Volume 133 Treatises 108: Military 4, Local Militia

志一百八

Treatise 108

兵四

Military 4

鄉兵

Local Militia

鄉兵始自雍、乾，旋募旋散，初非經制之師。嘉慶間，平川、楚教匪，鄉兵之功始著。道光之季，粵西寇起，各省舉辦團練，有駐守地方者，有隨營征剿者。侍郎曾國籓以衡、湘團練討寇，練鄉兵為勇營，以兵制部勒之，卒平巨憝，其始皆鄉兵也。而邊徼之地，剿有鄉兵。其在東三省者，則寧古塔以東之赫哲部、克雅克部，混同江東北之鄂倫春部，不設佐領，惟設鄉兵姓長。其在黑龍江者，有打牲人，在江以南之錫伯、卦勒察，江以北之索倫、達瑚爾，則附屬於滿營。在蒙古者，蒙兵而外，有奇古民勇。在山、陝邊外者，有番兵，有僧俗兵。在四川、雲南、貴州邊境者，有夷兵，有土司兵，有黑裸勇丁。在西藏者，有藏番兵。皆與內地鄉兵不同，故不詳。其各直省之鄉兵，曰屯練，曰民壯，曰鄉團，曰獵戶，曰漁團，曰沙民。額數之多寡不齊，器械之良窳不一，餉章之增減不定，良以聚散無恆，故與額兵迥異，無編製之可紀。茲特志其始末於後焉。

Local militia dated back to the Yongzheng and Qianlong reigns, raised and released in cycles rather than maintained as part of the standing army. It was during the Jiaqing era, in the campaign to suppress the Sichuan and Hubei sect rebels, that local militia first won clear renown. Near the close of the Daoguang reign, rebellion broke out in western Guangdong, and provinces across the empire organized militia companies—some to hold their own districts, others to campaign alongside regular forces. Vice Minister Zeng Guofan mobilized the Hunan and Hengyang militia against the rebels, drilled local militiamen into formal brave battalions under regular military discipline, and in the end crushed the great menace—yet every man in those ranks had begun as a village fighter. On the frontiers, too, local militia were raised for pacification duty. In the Three Eastern Provinces, the Hezhe and Keyake peoples east of Ningguta and the Oroqen northeast of the Songhua River had no banner assistants; only clan chiefs of local militia were appointed. In Heilongjiang there were tribute hunters; the Xibe and Guilecha south of the river and the Solon and Dahur north of it were attached to Manchu garrisons. In Mongolia, beyond the regular Mongol forces, there were Qigu civilian braves. Beyond the Shanxi and Shaanxi frontiers there were frontier tribesmen, monastic troops, and lay troops. Along the Sichuan, Yunnan, and Guizhou borderlands there were Yi fighters, native chieftain levies, and Heiluo brave militiamen. In Tibet there were Tibetan frontier troops. All of these differed from the local militia of the interior provinces, and so are not treated here in detail. In the provinces themselves, local militia went by many names: garrison militia, civilian strongmen, village companies, hunter bands, fishing militia, and sand-dwellers. Authorized strength varied, weapons ranged from good to poor, and pay schedules shifted constantly, for these forces gathered and dispersed without fixed routine; they bore little resemblance to regular troops, and no stable table of organization could be recorded. What follows is a record of their origins and development.

雍正八年，鄂爾泰平西南夷烏蒙之亂，調官兵萬餘人，鄉兵半之，遂定東川，是為鄉兵之始。

In the eighth year of Yongzheng, Ortai put down the Wumeng rebellion in the southwestern Yi country, calling up more than ten thousand regular troops and an equal number of local militia, and thus secured Dongchuan—this is taken as the beginning of local militia service.

乾隆三十八年，用兵小金川，定邊將軍溫福、定西將軍阿桂疏言，調滿洲兵道遠費重，不如多用鄉兵，人地相宜。四川鄉兵，以金川屯練為強，自平定金川以後，設屯練鄉兵，其糧餉倍於額兵，分屯大小金川兩路，春夏訓練，秋冬蒐獵，有戰事則搜剿山路，退兵則為殿後之用。

In the thirty-eighth year of Qianlong, during operations in the Lesser Jin River region, Generals Wen Fu and Agui argued in memorial that hauling Manchu troops from afar was ruinously expensive and that local militia, matched to people and terrain, should be used instead. Among Sichuan's local militia, the Jinchuan garrison companies were the strongest. After Jinchuan was pacified, garrison militia were established with rations twice those of regular troops, posted along both the Greater and Lesser Jinchuan routes. They drilled in spring and summer, hunted in autumn and winter, scoured mountain trails when fighting broke out, and covered the army's withdrawal when it pulled back.

嘉慶初，苗疆事起，傅鼐以鄉兵平苗，功冠諸將。詔以鼐總理邊務，令各省督撫以鼐練鄉兵之法練官兵。川、楚教匪之役，官兵征討，而鄉兵之功為多。其勛績最著者，文臣則四川按察使劉清，武臣則四川提督桂涵，湖北提督羅思舉，各統鄉兵，分路剿寇，大小數百戰，遂奏膚功。嘉慶十七年，以雲南邊外野夷裸匪肆擾，而緬寧、騰越各隘皆瘴癘之地，難駐官兵，乃練鄉兵一千六百人，以八百人駐守緬寧之丙野山樑等處，以八百人駐守騰越蠻章山等處，省官兵徵調之勞。其時苗疆底定，亦增設鄉兵，凡屯丁七千人，訓練之暇，開墾屯防田數十萬頃。

At the opening of the Jiaqing reign, when unrest erupted in the Miao frontier, Fu Nai suppressed the Miao with local militia and outshone every other commander. The throne then put Fu in charge of frontier affairs and instructed every provincial governor to drill regular troops by the same methods Fu had used to train local militia. In the war against the Sichuan and Hubei sect rebels, regular troops bore the main burden of campaigning, yet local militia won the greater share of credit. The most celebrated leaders were the civil official Liu Qing, Sichuan Surveillance Commissioner, and the military commanders Gui Han of Sichuan and Luo Siju of Hubei. Each led local militia along separate routes, fought several hundred engagements large and small, and in the end won a thorough victory. In the seventeenth year of Jiaqing, wild Yi and Luo bandits beyond Yunnan's borders were raiding freely, while the passes at Mianning and Tengyue were malarial country where regular garrisons could not be maintained. Sixteen hundred local militiamen were therefore trained—eight hundred posted at Bingyeshanliang and other points in Mianning, eight hundred at Manzhangshan and elsewhere in Tengyue—relieving regular troops of constant call-ups. By then the Miao frontier had been settled, and local militia were expanded as well: seven thousand garrison militiamen who, between drills, opened several hundred thousand qing of defensive farmland.

道光二年，令直隸疆臣招集團練，修築土堡，互為策應。十五年，令各州縣額設民壯，一律充補訓練，復令各省民壯每月隨營操演，范以紀律。是年，調大小金川鄉兵千名，給以千人之糧，隨營征戰，歸屯則仍食五百人之糧。二十一年，令山東巡撫於蓬萊、黃縣、榮成、寧海、掖縣、膠州、即墨所屬之十三梟，編練鄉兵，互相防衛。又令沿海疆臣仿浙江定海縣土堡之法，凡近海村落，招募鄉兵，興築土堡，以聯聲勢。二十三年，令廣東省以團練助防海口。旋疆吏疏言廣東民風宜於鄉團，招集已得十萬人，以昇平學社為團練總匯之區，推及韶州、廉州等處，一律舉行。二十六年，令各州縣民壯隨營考察技藝。是年，甘肅沿邊番賊肆擾，令疆臣召募獵戶千人，編為一軍，供遠探近防之用。及道光季年，張國樑募廣東潮州鄉兵追逐粵寇，轉戰東下，卒以獷悍不馴，遂至潰散。

In the second year of Daoguang, Zhili's frontier officials were ordered to raise militia companies, build earthen forts, and coordinate mutual support. In the fifteenth year, every prefecture and county was required to maintain a quota of civilian strongmen, fill vacancies, and train them uniformly; provinces were also ordered to have these men drill monthly with the camps under strict discipline. That same year, one thousand local militiamen from Greater and Lesser Jinchuan were called up with full rations for a thousand men while on campaign; when they returned to garrison duty, they were paid at half strength. In the twenty-first year, the Shandong governor was ordered to organize and drill local militia in thirteen districts under Penglai, Huangxian, Rongcheng, Ninghai, Yexian, Jiaozhou, and Jimo for mutual defense. Coastal officials were also told to follow the earthen-fort model used in Dinghai County, Zhejiang: recruit local militia in seaside villages and build earthworks to extend their defensive reach. In the twenty-third year, Guangdong was ordered to use militia companies to help defend Haikou. Soon afterward, provincial officials reported that Guangdong's local customs favored village militia: one hundred thousand men had already been enrolled, with the Shengping Academy society serving as the central hub, and the program was extended uniformly to Shaozhou, Lianzhou, and elsewhere. In the twenty-sixth year, every prefecture and county was ordered to test civilian strongmen on their skills during camp drills. That same year, frontier raiders along Gansu's borders were running wild, and officials were ordered to recruit one thousand hunter militiamen as a single corps for long-range scouting and local defense. Near the end of the Daoguang reign, Zhang Guoliang raised Chaozhou militia from Guangdong to chase the Cantonese rebels eastward, but their ferocity proved impossible to control, and the force eventually collapsed and scattered.

咸豐二年，令在籍侍郎曾國籓辦理湖南鄉團。旋國籓疏言先行練勇一千人，所辦者乃官勇非團丁，是為鄉團改勇營之始。三年，令山東登、萊、青三府舉辦聯庄團練，給以兵械。四年，令甘肅沿邊增募獵戶三千人以防番騎。八年，安徽巡撫翁同書疏言皖省定遠、壽州、合肥等縣舉辦團練，旬日之間，遠近響應，和州踞賊屢出焚掠，多被鄉團擊回，以其深明大義，踴躍同仇，凡董事團總人等，傳諭嘉勉。九年，河南巡撫恆福疏言，皖寇進偪豫境，令道府大員於接近皖寇之地，舉辦鄉團，睢州等州縣興築堡寨已數十處。旋諭河南官紳訓練鄉勇，聯村築寨，迅速舉行。

In the second year of Xianfeng, Vice Minister Zeng Guofan, then at home on leave, was ordered to organize Hunan's village militia. Zeng soon reported that he would begin by drilling one thousand braves—official troops, not village militiamen—and this marked the first step in turning village companies into formal brave battalions. In the third year, the three Shandong prefectures of Deng, Lai, and Qing were ordered to organize linked-village militia and were issued arms. In the fourth year, Gansu's frontier was ordered to expand hunter recruitment to three thousand men to guard against frontier cavalry raids. In the eighth year, Anhui Governor Weng Tongshu reported that Dingyuan, Shouzhou, Hefei, and other counties had raised militia companies, and within ten days the response spread far and wide. Rebels holding Hexian repeatedly sallied out to burn and loot, but village militia drove most of them back. Because the organizers clearly grasped the larger cause and rallied with shared resolve, the directors and militia chiefs were commended by imperial message. In the ninth year, Henan Governor Hengfu reported that Anhui rebels were closing on Henan's border and ordered circuit and prefectural officials to organize village militia in threatened districts; in Suizhou and other counties, several dozen fortifications had already been raised. An edict soon followed instructing Henan's officials and gentry to train local braves, link villages with fortified stockades, and act without delay.

十年，諭勝保等督辦鄉團，以資統率，酌定章程，凡辦團州縣一律遵行，惟鄉團更番調營，所領糧餉，易滋流弊，毋得冒濫。又諭：「江蘇等省在籍紳士，除已經辦理團練外，其明曉大義律身公正者，自不乏人，所有在京直隸、江蘇、安徽、浙江、河南等省之大小官員，將如何舉行鄉團，隨同官兵剿賊，及防守等一切事宜，各陳所見，各舉所知，迅即上聞。」

In the tenth year, Senggebao and others were appointed to oversee village militia and draw up regulations for every participating county—but when militia rotated through camp duty, rations were easily abused, and padding the rolls was forbidden. Another edict declared: 'Among gentry on home leave in Jiangsu and other provinces, beyond those already organizing militia, there are surely many who understand the larger cause and conduct themselves with integrity. Every official from Zhili, Jiangsu, Anhui, Zhejiang, Henan, and other provinces now in the capital, high or low, shall report how village militia should be organized, how they should join regular troops in suppressing rebels, and how defense should be handled; each shall recommend capable men and report at once.'

尋侍郎沈兆霖疏陳：「自咸豐三年以後，迭奉朝旨舉行鄉團，已至再至三，各省官紳士民，未嘗不遵旨辦理，而賊勢披猖，卒無成效。良由苟且塗飾，未經實力講求，或募勇以充數，徒取外觀，或藉端以營私，轉成欲壑，無事則恃為威脅，擾害鄉閭，有警則首先遁逃，流為盜賊。議者幾謂鄉團之無益而有損矣。不知名為民團，即當以民為團，而不可以募勇塞責也。民統於紳，則紳之邪正宜慎擇也。紳倚於官，則官之賢否宜嚴辨也。不歸併於一路，則督察無人，必不能一律堅固。不專力於四鄉，則城守雖嚴，已難免四面受敵。官與紳宜兩相孚，不宜兩相阨。兵與民宜兩相顧，不宜兩相仇。任封疆者，當知民本吾民，用兵數少，何如用民數多。任將帥者，當知兵本吾民，我能救民，自然民能救我。現在賊氛猖獗，非實辦民團，更無安全之法。」乃擬上事宜十二條：「一、民團須招本地有業之民，不可招市井無賴也。一、宜分別地段，以近賊一、二百里為最要，距賊稍遠，中隔一、二縣者為次要，其遠在三、四百里外者，則從緩辦團也。一、各州縣要地，宜一律辦團，無使一處疏漏，俾寇得乘隙而入也。一、辦團宜四鄉加密，有警則互相應援，無事則嚴詰姦宄，庶城守完固也。一、牧令宜擇賢能，與辦團之紳，不得各存意見，亦不得任用劣紳也。一、宜簡道府大員分路辦團，俾各縣聯為一氣也。一、民團有急，官兵速往救援，不得觀望也。一、宜擇要設卡盤查也。一、民團祗可就地助戰，不宜調遣，變為練勇，失其恆業也。一、立功宜即獎勵，視官兵稍優也。一、團費宜自捐自辦，不得藉端漁利也。一、民團辦成，則分防之兵可省，集合成軍，攻剿更為得力也。」

Soon afterward, Vice Minister Shen Zhaolin memorialized: 'Since the third year of Xianfeng, the court has ordered village militia raised again and again—two times, three times—and officials, gentry, and commoners in every province have obeyed, yet the rebels have only grown bolder and the effort has come to nothing. The trouble was superficial compliance without real effort: some hired braves merely to pad the rolls and put on a show; others used militia as a pretext for private profit until the scheme became insatiable. In quiet times they bullied their neighbors; when danger came they were the first to flee and turned to banditry. Critics were close to declaring village militia worthless at best and harmful at worst. They missed the point: what is called a people's militia must be made of the people themselves, not filled out with hired braves as a substitute. Because commoners fall under gentry leadership, the character of those gentry must be chosen with care. Because gentry depend on officials, the quality of those officials must be strictly assessed. Without unified command, there is no one to oversee the effort, and cohesion cannot be maintained. If effort is not concentrated on the surrounding countryside, even the strictest city defenses cannot prevent attack from every direction. Officials and gentry should trust one another, not work at cross purposes. Soldiers and civilians should look out for one another, not become enemies. Frontier governors should remember that the people are their own people—a few soldiers are no match for mobilizing the many. Commanders should remember that their troops come from the people: if I save the people, the people will save me. With rebels raging as they do now, there is no path to safety except genuinely organizing people's militia.' He then drafted twelve recommendations: 'First, people's militia must recruit local people with honest livelihoods, not street riffraff. Second, areas should be prioritized by distance: one to two hundred li from the rebels is most urgent; one or two counties farther back is secondary; three or four hundred li away may be organized more slowly. Third, every key point in each prefecture and county should organize militia, leaving no gap through which bandits might slip. Fourth, militia should be thicker in the surrounding countryside: mutual support when alarm sounds, strict scrutiny of infiltrators in quiet times, so that city defenses hold firm. Fifth, magistrates must be capable; they and the gentry running militia must not work at cross purposes, and unworthy gentry must not be put in charge. Sixth, senior circuit and prefectural officials should be appointed to organize militia by route, so counties act as one coordinated body. Seventh, when militia are in danger, regular troops must rush to their aid without hesitation. Eighth, strategic checkpoints should be set up for inspection. Ninth, militia should fight only as local auxiliaries; they must not be redeployed as trained braves and stripped of their regular livelihoods. Tenth, meritorious service should be rewarded at once, on terms slightly better than those for regular troops. Eleventh, militia funds should come from voluntary local contributions, not become a pretext for profiteering. Twelfth, once militia are in place, garrison troops can be reduced and concentrated for more effective offensive campaigns.'

同時應詔陳言者，有載垣等所議團練章程十條，賈楨等所擬辦理章程八條。旋命順天府府丞毛昶熙為督辦河南團練大臣，南汝光道鄭元善幫辦團練事宜，按照怡親王載垣等所擬章程辦理。命戶部右侍郎杜為督辦山東團練大臣，登萊青道貢璜、登州府知府盧朝安幫辦團練事宜，按照大學士賈楨等所擬條款，並參酌河南章程，體察情形辦理。又以皖南地方緊要，應一律辦團，令兩江總督曾國籓察看情形，擇其諳練軍務素有人望者，酌保一人，即令督辦皖南團練事宜。

Others responding to the edict included ten militia regulations proposed by Zaiyuan and colleagues, and eight implementation rules drafted by Jia Zhen and others. Mao Changxi, Vice Prefect of Shuntian Prefecture, was soon appointed to oversee Henan militia, with Zheng Yuanshan of the Nanyang-Ruzhou-Guangzhou Circuit assisting, under the regulations proposed by Prince Yi Zaiyuan and others. Du, Vice Minister of the Ministry of Revenue, was appointed to oversee Shandong militia, with Gong Huang of the Dengzhou-Laizhou-Qingzhou Circuit and Lu Chao'an, Prefect of Dengzhou, assisting under the provisions drafted by Grand Secretary Jia Zhen and others, adapted from Henan's model to local conditions. Because southern Anhui was critical and militia should be organized throughout the region, Governor-General Zeng Guofan was ordered to assess conditions, nominate one experienced and respected figure, and put him in charge of southern Anhui militia.

旋曾國籓覆陳：「鄉團本是良法，然奉行不善，縣官徒藉以斂費，局紳亦從而分肥，賊至則先行潰逃，賊退則重加苛派，轉為地方之弊。所經過各省，從未見有鄉團能專打一股、專克一城者，不過隨官兵之後，勝則貪財，敗則先奔，常藉口於工食之太少。而辦理歧異者，每多給錢文，團丁所領之餉，與官勇例價相同，且有過之。其取之民間，無非勸捐抽釐之類。是於團練已失其本義，于軍餉又大有妨礙。今奉諭舉行皖南團練，皖南嶺隘紛歧，若築碉設卡，有險可憑，徽、寧各要隘，宜擇地築碉，以資防守。有在籍翰林院編修宋夢蘭當賊由太平縣竄擾徽州，宋夢蘭督帶練丁協力嚴守，眾論翕然。請即以該員辦理皖南團練事宜，會同委員，董勸各屬紳民，興築碉塞。其未經克復者，官兵攻剿，概不令團丁隨往。其已經克復者，紳耆修碉，團丁守之。庶幾軍民兩利，名實相符矣。」

Zeng soon replied: 'Village militia were sound in principle, but poor execution turned them into a local curse—magistrates used them to levy fees, bureau gentry shared the spoils, men fled at the first sign of rebels, and after the enemy withdrew they imposed harsh new levies. In every province he had passed through, he had never seen village militia independently defeat a rebel band or take a city—they merely trailed regular troops, grabbing loot in victory and running first in defeat, always complaining their rations were too small. Where practice varied, militiamen often received cash payments matching—or exceeding—the standard rate for official braves. The money came from the people through voluntary donations, levy extractions, and similar measures. In this way militia training lost its original purpose and military finances were seriously undermined. Now ordered to organize southern Anhui militia: the region's mountain passes branch in every direction, and blockhouses and checkpoints built on defensible ground would serve well—key passes in Huizhou and Ningguo should each have blockhouses sited for defense. Hanlin Academy Compiler Song Menglan, then at home on leave, had supervised trained militiamen in a stout defense when rebels from Taiping County raided Huizhou, winning unanimous public praise. He recommended appointing Song to manage southern Anhui militia, working with commissioners to urge local gentry and people to build fortifications. In areas not yet recovered, regular troops would conduct offensives without bringing militiamen along. In recovered areas, elder gentry would build blockhouses and militiamen would garrison them. In this way both military and civilian interests would be served, and practice would match principle.'

又以四川地屬岩疆，毗連雲、貴，滇匪滋擾，未能肅清。嘉慶間，四川舉辦鄉團，行堅壁清野之法，著有成效，自應仿辦。所有應行事宜，諭四川在京各員，就地方情形，各抒所見。官紳中有練達時務者，各舉所知，以俟後命。同時尚書陳孚恩等以江西毗連安徽、浙江、廣東等省，疏請辦理團練，酌保辦事人員，並擬團練事宜八條。疏入，允行。命在籍翰林院修撰劉繹為江西督辦團練大臣，吉南贛寧道沈葆楨、甘肅安肅道劉於潯幫辦團練事宜，按照陳孚恩等所擬章程，妥為辦理。

Sichuan's rugged terrain bordered Yunnan and Guizhou, where Yunnan bandits continued to raid and full pacification had not been achieved. During Jiaqing, Sichuan had organized village militia and applied scorched-earth tactics with notable success, and the model should be followed. On all relevant measures, Sichuan officials then in the capital were instructed to report their views based on local conditions. Officials and gentry with practical experience were to recommend capable men, pending further orders. At the same time, Minister Chen Fu'en noted that Jiangxi bordered Anhui, Zhejiang, and Guangdong, and memorialized for militia organization, recommending personnel and proposing eight regulations. The memorial was approved. Hanlin Academy Compiler Liu Yi, on home leave, was appointed to oversee Jiangxi militia, with Shen Baozhen of the Ji'an-Nan'an-Ganzhou Circuit and Liu Yuxun of the Gansu Anxi-Suzhou Circuit assisting under Chen Fu'en's regulations.

同時督辦河南團練大臣、順天府府丞毛昶熙疏陳團練辦法，並酌擬規條：一、添築堡寨以扼要隘，一、講求險要以便堵御，一、慎擇首事以資統率，一、分選團丁以備訓練，一、攤派練費以備公用，一、互為聲援以資聯絡，一、申明號令以壹眾志，一、嚴定約束以禁頑暴，一、秉公賞罰以示勸懲，一、嚴察姦宄以防內應，一、旌表忠義以作民氣，一、事貴實力以冀成功。疏入，允行。

At the same time, Mao Changxi, overseeing Henan militia, memorialized on militia methods and drafted twelve rules: build fortifications at key passes; exploit defensible terrain; choose leaders carefully; select and train militiamen; apportion training costs; coordinate mutual support; clarify commands; enforce discipline; reward and punish fairly; watch for infiltrators; honor loyal service; and above all insist on practical effort. The memorial was approved.

毛昶熙又疏陳河南團練，以歸、陳二府為先。前統兵大臣勝保，因調團不齊，勒派百姓出資雇丁，統計勇糧運費，較正供多至倍蓰，百姓苦累，紛紛稟請，以抽丁一項，民力已竭，鄉團勢難再辦。其開封等府百姓聞歸、陳雇勇之苦，亦復觀望，不肯實辦。團練之事，仍恐有名無實。尋奉諭：「用民之法，總宜深得民心。勝保等所辦章程既與民心不洽，自應改弦更張，以期得力。慶廉即體察情形，將此項雇勇酌量裁撤。毛昶熙按照載垣等會議章程，速即集團練勇，以輔兵力。」又以甘肅控制西陲，地方遼闊，且與陝西、四川毗連，匪患未靖，自應一律舉辦團練，以靖邊陲。所有甘肅省團練事宜，即命陝甘總督樂斌督辦，並命甘涼道蕭浚蘭、刑部員外郎吳可讀、江西候補道楊升幫辦團練。

Mao Changxi further reported that Henan militia should begin in the Gui and Chen prefectures. Former commander Senggebao, unable to mobilize militia uniformly, had forced commoners to fund hired braves—grain and transport costs ran to several times normal revenue. The people petitioned in droves that conscription alone had exhausted them and village militia could no longer be raised. When the people of Kaifeng and other prefectures heard how hiring braves had burdened Gui and Chen, they too held back and refused to organize militia in earnest. There was still every reason to fear that militia training would exist in name only. An edict soon followed: 'Any policy that mobilizes the people must first win their hearts. Because the regulations Senggebao and others had drawn up ran against popular sentiment, the policy had to be changed if it was to work. Qing Lian was to assess local conditions and cut back these hired braves as appropriate. Mao Changxi was to follow the regulations agreed on by Zaiyuan and others and quickly raise militia braves to reinforce regular troops.' Gansu, moreover, guarded the western frontier across a vast territory bordering Shaanxi and Sichuan; with banditry still unsettled, militia should be organized throughout the province to secure the border. Governor-General Yue Bin of Shaanxi-Gansu was put in charge of Gansu militia, assisted by Xiao Junlan of the Gansu-Liangzhou Circuit, Wu Kedu of the Ministry of Justice, and Yang Sheng, an expectant circuit intendant from Jiangxi.

十一年，以歸化之番眾僧俗兵四千餘人，馬四千餘匹，防禦抱罕羌人。是年，奉諭：「鄉團之設，原以濟兵力所不逮。必須官紳一體，兵勇同心協力，內靖土匪，外御賊氛，於地方庶有裨益。若如清盛疏劾山東章丘縣之水賽街、新城之南婁里等庄，以及博山、萊蕪等縣鄉團，遇有經過客商，往來差役，輒敢擅行殺戮，害及無辜。撫署之差弁馬匹，亦被劫奪。是團練御賊尚無成效，而抗官滋事竟有滋蔓之勢。巡撫譚廷襄速將清盛所奏各情，嚴密查訪。如有藉團為名，肆行不法，及私立黑團，聚眾抗官，立即嚴懲。」又諭浙江巡撫：「前以浙省軍務未平，籌辦團練，勸諭捐輸，原以保衛民生。若如王履謙疏劾辦團情形，雜亂無章，勸捐委員，令捐戶加捐至數十倍之多，並於捐戶加以威逼。今賊氛逼近浙東，若因勸捐辦理不善，致失人心，必致激成內訌。巡撫王有齡速即會同王履謙妥為勸辦，議定章程，不得徇私委派貪劣之員。」

In the eleventh year, more than four thousand monastic and lay frontier troops from the Guihua tribes, with more than four thousand horses, were posted to guard against the Baohan Qiang. That same year an edict declared: 'Village militia were meant to fill the gaps regular troops could not cover. Officials and gentry must stand together, soldiers and militiamen must fight as one—pacifying local bandits within and repelling rebels without—if the locality is to gain any real benefit. But if, as Qing Sheng charged in memorial, village militia in places such as Shuisai Street in Zhangqiu County, Nanlouli in Xincheng, and Boshan and Laiwu counties dared to kill passing merchants and government couriers without authority, harming the innocent— Even couriers and horses from the governor's own office were robbed. Then militia had done nothing against bandits, while defiance of officials and local disorder were spreading. Governor Tan Tingxiang was ordered to investigate promptly and thoroughly every charge Qing Sheng had raised. Anyone who used militia as a cover for lawlessness, or who formed illegal private militia and gathered crowds to resist officials, was to be punished at once.' Another edict to the Zhejiang governor: 'Militia and donations were organized earlier because Zhejiang's military situation was unsettled, and the aim was to protect the people's livelihood. But if, as Wang Luqian charged, militia organization was chaotic, and donation commissioners forced contributors to pay many times the expected amount while threatening them— With rebels now closing on eastern Zhejiang, bungled fund-raising that alienates the people will surely spark internal conflict. Governor Wang Youling was ordered to work with Wang Luqian at once, organize donations properly, set clear regulations, and appoint no corrupt or unworthy men out of favoritism.'

是年，左副都御史潘祖廕疏言：「各省設立團練大臣，辦理年餘，曾無一效，請獎請敘，紛紛效尤，並未克復一城，其為無益，已可概見。應將團練大臣分別裁撤，以一事機而節糜費。」翰林院侍講學士顏宗儀疏言：「鄉團之設，原以百姓之財力，衛百姓之身家，果能眾志成城，同仇敵愾，即一舉、貢、生、監，足以統領之，無俟大員為之督率。若必以大僚綜任之，幫辦司員分理之，是督撫之外又設督撫，僚屬之外又增僚屬，徒滋紛擾。上年豫省辦團，各省團練大臣亦紛紛四齣。旋因浙江、四川、陝西、甘肅等省情形不同，旋即裁撤。而直隸、山東、江南、江北等處，則仍歸由團練大臣辦理。於是幫辦人員假公濟私，百端紛擾。或偪勒州縣供應，或苛派民間銀錢，或於官設捐局之外，團練再設捐局，或於官抽釐金之外，團練再抽釐金，或查閱各處團防，支應紛煩，地方告乏，或任令家人奴僕勒索規費，約束不嚴。幫辦人員或十餘人，或數十人，薪水所出，皆刻剝民間。刁生劣監，因以把持地方；狡吏貪夫，藉以希圖名利，流弊實多。各省團練大臣，直隸桑春榮操守尚嚴，山東杜已嘖有煩言，至於江北、江南所辦鄉團，自上年至今，未聞有團練大臣收復一州一縣者，徒以騷動天下，無益有損。今山東杜已經撤回，河南毛昶熙較有成效，其直隸、江南、江北等處團練大臣，宜一併撤回。其各省州縣距賊較遠者，停止辦團，以安民業。其距賊較近之處，仍責地方官切實辦團，而以本省督撫總其成，庶事權不至紛歧，商民可免滋擾。」

That year Left Vice Censor Pan Zuyin memorialized: 'Provincial militia supervisors have been at work for more than a year without a single success, yet requests for rewards and promotions multiply, and not one city has been recovered—their futility is obvious. The militia supervisors should be abolished province by province to unify command and cut waste.' Hanlin Lecturer Yan Zongyi argued: 'Village militia were meant to use the people's resources to protect their lives and property. When the community truly unites with shared resolve, a single juren, tribute student, licentiate, or supervising student can lead them—no high official is needed. If high officials must oversee everything and assistants divide the work, you end up with governors atop governors and subordinates atop subordinates—nothing but confusion. When Henan organized militia the previous year, provincial militia supervisors fanned out in every direction. Soon afterward, because conditions differed in Zhejiang, Sichuan, Shaanxi, Gansu, and elsewhere, those posts were abolished. In Zhili, Shandong, Jiangnan, Jiangbei, and other regions, however, militia still remained under the supervisors. Their assistants then used public office for private gain, stirring up trouble on every side. Some coerced prefectures and counties for supplies; some levied harsh exactions on the people; some set up donation bureaus on top of the official ones, or transit levies on top of official levies; some created endless expenses while inspecting local defenses until districts were drained; some let family members and servants extort fees because discipline was lax. Assistants numbered anywhere from a dozen to several dozen, all paid by squeezing the people. Scheming students and unworthy supervising students used the system to dominate local affairs; cunning clerks and greedy men seized the chance for profit and advancement—the abuses were endless. Of the provincial supervisors, Sang Chunrong in Zhili was relatively upright, while Du in Shandong was already widely criticized. As for village militia in Jiangbei and Jiangnan, not one prefecture or county had been recovered since the previous year—they had merely stirred up the country, doing harm and no good. Du in Shandong had already been recalled, and Mao Changxi in Henan had achieved some success; the supervisors in Zhili, Jiangnan, Jiangbei, and elsewhere should all be recalled as well. In prefectures and counties far from the fighting, militia organization should stop so people can return to their livelihoods. Where rebels were nearer, local officials should still organize militia in earnest under provincial governors, so authority stays unified and merchants and common people are spared further harassment.'

旋奉諭：「直隸團練大臣桑春榮回京供職，直隸團練事宜，責成文煜辦理。江西團練大臣劉繹來京任用，江西團練事宜，責成毓科督同官紳辦理。其二省京官如有回籍辦團者，各部院查取職名，飭令來京供職。江北團練大臣晏端書，江西團練大臣龐鍾璐，其辦理團練，是否仍須該員經理，抑或即可裁撤，令曾國籓、薛煥速議以聞。王履謙幫辦浙江團練，兼辦浙東捐務，今浙江軍務方殷，自難遽撤。令王有齡會同王履謙切實籌辦，以固疆圉。毛昶熙在河南歸德著有成效，應否仍令毛昶熙督辦團練，及有無把握之處，令嚴樹森速議以聞。」

An edict soon followed: 'Zhili Militia Supervisor Sang Chunrong is to return to the capital; Wen Yu will handle Zhili militia affairs. Jiangxi Militia Supervisor Liu Yi is coming to the capital for appointment; Yu Ke will supervise Jiangxi militia together with local officials and gentry. Any capital officials from those two provinces who have gone home to organize militia are to be identified by their ministries and ordered back to the capital. As for Jiangbei supervisor Yan Duanshu and Jiangxi supervisor Pang Zhonglu, Zeng Guofan and Xue Huan are to decide quickly whether their posts are still needed or can be abolished at once. Wang Luqian, who assists Zhejiang militia and handles eastern Zhejiang donations, cannot easily be removed while Zhejiang's military situation remains urgent. Wang Youling was ordered to work with Wang Luqian and organize matters in earnest to secure the frontier. Mao Changxi had achieved notable results in Guide, Henan; Yan Shusen is to decide quickly whether he should continue supervising militia and where confidence is lacking.'

旋兩江總督曾國籓覆陳：「團練之設，只能防小支千餘之游匪，不能剿大股數萬之悍賊。其練丁口糧，若太多，則與募勇之價相等，不必僅以團名；若太少，則與官勇之餉迥殊，不能得其死力。其團防經費，若取諸丁、漕、釐、捐四者之中，則有礙督撫籌款之途；若設法四者之外，則更無措手之處。事權既無專屬，剛柔實覺兩難。晏端書在江北不設餉局，但勸各邑築圩自保，龐鍾璐在江南激勸鄉民，俾知同仇敵愾之義，辦理極有斟酌。今之賊勢，決非鄉團所能奏功。應俟賊氛稍衰，大功將成，然後辦團練以善其後。晏端書、龐鍾璐二員，清操雅望，內任最宜。應請裁去團練差使，回京供職。」疏入，允之。

Governor-General Zeng Guofan soon replied: 'Militia can hold off roving bands of a thousand or so, but they cannot suppress rebel armies tens of thousands strong. If militiamen's rations are too high, they cost as much as recruited braves and the 'militia' label means little; if too low, they fall far below official braves' pay and will not fight to the death. If militia funds come from land tax, grain transport, transit levies, or donations, they interfere with the governors' own revenue; and if you look beyond those four sources, there is nowhere else to turn. With no clear authority, it is impossible to strike the right balance between firmness and flexibility. Yan Duanshu in Jiangbei created no pay bureau but urged counties to build dikes for self-defense; Pang Zhonglu in Jiangnan roused villagers to shared resolve—both handled matters with notable restraint. Today's rebels are far too strong for village militia to defeat. Militia should wait until rebel strength fades and final victory is near, then be organized properly to secure the aftermath. Yan Duanshu and Pang Zhonglu, both men of integrity and reputation, are best suited for posts in the capital. Their militia commissions should be abolished and they should return to the capital. The memorial was approved.

同治元年，諭：「鄉團之設，原以使民自衛身家，藉可保全地方，以輔官兵。前因各路辦理團練大臣隨帶多員，任意騷擾，有害無利，是以陸續裁撤，仍責令地方官切實經理。乃邇來統兵大員，守土牧令，或恐其分餉而輕為裁撤，或疑其無益而視為具文，於是民心不固，盜賊橫行，所過州縣村莊，動遭劫掠，是又地方官不能因地制宜舉行團練之所致，因噎廢食，貽誤殊多。嗣後各省團練，仍由督撫臣通飭各州縣，選公正紳士，實力興辦。務使官不掣肘，民悉同心，城市鄉村，聲勢聯絡。其有認真辦理保全地方者，將其實在勞績，聲明保獎。」

In the first year of Tongzhi an edict declared: 'Village militia were meant to let people defend their own lives and property, preserve their districts, and assist regular troops. Because militia supervisors along various routes had brought large staffs who harassed the people at will, those posts were abolished one by one and local officials were again charged with managing militia in earnest. Yet recently commanding generals and local magistrates, either fearing militia would drain military funds and abolishing them too readily, or treating them as empty paperwork, left popular resolve weak and bandits unchecked—prefectures, counties, and villages were plundered everywhere. This again came from local officials failing to organize militia according to local conditions; throwing out the remedy because of past abuse caused grave harm. Henceforth governors are again to order every prefecture and county to select upright gentry and organize militia in earnest. Officials must not obstruct them, the people must stand together, and cities and villages must be linked in mutual defense. Those who truly organize militia and preserve their districts shall have their achievements reported for reward.'

二年，以都察院代遞山東貢生硃德秀條陳團練事宜，語多可采，命硃德秀回籍，隨同英桂、趙德轍辦理團練，並命英桂督飭官紳，就地方情形，認真辦團，毋得有名無實。

In the second year the Censorate forwarded a memorial on militia from Shandong tribute student Zhu Dexiu, much of it worth adopting. Zhu was ordered home to assist Ying Gui and Zhao Dezhe in organizing militia, and Ying Gui was told to supervise officials and gentry according to local conditions—no empty show.

是年，統兵大臣僧格林沁疏言：「各省練團築寨，本以助守望而禦寇盜，為權宜補救之法。乃各團每以有寨可據，輒藐視官長，擅理詞訟，或聚眾抗糧，或挾仇械鬥，甚至謀為不軌，踞城戕官，如山東之劉德培，河南之李瞻，先後倡亂，而安徽之苗沛霖，尤為梟桀反覆，勞師糜餉，始得次第翦除。辦團之舉，始則合一鄉為一團，繼則聯眾團為一練，地廣人多，良莠不齊，不肖團長有跋扈情形，承辦團練紳士又不能杜漸防微，隨時舉發，致有尾大不掉之勢。況捻匪屢經竄擾之區，亦未見各團堵御得力。其河南團練，均由侍郎毛昶熙管理。毛昶熙於通省地方，勢難周曆兼顧，而各練既有專管大員，地方官轉至呼應不靈。今賊氛漸平，請命毛昶熙回京供職，所有團練，視直隸、山東之例，歸地方官經理，以一事權。並請飭河南巡撫嚴查各團，如有增置軍械等事，均責令稟請地方官允准置備。如不肖團長借修圍制械，種種斂錢，以致苦累鄉民，即從嚴懲辦，庶幾權歸於上，免滋流弊。」御史裘德俊疏言：「團練之舉，本屬有治人無治法。今直隸善後章程，有抽撥鄉團訓練之議。但抽撥鄉兵，必得賢明牧令，駕馭有方，乃能權不下移，民無擾累。若遇不肖州縣，借端苛斂，抽丁派費，吏胥因緣為奸，上下咸思中飽，小民已不聊生；加以每縣聚眾數百人，游手無著，以強凌弱，甚或恃眾把持，一有亂萌，尤易響應，不可不遠慮及之。」

That year commanding general Sengge Rinchen memorialized: 'Provincial militia stockades were meant to help with watch duty and repel bandits—a temporary expedient. Yet once militia had stockades to fall back on, they often defied officials, judged cases on their own, resisted grain taxes in armed crowds, fought private feuds, and even plotted rebellion—seizing cities and killing officials, as with Liu Depei in Shandong and Li Zhan in Henan. Miao Peilin in Anhui was especially fierce and treacherous; only after great expense in troops and funds was he finally cut down. Militia began as one village, one company, then linked many companies into larger units. With broad territory and mixed quality, bad militia chiefs grew overbearing, and organizing gentry failed to check abuses in time, until the force became unmanageable. Moreover, in areas repeatedly hit by Nian bandits, no militia company proved effective at blocking them. All Henan militia were managed by Vice Minister Mao Changxi. Mao Changxi could hardly cover the whole province, yet with each training unit under its own supervisor, local officials became harder to coordinate. Now that rebel strength is fading, Mao Changxi should return to the capital; all militia should follow the Zhili and Shandong precedent and revert to local official management. The Henan governor should also inspect every company strictly; any addition of arms must be approved by local officials in advance. If bad militia chiefs use fort repairs or armaments as pretexts to levy money and burden villagers, they should be punished severely so authority stays with the government and abuses are checked.' Censor Qiu Dejun argued: 'Militia training depends on the right people to run it, not on rules alone. Zhili's postwar regulations now propose drafting village militia for training. But drafting militiamen requires wise magistrates who control them well; only then can authority stay centralized and the people avoid harassment. Under corrupt officials, conscription becomes harsh levies, clerks seize chances to cheat, and everyone from top to bottom seeks a cut—the common people can barely survive; and when each county gathers hundreds of idle men, the strong bully the weak, some dominate by sheer numbers—once trouble starts they join in readily. This danger cannot be ignored.'

旋奉諭：「山東鄉團已由官為經理，所有河南省團練事宜，亦統歸官辦，以一事權。其直隸抽練團丁，督臣劉長佑權其利害，是否可行，如有窒礙之處，即據實以聞。」

An edict soon followed: 'Shandong village militia are already under official management; Henan militia will also be handled entirely by officials to unify authority. As for Zhili's plan to draft militiamen for training, Governor Liu Changyou should weigh the pros and cons and report any obstacles frankly.'

六年，李雲麟招募奇古民勇駐八里岡，與科布多、塔爾巴哈台蒙兵為犄角。

In the sixth year Li Yunlin recruited Qigu civilian braves for Balingang, coordinating with Mongol troops at Kobdo and Tarbagatai.

七年，諭各疆臣：「捻寇蕩平，勇丁亦各還鄉里，誠恐江南、安徽、河南、山東從前被兵處所，不免伏莽潛匿，乘隙為害。江、皖等省督撫，於徐、海、潁、亳、歸、汝、曹、沂等處，飭各地方官勸諭民間照舊修理圩寨，整頓鄉團，互相保衛。此外各處民團，亦應一律整飭，慎選牧令，安良除暴，以靖地方。」

In the seventh year frontier governors were told: 'The Nian rebels are suppressed and braves have gone home, but in war-ravaged Jiangnan, Anhui, Henan, and Shandong, hidden ruffians may still lurk and strike when they can. Governors of Jiangsu and Anhui were to order local officials in Xuzhou, Haizhou, Yingzhou, Bozhou, Gui, Ruzhou, Caozhou, Yizhou, and other districts to repair dikes and stockades, reorganize village militia, and protect one another as before. People's militia elsewhere should also be reorganized, capable magistrates chosen, the law-abiding protected and the violent suppressed, to quiet every district.'

十二年，因四川峨邊廳蠻族投誠，擇充千百戶等職，編製夷兵，建修碉堡。

In the twelfth year, after Yi tribes in Ebian Prefecture, Sichuan submitted, chiefs were appointed as thousand- and hundred-household officers, Yi troops were organized, and blockhouses built.

光緒六年，兩廣總督張之洞募沙民千人助守虎門，楊玉科增募千人及惠清營五百人，鄭紹忠募安勇二千人，所募鄉兵，以防勇規制編之。是年，命黑龍江將軍於增練馬隊外，秋冬之季，招集打牲人等，加以訓練。

In the sixth year of Guangxu, Governor-General Zhang Zhidong recruited one thousand sand-dwellers for Humen; Yang Yuken added one thousand men and five hundred for the Huiqing Camp; Zheng Shaozhong raised two thousand An braves—all organized as local militia under defensive brave regulations. That year the Heilongjiang general was ordered, besides expanding cavalry training, to gather tribute hunters each autumn and winter for drill.

八年，兩江總督左宗棠以江蘇沿江海州縣捕魚為業者甚多，於內江外海風濤沙線無不熟諳，而崇明尤為各海口漁戶爭趨之所。其中有技勇而悉洋務者，所在不乏。外洋船駛入內江者，每用漁戶為導。江蘇自川沙迄贛榆二十二州縣，濱臨江海，漁戶約數萬人。乃令蘇松太道員為沿海漁團督辦，於漁戶每百人中，選壯健三十人，練漁團五千名，設總局於吳淞口，設分局於濱海各縣，每月操練二次，習水勇技藝，用以捕盜緝私，兼備水師之選。

In the eighth year Governor-General Zuo Zongtang noted that many fishermen in Jiangsu's coastal prefectures and counties knew inner rivers and outer seas, winds, waves, and sandbars intimately—Chongming above all was where fishing households from every port converged. Many among them were skilled fighters who understood foreign affairs. Foreign ships entering inner rivers often relied on fishermen as pilots. From Chuansha to Ganyu, twenty-two Jiangsu prefectures and counties along the rivers and coast held tens of thousands of fishing households. The Suzhou-Songjiang-Taiwan circuit intendant was appointed to supervise coastal fishing militia. From every hundred fishing households thirty sturdy men were chosen—five thousand fishing militia in all—with a headquarters at Wusong and branch offices in coastal counties. They drilled twice monthly in naval skills to catch bandits, suppress smuggling, and supply recruits for the navy.

十一年，雲貴總督岑毓英釐定雲南通省營制，裸黑勇丁，編為六營，西南土防，編為二十五營。又因雲南沿邊，由西而東南，皆野人山寨，布列於九隘之外，乃調兵二千人，與原有防軍及鄉團土司，協力警備。督辦廣東軍務大臣彭玉麟以欽州、廉州地廣兵單，招募鄉團協守。是年，吉林將軍增練防軍，佐以烏拉牲丁，凡萬五千人。

In the eleventh year Governor-General Cen Yuying of Yunnan-Guizhou fixed Yunnan's garrison organization: Luohei brave militiamen were formed into six battalions and southwestern frontier defense into twenty-five battalions. Because Yunnan's frontier from west to southeast was lined with wild people's stockades beyond the nine passes, two thousand troops were mobilized to work with existing garrisons, village militia, and native chieftains in frontier defense. Peng Yulin, supervising Guangdong military affairs, recruited village militia to help garrison Qinzhou and Lianzhou, where territory was broad and troops were few. That year the Jilin general expanded defensive garrisons, supported by Wula tribute hunters, for a total of fifteen thousand men.

二十四年，都察院代陳湖南舉人何鎮圭條陳團練事宜，命兵部議奏。又諭：「侍郎張廕桓疏請實行團練，同時臣工屢有仿西法練民兵之請。若各省實行團練，即以鄉團為民兵，用更番替換之法，較諸遽練民兵為有把握。廣西會匪滋事，尤宜速辦，以收捍禦之功。各省督撫一律切實籌辦。各省於三月內，廣東、廣西於一月內，將辦理情形，具疏以聞。」

In the twenty-fourth year the Censorate forwarded a militia memorial from Hunan juren He Zhengui and ordered the Ministry of War to deliberate and report. Another edict noted that Vice Minister Zhang Yinhuan had memorialized for earnest militia training, while other officials had repeatedly called for people's militia trained on Western models. If provinces organize militia in earnest, using village companies as people's militia on a rotating basis, that approach is surer than rushing to train a new militia from scratch. With secret-society unrest in Guangxi, militia should be organized there especially quickly to secure the frontier. Every provincial governor is to organize militia in earnest. All provinces are to report progress within three months; Guangdong and Guangxi within one month.'

三十年，廣西巡撫柯逢時令廣西各州縣增募鄉勇八千人，給以毛瑟後膛槍，並令民間多築碉堡，共御外侮。

In the thirtieth year Guangxi Governor Ke Fengshi ordered every prefecture and county to raise eight thousand additional local braves, arm them with Mauser rifles, and urge the people to build more blockhouses against foreign aggression.

三十一年，兩廣總督李經羲增練防營，並募土著鄉兵，備廣西邊境。新疆巡撫潘效蘇以新疆兵費太重，改募土著，仿勇營訓練，次第遣散客軍。

In the thirty-first year Governor-General Li Jingyi of the Two Guangs expanded defensive battalions and recruited native local militia for the Guangxi border. Xinjiang Governor Pan Xiaosu, finding military costs too heavy, shifted to recruiting natives, training them like brave battalions, and gradually disbanding outside troops.

三十四年，雲南防軍裁併，於騰越、臨安兩路創設團練，藉資捍衛。

In the thirty-fourth year Yunnan garrisons were cut and merged, and new militia were organized on the Tengyue and Lin'an routes for frontier defense.

宣統元年，各省改防營為巡防隊。雲貴總督沈秉堃以雲南防軍內有各屬之保衛團，系昔日之鄉團，名為營隊，實即鄉兵，未能遽改為巡防隊，乃仍其舊。此鄉兵舉廢之概略也。

In the first year of Xuantong every province converted defensive battalions into patrol defense corps. Governor-General Shen Bingkun of Yunnan-Guizhou noted that Yunnan's garrisons included guard companies in various districts—formerly village militia, called battalion units but really local militia—that could not be converted at once to patrol corps, so the old arrangement remained. Such, in broad outline, is the story of how local militia were raised and abolished.

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