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卷132 志一百七 兵三 防军 陆军

Volume 132 Treatises 107: Military 3, Defense Forces, Army

Chapter 132 of 清史稿 · Draft History of Qing
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Chapter 132
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1
Treatise 107
2
Military, Part Three
3
Defense Forces and the Army
4
調 西
Defense forces were originally raised entirely by recruitment. Outside the Eight Banners and the Green Standard Army, they formed separate corps of their own, with no fixed establishment. Scattered through the prefectures and counties, they passed under campaign commanders whenever bandit alarms arose. For two centuries, every call-up for garrison duty or field service came from these units. The Taiwan campaign under Qianlong, the Guizhou and Huguang campaigns against the Miao between the Qianlong and Jiaqing reigns, the Sichuan and Shaanxi sectarian rebellions under Jiaqing, and the wars of suppression and negotiation with foreign ships under Daoguang all relied on brave battalions raised for the occasion and disbanded as soon as peace returned. Thus in the seventh year of Jiaqing, when a provincial commander was first posted to northern Huguang, brave recruits were used to fill the regular garrison rolls. In the seventeenth year of Daoguang, drilled volunteers were attached to the Zhenqian garrison banner; in the twenty-third year, thirty-six thousand coastal militia on land and sea were sent home again. The titles “defense forces” and “training forces” did not yet exist. When the Taiping rebellion broke out in the Daoguang and Xianfeng era, provinces across the empire raised braves for local defense; Zhang Guoliang mustered the largest body of Chaozhou volunteers. In the second year of Xianfeng, Zeng Guofan was charged with training Hunan volunteers and codified the battalion-and-platoon organization of the Xiang Army, which became the model for later defense-force establishments. When Zeng Guofan marched east on imperial orders, Huai volunteers joined the Xiang forces, and the combined corps grew to some two hundred battalions. Zuo Zongtang’s pacification of the northwest was carried out by a Chu Army of well over a hundred battalions as well. As soon as the fighting ended, strategic posts in every province were held by volunteer battalions left behind for garrison duty, and the old Green Standard Army became a hollow formality. Green Standard pay amounted to less than a quarter of what defense volunteers received, promotion was blocked, and men left the regular rolls in droves to enlist as braves. After the suppression of the Taiping and Nian rebels, Zuo Zongtang and others argued that the defense camps had proved themselves elite formations: in war regulars could not match the volunteers, while in peace they could still be posted for patrol and garrison. Regular troops should be retrained as drilled forces, but volunteer battalions should remain stationed at the strategic junctions of Zhili and the Yangtze–Huai region. From this policy came the term “defense forces.”
5
Training forces date from the Xianfeng period. As volunteer battalions multiplied, field commanders were repeatedly told to fill regular quotas with volunteers and keep the remainder in reserve, but there was not yet a distinct drilled army as such. Only in the first year of Tongzhi were provincial governors required to report the full head count and ration rolls of drilled volunteers to the Board for audit. That same year a foreign-rifle training detachment was established at Tianjin. In the second year, a portion of Zhili’s regular establishment was reorganized as training forces. In the fourth year, officials of the Boards of War and Revenue met to select and drill the six Zhili armies, and the term “training forces” was formally adopted. The provinces then followed suit with training forces of their own. Training forces were drawn from the regular establishment, but their battalion organization, platoon structure, and pay scales followed the Xiang and Huai models, identical to those of the defense forces. Green Standard regulars were scattered across prefectural garrison posts, while training forces were concentrated in major cities and strategic towns, with better arms and constant drill, turning a dispersed force into a concentrated one to hold vital points. Their function matched that of the defense forces, and in practice the training forces were defense forces as well.
6
西西西西
Between the Tongzhi and Guangxu reigns the provinces expanded their defense and training forces. In the twenty-fourth year of Guangxu the Boards of War and Revenue tallied them as follows: Zhili training forces, 11,000; Huai Army on garrison duty, 31,000; New Army, 11,400; Yi Army, 10,000; Fengtian training forces, 11,400; Jilin defense forces 8,598 and training forces 4,438; Heilongjiang training forces, 7,971; Shanxi training forces, 4,900; Henan defense forces, 9,190; Shaanxi defense and training forces, 14,450; Gansu defense forces, 12,500; Xinjiang defense forces, 27,845; Tarbagatai brave battalions, 2,432; Sichuan brave battalions, 15,698; Yunnan defense forces, 15,033; Guizhou training forces, 9,486; Guangdong brave battalions, 11,800; Guangxi brave battalions, 16,940; Hunan training forces, 12,970; Hubei brave battalions 12,690 and New Army 1,093; Jiangxi defense forces, 9,363; Anhui defense and training forces, 11,290; Jiangsu defense forces 23,790, Self-Strengthening Army 3,170, and Victorious Army 3,000; Zhejiang defense forces, 21,300; Shandong defense forces, 13,950; Fujian defense forces, 10,540. Defense forces and drilled volunteers in all provinces numbered more than 360,000 men and consumed over twenty million taels of silver a year. As the Green Standard Army was repeatedly reduced, provincial garrison duty passed entirely to the defense and training forces. After the mid-Guangxu period, defense and training forces were redesignated as patrol garrisons. Between the Guangxu and Xuantong reigns they were renamed again as the Army. As late as the third year of Xuantong, patrol garrisons had not yet been fully abolished in every province. This chapter records how defense and training forces were reorganized under Tongzhi, Guangxu, and Xuantong, with the new army regulations appended.
7
西調 調
Defense forces: In the first year of Tongzhi, Zhili selected five hundred men from six cooperative garrison battalions at Dagu for drill, later expanded to 2,500 organized into five battalions of ten squads each, with one overall commander, two wing officers, a commandant and two deputies per battalion, two order officers, ten squad leaders, and twenty assistant squad leaders. Shen Baozhen took Jiangxi’s quota of 12,000 troops, culled the aged and unfit, filled the ranks with picked men, and divided them into two reliefs: one drilled at the provincial capital while the other held the garrison posts, with rotation every six months. Men under drill received extra training pay amounting to less than half the cost of hired volunteers, and once trained they were sent to the front as reinforcements.
8
仿
In the second year Liu Changyou found Zhili’s camps long neglected, with wildly uneven strengths and confused command. He adopted the Xiang Army model: battalions of five hundred with battalion, platoon, and squad officers plus bodyguards; distinct flags and clear signals; six armies reorganized; and systematic instruction in camp layout and battle formation. The infantry battalion comprised one battalion officer, four platoon officers, five platoon chiefs, forty corporals, 360 rank-and-file, fifty bodyguards for the battalion officer, forty escorts for the platoon officers, and the battalion officer commanding the center platoon — 500 men in total. The cavalry battalion had one battalion officer, two assistants, five squad supervisors, five tents per platoon with one corporal and nine troopers each, and the battalion officer leading the center platoon — 316 men including partners and grooms. The Baoding training army numbered 1,950 cavalry, infantry, and garrison troops; Xuanhua, 1,480; Gubeikou, 2,410; Daming, 1,234; Zhengding, 1,480; and Tongyong, 1,754 — six armies in all.
9
調
In the fifth year the garrisons at Zunhua and elsewhere were fixed at 2,000 infantry and 500 cavalry per army, drawn from the governor’s and commander’s banners — 15,000 men in six armies under seventeen articles of drill regulations, all under the governor to defend the capital approaches. Two additional defense volunteer armies were drilled beyond the six armies. Garrison units left in Fengtian were transferred to fill gaps in Zhili’s training forces. Capital garrison training was handled by augmenting the Shenjiying establishment as required. That year Zuo Zongtang found Fujian’s Green Standard rolls bloated and pay meager. He cut forty percent of the troops and applied the savings to those who remained, consolidating camps for joint drill.
10
In the sixth year Ding Baozhen added three thousand cavalry to Shandong’s drilled forces.
11
仿 調
In the seventh year, as the Green Standard Army weakened everywhere, the provinces were ordered to replace weak troops with fit drilled volunteers. Zeng Guofan was put in charge of drilling in Zhili. Six thousand men were drawn from the provincial Green Standard rolls, organized on the volunteer model, and assigned to regional patrol. When coastal defense became urgent, they were posted to Tianjin in five battalions — center, left, right, front, and rear — to work in concert with the volunteer camps.
12
西
In the eighth year Zeng Guofan argued that with the wars over, the state should drill regulars rather than volunteers, while the training forces should adopt three volunteer practices: simple regulations, concentrated authority, and close rapport between officers and men. He cut rolls and raised pay, kept the strong and discharged the weak, and cracked down on men who sent substitutes. Beyond the existing 4,000 training troops, he drilled 1,000 more each at Gubeikou, Zhengding, and Baoding, placing them under generals from the southeastern campaigns. When training was complete, they were organized into four armies. Two armies were posted north of Beijing and two south; once results were clear, another 5,000 men would be trained. Beyond nine defense battalions not yet disbanded, Liu Mingchuan’s entire Huai Army held Zhangqiu; the governor’s personal artillery and a front-battalion detachment held Tianjin; personal artillery held the Dagu forts; six Sheng center battalions, three left battalions, two Ren battalions, and five cavalry units held Machang and Qingxian, with five batteries built west of the Grand Canal; three Sheng front, three right, and one old left battalion held Cangzhou; one Le center and one Le left battalion were also posted there; Sheng units ran military farms as well, all to shield the capital district. That year Ding Richang found that after the Huai Army left Jiangsu, the governor’s banner could field only about 1,600 men. He cut the unfit, filled the ranks with volunteers, formed left and right battalions, and trained them in foreign rifles and breech-loading artillery. Ma Xinyi saw Jiangnan’s 12,700 quota troops scattered in name only across countless posts. Only by concentrating them could weakness become strength. He picked 1,000 from the governor’s banner for left and right battalions, 500 from Pukou and Guazhou for a center battalion, 500 from Yangzhou and Taizhou for a front battalion, all drilled at the provincial capital, and 1,000 from the Xuzhou garrison for new left and right battalions — scaling drill to each region’s strategic weight. Liu Jintang found Xinjiang’s banner garrisons shattered after the Muslim rebellions. He created garrison troops at Urumqi, posted quota forces on both sides of the Tianshan, consolidated Xinjiang’s banner garrisons under a reorganized Yili command, and stationed elite cavalry and heavy infantry in the center to support both routes. As Sichuan quieted, Chong Shi trimmed the defense forces and selected banner and Green Standard units for drill.
13
In the ninth year Zeng Guofan raised another 1,000 cavalry volunteers in four battalions, brought Zhili’s regular rolls up to 10,000, and drilled separate cavalry and infantry commands. He memorialized battalion and platoon tables plus base pay, training pay, and campaign supplements, making Zhili the empire’s northern bastion.
14
西仿
In the tenth year Bao Yuanshen applied Zeng Guofan’s Zhili model to Shanxi’s governor’s banner: one cavalry and two infantry battalions drilled first, then extended to every garrison. Wu Tang found most of Sichuan’s quota troops unfit, consolidated them for training, and produced 10,000 effective soldiers. After the Miao frontier was pacified, Wang Wenshao kept thirty Hunan defense battalions along the Guizhou border and drilled one elite battalion each from the governor’s and commander’s banners.
15
調 西 調
In the twelfth year Zuo Zongtang in Shaanxi-Gansu and Cen Yuying in Yunnan-Guizhou were ordered to fill regular quotas with picked volunteers from their commands. Court and provincial officials alike were now focused on military drill. Li Zongxi warned that volunteers and regulars differed in status, cohesion, and discipline, and that volunteers could not simply be swapped into the regular rolls. Wang Kaitai urged rotating garrisons for drill in every province; after Yunnan and Guizhou were pacified, their regulars should rotate as well, lest long postings breed idleness. The Board of War noted that early Tongzhi drill reforms for the Shenjiying and Zhili’s six armies had separate training funds and their own camp organization. Fujian, Zhejiang, Guangdong, Jiangsu, and others applied savings from troop cuts to their training forces. Henan, Shanxi, Shandong, Hunan, and others followed Zhili by drilling men drawn from the regular rolls and adding modest training pay on top of base rations. Gansu, with fighting only just ended, began by drilling 1,500 men. Yet in each province only twenty or thirty percent of the original rolls were actually put under drill. The rest were left alone and inevitably grew slack. Provincial commanders should rotate rested drill cycles through the trained men and bring the untrained onto the drill ground in turn, until every soldier on the rolls became an effective fighter.
16
In the thirteenth year Duxing’a drilled 2,000 cavalry from Fengtian’s garrison rolls and 1,000 banner sulah as reserves in each city, planning further expansion once outside troops were withdrawn.
17
In the second year of Guangxu, Chong Shi replaced worn-out rotating banner garrisons in Fengtian with training forces at Xiuyan, Xiongyue, Dagushan, Qingduizi, and other posts.
18
In the third year Li Qing’ao’s proposal was approved to add infantry to Henan’s training forces.
19
西西仿 調 祿
In the sixth year provincial governors were ordered to trim their establishments as they saw fit. Even after cuts, defense forces remained numerous in many provinces. Zhili, Shaanxi, and Gansu still needed frontier troops; Yunnan and Guizhou already had relatively few defense forces; all other provinces should cut deeply. Once armed steamers entered service, the old war-junk fleets were also thinned or kept as needed. Soon afterward Guangxi’s Qing Yu, finding troops few and pay thin, cut defense forces and used the savings under Zhili’s drill rules to train two battalions each from the provincial and commander’s banners and one battalion each from the Zuojiang and Youjiang garrisons. Qi Yuan noted that since Tongzhi, horse bandits had ravaged Fengtian from every direction, prompting repeated calls for outside troops and expansion of banner and Green Standard camps, yet organization and pay remained inconsistent. In the fifth year of Guangxu, Zhili’s outside detachments were absorbed into Fengtian. Rifle, artillery, cavalry, and infantry units were unified into five Feng-designated mixed battalions — center, left, right, front, and rear — with an extra infantry battalion added to the center. Ding Baozhen explained that wartime Sichuan had swelled beyond local volunteers to include Hunan and Guizhou forces totaling more than 60,000 men. After peace, cuts proceeded in stages; by the third year of Guangxu about 10,000 defense troops remained holding vital passes and could not be reduced further. Guizhou already had fewer defense troops than most provinces; after the fifth year of Guangxu Li Mingchi cut more than 4,000 in stages. Li Hanzhang argued that Hubei’s defense battalions — three Sheng units, eight Zhongyi, seven Wuyi, and seven naval — held critical posts and should stand, while about 3,000 men were cut from the provincial regular rolls instead. Yulu reported that after the Nian rebellion, Anhui’s 18,000-odd garrison troops in the south and north were gradually consolidated for training, leaving 10,000 land and river defense troops on the rolls.
20
In the seventh year Cen Yuying, with the Miao rebellion over, trimmed Guizhou’s colony troops and defense volunteers, cutting 9,000 colony soldiers, filling regular quotas with the discharged men, and reorganizing training forces. Soon transferred to Fujian, he took 2,000 Guizhou training troops with him to drill Fujian’s regulars. Tan Zhonglin raised Zhejiang’s defense force to thirty battalions in the sixth year of Guangxu, then cut four; ten training battalions held Wenzhou, one each held Haimen and the provincial capital, and the rest returned to their garrison posts. That year, with provincial defense payrolls enormous, field commanders were ordered to audit accounts strictly and root out embezzlement and ghost rolls.
21
調
In the eighth year Chong Qi consolidated Fengtian’s forces. Aside from the Jiesheng banner camp, the Eastern Frontier garrison, and Mongol drilled volunteers, southern defense volunteers in the cavalry and infantry — posted on poor land — were merged into one battalion and the rest sent home to their provinces. Ren Daorong drew 1,200 infantry from Shandong’s governor’s banner and the Yanzhou and Caozhou garrisons into three battalions with extra pay for drill. After Yili was recovered, Zhang Yao and Liu Jintang drilled regulars from frontier camps and volunteers, converted campaign pay to fixed rations, revised the old system, added cavalry and heavy weapons, created mobile strike columns, and used military farming to feed the troops.
22
西 西
In the ninth year Zhang Zhidong reformed Shanxi’s army, beginning with the provincial banner to break old abuses and set the pattern for every camp in the province. Li Hongzhang trimmed Zhili’s defense forces but still kept several thousand men in Zhi, Rong, and Yisheng battalions, together with thirty-nine cavalry, infantry, and naval battalions of Huai personal guards and Ren, Sheng, Ming, and Chu units posted across the province. Cen Yuying explained that Guizhou’s turbulent Miao frontier had once fielded more than 30,000 troops, but long neglect left only the defense forces effective. After pacification, those defense units were folded into the regular establishment. Yunnan’s regulars included more than 9,000 combat troops and 7,000 garrison troops scattered across posts and checkpoints, while patrol and pursuit fell to the training forces. Combat troops were therefore concentrated at headquarters for constant inspection. Pan Yi consolidated Jiangxi’s defense forces to about 7,800 men, trimming more than ten soldiers from each platoon where consolidation allowed. Zeng Guoquan tallied Guangdong’s recruitment: in the sixth year of Guangxu Zhang Zhidong raised 1,000 sand fishermen for Humen; Yang Yukuo added 1,000 men and 500 for the Huiqing camp; Zheng Shaozhong raised 2,000 An volunteers; in the eighth year 1,000 elite troops garrisoned Qinzhou; Deng Anbang raised another 1,000 posted through Guangzhou’s dependencies — while Guangdong’s regular rolls still held more than 9,000 men.
23
西
In the tenth year Kuibin cut more than 3,000 men from Shanxi’s two regional commands and drilled one mixed cavalry-infantry battalion at Datong and one infantry battalion at Taiyuan.
24
西 沿
In the eleventh year Bian Baodi cut Hunan’s Green Standard rolls, picked the fit for training forces at double pay, and filled gaps with camp volunteers. Xiyuan and others drew 1,500 men from Jilin’s left and right defense cavalry-infantry camps, selected another 3,000 from untrained troops and banner station xidan, organized them into Ji-designated left and right wings, built fortifications, and put them under camp drill. Cen Yuying organized Yunnan’s 16,000 frontier defense troops into thirty battalions and each year, when the malarial season ended, toured the border himself to inspect the garrisons. Bian Baodi put half of Hunan’s entire regular establishment under training and organized them as patrol garrisons.
25
In the twelfth year Liu Bingzhang found that Sichuan’s defense camps had grown slack with old abuses, and had every one of the ten Shou- and Wu-designated battalions plus five salt-patrol battalions selected, re-drilled, and brought back into order.
26
西
In the thirteenth year Mutushan reorganized drilling in the Three Eastern Provinces, raising two cavalry detachments and eight infantry battalions per province so that Fengtian, Jilin, and Heilongjiang each fielded 4,500 men, and distributing sixty Krupp guns among their defense camps. Gangyi cut 6,000 men from Shanxi’s rolls and used the savings to drill new units: one provincial cavalry banner and three infantry battalions; two cavalry banners and four infantry battalions at Taiyuan; seven cavalry banners and two infantry battalions at Datong. On the northern route, Shu-designated battalions took up district patrol duties.
27
In the fourteenth year Cen Yuying picked and drilled more than 9,600 men from Yunnan’s interior defense forces and frontier volunteer camps to meet the provincial target of keeping half the force as combat troops. The border was too wide for the existing garrisons, so thirty more battalions—more than 15,400 men—were drilled and posted along the Tengyue and Mengzi frontiers and in Dali and Pu’er.
28
調西
In the fifteenth year Tan Junpei overhauled Yunnan’s camp organization. Yunnan’s defense forces dated their reorganization to the second year of Guangxu, when Liu Changyou picked combat troops and formed battalions of 370 men each. In the tenth year, when Cen Yuying led the army beyond the passes, he reorganized units into small battalions of 220 men, each divided into five platoons of four ten-man squads. In the eleventh year the training force battalions were merged so that half garrisoned the interior and half the frontier, still at roughly 200 men per small battalion. The force comprised seventy-seven combat battalions at eighty percent strength for rotation, twelve retained Guangdong volunteer battalions, six Luohé frontier volunteer battalions, and twenty-five southwestern native defense battalions. Thirty percent were then cut and the remainder consolidated: three old battalions became one, each reorganized into five platoons—the center with six squads, the rest with three—turning scattered units into a coherent whole. The result was twenty-six combat battalions, five Guangdong volunteer battalions, two Luohé volunteer battalions, and thirteen native volunteer battalions.
29
In the sixteenth year Zhang Yao drilled one infantry battalion in Shandong.
30
鹿西
In the seventeenth year Furun added a Left Infantry Battalion to the drill program. Lu Chuanlin explained that Shaanxi’s military system had not recovered from the recent troubles, so he kept selected defense and training battalions in the center for rapid response. Because cavalry patrolled more effectively, he converted infantry to cavalry to save pay, posting 1,500 mounted defense and training troops at key points on the plains and northern hills. Zhang Xu noted that after the Xiang volunteers went home, Hunan depended entirely on 10,000 defense troops and more than 2,400 naval volunteers to hold the province; he consolidated and rebalanced them so they could support one another.
31
仿
In the twenty-first year Yiketanga formed three artillery platoons in Fengtian, merged them with existing defense units into five battalions, and enrolled 2,000 hunter households as four battalions. That same year Zhang Zhidong raised thirteen Self-Strengthening Army battalions in Jiangnan, equipping and training them entirely on the European model.
32
仿
In the twenty-second year Zhang Zhidong drilled two Western drill battalions in Hubei. Nie Shicheng picked thirty cavalry and infantry battalions from the Huai Army garrison in Zhili, trained them on the German model, and organized them as the Wu Yi Army.
33
In the twenty-third year Zhang Zhidong argued that training forces lived or died by drill, and ordered each garrison to send one man in ten in rotation to the provincial capital for the new drill, then back to train the rest.
34
西西 祿
In the twenty-fourth year Wang Yuzao reformed Guizhou’s army, starting with three provincial defense battalions on Western drill and extending the change battalion by battalion. Wang Wenshao kept more than 20,000 Huai and training troops in Zhili, formed twenty left- and right-wing battalions at Dagu and Shanhaiguan, and posted thirty-three training battalions across the interior and Rehe. Seleng’e pointed out that Rehe governed two Mongol leagues and seventeen banners but had only 1,000 defense troops, so he added one 500-man infantry battalion, two 250-man cavalry battalions, and a 100-man artillery detachment. Zeng Qi argued that Fujian’s terrain called for infantry-heavy newly drilled defense forces backed by artillery, and added twelve mountain quick-firing guns. Hu Pinyi observed that eastern provinces, Zhili, Shaanxi, and Henan all maintained defense forces costing from hundreds of thousands to a million taels, while Shanxi— guarding the capital’s western flank—had only 5,000 training troops; he therefore raised a new army to secure the western approaches. Once the Northern Four Armies were trained, Ronglu posted them as the Front Army at Lutai (Wu Yi), Rear Army at Jizhou (Gan), Left Army at Shanhaiguan (Yi), and Right Army at Xiaozhan (New Army), with 10,000 more at Nanyuan as the Central Army. Short of arms, he ordered 3,000 quick-firing rifles and seven quick-firing guns from the Jiangnan Arsenal and merged the existing 12,000 Huai troops and 19,000 defense and training forces into the new program. Liu Kunyi put Jiangnan’s five defense routes—Jiangning, Zhenjiang, Wusong, Jiangyin, and Xuzhou—on Western drill and standardized their weapons throughout. That year the court ordered princes and ministers to pick 10,000 cavalry and infantry from Beijing’s Shenji Camp to form the Vanguard Camp. Northern provincial units were to be drilled by instructors from the New Army; southern units by instructors from the Self-Strengthening Army. Defense and training units in the Three Eastern Provinces were to be drilled by instructors from the Beiyang Military Academy.
35
祿 西 仿 西 西
In the twenty-fifth year Li Bingheng reported that Fengtian’s Ren and Yu armies were fully trained and urged that fortifications be built at chosen sites to turn them into major garrisons. Yulu found Zhili’s defense and training forces too large, kept 10,800 picked cavalry and infantry, and reorganized them into twelve infantry battalions of 300 men and twenty cavalry battalions of roughly 200—thirty-two battalions under left and right Zhili training wings commanded from Tongzhou-Yongding and Tianjin. The New Army and Song Qing’s twenty-five battalions remained at their old posts. Liu Shutang consolidated Zhejiang’s eleven Yun-, Ji-, Sheng-, and Lü-designated battalions and twenty-three banners into five armies called the Liang-Zhe New Army, drilled on the Beiyang Wu Yi model. Song Shou counted more than 2,000 men in Jiangxi’s Zhongxin and related defense battalions, 2,400 river-defense sailors on the Neijiang and Gan, and 3,000 in Wuwei and allied units scattered across the province, and set up a provincial camp affairs office in the capital to coordinate their training. Liu Kunyi consolidated Jiangnan’s forces into thirty-seven battalions, put them on the new drill, and began to see steady improvement. Wen Xing trimmed Mukden’s banner regulars to the fit and drilled them on the Beiyang training-force model. Yu Xiang picked an elite battalion from Sichuan’s garrison banner troops, using the same formations and organization as the defense forces. Song Shou armed Jiangxi’s 3,000 newly drilled defense troops with modern rifles and guns from the northern and southern arsenals for training. Huang Huaisen began reforming Guangxi’s forces by drilling 1,400 men from the provincial and command banners and Left and Right River battalions as a model for the rest. Liao Shoufeng put Ningbo and Zhenhai on Western drill first, then trained three infantry platoons and one artillery platoon as a provincial model; banner, defense, and training units would rotate through those four platoons until the whole province was converted.
36
西
In the twenty-sixth year Duanfang posted Shaanxi’s thirteen newly drilled Western-drill cavalry and infantry banners at mountain passes north and south. That year the court ordered governors to crack down on corrupt officers and clean up long-standing abuses in Zhejiang’s defense camps.
37
西 西仿 西 西
In the twenty-seventh year Li Xingrui standardized Jiangxi’s uneven defense rolls by dividing them into five routes: a Central standing force and Front, Rear, Left, and Right reserve forces of five battalions and five platoons each. Liu Kunyi designated the 2,000-man Wuwei Vanguard and Jiangsheng armies as left and right standing forces and folded the remaining forty-plus defense battalions into the reserve. Cen Chunxuan found Shanxi’s forces split among training troops, defense troops, and the Jinwei Army, and modeled a new scheme on the Beiyang Wuwei system: 3,000 provincial banner troops as left and right standing forces and 3,000 drilled men from Taiyuan and Datong as reserves. Wei Guangtao converted Yunnan’s twenty-four 250-man defense battalions into twelve 300-man standing battalions, turned the old training forces into reserves, and put all on Western drill. Ding Zhenduo picked 1,000 men from Guangxi’s three defense battalions as standing forces, with each subordinate unit drilling one or two squads according to its size. Deng Huaxi formed a 1,500-man standing force from Guizhou’s defense troops, the Weiyuan camp, and five drilled battalions, and a 5,700-man reserve from twenty-nine eastern and western training and pursuit battalions posted at the passes. That year a Military Administration Bureau was set up at Tianjin to supervise drill and garrison duties for all Huai, training, and defense forces in Zhili.
38
西
In the twenty-eighth year Sheng Yun, with all Shaanxi’s old and new units on Western drill, picked six elite banners as a standing new army and reorganized the Zhongjing banner infantry and Wuwei cavalry into twelve infantry banners—six as reserve defense troops for local duty and six as reserve Chang troops for frontier reclamation, backed by cavalry and artillery.
39
西
In the twenty-ninth year Xia Shi found Jiangxi’s 1,200-man new army too small for vital river defense, and since Jiujiang guarded the provincial gateway he raised another standing army. With the Central and Front standing forces, ten battalions now held the capital and Jiujiang while Left, Right, and Rear reserves covered the rest of the province.
40
沿
In the thirtieth year Cao Hongxun reported that Guizhou’s twenty-four standing and reserve battalions of 1900 had swelled by nineteen frontier volunteer battalions during border alerts, but pay was tight so each unit was trimmed until defense, training, and personal guards totaled just over 10,500 men, who were then put on Western drill one by one. Pan Xiaosu cut Xinjiang’s 32,000 banner, defense, patrol, and training troops to 13,000 picked regulars and distributed them proportionally along the northern and southern routes.
41
西
In the thirty-first year the Army Training Office found Shandong’s twenty Wuwei Vanguard battalions too scattered and ordered them concentrated at chosen posts and expanded into a full brigade. That year Tie Liang was sent to inspect defense forces, training forces, Army units, banner troops, and constabulary in Jiangsu, Anhui, Jiangxi, and Hubei. Tie Liang toured every unit and found weapons still mixed, drill uneven, and converted old camps advancing painfully slowly. Only Anhui’s two training squads, Jiujiang’s five standing battalions, and Hubei’s two regional commands looked noticeably better.
42
沿 西
In the thirty-third year Zhang Zhidong converted the river-bank pursuit camps and downstream bandit-suppression camps into a combined land-and-water patrol corps. Wang Shizhen converted northern Jiangsu’s patrol garrisons into six infantry and two cavalry battalions while leaving the Huai-Hai naval force and training guards unchanged. Xi Liang gradually converted Yunnan’s thirty-nine defense, railway patrol, and native volunteer battalions into the new army, fixing defense battalions at 250 men each and organizing forty-seven battalions across five routes: south, west, Pu’er, river, and railway patrol.
43
西仿 西 滿 調
In the first year of Xuantong Rehe’s Qiangsheng patrol battalion became standing forces, and Chahar’s Jingzhuang and Jingjian battalions were reorganized into one patrol cavalry battalion and two infantry battalions. Xu Shichang posted Fengtian’s patrol garrisons on five bandit-suppression routes, then merged them into one infantry regiment and reorganized the river-defense camps on the same model. When six Jiangnan infantry and two artillery battalions moved to northern Jiangsu, Wang Shizhen merged the remaining patrol and garrison units into eight patrol infantry battalions—including a new Seventh Battalion—aiming at a full brigade; he expanded the guard into a battalion and converted 300 training troops and ten naval sheds into patrol garrisons. Shen Bingkun explained that Yunnan’s subordinate “guard units” were really old local militia still called battalions, and could not yet be turned into formal patrol garrisons. Guang Fu explained that the Han companies of the Ili banner descended from Jin Shun’s western expedition volunteers on the Xiang Army model; under the new rules he formed a Left Route patrol garrison of one infantry battalion and two cavalry banners and a Right Route patrol garrison of two cavalry banners, posted at Huiyuan and Huining. Yuan Shuxun reported that Shandong’s Huai garrison had moved to the Yangtze in 1898, leaving two new defense battalions at Yanzhou, Yizhou, and Dezhou on vital north-south lines that could not yet be disbanded. Lian Kui, with Xinjiang’s finances stretched thin, reorganized existing defense camps into three infantry and two cavalry battalions, added an engineering squad and another cavalry battalion, and barely scraped together one brigade. Bao Fen consolidated Shanxi’s three old patrol branches at Taiyuan, Datong, and beyond the passes into Central, Front, and Rear routes under single commanders—twenty-two cavalry and infantry squads in all. Wu Zhongxi found Henan’s patrol garrisons out of compliance and reorganized the province’s twenty-eight infantry and twelve cavalry patrol battalions into five routes: Central (Yuzheng Left), Front (Nanyang), Left (Guide), Right (Hezhou), and Rear (Yuzheng Right). Zhao Erxun formed Sichuan’s twenty-nine defense battalions into six six-battalion armies on Central, Front, Rear, Left, Right, and Deputy Central routes posted across the province. The two Jing-designated battalions, two detached infantry battalions, and a newly raised Jing Rear battalion at Ningyuan became Deputy Left and Deputy Right patrol armies of three battalions each. Chengdu’s Manchu garrison was likewise reorganized into three patrol battalions for uniformity. Rui Cheng, beyond forming one brigade from Jiangsu’s battalions, also had Taihu naval patrol units and left and right land patrol forces converted from land banners and Suzhou pursuit guards; he rotated posts and drills to keep them from going slack.
44
西 西 駿沿 西
In the second year Cen Chunming reorganized Hunan’s patrol garrisons, set their pay scale, and stood them up at once; three anti-smuggling banners became the Southern Route patrol garrison. Sun Baoqi reorganized Shandong’s five patrol routes from each camp’s center platoon, formed artillery squads of six quick-firing guns, converted every county patrol volunteer unit into patrol garrisons, and brought Yanzhou, Yizhou, and Caozhou’s old patrol camps under the new drill scheme. En Shou converted all of Shaanxi’s constabulary troops into patrol garrisons. Yang Wending split Hunan’s patrol garrisons into Central, Eastern, Western, and Southern routes posted across the prefectures. Kunyuan recruited and drilled Chahar banner militia into patrol cavalry. Song Shou turned Fujian’s disbanded Green Standard troops into sixteen patrol battalions on five routes across the prefectures. Zhang Renjun turned the Two Jiangs patrol corps and ten command vessels into an investigation corps, funded patrol garrisons from coordinated Huai Army pay from Beiyang, and posted river-defense troops in the Jiangning capital. Xi Liang reorganized Fengtian’s auxiliary patrol, reserve, artillery, and guard camps into one Army infantry regiment and one artillery battalion. That year the governors of Shandong and Shanxi both urged postponing cuts to patrol garrisons to keep the peace locally.
45
駿 西滿 西 沿
In the third year Zhang Renjun argued that Two Jiangs patrol forces were too important to cut: thirty-two cavalry and infantry battalions at Jiangning, six infantry battalions in Jiangsu, and eight infantry battalions, one platoon, and one cavalry battalion in northern Jiangsu guarded terrain too vital to reduce. He proposed forming three patrol units from retained new-army squads and one platoon as the provincial commander’s guard. Ding Baoquan reported that Taiyuan’s Manchu garrison, on the new drill since 1902, was reorganized as a patrol garrison under the regulations. En Shou reported that Shaanxi’s constabulary had become patrol garrisons and that a joint cavalry-infantry patrol affairs office had been set up. Qing Shu reported that with more than 60,000 mu reclaimed in Qinghai, existing patrol garrisons could not cover the ground, so one defense banner was added. Cheng Xun explained that Rehe’s eight Zhili training battalions covered only Chaoyang and Jianping, and its thirteen newly drilled patrol battalions scattered across the prefecture could not yet become formal Army units. Zhang Xun posted thirteen Yangtze patrol cavalry, infantry, and artillery battalions at Pukou, Luhe, Jiangning, Suzhou, Huaiyuan, and other counties and spread scouts along the river to choke off bandit networks. Rui Cheng reported that after six Hunan battalions were disbanded, picked men from the provincial banner force were formed into one patrol battalion. Such was the broad pattern of reorganizing defense and training forces.
46
From the Xianfeng wars onward, forces evolved from Green Standard troops to volunteer camps, retained defense camps, training forces, patrol garrisons, and finally the Army—the military system renewing itself at each stage. By the Xuantong era the Green Standard was gone altogether, and the Xiang and Huai volunteers once posted on the northern and southern coasts had nearly vanished as well.
47
祿 祿
The modern Army system began after the Sino-Japanese War, when Infantry Commander Ronglu recommended Wenzhou circuit intendant Yuan Shikai to raise a new force—the Newly Created Army. Yuan also drilled troops at Xiaozhan in what became the Dingwu Army. Two Jiangs Governor-General Zhang Zhidong hired German instructors to raise the Jiangnan Self-Strengthening Army. Later, as Minister of War and Associate Grand Secretary commanding all Beiyang land and sea forces, Ronglu expanded the new armies into the Wuwei Army.
48
After the Boxer upheaval of 1900 every province set about raising new armies, either by converting defense forces or by fresh recruitment on the new model. By 1904 the system was codified: Beijing got an Army Training Office, each province a training supervision office, and the new army was divided into thirty-six brigades—finally bringing the new force under one standard.
49
西 調 西 西 西 西
In 1907, counting newly drilled Army units in the capital and provinces apart from the Imperial Guard, the First Brigade of the metropolitan region alone—garrisoned at Yangshanwa north of Beijing—numbered 748 officers and 11,764 soldiers. The Sixth Brigade was posted at Nanyuan with 747 officers and 11,846 soldiers. Zhili’s Second Brigade held Baoding, Yongping, and neighboring prefectures with 737 officers and 11,731 soldiers. The Fourth Brigade was stationed at Machang with 748 officers and 11,756 soldiers. Shandong’s Fifth Brigade was distributed across the provincial capital, Weixian, Changyi, and other posts with 748 officers and 11,764 soldiers. Jiangsu’s Twenty-third Mixed Brigade held Suzhou and nearby posts with 274 officers and 4,345 soldiers. Northern Jiangsu’s Thirteenth Mixed Brigade was posted at Qingjiangpu with 376 officers and 2,481 soldiers. Anhui kept two infantry regiments, one cavalry battalion, and one artillery squad at the provincial capital—253 officers and 4,155 soldiers in all. Jiangnan’s Ninth Brigade, with one infantry battalion and two cavalry squads at the provincial capital, fielded 789 officers and 8,255 soldiers. Jiangxi posted one infantry brigade and two cavalry squads at the provincial capital—231 officers and 4,287 soldiers. Henan’s Twenty-ninth Mixed Brigade at the provincial capital had 338 officers and 5,618 soldiers; an infantry brigade plus cavalry and artillery battalions were also detached to the capital with 162 officers and 3,085 men. Hunan kept one infantry brigade and one artillery battalion at the provincial capital—248 officers and 4,056 soldiers. Hubei’s Eighth Brigade at the provincial capital numbered 702 officers and 10,502 soldiers; the Twenty-first Mixed Brigade held Wuchang, Hanyang, and the Beijing-Hankou line with 288 officers and 4,612 men. Zhejiang posted one infantry brigade at the provincial capital with 159 officers and 2,384 soldiers. Fujian’s Tenth Brigade covered the provincial capital, Funing, Yanping, and other posts with 455 officers and 6,788 soldiers. Yunnan kept one infantry brigade and one artillery battalion at the provincial capital and Lin’an—238 officers and 4,248 soldiers. Guizhou fielded one infantry regiment and one artillery squad at the provincial capital—107 officers and 1,846 soldiers. Sichuan’s infantry detachment at the provincial capital mustered only twelve officers and sixty-one soldiers. Shanxi kept two infantry regiments plus cavalry and artillery battalions at the provincial capital—262 officers and 4,557 soldiers. Shaanxi posted one infantry brigade and one artillery squad at the provincial capital with 220 officers and 3,936 soldiers. Gansu distributed two infantry regiments and an artillery battalion across the provincial capital, Hezhou, Guyuan, and Xining—221 officers and 4,128 soldiers. Xinjiang kept one infantry brigade, one cavalry regiment, and one artillery battalion at the provincial capital—167 officers and 2,322 soldiers. The Northeast’s Third Brigade held Jilin city, Changchun, Ning’an, Yanji, Jinzhou, and other posts with 753 officers and 11,883 soldiers. The First Mixed Brigade at Fengtian’s capital had 303 officers and 3,059 men; the Second Mixed Brigade at Xinmin and elsewhere had 304 officers and 5,053 men; and Jilin hosted an infantry brigade and regiment plus an artillery battalion with 361 officers and 7,870 soldiers. By the third year of Xuantong, beyond the units already listed, Zhejiang became the Twenty-first Brigade, Yunnan the Nineteenth, Sichuan the Seventeenth, Fengtian the Twentieth, Jilin the Twenty-third, Guangdong the Twenty-sixth at the provincial capital, and Guangxi the Twenty-fifth at the capital and Guilin—twenty-six brigades in all, formed one after another. Soon afterward the Wuchang garrison rose first, the provinces followed, and the planned thirty-six brigades were never fully realized.
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