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卷426 列傳二百十三 王庆雲 谭廷襄 马新贻 李宗羲 徐宗幹 王凯泰 郭柏荫

Volume 426 Biographies 213: Wang Qingyun, Tan Tingxiang, Ma Xinyi, Li Zongxi, Xu Zonggan, Wang Kaitai, Guo Baiyin

Chapter 426 of 清史稿 · Draft History of Qing
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Chapter 426
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1
使
Wang Qingyun, whose style was Yanting, came from Min County in Fujian. He took his jinshi degree in 1829, entered the Hanlin Academy, and was made a compiler. In 1847 he placed in the top class of the triennial Hanlin review and was promoted to reader-in-waiting, then made vice commissioner of the Transmission Office. Qingyun kept abreast of current affairs and devoted himself above all to public finance, probing its strengths and weaknesses and tracking every inflow and outflow. When the Xianfeng Emperor came to the throne and called for counsel, Qingyun memorialized to open channels of remonstrance, cut routine paperwork, ease the people's burdens, and put national finance first. On strengthening the national accounts, he wrote in summary: "Annual revenue now runs to forty-four or forty-five million taels, while expenditure stays under forty million—yet actual land-tax collection lately barely reaches twenty-eight million. Drought and flood are chance events, yet provinces take turns every year requesting tax deferrals; The salt levy is assessed at more than 7.4 million taels a year, yet collections often fail to reach five million. The population grows daily, yet salt sales shrink by the day. Southern River works cost barely a million taels under Jiaqing; recently the figure has climbed in stages to 3.5 or 3.6 million. Receipts lag behind spending, yet nothing is done except stopgap schemes—far better to take the revenue already at hand and study it closely: why is land-and-poll tax deferred year after year? Why does the salt levy fall short everywhere? Why do river works report emergencies every single year? The abuses must be found and rooted out." When the memorial reached the throne, the emperor strongly approved it.
2
退 西使
The court then ordered officials at court and in the provinces to recommend talent; Vice Minister of Rites Zeng Guofan nominated Qingyun, and an edict promoted him to grand tutor and acting metropolitan prefect of Shuntian. In 1851 he was appointed vice minister of Revenue while continuing to act as metropolitan prefect. The Imperial Household Department proposed ordering estate managers to raise rents; if tenants refused, they would be forced to surrender the land within a set deadline. Qingyun joined Zhili governor-general Ne'erjing'e in citing Qianlong precedents abolishing estate managers and Jiaqing bans on rent hikes and tenant dispossession, and memorialized for an edict forbidding the Imperial Household Department to raise rents arbitrarily. The Ministry of Revenue sought reform of Hedong salt regulations and an audit of Shanxi fiscal deficits; Qingyun was sent with Zhejiang provincial treasurer Lian Ying to investigate.
3
西 使 仿 便 西西
He soon fixed regulations for auditing deficits and, with Shanxi governor Naxutu, reported: "Shanxi merchants' losses come first from heavy salt capital costs, second from excessive overhead, third from crushing transport charges. As official salt grew costly, smugglers seized the opening and spread everywhere. Salt once sold for thirty or fifty taels a picul; resident merchants then hoarded stock and rigged prices, salt-field deeds and tally tickets changed hands endlessly, and every link in the trade took its cut. A single picul cost 130 or 140 taels—small wonder transport merchants were ruined. Hedong salt served three provinces with endless hospitality costs; chief merchants' apportioned "hall assessments" and petty merchants' customary gifts totaled more than 260,000 taels—nearly half the annual levy. Transport charges per picul often hit a hundred taels; with official prices frozen, merchants adulterated salt and shorted weights, and the people's supply grew ever scarcer. We agreed that lowering salt capital requires fixing pond prices first; cutting overhead requires the tally system first; reducing transport costs requires dividing ports first—with anti-smuggling built into each step. Salt has licensed merchants but tallies need not bind fixed traders; the key is to keep merchants recruiting buyers, collect duty before salt moves, and keep quotas filled so revenue does not fall short. Resident merchants have always raised prices, always pleading short supply. The ponds are broad and the brine rich; even in uneven weather, pooling surplus to cover shortage can meet the quota of more than 5,600 piculs. Salt is costly not from short supply but from smuggling. We propose capping white salt at sixty taels a picul, with green salt priced lower in steps, leaving resident merchants a margin above production cost. Merchants should set mutual inspection rules; if salt does not leak sideways, licensed trade will prosper and tally resale prices can be cut back. Salt-field leases should go first to transport merchants to cut costs; extraneous fees by revenue guards and clerks must be banned and public expenses funded separately. Each tally should levy just over seven fen of silver, collected with the duty; any further demands will be treated as embezzlement. Issuing tallies, recruiting traders, drawing salt, and cutting transport vouchers should follow Liang-Huai practice with slight local adjustments for simplicity. Since Jiaqing 24, Hedong salt in Henan has been merchant-transported and retailed locally, with Huixing Town as the issue port—a arrangement merchants and people welcomed. We propose three routes for Shaanxi, Shanxi, and Huixing Town with no cross-traffic; salt is sold where it arrives, merchants may self-transport, smuggling is checked, and fraud is stamped out. For the whole Hedong quota, trimming overhead and changing ports against former prices would save more than 700,000 taels a year. With capable men enforcing the rules, merchants will not be ruined. If some firms quit, transport merchants may merge or resident merchants fill in—ending forever the abuses of brokered nominations and guarantor merchants." The ministries deliberated and adopted it.
4
西西 滿 西
Now expert in fiscal affairs and directing the ministry, Qingyun cleared 1,059 transfer items totaling 9.36 million taels that Jiangning, Suzhou, and Anhui treasuries should have reported from 1823 to 1851 but had long left outstanding. He also wrote: "Jiangnan's tax quota leads all provinces at 5.29 million taels; in 1836 over 5.6 million in arrears was written off—effectively remitting one year's levy every ten years; in 1846 over ten million was written off—two years' quota every decade. By 1852 over thirteen million was written off—nearly three years' quota every decade. He asked the Jiangsu authorities to forbid mixing mature-field arrears into the next year's deferred collections." He also replied to Fujian-Zhejiang governor-general Ji Zhichang's plea to defer and average Fujian's salt quota: "Fujian salt fails because smuggling is rampant and overhead is crushing. Ji proposed suspending 60,000 taels of averaged quota, assigning 20,000 in continuing customary levy, then resuming the average after five years while still paying the customary levy. This morning-three-evening-four scheme is hardly workable." He added that Ji had only described difficulties, not remedies—either levy at the works or tax by bundle. They should pick one workable plan and submit a detailed memorial." He also endorsed Jiangxi governor Zhang Fu's request to allocate Guangdong salt, citing Ming precedents of Chen Nanjin and Wang Shouren—"enriching revenue without new levies, accomplishing the task without troubling the people"—as an excellent policy. They should arrange it at once." He also wrote that Yunnan and Guizhou could no longer forward copper and lead—the routes were long and blocked by war. Standard cash should be cast where major garrisons stand, large cash at nearby waterways, then shipped to Sichuan and the two Hu provinces to exchange for silver and accept land-and-poll tax payments." He also noted that 40,000 troops on Xinjiang's northern and southern routes cost 1.3–1.4 million taels a year—tens of millions over nearly a century. He proposed ending Shaanxi troop rotations to Kashgar and the eight cities, using Ili and Urumqi Manchu and Green Standard garrisons on five-year turns instead—saving hundreds of thousands a year." He also sought to abolish the Eastern and Southern River directorships, merge river offices, cap Southern River repairs at one million and Eastern at 700–800,000 taels, and fold the grain-transport directorate into the Southern River governor-general's portfolio. Most of these proposals were adopted. He was soon appointed governor of Shaanxi.
5
西 調西
In 1854, when Taiping forces threatened Henan, Qingyun went to Tong Pass to plan defenses with commander Feng Shen and general Zhala Fen. He then traveled from Tong Pass to Shangnan and inspected every mountain pass. The emperor ordered Feng Shen to garrison Xiangyang with his troops. After the rebels took Wuchang, Qingyun urged moving Hubei's capital temporarily to Xiangyang and having Shanxi and Sichuan help fund the army to hold the line. He was soon transferred to governor of Shanxi.
6
西西 仿西 便 便
In 1855 he reported that Lu salt served Shanxi, Shaanxi, and Henan—Shaanxi was flooded with salt while Shanxi groaned under high prices. He proposed averaging 370 piculs of Shaanxi quota into Shanxi sales. Shanxi quota prices would be set fairly by distance from source. Henan's official transport was working well; he proposed adding private transport to widen participation. Smuggled salt from Jilantai and Huamachi was to be barred from the market." He also urged that because Shaanxi's salt levy was folded into land tax and payments lagged, the province should follow Henan's trader-recruitment model and set up inspection offices east and west of the Yellow River." He also noted that since the war began armies paid in silver and bought grain with cash—in good harvest years with ample silver, nothing could be more convenient. Now war zones cannot collect full taxes and depend on neighbors; intact regions cannot meet regular quotas and rely on donations. With grain dear and cash scarce, converting silver to cash and cash to grain wastes more than half the value. Once hungry soldiers could be fed with silver; soon even silver may not feed them—and silver cannot be counted on indefinitely. He proposed having counties mill granary grain for rations and using standard cash as well—where waterways allowed, both should work." All were approved.
7
西
He also reported that in Ming times Shanxi border counties had led people to build fortified villages for self-defense. A single county might have from a dozen to over a hundred forts, scattered like stars across the landscape. Today only Yunzhong, Dai, and Shuo still have linked fort networks; southern prefectures' forts are mostly ruined and should be repaired. Community rules and charity schools should reform idle youth; joint festivals would bind neighbors together and mutual watch would align their strength. In danger they would gather inside; in peace they would farm outside—applying fortified-village and scorched-country tactics without saying so." He also urged opening granaries for drought and locust victims in Nanyang and elsewhere in Henan so they would not join bandits—relief itself would prevent unrest. When Nian rebels threatened Nanyang, Qingyun privately proposed dividing southern Shanxi into three routes for patrol troops.
8
''
Promoted to Sichuan governor-general, he sent troops to guard Youyang and Xiushan when sect rebels rose in Guizhou's Sinan and asked brigade general Jiang Yulong to advance from Zhenyuan to retake the city. He soon reported that Sichuan's long-standing Gua bandits made theft cases exceed other provinces and ordered baojia enforcement with deadlines for arrests. He also proposed garrison farms at Youyang and posting troops at key towns and passes. He also condemned Sichuan runners who, while recovering stolen goods, mustered armed gangs to search and loot households in so-called "sao tong" raids—no different from robbery. He asked that all participants be beheaded under the armed-robbery statute, soldiers included." The ministries adopted them all.
9
調
When Guizhou rebels burned and looted their way toward Qinan, he sent troops across the border to take Cengluan Mountain and Feiti Cliff passes and destroy the nest at Hujiaping. In 1859 he also acted as Chengdu general and was transferred to governor-general of the two Guang provinces. En route he fell ill at Hanyang, asked to resign, and was allowed to do so. He was soon summoned to Beijing but illness kept him from going immediately. In 1861, when the Tongzhi Emperor acceded, he was made left censor-in-chief and then minister of Works. In March 1862, as Qingyun prepared to answer the summons despite his illness, he took a sudden turn for the worse and died; he was posthumously named Wenqin. His grandson Sun Renkan has his own biography among the model local officials.
10
調 西 西便
Tan Tingxiang, whose style was Zhuya, came from Shanyin in Zhejiang. He took his jinshi in 1833, entered the Hanlin Academy, and on leaving was made a secretary in the Ministry of Punishments, later promoted to director. He served as prefect of Yongping in Zhili, transferred to Baoding, became Shuntian metropolitan prefect, and was promoted to vice minister of Punishments. In 1856 he was appointed governor of Shaanxi. When provinces were to ship grain to Beijing, Tingxiang wrote: "Shaanxi produces little rice, and transport is impractical. He asked to pay in silver instead, with the ministry buying grain—cheaper and more efficient." In 1857 he acted as Zhili governor-general.
11
西 西便
When Anglo-French-Russian-American forces took Guangzhou, Tingxiang urged sealing trade and closing ports with a mix of conciliation and force; the emperor refused, fearing provocation would disrupt grain fleets at sea. In April 1858 British troops moved north, seized the Dagu forts, and probed inland waterways. Sand bars outside Dagu kept deep-draft ships out; enemy vessels sent small steam launches to sound the channels. Talks were underway and defenses were neglected; no one expected a sudden strike. Imperial commissioner Sengge Rinchen impeached Tingxiang, removed him from office, and exiled him to garrison duty. In 1859 he returned as acting Shaanxi governor with third-rank insignia. When the court ordered provinces to suppress Catholicism, Tingxiang wrote: "It has been in China over two centuries; sweeping searches only spread panic. He urged secret baojia inspections, covert registers, and gradual persuasion instead." With treaties still unsettled, a western flight was proposed; Tingxiang and Governor Le Bin listed three pros and three cons, and the idea was dropped.
12
調調
In 1861 he was appointed governor of Shandong. Years of war had filled Shandong with bandits; Nian rebels from Anhui joined local gangs until unrest spread nearly everywhere. Sengge Rinchen's army directed suppression from Shandong; Tingxiang led provincial troops to help and organized county militias—treated fully in Sengge Rinchen's biography. In 1862 he also acted as Hedong River director-general. In 1864 he became vice minister of Punishments, then Works, then Revenue.
13
使綿
In 1866 Hubei governor Zeng Guoquan impeached governor-general Guan Wen for greed, incompetence, and arrogance and for bribing Sichuan examination officials; Minister Miansen and Tingxiang were sent to investigate. Hu Jiayu said that returning from Sichuan via Hubei he accepted gifts from Guan Wen because land routes were blocked and he had no official support on the water route. In Hubei, Tingxiang reported that land tax, grain transport, salt, lijin, customs, and donations were spent as collected without waste. Only small Hanyang timber levies not filed for rewards—routine unreimbursed public expenses—had funded Guan Wen's gifts to the examiners." The emperor dismissed Guan Wen. Tingxiang was made acting governor-general; the examiners were referred for discipline.
14
Censor Fo'erguochun impeached Guoquan for the same timber-tax practice and accused Tingxiang of a cover-up. Tingxiang replied that Guoquan had not long been in office and denied the charge, noting Hubei's three occupations by rebels and improvised wartime administration. Punishing misuse of official funds was warning enough. Punishing recipients too would criminalize travel allowances and condolence gifts. Government should follow human decency; petty severity ill suits it." All gift recipients were left unpunished. In 1867 Guan Wen was finally removed; that winter Guoquan resigned for illness.
15
Back in Beijing, he acted as vice minister of Personnel and became left censor-in-chief. He was promoted to minister of Punishments and also acted as minister of Personnel. In 1870 he died and was posthumously made Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent with the name Duankai.
16
使 使使 使使
Ma Xinyi, whose style was Gushan, came from Heze in Shandong. He took his jinshi in 1847, was assigned as Anhui magistrate, served at Jianping and Hefei, and was known for diligence. In 1853, as Taiping forces ravaged Anhui and Huai bandits rose, Xinyi was constantly in the field. In 1855, campaigning at Luzhou and Chaohu, he routed relief forces and took rebel camps at Shengjiaqiao, Sanhe, and Zhegao before capturing Luzhou. For merit he rose to prefect, received the peacock feather, and was appointed to Luzhou. In 1857, when Nian and Taiping forces took Taozhen, he beat them at Shucheng and was marked for circuit intendant. In 1858 he acted as provincial judicial commissioner. When rebels attacked Luzhou he led militia out; they entered by a side path, his force collapsed, he lost his seal, and was stripped of rank but kept on duty. In 1859, mourning his mother, he was allowed to stay in acting office at Weng Tonghe's request. In 1860 Imperial Commissioner Yuan Jiasan sought his reinstatement. In 1861 Weng Tonghe recommended him again and he was queued for circuit intendant. When his father died, Yuan Jiasan asked that he remain with the army. In 1862 he helped retake Luzhou, defeated rebels at Wushan Temple, and was made acting provincial treasurer with judicial commissioner rank. When Miao Peilin rebelled, he followed Tang Xunfang at Mengcheng and won repeated victories. In 1863 he was made judicial commissioner and soon provincial treasurer.
17
In 1864 he was promoted to governor of Zhejiang. Zhejiang had just been pacified; on arrival he remitted tax arrears. In 1865 he cut excess surcharges in seven prefectures and abolished unnamed transport fees; the emperor agreed and had the ban carved in stone. He built Haining's stone seawall and Shaoxing's east embankment and dredged the Sanjiang estuary. He suppressed pirates in Qihai and captured their leader. He generously revived provincial academies, treated students like sons, and supported them with funds. Floods in Yanzhou and Shaoxing were met with remissions and verified relief. Taizhou was prone to armed brawls; Xinyi wrote that officials feared discipline and let incidents fester. He asked that officials who concealed incidents be punished; mere negligence would be forgiven, but capture and punishment would still be required." The ministries adopted it. He cleared Nantian—a forbidden coastal zone in Xiangshan and Ninghai—by capturing and executing bandit Qiu Caiqing. When brigade general Gang Antai was killed at sea, Zhang Qiguang destroyed over fifty pirates. The emperor censured him for failing to prevent Gang's death. In the Jiaxing-Huzhou waterways, wartime "gun boats" for self-defense had turned to gambling and robbery. With Jiangsu governor Guo Baiyin he destroyed gun-boat leaders and ended the scourge. He was promoted to governor-general of Fujian-Zhejiang.
18
調 宿 宿
In 1868 he became governor-general of Liang-Jiang and trade superintendent. He reported that banner garrisons were too weak to secure the region. He asked to train 2,500 selected men from each camp at Jiangning under his personal direction." They formed five battalions under Liu Qifa; banditry declined. Suqian's twin toll stations and Huai customs' Jiangba branch burdened merchants. He argued Jiangba belonged to Fengyang customs and Huai customs should not operate a distant sub-station. Huai customs should enforce old rules and forbid exactions. He asked to abolish Suqian's minor land toll and keep only the water station." Approved. He executed bandit leader Gao Gui, who had raided the Shandong-Jiangsu border.
19
西 使 使
In July 1870 he reviewed archery at the yamen's western range and walked back afterward. At the gate Zhang Wenxiang feigned a petition, stabbed him in the ribs, and he died the next day. General Kuiyu reported the murder; the emperor mourned, enriched his family, made him Grand Guardian posthumously, granted hereditary ranks, and named him Duanyin. Kuiyu acted as governor-general and interrogated Wenxiang, whose story kept changing. Wang Shurui demanded the mastermind; Zhang Zhiwan joined the investigation. Zhang Zhiwan reported that Wenxiang had served Taiping forces and later pirates. As Zhejiang governor Xinyi had crushed Nantian pirates, killing many; Wenxiang's wife was abducted. Wenxiang's petition at Ningbo was rejected; he acted from private revenge, not on orders. He sought conviction for treason." Minister Zheng Dunjin and Zeng Guofan confirmed the verdict; Wenxiang and his son were executed.
20
He won hearts in Anhui and Zhejiang; succeeding Zeng Guofan at Liang-Jiang he was thorough, calm, and steady. Shrines were raised at Jiangning, Anqing, Hangzhou, and the seawall.
21
調 調 調沿 使 便 使使 便
Li Zongxi, whose style was Yuting, came from Kaixian in Sichuan. He took his jinshi in 1847, was assigned to Anhui, and served at Yingshan, Wuyuan, and Taiping. In 1853, when Anqing fell, he supplied the Luzhou army and rose to prefect for merit. In 1858 he joined Zeng Guofan's Anhui campaign staff. In 1859 he acted as Anqing prefect but resigned for illness. In 1862 Yan Shusen recommended him; after audience he joined Shusen's Hubei staff. In 1864 Zeng Guofan put him in charge of north-of-the-Yangtze lijin and fixed river rates. After Jiangning's recovery he was appointed circuit intendant in Liang-Jiang. In 1865 he acted as Liang-Huai salt commissioner. He opened a new canal east of Guazhou so Huainan salt could avoid Yangtze storms after the war rerouted traffic through Taixing. He became Anhui judicial commissioner, then Jiangning provincial treasurer. In 1866, when Qingshui Tan burst its banks and seven prefectures and counties were flooded, Zongxi combined relief work with engineering and saved a great many lives. He set rules for reclaiming wasteland with phased tax relief and standardized grain-tribute and land-tax conversion for Jiangning’s seven subordinate districts, to general public approval.
22
西使 使
In 1869 he became Shanxi governor, impeached the provincial treasurer Hu Daren for negligence, and had him removed. He posted Judicial Commissioner Li Qingtang and others to garrison the province by district; when Shaanxi Muslim rebels crossed the frozen river, he won three successive battles; and repeatedly drove off raids eastward from Yanchuan and Hancheng. He resigned to observe mourning for his mother.
23
沿 使 調 使
In 1873, after mourning, he was appointed governor-general of Liang-Jiang. With Japan stirring trouble, he strengthened river defenses, adding batteries at Wulong Shan, Jiangyin’s Dutian Temple, Xiang Shan, Jiao Shan, and Xiaoguan. He also built up Liulian Sha and the Wulong Shan north-bank sand polder at Wusong and north Jiangyin so river and sea defenses supported each other. When the court ordered repairs to the Yuanmingyuan, Zongxi memorialized: “Foreign threats and domestic troubles—heaven’s signs and human affairs alike give cause for alarm. Cut building projects and reduce court expenditure and ceremonial display.” In 1874 he memorialized again: “Heavenly portents have recurred and foreign aggression is intensifying. Last year Censor Shen Huai asked that garden work be halted, and I too offered my counsel. Yet I must speak again: hard times and empty coffers are only part of the problem. Foreigners now stand at the capital’s very threshold. The Yuanmingyuan lies only a few dozen li from Beijing, without strong walls or a large guard force. In recent clashes between locals and missionaries, foreigners have repeatedly sent gunboats to press demands. Alarm at Tianjin in the morning meant alarm at Haidian by evening. That Your Majesty and the Empress Dowager stay there fills me with the deepest unease. If Your Majesty decisively halts the work, the people will see resolve to endure hardship and avenge humiliation, and will rally against the enemy. A ruler on a lofty throne, wielding power without reverence, grows arrogant; without loyal critics, flatterers gain access. Grand Secretary Wenxiang has lately retired on grounds of illness and Vice Minister Gui Qing has been transferred—people along the roads speak with regret. Veteran statesmen who care for the realm should be kept close to help form imperial virtue; and forthright remonstrators should be encouraged to speak and widen the Emperor’s hearing. The Emperor praised and accepted the memorial.
24
' ' 宿 沿西 沿 沿沿西 調 西 西 西使 使 西西 使 沿 西 便西 沿西 貿 椿使 使
When the Zongli Yamen drafted six coastal-defense proposals for governors to discuss, Zongxi wrote: “Everything rests on appointing the right men; for coastal defense, finding capable commanders matters most. As the Song official Yang Wanli said, ‘Do not cling to old ministers; seek new generals.’ War demands vigor, not stale habit—men still young, ambitious, and not yet bloated with past honors. Veteran commanders already enjoy the Emperor’s trust and need no recommendation from me. Ancient coastal defense did not mean naval battle, but training should still combine land and sea forces. War junks fall short of steamers, steamers of ironclads—but ships are only as good as the men who sail them. Until the fleet can be replaced, select officers and men for steamer training under the naval commander. Recruit coastal men who know the shoals and can endure hardship, train them in Western methods. The coast is too long to cover entirely with steamers; if the enemy lands where we are weak, ships and guns avail nothing—land forces must be drilled urgently. In 1871 Zeng Guofan proposed 90,000 coastal troops in seven provinces and 30,000 in three Yangtze provinces—120,000 in all. Land forces should hold the line; steamers should move them—so distant coasts remain linked. Follow that plan in earnest: fix quotas by province, demand results, favor quality over numbers, and keep forces concentrated. Do not refill old vacancies; drill the men already raised. Real strength is built in peace. Western firearms improve constantly, with new models appearing endlessly. Today’s marvel is tomorrow’s obsolete weapon. China cannot win by relying on firearms alone. Yet the times compel us to adapt whether we wish it or not. Shanghai’s arsenals can already copy the latest foreign cannon. The problem with firearms is not using them but neglecting them. Drilled in use they last; left idle they rust at once. After purchase and drill, guns and cannon must be cleaned and maintained on pain of punishment—that is how to safeguard public funds. Since antiquity, observers have judged a state’s strength by its talent, not its treasury; by the quality of government, not the size of armies—never by arsenals alone. Western strength rests on unity of purpose, simple strict law, merit-based appointment, honest administration, and careful selection of soldiers who fight without fear. Copy their weapons without understanding why they are strong, and we gain little. Arsenals spread from Fujian to Shanghai, Jiangning, and Tianjin, moving from guns to steamships. Give each major port one or two ironclads and several gunboats, backed by armed steamers with heavy guns, and batteries would form a credible defense and curb enemy ambitions. Western powers field scores of ironclads, hundreds of steamers, and thousands of guns; China cannot match their scale even with vast annual spending. Build ships and guns as means allow, but make good government and cultivating talent the foundation—then foreign pressure may ease. Donations, lijin, and surcharges have exhausted the people. Coal and iron are native resources; develop them and shipbuilding and armaments will prosper—and with them national strength. Cizhou is already in trial; expand existing mines in Hunan, Fujian, Jiangxi, and Shanxi rather than buy abroad when domestic supply suffices. For now, allocate sixty percent of port customs revenue to coastal defense for five years—that should fund the effort. Cutting expenditure is easier still. Begin at court: halt construction, cut special orders, reduce palace spending—and a million taels may be saved in a year. Governors should cut waste and audit grain, land tax, and lijin so nothing is stolen—another million may be gained. Let the Board of Revenue plan overall finances, set aside a dedicated defense fund, and make limits clear at every level—thrift, not profiteering, will balance the books. These points extend the original four proposals—but lasting success depends first on the right men. After wide consultation, I see three further measures worth trying. Most coastal islands are barren; only Taiwan’s position is commanding and pairs with Xiamen. It overlooks Kalimantan and Luzon to the southeast and commands routes to Vietnam, Siam, Burma, and Singapore—China’s foremost maritime gateway. Its hills yield timber for shipbuilding; its coal and iron can feed industry. Hardy settlers from Zhangzhou, Quanzhou, Huzhou, and Jiaxing would make excellent sailors. Appoint a capable official with broad authority to reconcile settlers and indigenous peoples, use Western machinery, and exploit coal, iron, and timber—a factory could follow in a few years; train a navy to support the coast and deter foreign designs. That is the first practical step in coastal defense. Tens of thousands of Fujian and Guangdong traders live at Singapore, Penang, San Francisco, and Melbourne. Their leaders include men capable of organizing whole communities. Send consuls to recruit leaders abroad—any capable man, civil or military—and give them nominal rank to organize and drill local militia, with provincial governors confirming appointments. Costs would be modest; the gain immense—that is the second measure. Foreigners fill every treaty port and know China inside out, while China remains poorly informed about them. Since the missions of Binchun, Zhigang, and Sun Jiangu, no envoys have followed. Choose able, broad-minded envoys as needed—to argue where argument helps and to prepare defenses in advance. They could also scout foreign talent and new inventions for recruitment and purchase—the third measure. Soon after he retired on grounds of illness.
25
In 1878, after the Dongxiang uprising, Zongxi was ordered to review the cases. He found Magistrate Sun Dingyang’s exactions had sparked the revolt, that Sun had rashly called in troops, and that Commander Li Youheng had slaughtered more than a thousand civilians; his report led to reversal of the verdicts. In 1880 the court summoned him to Beijing, but he asked to delay because he was still ill. He died in 1884; the court granted funeral honors.
26
鹿
His son Fang Ben, a provincial graduate, served as a director in the Ministry of War. He was capable and effective. Governors-General Lu Chuanlin and Xi Liang put him in charge of commerce and education. He died directing drought relief in eastern Sichuan and was posthumously made vice minister of the Court of the Imperial Stud.
27
調 使
Xu Zonggan, whose style was Shuren, came from Tongzhou in Jiangsu. He took his jinshi in 1820, served in Shandong at Wucheng and Tai’an. After ten respected years as magistrate he became prefect of Gaotang. In 1837 he helped Governor Jinge suppress the teacher-rebel Ma Gang; officials proposed sending the prisoners to the provincial capital. Zonggan persuaded the governor to execute them locally, calming the region. He was transferred to Jining prefecture. When Jinxian dredged the Peng River, downstream garrison villagers rioted, beating officials and clerks; Zonggan rushed in and ordered them to disperse. When the villagers surrendered, senior officials wanted harsh punishment; Zonggan argued they feared floods, not officialdom, and secured frontier service for only seven ringleaders. As acting Yanzhou prefect he repaired the Ziyang River dike.
28
使 使使調
In 1842 he became Baoning prefect in Sichuan and acting northern Sichuan intendant. Promoted to Tingzhang-Long intendant in Fujian, he inherited a long-unresolved armed land dispute in a subordinate county. Zonggan entered the village with a few dozen braves, heard both sides, feasted them to settle the feud, took the culprits for punishment, and subdued the local hard men. Governor-general Liu Yunke recommended him in secret. After mourning his mother in 1845 he was reappointed Taiwan intendant in Fujian. In 1853 Hong Gong's rebels took Taiwan and Fengshan and raided Gmalan; Zonggan's troops restored order. In 1854 he became judicial commissioner but Governor Wang Yide impeached him and he was dismissed. He was soon called to Beijing and sent to help suppress bandits in Henan. In 1856 he was sent again to Anhui. In 1857 he became Zhejiang judicial commissioner and treasurer, then was demoted for short-paying Gansu tribute. In 1860 Pang Zhonglu asked him to organize militia in Tongzhou and Taizhou.
29
In 1862 he was promoted to governor of Fujian. In 1864 Li Shixian and Wang Haiyang invaded from Guangdong; six counties fell before Zonggan and Zuo Zongtang recovered them. He died in 1866. Zuo and General Ying Gui praised him as an upright, frugal official beloved by the people." The court honored him posthumously as Qinghui and enshrined him among Fujian's model officials.
30
使 調 使 使
Wang Kaitai, originally Dunmin, style Bufan, came from Baoying in Jiangsu. He took his jinshi in 1850, entered the Hanlin Academy, and became a compiler. In 1860 he went home to mourn his mother. When rebels threatened northern Jiangsu, Yan Duanshu directed militia and Peng Yunzhang recommended Kaitai as his aide. He earned repeated fourth-rank honors for his service. In 1863 he joined Li Hongzhang's staff. In 1865 Ma Xinyi brought him to Zhejiang as circuit intendant acting grain commissioner. Zeng, Li, and Ma recommended him; in 1866 he became Zhejiang judicial commissioner. Sand choked Shaoxing's Sanjiang sluice that drained three counties; locals sought dredging. Kaitai dredged it and restored the old benefit. As Guangdong treasurer he cut fees, audited lijin, dredged canals, and expanded Yingyuan Academy. As Fujian governor he revived schools, banned violent customs, and filled granaries with 200,000 shi of lijin grain. As examination superintendent he sought to clean up examination abuses. He set deadlines to clear Taiwan's backlog of lawsuits.
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西 調 調 調
In 1886 he memorialized on six reforms, beginning with halting the sale of offices. Discounted purchase prices let men buy posts cheaply—from clerk to prefect for a few thousand taels. Men of modest means bought offices for profit—with abuses beyond counting. He urged stopping sales, funded by lijin and customs from six provinces. Fujian's decade of fundraising raised only tens of thousands—other provinces likely similar. Petty revenue was not worth ruined governance—he asked the ministries to decide. Second: cut redundant officials. Purchase and military paths flooded offices with unpaid expectant officials. Provincial expectants far outnumbered those in Beijing. Regulations allowed keeping two-tenths of acting posts relative to vacancies. He asked lower-ranked appointees be sent home to await recommendation, as with metropolitan cases. Third: limit recommendations. Wartime recommendations had flooded honors and shortcuts. Future recommendations should grant only ranks truly due. Grand enfeoffments and added ranks must not be abused. Fourth: restore integrity salaries. Wartime cuts to integrity salaries had impoverished officials; restoration would help probity. Full integrity salaries would help restore probity. Fujian could afford full integrity pay for circuit officials and below. He asked court and provinces to restore or increase integrity salaries. Fifth: value examination quotas. Donations had expanded provincial examination quotas. Triennial metropolitan exams risked unfit men passing through inflated quotas. Inflated local quotas let shallow scholars gain robes and bully villages. Donations should expand metropolitan quotas only; education commissioners should review. Unfilled quotas should be recorded until scholarship improved. Sixth: establish drill camps. Soldiers' pay could not feed families, so they took side jobs. Drills were empty ritual. Mobilization took weeks. Soldiers knew neither officers nor comrades—how could they fight? Recent victories depended on Hunan and Huai volunteer armies. Millions spent on regular troops yielded nothing—the system was broken. After Jiangning's recovery he urged Zeng Guofan to reform Green Standard troops with victorious braves in organized camps. Zeng adopted the idea in Zhili as drill troops before leaving Fujian. Zuo Zongtang's reduce-troops-add-pay policy in Fujian-Zhejiang was sound. He asked provinces to add saved pay to combat troops. Five-hundred-man camps, rotated postings, and no soldiers loafing in towns would follow Xiang army practice. Without extra pay, usable troops could turn soldiers into effective forces." The ministries were ordered to deliberate.
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In 1887, en route to audience at Suzhou, he fell ill and was granted sick leave. When Japan threatened Taiwan he was ordered back despite illness. In 1875 he moved to Taiwan, then returned to Fuzhou as illness worsened. He died and was posthumously named Wenqin, Junior Guardian of the Heir Apparent.
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使使 西調
Guo Baiyin, style Yuantang, came from Houguan in Fujian. He took his jinshi in 1832, entered the Hanlin, and rose to censor and supervising secretary. He served as Gansu Ganliang circuit intendant. In 1843 he failed to expose a Revenue Ministry vault deficit as investigating censor, was fined, then made principal secretary. In 1853 militia service at Xiamen and Yanping won him promotion to director. In 1862 he was assigned to Zeng Guofan's staff. In 1863 he became Jiangsu grain commissioner, then judicial commissioner, treasurer, and acting governor. In 1867 he was made Guangxi governor, moved to Hubei, but stayed acting in Jiangsu. He and Zhejiang captured gun-boat bandit leader Bu Xiao'er. Gun boats were banned and baojia inspection tightened.
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That year he took Hubei and acted as Huguang governor-general. Discharged braves were intercepted at Huangmei and Wuxue by Xiao Chaoxu's secret society. Troops were sent; the gang killed Chaoxu and surrendered. Sect rebels in Jingshan, Qishui, and Mianyang were captured and executed. In 1868 he reported Hankou's mix of foreigners, discharged braves, and vagrants. Camp disbandment bred rumors and secret-society recruitment. Discharge bureaus in Wuhan and Xiangyang sent braves home with travel money." He also urged restoring Huainan salt to Hubei. War had blocked Huainan salt; north Huai ticket salt was a temporary substitute. He asked to restore Huainan quotas and end north Huai ticket salt. Lu salt in three prefectures should also be banned. In 1869 floods brought relief teams on multiple routes. In 1870 he again acted as Huguang governor-general. In 1871 Hunan rebels took Yiyang and Longyang; he captured leaders. In 1873 he resigned for illness. He died in 1884.
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調 滿 滿 西 使
His son Shichang was a provincial graduate. Shichang earned prefect appointment in Zhejiang through military merit. Governor Jiang Yilin sent him to Guangdong as acting prefect of Zhaoqing. After Yilin left office he returned to Zhejiang as Taizhou prefect. Bandit Huang Jinman rebelled in reaction to corrupt, harsh officials. Shichang held key passes, organized local defense, punished corrupt officials, and cut oppressive levies. Huang Jinman then surrendered to Peng Yulin. In 1900 Quzhou people killed missionaries and murdered Xi'an magistrate Wu Deshao. Promoted to Jinhua-Quzhou-Yanzhou circuit intendant, he calmed the region and executed the ringleaders. In 1905 he acted as judicial commissioner. He died.
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His son Zeng Qin of Wuchang became vice minister of Rites.
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The historians note that Wang Qingyun and Tan Tingxiang served widely at court and in the provinces; Qingyun's fiscal precision and orderly defenses were especially admirable. Ma Xinyi and Li Zongxi rose from model local officials to great provincial posts with distinguished records. Li Zongxi's protests against Yuanmingyuan rebuilding and his coastal-defense plans were far-sighted. Xu Zonggan and Wang Kaitai were esteemed for integrity and benevolent rule. Guo Baiyin's long service on the frontiers left benefits for generations after.
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