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卷386 列傳一百七十三 文庆 文祥 宝鋆

Volume 386 Biographies 173: Wen Qing, Wen Xiang, Bao Yun

Chapter 386 of 清史稿 · Draft History of Qing
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1
滿 使 西使 西 調
Wen Qing, whose style was Kongxiu, belonged to the Feimo clan and came from the Manchu Bordered Red Banner; he was a grandson of Yongbao, who had served as governor-general of Guangdong and Guangxi. He received his jinshi degree in the second year of the Daoguang reign, entered the Hanlin Academy as a bachelor, and was appointed a Compiler. After five promotions he rose to Grand Mentor of the Heir Apparent. He went on to serve as commissioner of the Transmission Office, left vice censor-in-chief, and a grand secretary of the Grand Secretariat. In the twelfth year of the reign he was made vice minister of rites and concurrently vice banner commander. In the thirteenth year he directed the mourning ceremonies for Empress Xiaoshen. In a joint memorial setting out the periods for military and civilian tonsure and for suspending banquets, he wrongly cited the lines that the people mourned as for a father and mother and that music was stilled throughout the realm—language appropriate to an emperor's death, not an empress's. The case was sent to the ministers for severe review. Emperor Daoguang held that Wen Qing, as a Hanlin graduate, had merely echoed others; Wen Qing alone received a heavy penalty—loss of his vice banner command and demotion to third-rank insignia. He was soon restored and served in turn as vice minister of personnel and of revenue. In the sixteenth year he joined Minister Tang Jinzhao on an investigative tour of Shaanxi and Sichuan to impeach Governor Yang Mingyang and provincial administration commissioner Li Yiwen; both cases went to strict review. When the inquiry into denunciations against Yang was reopened, Wen Qing himself was dismissed. Tang Jinzhao stayed on to administer the Shaanxi governorship. Wen Qing also looked into corruption charges against Zhao Mingyi, magistrate of Wuzhi in Henan, and secured his removal from office. He was transferred to the vice ministry of revenue. In the seventeenth year he was assigned to train under the Grand Council and walk in attendance there, while also commanding the Right Wing. He was sent to Rehe with Commander-in-chief Qi Ying to audit successive superintendents who had shorted the treasury; the guilty were dismissed and made to repay. In the nineteenth year the penalties proposed in the Rehe deficit case were found unclear; summoned to audience, he answered untruthfully, the matter went to ministerial review, and he was removed from the Grand Council. In the twentieth year he served as chief examiner for the Jiangnan provincial tests; errors in the Upper and Lower Jiang quota, together with his smuggling the Hunan graduate Xiong Shaomu into the hall to mark papers, led to a recommendation for dismissal.
2
In the twenty-second year he received third-class imperial bodyguard rank and was appointed commissioner for affairs at Khüree. In the twenty-third year he was recalled to serve as vice minister of personnel and minister of the Imperial Household, then promoted in quick succession to left censor-in-chief and minister of war. In the twenty-fifth year he was dispatched to Sichuan with the governor-general and regional general to investigate former Tibetan ambans Meng Bao, Zhong Fang, and others for wrongful requisitions of official property; all were impeached and removed. In the twenty-seventh year he was reappointed to the Grand Council and released from the Imperial Household. He soon acted as governor-general of Shaanxi and Gansu; traveling through Henan he was told to inspect famine relief and impeached four magistrates for misconduct and delay.
3
殿
In the twenty-eighth year he was recalled as minister of personnel, concurrently chief of the metropolitan gendarmerie and minister of the Imperial Household; he left the Grand Council while taking on the chancellorship of the Hanlin Academy. In the thirtieth year he became an inner court minister. There was one Xue Zhizhong, from Hezhou in Gansu, who beguiled crowds with charms and spells. In the capital he treated illness by occult means, and many court grandees sought him out. He began to meddle in politics and speak of omens, while keeping his movements secret; patrolling censor Cao Moujian seized him, and a host of ministers inside and outside the capital were drawn in and censured. Wen Qing had once called Xue in to treat him. Emperor Xianfeng rebuked him: as chief of the metropolitan gendarmerie he should have seized Xue immediately; by failing to do so he had neglected his office, and was dismissed. In the first year of Xianfeng he received fifth-rank insignia and supervised construction at the Changling mausoleum. In the second year he was recalled as a grand secretary, soon promoted to minister of revenue, and again made inner court minister and Hanlin chancellor. In the fifth year he returned to the Grand Council as associate grand secretary. After inscribing the spirit tablet for Empress Xiaojing he received the additional title grand mentor of the heir apparent, entered the Wenyuan Grand Secretariat, rose to the Wuying Grand Secretariat, took charge of the Board of Revenue, and became chief tutor in the Upper Study.
4
滿 調
Wen Qing was upright, careful, and mindful of the larger good; both Daoguang and Xianfeng knew him intimately. Though he fell and was restored again and again, imperial trust in him never faded. The empire was beset by troubles; the rebellion in Guangdong burned hot, and imperial commissioners Sai Shanga and Ne'erjing'e were censured one after another for military failures. Wen Qing argued: "We should rely more on Han officials. Most of them rose from the countryside; they know the people's suffering and understand what is real and what is not. How does that compare with us, who have never left the capital and remain blind to the larger plan?" He repeatedly urged in secret memorials that the court set aside Manchu–Han divisions and appoint talent without clinging to seniority and rank. When Zeng Guofan first took the field he lost battle after battle, and jealous rivals worked to hold him down. Wen Qing alone insisted that Guofan commanded public confidence, could destroy the rebels, and would eventually win extraordinary distinction. Having once served with Hu Linyi as chief examiner, he knew Hu's ability well and recommended him again and again in secret; within a year Hu rose from Guizhou circuit intendant to Hubei governor, and every request Wen Qing made on his behalf was approved. He also commended Yuan Jiasan and Luo Bingzhang and asked that they be left in post without transfer so their work could bear fruit. At the Board of Revenue, when Yan Jingming was still a director, Wen Qing took his advice even on matters outside Yan's formal duties. In the end it was through such men that the great rebellion was put down. When Duanhua and Suishun gradually gained power, both respected and feared his stern integrity.
5
In the sixth year he died. His deathbed memorial warned that governors such as Qingduan, Fu Ji, Chong'en, and Yingqi were unfit for their posts and that delay in removing them would endanger the provinces. Emperor Xianfeng mourned him deeply, issued a generous edict of condolence, praised his integrity, depth of mind, diligence, and grasp of statecraft, posthumously made him grand guardian, and granted funds for his funeral. When the emperor came in person to mourn and saw how young the orphans were, he specially ordered Wen Qing enrolled in the Shrine of Worthies and directed his son Shanlian to be presented at court when he came of age; and his younger brother Wenyu, who had been exiled for a crime, was at once released and recalled. He was given the posthumous title Wenduan. Shanlian rose to serve as general at Fuzhou.
6
滿
Wen Xiang, whose style was Bochuan, belonged to the Guwalgiya clan of the Manchu Plain Red Banner; his family had long lived in Mukden. He took his jinshi degree in the twenty-fifth year of Daoguang, entered the Board of Works as a director, and rose step by step to bureau director. In the sixth year of Xianfeng the capital evaluation marked him for provincial promotion, but with aged parents at home he asked to stay in a Beijing office. He served in turn as vice director of the Imperial Stud, grand mentor of the heir apparent, and grand secretary, and acted as vice minister of justice. In the eighth year he joined the Grand Council, became vice minister of rites, then served in turn as vice minister of personnel, revenue, and works, while also commanding a banner vice command and the Left Wing.
7
退調 滿
In the tenth year the Anglo-French allies advanced on Tianjin, and Senggelinqin secretly urged the court to withdraw to Rehe. Wen Xiang argued that flight would unsettle the people, touch the fate of the dynasty, and offer no defensible ground beyond the passes; he strongly opposed the move, spoke with other ministers, and again asked for a private audience; afterward he joined fellow councilors Kuang Yuan and Du Han in a memorial to cancel the mobilized transport and issue a clear edict to reassure the empire. In the eighth month, as the enemy pressed harder, the court fled in haste; Wen Xiang was left as acting chief of the metropolitan gendarmerie to hold Beijing. He joined Prince Gong Yixin in the peace talks, moving in and out of the enemy camps; when unreasonable demands were made, he answered plainly and turned them back with argument. Finding the gendarmerie command too much to combine with his other duties, he asked to be relieved of it and was made acting commander of the Plain Blue Banner garrison. In the tenth month, after peace was concluded, he urged the court to return to Beijing so as to steady public morale. With Prince Gong and others he planned the larger settlement and memorialized on postwar recovery; the Zongli Yamen was then established under Prince Gong with several Manchu and Han ministers, and Wen Xiang shouldered the heaviest share of the work.
8
西
Peace with the foreigners was barely settled; Nian and Taiping rebels still burned; armies were worn out, funds exhausted, and the capital region lay defenseless. Wen Xiang secretly urged that picked Banner troops be drilled and armed with muskets; the Shenji Battalion was founded on this basis, and he was soon put in charge of it. He also reported that Senggelinqin's force was too thin and that Sheng Bao's newly raised men had never been under fire. Because the court relied on Senggelinqin to guard the capital approaches, he needed able generals and seasoned troops as support; Wen Xiang recommended Vice Banner Commander Fuming'a and Brigadier Cheng Ming for his army; and he also commended Shen Baozhen, Jiujiang circuit intendant in Jiangxi, and Liu Rong, a candidate magistrate in Hubei, as men of high promise. The memorial was approved in full.
9
In the eleventh year Emperor Xianfeng died at the Rehe traveling palace; the Tongzhi Emperor succeeded, and Suishun's faction seized power. Wen Xiang asked to leave the Grand Council but was refused. In the tenth month, on the return to Beijing, he joined the princes and ministers in asking that the two empress dowagers rule from behind the curtain. In the first year of Tongzhi he rose in quick succession to left censor-in-chief and minister of works, acted as minister of war, became minister of the Imperial Household, and took a banner command. In the second year he took charge of the Court of Colonial Affairs. As the southeast was pacified step by step and the capitals of Jiangsu and Zhejiang were retaken, rewards for the Grand Council were proposed; he firmly declined. In the third year Nanjing fell and the rebel leader was killed; on news of the victory he received the additional title grand guardian of the heir apparent, and his nephew Kaizhao was made a secretary in the Board. In the fourth year he acted as minister of revenue, resigned from the Imperial Household, and was allowed to do so.
10
調 調 退 調
That autumn mounted bandits broke through Xifeng Pass; Wen Xiang was sent with the Shenji Battalion to guard the Eastern Tombs and direct pursuit; the bandits withdrew toward Luanyang. He memorialized: "Local officials shelter bandits and breed trouble; accumulated abuses must be removed and the roots of banditry cut off. Their strongholds lie chiefly at Bamiancheng in Fengtian's Changtu district, at Bagou Hada in Rehe, and similar places. Hire informants, move troops for surprise arrests, and so destroy them at the root." When the campaign ended he returned to Beijing. When Emperor Xianfeng was laid to rest in the imperial tombs, his son Xilian was made a Board secretary. Soon after, his mother fell ill; he took three months' leave and returned to his banner estate to bring her home. With Fengtian banditry at its height he was ordered out with the Shenji Battalion, reinforced by Zhili foreign-rifle companies beyond the passes; Mongol princes of the Eastern Three Leagues were to strike from the north, and he routed the bandits at Dongjingzi near Jinzhou. Intelligence warned that the bandits would storm the Fengtian jail on a set day; he marched to the rescue at top speed. The bandits fell back southeast of the city and laid siege to Fushun; he ordered Brigadier Liu Jingfang to break them in a night attack, and the bandits fled beyond the frontier. He pushed into Jilin; in the spring of the fifth year he lifted the siege of Changchun, pursued the bandits to Chaoyang Slope in Changtu, attacked in three columns, won a dozen engagements, and killed or captured more than three thousand. The chief Ma Shazi, cornered, begged to surrender and was executed by dismemberment; he left troops and funds with General Duxing'a to mop up the remnants. He asked for remission of land tax in silver and grain for Fengtian and an end to shop levies. Back in Beijing he was made minister of personnel. When the Veritable Records of Emperor Xianfeng were completed, his son Xizhi was made a Board secretary.
11
滿
In the eighth year he went into mourning for his mother and received a special edict of condolence sacrifice. When the hundred days of mourning ended he was still too ill to return. When the Tianjin missionary case broke out he forced himself back to court despite his illness. In the tenth year he became associate grand secretary while serving as minister of personnel. In the eleventh year he was made grand secretary of the Titren Pavilion. From the early Tongzhi years Wen Xiang worked in concert with Prince Gong, directed foreign affairs, and carried the weight of that charge largely alone. Foreign affairs were treacherous and court opinion divided; he met them with steadfast loyalty and never shifted blame. When Emperor Tongzhi took personal rule, he laid out in full the course of foreign affairs over the years and the measures suited to each turn of events, hoping to open the emperor's eyes. Soon afterward Prince Gong was dismissed for defying the throne by opposing restoration of the Old Summer Palace. Wen Xiang wept and, with his colleagues, remonstrated so forcefully that he nearly suffered the same punishment. Prince Gong was soon reinstated, but after so many reversals he could no longer work with his former energy. Wen Xiang held himself with stern dignity at court and was deeply respected at home and abroad. The court leaned on him to keep steady and avoid sudden upheaval. In the thirteenth year of Tongzhi, still ill and on leave, he forced himself back to duty when Japan threatened Taiwan and drew up plans for defense. He memorialized: "Order the Board of Revenue and the Imperial Household Department to raise funds generously, cut wasteful spending, suspend nonessential projects, and devote resources to urgent coastal defense, so ministers and provincial governors can focus on keeping the realm intact. If Your Majesty remains anxious, diligent, and vigilant, officials at court and in the provinces will not lapse into complacency. Otherwise, taking false comfort and refusing to change course, the empire may come apart and popular loyalty may waver—with consequences too grave to describe." His language was urgent and uncompromising.
12
殿 使 西 使 使 '' ''
That winter Emperor Tongzhi died and Emperor Guangxu ascended the throne; Wen Xiang was promoted to grand secretary of the Hall of Literary Glory. He asked to retire on account of chronic illness; a gracious edict kept him in service, stripped him of other concurrent posts, and left him solely as grand councilor and head of foreign affairs at the Zongli Yamen. As troubles multiplied, Wen Xiang grew deeply alarmed and submitted a secret memorial on grand strategy: "The foreign menace to China grows deeper with time, and their search for openings in China grows ever more practiced and relentless. For years we fought and made peace by turns without ever reaching a stable settlement, because those in charge mishandled affairs. After the treaties of the 1860 crisis and the founding of a dedicated office for foreign affairs, relations have held—so far without open rupture. Day-to-day business must still be handled conscientiously as circumstances allow; but if we read foreign intentions and seek the true foundation for managing them, that foundation lies not in procedure but in the hearts of the people. Since the Jiaqing reign foreigners have grown steadily bolder—first on offshore islands, then at treaty ports, then inland—training troops, mastering machinery, and waiting for a crack in China through which to press their ambitions. Under Daoguang they ravaged the lower Yangzi; after the Nanjing treaty they watched and waited for their chance. When the Taiping rebellion broke out they judged that China was torn by rebellion and divided in loyalty—and that their opening had come. Their designs then came into the open: they forced the Tianjin approaches, and though checked briefly, pressed on until the crisis of 1860. The situation was dire, yet the people had not turned against the throne; relief armies were not elite troops, but they rallied when the alarm sounded; and though spies were suborned, public outrage was united. On that basis the court was able to accept restraint and secure the present peace. For more than a decade the realm has relied on the empress dowager and Your Majesty ruling with tireless diligence, leaving no opening for exploit; so that officials handling foreign affairs could hold the line, avoid provocation, and even push back on unreasonable demands. That is not because foreign policy has gone smoothly or because negotiators have been unusually skillful, but because Your Majesty and the empress dowager have ruled with constant vigilance, aligned policy with the people's wishes, and kept popular loyalty firm—thereby restraining foreign ambition and heading off dangers before they appear. Yet every power advances further in arms and technology, and their alliances grow tighter. Envoys long resident in Beijing rejoice when we misstep and worry when we govern well; their scrutiny grows ever sharper. Russia presses the western frontier; France schemes at Vietnam on Yunnan and Guangdong's border; Britain eyes Tibet and Sichuan from India. Restless aggression grows harder to contain by the day. They wait only for an opening in China; what restrains them is that the dynasty's foundation has not yet shaken and that the people's will cannot easily be defied. Some dismiss the powers as barbarous and ignorant of government; yet when their rulers act, they refer matters to the upper house—what the classics call consulting the high ministers; and to the lower house—consulting the common people. What passes deliberation they enact; what fails they drop. Nothing is done until it aligns with popular sentiment. They govern themselves by this standard, and they judge other nations' rise and fall by it as well. When a state's policies run against its people, the powers rush to exploit it, each fearing to arrive too late. Turkey and Greece are very weak yet endure among the great powers because their peoples remain united. France was mighty, yet Germany defeated it because the French king lived in ruinous luxury, piled up unpayable debt, and tried to buy the army with ever higher pay while losing the people—giving Germany its opening. Only those who despise themselves are despised by others; only what rots from within breeds worms. Such is the logic of events; such is what must follow. Foreign powers afflicting China are like disease afflicting the body: symptoms must be treated, but strengthening the body's vital force matters most. Foreigners watch daily whether the people stand with or against the throne; China must ensure that nothing we do offends popular judgment of right and wrong. China's hierarchy of imperial grace is strict; we cannot simply copy foreign parliaments, but we can adopt their underlying principle. In appointing officials and governing, every act should be weighed against principle and popular sentiment; what the people cannot accept should be stopped at once; and what the people wholeheartedly support should be carried through to success. Practice frugality to fill the treasury and prepare for emergencies; welcome remonstrance to open channels so grievances from below reach the throne. Keep popular loyalty firm and the dynasty's foundation secure, so that while foreign powers circle they find no opening—their designs may fail, and China may still stand on its own. This is a course still within reach—and one that brooks no delay. Once the opening appears, neither negotiation nor war can be relied on. Even temporary safety would leave the larger situation beyond repair. How much better to prevent the opening before it comes. In the sixth year of Xianfeng Wang Maoyin memorialized on foreign affairs, saying: 'Overseas powers contend daily for dominance; men see a line between China and abroad, but Heaven may see no such distinction.' He quoted the Classic—'High Heaven has no favorites; it aids only the virtuous'—and the Great Learning on ordering the realm, which three times names the sources of success and failure: first the people's hearts, then Heaven's mandate, and finally the ruler's own heart as proof. How grave and urgent his warning was! To quiet foreign ambition, nothing matters more than winning the people's hearts; win the people and you win Heaven's favor—no divination needed to see that truth. I have received the deepest favor and handled foreign affairs longer than any other minister; I have seen where foreigners scheme, and I know this moment is the critical hinge. Foreigners seek their opening here; China must close it here. Officials in charge can manage only details; Your Majesty holds the root in his own hands. I therefore speak plainly and beg Your Majesty to heed these humble words, keep this memorial close at hand, and pursue government that heals the root—before hidden dangers take hold. The realm would be blessed indeed!"
13
西 使 '使' 西 使 ''
Earlier, when the Taiwan crisis ended, Wen Xiang and Prince Gong had proposed coastal defense in six points: train troops, improve arms, build ships, raise funds, appoint the right men, and sustain the effort over time. Each point was spelled out in detail, and an edict ordered court and provincial officials to deliberate. By the second year of Guangxu the governors had reported back, and the proposals were to go before the court again. Wen Xiang was too ill to leave his house and knew he would not recover. He submitted a secret memorial: "Managing foreign powers is the state's foremost duty. The self-strengthening program now under discussion is the key to the empire's survival. My strength fails and my wits grow short; I know I cannot long serve as Your Majesty's loyal hound. If I should die, the truths I have kept silent will never reach Your Majesty's ear or inform the coming deliberations. How could I face you then? My loyal heart holds more than the Zongli Yamen's original memorial could say; I offer these words in full sincerity for Your Majesty. Every age has foreign enemies, but never a situation as strange, a peril as deep, or foes as numerous and cunning as today. If we meet this peril with sober resolve and stand firm, it can rouse our spirit, awaken our minds, and steel our will—this is what the sages meant by strength born of adversity. Yet if at this point we lapse into delay and negligence; if we leave matters to drift, forget plans as soon as they are made, or pursue empty forms without substance, the consequences are unthinkable—and the outcome needs no sage to predict. Past foreign crises grew fierce because court and provinces were estranged, policy swung between peace and war without settled principle, and frontier officials whitewashed reports so the throne never learned the truth. These three failures fed one another, and the trouble deepened day by day without end. Western states unite officials and merchants, church and state. Their traders crossed the oceans to China and everywhere met insult and obstruction; resentment had to break out—that was the logic of events. They then learned that every Chinese barrier could be forced open, every prohibition reversed, every 'iron rule' broken—often by the threat of arms. That was when they began to despise China and grow bold. Treaties were signed and trade opened, yet at court no minister truly understood foreign affairs, and in the provinces no governor devoted himself to managing them. Memorials were mostly evasive and cosmetic. Enemies were called obedient while still defiant; foreign resentment was reported as goodwill—until crises erupted and policy lurched between peace and war; peace might be signed in one province while fighting broke out in another; indemnities were paid by day and false victory reports filed by night. A storm-struck ship was claimed as a great victory; a messenger was hailed as a captured enemy chief—yet when armies actually clashed, defeat was total. Foreign arrogance and treaty demands grew worse; ministers at court and in the provinces alike dreaded foreign affairs—until the 1860 crisis left the government almost helpless. After the Zongli Yamen was founded, responsibility was clear, officials grew familiar with foreign affairs, and those in charge could no longer pass the buck. Yet foreign affairs are not the private business of a few officials—they are vital to the state itself. If they are vital to the state, every subject of the Qing ought to devote himself to preserving the larger order. Moreover, lasting peace rests on self-strengthening, and self-strengthening rests on real military power—matters the Zongli Yamen cannot control or carry out alone. With real armed strength, foreign demands can be resisted more effectively, rivals will hesitate, and covetous designs may fade—though not every matter falls to the Yamen, nothing is unrelated to it. Yet for more than a decade, whenever crisis struck and the realm hung in the balance, officials outside the foreign-affairs circle treated standing aside as the wise course; and when a settlement neared, dissent revived, or critics invoked the proverb that victors need not explain themselves; without regard for difficulty or circumstance, blaming only those who bore responsibility. Once the fault was that no one was clearly in charge; now the fault is that a dedicated office gives everyone else an excuse to shift blame. If those in charge shared that attitude and shirked together, we would arrive at Du Fu's lament: 'Only the Son of Heaven is left to worry for the realm.' Only those who can fight can hold; only those who can hold can make peace. That should be common knowledge. Today's foes cannot be resisted without mastering their own strengths. Whoever understands the times knows that. Yet at the decisive moment opinions divide: some speak in lofty moral terms and dismiss foreign affairs as beneath discussion; others seek a false peace and trust too deeply in the present settlement. Hence every proposal to train troops, build ships, study arms, astronomy, or mathematics has met heavy obstruction; even when approved, execution has often been hollow. When projects failed, critics blamed not those who blocked them but those who proposed them; and outsiders even denounced the state's plans for self-reliance as groveling to foreigners. Judgment had sunk to that depth! Japan's raid on Taiwan has only just been settled—and Japan is not yet in the class of France, Britain, Russia, or America. That unjust war nearly shook the entire realm; only after exhausting debate was it contained. If the great Western powers, watching from every side, seized one unreasonable pretext to make war, who knows what demands they would impose or how we could recover? The thought alone is enough to choke one's appetite. Can self-strengthening wait another moment? The items the Zongli Yamen asks the court to deliberate are urgently important and must be planned and implemented without delay. Provincial governors will soon report as ordered. If the matter goes to court, it is unlike ordinary conferences: the princes and senior ministers should set aside several days to deliberate thoroughly, trace each proposal from start to finish, weigh costs and benefits, decide what to adopt or drop, settle on practical methods, and not repeat the empty rituals of past meetings. If we adopt plans today but cannot sustain them with united resolve tomorrow, we had better not begin at all. If measures are adopted in name only, wasting treasury funds and multiplying empty posts across the provinces, it would be better not to act at all. Read the trends, judge the moment, weigh the enemy against ourselves: there is an overwhelming necessity to act, and an equally overwhelming need not to miss our chance again. One mistake cannot be undone; failure to act is unthinkable. The Zongli Yamen memorial's demand that "the court and provinces, the capital and the provinces, those inside and outside the Yamen, must all be of one mind—and remain so for the long term" expresses exactly this. The foundation lies here above all; I earnestly pray that Your Majesty will keep this close at heart and pursue it with vigor. Whether the Yamen's work can be sustained depends entirely on whether we can build strength deep enough to rely on. Only with real capacity to fight and to hold ground can we secure victory without war. If Your Majesty keeps this always in mind, the devoted labor of those charged with these affairs will surely win the imperial eye. Every official will then bring his mind to learning and planning together; many will surely surpass this humble servant a hundredfold in talent and judgment. Otherwise support will fail, change will become inevitable, and after disruption and forced reversal the anguish will surely exceed today's a hundredfold—more than I can bring myself to say." The memorial was submitted; before long he died. A warm edict granted condolences, praising him as "upright in conduct, meticulous in statecraft, loyal and pure, bright and straightforward, sincere and fair—a pillar of the realm." He was posthumously made Grand Tutor, granted a hereditary Captain of Cavalry, inducted into the Shrine of Worthies, given three thousand taels for the funeral, and libations were offered by Prince Zaicheng. He received the posthumous title Wenhong, was buried in Mukden, and General Chong Shi was sent to perform the sacrifice. In the fifteenth year, when the Empress Dowager resumed power, she recalled his earlier service and granted one altar of sacrifice.
14
歿
Wen Xiang was loyal and diligent—the foremost Grand Councilor of the restoration era. His integrity was unmatched; his household lived as plainly as a poor scholar's. He planned for the state with far sight. When Xinjiang was nearly pacified and Russia was to return Ili, Grand Secretary Zuo Zongtang took the mission on himself; Wen Xiang strongly backed him and memorialized that Zuo be given sole charge. After Wen Xiang's death, Vice Minister Chonghou was sent to Russia, was coerced into terms, and assented on his own authority—throwing the court into uproar. Chonghou was punished and replaced by Zeng Jize; only after long negotiation was a settlement reached, narrowly averting a major rupture. When the Franco-Vietnamese crisis erupted, policy swung between peace and war; coastal defenses proved too weak for a decisive blow, and the court settled for compromise. When the navy was built up, the state could not commit its full strength; in the end it was shattered by Japan. All unfolded as Wen Xiang had feared, while the court shifted from crisis to crisis and daily grew more burdened. His son Xizhi inherited the hereditary Captain of Cavalry while serving as an outer-court secretary.
15
滿 調
Bao Yun, whose style was Peiheng, belonged to the Suochuoluo clan of the Manchu Bordered White Banner; his family had long lived in Jilin. He passed the jinshi examination in 1838, was appointed a secretary in the Board of Rites, and was promoted to middle attendant. He rose through three postings to reader-in-waiting of the Hanlin Academy. In 1852, when Cantonese rebels swept into Hunan and Hubei, Bao Yun memorialized urging neighboring provinces to enforce fortify-and-clear tactics. In 1854 he was sent to the Sain Noyan Khan league to offer condolences, refused all gifts, and won the respect of the frontier princes. He was promoted to grand secretary of the Grand Secretariat. In 1855 he became Vice Minister of Rites, concurrently Mongol vice commander of the Plain Red Banner, and was transferred to the Board of Revenue. In 1858 he presided over the Zhejiang provincial examination; for expanding the quota and adding an official graduate he was found in violation, demoted one grade but kept in office. Emperor Xianfeng issued an edict, "Bao Yun has always styled himself bold and decisive, yet shares in favoritism," and rebuked him sharply.
16
In 1860 he was sent to Tianjin to inspect sea-transport tribute grain, then to Tongzhou to review the route. He repeatedly memorialized for rules against abuse and impeached negligent supervisors; the court adopted his proposals. He served as supervising minister of the Imperial Household, acting manager of the Board of Revenue's three treasuries, and joint commissioner for the capital's patrol defense. When the Anglo-French allies invaded, the court fled to Rehe and ordered two hundred thousand taels from the treasury to repair the traveling palace. Bao Yun argued that state finances were desperately strained and opposed the expenditure. The emperor was furious and nearly punished him severely; when the three imperial parks under his charge were looted, an edict sharply rebuked him and reduced his rank button to the fifth grade. After a month his rank was restored for his work on patrol defense; he was also made guard commander of the Bordered Red Banner and concurrently acting commander of the Plain Red Banner Han Army and the Left Vanguard. In 1861 Emperor Xianfeng died at the Rehe traveling palace. In the tenth month Emperor Tongzhi returned to Beijing; Bao Yun was appointed to the Grand Council and made a minister of the Zongli Yamen.
17
西 調 調 殿
In 1862 he was promoted to Minister of Revenue. In 1863 he impeached Zhang Yucang, chief eunuch of Princess Shouzhuang's household, for insolent speech; the court ordered his arrest, and Zhang was punished by law. In 1864 senior ministers were ordered to lecture in rotation on the Records of Governance and Tranquility; Bao Yun was among them. When Nanjing was recovered, he was made Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent and granted the peacock feather for his supporting role. In 1865 he was entrusted with the seal of the Imperial Household Department. Soon afterward, citing the press of Grand Council business, he asked to resign from the Imperial Household; the request was granted. After the Zongli Yamen was founded, the court sought knowledge of foreign languages, established the Tongwen Guan, and began Western studies—measures many courtiers opposed. In 1867 Yang Tingxi, a substitute censorate clerk, memorialized to abolish the Tongwen Guan and accused Prince Gong, Bao Yun, and others of monopolizing power. Bao Yun and Prince Gong asked to resign pending investigation; a warm edict kept them in office and urged them not to shrink from criticism or defer to rumor. In 1868, when the Nian rebels of Zhili and Shandong were suppressed, he was granted two grades of military merit. In 1872 he was transferred to the Board of Civil Office. When Emperor Tongzhi's wedding was completed, he was made Grand Guardian of the Heir Apparent. In 1873 he became concurrently chancellor of the Hanlin Academy and associate grand secretary while serving as Minister of Civil Office. Soon he moved to the Board of War, was appointed grand secretary of the Tiren Pavilion, and continued to direct the Board of Civil Office. In 1877 he was promoted to grand secretary of the Hall of Martial Eminence. In 1878, when the Muslim frontier was pacified, he received special commendation.
18
歿 仿
From early Tongzhi Bao Yun served on the Grand Council, working in harmony with Wen Xiang. He understood government, knew talent, and yielded to the capable; Prince Gong relied on his support. By now, however, the court was dividing into factions. After Wen Xiang's death, court debate grew fiercer. Compiler He Jinshou, citing drought, impeached the Grand Council for dereliction. An edict rebuked Prince Gong, Bao Yun, and others for witnessing crisis without remedy, ordered their dismissal, then by grace allowed them to remain in office. In 1879, for inscribing Emperor Tongzhi's spirit tablet, he was made Grand Tutor of the Heir Apparent; when the Veritable Records were completed, his son Jingfeng was promoted to director and his nephew Jingxing was granted licentiate status. In 1881 Sub-Reader Chen Baochen, citing a celestial omen, impeached Bao Yun alone and asked that he be dismissed at once, following the Han precedent of removing the three highest ministers after calamitous signs. An edict said: "Bao Yun has served on the Grand Council for many years without fault. Chen Baochen accuses him of shirking hard tasks and showing favoritism, yet cannot point to anything specific. Yet because this memorial was submitted, he must have failed in ordinary deliberations with the princes and senior ministers to work in harmony, inviting gossip. This grand secretary has received deep favor and still has his strength; he should devote himself to public duty, repay the throne, work with full energy, break free of routine habits, and fulfill his charge."
19
退西
In the third month of 1884 the Grand Councilors from Prince Gong down were dismissed on the same day. An edict said: "Bao Yun has served longest in the Council and deserves the sternest rebuke; yet considering his age, his past service is recorded and he is allowed to retire at his original rank." In 1886 the Empress Dowager graciously raised his status to retirement as grand secretary and granted half salary. After retirement Bao Yun often joined Prince Gong on the Western Hills, sightseeing and exchanging poetry. Past eighty, he still received imperial gifts. In 1891 he died. When his death memorial arrived, an edict praised him as "loyal and pure, bright and seasoned." He was posthumously made Grand Mentor, enshrined in the Shrine of Worthies, his son Jingfeng was promoted to Fourth Rank Capital Bureau, and his grandson Yin Huan was granted licentiate status. Prince Zaiying offered libations; the funeral honors were no less than if he had still held office. He received the posthumous title Wenjing.
20
His son Jingfeng rose to general of Guangzhou; after his death he received the posthumous title Chengshen.
21
His grandson Yin Huan passed the jinshi in 1898, served as vice director of the Imperial Academy, and was later appointed first-rank attendant of the Gate of Heavenly Purity.
22
The historian comments: Between the Xianfeng and Tongzhi reigns, domestic turmoil and foreign threat made each day seem the dynasty's last. Wen Qing urged employing Han officials, enabling Zeng Guofan, Hu Linyi, and others to carry out their strategies and build the restoration—an achievement of great weight. Wen Xiang and Bao Yun assisted Prince Gong in smoothing foreign relations and suppressing rebellion. Wen Xiang above all shouldered the hardest burdens, putting the public good before private interest, and was trusted at home and abroad—yet because court opinion was divided, he could not fully carry out his designs; In his last years he secretly laid out the great design; on decades of success and failure in dealing with foreign powers he saw as clearly as fire in daylight—a mirror of the dynasty's fate. Bao Yun was equally clear-sighted but lacked his moral firmness; he could not still the clamor or hold the national course steady. Men like Wen Xiang were truly pillars of the state!
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