1
黃河中
The Yellow River (continued)
2
熙甯四年七月辛卯，北京新堤第四、第五埽決，漂溺館陶、永濟、清陽以北，遣茂則乘驛相視。 八月，河溢澶州曹村，十月，溢衛州王供。 時新堤凡六埽，而決者二，下屬恩、冀，貫御河，奔沖為一。 帝憂之，自秋迄冬，數遣使經營。 是時，人爭言導河之利，茂則等謂：「二股河地最下，而舊防可因，今堙塞者才三十餘里，若度河之湍，浚而逆之，又存清水鎮河以析其勢，則悍者可回，決者可塞。」 帝然之。
On the xinmao day of the seventh month in the fourth year of the Xining era, breaches opened at the fourth and fifth revetments of Beijing’s new dike, inundating the country north of Guantao, Yongji, and Qingyang. The court dispatched Mao Ze post-haste to survey the damage. In the eighth month the river spilled over at Caocun in Danzhou; by the tenth month it had also overflowed at Wanggong in Weizhou. The new dike then comprised six revetments, two of which had burst; below, the floodwaters linked En and Ji prefectures, pierced the Imperial Canal, and merged into a single torrent. Deeply troubled, the emperor sent envoy after envoy from autumn through winter to oversee remedial works. At the time many officials urged the benefits of channeling the Yellow River. Mao Ze and his colleagues argued that the Two-Channel River occupied the lowest ground and that old embankments could still be used: only a little over thirty li were silted shut. Measure the main current’s force, dredge and turn it back, and keep the Qingshui Town River open to divide the flow—then the violent current could be bent aside and the breaches closed. The emperor agreed.
3
十二月，令河北轉運司開修二股河上流，並修塞第五埽決口。 五年二月甲寅，興役，四月丁卯，二股河成，深十一尺，廣四百尺。 方浚河則稍障其決水，至是，水入於河，而決口亦塞。
In the twelfth month the court ordered the Hebei transport office to reopen the upper reach of the Two-Channel River and to seal the breach at the fifth revetment. Labor began on jiayin day in the second month of the fifth year; by dingmao day in the fourth month the Two-Channel River was finished—eleven chi deep and four hundred chi wide. Dredging had partly checked the flood from the breach; once the channel was ready, the water returned to the riverbed and the breach was sealed as well.
4
六月，河溢北京夏津。 閏七月辛卯，帝語執政：「聞京東調夫修河，有壞產者，河北調急夫尤多； 若河復決，奈何？ 且河決不過占一河之地，或西或東，若利害無所校，聽其所趨，如何？」 王安石曰：「北流不塞，占公私田至多，又水散漫，久復澱塞。 昨修二股，費至少而公私田皆出，向之瀉鹵，俱為沃壤，庸非利乎。 況急夫已減於去歲，若復葺理堤防，則河北歲夫愈減矣。」
In the sixth month the river flooded Xiajin in the Beijing circuit. On xinmao day in the intercalary seventh month the emperor told his chief ministers, "I hear that Jingdong is drafting men to repair the river and that some households have lost their livelihoods; Hebei is pressing even more men into emergency corvée; if the river bursts again, what are we to do? Besides, a breach only claims the width of one channel, east or west. If we stop weighing costs against benefits and simply let the river go where it wishes, what do you think of that?" Wang Anshi replied, "If we do not block the northern current, it will engulf vast tracts of public and private farmland. The water will spread aimlessly and eventually silt up again. Repairing the two channels cost little, yet public and private fields reappeared and former salt flats turned into rich soil—is that not a clear gain? Urgent labor drafts are already lower than last year; if we keep the dikes in repair, Hebei's annual corvée burden should shrink further still."
5
六年四月，始置疏浚黃河司。 先是，有選人李公義者，獻鐵龍爪揚泥車法以浚河。 其法：用鐵數斤為爪形，以繩系舟尾而沈之水，篙工急棹，乘流相繼而下，一再過，水已深數尺。 宦官黃懷信以為可用，而患其太輕。 王安石請令懷信、公義同議增損，乃別制浚川杷。 其法：以巨木長八尺，齒長二尺，列於木下如杷狀，以石壓之； 兩旁系大繩，兩端矴大船，相距八十步，各用滑車絞之，去來撓蕩泥沙，已又移船而浚。 或渭水深則杷不能及底，雖數往來無益； 水淺則齒礙沙泥，曳之不動，卒乃反齒向上而曳之。 人皆知不可用，惟安石善其法，使懷信先試之以浚二股，又謀鑿直河數里以觀其效。 且言於帝曰：「開直河則水勢分。 其不可開者，以近河，每開數尺即見水，不容施功爾。 今第見水即以杷浚之，水當隨杷改趨直河，苟置數千杷，則諸河淺澱，皆非所患，歲可省開浚之費幾百千萬。」 帝曰：「果爾，甚善。 聞河北小軍壘當起夫五千，計合境之丁，僅及此數，一夫至用錢八緡。 故歐陽修嘗謂開河如放火，不開如失火，與其勞人，不如勿開。」 安石曰：「勞人以除害，所謂毒天下之民而從之者。」 帝乃許春首興工，而賞懷信以度僧牒十五道，公義與堂除； 以杷法下北京，令虞部員外郎、都大提舉大名府界金堤範子淵與通判、知縣共試驗之，皆言不可用。 會子淵以事至京師，安石問其故，子淵意附會，遽曰：「法誠善，第同官議不合耳。」 安石大悅。 至是，乃置浚河司，將自衛州浚至海口，差子淵都大提舉，公義為之屬。 許不拘常制，舉使臣等； 人船、木鐵、工匠，皆取之諸埽； 官吏奉給視都水監丞司； 行移與監司敵體。
In the fourth month of the sixth year the court created the Yellow River Dredging Office. Earlier a minor official named Li Gongyi had proposed dredging with iron “dragon-claw” mud-lifting carts towed along the channel. Several pounds of iron were forged into claws, roped to a boat’s stern and dragged underwater while oarsmen rowed hard downstream. One or two passes could deepen the channel by several chi. The eunuch Huang Huaixin judged the device workable but feared it was too light. Wang Anshi had Huang Huaixin and Li Gongyi revise the design together, producing a separate “river-dredging rake.” The new tool used an eight-chi beam with two-chi teeth set beneath like a rake and weighted with stone; heavy ropes ran to large boats moored eighty paces apart; capstans hauled the rake back and forth to scour silt, then the boats shifted position to continue dredging. Critics noted that in deep water the rake never reached the bottom, so repeated passes accomplished nothing; in shallow water the teeth snagged in mud and would not budge, so crews finally flipped the teeth upward and dragged it that way instead. Everyone else saw the rake as useless, but Wang Anshi alone championed it. He had Huang Huaixin trial it on the two channels and planned to cut a straight channel several li long to test its performance. He told the emperor, "Cutting a straight channel will split the current. The reason ordinary excavation fails is proximity to the river—dig a few chi and water appears, leaving no room to work. But wherever water appears, deploy the rake; the current should follow it into the straight channel. Thousands of rakes would clear shallow silt everywhere and save millions in annual dredging costs." The emperor said, "If that proves true, it would be excellent. I hear Hebei’s small garrison posts must levy five thousand laborers—barely the circuit’s entire adult male quota—and each man costs up to eight strings of cash. Ouyang Xiu once said that opening a river is like lighting a fire, while leaving it closed is like letting a fire burn unchecked—better not to open it than to exhaust the people." Wang Anshi replied, "To burden the people in order to remove a greater harm is what the sages meant by 'harming the people of the realm yet winning their obedience.'" The emperor approved work to begin that spring, rewarded Huang Huaixin with fifteen ordination certificates, and gave Li Gongyi a direct appointment at court; The rake method was sent to Beijing for trial by Fan Ziyuan—vice director of works and chief intendant of the Daming circuit Golden Dike—together with prefectural and county officials; all reported it unusable. When Fan Ziyuan came to the capital on other business, Wang Anshi asked why the trials failed. Seeking to please him, Fan Ziyuan said at once, "The method is sound; my colleagues simply disagreed." Wang Anshi was delighted. The River-Dredging Office was then established to dredge from Weizhou to the sea. Fan Ziyuan was named chief intendant and Li Gongyi his deputy. He was authorized to recommend commissioners without normal procedural limits; laborers, boats, timber, iron, and craftsmen were all drawn from the revetment posts; official salaries matched those of Directorate of Waterways assistant commissioners; and his orders carried equal weight with those of circuit supervisors.
6
當是時，北流閉已數年，水或橫決散漫，常虞壅遏。 十月、外監丞王令圖獻議，於北京第四、第五埽等處開修直河，使大河還二股故道，乃命範子淵及朱仲立領其事。 開直河#秄畎順擼饀鐘描聳榪６鹇杉扒逅瘇蠔櫻餐吮秤怵吆釉蛉锊湏Ｍ醢彩齩聳⒀雜描酥Γ礆舨魂」ぃ蟮潿鹇珊由狹鰨䦉墒剮械刂小？ /font>
By then the northern current had been shut off for years; the river sometimes burst sideways and spread widely, and officials constantly feared blockage. In the tenth month Outer Assistant Commissioner Wang Lingtu proposed opening a straight channel at Beijing’s fourth and fifth revetments to return the main river to the two-channel old course. Fan Ziyuan and Zhu Zhongli were placed in charge. [The received text here is corrupt in all editions; following parallel accounts:] They opened a straight channel eight chi deep, directed water into the two-channel old course, dredged the Two-Channel River and the Qingshui Town River, and sealed every place where the flood had withdrawn. No substantive text; HTML markup artifact in the source edition.
7
七年，都水監丞劉璯言：「自開直河，閉魚肋，水勢增漲，行流湍急，漸塌河岸，而許家港、清水鎮河極淺漫，幾於不流。 雖二股深快，而蒲泊已東，下至四界首，退出之田，略無固護，設遇漫水出岸，牽回河頭，將復成水患。 宜候霜降水落，閉清水鎮河，築縷河堤一道以遏漲水，使大河復循故道。 又退出良田數萬頃，俾民耕種。 而博州界堂邑等退背七埽，歲減修護之費，公私兩濟。」 從之。 是秋，判大名文彥博言：「河溢壞民田，多者六十村，戶至萬七千，少者九村，戶至四千六百，願蠲租稅。」 從之。 又命都水詰官吏不以水災聞者。 外都水監丞程昉以憂死。
In the seventh year Assistant Commissioner Liu Yan reported, "Since the straight channel was opened and the Fish-Rib outlet closed, the current has grown stronger and faster, eroding the banks, while Xujia Harbor and the Qingshui Town River have become so shallow and slack they barely flow. Though the two channels run deep and swift, east of Pubo down to the Four-Boundary Head the fields the river has left behind lack solid protection. Should floodwater spill over the banks, it could pull the channel back and bring disaster again. We should wait until autumn frost lowers the water, close the Qingshui Town River, build a thread-river dike to hold back the flood, and return the main current to its old course. Tens of thousands of qing of fertile land the river had abandoned could then be farmed again. In Bozhou the seven revetments behind Tangyi and similar sites would save annual maintenance costs, benefiting both state and people alike." The court approved the proposal. That autumn Wen Yanbo, chief official at Daming, reported that flooding had ruined farmland in as many as sixty villages affecting seventeen thousand households, and in the least nine villages with four thousand six hundred households. He asked that rents and taxes be remitted. The court approved the proposal. The court also ordered the Directorate of Waterways to discipline officials who failed to report flood damage. Outer Assistant Commissioner Cheng Fang died of anxiety over the crisis.
8
十月，安石去位，吳充為相。 十年五月，滎澤河堤急，詔判都水監俞光往治之。 是歲七月，河復溢衛州王供及汲縣上下埽、懷州黃沁、滑州韓村； 已醜，遂大決于澶州曹村，澶淵北流斷絕，河道南徙，東匯于梁山、張澤濼，分為二派，一合南清河入於淮，一合北清河入於海，凡灌郡縣四十五，而濮、齊、鄆、徐尤甚，壞田逾三十萬頃。 遣使修閉。
In the tenth month Wang Anshi left office and Wu Chong became chief councilor. In the fifth month of the tenth year the Yongze River dike was in crisis; Yu Guang, acting director of the Directorate of Waterways, was sent to repair it. That seventh month the river flooded again at Wanggong in Weizhou, the upper and lower revetments in Jixian, Huangqin in Huazhou, and Hancun in Huazhou; On jichou day a catastrophic breach opened at Caocun in Danzhou. The northern current at Chanyuan was cut off as the channel shifted south, pooling east at Liangshan and Zhangze Marsh and splitting in two—one branch joining the Southern Clear River to the Huai, the other the Northern Clear River to the sea. Forty-five prefectures and counties were inundated, Pu, Qi, Yun, and Xu suffering worst, with more than three hundred thousand qing of farmland destroyed. The court dispatched envoys to repair and close the breach.
9
八月，又決鄭州滎澤。 於是文彥博言：「臣正月嘗奏：德州河底淤澱，泄水稽滯，上流必至壅遏。 又河勢變移，四散漫流，兩岸俱被水患，若不預為經制，必溢魏、博、恩、澶等州之境。 而都水略無施設，止固護東流北岸而已。 適累年河流低下，官吏希省費之賞，未嘗增修堤岸，大名諸埽，皆可憂虞。 謂如曹村一埽，自熙寧八年至今三年，雖每計春料當培低怯，而有司未嘗如約，其埽兵又皆給他役，實在者十有七八。 今者果大決溢，此非天災，實人力不至也。 臣前論此，並乞審擇水官。 今河朔、京東州縣，人被患者莫知其數，嗷嗷籲天，上軫聖念，而水官不能自訟，猶汲汲希賞。 臣前論所陳，出於至誠，本圖補報，非敢激訐也。」
In the eighth month the river breached again at Yongze in Zhengzhou. Wen Yanbo then memorialized, "I reported in the first month that the riverbed at Dezhou was silting up, slowing drainage and inevitably backing up the upper reach. The channel keeps shifting and spreading in every direction, flooding both banks. Without advance planning it will surely spill into Wei, Bo, En, Dan, and neighboring prefectures. Yet the Directorate of Waterways has done almost nothing beyond shoring up the north bank of the eastern current. For years the river has run low while officials chase rewards for cutting costs and never strengthen the dikes—all of Daming’s revetments are cause for alarm. Take Caocun revetment: for three years since the eighth year of Xining, spring budgets called for raising weak spots, yet officials never followed through. Revetment troops were diverted to other duties, leaving only seven or eight men in ten on site. The great breach we see today is not heaven’s disaster but human failure. I raised this before and asked that water officials be chosen with care. Across Heshuo and Jingdong countless people suffer, crying to heaven while Your Majesty grieves—yet water officials refuse to admit fault and still chase rewards. My earlier warnings were offered in full sincerity, seeking only to serve the throne—not to provoke quarrels."
10
十一月，都水監言：「自曹村決溢，諸埽無復儲蓄，乞給錢二十萬緡下諸路，以時市梢草封樁。」 詔給十萬緡，非朝旨及埽岸危急，毋得擅用。
In the eleventh month the Directorate of Waterways reported that after the Caocun breach the revetments had no reserves left and requested two hundred thousand strings of cash for the circuits to buy fascines and straw for emergency repairs. The court granted one hundred thousand strings, to be spent only on imperial order or when a revetment was in imminent danger.
11
二年七月戊子，範子淵言：「因護黃河岸畢工，乞中分為兩埽。」 詔以廣武上、下埽為名。
On wuzi day in the seventh month of the second year Fan Ziyuan reported that work protecting the Yellow River bank was finished and asked that it be split into two revetments. The court named them the Upper and Lower Guangwu revetments.
12
三年七月，澶州孫村、陳埽及大吳、小吳埽決，詔外監丞司速修閉。 初，河決澶州也，北外監丞陳祐甫謂：「商胡決三十餘年，所行河道，填淤漸高，堤防歲增，未免氾濫。 今當修者有三：商胡一也，橫壟二也，禹舊跡三也。 然商胡、橫壟故道，地勢高平，土性疏惡，皆不可復，復亦不能持久。 惟禹故瀆尚存，在大伾、太行之間，地卑而勢固。 故秘閣校理李垂與今知深州孫民先皆有修復之議。 望召民先同河北漕臣一員，自衛州王供埽按視，訖於海口。」 從之。
In the seventh month of the third year breaches opened at Sun Village, Chen revetment, and the Great and Little Wu revetments in Danzhou; outer assistant commissioners were ordered to repair them at once. When the river first broke at Danzhou, Northern Outer Assistant Commissioner Chen Youfu argued that since the Shanghu breach thirty years earlier the active channel had silted higher year by year despite ever-taller dikes, so flooding remained inevitable. Three courses might be restored: Shanghu first, Henglong second, and Yu’s old channel third. But the Shanghu and Henglong old courses lie on high, level ground with loose, poor soil—they cannot be restored, nor would restoration last. Only Yu’s old channel remains, between Great Pi and the Taihang Mountains—low ground with a firm configuration. Former Secretariat collator Li Chui and the current prefect of Shenzhou Sun Minxian have both proposed restoring it. I ask that Sun Minxian be summoned with a Hebei transport official to survey from the Wanggong revetment in Weizhou to the sea mouth." The court approved the proposal.
13
四年四月，小吳埽復大決，自澶注入御河，恩州危甚。 六月戊午，詔：「東流已填淤不可復，將來更不修閉小吳決口，候見大河歸納，應合修立堤防，令李立之經畫以聞。」 帝謂輔臣曰：「河之為患久矣，後世以事治水，故常有礙。 夫水之趨下，乃其性也，以道治水，則無違其性可也。 如能順水所向，遷徙城邑以避之，復有何患？ 雖神禹復生，不過如此。」 輔臣皆曰：「誠如聖訓。」 河北東路提點刑獄劉定言：「王莽河一徑水，自大名界下合大流注冀州，及臨清徐曲御河決口、恩州趙村壩子決口兩徑水，亦注冀州城東。 若遂成河道，即大流難以西傾，全與李垂、孫民先所論違背，望早經制。」 詔送李立之。
In the fourth month of the fourth year the Little Wu revetment burst again, sending floodwater from Danzhou into the Imperial Canal and putting Enzhou in grave peril. On wuwu day in the sixth month an edict declared that the eastern current was silted beyond recovery and the Little Wu breach would no longer be closed. Once the main river settled, Li Lizhi was to plan any needed dikes and report. The emperor told his ministers, "Floods have plagued us for ages. Later generations tried to control the river piecemeal, which is why the problem never ends. Water naturally flows downward. Govern it by the Way and you do not fight its nature. If we follow where the water wishes to go and relocate towns out of its path, what further harm remains? Even if Yu the Great were reborn, he could do no more than this. The ministers replied, "Your sagely teaching is entirely correct." Hebei East Circuit judicial intendant Liu Ding warned that the Wang Mang River formed one stream joining the main current into Jizhou from below Daming, while breaches at Linqing Xuchu on the Imperial Canal and at Zhaocun Dam in Enzhou sent two more streams into the east of Jizhou. If these become permanent channels the main current cannot be turned west again, contradicting Li Chui and Sun Minxian’s plan entirely. I urge early intervention." The memorial was forwarded to Li Lizhi.
14
八月壬午，立之言：「臣自決口相視河流，至乾寧軍分入東、西兩塘，次入界河，於劈地口入海，通流無阻，宜修立東西堤。」 詔覆計之。 而言者又請：「自王供埽上添修南岸，于小吳口北創修遙堤，候將來礬山水下，決王供埽，使直河注東北，於滄州界或南或北，從故道入海。」 不從。
On renwu day in the eighth month Li Lizhi reported that from the breach the river ran to Qianning Army, split into eastern and western ponds, entered the Border River, and reached the sea at Pedi Mouth without obstruction. He recommended building eastern and western dikes. The court ordered a review and cost estimate. Others proposed raising the south bank from Wanggong revetment, building a distant dike north of Little Wu mouth, and when alum-mountain floodwaters came, breaching Wanggong to send a straight channel northeast to re-enter the sea north or south of Cangzhou along the old course. The court did not approve.
15
九月庚子，立之又言：「北京南樂、館陶、宗城、魏縣，淺口、永濟、延安鎮，瀛州景城鎮，在大河兩堤之間，乞相度遷於堤外。」 於是用其說，分立東西兩堤五十九埽。 定三等向著：河勢正著堤身為第一，河勢順流堤下為第二，河離堤一里內為第三。 退背亦三等：堤去河最遠為第一，次遠者為第二，次近一里以上為第三。 立之在熙甯初已主立堤，今竟行其言。
On gengzi day in the ninth month Li Lizhi added that Nanle, Guantao, Zongcheng, Weixian, Qian Kou, Yongji, Yan’an Town, and Jingcheng Town in Yingzhou all lay between the river’s two dikes and should be surveyed for relocation beyond the embankments. The court adopted his plan, establishing fifty-nine revetments along separate eastern and western dikes. Three grades were established for when the river bore toward the bank: the first applied when the current pressed straight against the dike; the second when it ran downstream along the toe of the embankment; the third when the water lay within one li of the dike. Three corresponding grades were set for when the river had pulled back: first when the dike stood farthest from the channel; second at the next remove; third when the gap was still more than one li. As early as the opening years of the Xining reign, Lizhi had urged building levees; now his policy was put fully into practice.
16
五年正月己丑，詔立之：「凡為小吳決口所立堤防，可按河勢向背應置埽處，毋虛設巡河官，毋橫費工料。」 六月，河溢北京內黃埽。 七月，決大吳埽堤，以紓靈平下埽危急。 八月，河決鄭州原武埽，溢入利津、陽武溝、刀馬河，歸納梁山濼。 詔曰：「原武決口已引奪大河四分以上，不大治之，將貽朝廷巨憂。 其輟修汴河堤岸司兵五千，並力築堤修閉。」 都水復言：「兩馬頭墊落，水面闊二十五步，天寒，乞候來春施工。」 至臘月竟塞雲。 九月，河溢滄州南皮上、下埽，又溢清池埽，又溢永靜軍阜城下埽。 十月辛亥，提舉汴河堤岸司言：「洛口廣武埽大河水漲，塌岸，壞下閘斗門，萬一入汴，人力無以枝梧。 密邇都城，可不深慮。」 詔都水監官速往護之。 丙辰，廣武上、下埽危急，詔救護，尋獲安定。
On the jichou day of the first month of the fifth year, the throne addressed Lizhi: "For every levee raised at the Xiaowu breach, set yang revetments only where the river's orientation toward or away from the bank requires them; do not post river patrol officers where they serve no purpose, and do not waste labor and supplies." In the sixth month the river topped the Neihuang yang revetment in the Northern Capital region. In the seventh month the court deliberately cut the Great Wu yang levee to ease the crisis threatening the Lingping Lower yang. In the eighth month the river burst the Yuanwu yang at Zhengzhou, spilled into the Lijin, Yangwu Canal, and Daoma River, and flowed back into the Liangshan marshland. An edict declared: "The Yuanwu breach has already diverted more than four-tenths of the main current; unless it is repaired on a large scale, the court will face a major calamity. Suspend the five thousand troops of the Bian River Dike Office from their usual work and concentrate them on building levees and sealing the breach." The Directorate of Waterworks replied: "Both horse-head spurs have settled; the channel is twenty-five paces wide; the cold season makes work impossible—we ask to defer construction until spring." Nevertheless, by the twelfth month the breach had been closed. In the ninth month the river topped the upper and lower Nanpi yangs in Cangzhou, then the Qingchi yang, then the Fucheng Lower yang in Yongjing Commandery. On the xinhai day of the tenth month, the Bian River Dike Office reported: "At the Guangwu yang near Luokou the main river has swollen, the bank has caved in, and the lower gate is ruined; should the flood enter the Bian Canal, no amount of labor could hold it back. It lies hard by the capital; the court cannot take the risk lightly." The throne ordered waterworks supervisors to hurry there and shore up the works. On the bingchen day the upper and lower Guangwu yangs were in peril; the court ordered emergency repairs, and they were soon stabilized.
17
七年七月，河溢元城埽，決橫堤，破北京。 帥臣王拱辰言：「河水暴至，數十萬眾號叫求救，而錢谷稟轉運，常平歸提舉，軍器工匠隸提刑，埽岸物料兵卒即屬都水監，逐司在遠，無一得專，倉卒何以濟民？ 望許不拘常制。」 詔：「事幹機速，奏覆牒稟所屬不及者，如所請。」 戊申，命拯護陽武埽。
In the seventh year, seventh month, the river topped the Yuancheng yang, burst the transverse levee, and flooded the Northern Capital region. Commander Wang Gongchen memorialized: "When the flood struck, hundreds of thousands cried for help, yet funds and grain require the transport commissioner, Ever-Normal reserves answer to the intendant, arms and artisans to the judicial commissioner, and yang materials, troops, and labor to the waterworks directorate—each office is remote and none may decide alone; in a crisis how can the people be aided? I ask permission to act outside the usual rules." The throne replied: "Where speed is essential and reporting or consulting superiors cannot keep pace, grant the request." On the wushen day Zheng was ordered to defend the Yangwu yang.
18
十月，冀州王令圖奏：「大河行流散漫，河內殊無緊流，旋生灘磧。 宜近澶州相視水勢，使還復故道。 會明年春，宮車晏駕。
In the tenth month Wang Lingtu of Jizhou reported: "The Yellow River runs in a diffuse course; there is scarcely a main channel left, and bars and shoals keep forming. The court should survey the flow near Dazhou and guide the river back to its former course. But in the spring of the following year the emperor died.
19
大抵熙甯初，專欲導東流，閉北流。 元豐以後，因河決而北，議者始欲復禹故跡。 神宗愛惜民力，思順水性，而水官難其人。 王安石力主程昉、範子淵，故二人尤以河事自任； 帝雖藉其才，然每抑之。 其後，元祐元年，子淵已改司農少卿，御史呂陶劾其「修堤開河，縻費巨萬，護堤壓埽之人，溺死無數。 元豐六年興役，至七年功用不成。 乞行廢放。」 於是黜知兗州，尋降知峽州。 其制略曰：「汝以有限之材，興必不可成之役，驅無辜之民，置之必死之地。」 中書舍人蘇軾詞也。
Broadly speaking, in the early Xining years the court sought only to force the river east and shut off the northern channel. After the Yuanfeng period, once breaches drove the river north, officials began calling for a return to Yu the Great's ancient course. Shenzong wished to spare the people and work with the river's nature, but he could find no water commissioner equal to the task. Wang Anshi strongly backed Cheng Fang and Fan Ziyuan, and the two men in turn made the river their personal charge; yet though the emperor used their abilities, he repeatedly held them in check. Later, in Yuanyou 1, Ziyuan had become vice minister of the imperial granaries when Censor Lü Tao impeached him: "His dike repairs and channel digging consumed vast sums, and countless laborers pressing yang revetments under him drowned. Works begun in the sixth year of Yuanfeng were still unfinished in the seventh year of Yuanfeng. I ask that the project be abandoned." He was demoted to prefect of Yanzhou, then soon reduced further to prefect of Xiazhou. The dismissal edict read in part: "With your limited talent you launched a work that could not succeed, drove innocent people, and sent them to certain death." Su Shi, as secretariat drafter, had composed the text.
20
八年三月，哲宗即位，宣仁聖烈皇后垂簾。 河流雖北，而孫村低下，夏、秋霖雨，漲水往往東出。 小吳之決既未塞，十月，又決大名之小張口，河北諸郡皆被水災。 知澶州王令圖建議浚迎陽埽舊河，又于孫村金堤置約，復故道。 本路轉運使範子奇仍請于大吳北岸修進鋸牙，擗約河勢。 於是回河東流之議起。
In the third month of the eighth year Zhezong ascended the throne and Empress Dowager Xuanren assumed the regency. Though the main channel ran north, the low ground at Suncun meant that summer and autumn rains often sent floodwaters eastward. The Xiaowu breach remained open; in the tenth month the Xiaozhangkou at Daming broke as well, and flood disaster spread across Hebei. Wang Lingtu, prefect of Dazhou, urged dredging the old channel at the Yingyang yang and setting a choke on the Jindi levee at Suncun to restore the former course. The circuit transport commissioner Fan Ziqi also asked to build sawtooth spur dikes on the north bank at Dawu to divert the current. Thus the debate to turn the Yellow River east again began.
21
元祐元年二月乙丑，詔：「未得雨澤，權罷修河，放諸路兵夫。」 九月丁丑，詔秘書監張問相度河北水事。 十月庚寅，又以王令圖領都水，同問行河。
On the yichou day of the second month of Yuanyou 1 an edict declared: "Rain has not yet come; suspend river works for now and release labor troops on all circuits." On the dingchou day of the ninth month the court ordered Zhang Wen of the Secretariat to survey Hebei's water problems. On the gengyin day of the tenth month Wang Lingtu was placed at the head of the waterworks directorate to inspect the river with Wen.
22
十一月丙子，問言：「臣至滑州決口相視，迎陽埽至大、小吳，水勢低下，舊河淤仰，故道難復。 請于南樂大名埽開直河並簽河，分引水勢入孫村口，以解北京向下水患。」 令圖亦以為然，於是減水河之議復起。 既從之矣，會北京留守韓絳奏引河近府非是，詔問別相視。
On the bingzi day of the eleventh month Wen reported: "At the Huazhou breach, from the Yingyang yang to the Great and Little Wu, the water lies low and the old bed is silted up—the former course cannot be restored. I propose cutting a straight channel and a branch channel at the Nanle-Daming yang to divert flow into Suncun and ease flooding below the Northern Capital." Lingtu agreed, and the plan for a flood-relief channel was revived. The court had already approved the plan when Han Jiang, resident defender of the Northern Capital, objected that drawing the river near the city was unwise; Wen was ordered to survey again.
23
二年二月，令圖、問欲必行前說，朝廷又從之。 三月，令圖死，以王孝先代領都水，亦請如令圖議。
In the second year, second month, Lingtu and Wen pressed their original plan, and the court again assented. In the third month Lingtu died; Wang Xiaoxian succeeded him at the waterworks directorate and likewise urged adopting Lingtu's plan.
24
右司諫王覿言：「河北人戶轉徙者多，朝廷責郡縣以安集，空倉廩以振濟，又遣專使察視之，恩德厚矣。 然耕耘是時，而流轉于道路者不已； 二麥將熟，而寓食于四方者未還。 其故何也，盍亦治其本矣。 今河之為患三：氾濫渟滀，漫無涯涘，吞食民田，未見窮已，一也； 緣邊漕運獨賴御河，今御河淤澱，轉輸艱梗，二也； 塘泊之設，以限南北，濁水所經，即為平陸，三也。 欲治三患，在遴擇都水、轉運而責成耳。 今轉運使範子奇反覆求合，都水使者王孝先暗繆，望別擇人。」
Remonstrance Wang Di said: "Many Hebei families have been displaced; the court has ordered prefectures to resettle them, emptied granaries for relief, and sent special inspectors—the grace shown is already great. Yet it is planting season, and people still wander the roads; the second wheat crop is nearly ripe, yet refugees living abroad have not come home. Why is this? The court should address the root cause as well. The river now inflicts three harms. First, endless flooding and standing water devour farmland without limit; second, frontier transport depends on the Imperial Canal, which is now silted and choked; third, the pond-marshes were meant to divide north from south, but wherever muddy water flows it turns them into flat land. To cure these three ills the court need only choose capable waterworks and transport officials and hold them accountable. Fan Ziqi, the transport commissioner, keeps shifting to please whichever side prevails, and Wang Xiaoxian, the waterworks commissioner, is incompetent. I urge the court to appoint others."
25
時知樞密院事安燾深以東流為是，兩疏言：「朝廷久議回河，獨憚勞費，不顧大患。 蓋自小吳未決以前，河入海之地雖屢變移，而盡在中國； 故京師恃以北限強敵，景德澶淵之事可驗也。 且河決每西，則河尾每北，河流既益西決，固已北抵境上。 若復不止，則南岸遂屬遼界，彼必為橋樑，守以州郡； 如慶曆中因取河南熟戶之地，遂築軍以窺河外，已然之效如此。 蓋自河而南，地勢平衍，直抵京師，長慮卻顧，可為寒心。 又朝廷捐東南之利，半以宿河北重兵，備預之意深矣。 使敵能至河南，則邈不相及。 今欲便於治河而緩於設險，非計也。」
An Tuo, director of the Bureau of Military Affairs, strongly favored turning the river east and wrote twice: "The court has debated restoring the eastern course for years, yet shrinks from the cost and ignores the greater disaster. Before the Xiaowu breach, although the river's mouth shifted often, it always lay within our territory; so the capital could rely on the river as a northern barrier against powerful enemies, as the Chanyuan settlement of the Jingde era shows. Moreover, each westward breach pushes the river's tail northward; with repeated western breaks, the channel has already reached our northern frontier. If this continues, the south bank will fall within Liao territory; they will build bridges and garrison it with prefectures; just as in the Qingli era they seized lands of registered households south of the river and built garrisons to watch beyond it—a precedent already proven. South of the river the land is flat and open all the way to the capital; the prospect is enough to make one tremble. The court already sacrifices half the southeast's revenue to station heavy forces in Hebei—a deep commitment to frontier defense. If the enemy could reach the lands south of the river, our defenses would be left far behind. To ease river works while neglecting strategic defenses is no policy at all."
26
王岩叟亦言：「朝廷知河流為北道之患日深，故遣使命水官相視便利，欲順而導之，以拯一路生靈於墊溺，甚大惠也。 然昔者專使未還，不知何疑而先罷議； 專使反命，不知何所取信而議復興。 既敕都水使者總護役事，調兵起工，有定日矣，已而復罷。 數十日間，變議者再三，何以示四方？ 今有大害七，不可不早為計。 北塞之所恃以為險者在塘泊，黃河堙之，猝不可浚，浸失北塞險固之利，一也。 橫遏西山之水，不得順流而下，蹙溢於千里，使百萬生齒，居無廬，耕無田，流散而不復，二也。 乾甯孤壘，危絕不足道，而大名、深、冀腹心郡縣，皆有終不自保之勢，三也。 滄州扼北敵海道，自河不東流，滄州在河之南，直抵京師，無有限隔，四也。 併吞御河，邊城失轉輸之便，五也。 河北轉運司歲耗財用，陷租賦以百萬計，六也。 六七月之間，河流交漲，占沒西路，阻絕遼使，進退不能，兩朝以為憂，七也。 非此七害，委之可，緩而未治可也。 且去歲之患，已甚前歲，今歲又甚焉，則奈何？ 望深詔執政大臣，早決河議而責成之。」 太師文彥博、中書侍郎呂大防皆主其說。
Wang Yansou also wrote: "The court knows the river grows daily more dangerous to the northern frontier, and sent officials to survey how best to guide it and save an entire circuit from drowning—a great act of grace. Yet while the envoy was still abroad, some doubt led the court to halt the plan; when he returned, on what grounds was the debate revived? The court had ordered the waterworks commissioner to oversee the project, mobilized troops, and set a start date—then halted it again. Within weeks the policy shifted repeatedly—what message does this send the realm? Seven grave dangers now demand urgent planning. First, the northern frontier depends on the pond-marshes for defense; the Yellow River is burying them beyond quick repair, eroding that strategic advantage. Second, it dams the western hill streams so they cannot drain, flooding a thousand li and leaving a million people homeless, landless, and scattered without return. Third, though the isolated fortress of Qianning is barely defensible, the core prefectures of Daming, Shen, and Ji all face the prospect of being unable to hold out. Fourth, Cangzhou guards the enemy's sea route northward; with the river no longer flowing east, Cangzhou lies south of the channel with nothing between it and the capital. Fifth, it has engulfed the Imperial Canal, depriving border cities of transport. Sixth, the Hebei transport office loses millions in revenue each year. Seventh, in summer the swollen rivers flood the western route, trapping Liao envoys so neither court can travel—a worry to both dynasties. Without these seven harms, delay might be tolerable. Last year's disaster already exceeded the year before, and this year is worse still—what will the court do? I urge the throne to command the chief ministers to settle the river policy at once and hold them accountable." Grand Mentor Wen Yanbo and Vice Director Lü Dafang both supported him.
27
中書舍人蘇轍謂右僕射呂公著曰：「河決而北，先帝不能回，而諸公欲回之，是自謂智勇勢力過先帝也。 盍因其舊而修其未備乎？」 公著唯唯。 於是三省奏：「自河北決，恩、冀以下數州被患，至今未見開修的確利害，致妨興工。」 乃詔河北轉運使、副，限兩月同水官講議聞奏。
Secretariat drafter Su Zhe told Right Vice Director Lü Gongzhu: "When the river broke northward, the late emperor could not turn it back; if you gentlemen succeed, you claim wisdom, courage, and power greater than his. Why not accept the present course and repair what remains unfinished?" Gongzhu murmured noncommittal agreement. The Three Departments then reported: "Since the Hebei breaches, several prefectures from En southward have suffered flood damage, yet the clear costs and benefits of any repair plan remain unsettled, blocking work from starting." The court ordered the Hebei transport commissioner and his deputy, together with water officials, to deliberate within two months and report back.
28
十一月，講議官皆言：「令圖、問相度開河，取水入孫村口還復故道處，測量得流分尺寸，取引不過，其說難行。」 十二月，張景先復以問說為善，果欲回河，惟北京已上、滑州而下為宜，仍于孫村浚治橫河舊堤，止用逐埽人兵、物料，並年例客軍，春天漸為之可也。 朝廷是其說。
In the eleventh month the deliberating officials agreed: "Lingtu and Wen's plan to divert water into Suncun and restore the old course cannot draw enough flow by measurement—the scheme will not work." In the twelfth month Zhang Jingxian again endorsed Wen's plan and urged turning the river back, but only between the Northern Capital upstream and Huazhou downstream; he proposed dredging the old cross-river levee at Suncun using only local yang labor, materials, and the usual guest troops, with work proceeding gradually in spring. The court accepted his proposal.
29
三年六月戊戌，乃詔：「黃河未復故道，終為河北之患。 王孝先等所議，已嘗興役，不可中罷，宜接續工料，向去決要回復故道。 三省、樞密院速與商議施行。」 右相範純仁言：「聖人有三寶：曰慈，曰儉，曰不敢為天下先。 蓋天下大勢，惟人君所向，群下競趨如川流山摧，小失其道，非一言一力可回，故居上者不可不謹也。 今聖意已有所向而為天下先矣。 乞諭執政：'前日降出文字，卻且進入。 '免希合之臣，妄測聖意，輕舉大役。」 尚書王存等亦言：「使大河決可東回，而北流遂斷，何惜勞民費財，以成經久之利。 今孝先等自未有必然之論，但僥倖萬一，以冀成功，又預求免責，若遂聽之，將有噬臍之悔。 乞望選公正近臣及忠實內侍，覆行按視，審度可否，興工未晚。」
On the wuxu day of the sixth month of the third year an edict declared: "Until the Yellow River returns to its old course, Hebei will never be secure. The plan of Wang Xiaoxian and others has already been started and must not be abandoned midway; supplies and labor should continue until the old course is restored. The Three Departments and the Bureau of Military Affairs should consult at once and implement it." Right Chancellor Fan Chunren said: "The sage holds three treasures: compassion, frugality, and not daring to place oneself ahead of all under Heaven. The realm's momentum follows wherever the ruler turns; officials rush after like a torrent or an avalanche. A small misstep cannot be reversed by a word or a single effort—those above must tread with care. Yet now the throne has already chosen a course and placed itself ahead of the realm. He asked that the chief councilors be told: "The documents issued the other day should for now be held back and not yet forwarded." Lest sycophantic ministers presume to read the throne's mind and rashly launch a vast public works campaign." Minister Wang Cun and others also argued: "If the great river can truly be turned back east and the northern channel shut off, why hesitate to spend treasure and burden the people to secure a lasting gain? Wang Xiaoxian and his allies offer no proof that success is certain—only a one-in-ten-thousand gamble—and they have already sought immunity from blame. If the court follows them, it will rue the day too late to undo the harm. We beg that upright ministers close to the throne and trustworthy inner attendants be chosen to reinspect on the ground, judge whether the project can succeed, and only then begin work—it would not be too late."
30
庚子，三省、樞密院奏事延和殿，文彥博、呂大防、安燾等謂：「河不東，則失中國之險，為契丹之利。」 范純仁、王存、胡宗愈則以虛費勞民為憂。 存謂：「今公私財力困匱，惟朝廷未甚知者，賴先帝時封樁錢物可用耳。 外路往往空乏，奈何起數千萬物料、兵夫，圖不可必成之功？ 且禦契丹得其道，則自景德至今八九十年，通好如一家，設險何與焉？ 不然，如石晉末耶律德光犯闕，豈無黃河為阻，況今河流未必便沖過北界耶？」 太后曰：「且熟議。」
On the gengzi day, the Three Departments and the Bureau of Military Affairs presented business in Yanhe Hall. Wen Yanbo, Lü Dafang, An Che, and others argued: "If the river does not run east again, the empire loses its strategic barrier—and the Khitan gain." Fan Chunren, Wang Cun, and Hu Zongyu, by contrast, worried chiefly about wasted funds and exhausted commoners. Wang Cun said: "Public and private resources are now spent to the bone. What the court may not yet fully grasp is that we are living on the sealed reserves the late emperor left—nothing more. The outer circuits are often bare. How can we mobilize tens of millions' worth of materials and laborers for a project that may never succeed? Moreover, if we manage the Khitan wisely, we have lived in peace like one household from the Jingde era until now—eighty or ninety years. What need is there for engineered barriers? If not, consider the end of Later Jin, when Yelü Deguang marched on the capital—did the Yellow River not still stand in his way? Besides, today's current may not readily punch through the northern frontier." The empress dowager said: "Deliberate further before deciding."
31
明日，純仁又畫四不可之說，且曰：「北流數年未為大患，而議者恐失中國之利，先事回改； 正如頃西夏本不為邊患，而好事者以為不取恐失機會，遂興靈武之師也。 臣聞孔子論為政曰：'先有司。 '今水官未嘗保明，而先示決欲回河之旨，他日敗事，是使之得以藉口也。」
The next day Fan Chunren submitted a memorial outlining four reasons the project should not proceed. He said: "The northern channel has not been a major disaster these past several years, yet advocates, fearing the empire will lose a strategic advantage, would alter the river preemptively— just as recently, when Xixia was no real frontier threat, eager officials insisted that failure to strike meant missing our chance—and so the Lingwu campaign was launched. I have heard Confucius on government say: "First put the right officers in place." The hydraulic officers have never guaranteed success, yet the court has already signaled a fixed intent to turn the river back. When the work fails later, they will have their excuse ready."
32
存、宗愈亦奏：「昨親聞德音，更令熟議。 然累日猶有未同，或令建議者結罪任責。 臣等本謂建議之人，思慮有所未逮，故乞差官覆按。 若但使之結罪，彼所見不過如此，後或誤事，加罪何益。 臣非不知河決北流，為患非一。 淤沿邊塘泊，斷御河漕運，失中國之險，遏西山之流。 若能全回大河，使由孫村故道，豈非上下通願？ 但恐不能成功，為患甚於今日。 故欲選近臣按視：若孝先之說決可成，則積聚物料，接續興役； 如不可為，則令沿河踏行，自恩、魏以北，塘泊以南，別求可以疏導歸海去處，不必專主孫村。 此亦三省共曾商量，望賜詳酌。 存又奏：「自古惟有導河並塞河。 導河者順水勢，自高導令就下； 塞河者為河堤決溢，修塞令入河身。 不聞幹引大河令就高行流也。」 於是收回戊戌詔書。
Wang Cun and Hu Zongyu also memorialized: "Yesterday we personally heard Your Majesty's gracious command to deliberate further. Yet after many days opinions still differ. Some propose making the advocates pledge guilt and bear sole responsibility. We originally believed the proponents had not thought the matter through, and therefore begged that officials be sent to reinspect on site. If we only make them pledge guilt, their judgment will go no deeper than it already does. If they err later, added punishment will do no good. We are not unaware that when the river broke northward it brought many harms. It silted frontier pond-weirs, severed grain transport on the Imperial Canal, cost the empire its strategic barrier, and blocked streams from the western hills. If the great river could fully return through Sun Village's old channel, would that not be the wish of throne and realm alike? But we fear it cannot succeed—and the harm would exceed what we suffer today. Therefore we wish close ministers chosen to inspect on site: if Wang Xiaoxian's plan can truly succeed, then stock materials and proceed with the work; if it cannot be done, then have them walk the banks from En and Wei northward and south of the pond-weirs to find another route to channel the water to the sea, without insisting solely on Sun Village. The Three Departments have jointly discussed this as well. We beg Your Majesty's thorough deliberation. Wang Cun further memorialized: "Since antiquity there have been only two ways to manage a river: guiding it and blocking it. To guide a river is to follow its tendency, leading it from high ground down to low; to block a river is to repair a breached dike and return the water to the main channel. I have never heard of forcibly drawing the great river to run uphill." Thereupon the wuxu edict was withdrawn.
33
戶部侍郎蘇轍、中書舍人曾肇各三上疏。 轍大略言：
Vice Minister of Revenue Su Zhe and Secretariat Drafter Zeng Zhao each submitted three memorials. Su Zhe's memorial, in outline, stated:
34
黃河西流，議復故道。 事之經歲，役兵二萬，聚梢樁等物三十余萬。 方河朔災傷困弊，而興必不可成之功，吏民竊歎。 今回河大議雖寢，然聞議者固執來歲開河分水之策。 今小吳決口，入地已深，而孫村所開，丈尺有限，不獨不能回河，亦必不能分水。 況黃河之性，急則通流，緩則淤澱，既無東西皆急之勢，安有兩河並行之理？ 縱使兩河並行，未免各立堤防，其費又倍矣。
The Yellow River flows west, and officials debate restoring its old course. The work has already run a year, employing twenty thousand troops and gathering more than three hundred thousand timbers, stakes, and similar materials. Just as the north of the river lies ruined by disaster and want, the state undertakes a project that cannot possibly succeed—and officials and commoners sigh in private. The great debate on turning the river back has been set aside, yet I hear that advocates still cling to next year's plan to open channels and split the flow. The Xiao Wu breach has already cut deep into the ground, while the opening at Sun Village is limited in size. It cannot turn the river back—and it certainly cannot divide the water. Moreover, the Yellow River runs clear when swift and silts when slow. Without swift currents on both east and west courses, how could two channels run side by side? Even if two channels could run in parallel, each would still need its own dikes—and the cost would double again.
35
今建議者其說有三，臣請折之：一曰御河湮滅，失饋運之利。 昔大河在東，御河自懷、衛經北京，漸曆邊郡，饋運既便，商賈通行。 自河西流，御河湮滅，失此大利，天實使然。 今河自小吳北行，占壓御河故地，雖使自北京以南折而東行，則御河湮滅已一二百里，何由復見？ 此御河之說不足聽也。 二曰恩、冀以北，漲水為害，公私損耗。 臣聞河之所行，利害相半，蓋水來雖有敗田破稅之害，其去亦有淤厚宿麥之利。 況故道已退之地，桑麻千里，賦役全復，此漲水之說不足聽也。 三曰河徙無常，萬一自契丹界入海，邊防失備。 按河昔在東，自河以西郡縣，與契丹接境，無山河之限，邊臣建為塘水，以捍契丹之沖。 今河既西，則西山一帶，契丹可行之地無幾，邊防之利，不言可知。 然議者尚恐河復北徙，則海口出契丹界中，造舟為梁，便於南牧。 臣聞契丹之河，自北南注以入於海。 蓋地形北高，河無北徙之道，而海口深浚，勢無徙移，此邊防之說不足聽也。
The advocates advance three arguments, which I beg to refute. First: the Imperial Canal has been buried and we have lost the benefit of transport. When the great river ran east, the Imperial Canal ran from Huai and Wei through Beijing and on along the frontier circuits. Transport was easy and merchants moved freely. Since the river turned west the canal has been buried and this great benefit lost—Heaven itself ordained it. Today the river runs north from Xiao Wu, covering the old canal bed. Even if it were bent east again south of Beijing, the canal has lain buried for one or two hundred li. How could it be restored? This argument about the Imperial Canal is not worth heeding. Second: that north of En and Ji, rising floodwaters harm the region and drain both public and private resources. I have heard that wherever the river runs, benefit and harm balance each other. Incoming water may ruin fields and tax yields, but when it retreats it deposits silt that enriches the winter wheat. Moreover, where the old channel has receded, mulberry and hemp fields stretch for a thousand li and levies have fully returned. This argument about flood damage is not worth heeding. Third: that the river's course is uncertain, and that if by chance it reached the sea through Khitan territory, frontier defenses would fail. When the river ran east, the prefectures west of it bordered the Khitan with no mountain or river barrier. Border officials therefore built pond-weirs to block Khitan raids. Now that the river lies west, the western hills leave the Khitan little ground to cross. The frontier advantage needs no elaboration. Yet advocates still fear the river may shift north again, so that its mouth would lie in Khitan lands. They could then build boats and bridges and raid south with ease. I have heard that the Khitan's own rivers flow from north to south into the sea. The land is higher in the north, so rivers have no path to shift northward, and the estuary is deep and unlikely to move. This frontier argument, too, is not worth heeding.
36
臣又聞謝卿材到闕，昌言：「黃河自小吳決口，乘高注北，水勢奔決，上流堤防無復決怒之患。 朝廷若以河事付臣，不役一夫，不費一金，十年保無河患。」 大臣以其異已罷歸，而使王孝先、俞瑾、張景先三人重畫回河之計。 蓋由元老大臣重于改過，故假契丹不測之憂，以取必於朝廷。 雖已遣百祿等出按利害，然未敢保其不觀望風旨也。 願亟回收買梢草指揮，來歲勿調開河役兵，使百祿等明知聖意無所偏系，不至阿附以誤國計。
I also hear that when Xie Qingcai reached court he proclaimed: "Since the Yellow River broke at Xiao Wu and poured north from high ground, the current rushes away with force. The upper dikes no longer face the danger of bursting. If the court entrusted river affairs to me, I would employ no laborer, spend no coin, and guarantee no river trouble for ten years." The senior ministers dismissed him for disagreeing with them and sent him home, then had Wang Xiaoxian, Yu Jin, and Zhang Jingxian redraw the plan to turn the river back. This arose because the senior ministers were reluctant to admit a mistake and therefore invoked unpredictable Khitan dangers to force the court's hand. Although Fan Bailu and others have been sent to survey the project's costs and benefits, I dare not guarantee they will not watch for the prevailing court sentiment. I beg that the order to purchase timbers and rushes be withdrawn at once and that river labor not be mobilized next year, so that Bailu and his colleagues know clearly that the throne's mind is unbiased and will not flatter their superiors to the ruin of the state.
37
肇之言曰：「數年以來，河北、京東、淮南災傷，今歲河北並邊稍熟，而近南州軍皆旱，京東、西、淮南饑殍瘡痍。 若來年雖未大興河役，止令修治舊堤，開減水河，亦須調發丁夫。 本路不足，則及鄰路，鄰路不足，則及淮南，民力果何以堪？ 民力未堪，則雖有回河之策，及梢草先具，將安施乎？」
Zeng Zhao wrote: "For years Hebei, Jingdong, and Huainan have suffered disasters. This year Hebei and the border districts are somewhat fertile, but the southern circuits are drought-stricken, and Jingdong, Jingxi, and Huainan are scarred by famine and corpses in the fields. Even if next year brings no major river works—only repairs to old dikes and opening flood-relief channels—corvée labor must still be mobilized. If one circuit lacks labor, the next is tapped; if neighbors lack labor, Huainan is drawn on. How can the people's strength bear it? If the people cannot bear the burden, then even if the plan to turn the river back stands ready and timbers and rushes are stockpiled—how could it be carried out?"
38
會百祿等行視東西二河，亦以為東流高仰，北流順下，決不可回。 即奏曰：
When Fan Bailu and his colleagues inspected the eastern and northern channels on site, they too concluded that the eastern course ran high and steep while the northern flow ran easily downhill—and that the river could certainly not be turned back. They immediately memorialized:
39
往者王令圖、張問欲開引水簽河，導水入孫村口還復故道。 議者疑焉，故置官設屬，使之講議。 既開撅井筒，折量地形水面尺寸高下，顧臨、王孝先、張景先、唐義問、陳祐之皆謂故道難復。 而孝先獨叛其說，初乞先開減水河，俟行流通快，新河勢緩，人工物料豐備，徐議閉塞北流。 已而召赴都堂，則又請以二年為期。 及朝廷詰其成功，遽云：「來年取水入孫村口，若河流順快，工料有備，便可閉塞，回復故道。」 是又不俟新河勢緩矣。 回河事大，甯容異同如此！ 蓋孝先、俞瑾等知合用物料五千余萬，未有指擬，見買數計，經歲未及毫釐，度事理終不可為，故為大言。
Formerly Wang Lingtu and Zhang Wen proposed opening a diversion sluice canal to guide water into Sun Village and restore the old channel. Skeptics raised doubts, so offices and staff were established for deliberation. After probe wells were opened and terrain and water levels measured, Gu Lin, Wang Xiaoxian, Zhang Jingxian, Tang Yiwen, and Chen Youzhi all judged the old channel difficult to restore. But Wang Xiaoxian alone broke ranks. He first asked to open a flood-relief canal, wait until the flow ran swift and the new channel slowed, and labor and materials were ample—then discuss blocking the northern flow. When he was summoned to the Secretariat Hall, he then asked for a two-year deadline. When the court pressed him on how he would succeed, he suddenly said: "Next year we will draw water into Sun Village. If the flow runs smooth and materials are ready, we can block the channel and restore the old course." Thus he no longer waited for the new channel to slow. Turning the river back is a matter of great weight—how can such inconsistency be tolerated! Wang Xiaoxian, Yu Jin, and their allies knew the project required more than fifty million units of materials with no funds allocated. Purchases over a year had scarcely begun. Judging the work impossible, they spoke in grand promises.
40
又云：「若失此時，或河勢移背，豈獨不可減水，即永無回河之理。」 臣等竊謂河流轉徙，乃其常事； 水性就下，固無一定。 若假以五年，休養數路民力，沿河積材，漸浚故道，葺舊堤，一旦流勢改變，審議事理，釃為二渠，分派行流，均減漲水之害，則勞費不大，功力易施，安得謂之一失此時，永無回河之理也？
They also said: "Miss this moment, or the river shifts away, and not only flood relief becomes impossible—even turning the river back would be lost forever." We hold privately that a river's shifting course is its natural way; and water by nature seeks low ground and is never fixed. If given five years to rest the people on several circuits, stock materials along the river, gradually dredge the old channel and repair the old dikes, then—once the current changed—deliberate and split the flow into two channels to ease flood damage, the labor and cost would be modest and the work manageable. How can one say that missing this moment means the river can never be turned back?
41
四年正月癸末，百祿等使回入對，復言：「修減水河，役過兵夫六萬三千余人，計五百三十萬工，費錢糧三十九萬二千九百余貫、石、匹、兩，收買物料錢七十五萬三百餘緡，用過物料二百九十余萬條、束，官員、使臣、軍大將凡一百一十餘員請給不預焉。 願罷有害無利之役，那移工料，繕築西堤，以護南決口。」 未報。 己亥，乃詔罷回河及修減水河。
On the guiwei day of the first month in the fourth year, Fan Bailu's mission returned and reported to the throne: "Repairing the flood-relief canal employed more than sixty-three thousand laborers, totaling 5.3 million work-days. It cost 392,900-plus units of cash, grain, bolts, and taels; material purchases totaled 750,300-plus strings; and more than 2.9 million bundles of materials were used—the salaries of more than 110 officials, envoys, and military officers not included. We beg to end this harmful and unprofitable work, shift labor and materials, and repair the western dike to protect the southern breach." No reply was issued. On the jihai day an edict halted the project to turn the river back and the repair of the flood-relief canal.
42
四月戊午，尚書省言：「大河東流，為中國之要險。 自大吳決後，由界河入海，不惟淤壞塘濼，兼濁水入界河，向去淺澱，則河必北流。 若河尾直注北界入海，則中國全失險阻之限，不可不為深慮。」 詔范百祿、趙君錫條畫以聞。
On the wuwu day of the fourth month, the Ministry of Revenue reported: "The great river flowing east is the empire's vital strategic barrier. Since the Da Wu breach it has entered the sea through the Border River. This has not only silted and ruined the pond-weirs but also sent muddy water into the Border River. If silting continues, the river will inevitably turn north again. If the river's mouth were to enter the sea directly through the northern frontier, the empire would wholly lose its strategic barrier. This demands the deepest consideration." The throne ordered Fan Bailu and Zhao Junxi to draft plans and report.
43
百祿等言：
Fan Bailu and his colleagues reported:
44
臣等昨按行黃河獨流口至界河，又東至海口，熟觀河流形勢； 並緣界河至海口鋪砦地分使臣各稱：界河未經黃河行流已前，闊一百五十步下至五十步，深一丈五尺下至一丈； 自黃河行流之後，今闊至五百四十步，次亦三二百步，深者三丈五尺，次亦二丈。 乃知水性就下，行疾則自刮除成空而稍深，與《前漢書》大司馬史張戎之論正合。
Yesterday we surveyed from the Yellow River's sole outlet to the Border River and on east to the estuary, closely observing the current's configuration; and along the Border River to the estuary posts, envoys in each sector reported that before the Yellow River flowed through it, the channel was 150 bu wide at most and 50 bu at least, and 1.5 zhang deep at most and 1 zhang at least; but after the Yellow River flowed through it, the channel is now as wide as 540 bu in places and 200 to 300 bu elsewhere, and as deep as 3.5 zhang in places and 2 zhang elsewhere. Thus we know that water seeks low ground and that a swift current scours its bed deeper—exactly matching Zhang Rong's argument in the Book of Former Han.
45
自元豐四年河出大吳，一向就下，沖入界河，行流勢如傾建。 經今八年，不舍晝夜，沖刷界河，兩岸日漸開闊，連底成空，趨海之勢甚迅。 雖遇元豐七年八年、元祐元年泛漲非常，而大吳以上數百里，終無決溢之害，此乃下流歸納處河流深快之驗也。
Since the fourth year of Yuanfeng, when the river broke out at Da Wu, it has run steadily downhill into the Border River, its current pouring like water from a tilted roof. For eight years now, without ceasing day or night, it has scoured the Border River. The banks widen daily, the bottom is hollowed out, and the rush to the sea is very swift. Although the extraordinary floods of Yuanfeng years seven and eight and Yuanyou year one occurred, for several hundred li above Da Wu there were ultimately no breaches or overflows—proof that where the lower reach receives the flow, the river runs deep and fast.
46
塘濼有限遼之名，無禦遼之實。 今之塘水，又異昔時，淺足以褰裳而涉，深足以維舟而濟，冬寒冰堅，尤為坦途。 如滄州等處，商胡之決即已澱淤，今四十二年，迄無邊警，亦無人言以為深憂。 自回河之議起，首以此動煩聖聽。 殊不思大吳初決，水未有歸，猶不北去； 今入海湍迅，界河益深，尚復何慮？ 藉令有此，則中國據上游，契丹豈不慮乘流擾之乎？
The pond-weirs bear the name of blocking the Liao but not the reality. Today's pond water differs again from former times. Where it is shallow, one can hike up one's skirts and wade across; where it is deep, boats can moor and cross. In winter the ice is firm and especially offers a level road. At places such as Cangzhou, the Shanghu breach has long since silted up. Forty-two years have passed with no frontier alarm, and no one speaks of it as a grave concern. Only since the debate on turning the river back arose has this been raised to trouble the throne's attention. They never reflect that when Da Wu first breached and the water had nowhere to go, the river still did not turn north. Now the river enters the sea in a swift torrent and the Border River grows ever deeper—what remains to fear? Even if it were so, the empire holds the upper reaches—would the Khitan not fear riding the current downstream to harass us?
47
自古朝那、蕭關、雲中、朔方、定襄、雁門、上郡、太原、右北平之間，南北往來之沖，豈塘濼界河之足限哉。 臣等竊謂本朝以來，未有大河安流，合于禹跡，如此之利便者。 其界河向去只有深闊，加以朝夕海潮往來渲蕩，必無淺澱，河尾安得直注北界，中國亦無全失險阻之理。 且河遇平壤灘漫，行流稍遲，則泥沙留淤； 若趨深走下，湍激奔騰，惟有刮除，無由淤積，不至上煩聖慮。
Since antiquity the routes between Chaona, Xiaoguan, Yunzhong, Shuofang, Dingxiang, Yanmen, Shangjun, Taiyuan, and Youbeiping have been the great corridors of north-south traffic—pond-weirs and the Border River alone could never hold that traffic in check. We venture to say that since our dynasty arose, never has the great river flowed so peacefully in accord with Yu's course, to such advantage. Going forward the Border River can only grow deeper and wider. With the sea tides washing it twice daily, shallow silt deposits are impossible. How could the river's mouth pour straight into the northern frontier? Nor is there any reason the empire would wholly lose its strategic barrier. Moreover, when the river meets level plains and spreads wide, a slightly slower current leaves mud and sand behind as silt; but when it runs deep and downward in a turbulent rush, it can only scour its bed clean—silt cannot accumulate—and need not trouble the throne's attention.
48
七月己巳朔，冀州南宮等五埽危急，詔撥提舉修河司物料百萬與之。 甲午，都水監言：「河為中國患久矣，自小吳決後，氾濫未著河槽，前後遣官相度非一，終未有定論。 以為北流無患，則前二年河決南宮下埽，去三年決上埽，今四年決宗城中埽，豈謂北流可保無虞？ 以為大河臥東，則南宮、宗城皆在西岸； 以為臥西，則冀州信都、恩州清河、武邑或決，皆在東岸。 要是大河千里，未見歸納經久之計，所以昨相度第三、第四鋪分決漲水，少紓目前之急。 繼又宗城決溢，向下包蓄不定，雖欲不為東流之計，不可得也。 河勢未可全奪，故為二股之策。 今相視新開第一口，水勢湍猛，發洩不及，已不候工畢，更撥沙河堤第二口泄減漲水，因而二股份行，以紓下流之患。 雖未保冬夏常流，已見有可為之勢。 必欲經久，遂作二股，仍較今所修利害孰為輕重，有司具析保明以聞。」
On the first day of the seventh month, jisi, the five revetments at Nangong in Jizhou and elsewhere were in critical danger. An edict allocated a million units of material from the Office for River Repair to them. On the jiawu day the Directorate of Waterways reported: "The river has long been the empire's scourge. Since the Small Wu breach, floods have not settled into the channel. Survey teams have been dispatched again and again, yet no final plan has been agreed upon. Those who claim the northern current is harmless should recall that two years ago the river broke the lower Nangong revetment, three years ago the upper revetment, and this year the middle Zongcheng revetment—can the northern flow truly be declared safe? If one argues the great river lies to the east, then Nangong and Zongcheng are both on the west bank; if one argues it lies to the west, then breaches at Xindu in Jizhou, Qinghe in Enzhou, or Wuyi would all strike the east bank. In short, along a thousand li of great river no enduring plan to channel and settle the flow has emerged. That is why we surveyed dividing the flood at the third and fourth posts yesterday, to ease the immediate crisis somewhat. Then Zongcheng breached and overflowed again; the waters below could no longer be held in check. Even if one wished to avoid planning for an eastern flow, it was no longer possible. The river's force could not be wholly diverted, so a two-channel policy was adopted. Inspection of the newly opened first outlet showed the current too violent to discharge quickly. Without waiting for the work to finish, a second outlet was cut through the Shahe dike to bleed off the flood. The two channels now run in parallel, easing the lower reach. Although year-round flow in winter and summer is not yet assured, the situation already shows what can be done. If a lasting solution is required, the two channels should be made permanent. Compare whether the present repairs do more harm or good, and let the responsible offices analyze, certify, and report to the throne."
49
八月丁未，翰林學士蘇轍言：
On the dingwei day of the eighth month, Hanlin Academician Su Zhe memorialized:
50
夏秋之交，暑雨頻並。 河流暴漲出岸，由孫村東行，蓋每歲常事。 而李偉與河埽使臣因此張惶，以分水為名，欲發回河之議，都水監從而和之。 河事一興，求無不可，況大臣以其符合己說而樂聞乎。
At the turn of summer and autumn, torrential rains fell one after another. The river surged over its banks and ran east from Suncun—an event that happens every year. But Li Wei and the river-revetment commissioners panicked at this and, under the pretext of dividing the water, sought to revive the project to turn the river back—and the Directorate of Waterways echoed them. Once river works are launched, no request is denied—especially when the senior ministers are pleased to hear proposals that match their own views?
51
臣聞河道西行孫村側左，大約入地二丈以來，今所報漲水出岸，由新開口地東入孫村，不過六七尺。 欲因六七尺漲水，而奪入地二丈河身，雖三尺童子，知其難矣。 然朝廷遂為之遣都水使者，興兵功，開河道，進鋸牙，欲約之使東。 方河水盛漲，其西行河道若不斷流，則遏之東行，實同兒戲。
I am told the main channel runs west along the left flank of Suncun, roughly two zhang or more below the surface. The reported flood over the banks, entering Suncun eastward through the newly opened ground, is no more than six or seven chi deep. To divert a channel two zhang below ground with only six or seven chi of floodwater—even a child three feet tall knows how impossible that is. Yet the court has dispatched a waterways commissioner, mobilized corvée labor, opened a channel, advanced saw-tooth barriers, and tried to force the river eastward. With the river at full flood, if its westward channel has not dried up, forcing it eastward is mere child's play.
52
臣願急命有司，徐觀水勢所向，依累年漲水舊例，因其東溢，引入故道，以紓北京朝夕之憂。 故道堤防壞決者，第略加修葺，免其決溢而已。 至於開河、進約等事，一切毋得興功，俟河勢稍定然後議。 不過一月，漲水既落，則西流之勢，決無移理。 兼聞孫村出岸漲水，今已斷流，河上官吏未肯奏知耳。
I beg the court to order the responsible offices to watch patiently where the current tends, follow the precedent of past flood seasons, and as the water spills eastward guide it into the old channel to ease the Northern Capital's daily anxiety. Where dikes along the old channel have failed, patch them lightly—only enough to prevent new breaches. As for opening new channels, advancing barriers, and the like—no such work should be undertaken until the river settles, when the matter can be debated again. Within a month at most, once the flood subsides, the westward current will certainly not change course. I also hear that the Suncun overflow has already ceased, but the river officials on site refuse to report it.
53
是時，吳安持與李偉力主東流，而謝卿材謂「近歲河流稍行地中，無可回之理」，上《河議》一編。 召赴政事堂會議，大臣不以為然。 癸丑，三省、樞密院言：「繼日霖雨，河上之役，恐煩聖慮。」 太后曰：「訪之外議，河水已東復故道矣。」
At that time Wu Anchi and Li Wei strongly advocated forcing the eastern flow, while Xie Qingcai argued that "in recent years the river has run somewhat below ground and cannot be turned back," and submitted a treatise 《On River Policy》. He was summoned to the Council Chamber for discussion, but the senior ministers were not persuaded. On the guichou day the Three Departments and Privy Council reported: "Rain has fallen day after day; the river works may trouble Your Majesty's mind." The Empress Dowager said: "According to outside opinion, the river has already returned east to its old channel."
54
乙丑，李偉言：「已開撥北京南沙河直堤第三鋪，放水入孫村口故道通行。」 又言：「大河已分流，即更不須開淘。 因昨來一決之後，東流自是順快，渲刷漸成港道。 見今已為二股，約奪大河三分以來，若得夫二萬，於九月興工，至十月寒凍時可畢。 因引導河勢，豈止為二股通行而已，亦將遂為回奪大河之計。 今來既因擗拶東流，修全鋸牙，當迤邐增進一埽，而取一埽之利，比至來年春、夏之交，遂可全復故道。 朝廷今日當極力必閉北流，乃為上策。 若不明詔有司，即令回河，深恐上下遷延，議終不決，觀望之間，遂失機會。 乞復置修河司。」 從之。
On the yichou day Li Wei reported: "We have opened the third post of the straight dike on Beijing's south Shahe, releasing water into the old channel at Suncun for passage." He added: "The great river has already split in two; dredging is no longer needed. Since last year's breach, the eastern flow has naturally grown swift; scouring has gradually carved out a channel. It is now two channels, drawing off roughly a third of the great river or more. With twenty thousand laborers, work could begin in the ninth month and finish before the cold sets in during the tenth month. By guiding the river's force, the aim is not merely to keep two channels open but to proceed with the plan to win back the main current. Now that the eastern flow has been forced into place and the saw-tooth barriers are fully repaired, revetments should be advanced one after another, each gaining ground—by the turn of spring and summer next year the old channel can be wholly restored. The court must now exert its full strength to shut the northern flow—that is the superior policy. Without a clear edict ordering the responsible offices to turn the river back, I fear that court and provinces will delay, debate will never end, and the opportunity will be lost while all stand watching. We beg that the Office for River Repair be restored." The court approved.
55
五年正月丁亥，梁燾言：「朝廷治河，東流北流，本無一偏之私。 今東流未成，邊北之州縣未至受患，其役可緩； 北流方悍，邊西之州縣，日夕可憂，其備宜急。 今傾半天下之力，專事東流，而不加一夫一草於北流之上，得不誤國計乎！ 去年屢決之害，全由堤防無備。 臣願嚴責水官，修治北流埽岸，使二方均被惻隱之恩。」
On the dinghai day of the first month in the fifth year, Liang Tao memorialized: "In governing the river, eastern flow and northern flow—the court originally held no partial preference. The eastern flow is not yet secure; the northern border counties have not yet suffered harm—those works can wait; but the northern flow is violent; the western border counties face danger at any moment—preparations there should be urgent. Now half the empire's resources are poured solely into the eastern flow, without a single laborer or blade of grass devoted to the northern flow—can this fail to betray the national plan! Last year's repeated breaches all stemmed from unready dikes. I beg that water officials be held strictly accountable to repair the northern-flow revetments and banks so that both regions alike receive the court's care."
56
二月己亥，詔開修減水河。 辛丑，乃詔三省、樞密院：「去冬愆雪，今未得雨，外路旱墻闊遠，宜權罷修河。」
On the jihai day of the second month an edict ordered the flood-relief canal opened and repaired. On the xinchou day an edict went to the Three Departments and Privy Council: "Last winter brought too little snow, and rain has not yet fallen. Drought on the outer circuits is wide and severe—river repair should be suspended for the time being."
57
戊申，蘇轍言：「臣去年使契丹，過河北，見州縣官吏，訪以河事，皆相視不敢正言。 及今年正月，還自契丹，所過吏民，方舉手相慶，皆言近有朝旨罷回河大役，命下之日，北京之人，歡呼鼓舞。 惟減水河役遷延不止，耗蠹之事，十存四五，民間竊議，意大臣業已為此，勢難遽回。 既為聖鑒所臨，要當迤邐盡罷。 今月六日，果蒙聖旨，以旱災為名，權罷修黃河，候今秋取旨。 大臣覆奏盡罷黃河東、北流及諸河功役，民方憂旱，聞命踴躍，實荷聖恩。 然臣竊詳聖旨，上合天意，下合民心。 因水之性，功力易就，天語激切，中外聞者或至泣下，而臣奉行，不得其平。 由此觀之，則是大臣所欲，雖害物而必行； 陛下所為，雖利民而不聽。 至於委曲回避，巧為之說，僅乃得行，君權已奪，國勢倒植。 臣所謂君臣之間，逆順之際，大為不便者，此事是也。 黃河既不可復回，則先罷修河司，只令河北轉運司盡將一道兵功，修貼北流堤岸； 罷吳安持、李偉都水監差遣，正其欺罔之罪，使天下曉然知聖意所在。 如此施行，不獨河事就緒，天下臣庶，自此不敢以虛誑欺朝廷，弊事庶幾漸去矣。」
On the wushen day Su Zhe memorialized: "Last year, on my mission to the Khitan, I passed through Hebei and questioned prefectural and county officials about the river. They looked at one another and dared not speak plainly. When I returned from the Khitan this first month, every official and commoner I met raised their hands in celebration, saying a recent imperial order had halted the great project to turn the river back. From the day the order arrived, the people of the Northern Capital shouted and danced for joy. Only the flood-relief canal work drags on; four or five tenths of the wasteful expense remains. People whisper that the senior ministers are already committed and the momentum makes sudden reversal difficult. Now that the throne has taken notice, the work should be wound down step by step until it is fully halted. On the sixth of this month we were indeed graced with an imperial order, citing drought, temporarily suspending Yellow River repair until further instruction this autumn. The senior ministers memorialized in reply to halt entirely the eastern flow, northern flow, and all river labor. The people, already anxious over drought, leaped at the order—they truly received the throne's grace. Yet I examine the imperial order closely—it accords with Heaven above and the people's hearts below. Following the water's nature, the work would be easy to finish. The imperial words were urgent and piercing—some within and without wept on hearing them—yet in carrying them out I could not obtain fairness. Viewed thus, what the senior ministers desire, though it harms the people, must be done; what Your Majesty orders, though it benefits the people, goes unheeded. Through evasive circumlocution and clever arguments they barely secure execution. Sovereign authority is already usurped and the state's posture inverted. What I call the gravest breach between ruler and minister, between compliance and defiance—is precisely this matter. Since the Yellow River cannot be turned back, abolish the Office for River Repair first and order the Hebei transport commissioner to devote all circuit labor to repairing the northern-flow dikes; remove Wu Anchi and Li Wei from their waterways posts, punish their deceit, and let all under Heaven clearly know where the throne's intent lies. If carried out thus, not only will the river affair be settled, but from this day forth no subject will dare deceive the court with empty falsehoods, and corrupt practices may gradually fade."
58
八月甲辰，提舉東流故道李偉言：「大河自五月後日益暴漲，始由北京南沙堤第七鋪決口，水出於第三、第四鋪並清豐口一併東流。 故道河槽深三丈至一丈以上，比去年尤為深快，頗減北流橫溢之患。 然今已秋深，水當減落，若不稍加措置，慮致斷絕，即東流遂成淤澱。 望下所屬官司，經畫沙堤等口分水利害，免淤故道，上誤國事。」 詔吳安持與本路監司、北外丞司及李偉按視，具合措置事連書以聞。
On the jiachen day of the eighth month Li Wei, charged with the old eastern channel, reported: "Since the fifth month the great river has grown more violent day by day. First it breached the seventh post of the south Shahe dike at Beijing; water then issued from the third and fourth posts together with Qingfeng mouth—all flowing east. The old channel's bed is three zhang deep in places and more than one zhang elsewhere—deeper and swifter than last year—greatly reducing the northern flow's lateral flooding. Yet autumn is already deep and the water should subside. Without some measure, I fear the flow will break off and the eastern channel will silt up. I hope the responsible offices will plan the hydraulic risks at outlets such as the sand dike, prevent silting of the old channel, and not mislead the state." An edict ordered Wu Anchi, together with the circuit's supervisory commissioners, the northern outer assistant commissioners, and Li Wei, to inspect on site, compile all required measures in a joint memorial, and report.
59
九月，中丞蘇轍言：「修河司若不罷，李偉若不去，河水終不得順流，河朔生靈終不得安居。 乞速罷修河司，及檢舉六年四月庚子敕，竄責李偉。」
In the ninth month Censor Su Zhe memorialized: "If the Office for River Repair is not abolished and Li Wei is not removed, the river will never run true and the people of Hebei will never know peace. I beg urgently to abolish the Office for River Repair and, citing the edict of gengzi in the fourth month of the sixth year, punish Li Wei by exile."
60
七年三月，以吏部郎中趙偁權河北轉運使。 偁素與安持等議不協，嘗上《河議》，其略曰：「自頃有司回河幾三年，功費騷動半天下，復為分水又四年矣。 故所謂分水者，因河流、相地勢導而分之。 今乃橫截河流，置埽約以扼之，開浚河門，徒為淵潭，其狀可見。 況故道千里，其間又有高處，故累歲漲落輒復自斷。 夫河流有逆順，地勢有高下，非朝廷可得而見，職在有司，朝廷任之亦信矣，患有司不自信耳。 臣謂當繕大河北流兩堤，復修宗城棄堤，閉宗城口，廢上、下約，開闞村河門，使河流湍直，以成深道。 聚三河工費以治一河，一二年可以就緒，而河患庶幾息矣。 願以河事並都水條例一付轉運司，而總以工部，罷外丞司使，措置歸一，則職事可舉，弊事可去。」
In the third month of the seventh year Zhao Cheng of the Ministry of Personnel was appointed acting Hebei transport commissioner. Cheng had long disagreed with Anchi and others. He had once submitted 《On River Policy》, which in gist said: "For some time the responsible offices have sought to turn the river back for nearly three years, stirring labor and expense through half the empire; then they divided the water again for four years more. True division of the water means following the river's flow and guiding it apart according to the terrain. Now they cut across the river's flow, set revetments and barriers to choke it, and open dredged outlets—only to make deep pools. The situation is plain to see. Moreover the old channel runs a thousand li, and within it are high stretches; thus year after year, as floods rise and fall, it breaks off again by itself. The river runs contrary or conforming; the terrain rises and falls—the court cannot see this for itself. The duty lies with the responsible offices, and entrusting them is trust enough—the trouble is that the responsible offices do not trust themselves. I propose repairing the great river's northern-flow banks on both sides, restoring the abandoned Zongcheng dike, closing the Zongcheng outlet, abolishing the upper and lower barriers, opening the Kancun river mouth, and letting the river run swift and straight to form a deep channel. Gather the labor expense of the three river projects to treat one river—in one or two years the work can be finished and the river scourge may roughly cease. I wish that river affairs and all waterways regulations be handed entirely to the transport commissioner, with overall charge resting in the Ministry of Works, abolishing the outer assistant commissioners so that arrangements are unified—then duties can be performed and corrupt practices removed."
61
四月，詔：「南、北外兩丞司管下河埽，今後令河北、京西轉運使、副、判官、府界提點分認界至，內河北仍於銜內帶'兼管南北外都水公事'。」
In the fourth month an edict stated: "The river revetments under the northern and southern outer assistant commissioners—hereafter let the Hebei and Jingxi transport commissioners, vice commissioners, judicial commissioners, and metropolitan frontier intendant divide and acknowledge their boundaries. Within Hebei, their titles shall still include 'Concurrently in charge of northern and southern outer waterways affairs.'"
62
十月辛酉，以大河東流，賜都水使者吳安持三品服，北都水監丞李偉再任。
On the xinyou day of the tenth month, because the great river flowed east, waterways commissioner Wu Anchi was granted third-rank robes and northern waterways assistant commissioner Li Wei was reappointed.