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黃河上
The Yellow River — Part One
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黃河自昔為中國患，《河渠書》述之詳矣。 探厥本源，則博望之說，猶為未也。 大元至元二十七年，我世祖皇帝命學士蒲察篤實西窮河源，始得其詳。 今西蕃朵甘思南鄙曰星宿海者，其源也，四山之間，有泉近百泓，匯而為海，登高望之，若星宿布列，故名。 流出復瀦，曰哈刺海，東出曰赤賓河，合忽闌、也裏術二河，東北流為九渡河，其水猶清，騎可涉也。 貫山中行，出西戎之都會，曰闊即、曰闊提者，合納憐河，所謂「細黃河」也，水流已濁。 繞昆侖之南，折而東注，合乞裏馬出河，復繞昆侖之北，自貴德、西寧之境，至積石，經河州，過臨洮，合洮河，東北流至蘭州，始入中國。 北繞朔方、北地、上郡而東，經三受降城、豐東勝州，折而南，出龍門，過河中，抵潼關。 東出三門、集津為孟津，過虎牢，而後奔放平壤。 吞納小水以百數，勢益雄放，無崇山巨磯以防閑之，旁激奔潰，不遵禹跡。 故虎牢迤東距海口三二千里，恒被其害，宋為特甚。 始自滑台、大伾，嘗兩經泛溢，復禹跡矣。 一時奸臣建議，必欲回之，俾復故流，竭天下之力以塞之。 屢塞屢決，至南渡而後，貽其禍于金源氏，由不能順其就下之性以導之故也。
From antiquity the Yellow River has been a scourge upon China, and the "Rivers and Canals Treatise" in the Records of the Grand Historian sets forth its history at length. Yet even when one traces it to its ultimate source, the account given by Zhang Qian, Marquis of Bowang, still falls short of the truth. In the twenty-seventh year of the Zhiyuan era (1290), during the Great Yuan, Our Emperor Shizu ordered the academician Pucha Duoshi to travel west to the furthest source of the river, and only then were its true details ascertained. Its source lies today on the southern frontier of Duo Gan Si in the Western Territories, at a place called the Sea of Starry Constellations. Between four mountains nearly a hundred springs pool into a lake; from the heights they look like stars strewn across the sky, and so it was named. The stream flows out and gathers again in Lake Hala. Where it issues eastward it is called the Chibin River; joining the Hulan and Yelishu rivers, it runs northeast as the Nine-Crossings River, its waters still clear enough for horsemen to wade across. Threading through the mountains, it emerges at the western capital called Kuoji or Kuoti, joins the Naling River — the so-called "slender Yellow River" — and by then the current has already turned muddy. Winding south of Kunlun, it bends eastward and joins the Qilimachu River, then curves north of Kunlun again. From the lands of Guide and Xining it reaches Jishi, passes Hezhou and Lintao, joins the Tao River, and flows northeast to Lanzhou — where it first enters the Chinese heartland. It sweeps north around Shuofang, Beidi, and Shang commanderies and runs east, passes the three Accept-the-Surrender fortresses and Fengdong Sheng Prefecture, turns south, issues through Longmen, crosses Hezhong, and reaches Tong Pass. Issuing east through Sanmen and Jijin it becomes the Meng Ford, passes Hulao, and then charges out across the flatlands. It swallows hundreds of tributaries, its force growing ever more violent. With no towering mountains or massive reefs to hold it in check, it bursts and spills to the sides, abandoning the course traced by Yu the Great. From Hulao eastward to the sea mouth — two or three thousand li — the region has constantly suffered its ravages, and under the Song the affliction was especially grave. Beginning at Huatai and Dapi, it twice broke its banks in catastrophic floods and returned to the course laid down by Yu. At one point treacherous ministers insisted that the river must be forced back into its former channel, and the empire exhausted its resources trying to dam it. Time after time it was dammed and time after time it broke through. After the court crossed south, the disaster was passed on to the Jin of the Golden Source — all because no one would yield to the river's nature of seeking lower ground and channel it accordingly.
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若江，若淮，若洛、汴、衡漳，暨江、淮以南諸水，皆有舟楫溉灌之利者，曆敘其事而分紀之。 為《河渠志》。
The Yangtze, the Huai, the Luo, Bian, Heng, and Zhang rivers, and all the waters south of the Yangtze and Huai that serve shipping and irrigation — each is treated in turn and recorded in its own section. These form the "Rivers and Canals Treatise."
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河入中國，行太行西，曲折山間，不能為大患。 既出大岯，東走赴海，更平地二千餘里，禹跡既湮，河並為一，特以堤防為之限。 夏秋霖潦，百川眾流所會，不免決溢之憂，然有司所以備河者，亦益工矣。
Once the river enters the Chinese heartland it runs west of the Taihang range, twisting through the mountains, and cannot yet do great harm. Once it clears Dapi and races east toward the sea across more than two thousand li of flat country, Yu's ancient course long buried, the waters have merged into a single stream held in only by embankments. In summer and autumn the seasonal rains gather a hundred rivers into one torrent, and the threat of breach and flood is never far off — yet the officials charged with river defense grew ever more adept at their work.
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自周顯德初，大決東平之楊劉，宰相李谷監治堤，自陽谷抵張秋口以遏之，水患少息。 然決河不復故道，離而為赤河。
From the opening years of Later Zhou's Xiande reign, the river burst catastrophically at Yangliu in Dongping. Chief Minister Li Gu oversaw dike repairs from Yanggu to Zhangqiukou to hold the flood back, and the waters eased somewhat. But the broken channel never rejoined the old course; it split away as the Red River.
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太祖乾德二年，遣使案行，將治古堤。 議者以舊河不可卒復，力役且大，遂止。 但詔民治遙堤，以禦沖注之患。 其後赤河決東平之竹村，七州之地復罹水災。 三年秋，大雨霖，開封府河決陽武，又孟州水漲，壞中氵單橋樑，澶、鄆亦言河決，詔發州兵治之。 四年八月，滑州河決，壞靈河縣大堤，詔殿前都指揮使韓重贇、馬步軍都軍頭王廷義等督士卒丁夫數萬人治之，被泛者蠲其秋租。
In the second year of Taizu's Qiande reign (964), envoys were sent to survey the river with plans to restore the ancient dikes. Advisers argued that the old channel could not be restored quickly and that the labor required would be enormous, and the plan was abandoned. The court merely ordered the populace to maintain the outer dikes as a buffer against the river's direct onslaught. Later the Red River broke through at Zhucun in Dongping, and seven prefectures were inundated once more. That autumn brought weeks of torrential rain. The river broke at Yangwu in Kaifeng prefecture; floods in Mengzhou destroyed the Zhongtan Bridge; Chan and Yun also reported breaches. An edict mobilized troops from the affected prefectures to make repairs. In the eighth month of the fourth year the river broke at Huazhou and destroyed Linghe County's main embankment. Taizu ordered Palace Front commander Han Chongyun, cavalry and infantry commander Wang Tingyi, and others to direct tens of thousands of soldiers and conscript laborers in the repair work, and exempted flood victims from the autumn land tax.
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五年正月，帝以河堤屢決，分遣使行視，發畿甸丁夫繕治。 自是歲以為常，皆以正月首事，季春而畢。 是月，詔開封大名府、鄆澶滑孟濮齊淄滄棣濱德博懷衛鄭等州長吏，並兼本州河堤使，蓋以謹力役而重水患也。
In the first month of the fifth year, with the dikes breaking again and again, the Emperor sent out multiple inspection teams and mobilized conscript labor from the capital districts for repairs. Thereafter this became annual routine — work always began in the first month and wrapped up by late spring. That same month an edict required the chief officials of Kaifeng, Daming, Yun, Chan, Hua, Meng, Pu, Qi, Zi, Cang, Di, Bin, De, Bo, Huai, Wei, Zheng, and other riverine prefectures to serve concurrently as their prefecture's river-dike commissioner — tightening control over corvée labor and underscoring the gravity of flood control.
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開寶四年十一月，河決澶淵，泛數州。 官守不時上言，通判、司封郎中姚恕棄市，知州杜審肇坐免。 五年正月，詔曰：「應緣黃、汴、清、禦等河州縣，除准舊制種藝桑棗外，委長吏課民別樹榆柳及土地所宜之木。 仍案戶籍高下，定為五等：第一等歲樹五十本，第二等以下遞減十本。 民欲廣樹藝者聽，其孤、寡、煢、獨者免。 是月，澶州修河卒賜以錢、鞋，役夫給以茶。 三月，詔曰：「朕每念河渠潰決，頗為民患，故署使職以總領焉，宜委官聯佐治其事。 自今開封等十七州府，各置河堤判官一員，以本州通判充； 如通判闕員，即以本州判官充。」 五月，河大決濮陽，又決陽武。 詔發諸州兵及丁夫凡五萬人，遣潁州團練使曹翰護其役。 翰辭，太祖謂曰：「霖雨不止，又聞河決。 朕信宿以來，焚香上禱於天，若天災流行，願在朕躬，勿延於民也。 翰頓首對曰：「昔宋景公諸侯耳，一發善言，災星退舍。 今陛下憂及兆庶，懇禱如是，固當上感天心，必不為災。」
In the eleventh month of Kaibao 4 (971), the river broke at Chanyuan and flooded several prefectures. Local officials had failed to report promptly. Vice-prefect Yao Shu, Secretariat Master of Records, was executed in the marketplace, and Prefect Du Shenzhao was removed from office. In the first month of the fifth year an edict declared: "Along the Yellow, Bian, Qing, and Yu rivers, beyond the mulberry and jujube already required by statute, local officials shall compel the people to plant elm, willow, and whatever trees suit the soil. Households were ranked in five grades by wealth: the top grade planted fifty trees a year, each lower grade ten fewer. Those who wished to plant more than required were free to do so; orphans, widows, the childless, and the utterly alone were exempt. That month soldiers working the dikes at Chanzhou received cash and shoes, and conscript laborers were given tea. In the third month an edict read: "We are ever mindful that river and canal breaches bring great suffering to the people. Commissioner posts have been created to oversee the work, and officials at every level should be assigned to assist. Henceforth each of the seventeen prefectures including Kaifeng shall appoint one river-dike judicial officer, to be filled by the prefecture's vice-prefect; and if the vice-prefect post is vacant, the prefectural judicial officer shall serve instead." In the fifth month the river broke catastrophically at Puyang and again at Yangwu. An edict mobilized fifty thousand troops and conscript laborers from the affected prefectures and sent Yingzhou regiment commander Cao Han to supervise the repairs. Han tried to decline. Taizu told him: "The rains have not stopped, and we have word of another breach. For two nights I have burned incense and prayed to Heaven: if disaster must come, let it strike me alone and not reach the people. Han kowtowed and answered: "Duke Jing of Song was only a feudal lord, yet a single word of compassion made the disaster star retreat from its station. Your Majesty's concern reaches every soul under Heaven, and your prayer is so earnest — surely Heaven will be moved, and disaster will not come."
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六月，下詔曰：「近者澶、濮等數州，霖雨薦降，洪河為患。 朕以屢經決溢，重困黎元，每閱前書，詳究經瀆。 至若夏後所載，但言導河至海，隨山濬川，未聞力制湍流，廣營高岸。 自戰國專利，堙塞故道，小以妨大，私而害公，九河之制遂隳，歷代之患弗弭。 凡搢紳多士、草澤之倫，有素習河渠之書，深知疏導之策，若為經久，可免重勞，並許詣闕上書，附驛條奏。 朕當親覽，用其所長，勉副詢求，當示甄獎。」 時東魯逸人田告者，纂《禹元經》十二篇，帝聞之，召至闕下，詢以治水之道，善其言，將授以官，以親老固辭歸養，從之。 翰至河上，親督工徒，未幾，決河皆塞。
In the sixth month an edict declared: "In Chan, Pu, and neighboring prefectures the seasonal rains have fallen without cease, and the great river has become a scourge. Repeated breaches and floods have brought heavy suffering to the people. We have turned again and again to the ancient texts, studying every classic account of the waterways. What the Xia sovereign's records describe is guiding the river to the sea and dredging channels along the mountains — never forcing raging currents or piling up towering embankments. Since the Warring States, when private gain took precedence, old channels were dammed and diverted — the small blocking the great, private interest harming the public good. The system of the Nine Rivers was ruined, and flood disasters persisted through every dynasty. Any scholar or recluse versed in river engineering who knows how to dredge and channel the waters for a lasting solution — come to court and submit a memorial. Send it by post relay; we will review each proposal in turn. We shall read each submission ourselves, employ what is sound, and reward those whose counsel proves worthy." At that time Tian Gao, a recluse from eastern Lu, had compiled twelve chapters of the "Yu Meta-Classic." The Emperor heard of it, summoned him to court, and questioned him on flood control. Impressed by his counsel, Taizu was about to offer him office — but Tian pleaded that his parents were elderly and he must return home to care for them. The Emperor let him go. Han reached the river and personally directed the labor crews. Before long every breach was sealed.
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太宗太平興國二年秋七月，河決孟州之溫縣、鄭州之滎澤、澶州之頓丘，皆發緣河諸州丁夫塞之。 又遣左衛大將軍李崇矩騎置自陝西至滄、棣，案行水勢。 視堤岸之缺，亟繕治之； 民被水災者，悉蠲其租。 三年正月，命使十七人分治黃河堤，以備水患。 滑州靈河縣河塞復決，命西上閣門使郭守文率卒塞之。 七年，河大漲，蹙清河，淩鄆州，城將陷，塞其門，急奏以聞。 詔殿前承旨劉吉馳往固之。
In the seventh month of Taizong's second Taiping Xingguo year (977), the river broke at Wen County in Mengzhou, Xingze in Zhengzhou, and Dunqiu in Chanzhou. Conscript labor from every riverine prefecture was mobilized to seal the breaches. Left Guard grand general Li Chongju was also sent with relay horses from west of Shan to Cang and Di to survey conditions along the river. Wherever the dikes showed gaps he ordered immediate repairs; and all land tax was remitted for flood victims. In the first month of the third year seventeen envoys were appointed, each responsible for a section of the Yellow River dikes. At Linghe County in Huazhou a previously sealed breach opened again. Western Upper Gate envoy Guo Shouwen was ordered to lead troops to close it. In the seventh year the river swelled enormously, pressing the Qing River and threatening Yunzhou. With the city about to be engulfed, its gates were sealed and urgent dispatches sent to court. An edict sent Palace Front recipient Liu Ji galloping to reinforce the defenses.
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八年五月，河大決滑州韓村，泛澶、濮、曹、濟諸州民田，壞居人廬舍，東南流至彭城界入於淮。 詔發丁夫塞之。 堤久不成，乃命使者按視遙堤舊址。 使回條奏，以為「治遙堤不如分水勢。 自孟抵鄆，雖有堤防，唯滑與澶最為隘狹。 於此二州之地，可立分水之制，宜於南北岸各開其一，北入王莽河以通于海，南入靈河以通於淮，節減暴流，一如汴口之法。 其分水河，量其遠邇，作為斗門，啟閉隨時，務乎均濟。 通舟運，溉農田，此富庶之資也。」 不報。 時多陰雨，河久未塞，帝憂之，遣樞密直學士張齊賢乘傳詣白馬津，用太牢加璧以祭。 十二月，滑州言決河塞，群臣稱賀。
In the fifth month of the eighth year the river broke catastrophically at Hancun in Huazhou, flooding farmland across Chan, Pu, Cao, and Ji, destroying homes, and running southeast to the Pengcheng border where it entered the Huai. An edict mobilized conscript labor to seal the breach. The dikes remained unfinished for a long time, so envoys were sent to survey the sites of the old outer embankments. On their return the envoys submitted separate memorials arguing that "repairing outer dikes is less effective than splitting the river's force. From Meng to Yun there are dikes throughout, but the channel is narrowest at Hua and Chan. At these two prefectures a water-diversion system should be built: open one channel on each bank — north into the Wang Mang River to reach the sea, south into the Ling River to reach the Huai — to tame the raging current, just as at the Bian River mouth. Along each diversion channel, sluice gates should be built at measured intervals, opened and closed as conditions require, to keep the flow evenly distributed. Shipping and irrigation would follow — the foundations of prosperity. The court gave no response. Rain fell for weeks on end and the breach would not close. Troubled, the Emperor sent Privy Council academician Zhang Qixian by relay to the White Horse Ford to offer sacrifice with a great victim and jade disc. In the twelfth month Huazhou reported the breach sealed, and the court celebrated.
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九年春，滑州復言房村河決，帝曰：「近以河決韓村，發民治堤不成，安可重困吾民，當以諸軍代之。」 乃發卒五萬，以侍衛步軍都指揮使田重進領其役，又命翰林學士宋白祭白馬津，沈乙太牢加璧，未幾役成。
In the spring of the ninth year Huazhou reported another breach at Fangcun. The Emperor said: "When the river broke at Hancun we mobilized civilians to repair the dikes and failed. How can we burden the people again? Send the armies instead." Fifty thousand troops were mobilized under Palace Guard infantry commander Tian Zhongjin. Hanlin academician Song Bai was again sent to sacrifice at the White Horse Ford, casting the yi vessel with a great victim and jade disc. Before long the work was done.
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淳化二年三月，詔：「長吏以下及巡河主埽使臣，經度行視河堤，勿致壞隳，違者當寘於法。」 四年十月，河決澶州，陷北城，壞廬舍七千余區，詔發卒代民治之。 是歲，巡河供奉官梁睿上言：「滑州土脈疏，岸善隤，每歲河決南岸，害民田。 請于迎陽鑿渠引水，凡四十里，至黎陽合大河，以防暴漲。」 帝許之。 五年正月，滑州言新渠成，帝又案圖，命昭宣使羅州刺史杜彥鈞率兵夫，計功十七萬，鑿河開渠，自韓村埽至州西鐵狗廟，凡十五余裏，復合於河，以分水勢。
In the third month of Chunhua 2 (991) an edict ordered: "Chief officials and river-patrol commissioners must inspect the dikes regularly and prevent damage or collapse. Violators will be punished by law." In the tenth month of the fourth year the river broke at Chanzhou, the north city was inundated, and more than seven thousand homes were destroyed. An edict sent troops to do the repair work in place of civilians. That year river-patrol tribute official Liang Rui memorialized: "The soil at Huazhou is loose and the banks crumble easily. Every year the river breaks on the south bank and destroys farmland. I propose cutting a diversion channel at Yingyang, forty li long, to join the main river at Liyang and relieve sudden floods." The Emperor approved the plan. In the first month of the fifth year Huazhou reported the new channel complete. The Emperor studied the maps and ordered Zhaoxuan envoy and Luozhou prefect Du Yanjun to lead soldiers and laborers — reckoned at 170,000 work units — to cut a channel from the Hancun bund to the Iron Dog Temple west of the city, more than fifteen li, rejoining the main river to split the current.
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真宗咸平三年五月，河決鄆州王陵埽，浮钜野，入淮、泗，水勢悍激，侵迫州城。 命使率諸州丁男二萬人塞之，逾月而畢。 始，赤河決，擁濟、泗，鄆州城中常苦水患。 至是，霖雨彌月，積潦益甚，乃遣工部郎中陳若拙經度徙城。 若拙請徙于東南十五里陽鄉之高原，詔可。 是年，詔：「緣河官吏，雖秩滿，須水落受代。 知州、通判兩月一巡堤，縣令、佐迭巡堤防，轉運使勿委以他職。」 又申嚴盜伐河上榆柳之禁。
In the fifth month of Zhenzong's third Xianping year (1000) the river broke at the Wangling bund in Yunzhou, spread across Juye, and poured into the Huai and Si with such force that it threatened the prefectural city. Envoys led twenty thousand conscript laborers from the affected prefectures to seal the breach. The work took more than a month. Ever since the Red River had broken its banks and pressed upon the Ji and Si, Yunzhou city had lived under constant threat of flood. Now the rains had lasted a full month and the floods worsened. Ministry of Works director Chen Ruozhuo was sent to survey a site and relocate the city. Ruozhuo proposed moving to the high ground at Yangxiang, fifteen li southeast. The edict approved. That year an edict declared: "River officials, even when their terms expire, must remain until the waters subside before being replaced. Prefects and vice-prefects shall inspect the dikes every two months; magistrates and assistants shall patrol in rotation; transport commissioners shall not be given other duties." The prohibition on cutting elm and willow along the river was strictly reinforced.
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著作佐郎李垂上《導河形勝書》三篇並圖，其略曰：
Archives assistant Li Chui submitted three chapters of the "Book on Guiding the River by Terrain" with maps. The summary reads:
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臣請自汲郡東推禹故道，挾御河，較其水勢，出大伾、上陽、太行三山之間，復西河故瀆，北注大名西、館陶南，東北合赤河而至於海。 因于魏縣北析一渠，正北稍西逕衡漳直北，下出邢、洺，如《夏書》過洚水，稍東注易水、合百濟、會朝河而至於海。 大伾而下，黃、禦混流，薄山障堤，勢不能遠。 如是則載之高地而北行，百姓獲利，而契丹不能南侵矣。 《禹貢》所謂「夾右碣石入於海」，孔安國曰：「河逆上此州界。」
I propose tracing Yu's old course east of Ji commandery, flanking the Imperial Canal and comparing water levels, so the river issues between Dapi, Shangyang, and the Taihang range, restores the Western River's old channel, flows north past west Daming and south Guantao, then northeast joins the Red River to reach the sea. North of Weixian a branch channel would run due north and slightly west through Heng and Zhang, descending to Xing and Ming — as the "Documents of Xia" describes passing the Jing waters — then east to the Yi River, joining the Baiji and Chao rivers to reach the sea. Below Dapi the Yellow and Imperial rivers mingle; hemmed in by mountains and dikes, the current cannot run far. Carried on high ground northward, the people would prosper and the Khitan could not invade from the south. The "Tribute of Yu" speaks of "passing to the right of Jieshi and entering the sea." Kong Anguo explained: "The river runs upstream against the current to this province's border."
17
其始作自大伾西八十里，曹公所開運渠東五里，引河水正北稍東十里，破伯禹古堤，逕牧馬陂，從禹故道，又東三十里轉大伾西、通利軍北，挾白溝，復西大河，北逕清豐、大名西，曆洹水、魏縣東，暨館陶南，入屯氏故瀆，合赤河而北至於海。 既而自大伾西新發故瀆西岸析一渠，正北稍西五里，廣深與汴等，合御河道，逼大伾北，即堅壤析一渠，東西二十里，廣深與汴等，復東大河。 兩渠分流，則三四分水，猶得注澶淵舊渠矣。 大都河水從西大河故瀆東北，合赤河而達於海，然後于魏縣北發御河西岸析一渠，正北稍西六十里，廣深與御河等，合衡漳水； 又冀州北界、深州西南三十里決衡漳西岸，限水為門，西北注滹沱，潦則塞之，使東漸渤海，旱則決之，使西灌屯田，此中國禦邊之利也。
Work would begin eighty li west of Dapi, five li east of Cao Cao's transport canal: draw the river due north and slightly east for ten li, break through Yu's ancient dike, pass the Horse-Pasturing Marsh along Yu's old course, then thirty li east to west of Dapi and north of Tongli Army, flank the White Ditch, rejoin the western main channel, run north past Qingfeng and west Daming, along the Huan and east Weixian to south Guantao, enter the Tun clan's old channel, join the Red River, and reach the sea. West of Dapi, on the west bank of the newly opened old channel, a five-li branch would run due north and slightly west, matching the Bian in width and depth, join the Imperial Canal route, and north of Dapi — where the soil is firm — a twenty-li east-west channel of equal dimensions would rejoin the eastern main river. With two diversion channels splitting the flow, three or four parts of the water would be drawn off while the old Chanyuan channel still received its share. For the most part the river would follow the western main channel's old course northeast, join the Red River, and reach the sea. Then north of Weixian, from the Imperial Canal's west bank, a sixty-li channel of equal width and depth would run due north and slightly west to join the Heng and Zhang rivers; and at Jizhou's northern border, thirty li southwest of Shenzhou, the Heng-Zhang west bank would be gated: northwest into the Hutuo — closed in flood so water flowed east toward the Bohai, opened in drought to irrigate garrison farms to the west. This would strengthen China's frontier defense.
18
兩漢而下，言水利者，屢欲求九河故道而疏之。 今考圖志，九河並在平原而北，且河壞澶、滑，未至平原而上已決矣，則九河奚利哉。 漢武舍大伾之故道，發頓丘之暴沖，則濫兗泛齊，流患中土，使河朔平田，膏腴千里，縱容邊寇劫掠其間。 今大河盡東，全燕陷北，而禦邊之計，莫大於河。 不然，則趙、魏百城，富庶萬億，所謂誨盜而招寇矣。 一日伺我饑饉，乘虛入寇，臨時用計者實難； 不如因人足財豐之時，成之為易。
Since the Han dynasties, hydraulic experts repeatedly sought to reopen and dredge the Nine Rivers' old channels. Maps and gazetteers show the Nine Rivers all lying north of Pingyuan — yet the river already breaks at Chan and Hua before it even reaches that plain. What good would reopening the Nine Rivers do? When Emperor Wu abandoned Dapi's old channel and unleashed the violent current at Dunqiu, Yan and Qi were flooded and the heartland suffered — while a thousand li of fertile Heshuo farmland lay open for frontier raiders to plunder. Today the great river runs entirely east, leaving all of Yan exposed to the north. No frontier defense matters more than controlling the river. Otherwise the hundred wealthy cities of Zhao and Wei would be — as the saying goes — teaching thieves and inviting raiders. If they wait for famine and strike when we are weak, improvised plans at the last moment will not suffice; better to complete the work now, while manpower and resources are plentiful.
19
詔樞密直學士任中正、龍圖閣直學士陳彭年、知制誥王曾詳定。 中正等上言：「詳垂所述，頗為周悉。 所言起滑台而下，派之為六，則緣流就下，湍急難制，恐水勢聚而為一，不能各依所導。 設或必成六派，則是更增六處河口，悠久難於堤防。 亦慮入滹沱、漳河，漸至二水淤塞，益為民患，又築堤七百里，役夫二十一萬七千，工至四十日，侵佔民田，頗為煩費。」 其議遂寢。
An edict commissioned Privy Council academician Ren Zhongzheng, Dragon Diagram Pavilion academician Chen Pengnian, and drafting drafter Wang Zeng to review the proposal. Zhongzheng and his colleagues memorialized: "Li Chui's proposal is thorough and comprehensive. But dividing the river into six channels from Huatai downward would follow the current's downward rush — fierce and uncontrollable. The waters would likely merge into one torrent rather than follow six separate courses. Even if six channels could be achieved, six additional mouths would be nearly impossible to dike over the long term. We also fear silting the Hutuo and Zhang until they become a new scourge. Building seven hundred li of dikes would require 217,000 laborers for forty days, seize farmland, and prove enormously costly. The proposal was shelved.
20
七年，詔罷葺遙堤，以養民力。 八月，河決澶州大吳埽，役徒數千，築新堤，亙二百四十步，水乃順道。 八年，京西轉運使陳堯佐議開滑州小河分水勢，遣使視利害以聞。 及還，請規度自三迎陽村北治之，復開汊河於上游，以泄其壅溢。 詔可。
In the seventh year an edict halted repair of outer dikes to spare the people's strength. In the eighth month the river broke at the Dawu bund in Chanzhou. Several thousand workers built a new dike two hundred forty paces long, and the water returned to its channel. In the eighth year Jingxi transport commissioner Chen Yaozuo proposed opening a small Huazhou channel to split the current. Envoys were sent to survey the pros and cons. On their return they proposed work north of Sanyingyang Village and reopening an upstream branch channel to relieve the backlog. The edict approved.
21
天禧三年六月乙未夜，滑州河溢城西北天臺山旁，俄復潰於城西南，岸摧七百步，漫溢州城，曆澶、濮、曹、鄆，注梁山泊； 又合清水、古汴渠東入於淮，州邑罹患者三十二。 即遣使賦諸州薪石、楗橛、芟竹之數千六百萬，發兵夫九萬人治之。 四年二月，河塞，群臣入賀，上親為文，刻石紀功。
On the yiyi night of the sixth month of Tianxi 3 (1019), the river overflowed at Huazhou beside Tiantai Mountain northwest of the city, then breached again southwest of the city. Seven hundred paces of bank collapsed, the prefectural city was inundated, and the flood swept through Chan, Pu, Cao, and Yun into Liangshan Marsh; then joined the Qing River and ancient Bian channel flowing east into the Huai. Thirty-two prefectures and districts were affected. Envoys immediately levied sixteen million units of timber, stone, piles, and reed-bamboo from the prefectures and mobilized ninety thousand soldiers and laborers for repairs. In the second month of the fourth year the breach was sealed. The court celebrated, and the Emperor personally composed an inscription on stone to commemorate the achievement.
22
是年，祠部員外郎李垂又言疏河利害，命垂至大名府、滑衛德貝州、通利軍與長吏計度。 垂上言：
That year Sacrifices Bureau vice director Li Chui again addressed the pros and cons of dredging the river. He was sent to Daming, Huazhou, Weizhou, Dezhou, Beizhou, and Tongli Army to consult with local officials. Chui memorialized:
23
臣所至，並稱黃河水入王莽沙河與西河故瀆，注金、赤河，必慮水勢浩大，蕩浸民田，難於防備。 臣亦以為河水所經，不無為害。 今者決河而南，為害既多，而又陽武埽東、石堰埽西，地形汙下，東河泄水又艱。 或者云：「今決處漕底坑深，舊渠逆上，若塞之，旁勞必復壞。」 如是，則議塞河者誠以為難。 若決河而北，為害雖少，一旦河水注御河，蕩易水，逕乾寧軍，入獨流口，遂及契丹之境。 或者云：「因此搖動邊鄙。」 如是，則議疏河者又益為難。 臣於兩難之間，輒畫一計：請自上流引北載之高地，東至大伾，瀉復於澶淵舊道，使南不至滑州，北不出通利軍界。
Everywhere I went officials warned that diverting the Yellow River into the Wang Mang Sha River and the Western River's old channel — and then into the Jin and Red rivers — would unleash such force as to inundate farmland beyond defense. I agree that wherever the river runs, harm follows. The southern breach has already done great harm. East of Yangwu bund and west of Shiyan bund the terrain is low-lying, and draining water eastward is difficult. Some argue: "The breach site has a deep pit and the old channel runs against the current. If we seal it, neighboring dikes will break again." Those who favor blocking the breach have a genuine case. A northern breach would do less immediate harm — yet once the river poured into the Imperial Canal, surged through the Yi, passed Ganning Army and Duliu mouth, it would reach Khitan territory. Others warn: "This would unsettle the frontier." Those who favor dredging face an even harder argument. Between these dilemmas I propose a third course: draw the river from upstream onto high ground northward, east to Dapi, and discharge it back into Chanyuan's old channel — so it neither reaches Huazhou to the south nor crosses Tongli Army's border to the north.
24
何以計之？ 臣請自衛州東界曹公所開運渠東五里，河北岸凸處，就岸實土堅引之，正北稍東十三里，破伯禹古堤，注裴家潭，逕牧馬陂，又正東稍北四十里，鑿大伾西山，釃為二渠：一逼大伾南足，決古堤正東八里，復澶淵舊道； 一逼通利軍城北曲河口，至大禹所導西河故瀆，正北稍東五里，開南北大堤，又東七里，入澶淵舊道，與南渠合。 夫如是，則北載之高地，大伾二山脽股之間分酌其勢，浚瀉兩渠，匯注東北，不遠三十里，復合於澶淵舊道，而滑州不治自涸矣。
How would this work? From Weizhou's eastern border, five li east of Cao Cao's transport canal, pack earth along a projecting point on the north bank to draw the water due north and slightly east for thirteen li, break Yu's ancient dike, pour into Peijia Pool, pass the Horse-Pasturing Marsh, then forty li east and slightly north, cut through Dapi's western mountain, and divide into two channels: one along Dapi's southern foot, breaching the ancient dike eight li east to restore Chanyuan's old course; one along the curved river mouth north of Tongli Army city to Yu's Western River old channel, five li due north and slightly east, opening great north-south dikes, then seven li east into Chanyuan's old course to join the southern channel. Thus carried on high ground, the river's force would be split between Dapi's two foothills, channeled through two dredged outlets gathering northeast, rejoining Chanyuan's old course within thirty li — and Huazhou would dry up without further intervention.
25
臣請以兵夫二萬，自來歲二月興作，除三伏半功外，至十月而成。 其均厚埤薄，俟次年可也。
I request twenty thousand soldiers and laborers, starting work in the second month of next year, half effort during midsummer's three fu periods, completion by the tenth month. Leveling high and low ground can wait until the following year.
26
疏奏，朝議慮其煩擾，罷之。
The memorial reached court, but deliberation feared the burden and the plan was abandoned.
27
初，滑州以天臺決口去水稍遠，聊興葺之，及西南堤成，乃於天臺口旁築月堤。 六月望，河復決天臺下，走衛南，浮徐、濟，害如三年而益甚，帝以新經賦率，慮殫困民力，即詔京東西、河北路經水災州軍，勿復科調丁夫，其守扞堤防役兵，仍令長吏存恤而番休之。 五年正月，知滑州陳堯佐以西北水壞，城無外禦，築大堤，又疊埽於城北，護州中居民； 復就鑿橫木，下垂木數條，置水旁以護岸，謂之「木龍」，當時賴焉。 復並舊河開枝流，以分導水勢，有詔嘉獎。
Initially Huazhou made only casual repairs at the Tiantai breach, which lay somewhat away from the main current. Once the southwest dike was finished, a crescent-shaped dike was built beside the Tiantai mouth. On the sixth month's full moon the river broke again below Tiantai, running south through Wei and flooding Xu and Ji — worse than three years before. With fresh tax levies just imposed, the Emperor feared exhausting the people and ordered flood-affected prefectures in Jingdong, Jingxi, and Hebei to levy no more conscript labor. Soldiers on dike duty were to receive care and rotating rest from their commanders. In the first month of the fifth year Huazhou prefect Chen Yaozuo, with northwestern floods having destroyed outer defenses, built a great dike and stacked river bundles north of the city to protect residents; he also had cross-timbers carved with hanging wooden strips placed along the bank to break the current — called "wooden dragons" — on which the city then relied. He also opened branch channels from the old river to split the current. An edict commended his work.
28
說者以黃河隨時漲落，故舉物候為水勢之名：自立春之後，東風解凍，河邊入候水，初至凡一寸，則夏秋當至一尺，頗為信驗，故謂之「信水」。 二月、三月桃華始開，冰泮兩積，川流猥集，波瀾盛長，謂之「桃華水」。 春末蕪菁華開，謂之「菜華水」。 四月末壟麥結秀，擢芒變色，謂之「麥黃水」。 五月瓜實延蔓，謂之「瓜蔓水」。 朔野之地，深山窮谷，固陰冱寒，冰堅晚泮，逮乎盛夏，消釋方盡，而沃蕩山石，水帶礬腥，並流於河，故六月中旬後，謂之「礬山水」。 七月菽豆方秀，謂之「豆華水」。 八月菼亂華，謂之「荻苗水」。 九月以重陽紀節，謂之「登高水」。 十月水落安流，復其故道，謂之「復槽水」。 十一月、十二月斷冰雜流，乘寒復結，謂之「蹙淩水」。 水信有常，率以為准； 非時暴漲，謂之「客水」。
Commentators note that the Yellow River rises and falls with the seasons and name each stage by natural signs. After the Beginning of Spring, when east winds thaw the ice, watchers record the first rise — one inch foretells a foot by summer and autumn. This sign has proved reliable, hence "trustworthy water." In the second and third months, as peach blossoms open, ice and snowmelt release their waters and streams converge in swelling waves — "peach-blossom water." When turnip flowers bloom in late spring — "vegetable-blossom water." At month's end in the fourth month, as wheat ears form and stalks turn golden — "wheat-yellow water." In the fifth month, as melon vines spread — "melon-vine water." In the northern wilds, ice in deep valleys melts only by midsummer. Waters washing over mineral-rich rocks carry alum's brackish tang into the river — after mid-sixth month, "alum-mountain water." In the seventh month, as beans flower — "bean-blossom water." In the eighth month, as reeds bloom — "reed-sprout water." In the ninth month, around the Double Yang festival — "climbing-high water." In the tenth month the waters subside and return to their channel — "returning-channel water." In the eleventh and twelfth months, as broken ice and mixed currents freeze again in the cold — "compressed-ice water." These seasonal signs follow regular patterns and serve as standards; untimely violent floods are called "guest water."
29
其水勢，凡移谼橫注，岸如刺毀，謂之「紮岸」。 漲溢逾防，謂之「抹岸」。 埽岸故朽，潛流漱其下，謂之「塌岸」。 浪勢旋激，岸土上隤，謂之「淪卷」。 水侵岸逆漲，謂之「上展」。 順漲，謂之「下展」。 或水乍落，直流之中，忽屈曲橫射，謂之「徑{穴叫}」。 水猛驟移，其將澄處，望之明白，謂之「拽白」，亦謂之「明灘」。 湍怒略渟，勢稍汩起，行舟值之多溺，謂之「薦浪水」。 水退淤澱，夏則膠土肥腴。 初秋則黃滅土，頗為疏壤，深秋則白滅土，霜降後皆沙也。
Among water conditions: when a channel shifts and pours crosswise, piercing the bank as if with stakes — "piercing the bank." When floodwaters rise over the embankment — "smearing the bank." When an old bundle-bank rots and hidden currents scour beneath — "collapsing bank." When swirling waves undercut the bank from above — "bank-collapse roll." When water pushes up against the bank against the current — "upstream spread." Rising with the current — "downstream spread." Or when water suddenly falls, a straight current abruptly bends and shoots sideways — "direct cross-burst." When violent currents shift suddenly, the approaching clear stretch looks bright from afar — "dragging white," also "bright shoal." When raging rapids briefly pause and swell upward, boats that hit them often sink — "standing-wave water." When the waters recede they leave silt; in summer this becomes rich, glutinous soil. Early autumn deposits yield yellow, somewhat loose soil; late autumn yields white depleted soil — after Frost's Descent it is all sand.
30
舊制，歲虞河決，有司常以孟秋預調塞治之物，梢芟、薪柴、楗橛、竹石、茭索、竹索凡千余萬，謂之「春料」。 詔下瀕河諸州所產之地，仍遣使會河渠官吏，乘農隙率丁夫水工，收采備用。 凡伐蘆荻謂之「芟」，伐山木榆柳枝葉謂之「梢」，辮竹糾芟為索。 以竹為巨索，長十尺至百尺，有數等。 先擇寬平之所為埽場。 埽之制，密佈芟索，鋪梢，梢芟相重，壓之以土，雜以碎石，以巨竹索橫貫其中，謂之「心索」。 卷而束之，復以大芟索擊其兩端，別以竹索自內旁出，其高至數丈，其長倍之。 凡用丁夫數百或千人，雜唱齊挽，積置於卑薄之處，謂之「埽岸」。 既下，以橛臬閡之，復以長木貫之，其竹索皆埋巨木於岸以維之，遇河之橫決，則復增之，以補其缺。 凡埽下非積數疊，亦不能遏其迅湍，又有馬頭、鋸牙、木岸者，以蹙水勢護堤焉。
By regulation, officials each mid-autumn pre-levied flood-repair materials — brush, reeds, timber, piles, bamboo, stone, rush rope, and bamboo rope totaling over ten million units — called "spring stock." Edicts went to riverine prefectures' producing regions. Envoys convened river officials and, during agricultural slack seasons, led laborers and water workers to gather and stock materials. Cutting reeds and rushes was called jian; cutting elm and willow branches was called shao; plaiting bamboo and binding jian into rope. Bamboo was fashioned into great ropes ten to one hundred feet long, in several grades. First a broad, level site was chosen as the bund yard. A bund was built by densely layering jian and rope, spreading shao atop, alternating layers, pressing with earth and broken stone, and running a great bamboo rope crosswise through the center — the "heart rope." The mass was rolled and bound, great jian ropes lashed to both ends, bamboo ropes issuing from the sides — several zhang high and twice as long. Hundreds or a thousand laborers hauled in chorus and stacked the bundles at weak points in the bank — "bund bank." Once placed, piles and stakes held them in place and long timbers were driven through. Bamboo ropes were anchored to great timbers buried in the bank. When the river breached, more bundles were added to fill gaps. Without multiple stacked layers a single bund could not check swift currents. Horse-head, saw-tooth, and wooden-bank structures also compressed the current to protect the dikes.
31
凡緣河諸州，孟州有河南北凡二埽，開封府有陽武埽，滑州有韓房二村、憑管、石堰、州西、魚池、迎陽凡七埽，舊有七里曲埽，後廢。
Along the river: Mengzhou had two bunds north and south of the channel; Kaifeng had Yangwu bund; Huazhou had seven — at Han and Fang villages, Pingguan, Shiyan, west of the city, Yuchi, and Yingyang (the old Qiliqu bund was later abandoned).
32
通利軍有齊賈、蘇村凡二埽，澶州有濮陽、大韓、大吳、商胡、王楚、橫隴、曹村、依仁、大北、岡孫、陳固、明公、王八凡十三埽，大名府有孫杜、侯村二埽，濮州有任村、東、西、北凡四埽，鄆州有博陵、張秋、關山、子路、王陵、竹口凡六埽，齊州有採金山、史家渦二埽，濱州有平河、安定二埽，棣州有聶家、梭堤、鋸牙、陽成四埽，所費皆有司歲計而無闕焉。
Tongli Army had two bunds (Qijia, Sucun); Chanzhou thirteen (Puyang, Dahan, Dawu, Shanghu, Wangchu, Henglong, Caocun, Yiren, Dabei, Gangsun, Chengu, Minggong, Wangba); Daming two (Sundu, Houcun); Puzhou four (Rencun and east, west, north); Yunzhou six (Boling, Zhangqiu, Guanshan, Zilu, Wangling, Zhukou); Qizhou two (Caijinshan, Shijiawo); Binzhou two (Pinghe, Anding); Dizhou four (Nieji, Suodi, Juya, Yangcheng). Officials budgeted for all annually without shortfall.
33
六年八月，河決於澶州之王楚埽，凡三十步。 八年，始詔河北轉運司計塞河之備，良山令陳曜請疏鄆、滑界糜丘河以分水勢，遂遣使行視遙堤。 明道二年，徙大名之朝城縣于杜婆村，廢鄆州之王橋渡、淄州之臨河鎮以避水。
In the eighth month of the sixth year the river broke at Chanzhou's Wangchu bund — thirty paces wide. In the eighth year an edict ordered the Hebei transport commission to plan flood defenses. Liangshan magistrate Chen Yao proposed dredging the Miqiu River on the Yun-Hua border to split the current, and envoys were sent to survey outer dikes. In Mingdao 2 (1033) Daming's Chaocheng County was relocated to Dupocun; Yunzhou's Wangqiao crossing and Zizhou's Linhe town were abandoned to escape the floods.
34
景祐元年七月，河決澶州橫隴埽。 慶曆元年，詔權停修決河。 自此久不復塞，而議開分水河以殺其暴。 未興工而河流自分，有司以聞，遣使特祠之。 三月，命築堤於澶以扞城。 八年六月癸酉，河決商胡埽，決口廣五百五十七步，乃命使行視河堤。
In the seventh month of Jingyou 1 (1034) the river broke at Chanzhou's Henglong bund. In Qingli 1 (1041) an edict temporarily halted breach repairs. The breach long went unrepaired while debate turned to opening diversion channels to tame the current. Before work could begin the river divided on its own. Officials reported it and envoys were sent to offer special sacrifice. In the third month dikes were ordered built at Chan to protect the city. On the guiyou day of the sixth month of the eighth year the river broke at the Shanghu bund — five hundred fifty-seven paces wide — and envoys were sent to survey the dikes.
35
皇祐元年三月，河合永濟渠注乾寧軍。 二年七月辛酉，河復決大名府館陶縣之郭固。 四年正月乙酉，塞郭固而河勢猶壅，議者請開六塔以披其勢。 至和元年，遣使行度故道，且詣銅城鎮海口，約古道高下之勢。 二年，翰林學士歐陽修奏疏曰：
In the third month of Huangyou 1 (1049) the river joined the Yongji Canal and poured into Ganning Army. On the xinyou day of the seventh month of the second year the river broke again at Guogu in Daming's Guantao County. On the yiyou day of the first month of the fourth year Guogu was sealed but the river remained congested. Advisers proposed opening Liuta to relieve the pressure. In Zhihe 1 (1054) envoys were sent to survey the old channel and measure elevations at Tongcheng town's sea mouth against the ancient course. In the second year Hanlin academician Ouyang Xiu memorialized:
36
朝廷欲俟秋興大役，塞商胡，開橫隴，回大河于古道。 夫動大眾必順天時、量人力，謀於其始而審於其終，然後必行，計其所利者多，乃可無悔。 比年以來，興役動眾，勞民費財，不精謀慮于厥初，輕信利害之偏說，舉事之始，既已蒼皇，群議一搖，尋復悔罷。 不敢遠引他事，且如河決商胡，是時執政之臣，不慎計慮，遽謀修塞。 凡科配梢芟一千八百萬，騷動六路一百餘軍州，官吏催驅，急若星火，民庶愁苦，盈於道途。 或物已輸官，或人方在路，未及興役，尋已罷修，虛費民財，為國斂怨，舉事輕脫，為害若斯。 今又聞復有修河之役，三十萬人之眾，開一千餘里之長河，計其所用物力，數倍往年。 當此天災歲旱、民困國貧之際，不量人力，不順天時，知其有大不可者五：
The court plans to wait until autumn for a major project — seal Shanghu, open Henglong, and return the great river to its old course. Mobilizing the masses requires matching heaven's seasons and measuring human capacity — planning from the start and examining the end. Only then should work proceed, and only where benefits clearly outweigh costs will there be no regret. In recent years projects have taxed the people and wasted treasure because planning at the outset was careless and partial arguments were trusted too easily. Work began in haste; when opinion wavered, projects were abandoned in regret. I need not cite distant examples — consider only the Shanghu breach. The ministers in power, without careful planning, hastily proposed to seal it. Eighteen million units of materials were levied across six circuits and more than a hundred prefectures and armies. Officials drove the work with fire-like urgency, and the people's suffering filled every road. Sometimes materials had already been delivered to the government, sometimes laborers were still on the road — and before work could even begin, the project was called off. Public funds were wasted, popular resentment mounted, and schemes were launched and dropped on a whim. The damage was exactly like this. Now I hear that another river-repair project is planned — three hundred thousand men to open a channel more than a thousand li long, requiring several times the material resources of past years. At a moment of drought and natural calamity, when the people are exhausted and the treasury empty, this project ignores human capacity and flouts the season. I see five compelling reasons why it must not proceed:
37
蓋自去秋至春半，天下苦旱，京東尤甚，河北次之。 國家常務安靜振恤之，猶恐民起為盜，況于兩路聚大眾、興大役乎？ 此其必不可者一也。
From last autumn through mid-spring the whole empire has endured drought — Jingdong worst of all, Hebei close behind. The court is already struggling merely to keep the peace and provide relief, and still fears that people will turn to banditry — how much worse if both circuits must mobilize vast numbers for a massive public works project? This is the first reason the project must be rejected.
38
河北自恩州用兵之後，繼以凶年，人戶流亡，十失八九。 數年以來，人稍歸復，然死亡之餘，所存者幾，瘡痍未斂，物力未完。 又京東自去冬無雨雪，麥不生苗，將逾暮春，粟未布種，農心焦勞，所向無望。 若別路差夫，又遠者難為赴役； 一出諸路，則兩路力所不任。 此其必不可者二也。
Since the En Prefecture campaign, Hebei has suffered famine after famine; eight or nine households out of every ten have fled. In recent years some people have drifted back, but survivors are few, wounds from the losses remain unhealed, and the region's resources are still depleted. Jingdong has had no rain or snow since last winter. Wheat never sprouted; late spring is almost gone and millet still unplanted. Farmers are desperate and see no hope anywhere. If labor is levied from other circuits, men from distant prefectures will struggle to arrive for duty; And if draftees must come from every circuit, Jingdong and Hebei together cannot bear the burden. This is the second reason the project must be rejected.
39
往年議塞滑州決河，時公私之力，未若今日之貧虛； 然猶儲積物料，誘率民財，數年之間，始能興役。 今國用方乏，民力方疲，且合商胡塞大決之洪流，此一大役也。 鑿橫隴開久廢之故道，又一大役也。 自橫隴至海千餘里，埽岸久已廢，頓須興緝，又一大役也。 往年公私有力之時，興一大役，尚須數年，今猝興三大役於災旱貧虛之際。 此其必不可者三也。
When blocking the Huazhou breach was discussed in past years, public and private resources were not nearly as depleted as they are today; Even then they had to stockpile materials and squeeze the people's wealth for several years before work could begin. Now the treasury is empty and the people exhausted, yet blocking the massive Shanghu breach is one enormous undertaking. Cutting through Henglong to reopen the long-abandoned old channel is another enormous undertaking. From Henglong to the sea — more than a thousand li — the shao bunds have long been abandoned and would need sudden, full-scale repair; yet another enormous undertaking. In better times, one major project still took years to launch; now they would suddenly undertake three at once amid drought, disaster, and poverty. This is the third reason the project must be rejected.
40
就令商胡可塞，故道未必可開。 鯀障洪水，九年無功，禹得《洪範》五行之書，知水潤下之性，乃因水之流，疏而就下，水患乃息。 然則以大禹之功，不能障塞，但能因勢而疏決爾。 今欲逆水之性，障而塞之，奪洪河之正流，使人力斡而回注，此大禹之所不能。 此其必不可者四也。
Even if Shanghu could be sealed, the old channel might not be openable at all. Gun tried to dam the flood for nine years and failed. Yu obtained the Hongfan treatise on the Five Phases, understood that water naturally seeks lower ground, and by guiding the current downward brought the flooding to an end. Even Yu the Great could not dam and block the river — he could only channel it according to the land's natural contours. Now they propose to defy water's nature — to dam it, seize the Yellow River's main channel, and force it back by human labor. This is what even Yu the Great could not accomplish. This is the fourth reason the project must be rejected.
41
橫隴湮塞已二十年，商胡決又數歲，故道已平而難鑿，安流已久而難回。 此其必不可者五也。
Henglong has been silted shut for twenty years and the Shanghu breach for several more. The old channel has filled in and would be hard to cut open; the current settled course has held for so long that reversing it would be nearly impossible. This is the fifth reason the project must be rejected.
42
臣伏思國家累歲災譴甚多，其於京東，變異尤大。 地貴安靜而有聲，巨嵎山摧，海水搖盪，如此不止者僅十年，天地警戒，宜不虛發。 臣謂變異所起之方，尤當過慮防懼，今乃欲於凶艱之年，聚三十萬之大眾於變異最大之方，臣恐災禍自茲而發也。 況京東赤地千里，饑饉之民，正苦天災。 又聞河役將動，往往伐桑毀屋，無復生計。 流亡盜賊之患，不可不虞。 宜速止罷，用安人心。
I reflect that the court has endured years of calamity and divine reproof, and that the omens in Jingdong have been especially severe. The earth, which ought to lie still, has rumbled; Giant Cliff Mountain collapsed and the sea surged — for nearly ten years such signs have not stopped. Warnings from heaven and earth are surely not sent without reason. The region where these portents have appeared demands the greatest caution — yet now, in a year of disaster, they would gather three hundred thousand men in exactly that region. I fear calamity will erupt from this. Jingdong is a thousand li of scorched earth, and famine-stricken people are already suffering under heaven's wrath. I also hear that as the river project nears, people are cutting down mulberry trees and tearing down their houses, leaving themselves no way to live. The threat of mass flight and banditry cannot be ignored. The project should be halted immediately to reassure the people.
43
九月，詔：「自商胡之決，大河注金堤，浸為河北患。 其故道又以河北、京東饑，故未興役。 今河渠司李仲昌議欲納水入六塔河，使歸橫隴舊河，舒一時之急。 其令兩制至待制以上、台諫官，與河渠司同詳定。」
In the ninth month an edict declared: "Since the Shanghu breach, the Yellow River has poured toward the Jindi embankment and gradually become a scourge upon Hebei. Reopening the old channel was deferred because Hebei and Jingdong were in famine, and the work was never begun. Now Li Zhongchang of the River Works Bureau proposes diverting water into the Liuta River to send it back toward the Henglong old channel and ease the immediate crisis. Let Hanlin academicians from dazhi through daizhi rank, together with censorial officials and the River Works Bureau, conduct a joint review."
44
修又上疏曰：
Ouyang Xiu submitted another memorial, saying:
45
伏見學士院集議修河，未有定論。 豈由賈昌朝欲復故道，李仲昌請開六塔，互執一說，莫知孰是。 臣愚皆謂不然。 言故道者，未詳利害之原； 述六塔者，近乎欺罔之繆。 今謂故道可復者，但見河北水患，而欲還之京東。 然不思天禧以來河水屢決之因，所以未知故道有不可復之勢，臣故謂未詳利害之原也。 若言六塔之利者，則不待攻而自破矣。 今六塔既已開，而恩、冀之患，何為尚告奔騰之急？ 此則減水未見其利也。 又開六塔者雲，可以全回大河，使復橫隴故道。 今六塔止是別河下流，已為濱、棣、德、博之患，若全回大河，顧其害如何？ 此臣故謂近乎欺罔之繆也。
I observe that the Hanlin Academy's collective deliberation on river repair has reached no settled conclusion. Perhaps because Jia Changchao wants to restore the old channel while Li Zhongchang urges opening Liuta — each clinging to one plan with no way to judge which is right. In my humble view, both are wrong. Those who advocate restoring the old channel have not grasped the root of the costs and benefits; Those who advocate Liuta come close to outright deception. Those who say the old channel can be restored see Hebei's flooding and want to send the river back to Jingdong. They do not consider why the river has breached repeatedly since the Tianxi era, and so fail to see that the old channel cannot be restored — hence I say they have not grasped the root of the matter. Claims about Liuta's benefits collapse on their own without needing refutation. Liuta is already open — so why do En and Ji prefectures still report urgent flooding? This shows that the touted water reduction has brought no benefit at all. Advocates of Liuta claim it can fully divert the Yellow River back to the Henglong old channel. Liuta is merely a branch of the lower stream and already harms Bin, Di, De, and Bo — what harm would follow if the entire river were diverted there? This is why I call it near-deceitful nonsense.
46
且河本泥沙，無不淤之理。 淤常先下流，下流淤高，水行漸壅，乃決上流之低處，此勢之常也。 然避高就下，水之本性，故河流已棄之道，自古難復。 臣不敢廣述河源，且以今所欲復之故道，言天禧以來屢決之因。
The river is inherently laden with silt and sand — silting is inevitable. Silt accumulates first downstream; as the lower reach rises, flow is gradually choked until the river breaks out at a low point upstream — the usual pattern. Water naturally seeks lower ground, so channels the river has already abandoned have always been hard to restore. I will not expound the river's ultimate source; for the channel they wish to restore, I will explain why it has repeatedly breached since the Tianxi era.
47
初，天禧中，河出京東，水行於今所謂故道者。 水既淤澀，乃決天臺埽，尋塞而復故道； 未幾，又決于滑州南鐵狗廟，今所謂龍門埽者。 其後數年，又塞而復故道。 已而又決王楚埽，所決差小，與故道分流，然而故道之水終以壅淤，故又於橫隴大決。 是則決河非不能力塞，故道非不能力復，所復不久終必決於上流者，由故道淤而水不能行故也。 及橫隴既決，水流就下，所以十餘年間，河未為患。 至慶曆三、四年，橫隴之水，又自海口先淤，凡一百四十餘里； 其後游、金、赤三河相次又淤。 下流既梗，乃決于上流之商胡口。 然則京東、橫隴兩河故道，皆下流淤塞，河水已棄之高地。 京東故道，屢復屢決，理不可復，不待言而易知也。
In the Tianxi period the river flowed east out of Jingdong along what is now called the old channel. After silting choked the channel, it breached at Tiantai shao; the breach was sealed and flow returned to the old channel; Soon it breached again south of Huazhou at the Iron Dog Temple — today's Longmen shao. A few years later it was blocked again and flow returned to the old channel. Then it breached at Wangchu shao — a smaller break that split flow with the old channel — but the old channel still silted up until a major breach opened at Henglong. Breaches could be forcibly sealed and the old channel forcibly restored — but restorations never lasted, because the old channel silted up and water could not pass. Once Henglong breached, water ran downward — and for more than ten years the river caused no harm. By Qingli years three and four, the Henglong channel silted first from the estuary for more than one hundred forty li; After that the You, Jin, and Chi rivers silted up in succession. With the lower reach blocked, the river breached at Shanghu upstream. Both the Jingdong and Henglong old channels are silt-blocked stretches of high ground the river has long since abandoned. The Jingdong old channel was restored and breached again and again — obviously it cannot be recovered; that needs no argument.
48
昨議者度京東故道功科，但雲銅城已上乃特高爾，其東比銅城以上則稍低，比商胡已上則實高也。 若雲銅城以東地勢鬥下，則當日水流宜決銅城已上，何緣而頓淤橫隴之口，亦何緣而大決也？ 然則兩河故道，既皆不可為，則河北水患何為而可去？ 臣聞智者之于事，有所不能必，則較其利害之輕重，擇其害少者而為之，猶愈害多而利少，何況有害而無利，此三者可較而擇也。
Previous planners estimated the Jingdong old channel work and claimed only the stretch above Copper City was especially high; east of Copper City the land is somewhat lower, but still actually higher than the reach above Shanghu. If the land east of Copper City truly slopes steeply down, water should have breached above Copper City — so why did Henglong's mouth suddenly silt up, and why the catastrophic breach? If both old channels are impossible, how can Hebei's flooding be relieved? When certainty is impossible, the wise weigh lesser against greater harm — better than much harm for little gain, and especially when there is harm without gain. Among these three options one can choose.
49
又商胡初決之時，欲議修塞，計用梢芟一千八百萬，科配六路一百餘州軍。 今欲塞者乃往年之商胡，則必用往年之物數。 至於開鑿故道，張奎所計工費甚大，其後李參減損，猶用三十萬人。 然欲以五十步之狹，容大河之水，此可笑者，又欲增一夫所開三尺之方，倍為六尺，且闊厚三尺而長六尺，自一倍之功，在於人力，已為勞苦。 雲六尺之方，以開方法算之，乃八倍之功，此豈人力之所勝？ 是則前功既大而難興，後功雖小而不實。
When Shanghu first breached, repair was estimated at eighteen million units of shao and jian, levied across six circuits and more than a hundred prefectures and armies. To seal the same Shanghu breach now would require the same materials as before. Opening the old channel by Zhang Kui's estimate would cost enormously; even Li Can's reduced plan still required three hundred thousand men. Trying to contain the Yellow River in a channel only fifty paces wide is laughable. They also propose doubling each man's excavation from a three-chi square to six chi wide, three thick, and six long — even doubling the labor is already backbreaking. By excavation calculation a six-chi section requires eight times the work — far beyond human capacity. The original plan is too large to launch; the scaled-down version is too small to be workable.
50
大抵塞商胡、開故道，凡二大役，皆困國勞人，所舉如此，而欲開難復屢決已驗之故道，使其虛費，而商胡不可塞，故道不可復，此所謂有害而無利者也。 就使幸而暫塞，以紓目前之患，而終於上流必決，如龍門、橫隴之比，此所謂利少而害多也。
Blocking Shanghu and opening the old channel are two huge undertakings that exhaust the nation and the people. Trying to reopen a channel repeatedly proven unrecoverable wastes everything while neither goal is achievable — pure harm without benefit. Even if temporarily sealed to ease present flooding, upstream breach is inevitable — as at Longmen and Henglong — little benefit for much harm.
51
若六塔者，于大河有減水之名，而無減患之實。 今下流所散，為患已多，若全回大河以注之，則濱、棣、德、博河北所仰之州，不勝其患，而又故道淤澀，上流必有他決之虞，此直有害而無利耳，是皆智者之不為也。 今若因水所在，增治堤防，疏其下流，浚以入海，則可無決溢散漫之虞。
Liuta has the name of reducing water but not the reality of reducing disaster. Lower branches already cause much harm. Diverting the full river would overwhelm Bin, Di, De, and Bo — prefectures Hebei depends on — while the silted old channel guarantees upstream breach elsewhere. Pure harm, nothing wise men would undertake. Instead, strengthen dikes where the water runs, clear the lower reach, and dredge it to the sea — then there need be no fear of breach and spill.
52
今河所歷數州之地，誠為患矣； 堤防歲用之夫，誠為勞矣。 與其虛費天下之財，虛舉大眾之役，而不能成功，終不免為數州之患，勞歲用之夫，則此所謂害少者，乃智者之所宜擇也。
The river's passage through several prefectures is indeed a burden; Annual dike maintenance labor is indeed exhausting. Rather than wasting national wealth and masses on doomed projects that still leave several prefectures suffering, the lesser harm — annual dike labor — is what the wise should choose.
53
大約今河之勢，負三決之虞：復故道，上流必決； 開六塔，上流亦決； 河之下流，若不浚使入海，則上流亦決。 臣請選知水利之臣，就其下流，求入海路而浚之； 不然，下流梗澀，則終虞上決，為患無涯。 臣非知水者，但以今事可驗者較之耳。 願下臣議，裁取其當焉。
The river today faces three breach risks: restore the old channel and upstream will breach; open Liuta and upstream will also breach; if the lower reach is not dredged to the sea, upstream will breach as well. I ask that officials skilled in water works be chosen to find and dredge a route to the sea at the lower reach; Otherwise, with the lower reach blocked, upstream breach is inevitable and the harm boundless. I am no hydrologist — I only compare what present evidence shows. I ask Your Majesty to receive my memorial and judge what is fitting.
54
預議官翰林學士承旨孫抃等言：開故道，誠久利，然功大難成； 六塔下流，可導而東去，以紓恩、冀金堤之患。
The pre-deliberation officers — chief Hanlin academician Sun Bi and others — said: reopening the old channel would bring lasting benefit, but the work is too great to finish; The Liuta lower reach can be directed eastward to relieve flooding at the En and Ji Jindi embankment.
55
十二月，中書上奏曰：「自商胡決，為大名、恩冀患。 先議開銅城道，塞商胡，以功大難卒就，緩之，而憂金堤泛溢不能捍也。 願備工費，因六塔水勢入橫隴，宜令河北、京東預完堤埽，上河水所居民田數。」 詔下中書奏，以知澶州事李璋為總管，轉運使周沆權同知潭州，內侍都知鄧保吉為鈐轄，殿中丞李仲昌提舉河渠，內殿承制張懷恩為都監。 而保吉不行，以內侍押班王從善代之。 以龍圖閣直學士施昌言總領其事，提點開封府界縣鎮事蔡挺、勾當河渠事楊緯同修河決。 修又奏請罷六塔之役，時宰相富弼尤主昌議，疏奏亦不省。
In the twelfth month the Secretariat memorialized: "Since the Shanghu breach, Daming and En-Ji have suffered. Opening the Copper City route and blocking Shanghu was deferred as too difficult to finish quickly, yet we fear the Jindi embankment cannot hold the overflow. We ask to prepare funds to use Liuta's flow into Henglong, and order Hebei and Jingdong to complete dikes and shao bunds in advance and tally farmland above the high-water line. The edict approved the memorial: Li Zhang, prefect of Chanzhou, as overall supervisor; transport commissioner Zhou Hang as acting co-administrator of Tanzhou; inner attendant Deng Baoji as coordinator; Li Zhongchang supervising river works; Zhang Huai'en as chief overseer. But Baoji did not go; inner attendant Wang Congshan replaced him. Dragon Diagram Pavilion academician Shi Changyan was appointed to lead the project; Cai Ting, overseeing Kaifeng border counties and towns, and Yang Wei, handling river works, jointly managed the river breach repair. Ouyang Xiu submitted another memorial asking to halt the Liuta project. Chief Councillor Fu Bi was then the strongest advocate of the plan, and these memorials too went unheeded.
56
五年，河流派別于魏之第六埽，曰二股河，其廣二百尺。 自二股河行一百三十里，至魏、恩、德、博之境，曰四界首河。 七月，都轉運使韓贄言：「四界首古大河所經，即《溝洫志》所謂'平原、金堤，開通大河，入篤馬河，至海五百餘里'者也。 自春以丁壯三千浚之，可一月而畢。 支分河流入金、赤河，使其深六尺，為利可必。 商胡決河自魏至於恩冀、乾甯入於海，今二股河自魏、恩東至於德、滄入於海，分而為二，則上流不壅，可以無決溢之患。」 乃上《四界首二股河圖》。 七年七月戊辰，河決大名第五埽。
In the fifth year the river split at the sixth bund in Wei prefecture, forming what was called the Two-Branch River, two hundred feet across. The Two-Branch River ran one hundred thirty li to where Wei, En, De, and Bo met, a stretch known as the Four Border Head River. In the seventh month Metropolitan Transport Commissioner Han Zan said: "The Four Border Head follows the ancient Great River's course — the route described in the Treatise on Ditches and Canals: 'From Pingyuan and Jindi, opening the Great River into the Duma River, more than five hundred li to the sea. Starting in spring, three thousand laborers could dredge it in a month. Diverting water into the Jin and Chi rivers and deepening them to six feet would surely bring benefit. The Shanghu breach channel runs from Wei through En-Ji and Qianning to the sea; the Two-Branch River runs from Wei and En east to De and Cang to the sea. With the flow divided in two, the upper reach would no longer choke and the risk of breach and overflow would be removed." He then submitted a diagram of the Four Border Head and Two-Branch River. In the seventh year, on the wuchen day of the seventh month, the river broke through at the fifth bund in Daming.
57
英宗治平元年，始命都水監浚二股、五股河，以紓恩、冀之患。 初，都水監言：「商胡堙塞，冀州界河淺，房家、武邑二埽由此潰，慮一旦大決，則甚于商胡之患。」 乃遣判都水監張鞏、戶部副使張燾等行視，遂興工役，卒塞之。
In the first year of Emperor Yingzong's Zhiping reign, the Directorate of Waterways was ordered to dredge the Two-Branch and Five-Branch rivers to ease flooding in En and Ji. Earlier the Directorate of Waterways had reported: "With Shanghu sealed shut, the river along the Jizhou border is shallow, and the Fangjia and Wuyi bunds failed for that reason. A major breach now could prove worse than the Shanghu disaster." It sent Vice-Director Zhang Gong of the Directorate of Waterways, Revenue Vice Commissioner Zhang Tao, and others to inspect the site, launched the project, and finally sealed the breach.
58
神宗熙甯元年六月，河溢恩州烏欄堤，又決冀州棗強埽，北注瀛。 七月，又溢瀛州樂壽埽。 帝憂之，顧問近臣司馬光等。 都水監丞李立之請于恩、冀、深、瀛等州，創生堤三百六十七里以御河，而河北都轉運司言：「當用夫八萬三千餘人，役一月成。 今方災傷，願徐之。」 都水監丞宋昌言謂：「今二股河門變移，請迎河港進約，簽入河身，以紓四州水患。」 遂與屯田都監內侍程昉獻議，開二股以導東流。 於是都水監奏：「慶曆八年，商胡北流，於今二十餘年，自澶州下至乾寧軍，創堤千有餘里，公私勞擾。 近歲冀州而下，河道梗澀，致上下埽岸屢危。 今棗強抹岸，沖奪故道，雖創新堤，終非久計。 願相六塔舊口，並二股河導使東流，徐塞北流。」 而提舉河渠王亞等謂：「黃、御河帶北行入獨流東砦，經乾寧軍、滄州等八砦邊界，直入大海。 其近海口闊六七百步，深八九丈，三女砦以西闊三四百步，深五六丈。 其勢愈深，其流愈猛，天所以限契丹。 議者欲再開二股，漸閉北流，此乃未嘗睹黃河在界河內東流之利也。」
In the sixth month of Shenzong's first Xining year the river overflowed the Wulan dike in Enzhou and broke the Zaoqiang bund in Jizhou, pouring north into Ying prefecture. In the seventh month it overflowed again at the Leshou bund in Yingzhou. Deeply worried, the emperor consulted his close advisers, including Sima Guang. Directorate Vice-Director Li Lizhi proposed building three hundred sixty-seven li of new dikes in En, Ji, Shen, Ying, and neighboring prefectures to hold the river back. The Hebei transport office replied that this would take more than eighty-three thousand laborers and a month to complete. The region is still recovering from disaster; we ask that the work be deferred." Directorate Vice-Director Song Changyan argued: "The Two-Branch River mouth has shifted. We should meet the river where it runs, advance the upper contract, and pierce the channel to relieve flooding in the four prefectures." He and Agriculture Commissioner Cheng Fang, an inner attendant, then submitted a plan to open the Two-Branch channel and steer the river eastward. The Directorate of Waterways then memorialized: "Since the Shanghu breach turned north in Qingli 8, more than twenty years ago, over a thousand li of dikes have been built from Chanzhou to Qianning Army, exhausting both the state and the people. In recent years the channel below Jizhou has silted up, repeatedly threatening the upper and lower bunds. Zaoqiang is now eating away the bank and cutting into the old channel; new dikes may help, but they are no lasting solution. We propose surveying the old Liuta mouth and using the Two-Branch River to steer the flow east while gradually shutting off the northern channel." But River Works Supervisor Wang Ya and others objected: "The Yellow and Imperial rivers run north into Duliu East Fortress, cross the borders of Qianning Army, Cangzhou, and seven other fortresses, and pour straight into the sea. Near the estuary the channel is six or seven hundred paces wide and eight or nine zhang deep; west of Sannü Fortress it is three or four hundred paces wide and five or six zhang deep. The deeper the channel, the swifter the current — heaven's own barrier against the Khitan. Advocates of reopening the Two-Branch channel and gradually shutting the northern flow have never grasped the advantage of the Yellow River running east inside the frontier channel."
59
十一月，詔翰林學士司馬光、入內內侍省副都知張茂則，乘傳相度四州生堤，回日兼視六塔、二股利害。 二年正月，光入對：「請如宋昌言策，於二股之西置上約，擗水令東。 俟東流漸深，北流淤淺，即塞北流，放出御河、胡盧河，下紓恩、冀、深、瀛以西之患。」
In the eleventh month the court ordered Hanlin Academician Sima Guang and Inner Attendant Vice Director Zhang Maozhe to ride post horses and survey the new dikes in the four prefectures, and on their return to assess the Liuta and Two-Branch River projects as well. In the first month of the second year Sima Guang addressed the throne: "I urge adopting Song Changyan's plan: build an upper contract west of the Two-Branch channel and divert the water east. Once the eastern channel deepens and the northern one silts up, block the northern flow, restore the Imperial River and Hulu River, and relieve flooding west of En, Ji, Shen, and Ying."
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初，商胡決河自魏之北，至恩、冀、乾甯入於海，是謂北流。 嘉祐五年，河流派于魏之第六埽，遂為二股，自魏、恩東至於德、滄，入於海，是謂東流。 時議者多不同，李立之力主生堤，帝不聽，卒用昌言說，置上約。
After the Shanghu breach the river ran north of Wei through En, Ji, and Qianning to the sea — the northern flow. In Jiayou 5 the river split at the sixth bund in Wei prefecture into two channels running east from Wei and En through De and Cang to the sea — the eastern flow. Opinion was sharply divided. Li Lizhi pressed hard for the new dikes, but the emperor rejected that course and finally adopted Song Changyan's plan, building the upper contract.
61
三月，光奏：「治河當因地形水勢，若強用人力，引使就高，橫立堤防，則逆激旁潰，不惟無成，仍敗舊績。 臣慮官吏見東流已及四分，急於見功，遽塞北流。 而不知二股分流，十里之內，相去尚近，地勢復東高西下。 若河流並東，一遇盛漲，水勢西合入北流，則東流遂絕； 或於滄、德堤埽未成之處，決溢橫流。 雖除西路之患，而害及東路，非策也。 宜專護上約及二股堤岸。 若今歲東流止添二分，則此去河勢自東，近者二三年，遠者四五年，候及八分以上，河流沖刷已闊，滄、德堤埽已固，自然北流日減，可以閉塞，兩路俱無害矣。」
In the third month Sima Guang memorialized: "River control must follow the land and the water's own force. Forcing the river uphill and building dikes across its path will only drive the current sideways and burst the banks — ruining past work and achieving nothing. I fear that officials, seeing the eastern channel already carrying four-tenths of the flow, will rush to claim credit and seal off the northern channel too soon. They do not see that the two branches, though split, lie within ten li of each other on ground that slopes down from east to west. If all the water is forced east, a major flood will drive the current back west into the northern channel and the eastern flow will die; or it will burst where the Cang and De dikes and bunds are still unfinished and spill across the land. That would relieve the western route only to wreck the eastern one — a poor strategy. We should concentrate on protecting the upper contract and the Two-Branch dikes. If the eastern channel gains only two-tenths more this year, the river will gradually turn east on its own — in two or three years, perhaps four or five. Once it carries eight-tenths or more, the scoured channel will be wide, the Cang and De defenses solid, and the northern flow will shrink daily until it can safely be shut off, leaving both routes secure."
62
會北京留守韓琦言：「今歲兵夫數少，而金堤兩埽，修上、下約甚急，深進馬頭，欲奪大河。 緣二股及嫩灘舊闊千一百步，是以可容漲水。 今截去八百步有餘，則將束大河于二百余步之間，下流既壅，上流蹙遏湍怒，又無兵夫修護堤岸，其沖決必矣。 況自德至滄，皆二股下流，既無堤防，必侵民田。 設若河門束狹，不能容納漲水，上、下約隨流而脫，則二股與北流為一，其患愈大。 又恩、深州所創生堤，其東則大河西來，其西則西山諸水東注，腹背受水，兩難捍禦。 望選近臣速至河所，與在外官合議。」 帝在經筵以琦奏諭光，命同茂則再往。
Meanwhile Beijing Commandant Han Qi warned: "Labor is scarce this year, yet at the two Jin di bunds work on the upper and lower contracts is being rushed forward, with horse-head structures pushed deep into the channel to wrest control of the Great River. The Two-Branch channel and the tender shoal were once eleven hundred paces wide — wide enough to absorb flood swell. More than eight hundred paces have now been cut away, squeezing the Great River into little more than two hundred. The lower reach will choke, the upper reach will roar under the pressure, and with no labor to maintain the banks, a breach is certain. From De to Cang the entire lower Two-Branch reach lacks dikes and will inevitably flood farmland. If the river mouth is narrowed so it cannot hold flood swell and the upper and lower contracts are torn away, the Two-Branch channel and the northern flow will merge — and the disaster will be worse still. The new dikes in En and Shen prefectures face the Great River from the west on one side and mountain streams from the western hills on the other — caught between two floods, neither front can be held. I ask that a senior court official be sent quickly to the river to confer with the local officers on the ground." At the classics lecture the emperor shared Han Qi's memorial with Sima Guang and ordered him to return to the river with Zhang Maozhe.
63
四月，光與張鞏、李立之、宋昌言、張問、呂大防、程昉行視上約及方鋸牙，濟河，集議於下約。 光等奏：「二股河上約並在灘上，不礙河行。 但所進方鋸牙已深，致北流河門稍狹，乞減折二十步，令近後，仍作蛾眉埽裹護。 其滄、德界有古遙堤，當加葺治。 所修二股，本欲疏導河水東去，生堤本欲捍御河水西來，相為表裏，未可偏廢。」 帝因謂二府曰：「韓琦頗疑修二股。」 趙抃曰：「人多以六塔為戒。」 王安石曰：「異議者，皆不考事實故也。」 帝又問：「程昉、宋昌言同修二股如何？」 安石以為可治。 帝曰：「欲作簽河甚善。」 安石曰：「誠然。 若及時作之，使決河可東，北流可閉。」 因言：「李立之所築生堤，去河遠者至八九十里，本計以禦漫水，而不可御河南之向著，臣恐漫水亦不可禦也。」 帝以為然。 五月丙寅，乃詔立之乘驛赴闕議之。
In the fourth month Sima Guang joined Zhang Gong, Li Lizhi, Song Changyan, Zhang Wen, Lü Dafang, and Cheng Fang to inspect the upper contract and the square saw-teeth structures, crossed the river, and met for deliberation at the lower contract. Sima Guang and his colleagues reported: "The upper contracts on the Two-Branch channel sit on the shoal and do not obstruct the river's flow. But the square saw-teeth structures have been pushed too far forward, narrowing the northern channel's mouth. We ask that they be pulled back twenty paces and that crescent bunds be built for protection. An ancient distant dike on the Cang-De border should also be repaired. The Two-Branch works were meant to steer the river east; the new dikes were meant to hold back floods from the west. They work as inner and outer defenses together, and neither should be dropped." The emperor then told the two councils: "Han Qi has serious doubts about the Two-Branch repairs." Zhao Bian replied: "Many take Liuta as a cautionary tale." Wang Anshi said: "The dissenters simply have not looked at the facts." The emperor asked: "What if Cheng Fang and Song Changyan jointly oversee the Two-Branch repairs?" Anshi said it could be done. The emperor said: "Channel-piercing is an excellent idea." Anshi agreed: "Exactly. Done promptly, the breach channel can be turned east and the northern flow shut off." He added: "Li Lizhi's new dikes stand as far as eighty or ninety li from the river. They were meant to block spreading floodwater, but they cannot stop the river itself advancing from the south — and I doubt they can even stop the spreading water." The emperor agreed. On the bingyin day of the fifth month the court ordered Li Lizhi to ride post to the capital for consultation.
64
六月戊申，命司馬光都大提舉修二股工役。 呂公著言：「朝廷遣光相視董役，非所以褒崇近職、待遇儒臣也。」 乃罷光行。
On the wushen day of the sixth month Sima Guang was appointed chief supervisor of the Two-Branch repair project. Lü Gongzhu objected: "Sending Sima Guang to inspect and supervise river works is no way to honor a senior court officer or treat a Confucian minister." Sima Guang's assignment was cancelled.
65
七月，二股河通快，北流稍自閉。 戊子，張鞏奏：「上約累經泛漲，並下約各已無虞，東流勢漸順快，宜塞北流，除恩、冀、深、瀛、永靜、乾寧等州軍水患。 又使御河、胡盧河下流各還故道，則漕運無壅遏，郵傳無滯留，塘泊無淤淺。 復於邊防大計，不失南北之限，歲減費不可勝數，亦使流移歸復，實無窮之利。 且黃河所至，古今未嘗無患，較利害輕重而取捨之可也。 惟是東流南北堤防未立，閉口修堤，工費甚夥，所當預備。 望選習知河事者，與臣等講求，具圖以聞。」 乃復詔光、茂則及都水監官、河北轉運使同相度閉塞北流利害，有所不同，各以議上。
In the seventh month the Two-Branch River ran clear and fast, and the northern channel began to close on its own. On the wuzi day Zhang Gong memorialized: "The upper contract has weathered repeated floods, and the lower contract is secure. The eastern channel is running smoothly. We should block the northern flow and end flooding in En, Ji, Shen, Ying, Yongjing, Qianning, and neighboring jurisdictions. Restoring the Imperial River and Hulu River to their old courses would unblock grain transport, keep the courier network moving, and prevent the pond-barriers from silting up. It would serve frontier strategy by preserving the north-south boundary, save untold annual expense, and let displaced people return home — benefits without end. The Yellow River has brought trouble wherever it runs, in every age. We need only weigh the costs and benefits and choose accordingly. But the north-south dikes for the eastern channel are not yet in place, and sealing the mouth and building dikes will be enormously costly — preparations must be made now. We ask that experts in river works be chosen to study the plan with us and submit drawings for the court's review." The court again ordered Sima Guang, Zhang Maozhe, Directorate officials, and the Hebei transport commissioner to assess the pros and cons of blocking the northern flow; where they disagreed, each was to submit his own view.
66
八月己亥，光入辭，言：「鞏等欲塞二股河北流，臣恐勞費未易。 或幸而可塞，則東流淺狹，堤防未全，必致決溢，是移恩、冀、深、瀛之患於滄、德等州也。 不若俟三二年，東流益深闊，堤防稍固，北流漸淺，薪芻有備，塞之便。」 帝曰：「東流、北流之患孰輕重？」 光曰：「兩地皆王民，無輕重； 然北流已殘破，東流尚全。」 帝曰； 「今不俟東流順快而塞北流，他日河勢改移，奈何？」 光曰：「上約固則東流日增，北流日減，何憂改移。 若上約流失，其事不可知，惟當並力護上約耳。」 帝曰：「上約安可保？」 光曰：「今歲創修，誠為難保，然昨經大水而無虞，來歲地腳已牢，復何慮。 且上約居河之側，聽河北流，猶懼不保； 今欲橫截使不行，庸可保乎？」 帝曰：「若河水常分二流，何時當有成功？」 光曰：「上約苟存，東流必增，北流必減； 借使分為二流，于張鞏等不見成功，於國家亦無所害。 何則？ 西北之水，並于山東，故為害大，分則害小矣。 鞏等亟欲塞北流，皆為身謀，不顧國力與民患也。」 帝曰：「防捍兩河，何以供億？」 光曰：「並為一則勞費自倍，分二流則勞費減半。 今減北流財力之半，以備東流，不亦可乎？」 帝曰：「卿等至彼視之。」
On the jihai day of the eighth month Sima Guang took leave of the throne and said: "Zhang Gong and his allies want to shut the northern channel of the Two-Branch River. I fear the labor and expense will be formidable. Even if sealing it succeeds, the eastern channel is still shallow and narrow and the dikes incomplete — a breach is inevitable. We would simply move the disaster from En, Ji, Shen, and Ying to Cang, De, and beyond. Better to wait two or three years until the eastern channel deepens and widens, the dikes are stronger, the northern flow silts up, and supplies are ready — then sealing it will be straightforward." The emperor asked: "Which is the greater disaster — the eastern flow or the northern?" Sima Guang replied: "Both regions hold the emperor's people — neither can be ranked above the other; but the northern channel is already devastated while the eastern one remains intact." The emperor said: "If we block the northern flow before the eastern channel runs clear, what happens when the river shifts course someday?" Sima Guang replied: "If the upper contract holds, the eastern flow will grow daily and the northern shrink — why fear a shift? If the upper contract fails, anything could happen — our only course is to defend it with all our strength." The emperor asked: "How can the upper contract be kept secure?" Sima Guang said: "Freshly built this year, it is hard to guarantee — yet it just survived a major flood unscathed. Next year its foundations will be set; what is there to fear? The upper contract sits beside the river and still lets the northern flow pass — and even that we can barely hold; and now you want to block the river entirely — how can that be secure?" The emperor asked: "If the river stays divided in two, when will the project ever succeed?" Sima Guang replied: "As long as the upper contract holds, the eastern flow will grow and the northern shrink; Even if the river stays divided, Zhang Gong and his allies may see no victory — but the state would come to no harm. Why? All the waters of the northwest converge on Shandong, so the damage is greatest when they run together — divided, the harm is far less. Zhang Gong and his allies are rushing to seal the northern flow for their own credit, without regard for the state's resources or the people's suffering." The emperor asked: "If we must defend both channels, how can we afford it?" Sima Guang replied: "Merging them into one channel doubles the cost; keeping two channels cuts it in half. Shift half the resources now spent on the northern channel to the eastern one — would that not suffice?" The emperor said: "Go there and see for yourselves."
67
時二股河東流及六分，鞏等因欲閉斷北流，帝意向之。 光以為須及八分乃可，仍待其自然，不可施功。 王安石曰：「光議事屢不合，今令視河，後必不從其議，是重使不安職也。」 庚子，乃獨遣茂則。 茂則奏：「二股河東傾已及八分，北流止二分。」 張鞏等亦奏：「丙午，大河東徙，北流淺小。 戊申，北流閉。」 詔獎諭司馬光等，仍賜衣、帶、馬。
By then the eastern branch of the Two-Branch River carried six-tenths of the current. Zhang Gong and his allies pressed to seal the northern flow, and the emperor was inclined to agree. Sima Guang argued that eight-tenths was needed before sealing would work, and that nature must take its course — no forced engineering yet. Wang Anshi said: "Sima Guang's advice repeatedly clashes with policy. Sending him to survey the river when his recommendations will surely be ignored only sets him up to fail in a weighty post." On the gengzi day only Maozhe was sent. Maozhe reported: "The eastern branch now carries eight-tenths of the current; the northern flow only two-tenths." Zhang Gong and others also reported: "On the bingwu day the main river shifted eastward; the northern channel is shallow and weak. On the wushen day the northern channel was sealed." An edict commended Sima Guang and his colleagues and bestowed robes, belts, and horses.
68
時北流既塞，而河自其南四十里許家港東決，氾濫大名、恩、德、滄、永靜五州軍境。 三年二月，命茂則、鞏相度澶、滑州以下至東流河勢、堤防利害。 時方濬御河，韓琦言：「事有緩急，工有後先，今御河漕運通駛，未至有害，不宜減大河之役。」 乃詔輟河夫卒三萬三千，專治東流。
Though the northern channel was sealed, the river broke east at Xujia Harbor forty li to the south, flooding Daming, En, De, Cang, and Yongjing. In the second month of the third year Maozhe and Zhang Gong were ordered to survey from Chan and Hua downstream along the eastern channel, assessing water conditions and dike defenses. The Imperial Canal was being dredged at the time. Han Qi said: "Tasks have priorities. The canal transport is running smoothly and poses no threat yet — we should not cut back work on the Yellow River." An edict redirected thirty-three thousand river workers to focus exclusively on the eastern channel.