1
文慶,字孔修,費莫氏,滿州鑲紅旗人,兩廣總督永保之孫也。 道光二年進士,選庶吉士,授編修。 五遷至詹事。 歷通政使、左副都御史、內閣學士。 十二年,授禮部侍郎,兼副都統。 十三年,總理孝慎皇后喪儀,會奏軍民薙發及停止宴會期限疏中,誤引「百姓如喪考妣,四海遏密八音」語,下諸臣嚴議。 宣宗以文慶翰林出身,隨聲附和,獨重譴,褫副都統,降三品頂戴。 尋復之,歷吏部、戶部侍郎。 十六年,偕尚書湯金釗赴陝西、四川按劾巡撫楊名颺、布政使李羲文,並下嚴議,尋复按名颺被訐事,褫其職。 金釗留署陝西巡撫。 文慶又按河南武陟知縣趙銘彝貪婪狀,劾褫職。 調戶部侍郎。 十七年,命在軍機大臣上學習行走,兼右翼總兵。 命赴熱河,偕都統耆英按歷任總管虧短庫款,褫職追繳。 十九年,以查辦熱河虧空案內擬罪未晰,召問,奏對失實,下部議,罷直軍機。 二十年,典江南鄉試,以上下江中額有誤,又私攜湖南舉人熊少牧入闈閱卷,議褫職。
Wen Qing, whose style was Kongxiu, belonged to the Feimo clan and came from the Manchu Bordered Red Banner; he was a grandson of Yongbao, who had served as governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi. He received his jinshi degree in the second year of the Daoguang reign, entered the Hanlin Academy as a bachelor, and was appointed a Compiler. After five promotions he rose to Grand Mentor of the Heir Apparent. He went on to serve as commissioner of the Transmission Office, left vice censor-in-chief, and a grand secretary of the Grand Secretariat. In the twelfth year of the reign he was made vice minister of rites and concurrently vice banner commander. In the thirteenth year he directed the mourning ceremonies for Empress Xiaoshen. In a joint memorial setting out the periods for military and civilian tonsure and for suspending banquets, he wrongly cited the lines that the people mourned as for a father and mother and that music was stilled throughout the realm—language appropriate to an emperor's death, not an empress's. The case was sent to the ministers for severe review. Emperor Daoguang held that Wen Qing, as a Hanlin graduate, had merely echoed others; Wen Qing alone received a heavy penalty—loss of his vice banner command and demotion to third-rank insignia. He was soon restored and served in turn as vice minister of personnel and of revenue. In the sixteenth year he joined Minister Tang Jinzhao on an investigative tour of Shaanxi and Sichuan to impeach Governor Yang Mingyang and provincial administration commissioner Li Yiwen; both cases went to strict review. When the inquiry into denunciations against Yang was reopened, Wen Qing himself was dismissed. Tang Jinzhao stayed on to administer the Shaanxi governorship. Wen Qing also looked into corruption charges against Zhao Mingyi, magistrate of Wuzhi in Henan, and secured his removal from office. He was transferred to the vice ministry of revenue. In the seventeenth year he was assigned to train under the Grand Council and walk in attendance there, while also commanding the Right Wing. He was sent to Rehe with Commander-in-chief Qi Ying to audit successive superintendents who had shorted the treasury; the guilty were dismissed and made to repay. In the nineteenth year the penalties proposed in the Rehe deficit case were found unclear; summoned to audience, he answered untruthfully, the matter went to ministerial review, and he was removed from the Grand Council. In the twentieth year he served as chief examiner for the Jiangnan provincial tests; errors in the Upper and Lower Jiang quota, together with his smuggling the Hunan graduate Xiong Shaomu into the hall to mark papers, led to a recommendation for dismissal.
2
二十二年,予三等侍衛,充庫倫辦事大臣。 二十三年,召授吏部侍郎、內務府大臣,連擢左都御史、兵部尚書。 二十五年,命赴四川,偕總督、將軍按前任駐藏大臣孟保、鍾芳等濫提官物,劾罷之。 二十七年,復命為軍機大臣,解內務府事務。 尋署陝甘總督,道經河南,命察賑務,劾玩誤之知縣四人。
In the twenty-second year he received third-class imperial bodyguard rank and was appointed commissioner for affairs at Khüree. In the twenty-third year he was recalled to serve as vice minister of personnel and minister of the Imperial Household, then promoted in quick succession to left censor-in-chief and minister of war. In the twenty-fifth year he was dispatched to Sichuan with the governor-general and regional general to investigate former Tibetan ambans Meng Bao, Zhong Fang, and others for wrongful requisitions of official property; all were impeached and removed. In the twenty-seventh year he was reappointed to the Grand Council and released from the Imperial Household. He soon acted as governor-general of Shaanxi and Gansu; traveling through Henan he was told to inspect famine relief and impeached four magistrates for misconduct and delay.
3
二十八年,召授吏部尚書,兼步軍統領、內務府大臣,罷直軍機處、兼翰林院掌院學士。 三十年,充內大臣。 薛執中者,甘肅河州人,以符咒惑眾。 至京師,藉術醫病,朝貴多與往來。 遂妄議時政,談休咎,行踪詭秘,為巡城御史曹楙堅捕治,中外大臣牽連被譴者眾。 文慶曾延治病,文宗斥其身為步軍統領,不能立時捕究,有乖職守,褫職。 咸豐元年,予五品頂戴,辦理昌陵工程。 二年,起授內閣學士,尋擢戶部尚書,復為內大臣、翰林院掌院學士。 五年,復為軍機大臣、協辦大學士。 題孝靜皇后神主,加太子太保,拜文淵閣大學士,晉武英殿大學士,管理戶部,充上書房總師傅。
In the twenty-eighth year he was recalled as minister of personnel, concurrently chief of the metropolitan gendarmerie and minister of the Imperial Household; he left the Grand Council while taking on the chancellorship of the Hanlin Academy. In the thirtieth year he became an inner court minister. There was one Xue Zhizhong, from Hezhou in Gansu, who beguiled crowds with charms and spells. In the capital he treated illness by occult means, and many court grandees sought him out. He began to meddle in politics and speak of omens, while keeping his movements secret; patrolling censor Cao Moujian seized him, and a host of ministers inside and outside the capital were drawn in and censured. Wen Qing had once called Xue in to treat him. Emperor Xianfeng rebuked him: as chief of the metropolitan gendarmerie he should have seized Xue immediately; by failing to do so he had neglected his office, and was dismissed. In the first year of Xianfeng he received fifth-rank insignia and supervised construction at the Changling mausoleum. In the second year he was recalled as a grand secretary, soon promoted to minister of revenue, and again made inner court minister and Hanlin chancellor. In the fifth year he returned to the Grand Council as associate grand secretary. After inscribing the spirit tablet for Empress Xiaojing he received the additional title grand mentor of the heir apparent, entered the Wenyuan Grand Secretariat, rose to the Wuying Grand Secretariat, took charge of the Board of Revenue, and became chief tutor in the Upper Study.
4
文慶醇謹持大體,宣宗、文宗知之深,屢躓屢起,眷倚不衰。 時海內多故,粵匪猖熾,欽差大臣賽尚阿、訥爾經額先後以失律被譴。 文慶言:「當重用漢臣,彼多從田間來,知民疾苦,熟諳情偽。 豈若吾輩未出國門、懵然於大計者乎?」 常密請破除滿、漢畛域之見,不拘資格以用人。 曾國籓初任軍事,屢戰失利,忌者沮抑之。 文慶獨言國籓負時望,能殺賊,終當建非常之功。 曾與胡林翼同典試,深知其才略,屢密薦,由貴州道員一歲之間擢至湖北巡撫,凡所奏請,無不從者。 又薦袁甲三、駱秉章之才,請久任勿他調,以觀厥成。 在戶部,閻敬銘方為主事,當採用其議,非所司者亦諮之。 後卒得諸人力以戡定大難。 端華、肅順漸進用事,皆敬憚其嚴正焉。
Wen Qing was upright, careful, and mindful of the larger good; both Daoguang and Xianfeng knew him intimately. Though he fell and was restored again and again, imperial trust in him never faded. The empire was beset by troubles; the rebellion in Guangdong burned hot, and imperial commissioners Sai Shanga and Ne'erjing'e were censured one after another for military failures. Wen Qing argued: "We should rely more on Han officials. Most of them rose from the countryside; they know the people's suffering and understand what is real and what is not. How does that compare with us, who have never left the capital and remain blind to the larger plan?" He repeatedly urged in secret memorials that the court set aside Manchu–Han divisions and appoint talent without clinging to seniority and rank. When Zeng Guofan first took the field he lost battle after battle, and jealous rivals worked to hold him down. Wen Qing alone insisted that Guofan commanded public confidence, could destroy the rebels, and would eventually win extraordinary distinction. Having once served with Hu Linyi as chief examiner, he knew Hu's ability well and recommended him again and again in secret; within a year Hu rose from Guizhou circuit intendant to Hubei governor, and every request Wen Qing made on his behalf was approved. He also commended Yuan Jiasan and Luo Bingzhang and asked that they be left in post without transfer so their work could bear fruit. At the Board of Revenue, when Yan Jingming was still a director, Wen Qing took his advice even on matters outside Yan's formal duties. In the end it was through such men that the great rebellion was put down. When Duanhua and Suishun gradually gained power, both respected and feared his stern integrity.
5
六年,卒。 遺疏言各省督撫如慶端、福濟、崇恩、瑛棨等,皆不能勝任,不早罷,恐誤封疆。 文宗深惜之,優詔賜卹,嘉其人品端粹,器量淵深,辦事精勤,通達治體,贈太保,賜金治喪。 及親奠,見其遺孤幼穉,特詔加恩入祀賢良祠,命其子善聯俟及歲引見; 弟文玉,以罪遣戍,即釋回。 予諡文端。 善聯,官至福州將軍。
In the sixth year he died. His deathbed memorial warned that governors such as Qingduan, Fu Ji, Chong'en, and Yingqi were unfit for their posts and that delay in removing them would endanger the provinces. Emperor Xianfeng mourned him deeply, issued a generous edict of condolence, praised his integrity, depth of mind, diligence, and grasp of statecraft, posthumously made him grand guardian, and granted funds for his funeral. When the emperor came in person to mourn and saw how young the orphans were, he specially ordered Wen Qing enrolled in the Shrine of Worthies and directed his son Shanlian to be presented at court when he came of age; and his younger brother Wenyu, who had been exiled for a crime, was at once released and recalled. He was given the posthumous title Wenduan. Shanlian rose to serve as general at Fuzhou.
6
文祥,字博川,瓜爾佳氏,滿洲正紅旗人,世居盛京。 道光二十五年進士,授工部主事,累遷郎中。 咸豐六年,京察,記名道府,因親老,乞留京職。 歷太僕寺少卿、詹事、內閣學士,署刑部侍郎。 八年,命在軍機大臣上行走,授禮部侍郎,歷吏部、戶部、工部侍郎,兼副都統、左翼總兵。
Wen Xiang, whose style was Bochuan, belonged to the Guwalgiya clan of the Manchu Plain Red Banner; his family had long lived in Mukden. He took his jinshi degree in the twenty-fifth year of Daoguang, entered the Board of Works as a director, and rose step by step to bureau director. In the sixth year of Xianfeng the capital evaluation marked him for provincial promotion, but with aged parents at home he asked to stay in a Beijing office. He served in turn as vice director of the Imperial Stud, grand mentor of the heir apparent, and grand secretary, and acted as vice minister of justice. In the eighth year he joined the Grand Council, became vice minister of rites, then served in turn as vice minister of personnel, revenue, and works, while also commanding a banner vice command and the Left Wing.
7
十年,英法聯軍犯天津,僧格林沁密疏請幸熱河。 文祥以搖動人心,有關大局,且塞外無險可扼,力持不可,偕廷臣言之,復請獨對; 退偕同直侍郎匡源、杜翰具疏請罷所調車馬,明詔宣示中外。 八月,敵氛益熾,車駕遽行,命文祥署步軍統領,司留守。 從恭親王奕訢議和,出入敵營,於非分之求,侃侃直言,折之以理。 尋以步軍統領難兼顧,疏辭,改署正藍旗護軍統領。 十月,和議成,疏請回鑾,以定人心。 偕恭親王等通籌全局,疏上善後事宜,於是設立總理各國事務衙門,恭親王領之,滿、漢大臣數人,文祥任事最專。
In the tenth year the Anglo-French allies advanced on Tianjin, and Senggelinqin secretly urged the court to withdraw to Rehe. Wen Xiang argued that flight would unsettle the people, touch the fate of the dynasty, and offer no defensible ground beyond the passes; he strongly opposed the move, spoke with other ministers, and again asked for a private audience; afterward he joined fellow councilors Kuang Yuan and Du Han in a memorial to cancel the mobilized transport and issue a clear edict to reassure the empire. In the eighth month, as the enemy pressed harder, the court fled in haste; Wen Xiang was left as acting chief of the metropolitan gendarmerie to hold Beijing. He joined Prince Gong Yixin in the peace talks, moving in and out of the enemy camps; when unreasonable demands were made, he answered plainly and turned them back with argument. Finding the gendarmerie command too much to combine with his other duties, he asked to be relieved of it and was made acting commander of the Plain Blue Banner garrison. In the tenth month, after peace was concluded, he urged the court to return to Beijing so as to steady public morale. With Prince Gong and others he planned the larger settlement and memorialized on postwar recovery; the Zongli Yamen was then established under Prince Gong with several Manchu and Han ministers, and Wen Xiang shouldered the heaviest share of the work.
8
時和局甫定,發、捻猶熾,兵疲餉竭,近畿空虛。 文祥密疏請選練八旗兵丁,添置槍砲,於是始立神機營,尋命管理營務。 又疏言僧格林沁兵力單薄,勝保所部新募未經行陣。 既恃僧格林沁保障畿輔,必得良將勁卒為贊助,薦副都統富明阿、總兵成明隸其軍; 又薦江西九江道沈葆楨、湖北候補知縣劉蓉堪大用。 疏上,並嘉納焉。
Peace with the foreigners was barely settled; Nian and Taiping rebels still burned; armies were worn out, funds exhausted, and the capital region lay defenseless. Wen Xiang secretly urged that picked Banner troops be drilled and armed with muskets; the Shenji Battalion was founded on this basis, and he was soon put in charge of it. He also reported that Senggelinqin's force was too thin and that Sheng Bao's newly raised men had never been under fire. Because the court relied on Senggelinqin to guard the capital approaches, he needed able generals and seasoned troops as support; Wen Xiang recommended Vice Banner Commander Fuming'a and Brigadier Cheng Ming for his army; and he also commended Shen Baozhen, Jiujiang circuit intendant in Jiangxi, and Liu Rong, a candidate magistrate in Hubei, as men of high promise. The memorial was approved in full.
9
十一年,文宗崩於熱河行在,穆宗即位,肅順等專政,文祥請解樞務,不許。 十月,回鑾,偕王大臣疏請兩宮皇太后垂簾聽政。 同治元年,連擢左都御史、工部尚書,兼署兵部尚書,為內務府大臣,兼都統。 二年,管理籓院事務。 東南軍事以次戡定,江蘇、浙江省城克復,議加恩樞臣,固辭。 三年,江寧复,首逆就殲,捷至,加太子太保,予侄凱肇員外郎。 四年,署戶部尚書,辭內務府大臣,允之。
In the eleventh year Emperor Xianfeng died at the Rehe traveling palace; the Tongzhi Emperor succeeded, and Suishun's faction seized power. Wen Xiang asked to leave the Grand Council but was refused. In the tenth month, on the return to Beijing, he joined the princes and ministers in asking that the two empress dowagers rule from behind the curtain. In the first year of Tongzhi he rose in quick succession to left censor-in-chief and minister of works, acted as minister of war, became minister of the Imperial Household, and took a banner command. In the second year he took charge of the Court of Colonial Affairs. As the southeast was pacified step by step and the capitals of Jiangsu and Zhejiang were retaken, rewards for the Grand Council were proposed; he firmly declined. In the third year Nanjing fell and the rebel leader was killed; on news of the victory he received the additional title grand guardian of the heir apparent, and his nephew Kaizhao was made a secretary in the Board. In the fourth year he acted as minister of revenue, resigned from the Imperial Household, and was allowed to do so.
10
是年秋,馬賊入喜峰口,命文祥率神機營兵防護東陵,督諸軍進剿,賊遁灤陽。 疏陳:「地方官豢賊釀患,請除積弊,清盜源。 馬賊巢穴多在奉天昌圖廳八面城、熱河八溝哈達等處。 請購線偵察,調兵掩捕,庶絕根株。」 事定,回京。 文宗奉安山陵,賜其子熙聯員外郎。 尋以母病請假三月,回旗迎養。 奉天馬賊方熾,命率神機營兵往剿,增調直隸洋槍隊出關,約東三盟蒙古王公由北路夾擊,破賊於錦州東井子。 諜知賊將劫奉天獄,約期攻城,兼程馳援,賊退踞城東南,圍撫順; 令總兵劉景芳夜擊破之,賊遁出邊。 遣軍趨吉林,五年春,解長春廳圍,追賊至昌圖朝陽坡,分三路進擊,十數戰皆捷,擒斬三千餘。 賊首馬傻子窮蹙乞降,磔之; 留兵餉授將軍都興阿,俾清餘孽。 請蠲奉天地丁銀米,停鋪捐。 回京,調吏部尚書。 文宗實錄成,賜子熙治員外郎。
That autumn mounted bandits broke through Xifeng Pass; Wen Xiang was sent with the Shenji Battalion to guard the Eastern Tombs and direct pursuit; the bandits withdrew toward Luanyang. He memorialized: "Local officials shelter bandits and breed trouble; accumulated abuses must be removed and the roots of banditry cut off. Their strongholds lie chiefly at Bamiancheng in Fengtian's Changtu district, at Bagou Hada in Rehe, and similar places. Hire informants, move troops for surprise arrests, and so destroy them at the root." When the campaign ended he returned to Beijing. When Emperor Xianfeng was laid to rest in the imperial tombs, his son Xilian was made a Board secretary. Soon after, his mother fell ill; he took three months' leave and returned to his banner estate to bring her home. With Fengtian banditry at its height he was ordered out with the Shenji Battalion, reinforced by Zhili foreign-rifle companies beyond the passes; Mongol princes of the Eastern Three Leagues were to strike from the north, and he routed the bandits at Dongjingzi near Jinzhou. Intelligence warned that the bandits would storm the Fengtian jail on a set day; he marched to the rescue at top speed. The bandits fell back southeast of the city and laid siege to Fushun; he ordered Brigadier Liu Jingfang to break them in a night attack, and the bandits fled beyond the frontier. He pushed into Jilin; in the spring of the fifth year he lifted the siege of Changchun, pursued the bandits to Chaoyang Slope in Changtu, attacked in three columns, won a dozen engagements, and killed or captured more than three thousand. The chief Ma Shazi, cornered, begged to surrender and was executed by dismemberment; he left troops and funds with General Duxing'a to mop up the remnants. He asked for remission of land tax in silver and grain for Fengtian and an end to shop levies. Back in Beijing he was made minister of personnel. When the Veritable Records of Emperor Xianfeng were completed, his son Xizhi was made a Board secretary.
11
八年,丁母憂,特賜諭祭。 百日假滿,病未出。 天津教案起,力疾還朝。 十年,以吏部尚書協辦大學士。 十一年,拜體仁閣大學士。 文祥自同治初年偕恭親王同心輔政,總理各國事務,以一身負其責。 洋情譸幻,朝論紛紜,一以忠信持之,無諉卸。 洎穆宗親政,臚陳歷年洋務情形,因應機宜甚備,冀有啟悟。 既而恭親王以阻圓明園工程忤旨斥罷,文祥涕泣,偕同列力諫,幾同譴。 恭親王尋復職,而自屢遭挫折後,任事不能如初。 文祥正色立朝,為中外所嚴憚,朝局賴以維持,不致驟變。 十三年,病久不瘉,在告,會日本窺台灣,強出籌戰守。 疏請:「敕下戶部、內務府寬籌餉需,裁減浮用,停不急之工作,謀至急之海防,俾部臣、疆臣皆得專力圖維。 皇上憂勤惕厲,斯內外臣工不敢蹈玩洩之習。 否則狃以為安,不思變計,恐中外解體,人心動搖,其患有不可勝言者。」 言甚切至。
In the eighth year he went into mourning for his mother and received a special edict of condolence sacrifice. When the hundred days of mourning ended he was still too ill to return. When the Tianjin missionary case broke out he forced himself back to court despite his illness. In the tenth year he became associate grand secretary while serving as minister of personnel. In the eleventh year he was made grand secretary of the Titren Pavilion. From the early Tongzhi years Wen Xiang worked in concert with Prince Gong, directed foreign affairs, and carried the weight of that charge largely alone. Foreign affairs were treacherous and court opinion divided; he met them with steadfast loyalty and never shifted blame. When Emperor Tongzhi took personal rule, he laid out in full the course of foreign affairs over the years and the measures suited to each turn of events, hoping to open the emperor's eyes. Soon afterward Prince Gong was dismissed for defying the throne by opposing restoration of the Old Summer Palace. Wen Xiang wept and, with his colleagues, remonstrated so forcefully that he nearly suffered the same punishment. Prince Gong was soon reinstated, but after so many reversals he could no longer work with his former energy. Wen Xiang held himself with stern dignity at court and was deeply respected at home and abroad. The court leaned on him to keep steady and avoid sudden upheaval. In the thirteenth year of Tongzhi, still ill and on leave, he forced himself back to duty when Japan threatened Taiwan and drew up plans for defense. He memorialized: "Order the Board of Revenue and the Imperial Household Department to raise funds generously, cut wasteful spending, suspend nonessential projects, and devote resources to urgent coastal defense, so ministers and provincial governors can focus on keeping the realm intact. If Your Majesty remains anxious, diligent, and vigilant, officials at court and in the provinces will not lapse into complacency. Otherwise, taking false comfort and refusing to change course, the empire may come apart and popular loyalty may waver—with consequences too grave to describe." His language was urgent and uncompromising.
12
是年冬,穆宗崩,德宗繼統即位,晉武英殿大學士。 以久病請罷,溫詔慰留,解諸兼職,專任軍機大臣及總理各國事務。 時國家漸多故,文祥深憂之,密陳大計疏曰:「洋人為患中國,愈久愈深,而其窺伺中國之間,亦愈熟愈密。 從前屢戰屢和,迄無定局,因在事諸臣操縱未宜。 及庚申定約,設立衙門專司其事,以至於今,未見決裂。 就事論事,固當相機盡心辦理,而揣洋人之用心,求馭外之大本,則不繫於此,所繫者在人心而已矣。 溯自嘉慶年間,洋人漸形強悍,始而海島,繼而口岸,再及內地,蓄力厲精習機器,以待中國之間,一逞其欲。 道光年間,肆掠江、浙,自江寧換約以後,覬覦觀望。 直至粵匪滋事,以為中國有此犯上作亂之事,人心不一,得其間矣。 於是其謀遂洩,闖入津門,雖經小挫,而其意愈堅,致有庚申之警。 然其時勢局固危,民心未二,勤王之師雖非勁旅,而聞警偕來; 奸細之徒雖被誘脅,而公憤同具,以是得受羈縻,成此和局。 十餘年來,仰賴皇太后、皇上勵精圖治,宵旰勤勞,無間隙之可尋; 在事諸臣始得遇事維持,未至啟釁,偶有乾求,尚能往返爭持,不至太甚,非洋務之順手,及在事者折沖之力,皆我皇太后、皇上朝乾夕惕,事事期符民隱,人心固結,有以折外族之心,而杜未形之患也。 然而各國火器技藝之講求益進,彼此相結之勢益固。 使臣久駐京師,聞我一政之當則憂,一或不當則喜,其探測愈精。 俄人逼於西疆,法人計佔越南,緊接滇、粵,英人謀由印度入藏及蜀,蠢蠢欲動之勢,益不可遏。 所伺者中國之間耳,所惎者中國大本之未搖,而人心之難違耳。 說者謂各國性近犬羊,未知政治,然其國中偶有動作,必由其國主付上議院議之,所謂謀及卿士也; 付下議院議之,所謂謀及庶人也。 議之可行則行,否則止,事事必合乎民情而後決然行之。 自治其國以此,其觀他國之廢興成敗亦以此。 儻其國一切政治皆與民情相背,則各國始逞所欲為,取之恐後矣。 如土耳其、希臘等國,勢極弱小,而得以久存各大國之間者,其人心固也。 強大如法國,而德國得以勝之者,以法王窮侈任性,負國債之多不可復計,雖日益額餉以要結兵心,而民心已去,始有以乘其間也。 夫人必自侮而後人侮之,物必先自腐而後蟲生焉。 理之所在,勢所必至。 中國之有外國,猶人身之有疾病,病者必相證用藥,而培元氣為尤要。 外國無日不察我民心之向背,中國必求無事不愜於民心之是非。 中國天澤分嚴,外國上議院、下議院之設,勢有難行,而義可採取。 凡我用人行政,一舉一動,揆之至理,度之民情,非人心所共愜,則急止勿為; 事係人心所共快,則務期於成。 崇節儉以裕帑需,遇事始能有備,納諫諍以開言路,下情藉以上通。 總期人心永結,大本永固,當各外國環伺之時,而使之無一間可乘,庶彼謀不能即遂,而在我亦堪自立。 此為目前猶可及之計,亦為此時不能稍緩之圖。 若待其間之既開,而欲為斡旋補苴之法,則和與戰俱不可恃。 即使仍可苟安,而大局已不堪復問,則何如預防其間之為計也。 咸豐六年王茂廕奏陳夷務,謂:'海外諸國日起爭雄,自人視之,雖有中外之分,自天視之,殆無彼此之意。' 引書言'皇天無親,惟德是輔',及大學平天下章三言得失,首人心、次天命、而終以君心為證。 何其言之危且切歟! 欲戢夷心,莫要於順民心,能順民心,斯足以承天心,固不待蓍蔡而昭然若睹耳。 臣受恩最重,辦理洋務最久,實有見於洋人居心積慮之處,而現時尤為迫切緊要之關。 外國之求間在此,中國之彌間亦在此。 在事諸臣,僅謀其末,我皇上實操其本。 用敢直陳,伏乞俯鑑芻言,將此摺時置左右,力求端本之治,以回隱患之萌。 天下幸甚!」
That winter Emperor Tongzhi died and Emperor Guangxu ascended the throne; Wen Xiang was promoted to grand secretary of the Hall of Literary Glory. He asked to retire on account of chronic illness; a gracious edict kept him in service, stripped him of other concurrent posts, and left him solely as grand councilor and head of foreign affairs at the Zongli Yamen. As troubles multiplied, Wen Xiang grew deeply alarmed and submitted a secret memorial on grand strategy: "The foreign menace to China grows deeper with time, and their search for openings in China grows ever more practiced and relentless. For years we fought and made peace by turns without ever reaching a stable settlement, because those in charge mishandled affairs. After the treaties of the 1860 crisis and the founding of a dedicated office for foreign affairs, relations have held—so far without open rupture. Day-to-day business must still be handled conscientiously as circumstances allow; but if we read foreign intentions and seek the true foundation for managing them, that foundation lies not in procedure but in the hearts of the people. Since the Jiaqing reign foreigners have grown steadily bolder—first on offshore islands, then at treaty ports, then inland—training troops, mastering machinery, and waiting for a crack in China through which to press their ambitions. Under Daoguang they ravaged the lower Yangzi; after the Nanjing treaty they watched and waited for their chance. When the Taiping rebellion broke out they judged that China was torn by rebellion and divided in loyalty—and that their opening had come. Their designs then came into the open: they forced the Tianjin approaches, and though checked briefly, pressed on until the crisis of 1860. The situation was dire, yet the people had not turned against the throne; relief armies were not elite troops, but they rallied when the alarm sounded; and though spies were suborned, public outrage was united. On that basis the court was able to accept restraint and secure the present peace. For more than a decade the realm has relied on the empress dowager and Your Majesty ruling with tireless diligence, leaving no opening for exploit; so that officials handling foreign affairs could hold the line, avoid provocation, and even push back on unreasonable demands. That is not because foreign policy has gone smoothly or because negotiators have been unusually skillful, but because Your Majesty and the empress dowager have ruled with constant vigilance, aligned policy with the people's wishes, and kept popular loyalty firm—thereby restraining foreign ambition and heading off dangers before they appear. Yet every power advances further in arms and technology, and their alliances grow tighter. Envoys long resident in Beijing rejoice when we misstep and worry when we govern well; their scrutiny grows ever sharper. Russia presses the western frontier; France schemes at Vietnam on Yunnan and Guangdong's border; Britain eyes Tibet and Sichuan from India. Restless aggression grows harder to contain by the day. They wait only for an opening in China; what restrains them is that the dynasty's foundation has not yet shaken and that the people's will cannot easily be defied. Some dismiss the powers as barbarous and ignorant of government; yet when their rulers act, they refer matters to the upper house—what the classics call consulting the high ministers; and to the lower house—consulting the common people. What passes deliberation they enact; what fails they drop. Nothing is done until it aligns with popular sentiment. They govern themselves by this standard, and they judge other nations' rise and fall by it as well. When a state's policies run against its people, the powers rush to exploit it, each fearing to arrive too late. Turkey and Greece are very weak yet endure among the great powers because their peoples remain united. France was mighty, yet Germany defeated it because the French king lived in ruinous luxury, piled up unpayable debt, and tried to buy the army with ever higher pay while losing the people—giving Germany its opening. Only those who despise themselves are despised by others; only what rots from within breeds worms. Such is the logic of events; such is what must follow. Foreign powers afflicting China are like disease afflicting the body: symptoms must be treated, but strengthening the body's vital force matters most. Foreigners watch daily whether the people stand with or against the throne; China must ensure that nothing we do offends popular judgment of right and wrong. China's hierarchy of imperial grace is strict; we cannot simply copy foreign parliaments, but we can adopt their underlying principle. In appointing officials and governing, every act should be weighed against principle and popular sentiment; what the people cannot accept should be stopped at once; and what the people wholeheartedly support should be carried through to success. Practice frugality to fill the treasury and prepare for emergencies; welcome remonstrance to open channels so grievances from below reach the throne. Keep popular loyalty firm and the dynasty's foundation secure, so that while foreign powers circle they find no opening—their designs may fail, and China may still stand on its own. This is a course still within reach—and one that brooks no delay. Once the opening appears, neither negotiation nor war can be relied on. Even temporary safety would leave the larger situation beyond repair. How much better to prevent the opening before it comes. In the sixth year of Xianfeng Wang Maoyin memorialized on foreign affairs, saying: 'Overseas powers contend daily for dominance; men see a line between China and abroad, but Heaven may see no such distinction.' He quoted the Classic—'High Heaven has no favorites; it aids only the virtuous'—and the Great Learning on ordering the realm, which three times names the sources of success and failure: first the people's hearts, then Heaven's mandate, and finally the ruler's own heart as proof. How grave and urgent his warning was! To quiet foreign ambition, nothing matters more than winning the people's hearts; win the people and you win Heaven's favor—no divination needed to see that truth. I have received the deepest favor and handled foreign affairs longer than any other minister; I have seen where foreigners scheme, and I know this moment is the critical hinge. Foreigners seek their opening here; China must close it here. Officials in charge can manage only details; Your Majesty holds the root in his own hands. I therefore speak plainly and beg Your Majesty to heed these humble words, keep this memorial close at hand, and pursue government that heals the root—before hidden dangers take hold. The realm would be blessed indeed!"
13
先是,當台灣事平,文祥即偕恭親王議興海防,條上六事:曰練兵,曰簡器,曰造船,曰籌餉,曰用人,曰持久。 各具條目,敕下中外大臣會議。 至光緒二年,疆臣覆奏,將復下廷議。 文祥已病不能出,自知且不起,乃密疏上曰:「馭外之端,為國家第一要務。 現籌自強之計,為安危全局一大關鍵。 臣衰病侵尋,心長智短,知不能永效犬馬以報主知。 恐一旦填溝壑,則平生欲言未言之隱,無以上達宸聰,下資會議,何以對陛下? 此心耿耿,有非總理衙門原奏所能盡者,敢竭誠吐赤,為我皇上敬陳之。 夫敵國外患,無代無之,然未有如今日之局之奇、患之深、為我敵者之多且狡也。 果因此患而衡慮困心,自立不敗,原足作我精神,惺我心志,厲我志氣,所謂生於憂患者正在於此。 至此而復因循洩沓; 一聽諸數而莫為之籌,即偶一籌念而移時輒忘,或有名無實,大局將不堪設想,而其幾不待智者而決矣。 從前夷患之熾,由於中外之情相隔,和戰之見無定,疆吏又遇事粉飾,其情形不能上達於朝廷。 坐是三失,而其患遂日久日深,無所底止。 泰西各國官商一氣,政教並行,各商舶遠涉重洋,初至中華,處處受我侮抑,事事被我阻塞,其情鬱而不能不發者,勢也。 繼而見中國官之阻之者可以通,抑之者可以伸,必不可破之格,或取勝於兵力之相迫而卒無不破,此中國之為所輕而各國漸敢恣肆之機也。 迨至立約通商已有成議,而內無深知洋務之大臣,在外無究心撫馭之疆吏,一切奏牘之陳,類多敷衍諱飾。 敵人方桀驁而稱為恭順,洋情方怨毒而號為懽忭,遂至激成事端,忽和忽戰; 甚且彼省之和局甫成,此省之戰事又起,賠款朝給,捷書暮陳。 乘遭風之船以為勝仗,執送信之酋以為擒渠,果至兩軍相交,仍復一敗不可收拾。 於是夷情愈驕,約款愈肆,中外大臣皆視辦理洋務為畏途,而庚申釁起,幾至無可措手。 自設立總理衙門,其事始有責成,情形漸能熟悉,在事諸臣亦無敢推諉。 然其事非在事諸臣之事,而國家切要之事也。 既為國家切要之事,則凡為大清臣子者,無人不應一心謀畫,以維大局。 況和局之本在自強,自強之要在武備,亦非總理衙門所能操其權盡其用也。 使武備果有實際,則於外族要求之端,持之易力,在彼有顧忌,覦覬亦可潛消,事不盡屬總理衙門,而無事不息息相關也。 乃十數年來,遇有重大之端,安危呼吸之際,事外諸臣以袖手為得計; 事甫就緒,異議復生,或轉託於成事不說; 不問事之難易情形若何,一歸咎於任事之人。 是從前之誤以無專責而仔肩乏人,今日之事又以有專屬而藉口有自。 設在事諸臣亦同存此心,爭相諉謝,必至如唐臣杜甫詩中所謂'獨使至尊憂社稷'矣。 夫能戰始能守,能守始能和,宜人人知之。 今日之敵,非得其所長,斷難與抗,稍識時務者,亦詎勿知? 乃至緊要關鍵,意見頓相背,往往陳義甚高,鄙洋務為不足言,抑或苟安為計,覺和局之深可恃。 是以歷來練兵、造船、習器、天文、算學諸事,每興一議而阻之者多,即就一事而為之者非其實。 至於無成,則不咎其阻撓之故,而責創議之人; 甚至局外紛紛論說,以國家經營自立之計,而指為敷衍洋人。 所見之誤,竟至於此! 今日本擾台之役業經議結,日本尚非法、英、俄、美之比,此事本屬無名之師,已幾幾震動全局,費盡筆爭舌戰,始就範圍。 若泰西強大各國環而相伺,得中國一無理之端,藉為名義,構兵而來,更不知如何要挾,如何挽回? 言念及此,真有食不下嚥者,則自強之計尚可須臾緩哉? 此總理衙門奏請飭令會議諸條,實為緊要關係,不可不及早切實籌辦者也。 今計各疆吏遵旨籌議,指日將依限上陳,如飭下廷議,非向來會議事件可比,應由各王大臣期定數日,詳細籌商,將事之本末始終,一律貫澈,利害之輕重,條議之行止,辦法切實,折中定見,無蹈從前會議故習。 如今日議之行之,而異日不能同心堅持,則不如不辦。 如事雖議行,而名是實非,徒為開銷帑需,增益各省人員差使名目,亦不如不辦。 度勢揆時,料敵審己,實有萬萬不能不辦之勢,亦實有萬萬不可再誤之機。 一誤即不能復更,不辦即不堪設想。 總理衙門摺內所謂'必須上下一心,內外一心,局中局外一心,且歷久永遠一心',即此意也。 而大本所在,尤望我皇上切念而健行之。 總理衙門承辦之事,能否維持,全視實力之能否深恃。 必確有可戰可守之實,庶可握不戰之勝。 惟我皇上念茲在茲,則在事諸臣之苦心,自能上邀宸鑑。 凡百臣工亦人人有求知此事共籌此事之心,其才識智力必有百倍於臣者。 否則支持既難,變更不免,變而復合,痛心之端,必且百倍今日,非臣之所忍言矣。」 疏上,未幾卒。 溫詔賜卹,稱其「清正持躬,精詳謀國,忠純亮直,誠懇公明,為國家股肱心膂之臣」,贈太傅,予騎都尉世職,入祀賢良祠,賜銀三千兩治喪,遣貝勒載澂奠醊,諡文忠,歸葬盛京,命將軍崇實往賜祭。 十五年,皇太后歸政,追念前勞,賜祭一壇。
Earlier, when the Taiwan crisis ended, Wen Xiang and Prince Gong had proposed coastal defense in six points: train troops, improve arms, build ships, raise funds, appoint the right men, and sustain the effort over time. Each point was spelled out in detail, and an edict ordered court and provincial officials to deliberate. By the second year of Guangxu the governors had reported back, and the proposals were to go before the court again. Wen Xiang was too ill to leave his house and knew he would not recover. He submitted a secret memorial: "Managing foreign powers is the state's foremost duty. The self-strengthening program now under discussion is the key to the empire's survival. My strength fails and my wits grow short; I know I cannot long serve as Your Majesty's loyal hound. If I should die, the truths I have kept silent will never reach Your Majesty's ear or inform the coming deliberations. How could I face you then? My loyal heart holds more than the Zongli Yamen's original memorial could say; I offer these words in full sincerity for Your Majesty. Every age has foreign enemies, but never a situation as strange, a peril as deep, or foes as numerous and cunning as today. If we meet this peril with sober resolve and stand firm, it can rouse our spirit, awaken our minds, and steel our will—this is what the sages meant by strength born of adversity. Yet if at this point we lapse into delay and negligence; if we leave matters to drift, forget plans as soon as they are made, or pursue empty forms without substance, the consequences are unthinkable—and the outcome needs no sage to predict. Past foreign crises grew fierce because court and provinces were estranged, policy swung between peace and war without settled principle, and frontier officials whitewashed reports so the throne never learned the truth. These three failures fed one another, and the trouble deepened day by day without end. Western states unite officials and merchants, church and state. Their traders crossed the oceans to China and everywhere met insult and obstruction; resentment had to break out—that was the logic of events. They then learned that every Chinese barrier could be forced open, every prohibition reversed, every 'iron rule' broken—often by the threat of arms. That was when they began to despise China and grow bold. Treaties were signed and trade opened, yet at court no minister truly understood foreign affairs, and in the provinces no governor devoted himself to managing them. Memorials were mostly evasive and cosmetic. Enemies were called obedient while still defiant; foreign resentment was reported as goodwill—until crises erupted and policy lurched between peace and war; peace might be signed in one province while fighting broke out in another; indemnities were paid by day and false victory reports filed by night. A storm-struck ship was claimed as a great victory; a messenger was hailed as a captured enemy chief—yet when armies actually clashed, defeat was total. Foreign arrogance and treaty demands grew worse; ministers at court and in the provinces alike dreaded foreign affairs—until the 1860 crisis left the government almost helpless. After the Zongli Yamen was founded, responsibility was clear, officials grew familiar with foreign affairs, and those in charge could no longer pass the buck. Yet foreign affairs are not the private business of a few officials—they are vital to the state itself. If they are vital to the state, every subject of the Qing ought to devote himself to preserving the larger order. Moreover, lasting peace rests on self-strengthening, and self-strengthening rests on real military power—matters the Zongli Yamen cannot control or carry out alone. With real armed strength, foreign demands can be resisted more effectively, rivals will hesitate, and covetous designs may fade—though not every matter falls to the Yamen, nothing is unrelated to it. Yet for more than a decade, whenever crisis struck and the realm hung in the balance, officials outside the foreign-affairs circle treated standing aside as the wise course; and when a settlement neared, dissent revived, or critics invoked the proverb that victors need not explain themselves; without regard for difficulty or circumstance, blaming only those who bore responsibility. Once the fault was that no one was clearly in charge; now the fault is that a dedicated office gives everyone else an excuse to shift blame. If those in charge shared that attitude and shirked together, we would arrive at Du Fu's lament: 'Only the Son of Heaven is left to worry for the realm.' Only those who can fight can hold; only those who can hold can make peace. That should be common knowledge. Today's foes cannot be resisted without mastering their own strengths. Whoever understands the times knows that. Yet at the decisive moment opinions divide: some speak in lofty moral terms and dismiss foreign affairs as beneath discussion; others seek a false peace and trust too deeply in the present settlement. Hence every proposal to train troops, build ships, study arms, astronomy, or mathematics has met heavy obstruction; even when approved, execution has often been hollow. When projects failed, critics blamed not those who blocked them but those who proposed them; and outsiders even denounced the state's plans for self-reliance as groveling to foreigners. Judgment had sunk to that depth! Japan's raid on Taiwan has only just been settled—and Japan is not yet in the class of France, Britain, Russia, or America. That unjust war nearly shook the entire realm; only after exhausting debate was it contained. If the great Western powers, watching from every side, seized one unreasonable pretext to make war, who knows what demands they would impose or how we could recover? The thought alone is enough to choke one's appetite. Can self-strengthening wait another moment? The items the Zongli Yamen asks the court to deliberate are urgently important and must be planned and implemented without delay. Provincial governors will soon report as ordered. If the matter goes to court, it is unlike ordinary conferences: the princes and senior ministers should set aside several days to deliberate thoroughly, trace each proposal from start to finish, weigh costs and benefits, decide what to adopt or drop, settle on practical methods, and not repeat the empty rituals of past meetings. If we adopt plans today but cannot sustain them with united resolve tomorrow, we had better not begin at all. If measures are adopted in name only, wasting treasury funds and multiplying empty posts across the provinces, it would be better not to act at all. Read the trends, judge the moment, weigh the enemy against ourselves: there is an overwhelming necessity to act, and an equally overwhelming need not to miss our chance again. One mistake cannot be undone; failure to act is unthinkable. The Zongli Yamen memorial's demand that "the court and provinces, the capital and the provinces, those inside and outside the Yamen, must all be of one mind—and remain so for the long term" expresses exactly this. The foundation lies here above all; I earnestly pray that Your Majesty will keep this close at heart and pursue it with vigor. Whether the Yamen's work can be sustained depends entirely on whether we can build strength deep enough to rely on. Only with real capacity to fight and to hold ground can we secure victory without war. If Your Majesty keeps this always in mind, the devoted labor of those charged with these affairs will surely win the imperial eye. Every official will then bring his mind to learning and planning together; many will surely surpass this humble servant a hundredfold in talent and judgment. Otherwise support will fail, change will become inevitable, and after disruption and forced reversal the anguish will surely exceed today's a hundredfold—more than I can bring myself to say." The memorial was submitted; before long he died. A warm edict granted condolences, praising him as "upright in conduct, meticulous in statecraft, loyal and pure, bright and straightforward, sincere and fair—a pillar of the realm." He was posthumously made Grand Tutor, granted a hereditary Captain of Cavalry, inducted into the Shrine of Worthies, given three thousand taels for the funeral, and libations were offered by Prince Zaicheng. He received the posthumous title Wenhong, was buried in Mukden, and General Chong Shi was sent to perform the sacrifice. In the fifteenth year, when the Empress Dowager resumed power, she recalled his earlier service and granted one altar of sacrifice.
14
文祥忠勤,為中興樞臣之冠。 清操絕人,家如寒素。 謀國深遠,當新疆軍事漸定,與俄國議交還伊犁,大學士左宗棠引以自任,文祥力主之,奏請專任。 文祥既歿,後乃遣侍郎崇厚赴俄國,為所迫脅,擅允條款,朝論譁然。 譴罪崇厚,易以曾紀澤往,久之乃定議,倖免大釁。 法越事起,和戰屢更,以海防疏,不能大創敵,遷就結局。 及興海軍,未能竭全力以成之,卒挫於日本。 皆如文祥所慮,而朝局數變,日以多事矣。 子熙治,以員外郎襲騎都尉世職。
Wen Xiang was loyal and diligent—the foremost Grand Councilor of the restoration era. His integrity was unmatched; his household lived as plainly as a poor scholar's. He planned for the state with far sight. When Xinjiang was nearly pacified and Russia was to return Ili, Grand Secretary Zuo Zongtang took the mission on himself; Wen Xiang strongly backed him and memorialized that Zuo be given sole charge. After Wen Xiang's death, Vice Minister Chonghou was sent to Russia, was coerced into terms, and assented on his own authority—throwing the court into uproar. Chonghou was punished and replaced by Zeng Jize; only after long negotiation was a settlement reached, narrowly averting a major rupture. When the Franco-Vietnamese crisis erupted, policy swung between peace and war; coastal defenses proved too weak for a decisive blow, and the court settled for compromise. When the navy was built up, the state could not commit its full strength; in the end it was shattered by Japan. All unfolded as Wen Xiang had feared, while the court shifted from crisis to crisis and daily grew more burdened. His son Xizhi inherited the hereditary Captain of Cavalry while serving as an outer-court secretary.
15
寶鋆,字佩蘅,索綽絡氏,滿洲鑲白旗人,世居吉林。 道光十八年進士,授禮部主事,擢中允。 三遷侍讀學士。 咸豐二年,粵匪竄兩湖,寶鋆疏請鄰近諸省力行堅壁清野之策。 四年,命往三音諾顏部賜奠,謝絕餽贐,外籓敬之。 擢內閣學士。 五年,遷禮部侍郎,兼正紅旗蒙古副都統,調戶部。 八年,典浙江鄉試,以廣額加中官生一名,坐違制,鐫一級留任,文宗諭「寶鋆素以果敢自命,亦同瞻徇」,特嚴斥焉。
Bao Yun, whose style was Peiheng, belonged to the Suochuoluo clan of the Manchu Bordered White Banner; his family had long lived in Jilin. He passed the jinshi examination in 1838, was appointed a secretary in the Board of Rites, and was promoted to middle attendant. He rose through three postings to reader-in-waiting of the Hanlin Academy. In 1852, when Cantonese rebels swept into Hunan and Hubei, Bao Yun memorialized urging neighboring provinces to enforce fortify-and-clear tactics. In 1854 he was sent to the Sain Noyan Khan league to offer condolences, refused all gifts, and won the respect of the frontier princes. He was promoted to grand secretary of the Grand Secretariat. In 1855 he became Vice Minister of Rites, concurrently Mongol vice commander of the Plain Red Banner, and was transferred to the Board of Revenue. In 1858 he presided over the Zhejiang provincial examination; for expanding the quota and adding an official graduate he was found in violation, demoted one grade but kept in office. Emperor Xianfeng issued an edict, "Bao Yun has always styled himself bold and decisive, yet shares in favoritism," and rebuked him sharply.
16
十年,命赴天津驗收海運漕糧,复赴通州察視,迭疏請定杜弊章程,並劾監督貽誤,如所請行。 任總管內務府大臣,署理戶部三庫事務,會辦京城巡防。 時英法聯軍內犯,車駕幸熱河,既至,命提庫帑二十萬兩修葺行宮。 寶鋆以國用方亟,持不可。 上怒,欲加嚴譴,會所管三山被掠,詔切責,降五品頂戴。 踰月後,以巡防勞勚,復之,兼鑲紅旗護軍統領,复兼署正紅旗漢軍都統、左翼前鋒統領。 十一年,文宗崩於行在。 十月,穆宗回京,命在軍機大臣上行走,並充總理各國事務大臣。
In 1860 he was sent to Tianjin to inspect sea-transport tribute grain, then to Tongzhou to review the route. He repeatedly memorialized for rules against abuse and impeached negligent supervisors; the court adopted his proposals. He served as supervising minister of the Imperial Household, acting manager of the Board of Revenue's three treasuries, and joint commissioner for the capital's patrol defense. When the Anglo-French allies invaded, the court fled to Rehe and ordered two hundred thousand taels from the treasury to repair the traveling palace. Bao Yun argued that state finances were desperately strained and opposed the expenditure. The emperor was furious and nearly punished him severely; when the three imperial parks under his charge were looted, an edict sharply rebuked him and reduced his rank button to the fifth grade. After a month his rank was restored for his work on patrol defense; he was also made guard commander of the Bordered Red Banner and concurrently acting commander of the Plain Red Banner Han Army and the Left Vanguard. In 1861 Emperor Xianfeng died at the Rehe traveling palace. In the tenth month Emperor Tongzhi returned to Beijing; Bao Yun was appointed to the Grand Council and made a minister of the Zongli Yamen.
17
同治元年,擢戶部尚書。 二年,奏劾壽莊公主府首領太監張玉蒼出言無狀,嚴旨逮訊,玉蒼治如律。 三年,命大臣輪班進講治平寶鑑,寶鋆與焉。 江寧克復,以翊贊功,加太子少保,賜花翎。 四年,命佩帶內務府印鑰。 尋以樞務事繁,請解內務府大臣職,允之。 自設立總理各國事務衙門,始求通知外國語言文字,置同文館,肄習西學,廷臣每以為非。 六年,都察院代奏職員楊廷熙上書請撤同文館,語涉恭親王及寶鋆等專擅挾持,於是寶鋆偕恭親王請罷直候查辦,溫詔慰留,勉以不避嫌怨,勿因浮言推諉。 七年,直東捻匪肅清,加軍功二級。 十一年,調吏部。 穆宗大婚禮成,加太子太保。 十二年,兼翰林院掌院學士,以吏部尚書協辦大學士。 尋調兵部,拜體仁閣大學士,管理吏部。 光緒三年,晉武英殿大學士。 四年,回疆肅清,被優敘。
In 1862 he was promoted to Minister of Revenue. In 1863 he impeached Zhang Yucang, chief eunuch of Princess Shouzhuang's household, for insolent speech; the court ordered his arrest, and Zhang was punished by law. In 1864 senior ministers were ordered to lecture in rotation on the Records of Governance and Tranquility; Bao Yun was among them. When Nanjing was recovered, he was made Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent and granted the peacock feather for his supporting role. In 1865 he was entrusted with the seal of the Imperial Household Department. Soon afterward, citing the press of Grand Council business, he asked to resign from the Imperial Household; the request was granted. After the Zongli Yamen was founded, the court sought knowledge of foreign languages, established the Tongwen Guan, and began Western studies—measures many courtiers opposed. In 1867 Yang Tingxi, a substitute censorate clerk, memorialized to abolish the Tongwen Guan and accused Prince Gong, Bao Yun, and others of monopolizing power. Bao Yun and Prince Gong asked to resign pending investigation; a warm edict kept them in office and urged them not to shrink from criticism or defer to rumor. In 1868, when the Nian rebels of Zhili and Shandong were suppressed, he was granted two grades of military merit. In 1872 he was transferred to the Board of Civil Office. When Emperor Tongzhi's wedding was completed, he was made Grand Guardian of the Heir Apparent. In 1873 he became concurrently chancellor of the Hanlin Academy and associate grand secretary while serving as Minister of Civil Office. Soon he moved to the Board of War, was appointed grand secretary of the Tiren Pavilion, and continued to direct the Board of Civil Office. In 1877 he was promoted to grand secretary of the Hall of Martial Eminence. In 1878, when the Muslim frontier was pacified, he received special commendation.
18
寶鋆自同治初年預樞務,偕文祥和衷翊贊,通達政體,知人讓善,恭親王資其襄助,至是朝列漸分門戶。 文祥既歿,議論益紛,編修何金壽因旱災劾樞臣不職,請加訓責,詔斥恭親王、寶鋆等目擊時艱,毫無補救,嚴議革職,加恩改留任。 五年,以題穆宗神主,加太子太傅,復以實錄告成,推恩其子景灃晉秩郎中,侄景星賜舉人。 七年,庶子陳寶琛以星變陳言,專劾寶鋆,請仿漢災異策免三公故事,立予罷斥。 詔曰:「寶鋆在軍機大臣上行走有年,尚無過失。 陳寶琛謂其畏難巧卸,瞻徇情面,亦不能確有所指。 惟既有此奏,自平時與王大臣等議事未能和衷共濟,致啟人言。 該大學士受恩深重,精力尚健,自當恪矢公忠,勉圖報稱,務宜殫精竭慮,力戒因循積習,用副委任。」
From early Tongzhi Bao Yun served on the Grand Council, working in harmony with Wen Xiang. He understood government, knew talent, and yielded to the capable; Prince Gong relied on his support. By now, however, the court was dividing into factions. After Wen Xiang's death, court debate grew fiercer. Compiler He Jinshou, citing drought, impeached the Grand Council for dereliction. An edict rebuked Prince Gong, Bao Yun, and others for witnessing crisis without remedy, ordered their dismissal, then by grace allowed them to remain in office. In 1879, for inscribing Emperor Tongzhi's spirit tablet, he was made Grand Tutor of the Heir Apparent; when the Veritable Records were completed, his son Jingfeng was promoted to director and his nephew Jingxing was granted licentiate status. In 1881 Sub-Reader Chen Baochen, citing a celestial omen, impeached Bao Yun alone and asked that he be dismissed at once, following the Han precedent of removing the three highest ministers after calamitous signs. An edict said: "Bao Yun has served on the Grand Council for many years without fault. Chen Baochen accuses him of shirking hard tasks and showing favoritism, yet cannot point to anything specific. Yet because this memorial was submitted, he must have failed in ordinary deliberations with the princes and senior ministers to work in harmony, inviting gossip. This grand secretary has received deep favor and still has his strength; he should devote himself to public duty, repay the throne, work with full energy, break free of routine habits, and fulfill his charge."
19
十年三月,軍機大臣自恭親王以下同日斥罷,詔:「寶鋆入直最久,責備宜嚴,姑念年老,特錄前勞,全其末路,以原品休致。」 十二年,皇太后懿旨加恩,改以大學士致仕,賞食半俸。 寶鋆退休後,時偕恭親王居西山遊覽唱和。 年逾八十,恩賚猶及。 十七年,卒。 遺疏入,詔褒其「忠清亮直,練達老成」,贈太保,祀賢良祠,擢子景灃四品京堂,賜孫廕桓舉人,遣貝勒載瀅奠醊,飾終之典,視在位無所減,諡文靖。
In the third month of 1884 the Grand Councilors from Prince Gong down were dismissed on the same day. An edict said: "Bao Yun has served longest in the Council and deserves the sternest rebuke; yet considering his age, his past service is recorded and he is allowed to retire at his original rank." In 1886 the Empress Dowager graciously raised his status to retirement as grand secretary and granted half salary. After retirement Bao Yun often joined Prince Gong on the Western Hills, sightseeing and exchanging poetry. Past eighty, he still received imperial gifts. In 1891 he died. When his death memorial arrived, an edict praised him as "loyal and pure, bright and seasoned." He was posthumously made Grand Mentor, enshrined in the Shrine of Worthies, his son Jingfeng was promoted to Fourth Rank Capital Bureau, and his grandson Yin Huan was granted licentiate status. Prince Zaiying offered libations; the funeral honors were no less than if he had still held office. He received the posthumous title Wenjing.
20
子景灃,官至廣州將軍,卒,諡誠慎。
His son Jingfeng rose to general of Guangzhou; after his death he received the posthumous title Chengshen.
21
孫廕桓,光緒二十四年進士,歷官國子監司業,改乾清門頭等侍衛。
His grandson Yin Huan passed the jinshi in 1898, served as vice director of the Imperial Academy, and was later appointed first-rank attendant of the Gate of Heavenly Purity.
22
論曰:咸、同之間,內憂外患,岌岌不可終日。 文慶倡言重用漢臣,俾曾國籓、胡林翼等得展經猷,以建中興之業,其功甚偉。 文祥、寶鋆襄贊恭親王,和輯邦交,削平寇亂。 文祥尤力任艱鉅,公而忘私,為中外所倚賴,而朝議未一,猶不能盡其規略; 晚年密陳大計,於數十年馭外得失,洞如觀火,一代興亡之龜鑑也。 寶鋆明達同之,貞毅不及,遂無以鎮紛囂而持國是。 如文祥者,洵社稷臣哉!
The historian comments: Between the Xianfeng and Tongzhi reigns, domestic turmoil and foreign threat made each day seem the dynasty's last. Wen Qing urged employing Han officials, enabling Zeng Guofan, Hu Linyi, and others to carry out their strategies and build the restoration—an achievement of great weight. Wen Xiang and Bao Yun assisted Prince Gong in smoothing foreign relations and suppressing rebellion. Wen Xiang above all shouldered the hardest burdens, putting the public good before private interest, and was trusted at home and abroad—yet because court opinion was divided, he could not fully carry out his designs; In his last years he secretly laid out the great design; on decades of success and failure in dealing with foreign powers he saw as clearly as fire in daylight—a mirror of the dynasty's fate. Bao Yun was equally clear-sighted but lacked his moral firmness; he could not still the clamor or hold the national course steady. Men like Wen Xiang were truly pillars of the state!