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卷378 列傳一百六十五 黄爵滋 金应麟 陈庆镛 苏廷魁 朱琦

Volume 378 Biographies 165: Huang Juezi, Jin Yinglin, Chen Qingyong, Su Tingkui, Zhu Qi

Chapter 378 of 清史稿 · Draft History of Qing
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1
Biography 165
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Huang Juezi, Jin Yinglin, Chen Qingyong, Su Tingkui, and Zhu Qi
3
西
Huang Juezi (style name Shuzhai) came from Yihuang in Jiangxi. He earned his jinshi degree in Daoguang 3 (1823), entered the Hanlin Academy as a probationary academician, served as a compiling editor, and was later promoted to censor and supervising secretary. He won renown for frank memorials, spoke out sharply on every issue without pulling punches, and saw many of his proposals accepted by the throne. In Daoguang 15 (1835) he received a special promotion to vice minister of the Court of Imperial Entertainments. An edict explained that Juezi, along with supervising secretaries Feng Zanxun, Jin Yinglin, Zeng Wangyan, and others, had all spoken boldly, and were promoted expressly to encourage the censorate and widen the avenue of loyal remonstrance—while warning them not to grow cautious about preserving rank once elevated, a message meant for the bureaucracy at large. He soon submitted memorials on six topics—reading Heaven's signs, widening remonstrance, cultivating military talent, controlling lawless populations, reforming the capital garrisons, and tightening coastal defences against foreigners—along with long-standing abuses in the grain transport and river works; the court referred them all for policy action.
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沿 滿
English vessels were then appearing repeatedly off the coasts of Fujian, Zhejiang, Jiangnan, and Shandong, cruising the waters and charting the landscape. Juezi warned in a memorial: "Foreign powers cannot be handled solely through conciliation, and our undefended coast is gravely exposed." In Daoguang 18 (1838), in his celebrated memorial urging an opium ban, he wrote: "I observe that silver has grown steadily dearer in recent years—each tael now exchanges for over sixteen hundred cash. This is not domestic consumption of silver, but a drain of silver overseas. Since opium entered China, the annual outflow before Daoguang 3 had already run to several million taels; at first only wealthy young idlers took it up as a fashionable vice. Soon officials and gentry at the top, artisans and merchants below, actors and servants, even women, monks, and priests were smoking it everywhere. Guangdong smugglers colluded with soldiers and clerks, using swift craft such as the "dragon-stripping" and "fast crab" boats to ship silver abroad and opium ashore. From Daoguang 3 to 11, the annual drain ran to seventeen or eighteen million taels; from Daoguang 11 to 14, to more than twenty million taels a year; and since Daoguang 14 the figure has climbed toward thirty million; while the ports of Fujian, Zhejiang, Shandong, and Tianjin together account for tens of millions more. China's productive wealth is poured into a bottomless foreign pit in exchange for this poison, and the nation grows sicker year by year with no end in sight. Land tax across the provinces was collected chiefly in copper cash, then converted to silver for final accounts—formerly officials often showed a surplus, but now every settlement runs at a loss. Salt merchants who once fought for the lucrative salt trade now receive payment in cash but must remit duties in silver—a business once prized has become a path to ruin. If silver keeps rising for a few more years, how can fiscal settlements possibly be completed? How can accumulated tax arrears ever be cleared? And if an emergency arose, how could the treasury meet it? Everyone knows opium is the leak in the nation's finances, yet no one has found how to stop it. The drain of silver stems from the scale of the opium trade; and trafficking flourishes because smokers are so numerous. Without smokers there would be no trade; without trade, foreign opium would not enter China at all. We should strike first at consumption. I beg Your Majesty to allow a one-year grace period for smokers to quit—even the deepest addiction can be broken. Anyone still smoking after a year would be a lawless subject deserving no mercy under the severest penalty. Under existing law, smoking carried only the cangue and beating; failing to denounce traffickers brought a hundred blows and three years' penal servitude—all punishments short of death. Withdrawal hurts more than those penalties, so addicts refuse to quit. Make the penalty death, and the terror of execution would outweigh the misery of withdrawal—I know they would rather die at home than on the scaffold. Coupled with Your Majesty's thunderous wrath, even the most stubborn and long-addicted would be shaken awake. When the imperial will is stern, officials enforce the law rigorously and offenders take heed. Within that year, before a single execution, eight or nine in ten would quit on their own. Former smokers would be saved by the law; the untainted would be warned off in time—the power to suppress vice is itself the highest mercy. I beg Your Majesty to order every governor to enforce the baojia household registers: first instruct the people, then after one year require mutual guarantees from groups of five households, allow informers to come forward with generous rewards, and if anyone is concealed, execute the offender under the new statute and punish the guaranteeing households as well. In major cities and trading towns, hold inns responsible: any shop that harbors smokers should be punished as for sheltering criminals. Civil and military officials of every rank should face aggravated penalties, and their descendants should be barred from the examinations. For relatives, secretaries, and servants of officials, punish the offenders and also hold the supervising official strictly accountable. Manchu and Han troops should be registered and policed through the baojia system like civilians; and commanders who fail to detect offenders should face the same penalties as civil officials. Then army and people alike would be cleansed, the fiscal leak plugged, and silver might cease its rise—only then could we truly reform the finances. That would be a blessing for the empire and for generations to come." When the memorial reached the throne, the Emperor strongly endorsed it and ordered provincial officials to submit opinions and draft regulations without delay.
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使調
Earlier, Xu Naiji of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices had argued that strict prohibition was unworkable while the coast remained closed to trade, and proposed legalizing opium under the old tax system with barter instead of silver payment and heavier penalties only for officials, scholars, and soldiers—a plan widely condemned as improper. Juezi impeached Xu Naiji, who was dismissed; Juezi was then promoted in rapid succession to vice minister of the Court of Judicial Review, transmission commissioner, vice minister of Rites, and finally transferred to the Ministry of Punishments. In Daoguang 19 (1839), the court enacted new statutes on trafficking and smoking opium, largely along the lines Juezi had proposed.
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退
Lin Zexu reached Guangdong, burned all the opium stored on the receiving ships, and pressed charges against foreign traffickers. The British consul Charles Elliot refused to comply, and war broke out. In Daoguang 20 (1840), Juezi was sent with Left Censor-in-Chief Qi Junzao to Fujian to oversee the opium ban and, with Governor-General Deng Tingzhen, to prepare coastal defences. When British forces attacked, Deng Tingzhen reported repeated victories at Xiamen, which the Emperor found hard to believe. Juezi and Qi Junzao were inspecting affairs in Zhejiang when they were ordered back to Fujian to investigate and report. They reported: "Deng Tingzhen's accounts were not false; Dinghai must be recovered without delay; and the navy's specialized skills require appointing men outside the usual seniority rules." They laid out detailed plans for offense and defense. They also warned that Zhejiang was the strategic heart linking Fujian and Guangdong to Jiangsu, and urged the court to tell Yilibu not to heed Qishan alone or assume the enemy would simply withdraw. Back in Beijing, Juezi argued forcefully that Britain's expeditionary forces were overextended, urged a complete trade embargo, recruitment and fiscal retrenchment for a war of attrition, and submitted a coastal defence map. Qishan's peace negotiations in Guangdong then failed, and repeated campaigns in Guangdong and Zhejiang went badly. In Daoguang 22 (1842), British forces advanced up the Yangzi from the sea, and peace was concluded at Nanjing—the opium prohibition was effectively abandoned. He soon resigned to observe mourning for his father.
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As a censor, Juezi had inspected the Ministry of Revenue silver vault and memorialized on clerks who accepted short payments and caused treasury losses. In Daoguang 23 (1843), a nine-million-tael vault deficit came to light; vault managers and inspectors were stripped of rank and ordered to make restitution, and were gradually reappointed once they had paid in full. Juezi awaited appointment as a vice director but stayed home with a foot ailment; the Emperor still occasionally inquired after him. He came to Beijing in Daoguang 30 (1850), but the Emperor died soon after, and he never took office again. He died three years later.
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Juezi was known as a poet and a convivial man: he drafted memorials by night, rode out by day to visit friends and literati, drinking and composing verse with exuberant spirit. When he launched the drive to ban opium he consistently favored war, and for a time was seen as the moral leader of the Qingliu reform party. His collected memorials, poetry, and prose circulated widely.
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西 使使使
Jin Yinglin (style name Yabo) came from Qiantang in Zhejiang. As a provincial graduate he purchased appointment as a secretariat drafter. He passed the jinshi examination in Daoguang 6 (1826), was made a principal clerk in the Ministry of Punishments, supervised the autumn judicial review, and accompanied senior officials on case reviews in Sichuan, Hubei, and Shanxi. He rose through the ranks to director, then censor, then supervising secretary. He memorialized for revisions to the penal code, addressing affray, reporting bandits, prison breaks, false accusation, private coining, mourning and residence violations, sentencing citations, slaves assaulting masters, wrongful imprisonment and torture, authorized pursuit of criminals, retention for filial support, official misconduct in criminal cases, places of exile, and fugitives from provincial garrisons—article by article; many of his proposals were adopted; he also exposed abuses by copper-transport boats and the burdens imposed by the courier stations, and the court ordered provincial governors to suppress them. He submitted dozens of confidential memorials in all; his impeachments of Governor-General Qishan and river conservancy official Wu Bangqing won particular acclaim. The Daoguang Emperor praised his outspokenness and promoted him to vice minister of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices. After mourning for his parents he was appointed vice minister of the Court of Imperial Entertainments. He memorialized on the decay of the navy and the disorder of the grain transport system. In Daoguang 19 he was posted as surveillance commissioner of Zhili, tried Acting Changlu Salt Transport Commissioner Yang Chengye and others for bribery, sentenced them to exile, and implicated former transport commissioners including Chen Chongli. He was soon recalled as vice minister of the Court of Judicial Review.
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祿
In Daoguang 22 he wrote: "Coastal officials deceive the throne because they prize rank and salary above all and are skilled at evasion. To break their deceit requires resolute imperial decision. Do not be bound by seniority, do not shrink from suspicion, pardon past faults, and do not stint on rewards. Recently at the Yangzi estuary the garrison was ample on paper, yet enemy ships penetrated deep inland and rout was reported again and again. The fat of the people is drained dry to preserve the lives of a few mediocre officials. Critics excuse failure by claiming there are no men, no troops, no funds, and no weapons. I hold that men must be found, troops must be trained, and funds and arms must be deployed as available—use strength when plentiful, stratagem when scarce, rouse the army's spirit, and secure the frontier. All this requires only that Your Majesty delegate authority and that those in charge act in concert." He also submitted detailed diagrams of projected revenue and expenditure, firearms, and coastal warfare strategy. In Daoguang 23 he asked leave to care for his aged parents and never returned to office. He left behind the Zhihua Hall Memorials and works in parallel prose.
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Chen Qingyong (style name Songnan) came from Jinjiang in Fujian. He earned his jinshi in Daoguang 12 (1832), entered the Hanlin Academy, was posted to the Ministry of Revenue as a principal clerk, rose to vice director, and was made a censor. In Daoguang 23, after the coastal disasters, officials who had been punished were gradually brought back into service.
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' ' 輿 ''
Chen Qingyong memorialized that rewards and punishments had been mishandled: "Nothing matters more in government than how punishments and rewards are applied. That authority rests with the sovereign and must be made clear to the people, for it embodies the empire's fundamental fairness. The Great Learning teaches that bringing peace to the realm depends on holding the measuring square—applying the same standard to oneself that one applies to others. What is the measuring square? The people's likes and dislikes. Since the coastal troubles began, governors-general, generals, and officials down to county deputies have fled in panic like startled birds and beasts. The Emperor was furious, and the law allowed no escape for those who had broken discipline. The disgraced generals Yishan and Yijing, staff officer Wenwei, Governor-General Niu Jian, and Provincial Commander Yu Buyun were arrested in turn; Buyun was executed. Men of spirit applauded, saying that although the law had not reached Qishan before, it had at least been applied to Yu Buyun. Before long, however, Qishan was reappointed assistant commissioner at Yarkand. When the court gazette announced this, the public was appalled, though some explained it by saying that ancient sage kings had banished criminals to the four corners of the realm to ward off evil spirits. Perhaps the Emperor's treatment of Qishan was of that kind—yet now he was appointed Rehe lieutenant-general with third-rank insignia, Yijing was made Yarkand assistant commissioner, and Wenwei leading commissioner at Gucheng. Qishan had been the first to show weakness when war began, sapping army morale and bringing the empire to ruin. Dismissal and lifelong disgrace would scarcely satisfy public outrage or restore military morale. Yijing's guilt was somewhat less than Qishan's, and Wenwei's somewhat less than Yijing's. Yet how grave a matter it is when the Emperor sends generals to war. Yijing kept his army idle for half a year without ever seeing battle, boasted emptily that one assault would recover three cities, then let his plans leak, made himself a laughingstock to the enemy, lost his army and his generals, and collapsed in a single defeat. Without even counting his harassment of the people, waste of supplies, abuse of power, and acceptance of bribes, his crimes were already beyond measure. I know that Yijing is a descendant of the Qianlong Emperor, and that Your Majesty, cherishing imperial kin, is reluctant to execute him outright. Even if he were spared, he should be imprisoned for life rather than bring shame on the imperial house—who imagined he would be released and reappointed in less than three months? Moreover, Your Majesty may not yet realize how deeply the people hate these men. If Your Majesty heeded public opinion, who would not denounce Qishan as the chief culprit, or demand that Yishan, Yijing, Niu Jian, and Wenwei be cast out without delay? This is not my opinion alone. I hear that Qishan remains as extravagant and overbearing as ever and went to Yarkand reluctantly; and before he had even left the frontier pass, he was recalled. Rehe lies close to the capital; learned and common people alike sigh in dismay, fearing the Emperor intends to employ Qishan even closer to court. If trouble should arise again, this same man would surely be the one to mislead Your Majesty. As the proverb says, frost underfoot foretells solid ice—a prospect that should fill us with dread. At the recent Hanlin examination the topic was "boiling A and enfeoffing Jimo," yet rewards and punishments now run the opposite way—I do not know whom Your Majesty considers "A." And who is "Jimo"? If the imperial mind has erred and Jimo is treated as A and A as Jimo, will not flatterers and detractors alike confuse right and wrong? I beg Your Majesty to rouse imperial authority, withdraw these appointments, heed the Great Learning's teaching on the measuring square, discern true praise and blame in the court, give the law some force, and console the people's hearts." When the memorial reached the throne, the Daoguang Emperor praised it and said: "I lacked the wisdom to judge men, and so Qishan, Yijing, Wenwei, and others lost armies and broke discipline. I can only blame myself and will not shift guilt onto my officials. This censor asks me to withdraw my orders. I am not a ruler who covers his faults—how could I shield them?" He then stripped Qishan and the others of their posts and ordered them to remain at home in reflection. His reputation for integrity then resounded throughout the empire.
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詿祿 退 祿
In Daoguang 25 he was made supervising secretary and inspector of the Eastern City, but was demoted to acting director of the Court of Imperial Entertainments after an official inquiry. In Daoguang 26 he asked leave to return home. When the Xianfeng Emperor ascended, Grand Secretary Zhu Fengbiao recommended him for censor again; though he had fallen, he rose once more undaunted and submitted repeated memorials on matters of state. After the Taiping rebellion began, bandit gangs stirred in Fujian and spread through Quanzhou, Zhangzhou, Xinghua, and Yongchun. In Xianfeng 3 he memorialized on the situation and was ordered home to organize local militia. He detected and executed the sorceress Qiu, who had incited rebellion in Huian, and was rewarded with the peacock feather. He soon asked leave of his post on grounds of illness. In Xianfeng 7 the rebel Lin Jun gathered bandits from Putian, Xianyou, Yongchun, and Nan'an to attack Quanzhou; Qingyong rallied the gentry and people to hold the city, and the rebels withdrew after several days. For this service he was made a candidate for circuit intendant. He died at Quanzhou in Xianfeng 8 and was posthumously made vice minister of the Court of Imperial Entertainments, granted state funeral honors, with one son ennobled as county magistrate and his spirit enshrined in the local worthies' temple.
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Qingyong was a scholar of Han learning who followed Song Confucian conduct in life; his prose was plain and solid. He left the Zhoujing Hall Collected Works, Examination of the Three Schools' Poetry, Explanation of the Shuowen, Examination of Ancient Zhou Script, and other works.
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西
Su Tingkui (style name Gengtang) came from Gaoyao in Guangdong. He earned his jinshi in Daoguang 15 (1835), entered the Hanlin Academy, and was made a compiling editor. In Daoguang 22 he was made a censor. As coastal war intensified, he repeatedly memorialized urging repair of the Humen batteries and the passes at Yantangxu, Dashaha, and Guigang to guard against a return attack on Guangdong—until peace was concluded. In the spring of Daoguang 23 a white comet swept from the southwest through the Shen constellation; he submitted a memorial of several thousand words on this omen, condemning current policy and blaming Grand Councilor Mujangga and others, demanding their immediate dismissal; and calling for an imperial self-reproach edict and open remonstrance—his language was blunt and accusatory. The Daoguang Emperor was moved by the memorial and praised its blunt honesty; court and public alike looked to him with admiration. After mourning for his parents he was made supervising secretary.
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退
In Xianfeng 1 he submitted a memorial on careful beginnings, urging policies of great relief, humility in labor, guarding against pride, sincerity in employing talent, careful governance at the start, Hanlin lecturers, and strict selection of filial and upright candidates—the Xianfeng Emperor accepted it with praise. When Saišangga went out to command the army, he promoted Grand Secretariat reader Muyin to fifth-rank capital official and placed him to learn duties above the Grand Council. Tingkui impeached this as a breach of precedent, nepotism, and reckless promotion that opened the door to favoritism, and asked that Muyin return to his clerk post when Saišangga came back. An edict rebuked Tingkui for interfering in appointments, but spared him because of his upright record. The Emperor first concealed Tingkui's name and showed the memorial to Saišangga; when Saišangga withdrew and drank with the censorial officials, he asked, "Who impeached me?" Tingkui rose and said, "You have failed the state; I dare not fail you by concealing it." He again returned home to observe mourning. In Xianfeng 4 the Red Turban rebels rose in Guangdong and threatened the provincial capital. Some proposed borrowing foreign troops and funding them with shop levies; he fought the proposal and had it dropped.
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退
In Xianfeng 8 the Anglo-French forces occupied Guangzhou; Tingkui and Vice Minister Luo Dunyan organized a militia defense bureau, cleared the countryside, cut off collaborators, and recruited tens of thousands of militia from Dongguan, Sanyuanli, and Foshan; when they announced an attack and the enemy came out, they killed more than a hundred. The enemy grew cautious and withdrew somewhat, then sailed north; after peace at Tianjin the foreign troops remained in Guangdong and popular anger grew; Tingkui asked to keep the militia bureau against local bandits. The foreigners protested that recruiting militia after peace was improper and blamed the Chinese for posting a bounty on Consul Harry Parkes. Peace negotiator Guiliang feared this would disrupt the treaty and memorialized to dissolve the bureau. Earlier, when boat bandits besieged Sihui and Zhaoqing in Guangning and troops were exhausted, some urged him to flee. Tingkui said, "I am the militia defense commissioner—I swear to live or die with this city!" Provincial Commander Kunshou then captured Wuzhou and came to the rescue, and the city was saved. Frontier officials repeatedly tried to memorialize his merits, but he firmly declined.
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使
Early in the Tongzhi reign, on ministers' recommendation, he was made intendant of the Kai-Gui-Chen-Xu circuit in Henan, served as provincial treasurer, and was promoted to Governor-General of the Eastern Rivers. In Tongzhi 7 the Yellow River breached at Xingze without shifting course; he was dismissed but kept in post, and after three months' work was restored. The following year he was summoned to the capital, resigned, and returned home on grounds of illness. He died in Guangxu 4 (1878).
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西 歿
Zhu Qi (style name Bohan) came from Lingui in Guangxi. His father Zhu Fengsen earned his jinshi in Jiaqing 6 (1801), served as magistrate of Jun County in Henan, and won a reputation for good governance. When sectarian rebels rose in Hua County, he led the militia in repeated victories and preserved the city. He was promoted to vice prefect of Henan Prefecture. After his death he was enshrined among distinguished officials.
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退 便 退 退 退 便
Zhu Qi placed first in the provincial examinations. He earned his jinshi in Daoguang 15 (1835), entered the Hanlin Academy, and was made a compiling editor. He admired the character of his fellow townsman Chen Hongmou and strove to live by moral integrity. Made a censor after the coastal war ended, he saw danger lurking everywhere while court and country relapsed into listlessness and the censorate fell silent—he was deeply troubled. He wrote a treatise On Reputation and Reality, opening: "Under Heaven there is the conduct of petty localism and the conduct of great statesmen. Petty localism and great statesmanship are only names; examine conduct and whether it serves the state--that is reality. The age praises "prudent and solid," "pure and quiet," and "daily yielding"—names of the highest beauty—yet these are petty conduct, not the conduct of great statesmen. The duty of great statesmen is to govern the state and secure the realm: they possess firm integrity and are feared and respected by the sovereign; they plan deeply and far ahead for the empire's lasting good. If their counsel is heeded they stay; if not, they leave on principle. They do not calculate their personal comfort; nor do they flee the world's blame. Now it is otherwise. They say: if I plan for the empire's long-term good, the world's troubles will fall on me; if I am feared and respected by the sovereign, I cannot long keep my post; better to be prudent, pure, and yielding—one can sit secure without trouble and win the fairest name. What gentleman would not strive for a post without worry, long tenure, and a beautiful reputation? Hence most of the "worthy" ministers praised in recent times excel in these three qualities alone. In jade caps and court robes they walk with easy dignity through the palace corridors; their superiors trust them and no one criticizes them—they seem unfathomably deep. Yet when great crisis comes they are helpless, silent and tongue-tied—and their prudence, purity, and yielding prove wholly useless; only then do they realize that the statesmen once feared and respected by the sovereign, with deep vision, are nowhere to be found. Yet prudence, purity, and yielding are not in themselves useless. Ancient men who had achieved world-shaking merit and sought to preserve it, or who wielded power that awed the throne and feared an unhappy end, were scrupulous in these virtues to restrain shallow custom and preserve their integrity in old age. Later men without such talent hold such posts, enjoy their ease while avoiding trouble, borrow these fairest names, and complacently think themselves sufficient. Nothing offers a safer hiding place than these three virtues. They are what Confucius called vulgar men—in the end, village worthies in disguise. They are men of the sort of Zhang Yu, Hu Guang, and Zhao Jie—how shameful!" He then submitted repeated memorials on urgent affairs of state, but all were retained at court without response. His contemporaries admired his outspoken integrity and called him a censor of renown.
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西
When his counsel went unheeded, he asked leave to return home in Daoguang 26. Within a few years bandits swarmed in Guangxi, and his warnings proved true. At home he organized local militia and helped defend the region. The rebel chieftain Zhang Jiaxiang repented and offered to surrender, but the authorities still distrusted him. Qi judged him loyal and brave enough to use, pledged his own family's safety as guarantee, accepted the surrender, renamed him Guoliang, and he became a famous general. For his service in the city's defense he was made a candidate for circuit intendant. In Xianfeng 6 he returned to Beijing. After two years he followed Imperial Commissioner Guiliang to Jiangsu without success until Wang Youling alone valued him; when Wang became governor of Zhejiang, he recruited Qi to assist in military affairs. In Xianfeng 11 the Taiping rebels attacked Hangzhou, and he directed the militia bureau. He defended the Qingbo Gate; when the city fell, he died in its defense. He was posthumously made vice minister of the Court of Imperial Sacrifices, granted a hereditary commandant of cavalry rank, and enshrined in the Shrine of Manifest Loyalty.
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Qi followed the Cheng-Zhu school of Neo-Confucianism; his poetry and prose were disciplined in style. He left the Yizhi Hall Collected Works and Censorial Memorials.
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The historian comments: Huang Juezi originated the proposal to ban opium. It was enforced with harsh urgency, border war followed, and vacillation afterward only further diminished national prestige—yet the blame cannot fairly be laid on those who first proposed the ban. Yet securing the state and deciding victory a thousand li away cannot rest on zeal alone. Action is hard enough—how much harder is it to speak rightly? Jin Yinglin was promoted at the same time and likewise consistently favored war. Chen Qingyong, Su Tingkui, and Zhu Qi were known as the "Three Upright Ones"; with Yinglin added, they were called the "Four Tigers." Their counsel was sometimes heeded and sometimes ignored, yet they spoke with stern moral force enough to pierce stubbornness and rouse the timid.
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