1
Huang Tifang, whose courtesy name was Shulan, came from Rui'an in Zhejiang. He passed the jinshi examination in the second year of Tongzhi, entered the Hanlin as a bachelor, and received appointment as an editor. He spent his days studying state institutions and came to harbor a strong desire to put his learning to practical service. Rising eventually to Reader-in-Waiting of the Hanlin Academy, he repeatedly memorialized the throne on the strengths and failings of contemporary governance. During famine in Shanxi and Henan he urged emergency relief, reform of local administration, and review of routine legal cases—measures that met with the emperor's approval. When officials debated banning distilleries to free grain for the populace, the Board of Revenue blocked the move. Tifang pointed out that licensed distillers paid the ministry thirty thousand taels a year; he then denounced Dong Xun's corruption and was demoted as punishment.
2
光緒五年三月，惠陵禮成，主事吳可讀為定大統以屍諫。 詔言：「同治十三年十二月初五日降旨，嗣後皇帝生有皇子，即承繼大行皇帝為嗣。 吳可讀所奏，前旨即是此意。」 於是下群臣議，體芳略言：「'即是此意'一語，止有恪遵，更有何議？ 乃激烈者盛氣力爭，巽畏者囁嚅不吐，或忠或謹，皆人臣盛節，而惜其未明今日事勢也。 譬諸士民之家，長子次子各有孫，而自祖父母視之則無異。 然襲爵職必歸之長房者，嫡長與嫡次之別也。 又如大宗無子，次宗止一嫡子，然小宗以嫡子繼大宗，不聞有所吝者，以仍得兼承本宗故也。 唯君與民微有不同。 民間以嫡子繼大宗，則大宗為主，本宗為兼。 天潢以嫡子繼帝系，則帝係為主，本宗可得而兼，親不可得而兼。 若人君以嫡子繼長支，則固以繼長支為主，而本宗亦不能不兼。 蓋人君無小宗，即稱謂加以區別，亦於本宗恩義無傷。 此兩宮意在嗣子承統，慈愛穆宗，亦即所以慈愛皇上之說也。 今非合兩統為一統，以不定為豫定，就將來承繼者以為承嗣，似亦無策以處之矣。 試思此時即不專為穆宗計，既正名為先帝嗣子，豈有僅封一王貝勒者乎？ 即不專為皇上計，古來天子之嗣子，豈有以不主神器之諸皇子當之者乎？ 即僅為穆宗計，皇上可如民間出繼之子乎？ 即僅為皇上計，穆宗可如前明稱為皇伯考乎？ 夫奉祖訓，禀懿旨，體聖意，非僭。 先帝今上皆無不宜，非悖。 明其統而非其人，非擅。 論統系，辨宗法，正足見國家億萬年無疆之庥，非干犯忌諱。 此固無意氣可逞，亦無功罪可言也。」 疏入，詔存毓慶宮。 自是劾尚書賀壽慈飾奏，俄使崇厚誤國，洪鈞譯地圖舛謬，美使崔國英赴賽會失體，皆人所難言，直聲震中外。
In the third month of Guangxu 5, after the rites at Emperor Tongzhi's Huiling mausoleum were completed, Principal Clerk Wu Kedu committed suicide in memorial protest to settle the question of imperial succession. An edict declared: "On the fifth day of the twelfth month, Tongzhi 13, it was decreed that whenever the reigning emperor should have a son, that son would succeed the late emperor as heir. Wu Kedu's memorial expressed precisely what the earlier edict had meant." The court then ordered the ministers to deliberate. Tifang wrote in summary: "The words 'exactly this meaning' permit nothing but obedient compliance—what room is left for argument? Yet the ardent argued with fierce passion while the timid muttered and held back; whether loyal or cautious, each showed the highest integrity of a minister—yet none, alas, grasped the realities of the present moment. Take an ordinary household: the eldest and second sons may each have grandsons, yet to the grandparents those grandchildren are alike. Still, the hereditary title must pass to the senior line—that is the difference between the legitimate eldest son and the legitimate second. Or again: when the major line lacks an heir and the minor line has but one legitimate son, that son from the minor line may succeed the major line without objection, because he can still inherit his birth line as well. Between throne and subject, however, the case differs slightly. Among common families, when a legitimate son succeeds the major line, the major line is primary and his birth line secondary. When an imperial legitimate son succeeds the dynastic line, the dynastic line is primary: he may still hold his birth line in name, but he cannot hold two bonds of filial kinship at once. When a sovereign's legitimate son succeeds the senior imperial branch, succession to that branch is primary—yet he must also bear his birth line jointly. A ruler has no true minor line: even when forms of address are distinguished, the moral claims of his birth line remain intact. This is what the two empress dowagers intend—that an heir's son should carry on the line: to honor Emperor Tongzhi is also to honor the present emperor. Unless the two lines of succession are merged into one—treating what is still unsettled as already settled and naming the future heir as present heir—there seems no way to resolve the difficulty. Even setting aside concern for Tongzhi alone: once he is formally named heir to the late emperor, could he be given no more than a princely or beile rank? Even setting aside concern for the present emperor alone: in all history, has an heir to the Son of Heaven ever been a prince not destined for the throne? Even if one cared only for Tongzhi: could the present emperor be treated like an ordinary adopted-out son? Even if one cared only for the present emperor: could Tongzhi be styled Imperial Uncle, as in the Ming dynasty? To follow ancestral teaching, heed the empress dowager's decree, and embody the sovereign's intent is not overreaching. Neither the late emperor nor the present sovereign is slighted; it is not disloyalty. To clarify the line of succession rather than name a particular person is not usurpation. To discuss the succession and clarify clan law is precisely to affirm the dynasty's blessing of endless duration—it is not to violate taboo. This is neither a matter for personal passion nor for claims of merit or blame." When the memorial reached the throne, an edict ordered it filed in the Yuqing Palace. Thereafter he denounced Minister He Shouci for falsifying reports, the Russian envoy Chonghou for betraying the nation, Hong Jun for errors in map translation, and the American minister Cui Guoying for misconduct at an exhibition—charges others dared not voice—and his reputation for blunt integrity resounded at home and abroad.
3
In the seventh year he was promoted to Academician of the Grand Secretariat and appointed educational commissioner of Jiangsu. The following year he was appointed Left Vice Minister of War. When the Sino-French War broke out, he urged recovery of the Ryukyu kingdom and a comprehensive policy on Vietnam. In the eleventh year he returned to Beijing, attacked Li Hongzhang's failure as commander, and urged that Zeng Jize be recalled at once to train forces; the memorial displeased the court and he was demoted to Commissioner of Transmission. He twice served as acting Left Vice Censor-in-Chief, arguing that self-strengthening must begin at home and detailing the successes and failures of foreign relations—judgments later borne out by events. In the seventeenth year he asked to retire. He died in the twenty-fifth year. His sons Shaoji and Shaodi both inherited the family scholarship, Shaoji being especially accomplished and refined.
4
Shaoji, whose courtesy name was Zhongtao. He passed the jinshi examination in Guangxu 6 and, as a Hanlin editor, served as chief examiner for Hubei's provincial examination. He rose to Lecturer and was appointed Junior Tutor. When the Imperial University was founded in Beijing, he served as its chief administrator. He studied Eastern and Western educational systems in depth and personally drafted the university's statutes. He was promoted to Reader-in-Waiting of the Hanlin Academy. He served in turn as supervisor of the Compilation Bureau and the Translation Bureau. He was appointed educational intendant of Hubei. Traveling to Japan, he debated Confucian doctrine with Japanese scholars and invariably won their admiration. Shortly after his return he died.
5
The imperial clansman Baoting, whose courtesy name was Zhupo, belonged to the Manchu Bordered Blue Banner and was an eighth-generation descendant of Prince Xian of Zheng, Jirhalang. He passed the jinshi examination in Tongzhi 7, entered the Hanlin as a bachelor, and was appointed editor. He rose in due course to Lecturer of the Hanlin Academy. At the beginning of Guangxu he memorialized for the appointment of tutors to cultivate the emperor's virtue, tighter control of eunuchs to prevent interference, audit of the Imperial Household Department to cut waste, and drill of the Shenji Camp for emergencies—all measures praised and accepted by the empress dowager. Rated third class in the triennial examination, he was demoted to Junior Mentor and soon appointed Vice Director of Studies. The court was then intent on reform and solicited views on administration, livelihood, appointments, and policy; Baoting exposed abuses in a memorial of several hundred blunt, penetrating words. During famine in Shanxi and Henan he answered the imperial call for advice, urging the emperor to reproach himself and hold his ministers accountable. He proposed four relief measures: audit tax collection, open grain-donation drives, purchase foreign rice, and expand government grain-sale offices. Because the disaster was widespread and relief burdens heavy, he also urged a system of graded loans to the afflicted. During drought around the capital, when the sun appeared red and rumors panicked the markets, he urged tight internal security and outward calm to steady public sentiment. Promoted to Lecturer-in-Waiting, he submitted six reforms: clarify promotions and demotions, fix responsibility, conduct thorough inquiries, enforce deadlines, root out fraud, and use amnesties sparingly—proposals the throne approved. In the fifth year he was made Reader-in-Waiting of the Hanlin Academy.
6
初，德宗繼統嗣文宗，懿旨謂將來生有皇子，即繼穆宗為嗣。 內閣侍讀學士廣安請頒鐵券，被訶責。 至是，穆宗奉安惠陵，主事吳可讀堅請為其立後，以屍諫，下廷臣議。 寶廷謂：「恭繹懿旨之意，蓋言穆宗未有儲貳，即以皇上所生之子為嗣，非言生皇子即時承繼也，言嗣而統賅焉矣。 引伸之，蓋言將來即以皇上傳統之皇子繼穆宗為嗣也。 因皇上甫承大統，故渾涵其詞，留待親政日自下明詔，此皇太后不忍歧視之慈心，欲以孝弟仁讓之休歸之皇上也。 廣安不能喻，故生爭於前； 吳可讀不能喻，故死爭於後。 竊痛可讀殉死之忠，而又惜其遺摺之言不盡意也。 可讀未喻懿旨言外之意，而其遺摺未達之意，皇太后早鑑及之，故曰'前降旨時即是此意'也。 而可讀猶以忠佞不齊為慮，誠過慮也。 宋太宗背杜太后，明景帝廢太子見深，雖因佞臣妄進邪說，究由二君有自私之心。 乃者兩宮懿旨懸於上，孤臣遺疏存於下，傳之九州，載之國史，皇上天生聖人，必能以皇太后之心為心。 請將前後懿旨恭呈御覽，明降諭旨，宣示中外，俾天下後世咸知我皇太后至慈，皇上至孝至弟至仁至讓，且以見穆宗至聖至明，付託得人也。 如是，則綱紀正，名分定，天理順，人情安矣。 因赴內閣集議，意微不合，謹以上聞。」
When Emperor Guangxu had first succeeded as heir to Emperor Xianfeng, an empress dowager's decree held that any son born to him in future would succeed Emperor Tongzhi as heir. Guang'an, Lecturer-in-Waiting of the Grand Secretariat, had asked for an iron bond of assurance and was reprimanded. Now, when Emperor Tongzhi was interred at Huiling, Principal Clerk Wu Kedu insisted that an heir be named for him and remonstrated by suicide; the court ordered a ministerial debate. Baoting wrote: "Reverently construed, the empress dowager's decree means that because Tongzhi left no heir, the son the present emperor bears shall be his successor—not that any newborn son must succeed at once, but that 'heir' here embraces the whole line of succession. Taken further, it means that in future the son who inherits the present emperor's own line will succeed Tongzhi as heir. Because the emperor had only just ascended the throne, the wording was deliberately broad, leaving a clear edict for the day he took personal rule—this was the empress dowager's compassion, unwilling to divide loyalties, wishing to leave the emperor the credit of filial devotion, brotherly duty, benevolence, and forbearance. Guang'an failed to grasp this and argued in life; Wu Kedup failed to grasp it and contended in death. I deeply grieve Wu Kedu's loyal death, yet regret that his final memorial did not fully express his intent. Wu Kedup did not grasp what lay beyond the empress dowager's words, yet she had long seen what his memorial left unsaid—hence her declaration that the earlier edict had meant exactly this. Yet Wu Kedup still feared that loyal and treacherous ministers would not act as one—a needless anxiety. Song Taizong betrayed Empress Dowager Du's charge; Ming Jingdi deposed the heir Zhu Jianshen—though flatterers fed them false counsel, both rulers acted from selfish motives. Now the two palaces' decrees stand above and a lone minister's dying memorial below, to be proclaimed throughout the realm and written into the dynastic record; the emperor, a sage by nature, will surely make the empress dowager's intent his own. I beg that the earlier and later decrees be presented for the emperor's review, that a clear edict be issued and proclaimed at home and abroad, so that all the world and posterity may know the empress dowager's boundless compassion, the emperor's supreme filial piety, brotherly duty, benevolence, and forbearance—and may see that Tongzhi, most sage and discerning, entrusted his line to the right man. Then moral order will be restored, titles fixed, heaven's way satisfied, and human hearts at ease. Finding my view at slight variance with the Grand Secretariat deliberation, I respectfully submit this for the throne's attention."
7
又奏：「廷臣謂穆宗繼統之議，已賅於皇太后前降懿旨之中，將來神器所歸，皇上自能斟酌盡善，固也。 然懿旨意深詞簡，不及此引伸明晰，異日皇上生有皇子，將繼穆宗為嗣乎，抑不即繼乎？ 不即繼似違懿旨，即繼又嫌跡近建儲。 就令僅言繼嗣，不標繼統之名，而臣民亦隱以儲貳視之，是不建之建也。 而此皇子賢也，固宗社福； 如其不賢，將來仍傳繼統乎，抑舍而別傳乎？ 別傳之皇子，仍繼穆宗為嗣乎，抑不繼乎？ 即使仍繼穆宗，是亦不廢立之廢立也，豈太平盛事乎？ 至此時即欲皇上斟酌盡善，不亦難乎？ 廷議之意，或以皇上親政，皇子應尚未生，不難豫酌一盡善之規。 然國君十五而生子，皇子誕育如在徹簾之前，又何以處之乎？ 與其留此兩難之局以待皇上，何如及今斟酌盡善乎？ 且懿旨非皇上可改，此時不引伸明晰，將來皇上雖斟酌盡善，何敢自為變通乎？ 此未妥者一也。 廷議又謂繼統與建儲，文義似殊，而事體則一，似也。 然列聖垂訓，原言嗣統之常，今則事屬創局，可讀意在存穆宗之統，與無故擅請建儲者有間，文義之殊，不待言矣。 今廷議不分別詞意，漫謂我朝家法未能深知，則日前懿旨'即是此意'之謂何，臣民不更滋疑乎？ 此未妥者又一也。」 疏入，詔藏毓慶宮。 其他，俄使來議約，朝鮮請通商，均有所獻納。
He also wrote: "Ministers say the question of Tongzhi's succession is already covered by the empress dowager's earlier decree, and that when the throne passes in future the emperor can weigh every matter to perfection—so far, so good. Yet the decree's intent is deep and its wording brief; without this fuller explanation, when the emperor has a son, will that son succeed Tongzhi at once or not? Not succeeding at once would seem to violate the decree; succeeding at once would look too much like naming a crown prince. Even if one spoke only of heirship without naming succession to the line, officials and people would still treat the child as crown prince in all but name—establishing an heir without formally doing so. If that prince proves worthy, the realm is blessed; if he proves unworthy, will the line still pass to him, or be set aside for another? Would a prince from another line still succeed Tongzhi as heir, or not? Even if he did succeed Tongzhi, that would amount to deposing and enthroning without calling it so—hardly an age of great peace, would it? By then, could the emperor still weigh every matter to perfection? Ministers may think that when the emperor takes personal rule no prince will yet have been born, making it easy to frame a perfect plan in advance. Yet rulers commonly father sons at fifteen; if a prince is born before the regency ends, what then? Rather than leave this dilemma for the emperor, would it not be better to settle it now? Moreover, the empress dowager's decree is not the emperor's to alter; if it is not clarified now, how could he later dare change it even if he wished to? This is the first flaw in the ministers' plan. Ministers also say that succession to the line and naming a crown prince differ in wording but not in substance—so it seems. Yet the teaching of our sage forebears concerned the normal rule of heir and succession; today's case is unprecedented. Wu Kedup sought to preserve Tongzhi's line—quite unlike those who presumptuously demand a crown prince without cause. The difference in wording scarcely needs stating. If ministers refuse to distinguish the terms and casually claim ignorance of dynastic law, what becomes of the empress dowager's words 'exactly this meaning'? Will not officials and people only grow more suspicious? This is the second flaw." When the memorial reached the throne, an edict ordered it filed in the Yuqing Palace. On other matters too—Russian treaty negotiations, Korea's request for trade—he submitted thoughtful proposals.
8
In the seventh year he was appointed Academician of the Grand Secretariat and sent to preside over Fujian's provincial examination. After completing his duties he returned to the capital, resigned in self-accusation for taking a concubine en route, built a residence on the Western Hills, and retired there. That winter, on the empress dowager's birthday celebrations, he was honored with third-rank standing. He died in the sixteenth year.
9
子壽富，庶吉士。 庚子，拳匪亂，殉難，自有傳。
His son Shoufu served as a Hanlin bachelor. In the gengzi year of the Boxer Rebellion he died a martyr's death; his life is recorded in a separate biography.
10
The imperial clansman Sheng Yu, whose courtesy name was Boxi, belonged to the Manchu Bordered White Banner and was a seventh-generation descendant of Prince Suwu, Hooge. His grandfather Jingzheng had served as Associate Grand Secretary. His father Heng'en had been Left Vice Censor-in-Chief. Sheng Yu showed exceptional talent as a boy. At ten he used the term "teqin" in a poem and, citing the Tang stele of Kül Tigin, demonstrated that the New Tang History's Turkic "chun tele" was a misreading of "teqin"—an achievement that brought him wide renown. He passed the jinshi examination in Guangxu 2 and was appointed a Hanlin editor. He redoubled his studies, researching the classics, history, geography, and Qing institutional precedents until he could narrate their evolution in full detail. He rose in due course to Right Junior Tutor and was appointed to the Daily Lecture and Imperial Diary.
11
When Fujian-Zhejiang Governor-General He Jing and Governor Liu Bingzhang accepted the surrender of the Taiwan rebel Huang Jinman, Sheng Yu attacked them for sheltering criminals and urged strict judicial review, with Jinman exiled to Heilongjiang and Xinjiang. When Minister Peng Yulin repeatedly refused office, Sheng Yu impeached him for putting personal ease first and encouraging the arrogance of meritorious officials. Before Zhejiang Surveillance Commissioner Chen Baozhen could depart for his audience with the throne, Sheng Yu revived charges of careless adjudication from Chen's tenure in Henan, and Chen was dismissed; Zhang Peilun then charged him with lingering in Beijing to lobby for promotion. When Chen Baozhen defended himself in a memorial, Sheng Yu declared that his noisy self-defense was unbecoming a senior minister and urged another referral to the judiciary. During the Korean crisis, Commander Wu Changqing, acting on orders from Beiyang Commissioner Zhang Shusheng, marched into Korea, seized the Taewon-gun Li Gang-yeo, and brought him back—an exploit then widely praised as extraordinary. Sheng Yu wrote: "This arose from entrapment and abduction and cannot be called merit; it only chills our tributary ally and invites ridicule abroad. They should be sternly punished, so that at home and abroad all may know this was never the court's intent." Though he had served as lecturer for less than half a year, he repeatedly memorialized on state affairs, and public opinion hailed him as a fearless remonstrator.
12
In the tenth year he was appointed Chancellor of the Imperial Academy. When the Sino-French conflict erupted, Xu Yanxu and Tang Jiong were arrested for losing territory. Sheng Yu wrote: "To seize and interrogate frontier officials without a clear imperial edict—in two hundred years there has been no precedent for such a procedure." He also impeached the Grand Council ministers for dereliction of duty. The empress dowager was enraged and dismissed Prince Gong Yixin and others, but then summoned Prince Chun Yixuan to the Grand Council. Sheng Yu protested again: "Prince Chun's princely station is too exalted to be burdened with routine state affairs." That summer the court ordered a ministerial debate on war and peace. Sheng Yu argued for immediate war, setting forth seven advantages and warning: "If we miss our chance again, we shall bite our navels in vain regret."
13
As chancellor, Sheng Yu and Vice Director Zhi Lin overhauled instruction at the academy: they renovated the dormitories, increased stipends, instituted a points-based schedule, punished idleness, rewarded serious scholarship—and student conduct was transformed. In the fourteenth year he served as chief examiner for Shandong's provincial examination. The following year he retired on grounds of illness. In retirement Sheng Yu enjoyed a reputation for integrity, and young scholars considered it a privilege to hear him speak and observe his manner. He died in the twenty-fifth year.
14
張佩綸，字幼樵，直隸豐潤人。 父印塘，官安徽按察使，卒於軍。 佩綸，成同治十年進士，以編脩大考擢侍講，充日講起居注官。 時外侮亟，累疏陳經國大政，請敕新疆、東三省、台灣嚴戒備，杜日、俄窺伺。 晉、豫飢，畿輔旱，乃引祖宗成訓，請上下交儆，條四目以進：曰誠祈，曰集議，曰恤民，曰省刑。 恭親王奕訢遭讒構，復請責王竭誠負重，上嘉納之。 通政使黃體芳繼陳災狀，語稍激，絓吏議，佩綸力爭，被宥。 尋丁憂，服竟，起故官。 時琉球已亡，法圖越南亟，佩綸曰：「亡琉球則朝鮮可危，棄越南則緬甸必失。」 因請建置南北海防，設水師四大鎮； 又薦道員徐延旭、唐炯知兵堪任邊事，其招致劉永福黑旗兵為己用。 是時吳大澂、陳寶琛好論時政，與寶廷、鄧承修輩號「清流黨」，而佩綸尤以糾彈大臣著一時。 如侍郎賀壽慈，尚書萬青藜、董恂，皆被劾去。
Zhang Peilun, whose courtesy name was Youqiao, came from Fengrun in Zhili. His father Yintang had served as Anhui Surveillance Commissioner and died on campaign. Peilun passed the jinshi examination in Tongzhi 10; rated highly in the triennial examination as a Hanlin editor, he was promoted to Lecturer and appointed to the Daily Lecture and Imperial Diary. As foreign pressure mounted, he repeatedly memorialized on fundamental state policy, urging strict defenses for Xinjiang, the Northeast, and Taiwan to forestall Japanese and Russian encroachment. During famine in Shanxi and Henan and drought around the capital, he cited ancestral teaching and urged vigilance at every level, proposing four measures: sincere prayer, collective deliberation, relief for the people, and reduction of punishments. When Prince Gong Yixin fell victim to slander, Peilun urged that the prince be entrusted with full authority and devotion—a proposal the emperor praised and accepted. When Commissioner of Transmission Huang Tifang next reported on disasters in heated language and faced disciplinary action, Peilun argued vigorously on his behalf and Huang was pardoned. He soon entered mourning for his father; when the mourning period ended, he returned to his former post. Ryukyu had already fallen and France was pressing hard on Vietnam. Peilun warned: "Lose Ryukyu and Korea is endangered; abandon Vietnam and Burma will surely follow." He therefore urged coastal defenses north and south and four major naval commands; he also recommended Circuit Intendants Xu Yanxu and Tang Jiong as military men fit for frontier duty, and urged them to enlist Liu Yongfu's Black Flag Army for their own forces. At this time Wu Dacheng and Chen Baochen were outspoken on current affairs; with Baoting, Deng Chengxiu, and others they were known as the "Qingliu Party", while Peilun was especially famed for impeaching senior officials. Vice Minister He Shouci and Ministers Wan Qingli and Dong Xun were among those he drove from office.
15
In Guangxu 8 the Yunnan reimbursement scandal broke. Wang Wenshao, a Grand Council minister, also headed the Board of Revenue, and censors flooded the court with charges of bribery. Though the emperor still trusted him, Peilun cited the Qianlong precedent of Liang Shizheng retiring to care for his father and urged Wang to withdraw on grounds of conflict—without response; after two further impeachment memorials Wang was dismissed, and Peilun was appointed acting Left Vice Censor-in-Chief and promoted to Lecturer-in-Waiting of the Hanlin Academy. The following year, as the Sino-French conflict erupted, Peilun submitted more than a dozen memorials. The court finally sent troops against local bandits to check the French advance, but the French, finding this inconvenient, feigned peace talks while secretly capturing Nanding. Peilun urged striking before French forces concentrated and ordering the Guangdong governor to send a fleet to the Vietnamese capital. The Grand Council, clinging to peace and fearing Peilun would block their deliberations, sent him to Shaanxi on an investigation. Soon the French attacked Hue, forced Vietnam into alliance, and the Vietnamese situation deteriorated further. On his return he was assigned to the Zongli Yamen for Foreign Affairs.
16
In the tenth year, when the French threatened coastal invasion, Peilun argued that the Vietnamese crisis was unresolved, the Black Flags still held the field, and France had no reason to divert forces eastward. He urged that garrisons not be withdrawn lest war be provoked—the emperor agreed. The court consulted Li Hongzhang and decided on war, appointing Peilun third-grade commissioner to oversee Fujian's coastal defense. At the Foochow Navy Yard Peilun surrounded himself with eleven vessels for protection. When the commanders protested that this was no plan of theirs, he rebuked them. When French warships gathered and a challenge arrived, his officers rushed to urge preparations; he drove them out with rebukes. Only when he saw the French ships raising steam did panic set in. He sent student Wei Han to beg for a truce, but before Wei arrived the guns opened fire; five battalions routed, three of them annihilated. Peilun fled toward Mount Gu, but villagers turned him away. He cried: "I am the commissioner in charge!" They refused him just the same. The next day he fled to Pengtian village, still filing embellished reports. The court ordered treasury funds to reward him and appointed him concurrent Superintendent of the Naval Yard. When news of the Mawei disaster arrived, he was merely stripped of his commissioner rank and referred to the judiciary. Fujian was outraged. Editor Pan Bingnian, Censor Wan Peiyin, and others then filed memorial after memorial detailing his offenses. He had already been dismissed for recommending Tang Shang and Xu Yanxu; now he was sentenced to exile again.
17
After his exile he was released and Li Hongzhang again took him onto his staff, giving him his daughter in marriage. When the First Sino-Japanese War broke out, Censor Duan Liang impeached him for meddling in public affairs, and he was ordered home. During the Boxer peace negotiations of 1900, Li Hongzhang recommended him as skilled in diplomacy, and the court appointed him an editor to help draft the treaty. When the treaty was signed he was promoted to a fourth- or fifth-rank capital post but pleaded illness and declined to serve. He died in the thirty-fourth year.
18
He Ruzhang, whose courtesy name was Ziguan, was a native of Dapu in Guangdong. He passed the jinshi examination in Tongzhi 7, entered the Hanlin as a bachelor, and was appointed editor. As a Hanlin Reader he was dispatched as envoy to Japan. On his return he was appointed Junior Vice Director of the Hanlin and sent to superintend the naval yard. Following Li Hongzhang's policy of peace, he clung to negotiation; when the enemy arrived he still sternly ordered every ship not to move. After the defeat he fled on the pretext of escorting funds; nowhere would admit him, and in desperation he sought out Peilun at Pengtian village. Peilun, fearing the enemy would track him down, tricked Ruzhang into leaving. Public opinion held that Peilun was chiefly to blame for the Fujian disaster and Ruzhang second. Ruzhang was also exiled. He later died at home.
19
Deng Chengxiu, whose courtesy name was Tiexiang, came from Guishan in Guangdong. He passed the provincial examination in Xianfeng 11, purchased office as a secretary, and was assigned to the Board of Punishments. He was transferred to censor but returned home to mourn his father. Early in Guangxu, when his mourning ended, he returned to his former post. With Zhang Peilun and others he led the Qingliu faction's moral criticism, impeaching officials relentlessly, and was known as the "Iron Han". He repeatedly denounced surname-based examination gambling contributions as a grave corruption of governance; customs revenue embezzlement that drained the treasury; on entrenched examination abuses, he proposed seven reforms; on entrenched official corruption, he proposed eight measures to purge it. He also impeached Governor Li Hanzhang for maladministration, Left Vice Censor-in-Chief Chong Xun for misconduct, Vice Ministers including Chang Xu for violating regulations, and Educational Commissioners Wu Baoshu and Ye Dachao, Provincial Administration Commissioners Fang Dashen and Gong Yitu, and Salt Controller Zhou Xingyu for various failures in office. When frontier alarms arose, he attacked the whole court for laxity and urged that Zuo Zongtang be recalled to direct state affairs. A year later, when a comet appeared, he declared that Zuo Zongtang had held office for months without visible achievement, extended his attack to the senility of Baojun and Wang Wenshao, and urged their dismissal to appease heaven. Wang Wenshao was then rising from provincial service to greater power. When the Yunnan reimbursement scandal broke, Deng impeached him again—still without success. Eventually he was promoted to Supervising Secretary.
20
時朝鮮亂平，琉球案未結，上言簡知兵大臣駐煙台，厚集南北洋戰艦番巡，留吳長慶軍戍朝互犄角。 越南亂作，法人襲順化，復請詔百官廷議定國是，皆不報。 十年，越事益壞，首劾徐延旭、唐炯失地喪師，趙沃、黃桂蘭擁兵僨事，宜肅國憲。 其夏，法人原媾和，承修聯合臺諫上書，極言和議難恃。 旋與司業潘衍桐密上間敵五策，並劾李鴻章定和之疏，嫉劉永福敢戰，言之憤絕。 亡何，法果敗盟，侵台灣雞籠，樞臣議和戰未決。 於是承修再陳三策：「法所恃為援者西貢、東京。 我若師分三路，亟攻越南，彼將自救不暇，策之上也。 分兵為守，敵至則戰，敵退不追，老師糜餉，利害共之，策之中也。 若慮餉詘運阻，不敢言戰，則其禍不勝言矣，是謂無策。」 補鴻臚寺卿，充總理各國事務大臣。 自此陳說兵事，章凡十三上，多見採納。 嗣以中允樊恭煦獲譴，上疏營救，坐鐫秩。 明年，赴天津佐鴻章與法使巴特納商和約，定新約十款。 還，乞歸省。
Korea was pacified but the Ryukyu question remained open. He urged appointing a military minister at Yantai, concentrating Northern and Southern Fleet warships for patrol, and keeping Wu Changqing's army in Korea as a counterweight. When Vietnam erupted and the French seized Hue, he again urged a court assembly of all officials to settle national policy—all without response. In the tenth year, as Vietnam deteriorated, he was first to impeach Xu Yanxu and Tang Jiong for losing territory and armies, and Zhao Wo and Huang Guilan for misusing troops and ruining the campaign—urging that national law be enforced. That summer, when the French sought peace, Chengxiu joined censors and remonstrators in memorials declaring peace talks untrustworthy. He soon joined Vice Director Pan Yantong in secretly submitting five stratagems against the enemy and impeached Li Hongzhang's peace memorial, raging with indignation at Li's hostility to Liu Yongfu's fighting spirit. Before long the French broke the treaty and attacked Jilong in Taiwan, while the Grand Council remained undecided between war and peace. Chengxiu then proposed three stratagems: "France's bases of support are Saigon and Tonkin. If we divide our forces into three columns and strike Vietnam swiftly, they will be too busy saving themselves—the superior stratagem. Hold divided forces on the defensive, fight when the enemy comes but do not pursue when they withdraw, wearing out our armies and wasting supplies while sharing costs with the enemy—the middling stratagem. If we fear short funds and blocked supply lines and dare not speak of war, the calamity is beyond description—this is no stratagem at all." He was appointed Chief of the Court of State Ceremonial (Honglu Temple) and served as Minister of the Zongli Yamen for Foreign Affairs. Thereafter he repeatedly memorialized on military affairs, submitting thirteen memorials in all, many of which the court adopted. When Junior Mentor Fan Gongxu was punished, he memorialized in his defense and was himself demoted. The following year he went to Tianjin to assist Li Hongzhang in negotiating a treaty with the French envoy Patenotre, settling ten articles of a new convention. After returning to the capital he asked leave to visit his family.
21
Before he could leave Beijing he was ordered to Guangxi to survey the Sino-Vietnamese border with the French envoy; on arrival he rode out alone through the frontier pass to meet Bourée. Bourée wanted to survey the old boundary first; Chengxiu, citing the treaty, insisted on correcting the line first, and neither would yield. Bourée openly offered Wenyuan, Baole, and Haining to China while secretly cabling his minister in Beijing to accuse Chengxiu of violating the treaty, warning that unless the old boundary were surveyed first talks would collapse. The court, unable to refuse, agreed. Chengxiu then telegraphed a memorial listing three difficulties and two harms: "Border inhabitants refuse French rule; surveying the old boundary first risks unrest—the first difficulty. Baole is open pasture where roaming braves are fierce and block the roads—the second difficulty. Old boundary markers are broken—fewer than half remain; sheer cliffs, malarial rains, and suffocating heat stop men and horses—the third difficulty. Once the old boundary is surveyed they will surely discard it—what hope for fixing a new line? Neither Qulü nor Wenyuan can be held; the pass loses its strategic value and both attack and defense become impossible—the first harm. Lose Wenyuan and there is no buffer to the north; inland trade will be squeezed, Vietnam will be gone—how then can Guangdong be saved? That is the second harm." The memorial reached the throne but drew no response.
22
In the twelfth year the French separately sent Dillon and Descours to meet. A French judge named Daru had just reached Zhe'erlan when Vietnamese killed him. The envoys were frightened and, ashamed of the incident, concealed it; they pressed for demarcation by map, and the court agreed. They then proposed ceding Jiangping, Huangzhu, Bailongwei, and other districts to Vietnam. Chengxiu cited maps and records and held firm; unable to prevail, the envoys proposed splitting Bailongwei, the left half to China and the right to Vietnam. Chengxiu argued that the district was Qinzhou's maritime gateway: in French hands it would threaten Fangcheng inland and sever Dongxing and Sile seaward—Qin and Lian would be lost. Talks dragged on until three provisional articles were agreed, but before matters were settled the envoys used troops to drive the people of Jiangping and Huangzhu inland. Fearing a border clash, the court ordered a survey of the full boundary from Qinzhou west through Guangxi; Chengxiu then signed the definitive agreement, described in detail in the treatises on foreign relations. In the thirteenth year he reported the full story of the treaty to the throne and was restored to rank. In the fourteenth year he retired on grounds of illness, took charge of Fenghu Academy, and devoted himself to study while supporting his mother. He died at Huizhou in the seventeenth year.
23
Xu Zhixiang, whose courtesy name was Jihe, came from Jiading in Jiangsu. He passed the jinshi examination in Xianfeng 10, entered the Hanlin as a bachelor, and was appointed editor. Promoted to Junior Mentor, he served as chief examiner for Shandong's provincial examination. He rose to Academician of the Grand Secretariat and was appointed educational commissioner of Shuntian. After his father's death he left office; when mourning ended he returned to his former post. In Guangxu 10, as France and Vietnam went to war, Detring urged peace talks, but the court had not yet decided. Zhixiang proposed three policies: fight decisively and at once, give commanders full authority, and coordinate all forces. As the Fujian crisis worsened he declared He Jing and Zhang Zhaodong incapable of decisive action and recommended Yang Yuebin and Zhang Peilun for major commands—proposals largely accepted by the throne. When railways were debated he reacted with revulsion, memorializing eight grave harms and urging rejection of the scheme and priority for river works; the emperor called his arguments absurd and demoted him three ranks. Two years later, when railways were debated again, he blocked the plan a second time. He submitted more than ten sealed memorials in all, persistently urging restraint on eunuchs and repair of the rivers—conduct praised by public opinion. He served in turn as chief examiner for the Fujian and Guangdong provincial examinations. In the eighteenth year he became President of the Court of Judicial Review, impeaching in succession Grand Councilor Prince Li Shiduo and Shanxi Governor Akedachun, while attacking Zhang Zhidong with relentless energy. He was soon appointed to inspect education in Zhejiang, where he earned a reputation for strictness.
24
After China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War he denounced Yikuang and Li Hongzhang for betraying the nation, urged that Ye Zhichao, Wei Rugui, and others be arrested and punished, and proposed giving Feng Zicai and Liu Yongfu formal command to restore national prestige and revive army morale. When the Shandong missionary case broke out, the German envoy Heyking demanded that Li Bingheng be removed from office. Zhixiang wrote: "Last year Liu Bingzhang was dismissed; this year Li Bingheng—the court's power over appointments is being exercised by a foreign power. I beg that national dignity be preserved and that we not yield to intimidation." Privately he felt the nation's course was not being righted and turmoil would not end; citing the Kangxi emperor's devotion to Zhu Xi as dynastic precedent, he urged regular classical lectures to cultivate the sovereign's virtue—all without response. When his term expired he returned to Beijing and was appointed Right Vice Minister of War. In the twenty-fourth year, when the emperor fell ill and public anxiety mounted, he again urged measures to cultivate the sovereign's virtue.
25
The state faced many crises and the succession remained unsettled; Zhixiang, concerned for the dynastic foundation, wrote in summary: "Song Zhenzong once took imperial clansmen's sons into the palace to rear; when Renzong was born they were sent home; later Renzong, Gaozong, and Lizong all followed the same practice. Zhenzong was the ruler who sent foster sons home once a natural son was born. When no natural son existed, foster sons received the throne: Renzong to Yingzong, Gaozong to Xiaozong, and Lizong to Duzong. Given the weight of the succession and the people's urgent hopes, I urge that we follow the Song precedent: carefully select several sons of brothers from the near imperial clan, chosen for kinship and merit, to attend within the palace as foster sons but not as designated heirs, observing household law so their character may be quietly tested while awaiting the birth of an imperial son. Then though the emperor has no son he will have sons in waiting, though the empress dowager has no grandson she will have grandsons in prospect, and the great charge entrusted by Tongzhi will have a line of succession." Before long, the court did establish Pujun as heir apparent. He died in the twenty-fifth year.
26
The historians comment: Tifang, Baoting, Peilun, and Zhang Zhidong were known as the Four Remonstrating Hanlin; on major state affairs they invariably memorialized the throne on right and wrong, and together with like-minded contemporaries were called the "Qingliu Party". Yet in debating the imperial succession Tifang and Baoting showed a loyal devotion that Peilun and the others could not equal. Chengxiu made a career of fierce denunciation; Zhixiang was punished for absurd arguments—thoughtful men held both in low regard. Only Sheng Yu spoke with restraint and withdrew early to preserve his integrity—perhaps he alone, standing apart, did not betray his pure reputation?