and central channels silted up, the entire current passed through the north channel via the Feng River into the Canal." He then proposed seven coordinated measures for dredging and construction: first, regulate the Hai River so the lower outlet runs freely, then work upstream; second, the great depression east of the Feng River's east dike should be made the Yongding's lower outlet; third, build the west dike of the North Canal; fourth, plan to restore the Daqing River's old lower course at Xigu; fifth, build and repair the Gedian embankment; sixth, build the transverse and longitudinal dikes at Hanjiashu; seventh, dredge the Zhongting River in the hope of a lasting remedy. The project would require a little over 770,000 taels. The emperor ordered the work to be planned and carried out over successive years. The Boxer uprising intervened, and the plan was never carried out.
39
In the decades that followed, breaches opened repeatedly on both banks, and each was sealed as soon as it appeared. Commentators argued that if every danger point were faced with stone dikes, narrow bends were widened and straightened, water were released eastward from the south seventh section along the marshes to Tianjin, and stone overflow dams were added to divide peak floods, the river might at last be kept permanently secure.
40
便
Sea dikes exist only in Jiangsu and Zhejiang. Along the coast dikes are maintained to hold back the salt tide, secure settlements, and protect the fields. In Jiangnan the dikes run from Jinshan in Songjiang to Baoshan, more than 36,400 zhang in length. In Zhejiang they run from Wulong Temple in Renhe to the Jinshan border with Jiangnan, more than 37,200 zhang in length. Jiangnan's coast is level and its tides comparatively mild; the force of the water is still moderate. In Zhejiang the river runs downstream while the sea tide runs up against it; where they meet the surge is fierce and the danger especially great. Since Tang and Song the dikes had been rebuilt many times, but the system was never fully established. Under the Qing earth dikes were replaced with stone dikes and private upkeep with official maintenance; great projects were undertaken again and again in pursuit of strength, and the coastal population at last enjoyed security and prosperity.
41
滿西沿 使 使
In the sixteenth year of Shunzhi Supervising Secretary Zhang Weichi of the Rites Section reported: "In Jiangsu and Zhejiang the seven prefectures of Hang, Jia, Hu, Ning, Shao, Su, and Song all lie on the coast and depend on sea dikes for protection; at Haiyan, where two mountains face each other, the tide is especially violent. For this reason the Ming specially set aside funds for sea-dike labor to support annual repairs. Recently it is unclear where this fund has gone, and the dike foundations have collapsed entirely. If wind and waves rise and water pours straight through the collapsed sections, the seven prefectures may suffer no small harm. I ask that the governors and surveillance commissioners be strictly ordered to finish repairs within a fixed deadline and that annual maintenance be required again, so harm may be prevented before it arises." The memorial was referred to the ministries for deliberation and implementation. In the third year of the Kangxi reign, the sea surged over Haining in Zhejiang and breached more than twenty-three hundred zhang of tidal dike. Governor-General Zhao Tingchen and Provincial Governor Zhu Changzuo asked that treasury funds be released for repairs, and that more than five thousand zhang of stone embankment at Jianshan be restored as well. In the twenty-seventh year, one thousand zhang of stone tidal dike at Haiyan were repaired. In the thirty-seventh year a violent hurricane drove the tide over the dikes, tearing out more than sixteen hundred zhang at Haining and more than three hundred at Haiyan; the breaches were then rebuilt. In the fifty-seventh year Provincial Governor Zhu Shi proposed rebuilding the Haining stone dike with wooden cribs below, sloped revetment on the seaward face, and renewed dredging of the backup canal to contain flooding. In the fifty-ninth year Governor-General Manbao and Zhu Shi reported: "Along the coast west of Mount Xiayu in Shangyu, the earthen dikes had been scoured away entirely. South of there the sands of Da Wai had accreted into dry land, so river and tide now drove straight at Bei Dai and eastward, and the Old Salt Storehouse at Haining, among other sites, had collapsed into the sea." They proposed five remedies: first, build more than thirteen hundred zhang of stone dike along the north bank at Old Salt Storehouse to safeguard cropland and irrigation in Hangzhou, Jiaxing, and Huzhou prefectures; second, construct new-style stone dikes built to endure; third, cut through the shoals at Zhong Xiao Wai so the river and sea resume their old course between Mount Zhe and Mount Hezhuang, deflecting the tide's northward push; fourth, raise more than seventeen hundred zhang of stone dike at Mount Xiayu to shield the south bank from tidal damage; fifth, assign officers to maintain the works yearly so they would stand firm for the long term. The Board deliberated and approved the plan as requested.
42
In the second year of Yongzheng the Emperor, deeming the tidal works critical, ordered Minister of Personnel Zhu Shi to join Zhejiang Governor Fa Hai and Jiangsu Governor He Tianpei in surveying the dikes of Hangzhou, Jiaxing, Huzhou, and neighboring prefectures, which would cost somewhat more than 105,000 taels, and the dikes of Huating, Lou, Shanghai, and other counties in Songjiang, which would need somewhat more than 190,000 taels; the Board approved. In the sixth year Provincial Governor Li Wei asked permission to undertake emergency repairs wherever sudden breaches could not wait, and to report afterward. From this point the term "emergency repair" entered official use. In the eleventh year he dispatched Inner Court Minister Haiwang and Zhili Governor-General Li Wei to Zhejiang to inspect the sea dikes, saying: "If the works can be made lasting and the people protected, spend ten million taels from the treasury without hesitation." They soon proposed a stone dam between Jian and Ta mountains to hold back the current, conversion of grass dikes and mixed strip- and block-stone works into great stone dikes, and construction of upper backup dikes behind the existing line. In the twelfth year, because the Jianshan closure and the Zhong Xiao Wai diversion had long remained unfinished, Zhejiang Governor Cheng Yuanzhang and his colleagues were censured for poor oversight; Deputy Lieutenant-General Long Sheng of Hangzhou was placed in overall charge, assisted by Censor Pian Wu. The work was finished in the fifth month. In the thirteenth year he appointed Southern Rivers Director-General Ji Zengyun to oversee the tidal works. Ji Zengyun reported: "South of Haining's gate the land faces river and sea; build more than five hundred zhang of scale-pattern stone dike there first to shield the city." The court was ordered to deliberate and implement the plan.
43
椿使
In the first year of Qianlong, acting Jiangsu Governor Gu Cong proposed a Coastal Defense Circuit devoted solely to the yearly upkeep of the sea dikes. Ji Zengyun asked to build more than six thousand zhang of scale-pattern great stone dike at Renhe, Haining, and elsewhere as conditions required; all was approved. The following year more than five thousand nine hundred zhang of scale-pattern great stone dike were raised from Pu'erdou in Haining to Jianshantou. In the fourth year the court approved Zhejiang Governor Lu Chao's plan for the great Jianshan dam; work finished the following autumn, and the Emperor wrote an inscription to commemorate it. In the sixth year Left Censor-in-Chief Liu Tongxun wrote: "Earlier the court had approved Fujian-Zhejiang Governor-General De Pei's plan to replace the fascine dike from Old Salt Storehouse to Zhangjia'an with stone. In my view the fascine-to-stone conversion need not be rushed, but repairs along both north and south banks cannot wait. Along the full line, Haining still sees tides that surge back and forth, but at Haiyan the tide meets the dike head-on; there the great stone work, cracked and leaking after years of service, most urgently needs repair. By my rough estimate, seven hundred thousand taels would make the entire line secure as wrapped mulberry—lasting and strong." When the memorial arrived, Liu Tongxun was ordered to inspect the works jointly with Zhejiang Governor-General De Pei and Zhejiang Governor Chang An. Their reply held that stone conversion was indeed the lasting solution, but should proceed slowly—three hundred zhang a year. In the seventh year Governor-General Nasutu proposed building stone cages in sections at the worst points first, then raising stone dikes once the footings had set firm. Two years later Minister Neqin was sent to survey the coast. He reported: "The fascine dikes in Renhe and Haining are sound; if shifting protective sands are the worry, dredge the old Zhong Xiao Wai channel so the tide follows its proper course—in that case both upper and lower dikes will hold." The plan to convert the dikes to stone was therefore dropped. In the seventh month Jiangsu Governor Chen Dashou reported: "Baoshan fronts the open sea, and at Yuepu the earthen dike is being eaten by the tide. I ask to build a single-stone dam, add one hundred seventy zhang of piled-stone slope on each side, link a sand dike to the earthwork, and set culverts through it for drainage." The Board approved and ordered implementation.
44
西 調
In the eleventh year Chang An reported: "North of Shushan a shoal four to five hundred zhang wide blocks the channel. Four cuts were first opened at the sand spit to draw the tide in and scour the shoal. The summer flood has passed, the southern shoal has largely washed away, Shushan stands in open water, and the tide is shifting southward. If the autumn tides do not rebuild the shoal, the main current will flow through Zhong Xiao Wai for good." The court took note. In the twelfth year Chang An sent officers to dredge around Shushan by cutting through the shoals. On the first day of the eleventh month the Zhong Xiao Wai diversion broke open overnight; the main current returned to its old course, water drew back on both banks as sand built up, and the ground lay level on either side. In the thirteenth year Grand Secretaries Gao Bin and Neqin were sent in turn to inspect the tidal works. Gao Bin proposed earthen weirs behind the fascine-and-stone dikes east and west to break the force of the tide. In the fourth month Neqin laid out plans for follow-up work, and Provincial Governor Fang Guancheng was told to decide the details. Fang Guancheng asked for bamboo-cage rolling dams along the north dike's old Bei Dai channel and at Sanli Bridge, Duozhuan Temple, and similar points to seal tidal cuts; block-stone dikes at Da and Xiao Shanwei; advance safeguards on the south bank; and detachments from the Right Battalion posted at divided stations along the line. The court deliberated and approved the plan. In the sixteenth year the court approved Governor Yonggui's plan to rebuild the earthen dike at Songjialou in Shanyin as stone and add sloped revetment.
45
In the seventeenth year Governor Yeerhashan wrote: "The channel between the Zhong Wai hills is barely six li wide and silts up quickly. A spit more than one hundred thirty zhang long at the foot of Wentang Mountain on the south bank turns the current north, and another of more than fifty zhang north of Hezhuang Mountain blocks the main flow through Zhong Wai. Work is under way to cut and dredge both shoals so the current will not be impeded." The Emperor responded with praise and encouragement. In the nineteenth year the Coastal Defense Circuit was abolished, the Zhejiang dikes being judged free of hazard. In the twenty-first year Ka'erjishan reported: "The current is shifting south; the north bank is secure, but the critical works lie around Shaoxing. He proposed four hundred zhang of Haining-style scale-pattern great strip-stone dike at Songjialou and Yangliu Harbor." The court approved. In the twenty-third year the sea dike at Zhenhai County was extended. In the twenty-sixth year Jiangsu Governor Chen Hongmou proposed linking earthen dikes along the Changshu and Zhaowen coast from the Taicang prefectural border. Later the mouths of the Baimao River and Xuliujing were opened and fitted with gates to regulate flow. That year a high tide brought down the stone wall; he asked to replace it with a rolling dam. The Emperor approved.
46
仿
In the twenty-seventh year, on his southern tour, the Emperor inspected the Haining sea dikes. He said: "I regard the sea dikes as Yue's first line of defense. In recent years the tide has been shifting toward Bei Dai, which directly affects Haining, Qiantang, and the neighboring counties. There had been plans to replace the fascine dike at Old Salt Storehouse with stone, but opinion was divided. On inspection yesterday I found the sand there too loose and treacherous for stone—only a thorough repair of the fascine dike will serve, as the best way to shore up what is failing. See to it diligently: set yearly repairs to strengthen the footings, and add sloped revetment and stone cages for protection." He added: "Between Jianshan and Tashan there once stood a stone dike. I see it now spanning the sea and meeting the main current head-on—the true hinge of the whole defense. Given present conditions, either reinforce it with more bamboo cages or rebuild it with rows of wooden cribs. If the shoal continues to build out, rebuild it as a strip-stone dam standing firm as a midstream pillar, so the north-bank dikes may be secured for good. Let the governors carry out my wishes, draw on the treasury as needed, and inscribe a stone at Tashan to mark the work for posterity." In the twenty-eighth year Jiangsu Governor Zhuang Yougong wrote: "The coast of Songjiang and Taicang in Jiangnan is prone to slump; the sloped revetments at Huating and Baoshan cannot be trusted. They should be rebuilt on the block-stone cage model used at Old Salt Storehouse in Zhejiang." An edict approved the request. In the spring of the thirtieth year, on his southern tour, the Emperor inspected the Haining sea dikes. He said: "The stone dike around the city is the city's true defense. The sloped revetment below has only two tiers, and the tide seems to strike at the crest. Adding a third tier would help greatly. Order the full four hundred sixty-odd zhang still required to be built at once." The work was finished in the third month.
47
西西
In the thirty-fifth year Governor Xiong Xuepeng proposed scale-pattern great stone dikes at Xiaoshan, Shanyin, and Kuaiji. The Emperor dismissed the proposal, noting that the tide was shifting toward Bei Wai and bore no relation to the south bank. In the thirty-seventh year Governor Fulehun reported on the Zhong Wai diversion: "The tide and main current—one branch runs straight from Shushan into the channel, another enters obliquely west of Yanfeng Mountain; they meet at mid-channel by Hezhuang Mountain, collide, and split again westward. I have had officers cut more than twenty channels through the middle of the diversion to steer the tide back into the old Zhong Wai course." The Emperor replied: "Tides shift by nature, like breathing in and out; digging diversion channels may be wasted effort. Strengthen the dikes and wait for the tide to find its old course on its own; do not insist on cutting channels to steer it—human strength cannot master the sea."
48
椿 仿
In the forty-third year Zhejiang Governor Wang Tanwang reported on the state of the sea dikes, and Jiangsu Governor-General Gao Jin was ordered to survey them jointly. They soon proposed adding bamboo cages along five hundred zhang of fascine work at Zhangjia'an and three hundred zhang before the Tide God's Temple, with a double row of piles to prevent movement. The court approved. In the forty-fifth year, on his southern tour, the Emperor visited Jianshan at Haining to inspect the sea dikes. In the twelfth month Grand Secretary Agui and Southern Rivers Director-General Chen Huizu were sent to Zhejiang to inspect the works on site. They reported: "The sea-dike project calls for two thousand two hundred zhang of stone work; strip stone would be easier to build and finish sooner—about three years to completion." They added that scale-pattern stone dikes, built like the eastern dike with sixteen to eighteen courses according to the terrain, would cost about three hundred thousand taels. The Emperor ordered Vice Minister of Works Yang Kui to remain on site to assist; the work was finished the following eighth month. In the forty-ninth year the Emperor visited Hangzhou and inspected the dikes, saying: "At Old Salt Storehouse the old fascine dike was replaced last year with more than four thousand two hundred zhang of stone; sloped revetment should have been built to protect it. Yet the governors gave it no thought; if an exceptional tide should rise, how could the dike hold? Order the ground behind the fascine dike shaped into a slope and planted with willows so the roots bind the soil; stone and fascine will then work as one, and the fascine dike will serve as revetment for the stone. Along the Fan Gong Pond stretch as well, stone works must be linked in before the provincial capital can be adequately protected. Five million taels from the treasury were allocated to the governors-general and governors for verification, with repairs to proceed by stages over successive years." The works were completed in Qianlong 52.
49
In Jiaqing 4 Zhejiang Governor Yude requested converting the earthen dikes at Shanyin to brush dikes. In Jiaqing 13 Zhejiang Governor Ruan Yuan requested converting the earthen banks at Xiaoshan to brush dikes. In Jiaqing 16 Zhejiang Governor Jiang Youqian requested that all earthen dikes at Shanyin be rebuilt uniformly as brush dikes; Jiangsu Governor Zhang Xu requested adding two layers of single dams atop the earthen dikes at Huating. All were approved.
50
西 西 椿
In the fifth month of Daoguang 13 Governor Funiyang'a memorialized: "For the eastern and western protective sea-dike works, the most dangerous sections should be repaired first, at a cost of more than 512,000 taels." In the eleventh month he reported again: "Works both within and beyond the scheduled limits have collapsed, requiring more than 194,000 taels." In the twelfth month he reported again: "Within the eastern dike boundary, a scale-pattern dike of more than 2,600 zhang should be built between the front and rear dikes, at a cost of 922,000 taels." All were referred to the ministry for approval and implementation. In Daoguang 14 Vice Minister of Justice Zhao Shengkui and former Eastern Rivers Director Yan Huang were ordered to join Funiyang'a in surveying all works requiring repair. They soon memorialized: "To protect the dike foot from seaward attack, nothing surpasses level waterworks. From the Nianliting to the Zhenhai flood sections, we propose adding three disk heads and rebuilding more than 3,300 zhang of brush dike; east of Wulong Temple on the western dike, scale-pattern stone blocks should be linked in; the encircling stone dike at Haining should be raised by two layers of strip stone. Further work is to continue during the next great flood season." Left Censor-in-Chief Wu Chun was sent to survey and remained in Zhejiang to supervise the work. In the third month of Daoguang 16 the works were completed: more than seventeen thousand zhang of repairs in all, at a cost of more than 1.57 million taels. In Daoguang 30 Governor Wu Wenrong repeatedly reported breaches in the sea-dike stonework and ordered emergency repairs. The work was completed in the tenth month.
51
In the eighth month of Xianfeng 7 fascine works along the sea dikes were suddenly destroyed by wind and tide. By the twelfth month they had been closed up in succession. In Tongzhi 3 Censor Hong Yanchang reported that Zhejiang sea dikes had burst and asked that funds be raised quickly for repairs. The ministry approved allocating revenues from the Zhejiang maritime customs and other taxes. In Tongzhi 5 Hanlin Bachelor Zhong Peixian memorialized that sea dikes concerned the security of the entire southeast, citing four harms and three grave concerns. Governor Ma Xinyi was ordered to survey in detail and repair more than 260 zhang of scale-pattern stonework at Haining. In Tongzhi 6, because Zhejiang sea-dike works were vast and costly, repairs were divided into essential and secondary priorities, with completion expected within ten years. In Tongzhi 7 Liangjiang Governor-General Zeng Guofan and others requested repairs to the protective dams of the Huating stone dikes; thereafter dike works were maintained annually.
52
椿椿椿
In Guangxu 3 the northern stone dike at Baoshan was repaired with protective earthwork, protective and water-blocking dams were built, and more than 1,300 zhang of scale-pattern stone dikes at Renhe and Haining were restored. In Guangxu 10 dikes, dams, and stone slopes at Zhaowen, Huating, Baoshan, and elsewhere were repaired. In Guangxu 12 Zhejiang Governor Liu Bingzhang reported that the original stone dike at Haiyan, more than 4,600 zhang long, had lost more than half to collapse over the years. Essential sections were chosen for repair—500 zhang to be buried and faced in stone, 460 zhang to be rebuilt—at a cost of 200,000 taels. The request was approved. In Guangxu 18 Zhejiang Governor Liu Shutang memorialized that the encircling stone dike at Haining was collapsing daily. He requested adding level waterworks, using surplus funds from the accumulated sea-dike silk surtax to begin at once, with further funds to be raised in succession. The request was approved. In Guangxu 19 repairs included 151 zhang of pile-and-stone level slope at Qianjing Mouth in Taicang, 200 zhang at Yanglin Mouth in Zhenyang, 200 zhang of double-pile stone-protected dam from Shijia Bridge to Laorenbin in Zhaowen, and 46 zhang of pure stone sloping dam on the outer dike at Huating.
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In sum, sea-dike works in the two provinces, after the major Daoguang repairs, suffered repeated warfare until half lay in ruins. By early Tongzhi large works were launched, but treasury funds fell short, so sea-dike contributions were opened and silk merchants in both provinces were urged to pay an additional sea-dike silk surtax beyond the regular levy in exchange for award tickets. It was soon halted. In Guangxu 30 Zhejiang Governor Nie Jigui requested restoring the old contribution regulations to fund essential works. Because after Guangxu 27 tides grew violent and sections once moderately dangerous became extremely dangerous, it was proposed to clear and rebuild all fascine works from the foundation; without raising vast funds, they could not be secured for long.
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