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卷306 列傳九十三 曹一士 李慎修 李元直 陈​​法 胡定 仲永檀 柴潮生 储麟趾

Volume 306 Biographies 93: Cao Yishi, Li Shenxiu, Li Yuanzhi, Chen ​​fa, Hu Ding, Zhong Yongtan, Chai Chaosheng, Chu Linzhi

Chapter 306 of 清史稿 · Draft History of Qing
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1
== '' 便 調
Cao Yishi, whose courtesy name was Eting, came from Shanghai in Jiangsu. In the seventh year of Yongzheng he passed the jinshi examination, entered the Hanlin Academy as a bachelor, and after completing his probation was appointed a compiler. In the thirteenth year he was chosen by examination and appointed supervising censor for the Yunnan circuit. When Emperor Gaozong came to the throne, he ordered the officials to appear before him in rotation. Cao Yishi submitted a memorial: "Reading reverently the imperial rescript that says, 'When the people are secure, then I am secure'—what magnanimous words from the throne! All who heard them were moved to tears. Your subject believes that if the people are to be kept secure, nothing matters more than choosing governors-general and provincial governors with the utmost care. Governors-general and provincial governors stand at the head of the prefects and magistrates. Among them are men of virtue and men of ability; best are those who possess both, next are the virtuous who fall short in ability, and after them come the able who lack sufficient virtue. Whether a governor-general or provincial governor is virtuous or capable becomes perfectly clear from the men he recommends. Today, when governors-general and provincial governors put forward prefects and magistrates, they rely on a few standard points: vigor of age and body, diligence and prudence in office, and willingness to face enmity without flinching. When their actual record is examined, taxes and grain are paid in full, land is widely opened for cultivation, and bandits and thieves are effectively captured. If all this proves true, such men are indeed what people call capable officials. Yet before long some are exposed as corrupt, others become notorious for cruelty—and every one of these greedy or harsh officials had first passed as a capable one. They truly possessed talent enough to serve their wickedness. A worthy official is plain and sincere, tender-hearted toward the people, refuses fawning compliance with his superiors, and is praised alike by colleagues and commoners as a man who governs without vexation. I believe the present age still has no shortage of such men, yet they scarcely appear on the recommendation lists of governors-general and provincial governors. Is this not because worthiness is undervalued while capability is over prized? Or do they simply equate the capable official with the worthy one? I fear that what passes for ability is not ability at all. If quick compliance in running errands counts as ability, then seasoned and deliberate men are dismissed as slow and dull. If sharp and fluent replies count as ability, then plain, reserved men are judged pedantic and obtuse. If flaunting talent and courting trouble count as ability, then calm and steady men are condemned as lax and indolent. If martial harshness and contempt for public opinion count as ability, then men who wear themselves out nurturing the people and are awkward at showy exertion are called fame-seekers of insufficient talent, and are removed on trifling pretexts. When those they chose fail catastrophically, they say only, 'Your subject erred in recommendation,' and leave the matter to the ministry for deliberation. Where recommendations go wrong, impeachments go wrong as well. If mistaken recommendation is treated so lightly, what becomes of mistaken impeachment? A mistaken recommender may still be called to account, but against a mistaken impeacher where is justice to be sought? I believe today's governors-general and provincial governors are far readier to reward visible achievement than to cultivate greatness through generous forbearance. They do much that harms those below to serve those above, and little that sacrifices the interests of superiors for the sake of the people. This goes to the very foundations of good government. Your Majesty has already abolished every vexatious change—land surveys, reclamation drives, the carving up of prefectures and counties, the reassignment of pastoral officials, and the like. No governor-general or provincial governor can fail to echo this reforming tide; the worry is that some will cling to old habits, gloss over their faults, and shield themselves. Some will court approval and choose indulgent ease over honest effort. I beg Your Majesty to issue a special edict that analyzes and instructs them, so that within a rule both keen and strict there may also be room for a generous and humane policy. As for the prefects and magistrates under them, command that when securing nominations they distinguish worthy men from able men, and then set out concrete deeds in detail. If an able man later proves corrupt, let him be allowed to confess it himself. If a worthy man is found guilty of misconduct, punish him all the more severely. If every recommendation is of the able and none of the worthy, then either the senior official lacks the discipline to govern himself and his subordinates, or worthy men are being shut out from the throne's hearing. Whether a governor-general or provincial governor is worthy becomes perfectly clear from those he chooses to promote." When the memorial arrived, the Emperor circulated its substance in a general edict to all governors-general and provincial governors.
2
使 '' 使使
Cao Yishi also asked that cases of "association with seditious speech" be treated more leniently and that malicious denunciation be forbidden. He wrote: "In antiquity the Grand Historian gathered folk songs to observe the people's customs, and so learned whether each state's government succeeded or failed and whether its manners were sound or corrupt. This is the meaning of the passage in the Book of Yu about watching over order and neglect in receiving and transmitting the people's words—it was meant to let grievances from below reach the throne. Even by the late Zhou, Zichan still did not forbid the talk at the village schools. Only when a man's conduct was perverse and unyielding, and his words false yet artful—even if he were a public figure—would the sage ruler resort to execution at the twin platforms, truly fearing that such a man might mislead the multitude. In earlier times, men such as Dai Mingshi and Wang Jingqi, who composed language with plainly treasonous intent, were executed by the Kangxi and Yongzheng emperors because they had truly committed great rebellion—not without cause. When poetry or prose merely touched on what seemed suspicious—as when Chen Pengnian, while serving as prefect of Suzhou, wrote poems on a visit to Tiger Hill, and someone secretly accused him of treason—Emperor Kangxi openly told the Nine Ministers, 'Since antiquity, the framing of good men has mostly taken this form.' Such godlike discernment, piercing hidden truth, may stand as a model for all ages. In recent years petty men, failing to understand why the two previous reigns punished great traitors, have nursed private grudges and, seizing on vague insinuations, attacked poems and essays, picking over phrases and individual characters. Magistrates, scenting trouble, have pursued cases relentlessly, sometimes sweeping up teachers and pupils, dragging in relatives and friends, ruining families and driving men to flight—a grievous spectacle. I submit that talk of the well-field system and feudal enfeoffment is only the stock theme of pedantic scholars, and cannot be treated as a present-day attempt to overturn the age and restore antiquity. Lamentations and historical verse are merely the habitual manner of poets, and cannot be treated as covert satire on the present by appeal to the past. Even when a preface or colophon omits a reign title, it may be no more than a moment's carelessness by some obscure writer—not proof that he truly harbored rebellion and dared publish it openly. If every such case were punished as unpardonable sedition, denunciation would never cease and scholars would dread the written word—far from the state's intent to uphold law through righteousness and to shelter the imperfect through mercy. Reading humbly Your Majesty's recent edicts, I see that old taboos in official memorials have all been swept away. In this I see a sage's breadth of mind—the revival of that ancient flourishing when memorials were freely submitted and popular sentiment gathered in. If even court memorials may now speak without fear, what need is there to hunt through the private writings of men in the provinces? I ask that the provincial authorities be ordered to examine whether such cases occurred in the past and whether any remain ineligible for amnesty, report them item by item, and await the throne's clear ruling. Henceforth, whenever someone denounces another's writing, if no clear evidence of guilt appears, let the accuser be punished under the law for the crime he alleged—a warning to all who bear false witness out of revenge. Then the curse upon the written word may be lifted, and the epidemic of malicious accusation may be stilled." The Emperor approved this proposal as well.
3
Under Yongzheng, the provinces were pressed to open wasteland, and governors-general and provincial governors made reclamation the measure by which prefectures and counties were judged—often to the people's harm. Cao Yishi memorialized: "Reclamation exists to treat idle land with care and to encourage farmers—it was never meant chiefly as a scheme to swell the state's tax revenue. I am told that reclamation is poorly enforced in the provinces, and that two abuses have arisen. The first is to treat cultivated land as wasteland. Following their superiors' wishes, prefectures and counties fail to measure the wasteland that actually exists, yet pre-report a quota of mu, thereby winning praise for public zeal. When they know the wasteland falls short, they simply levy the deficit against land already under cultivation so as to meet the reported figure. The people, fearing the magistrates, bow and submit, all agreeing to call it newly reclaimed wasteland. The second abuse is to treat wasteland as cultivated land. Wasteland along riverbanks lies low; when the water rises it turns at once to marsh. Wasteland at the foot of hills has thin soil over rock and cannot be broken for planting. Yet prefectures and counties count all such land in their reclamation reports. Poor peasants, desperate for food, grasp at the oxen, seed, and thatched shelters the government provides, living from day to day without heed to whether the land can truly be farmed. After ten years the peasants must declare the land cultivated, and the officials must assess tax upon it. If the harvest is meager, it will not even suffice to meet the tax. In a year of poor harvest they end the season penniless, and from this begin flight, ruin, and the loss of livelihood. Worse still, once the tax quota is fixed, prefectures and counties dare not leave arrears on the books and governors-general and provincial governors dare not grant relief; the old abuses of shifting burdens and spreading levies will again fall upon land already under cultivation. This is what passes for reclamation: the name exists, but the reality does not. These two abuses arise because local officials care only for land revenue and give no thought to the harm they leave behind. Senior officials think only of starting the work and never of how it will end. Thus a policy meant to bless the people becomes instead a ladder by which they are burdened. I ask that the provincial governors-general and governors be ordered: for all reclaimed acreage, whether already taxed or not, let prefectural and county officials re-survey it. Where cultivated land has been falsely reported as reclaimed, let it be reported and struck from the quota, and let the officials be exempted from punishment. If the land is truly new reclamation, let a sealed certificate be filed; the slightest falsification, once discovered, shall be heavily punished. Then the abuse of treating cultivated land as wasteland may be prevented. When newly reclaimed land is due for taxation, let governors-general and provincial governors send officials to re-survey it; if the soil is stony, barren, and thin, exempt it at once. If, because reclamation was reported earlier, officials nevertheless impose tax and thereby burden the people, let them, once discovered, be punished severely. Then the abuse of treating wasteland as cultivated land may also be prevented." (End of memorial.)
4
便
In the first year of Qianlong he was transferred to supervising censor in the Office of Works. By established practice, when censors were promoted to supervising censors, precedence was determined by seniority of rank and service. Cao Yishi had served in the censorate only six months; his appointment was a special elevation by the throne. Soon afterward he memorialized to impeach Wang Shijun, the former governor-general of the Eastern Yellow River Directorate; before the memorial was issued, word of it leaked abroad. The Emperor suspected that Cao Yishi himself had leaked it, summoned him for questioning, and referred the matter for official deliberation, which recommended demotion; the Emperor nevertheless showed mercy. Cao Yishi again memorialized asking that the six departments be restored to their old duties of reviewing and rejecting memorials, and that they no longer be burdened with inspecting city granaries, transport grain, salt, and the like. He also exposed abuses in provincial engineering accounts and asked that for every construction or dredging project the required materials and labor be estimated by regulation and publicly posted at the work site. He also spoke of trials in the prefectures and counties, where clerks manipulated proceedings and altered testimony, and asked that this be strictly forbidden. He also addressed abuses in the salt administration, asking that merchants no longer be compelled to make public contributions and that salt officials be forbidden to collude with them. As for common people carrying salt on shoulder poles and in packs, he warned against harsh arrests. As for great merchants who used privileged salt boats to choke the waterways, he warned against blocking and seizing passage. All these proposals were referred to the ministries for deliberation and enactment. Cao Yishi was stricken with a choking illness of the throat and died that same year.
5
Cao Yishi had risen late in life; he served as a remonstrating official for less than a year, yet every proposal he made served the people's welfare and the health of public morals, and his words were repeated throughout court and countryside. When news of his death spread, all mourned the loss.
6
== 西
Li Shenxiu, whose courtesy name was Siyong, came from Zhangqiu in Shandong. In the fifty-first year of Kangxi he passed the jinshi examination and was appointed a drafter in the Secretariat. He was promoted to department director, then sent out to serve as prefect of Hangzhou in Zhejiang. In the fifth year of Yongzheng he returned to the capital as a department director in the Ministry of Justice; over more than ten years he handled cases and reversed many wrongful verdicts. In one case of embezzlement from the public treasury, the initial recommendation was to apply the lesser penalty for misappropriation; Shenxiu refused to accept it. Some even tried to needle him with hints of the emperor's displeasure, but he would not be swayed. Early in the Qianlong reign he was posted as intendant of Henan's Nanru Guang Circuit, then transferred to Hubei's Wuhan Huangde Circuit, and resigned to observe mourning. After his mourning period ended, he was appointed intendant of the Jiangnan Postal and Salt Circuit. When he was presented at court, the Qianlong Emperor said, "Li Shenxiu is seasoned and bluntly honest; he is fit to serve as a remonstrating official." He was specially appointed supervising censor of the Jiangxi Circuit. In a memorial he denounced the Board of Revenue for disordering the currency system with policies that were severe, rushed, and needlessly burdensome. He reviewed earlier dynasties' gains and losses point by point, warned that coin would soon grow scarce and costly, and laid bare the harm to the last degree. On Lantern Festival night the emperor treated the princes and senior ministers to fireworks; Shenxiu remonstrated in a memorial, arguing that chasing amusements blunts the will to govern. The emperor loved to write poetry; once, in private audience, he asked whether Shenxiu wrote verse, and Shenxiu replied: "Your Majesty's desk holds ten thousand matters; I fear that brushwork might distract you from statecraft—please do not let poetry tax your mind." The emperor agreed and worked his words into a poem. He once asked Shenxiu: "What puny man are you, to speak so plainly?" Shenxiu answered: "I am homely of face but sound of heart." The emperor burst out laughing. He was posted again as intendant of Hunan's Heng-Chen-Yong circuit. In the twelfth year he asked to retire for illness, went home, and died.
7
Li Yuanzhi of Gaomi had been a censor earlier and was famed for blunt integrity. Shenxiu shared his renown; together they were known as "the Two Lis of Shandong." Beijing nicknamed Yuanzhi "Stubborn Li" and Shenxiu "Short Li."
8
Yuanzhi, whose courtesy name was Xiangshan. In Kangxi 52 he passed the jinshi examination, entered the Hanlin as a bachelor, and after leaving the academy was appointed compiler. In Yongzheng 7 he won appointment by examination as supervising censor for the Sichuan circuit; in eight months he filed dozens of memorials. He repeatedly attacked the men then in power, declaring: "The court hears too much agreement and too little frank objection—we have Yao and Shun on the throne but no Gao or Kui at their side." The emperor took offense. He called in the officials Yuanzhi had named—Grand Secretaries Zhu Shi and Zhang Tingyu among them—and Yuanzhi as well, and demanded: "Every ruler finds the ministers he deserves. If, as you claim, there are no Gao or Kui here, how could I count myself Yao or Shun?" Yuanzhi stood his ground. The emperor told the others: "His language is rough, but his loyalty is plain." The next day he recalled Yuanzhi and praised his courage in speaking out. When Guangdong sent lychees as tribute, the emperor gave him a few. Soon he was sent to inspect Taiwan. He asked for higher "integrity nurture" stipends and an end to gift-giving, and listed several dozen measures for aboriginal welfare. Taiwan sat overseas; visiting censors often acted like guests and let the circuit intendant and prefect decide everything. Yuanzhi did the opposite, repeatedly dispatching subordinates to ask after the people's hardships. When he tried to act, the governor-general and governor accused him of encroaching on their authority; he was demoted and removed. He spent more than twenty years at home and died. The Yongzheng Emperor once said: "I can trust Yuanzhi not to crave money, but I fear he presses too hard in office." He also told his ministers: "How rare real talent is! Is Yuanzhi not exactly the sort who delivers results? Yet his blunt force overwhelms people." In old age, whenever Yuanzhi recalled the emperor's favor, he wept. As a young Hanlin scholar he befriended Sun Jiagan, Xie Jishi, and Chen Fa, urging one another to live by ancient standards; people called them the Four Gentlemen. When Sun Jiagan governed Huguang and tried Xie Jishi's case while bending toward Governor Xu Rong—conduct critics rejected—Yuanzhi broke with him.
9
Chen Fa, whose courtesy name was Dingzhai, came from Anping in Guizhou. A jinshi of Kangxi 52, he rose from reviewer to intendant of Daming circuit in Zhili. He taught in the Zhu Xi tradition and wrote the Mingbianlu, refuting Lu and Wang. In office he put teaching and nurturing the people first, drafting every notice himself in language that was warm and plain. Years later people still quoted them from memory.
10
== 西 使使 使 媿
Hu Ding, whose courtesy name was Dengxian, came from Baochang in Guangdong. In Yongzheng 11 he passed the jinshi examination, entered the Hanlin as a bachelor, and was appointed reviewer. In Qianlong 5 he won appointment by examination as supervising censor for the Shaanxi circuit. In Qianlong 7, Hunan governor Xu Rong impeached grain intendant Xie Jishi; Huguang governor-general Sun Jiagan was ordered to investigate and was poised to convict Jishi. In the second month of Qianlong 8, Hu Ding memorialized, detailing Rong's frame-up and Jiagan's partiality, and appended Hunan placards naming provincial administration commissioner Zhang Can, surveillance commissioner Wang Jie, Changsha prefect Zhang Lin, Hengzhou sub-prefect Fang Guobao, and Shanhua magistrate Fan Deyi as Rong's accomplices in a conspiracy to destroy Jishi; He also cited a Beijing rhyme that mocked Rong as a shrew, jealous of talent and spiteful as a woman's secret malice. When the memorial arrived, the emperor sent Vice Minister of Revenue Arigun to Hunan to reinvestigate with Jiagan and told Ding to go along. Meanwhile Yuechang circuit intendant Cang De secretly reported to the Censorate that Zhang Can had solicited favors and altered documents; once Arigun reached Hunan, Jishi was vindicated. The emperor dismissed Jiagan, Rong, and others and said: "Hu Ding speaks as a censor; if he had lied, he would deserve punishment. Now that it is true, merely exonerating Jishi would be a small thing; but because it exposes governors and governor-generals who lied from private grudges and covered for one another, warning everyone— that truly strengthens government and does great good. Every governor and governor-general must recommend and impeach with a fair mind or fail the trust placed in him; if favor and spite drive such decisions, as with Jiagan and Rong, how can they face the court without shame? Let every governor and governor-general take warning from Jiagan and Rong and examine himself." From then on Ding was famed for bold speech.
11
西 西
He moved to supervising secretary in the Bureau of Military Affairs and inspected the Western City ward. He identified residents praised or notorious for their conduct and posted their names on public boards. When commoners brought disputes, he summoned them at once, heard them, and ruled on the spot. After thieves struck Wofo Temple in the Western Hills, a colleague wrongly reported that the monks had staged the theft; Ding traced the real culprits and cleared the monks. He soon asked to retire and care for his aged mother. After mourning he was reappointed supervising censor for the Fujian circuit. He charged an Imperial Household director with extorting the public; the inquiry found no basis, he lost his post and was sent to the Ministry of Punishments, and after a long trial was dismissed. In Qianlong 22, when the emperor traveled south, Ding greeted him at Hangzhou and regained his former rank. He died at seventy-nine. His collected writings survive as the Shuangbailu Collection.
12
==西 西 ''''
Zhong Yongtan, whose courtesy name was Xiangxi, came from Jining in Shandong. A jinshi of Qianlong 1, he entered the Hanlin as a bachelor and was appointed reviewer. In Qianlong 5 he won appointment by examination as supervising censor for the Shaanxi circuit. He asked that Lantern Festival fireworks and music be trimmed, writing in brief: "A ruler faces ten thousand tasks; the moment he indulges ease, slackness begins. Each year around the festival, fireworks and music are daily brought before the throne. I ask that they be scaled back, so as to preserve a clear and disciplined body and mind." The emperor replied: "The Documents warn, 'Do not enslave ear and eye'; the Odes warn, 'Enjoy pleasure but never to excess'—these teachings of the sages I ponder nightly and dare not ignore. Seasonal feasts are ancient custom; at New Year, when the year is presented, Mongol tributaries from beyond the frontier must attend rites that cannot be omitted. I follow old practice and have added nothing. State business I handle as always; nothing has slipped. Yongtan speaks what he believes without hiding it—that is what I commend in him, and I know his heart. (End of rescript.)
13
In Beijing a Board of Works stonemason named Yu Junbi was rich and childless. After his death a relative, Xu Bingyi, schemed to seize the property. Grand Secretary Xu Wangyou, a clansman, had the Nine Ministers summoned to the funeral to show clout and first claimed Junbi had hoarded silver. Stepping Commandant E Shan reported it; the emperor ordered a stern investigation; Bingyi was punished by law, Wangyou was dismissed, and the Nine Ministers were rebuked by edict. In Qianlong 6, Yongtan reported: "Rumor says E Shan took ten thousand taels in bribes from the Yu family, and that Vice Minister of Rites Wu Jiaju received a share when he attended the funeral; I also hear that mourners were not only the Nine Ministers—Grand Secretary Zhang Tingyu sent a note, Xu Ben and Zhao Guolin came in person, and junior mentor Chen Hao ran messages; I report this secretly as I know it, ready for inquiry." He added: "Secret memorials kept at court still leak outside—someone must be whispering to those near the emperor. If the mighty have spies, the throne will be deaf. When the memorial arrived, the emperor doubted Yongtan and ordered Prince Yi, Prince He, Grand Secretaries Ortai, Zhang Tingyu, and Xu Ben, and Ministers Neqin and Laibao to investigate. They were to demand which withheld memorial he meant had leaked, and whom among the powerful he accused of bribing the inner circle—when, he said, there was no inner circle to bribe and no magnate who could— and to answer directly. E Shan's servants and the middlemen who took bribes all confessed that E Shan had accepted Yu family money; Prince He and the others so reported. The emperor called Prince He, Ortai, Neqin, and Laibao to confront E Shan; speaking gently, he drew out a confession that E Shan had taken a thousand taels of silver. The emperor told E Shan: "By law you deserve strangulation. You were once a great minister; I cannot leave you to the execution ground. Yet how can you face the world again? You must decide for yourself what to do." He then ordered Prince He and the others to confer with Grand Secretaries Zhang Tingyu, Fu Min, and Xu Ben and Ministers Haiwang and Vice Minister Shuhede, as he had directed. Neqin and Laibao were told to show E Shan the princes' and ministers' report; E Shan then denied ever taking a bribe. The emperor furiously accused E Shan of lying, stripped him and sent him to the Ministry of Punishments, had Fu Min, Haiwang, and Shuhede try him again, fixed strangulation—and still granted him suicide by imperial mercy. Wu Jiaju and Chen Hao were dismissed as well. Asked which secret memorial had leaked, Yongtan answered with Wu Shigong's secret impeachment of Shi Yizhi. Prince He and the others found that Grand Secretary Zhao Guolin and others had not attended the Yu funeral, yet the rumor was not baseless. The Emperor then praised Yongtan for uncovering hidden misconduct and speaking out without reserve, and promoted him to vice censor-in-chief.
14
退 祿 退
Guo Guolin alone submitted a rebuttal, saying: "Yongtan reports what he hears; he was raised to high rank as a reward, yet is now reproached for the petty offense of refusing to bow and kneel. When a practice tends toward abuse, one should check it before it takes root. When policy swings back and forth, one must see it through to a sound conclusion. In the late Ming, the censorial remonstrance and the executive government each formed separate camps and mutually ostracized one another, until public order was deeply undermined. Today no power rivals the throne, and no voice enjoys a partial ear; it is better to guard against evils not yet arisen than to slacken before dangers about to arrive. I beg that Your Majesty issue a special edict, promulgated throughout the realm, explaining that Yongtan's rapid promotion rewards his courage while indulging his rashness. Henceforth, whenever someone denounces a senior minister without substantiation, separate penalties shall apply. Then merit and fault will not cancel each other out, and rewards and punishments will not be skewed. If my words are too blunt, I beg dismissal, or leave to resign, that my original purpose may remain intact." The Emperor then issued an edict: "Raising Yongtan so swiftly also reflects the wish to nurture good and curtail evil. The Grand Secretary's words show seasoned foresight, and I welcome them gladly. Take up your duties in the Grand Secretariat and do not depart from my intent." Guo Guolin pressed his resignation all the harder; Supervising Censor Lu Bingchun impeached him, alleging that when the Emperor had asked whether Guo had attended the Yu family's mourning, Guo had left and told his kinsman Liu Fanzhang, a retired director of the Court of Imperial Entertainments, in unseemly language. The Emperor summoned Liu Fanzhang and ordered O-er-tai, Zhang Tingyu, Xu Ben, Neqin, and Laibao to investigate, remarking that Liu was a vulgar man of the marketplace, that Guo had contemplated marriage ties with him and had once recommended him by memorial—the conduct was improper. He dispatched O-er-tai and the others to convey his wishes and instruct Guo to seek retirement. When after several days Guo's retirement memorial still had not come, the Emperor specially ordered him demoted one rank and kept in the capital awaiting a new post. Lu Bingchun had overreached in his language; Liu Fanzhang pried into why he had been punished—careless conduct—and both were dismissed from office.
15
Yongtan was again promoted to left vice censor-in-chief. Luo Shangzhen, a commoner of Weng'an in Guizhou, petitioned the Censorate that Wang Shijun, formerly governor of Sichuan, had seized his family's burial ground at home; the Emperor ordered Yongtan to Guizhou to investigate jointly with Governor-General Zhang Guangsi, and Wang was convicted as the law required. Henan Governor Ya'ertu impeached Yongtan, charging that on his return from Guizhou he passed through Nanyang and let his servants beat villagers; the ministry deliberated and imposed a salary fine. In the twelfth month of the seventh year he was ordered to Jiangnan to manage famine relief with Governor Zhou Xuejian; before setting out, Yongtan disclosed to Grand Secretary O-er-tai's son O Rong'an the matter of a secret memorial withheld at court. The Emperor ordered Yongtan stripped of office and remanded to the Imperial Household Department's Office of Punishments; he charged Prince Zhuang, Prince Lu, Prince He, Prince Ping, Grand Secretaries Zhang Tingyu and Xu Ben, and Ministers Neqin, Laibao, and Hadaha to try the case. O Rong'an and Yongtan confessed that before the memorial was filed they had plotted together, and after filing they compared notes. The princes and senior ministers invoked the law on leaking state secrets; the Emperor rebuked them for forming cliques for private gain, declared the statute inapplicable, and ordered the Three Judicial Offices to review the verdict jointly. The princes and ministers then asked for judicial torture and also sought to dismiss Grand Secretary O-er-tai and arrest him; the Emperor said O-er-tai stood in the succession of a great minister and he could not bring himself to pursue the matter deeply, and referred it to the officials for deliberation with a token penalty in view. Yongtan and O Rong'an need not be tortured either; Yongtan had been specially favored with rapid promotion, yet attached himself to his patron's circle—for every accusation he had first plotted in secret, knitting factional ties and driving out dissent—the offense was serious; O Rong'an's guilt was likewise inescapable, but compared with Yongtan he deserved mitigation at sentencing. He ordered a final sentence drafted and submitted; before the memorial reached him, Yongtan died in custody. O Rong'an was sentenced to exile; the Emperor showed mercy—the details appear in his biography.
16
== 西 ' ' 便
Chai Chaosheng, whose courtesy name was Yumen, came from Renhe in Zhejiang. In the second year of Yongzheng he passed the provincial examination, was appointed a secretariat drafting clerk, and served as a clerk on the Grand Council. He rose in turn to principal clerk in the Ministry of Works. In the seventh year of Qianlong he was chosen by examination and appointed supervising censor for the Shanxi circuit. That year brought drought; the Emperor issued an edict inviting candid counsel. Chaosheng submitted a memorial: "When the ruler seeks counsel and ministers admonish one another, that is the wholesome custom of a well-governed age; to grow more humble and restrain excess, and to examine oneself—that is the supreme rule of personal discipline. Your subject has read with reverence the imperial words: "Among you nine ministers, who can hold the ruler to account?" What have you done to advance good and bar evil? This truly expresses our Emperor's open heart, deep as a valley, never weary of honest counsel. Since spring this year the capital region has not received adequate rain; Your Majesty labors day and night in anxiety without respite. Heaven's gift of rain and sun is beyond prediction; yet human effort at self-reform should not shy from the sternest self-criticism. Self-examination in outward conduct—in every act and word, what is pure or mixed is easily seen; self-examination in what is hidden—in what neither ear nor eye reaches, the first stirrings are hard to detect. The ruler's mind is the fountain of all change; the empire and every office and subject stake their fate upon it. Amid countless duties, does Your Majesty never have moments to refresh the spirit and take innocent pleasure? Yet I fear that when a single thought stirs by chance, the start is tiny, and the habit of indulgence and self-forgiveness may catch one unawares, until it spreads unseen and cannot be stopped. Then what passes through the mind in an instant bears on whether the imperial work is concentrated or diffuse. I humbly beg Your Majesty, in what the whole bureaucracy cannot see and intimates cannot spy upon, to grow daily more vigilant and strict—would that not surpass sporadic self-examination in drawing down Heaven's favorable response?"
17
" 涿 使 西 涿 ' ' 便 使 使 ' 使調調 ' 西
In the eighth year the prefectures of Tianjin and Hejian suffered severe drought. In the ninth year Chaosheng memorialized again: "In Hejian and Tianjin the main rivers are three: the Wei, the Hutuo, and the Zhang. Besides these, Hejian has eleven distributary streams, seventeen storage marshes, and three retention canals; Tianjin has thirteen branch streams, fourteen storage marshes, and six receiving estuaries—the water network is vast. Had the rivers and canals been kept deep and wide with storage and release properly managed, even in drought years full irrigation could not always be achieved, yet half the benefit might still be secured. Even otherwise, water stored in normal times could sustain the land for months, until heavy rains arrived. How then could people abandon fields and homes, take up children and wives, and flee starving along the roads? The collapse of water management is plain from this. When even one day of good rain fails, relief spending cannot stop. Your subject believes that pouring money into relief alone is inferior to releasing a large treasury sum and dispatching senior ministers to oversee water works in the capital region—feeding the hungry, easing drought and flood, and turning poor districts prosperous. For immediate crisis and long-term national planning, nothing surpasses this. Your subject cites Han Zhang Kan, who as administrator of Yuyang opened eight thousand qing of rice fields at Hunu—today's Changping. Under Northern Qi, Pei Yanjun as regional inspector of Youzhou restored the ancient Dukang Slope and irrigated more than ten thousand mu—Dukang is today's Zhuozhou. In Song, He Chengju as Hebei commissioner built dikes six hundred li long to irrigate land in Xiong, Mo, and Ba. In Ming, Wang Yingjiao as Tianjin governor contributed his salary and opened two thousand mu yielding four or five shi per mu. Today's eastern and western storage marshes are He Chengju's Tangluo; Tianjin's Shiziwei is where Wang Yingjiao's paddies stood. In our dynasty Governor Li Guangdi asked to develop Hejian paddies, noting that flooded Zhuozhou land sold for two hundred cash per mu, yet once converted to paddy fetched ten taels of silver per mu. Last year Governor-General Gao Bin proposed irrigating from the Yongding River, likewise reporting universal joy wherever surveys went. Your subject has heard that at Shijingshan an estate steward named Xiu diverted the Hun River to irrigate and reaped several times the normal harvest per mu. In Li County a rich household dug its own wells and profited even in drought years. Bazhou Prefect Zhu Yifei persuaded the people to sink more than twenty wells, which they came to depend on. Recent examples furnish solid proof—water development can surely succeed. Your subject asks that a senior minister be sent with several hundred thousand taels to Hejian and Tianjin to supervise circuit, prefectural, and county officials and their deputies; save transport arteries and the violent main stream of the Hutuo, which must not be lightly tampered with, every river, canal, and marsh with recoverable traces should be thoroughly dredged. Beside each river, canal, and marsh, open smaller streams; beside those streams, open main ditches—all as deep and wide as feasible, stopping where the water cannot carry. Build sluice gates in stages to feed one another. In drought, channel water into ditches for irrigation; in flood, open the gates and send water back to the rivers. Where fields stand far from water, sink one well per qing and one large pond per ten qing—enough for practical use. Where works encroach on private land or ancient dykes long turned to livelihood, compensate by mu and restore shares; then suspend grain relief to current famine victims and refugees, assign them by section to paid labor, and grant rations generously rather than stingily. One family member on the works—suspend relief for two mouths at home; Two on the works—suspend relief for four at home. Remaining dependents and households unable to work should still receive relief as before. Where dredging yields cultivable land, lend seed and tools and recover the cost over successive years. Your subject further asks that another minister be chosen with treasury funds to tour every Zhili prefecture in the same phased manner as Hejian and Tianjin. Objectors say: "Northern ground is high and dry, ill suited to rice; soil is sandy and salty and water sinks away; digging up private land provokes resentment." Xu Zhenming in the previous dynasty tried and failed immediately; Prince Yi Xian and Grand Secretary Zhu Shi nearly succeeded yet abandoned the work—a plain warning. Your subject notes that soils differ in what they bear; rice is not unknown in Jizhou—Yutian and Fengrun produce fine japonica in abundance. Moreover, the proposal is only to restore water works; no one need force paddies. Whether dredging or digging, spend public money; plant rice or dry grain as the people prefer. That is the first objection answered. Sandy, salty soil exists, but only here and there—is the whole region nothing but sand and salt? Even where soil is sandy and salty, an extra watercourse still beats unchecked overflow. That is the second objection answered. To treat canal land as pure loss shows ignorance of farming. Farmers exhaust their strength on what they till and do not crave ever more acreage. Sacrifice one mu of ten to store water and the other nine may double their yield—is that not better than ten mu of meager harvest? Besides, donated land is compensated and restored by measure. That is the third objection answered. As for earlier efforts that started and stopped, there were causes: Xu Zhenming spoke of benefit for a hundred generations, yet Supervising Censor Wang Zhidong impeached him at the instigation of eunuchs and imperial in-laws. His memorial said only that the Hutuo should not be opened—it never said paddies could not be tried. Yet in recruiting southerners to reclaim land they granted them the plots outright and even allowed them to register locally for the examinations. Zuo Guangdou's colony-and-school schemes worked the same way. They took land from northerners and shut them out of the examination ladder; no wonder it provoked widespread complaint. The record of the four garrison-farming bureaus speaks for itself. Some agents back then performed poorly, yet when the worthy prince died the whole project was condemned and scrapped—hardly the counsel of statesmen who think in generations. Bold ventures at first alarm the people; only persistence turns them into lasting success. When Qin dug the Zheng and Bai canals the gain endured for centuries, yet at the time the court nearly executed the engineer Zheng Guo. Under Han, Hedong governor Fan Xi drew the Fen to irrigate fields, but as the channels kept shifting farmers could not recoup their seed. In Tang, Changsun Shu reopened the works and harvests reached ten shi per mu. Every great work is hard to start and easy to finish once it is underway. To see it through is right; to quit midway is wrong. This is the fourth matter beyond reasonable doubt. Once irrigation is in place, recruit skilled farmers, build sluices and tools, and lay out yearly upkeep so channels never choke up—let the responsible ministers plan this in detail. Your Majesty treats the people as his children; for relief and succor, even ten million taels from the treasury would not be too much. Clearing the capital's drainage alone was estimated at over two hundred thousand taels—against reviving an entire province's hydraulics, the relative cost is plain. Moreover this project builds wealth; it is not mere expenditure. Natural calamities repeat in every age, and famine relief is never foolproof—why not invest a million on river works and promptly secure a rich state and contented people? Even Yao's floods or Tang's droughts could be met by shifting water from abundance to want—relief without lasting harm. Grain prices have weighed on Your Majesty year after year; suspending government purchases entirely cannot be sustained forever. Selling the student quota to fill the granaries is no superior solution either. If ordinary farmers were steadily well-off at harvest, they would naturally afford two meals a day. I questioned officials and commoners in Zhili; all said, "Irrigated land yields more than twice what dry land does." This is an ever-normal granary that never runs empty. The capital environs hold many Banner estates; Zhili is the metropolis's vital province—both should be made prosperous so the center can anchor the realm. Han Wudi resettled great clans in Guanzhong and Ming Chengzu moved rich families to the capital—harsh perhaps, but far-sighted. With irrigation thriving, army and people both gain—a treasury no vault can hold. Rain rises when earth and water breathe upward and falls when they soak the soil; when earth dominates, moisture is stifled. Zhili has seen repeated drought prayers in recent years. Balance earth and water and seasonable rain and sun follow—proved harmony with nature. Water helps when channeled apart and harms when left to mass together; used it profits, discarded it destroys. Zhou Yong said, "Whoever farms the land also governs the water." Zhang Boxxing held the same view. As magistrate of Lingshou, Lu Longqi pressed the people to dredge the Wei River. At first there was grumbling that he was digging a dry riverbed to burden the people; Then floods struck; only Lingshou had channels to carry them off, and that year ended in harvest. Merchants turn to boats in drought; a state that prepares so need not fear flood—implicit river control. Population swells while the food supply thins. I believe developing paddies in the northwest and opening land in the southeast would naturally ease grain prices. The scheme is vast; begin in Zhili, and if it succeeds extend it gradually. Lasting prosperity for ages may begin here!"
18
' ' 滿 使 沿 滿 滿 便 輿
In the tenth year he submitted a memorial outlining three fiscal policies, saying: "Governing the empire turns on two great matters: appointing the right men and managing the treasury. After long peace, state consumption has swelled; easing burdens on the people while revenue falters weighs on Your Majesty daily; yet matching expenditure to income still lacks a comprehensive plan. The Book of Rites says, "When revenue is ample, a hundred undertakings succeed." When funds run short, remissions, balanced taxation, disaster relief, and care for the poor—all the great policies of benevolent rule—cannot be fully applied. Procrastinate long enough and stopgap expedients multiply. This is no minor concern for the empire. Recently a censorial memorial proposed fixed accounts, stating annual revenue at thirty-six million taels and expenditure the same. Measured for the present, revenue barely covers spending. Projected forward, revenue will likely fall short of need. With Your Majesty's wisdom and the realm at peace, failure to devise lasting ways to increase revenue and cut waste is to miss the moment. We who serve in the censorate and provincial offices, though favored by grace, cannot contribute our mite to long-range planning—we fail the state. In my view the remedies are three: open frontier garrison farms for idle bannermen; pay out several years' stipends and release the Han Banners; redirect student-purchase fees to provincial public funds. Only then can sound policies be implemented. Manchu, Mongol, and Han Banners alike have seen registered population multiply tenfold since Shunzhi, while livelihoods are harder than in Kangxi—perhaps half as secure—and still they depend endlessly on state pay. Pen them within five hundred li and the upper evil will mirror the Northern Song's burden of idle troops, the lower evil the Ming's ruinous imperial clans—this demands flexible reform. I am told the Fengtian frontier offers rich soil and good water; dispatch able ministers to develop it by separate routes. Where land can be farmed, spend treasury funds on forts, beacons, dwellings, oxen, and tools; let each Manchu Banner send secondary and surplus men able to farm, while primary registers remain armored on capital duty. Grant tilled land as permanent holdings; recover construction costs over time without adding land tax. Require drill in farming slack seasons; in a few years they will become seasoned soldiers. Each year assign men from the courier stations to contribute land and funds; thereafter volunteers may follow in turn. This is how to settle idle Manchu banner population. The Han Banners were already permitted to leave the banners, but rigid regulations have made release rare. Now permit all to leave the banners whether or not they hold office. Families with an incumbent official receive three years' stipend; others receive six. They may take their property and go where they will. Rich and poor alike will find their footing, and after five years treasury savings will be immense. If full payout at once is impossible, disburse over several years; reassign banner officers from commanders down to senior clerks as Green Standard brigade and garrison commanders. This is how to settle the Han Banners. I further observe that consolidating surplus melt fees into the public treasury is both the empire's greatest fiscal gain and its greatest administrative ill. Under Kangxi, rules were loose; local officials still levied melt surcharges beyond land and poll taxes, and hidden customary fees were not fully eliminated. Once melt surcharges were centralized, corrupt channels were cleared—that was the gain. Formerly such funds were informal levies, not budget lines; upright magistrates would not abuse them and superiors dared not demand them; capable men used local money for local needs, so Kangxi produced many honest officials with real achievements and fluid finances. After consolidation, payments matched regular tribute and the Board of Revenue controlled every outlay; beyond integrity stipends from land tax and public funds, nothing remained; integrity stipends, after secretaries, servants, teachers, wages, obligatory courtesies, and carriage and household costs, also left nothing. When local projects required funding, officials feared Board rejection above and personal liability below; they pursued showy projects without real benefit and called daily bustle diligence. Hence it became a great ill for the empire. Public benefit has its limits; even sage institutions must adapt. The melt-fee consolidation cannot be reversed; only a separate local public fund can spare responsible officials financial paralysis, so that real governance can be required of them. Keep ever-normal granaries under the old rules; dedicate student-purchase fees to provincial public funds; beyond salaries and troop pay from regular revenue, use this pool for disaster relief, poor relief, hydraulics, reclamation loans, public works, and grain purchases when prices fall short—local funds for local needs. For major projects, governors-general and governors should pool provincial resources; if still insufficient, neighboring provinces should mutual aid. Circuit and prefectural officials should audit use; governors-general and governors should approve reductions; the Board need not micromanage—then funds will suffice, rules stay simple, and genuine local policy can proceed. Offices exist to serve the people; write laws against corruption, but do not abolish necessary funds for fear of abuse. Tang officials cut Liu Yan's shipping allowances and the grain transport system collapsed; Ming officials converted Zhou Chen's transport surcharges into regular tax, spawning arrears everywhere and starving dead along the roads. A great empire cannot be run by penny-wise tricks; sound fiscal statesmen do not act so. This is why student-purchase fees should fund provincial public expenses. Once these three measures take effect, revenue and spending will stabilize and funds will be secure; no present task is more urgent. I humbly beg Your Majesty to reflect deeply and charge loyal, capable ministers to deliberate and enact these proposals."
19
He was soon promoted to supervising secretary in the Bureau of Military Affairs and assigned to inspect the northern city ward. He requested leave to care for his mother and nursed her with devoted filial piety. In poverty he supported himself as a physician. In time he died.
20
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Chu Linzhi, courtesy name Lüchun, was a native of Jingxi in Jiangnan. In 1739 he passed the jinshi examination, became a Hanlin bachelor, and was appointed compiler. In presenting classical commentaries he drew on the ancients, posed sharp questions, and offered constructive criticism in language of refined clarity. In 1749 he was selected and appointed supervising censor for the Guizhou circuit. The compiler Zhu Quan was related by marriage to Grand Secretary Zhang Tingyu; while serving as educational commissioner of Sichuan he delayed observing mourning when his mother died. Chu Linzhi submitted a memorial impeaching him without sparing Zhang Tingyu's name; Emperor Gaozong took this as proof of his blunt integrity.
21
' ' '' '' 使使 ' '
During a severe drought he answered an imperial call for memorials with a submission that, in essence, said: "Your subject has heard that Heaven's way is like keeping a steelyard in balance. Rain and sun, cold and heat—each in its season finds its proper mean; yet when the cosmic breath momentarily tilts, the sign appears in excessive yang suppressed beneath yin. Still, as cycles turn and time passes, balance always returns—that is Heaven's impartiality. The ruler's way mirrors Heaven, likewise as though holding a steelyard level. Joy and anger, punishment and reward—in governance nothing should stray from the mean; yet when judgment slips, the tell appears in whom you appoint and how you rule. Through careful adjustment, all must finally settle on the great mean and perfect rectitude—that is the height of royal virtue. The Han scholar Dong Zhongshu said: "Those who speak truly of Heaven prove it in human affairs; Heaven and humanity answer each other faster than stick strikes drum. That is why the Spring and Autumn Annals records disasters and portents at length. Your Majesty is utterly sage and penetratingly wise—surely no trifling fault could summon ill omens and bring disaster? Yet your foolish subject, guessing with a dipper and peering through a tube, believes that ancient rulers feared being unclear, whereas Your Majesty alone fears being too clear; ancient rulers feared indecision, whereas Your Majesty alone fears deciding too swiftly. Even a single promotion or appointment often surprises everyone, beyond what deliberation could anticipate. This is the slight tilt in Your Majesty's judgment—what I mean by an excess of sagely clarity and swift decisiveness. The historians' praise of Yao reads: "Sage upon sage, spirit upon spirit. The Song master Zhu Xi said: "The sage is the name for one whose spirit cannot be fathomed. What is admirable in "unfathomable" is weaving many strands together, weighing them in array, and moving with the times—not meaning inexplicable in this matter or that. This can hardly touch Your Majesty's virtue by one part in ten thousand, yet your subject especially wishes that Your Majesty would open your heart and act with perfect fairness, so that harmony pervades the realm and the world admires the rightness of your appointments—not merely marvels at how startling they are. If the answer is that one must do so to nip trouble in the bud, the laws of the realm are already complete; tell me which minister's conduct is crooked or straight—who could hide anything from Your Majesty's penetrating gaze? Your subject has also heard the Tang minister Han Yu say: "Yang alone brings drought, yin alone brings flood. The ruler is yang and ministers are yin; where there is a ruler but no ministers, drought persists. Today Your Majesty rises before dawn and retires after dark, worn with care within the palace, while princes and grand ministers stand with folded hands filling their seats, offering no counsel, doing nothing to magnify your virtue or help spread your sage rule. The ruler toils above while ministers idle below—Heaven's bounty flows downward while Earth's response cannot rise. As a cause of drought, the logic may well hold. In all humility your subject wishes that Your Majesty would empty the self and hold no private bias—in every appointment and every policy keep the even mirror and level balance unchanged. And toward one or two ministers of pure loyalty who fret for the realm, summon them now and then; in quiet moments after a simple repast, draw on their counsel. Then timely rain and wind will surely dispel the drought. (End of memorial.)
22
Chu Linzhi rose through several posts to vice minister of the Court of the Imperial Stud, then became vice director of the Imperial Clan Court. He pleaded illness and retired, remaining at home for more than ten years. He died at the age of eighty-two.
23
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Discussion: The historians observe that remonstrating ministers serve the state best when they rectify the ruler's virtue, next when they plan military and civil affairs and grasp a century's worth of gain and loss. As for striking down wickedness and shutting out harm, standing tall and not flinching before the powerful—that too demands courage not easily praised in words. When Gaozong took the throne, he humbled himself to accept remonstrance. Cao Yishi, Li Shenxiu, Chai Chaosheng, and Chu Linzhi—the counsel they offered fulfilled the duty of presenting good and pressing hard questions. Chai Chaosheng's three policies on public finance were especially far-sighted—a pity they were never adopted. Hu Ding's impeachment of Xu Rong and Zhong Yongtan's impeachment of E Shan both showed men who could perform their offices. Yet Yongtan destroyed himself through a leak of words—how strange!
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