← Back to 宋史

卷九十三 志第四十六 河渠三

Volume 93 Treatises 46: Rivers and Canals 3

Chapter 93 of 宋史 · History of Song
← Previous Chapter
Chapter 93
Next Chapter →
1
The Yellow River, continued
2
使
On yimao in the second month of the eighth year of Yuanyou, the Three Departments received an edict: "As to the soft weir on the northern flow, act entirely as the Directorate of Waterways has proposed." Su Che, Vice Director of the Secretariat, submitted: "I have long maintained that a soft weir cannot be used on the northern channel—the tradeoffs are obvious. The eastern channel was dug by human effort and is only a little over a hundred paces wide; in winter the stream dries up, so a soft weir is feasible there. Today the northern channel is the river's main course—many times the eastern flow—and the water never stops running. How could a soft weir possibly hold? What the water officials really want is to call it a soft weir while building a hard one—a covert scheme to force the river back onto its old course. The court has already seen through them; the soft-weir proposal should not be approved again." Zhao Zhen also submitted a memorial: "I believe river policy turns on three great tradeoffs, yet debaters push rival plans—some fixated on the immediate and blind to the long term, gambling for credit; others seize one option and reject another, twisting facts beyond recognition. The result is that real benefits stay obscure, real harms persist, the throne is misled, the people suffer more, and forced labor is squandered without end. I find this deeply distressing. These three great concerns are: on the northern channel, which carries the full river, the problem is that the water cannot be split off; on the eastern channel, which diverts water, the problem is that the water cannot run freely; and at the Zongcheng breach, the problem is that the water cannot be shut in. Remove the problem in each case and you gain benefit; fail to remove it and you inherit harm. Instead of addressing these issues, they talk only of shutting the northern channel outright—seeing the short-term gain of a day's closure but not the disaster once it is blocked, noting how easy it is to work the sunken northern channel yet ignoring the surge at Kancun, which cannot all be forced into the eastern flow at once. Trying to merge the river for gain while ignoring the risk of jams and breaches up- and downstream is exactly the sort of short-sighted gamble for credit that I described. The agencies want to cut the northern flow but avoid responsibility, so they invoke water division and propose a soft weir; when they see the current cannot be held by a soft weir, they plan to breach it anyway. I fear we will waste labor and funds treating the river as a toy. Please wait until the flood subsides and the channel settles, observe the main river's behavior, and then decide policy for the eastern and northern flows."
3
西 使 西
In the fifth month the water officials finally pushed to advance the upper and lower bonds at Liangcun to pinch the river mouth; when floodwater hit, the works jammed and collapsed. Water struck Deqing in the south, burst west at Neihuang, silted Liangcun in the east, and spilled north at Kancun; the Zongcheng breach reopened toward Weidian; silt choked off the northern channel; the river fanned out in four directions and wrecked the floating bridges of the eastern prefectures. On bingyin in the twelfth month, Supervising Censor Guo Zhizhang reported: "On a recent mission to Hebei I entered Beijing from Duanzhou and crossed at Sunkou village; the water trending east runs very wide and deep; traveling from Beijing toward Mingzhou and crossing again at Yangjia shallows, I saw only two or three tenths of the water heading north—then I understood that the main river should be closed to the north and sent east. I ask that the Directorate of Waterways be instructed to survey the situation." Wu Anchì was again placed in charge of the Directorate of Waterways and immediately proposed: "We have recently followed the court's order and dammed the spur at Weidian, cutting off the lower branch of the northern flow. But there are no dikes on either flank; if the flood rises even slightly, water will spill across the flats, and a sheet flow between Beijing and Enzhou would do even greater damage. I request blocking Liangcun mouth, sealing Zhangbao mouth, and opening the Chicken-Claw River east of Qingfeng mouth to split and weaken the current." Lü Dafang endorsed the plan because it matched his views, and an edict ordered him and the Beijing garrison commander to inspect the site together.
4
使 西 西西 鹿 使 便
Fan Chunren had returned as chief councilor on the right, and he and Su Che strongly opposed the plan. The court then ordered: "Let the Directorate of Waterways consult with this circuit's pacification, transport, and judicial commissioners; implement if feasible, and report any objections at once." This was in the first month of the first year of Shaosheng. Transport Commissioner Zhao Zhen strongly disagreed, while Judicial Commissioner Shangguan Jun largely backed him. Zhao Zhen said: "From Mengjin the river first spreads across level ground; only the full current can carve a stable channel. When Yu tamed the floods, he spread the waters into the Nine Rivers from northern Ji to Cang and Di because near the sea there was little risk. Over the past century the river has broken west at Henglong, Liuta, Shanghu, and Xiaowu—that is the river's habitual drift. Officials instead built brush revetments and bonds to cut the flow crosswise; failing to return the river, they turned to splitting the water. First Nangong, then Zongcheng, then Neihuang—each breach to the west—shows plainly that the land slopes downward to the west. To seek peace on the river while fighting the lay of the land and the nature of the water—I see no way this can succeed. I ask to open the Kancun river mouth, repair revetments at Pingxiang, Julu, Jiaojia, and elsewhere, and dredge the old Danyuan channel against high water." Daming Pacification Commissioner Xu Jiang said: "Weighing the options today, if we abandon the old course and rely only on the northern flow, we risk a silted lower reach while the upper river bursts sideways—the damage would spread further. If we simply shut the northern channel and force the river east into the old course, we again fear the channel cannot take the full volume and the dikes will fail. I believe we should send water east through Liangcun mouth and north through Neihuang mouth, close the other openings entirely, and thus spare Daming and the surrounding prefectures. Wait until the spring-summer flood peaks, then test whether the old course can carry the flow; if it can, Neihuang mouth may be sealed; if it cannot, the Liangcun project should be halted. Once policy is settled, the people will be reassured and the river can be guided back in due course without harm." The court ordered: "Wu Anchì, together with Directorate Vice Director Zheng You and the circuit's pacification, transport, and judicial officials, shall submit certified maps and reports; if anything is impracticable, state the pros and cons as well."
5
使
On guiyou in the third month, Supervising Censor Guo Zhizhang said: "The river has returned to its old course and the eastward flow can no longer be stopped. Envoys were recently sent to inspect, yet the agencies still disagree. The water officials work on the river daily; I ask that responsibility be entrusted to them alone." On yihai, Lü Dafang was removed as chief councilor.
6
' ' 使 使
In the sixth month, Right Remonstrator Zhang Shangying submitted: "During Yuanfeng the river broke at Nangong mouth; debate dragged on for years until the late emperor sighed, 'Even if Yu the Great were reborn, he could not turn this river back. He then forbade any further debate on forcing the river back and closing mouths, adopting the Han view to let the floods find their own level. Early in Yuanyou, Wen Yanbo and Lü Dafang rejected that edict, promoted Wu Anchì to head the Directorate of Waterways, and put him in charge of the eastern-flow project. Within five hundred li of Jingdong and Hebei men were conscripted; beyond that distance hirelings were paid; Ever-Normal Granary funds bought fascines and brush, and elms and willows were felled. After eight years without measurable success, Anchì was moved to Grandee of the Stud and Wang Zongwang took his place. When Zongwang arrived, Liu Fengshi still pressed the eastern-flow policy in the spirit of Yanbo and Dafang, trying to take the full river through Liangcun mouth. Now Liangcun mouth is silted shut, yet they have cut two breaches in the sand dike to release water. They once planned seventy li of dike to block the northern flow; now they say they will wait until frost and low water before building. The court is close at hand; the water officials should not have deceived it for nine years like this. For nine years the Fan River rose every season and fell with frost—did floods begin only this year, and can work start only after the water drops? I ask that envoys verify the facts and audit all public and private spending on money, grain, and fascines since the return-river policy began, following the precedent of the Liuta River project under Emperor Renzong."
7
使
In the seventh month on xinchou the Guangwu revetment was in critical danger; Wang Zongwang was ordered to rush to the site. On renyin the emperor told his ministers: "Guangwu is near the Luo River; we must guard against a flood pouring down on the capital. I have already sent a palace envoy to inspect." The ministers presented maps and reports: "A shoal has formed on the Yellow River's north bank, driving water toward the south bank. The rain has stopped and the river will fall; we have sent water officials with the Luokou staff to inspect, build tie dikes, and clear the soft shoal on the north bank so the river runs straight—then there will be no danger."
8
滿 便
On bingzi in the eighth month, Acting Vice Minister of Works Wu Anchì and others reported: "The Guangwu revetment is critical; where more than two thousand paces of dike have been scoured away, the ground is slightly higher. From Qili shop east of Gong county to the present Luokou is less than ten li; a new channel could divert the river southward with very little land and labor. Wang Zongwang inspected the site and sank test shafts; all called it advantageous except that a great dike to the south would be enormously costly—I ask the responsible agencies to survey and certify in person." The court approved.
9
使
On dingyou in the tenth month, Wang Zongwang said: "Since Yuanfeng the great river has run in eastern and northern channels with enormous stakes; years of dispute have left national policy unsettled and the water officials without clear direction. Since receiving the edict nine months ago I have carried out the imperial plan: from Kancun down to the seven river mouths at Kaolao dike, all have been sealed. We built seventy li of Golden Dike to block the northern flow entirely and send the whole river east back to the old course, ending the disaster. From Kancun to the sea mouth we repaired old and new dikes and dredged silted shallows so that even midsummer floods would not cause jams or breaches. I ask that the historians record how since Shaosheng the emperor's decisive judgment produced this achievement." The court ordered Zongwang and others to report in detail the merit grades of officials involved in closing the northern channel. Yet the eastern-channel dikes were still not secure; riverside districts suffered floods; refugees entered the capital and often camped along the imperial galleries and in monasteries. The court issued travel passes and ordered them home to receive relief.
10
西
On jiyou, Anchì reported again: "Following the court's order we surveyed opening and dredging the old Duanzhou channel to split floodwater. Duanzhou was the river's old course; we recently sought to open it, but the east-west gradient was too steep to build then. We ask to dredge the Yan family river for now and have subordinates first estimate materials to repair eleven revetments." The court ordered: "The Directorate of Waterways shall report the pros and cons before next year's flood season."
11
使 使
On guichou the Three Departments and Bureau of Military Affairs reported: "In the eighth year of Yuanfeng, Duanzhou prefect Wang Lingtu proposed restoring the great river's old course. In the fourth year of Yuanyou, Director Wu Anchì, seeking to relieve crises at Nangong and other revetments, adopted a return-river plan at Sunkou village. When bonds were advanced at Liangcun for the eastern flow, Sunkou mouth proved too narrow and Deqing Army and other places were flooded. This spring Wang Zongwang and others closed the northern channel at Neihuang's lower revetment, yet at flood stage three-tenths of the flow still ran north; upstream revetments were already critical and the Jiangling revetment burst, ruining farmland. Zongwang has now reported that below Kancun the river has been sealed, more than seventy li of new dike built, the northern flow fully shut, and the entire river sent east to the old course. Inquiry shows the eastern channel downstream runs over ground that is already high, so the water moves slowly. With the northern flow shut, next midsummer the full flood will run the old course; not only are the old dikes damaged and weak, but the new Kancun dike may not hold. Upstream of the capital we also fear jams and breaches at the revetments; advance planning is essential." The court ordered Acting Vice Minister Wu Anchì, Director Wang Zongwang, Vice Director Zheng You, and the Northern Outer Directorate staff to inspect from Kancun to the sea mouth, repair and dredge as needed, and prevent jams or breaches.
12
調 沿
On bingchen Zhang Shangying said again: "The northern flow is closed this year; the Directorate chiefs congratulated the throne and some asked the historians to record it—meaning the river is back on the old course and we need only maintain dikes against future breaches. Yet I hear Wang Zongwang and Li Zhong now want to open the old Duanzhou channel to split the flow, while Wu Anchì asks to wait until before the flood season to survey. If the Duanzhou old channel is opened without matching the eastern channel's bed level, it will silt up as soon as the water falls. If it could be leveled, we should have closed the mouths and returned the river from the start—why spend nine years and vast resources? Anchì's plea to wait for the flood season is empty delay. Past floods and this year's floods both reached Duanzhou and Deqing Army—Anchì has been in charge nine years; how could he not know? Pushing decisions to next year is the trick of a rabbit with three burrows—a way to hide, not service to the state. With spring establishment near and corvée drafts due, if we do not decide now and leave room for more debate, how can treasury and people bear the burden? I hear that former water officials Sun Minxian and Jia Zhongmin (Yuanyou year 6) each wrote River Discourses; I ask that they be retrieved for reference. Summon past and present circuit commissioners and veterans of river work, together with the water officials, to the chief council hall for thorough debate, settle on a policy that is sound and durable, unify opinion, and avoid spending finite resources on endless projects." In the seventh month of year two, on wuwu, an edict ordered: "All Yellow River prefectures and garrisons must report river-defense breaches or overflows at once."
13
On yihai in the second month of the second year of Yuanfu, Northern Outer Vice Director Li Wei proposed: "Survey the main and secondary river mouths; while the current is weak, repair and seal them and set eyebrow revetments to hold each in place. I ask to draft thirty thousand regular laborers from Hebei and Jingdong; other quotas should be hired by the river offices." On dingsi in the third month, Wei also asked to cut a small channel inside the main river south of Duanzhou to take floodwater and ease the threat to the Beijing region below Dawu mouth." Both proposals were approved.
14
At the end of the sixth month the river broke at Neihuang mouth, and the eastern flow was cut off. On jiaxu in the eighth month, an edict said: "The great river is running almost entirely north; entrust river work to the Transport Commission and require prefectures and counties to protect the dikes together." On xinchou, Left Remonstrator Wang Zudao asked that Wu Anchì, Zheng You, Li Zhong, and Li Wei be punished and exiled to clarify the late emperor's policy favoring the northern flow. The edict approved the request.
15
使
The Yellow River has plagued China for two thousand years. Never in history has any age poured the empire's resources into the river as ours has. Yet in recent times none has indulged popular prejudice more, trying to force the great river to obey human will. I need not reach far back: at the end of Yuanyou, when Xiaowu breached, advocates plotted extravagant schemes to win glory and rich rewards. Ignoring terrain, labor, and state expense alike, they pressed hard for the eastern-flow policy. In mid-flood they erected horse-head spurs and sawtooth works, launched fascines and timber, at a hundredfold the cost. They fought the current to drive it east, lifting the channel into the air rather than letting it run on the ground alone. Dikes were raised ever higher in fear of a break, but silt piled up until the bed stood steep; when it finally burst, the river turned north again. This was not mere failure of the dikes; it was the inevitable course of nature.
16
When Yu tamed the flood he did not only take the easy path; he always worked with the river's shifts to guide it. The Yellow River is muddy, half water and half silt; the longer it runs the more it silts up downstream, and breach becomes inevitable—no human power can alter that. Whether it turns from north to east or east to north, how can mere human strength control it?
17
使
Today's policy should follow the river's course: build dikes broadly, restrain the current, and keep it from spreading in wide floods. If one fears silt from the northern channel filling the border marshes, shore up the marsh banks with dikes—that is the lasting policy. Rumor says advocates have again proposed the eastern flow; after years of disaster, displacement, and empty treasuries, the realm cannot bear it in any case; And since the river now plunges from high ground in a fierce torrent, the recent breach cannot be reversed. To launch such works would only drain state and people alike—not help the people but deepen our own plight.
18
西沿 西
In the tenth month of the third year of Chongning, officials reported: "Having received orders to manage the great river, we traveled the western route along border prefectures and garrisons, returned to Wuqiang, followed the embankment to Shenzhou, then north to Hengshui and on to Ji. We crossed north at Yuanlai Fort and sent subordinates to inspect the northern channel above Enzhou. Water by nature flows downward; to draw it uphill is impossible. The western hills hold standing water that will seek the low ground; guide each stream by its own course and nothing will be dammed up. An edict ordered the straight channel cut open to ease the current.
19
西沿
In the second month of year four, the Ministry of Works proposed: "Repair the grain-transport embankments at Sucun and elsewhere as main dikes against floods; compared with rebuilding abandoned dikes and straight dikes, this would save some 440,000 labor units and 710,000-odd units of materials." The proposal was approved. In the intercalary second month the Secretariat reported: "The northern channel, fed by streams from the western hills, overlooks Xiong, Ba, and Mo and the border marshes from the Wuqiang and Leshou revetments; any breach would do great harm." An edict ordered higher revetment dikes and stored supplies against floods. That year the great river ran quietly.
20
In the second month of year five, Huazhou was ordered to anchor its floating bridge on the north bank, build fortifications, and station troops to guard it. In the eighth month the Yangwu auxiliary embankment was repaired.
21
In the second month of the first year of Daguan, work was ordered on a straight channel from the fifth to the fifteenth station of the Yangwu upper revetment to split and ease the current. The offices reported: "The cut should be 3,440 paces long, eighty chi wide at the surface, five zhang wide at the bottom, and seven chi deep—107,000-odd units of labor using 3,582 workers, to finish in one month." This was approved. In the twelfth month Zhao Ting of the Ministry of Works noted: "The northern and southern vice directorates together plan eighty-seven li of straight channel at a cost of eighty to ninety thousand strings of cash." Once completed, they will spare long-term flood-defense costs." The edict approved.
22
調 調 調 調 鹿
In the fifth month of the second year Zhao Ting submitted a plan to commute corvée, arguing in summary: "The Yellow River drafts laborers each spring to build revetments, disturbing several circuits and often ruining households. This spring at Huazhou's Yuchi revetment they accepted cash in lieu of labor, bought earth to shore the revetment, and had money left over compared with drafting corvée. I ask that all spring corvée on dikes and revetments follow this precedent as standing law." An edict said: "River-defense labor drafts a hundred thousand men a year and has long burdened the riverside population. Let wealthy households pay to commute service and poorer ones supply labor; report the detailed rules." On bingchen, Xingzhou reported a breach that engulfed Julu County. An edict ordered the county seat moved to higher ground. Longping in Zhaozhou was also relocated because it stood on low, wet ground.
23
使西 使
On jimao in the sixth month, Directorate Commissioner Wu Jie reported: "Since Xiaowu breached in the Yuanfeng era, the northern channel has entered the Imperial Canal, gathered western streams, and reached the sea through the triple fork at Dulu Fort in Qingzhou. Though this secured the strategic terrain, over the years it has eroded lagoon dikes, washed out roads, and damaged frontier forts. I have been ordered to repair the embankments and hold back floods. But an eight-chi dike at the tail of the nine rivers may not hold. Patching only after damage will let the ponds merge with the channel and undermine border defense. I request orders for full repair." Approved. On gengyin, flooding in Jizhou destroyed Xindu and Nangong counties.
24
In the eighth month of year three, Shen Chuncheng was ordered to open and dredge the Tuyuan River. Tuyuan lies across from the Guangwu revetment and diverts high water below it.
25
使 西 西 使穿
In the eleventh month of the fourth year of Zhenghe, Meng Changling reported: "This summer and autumn the river held to the middle course, so Huazhou's bridge did not need dismantling and annual costs fell sharply." The court allowed congratulations and graded rewards for the officials. Changling also proposed routing the river past Mount Daqi and placing a permanent bridge, saying: "The river approaches from east of Daqi, runs west of the mountain and stops; after a few li it bends south, turns east, then north again, and again halts east of Daqi—all within about ten li. The terrain and current make an east-west crossing easy over barely ten li; the ground is low enough to cut a channel, cliffs can serve as horse-heads, and a mid-channel bar lies between, much like Heyang. If the river were cut through Mount Daqi and the two lesser hills to the northeast in two branches reuniting downstream, the three peaks could anchor a floating bridge at a fraction of the cost and ease labor across the north." The court welcomed the plan and approved it.
26
西
In year five a supervisory office for the permanent bridges was established. On guichou in the sixth month an amnesty was proclaimed in Hebei, Jingdong, and Jingxi, declaring in part: "We cut through mountains and opened channels along the tracks of Yu's nine rivers; and bridged their footing to achieve a benefit that will last ten thousand generations. The work finished on schedule without neglect. Travelers are no longer blocked, and no place is cut off north from south. The spirits are appeased and the people rejoice. Yet the northern frontier and the capital districts have seen shovels busy and supplies moved—the people have labored, and We deeply pity them. Let them enjoy Our leniency and receive broad tax relief. Let the supervisory office report graded rewards for officials who opened the channel. Another edict named the bridge from Jushan to Mount Daqi in Xunzhou the Tiancheng Bridge; and the bridge from Mount Daqi to Mount Wenzi in Huazhou the Rongguang Bridge. Rongguang was soon renamed Shengong. In the seventh month the emperor composed the bridge names and had them engraved on the cliff. When the channel was first cut the water ran through, but the current was violent; where it narrowed at the hills it often flooded, drowning workers near the forts and reaching Tongli Army—later forming a vast marsh. That month Meng Changling was promoted to Vice Minister of Works.
27
On jihai in the eighth month the Directorate of Waterways reported: "With the river now flowing through the three mountains just east of Tongli, We fear flooding. We ask to move the garrison between Mount Daqi and Jushan to higher ground." Approved. On dingsi in the tenth month the Secretariat reported a breach at Zaoqiang revetment in Jizhou; Prefect Xin Changzong, a military appointee ignorant of river work, was replaced by Wang Zhongyuan.
28
使 使
On bingyin in the eleventh month Meng Kuo reported: "Repeated floods have raised the shoals and tipped the river toward the east bank. Closing the upper Zaoqiang breach would cost a fortune; deep winter forbids heavy labor, and even a full repair would require raising two hundred-odd li of east embankment—fighting the river—without wholly preventing breaches. The overflow now crosses saline flats and standing pools, avoids prefectures and garrisons, passes only a few counties, and winds back to the Imperial Canal and the Yellow River. I propose to begin above the breach at Enzhou's flood dike, strengthen the old embankment, link it along the east bank of the Imperial Canal, and tie it back into the main river." Approved. On yihai officials said: "Yu's work lay buried for millennia until Your Majesty's wisdom restored it at once, routing the river through three mountains. Long embankments coil firm; a bridge spans the flood leaning on the hills—heaven and earth themselves seemed to ordain it. Your might spans north and south, surpassing all earlier ages: no yearly cost of dismantling bridges, no hardship for travelers. Now that the great work is done, I urge the offices daily and monthly to watch the river's course, strengthen the dikes, and have water and transport officials patrol without cease in every flood." The edict referred the matter to Changling.
29
使
On xinmao in the fourth month of year six Wu Jie reported the Yellow River clear at Zaoqiang in Jizhou, and the court allowed congratulations. On wuwu in the seventh month Grand Preceptor Cai Jing proposed naming the bridge inscription pavilion the Carry On Yu Pavilion and its gate the Record Merit Gate. On xinmao in the tenth month Cai Jing and others asked to submit a memorial of congratulations on Jizhou's clear river.
30
使
On dingsi in the fifth month of the seventh year, officials reported: "At Ninghua Town in En Prefecture, beside the Great River, the ground is low and lies directly in the path of a crushing bend in the current. Years of wear had left the banks thin and brittle; water seeped through in countless places, and townsfolk had long since abandoned the vicinity. With the rainy season between summer and autumn, a single breach would send the eastern flow surging on an unknown course—endangering a whole district of lives—and might also cut the frontier highways linking Daming, Hejian, and neighboring prefectures. We ask that the proper offices be ordered to reinforce the banks in place." The court agreed. On guiyou in the sixth month, Waterways Commissioner Meng Yang reported: "At Heyang the northern and southern branches once split the flow, with a central pontoon anchoring a floating bridge. Lately the northern branch has silted shut and no longer carries water; only the southern branch still bears a bridge. That stretch is narrow, and the current hammers it; every flood season the bridge suffers repeated damage. We propose reopening the northern channel and restoring both bridges as before." The court agreed. On dingwei in the ninth month the court put Yang in sole charge of the work and ordered Heyang prefect Wang Xu to supply funds and oversee labor and materials.
31
使
On jihai in the third month of the first year of Chonghe, an edict ran: "The Wannian Dike along the Huazhou–Xunzhou border depends wholly on timber to hold its banks—plant trees widely along it to buttress the ground." On jiachen in the fifth month another edict said: "At the first revetment in Heyang County, Mengzhou, since spring the river has run fierce, eating into farmland and closing to within two or three li of the prefectural seat. Let the Waterways Commissioner, the transport commissioner, and the Heyang prefect coordinate reinforcement." That autumn rains endangered the Guangwu revetment; the court sent palace attendant Wang Reng to survey and manage the crisis.
32
On jimao in the ninth month of the second year, Wang Fu reported: "When Meng Changling surveyed the river at Hancun revetment in Huazhou, the current had driven into Cunjin Pool—the descent was steep and nearly impossible to contain. A recent edict had ordered a channel cut straight across the mapped harbor bend. While crews debated excavation, a straight channel suddenly formed of its own; below Cunjin Pool the water steadied at once, and laborers raised their heads and marveled. I ask that the event be recorded in the Historical Archives and that all officials be led in congratulatory memorials." The court agreed.
33
使
In the sixth month of the third year the river flooded Xindu in Jizhou. In the eleventh month the river burst at Qinghe revetment. That year floods wrecked the Tiancheng and Shenggong bridges; responsible officials were punished according to their degree of fault. On renzi in the fourth month of the fourth year, Waterways Commissioner Meng Yang reported: "By imperial order we restored the Sanshandong Bridge, employing 157,800 laborers; it has since weathered repeated floods without trouble." The throne restored officials demoted for the bridge disaster; Yang was promoted from Rectifier of Discussion to Rectifier of Tributary.
34
殿殿 西 簿 西
In the seventh year Qinzong succeeded to the throne. On yimao in the second month of the first year of Jingkang, Censor-in-Chief Xu Han impeached the Mengs: "Baohé Academician Meng Changling, Yankang Academician Meng Yang, and Longtu Direct Academician Meng Kui held river office in succession for twenty years, piling wrong upon wrong. They invented dike works and inflated stake counts, exhausting the people and hoarding gold and silk. They trafficked with court favorites; palace attendant Wang Reng was their shadow patron, catapulting them through ranks beyond reason. The Great River pontoon bridge required new boats every year, and western capital corvée districts still dread the duty. Changling's Sanshan scheme diverted the main current, squandering a century of floating-bridge costs on a few years of ceremonial thoroughfare. Countless thousands drowned; neighboring prefectures lay in ruins. Hirelings they picked were paid by the purse; wealthy contractors queued for nominal posts and drew honors without ever attending court. Every project they launched bred bottomless graft, beyond the reach of ministry auditors or the censorate. As Your Majesty sets the court in order, the Mengs must be punished first—or justice will never convince the realm. I urge that their ill-gotten gains be inventoried and standard penalties applied. All three were demoted: Changling to an outer palace post, Yang retained interim charge of the Directorate of Waterways, Kui to finish pontoon work before further orders. Han again asked to audit their accounts and expose their corruption. The court instead granted Changling Junior Grandee of Grace and Yang and Kui Junior Master of Grace for Tributary—mild ranks after denunciation. On dingchou in the third month the Jingxi transport commissioner reported: "This circuit levies 30,000 corvée laborers yearly for river defense and 18,000 for canal work. Years of failed harvests and bandit raids have broken the populace; we beg a measured reduction. The court cut the levy by eight thousand laborers.
35
調 西 調
The Bian Canal: in early Sui, engineers dredged the Ji Channel to draw Yellow River water toward the Huai; under Tang it was renamed Guangji. The Song seat at Daliang took the Yellow River intake south of Heyin in Mengzhou as the canal head, feeding the Huai and Si systems. From spring through winter officials balanced the intake so depth held at six chi—enough for heavy grain barges. Millions of bushels from the Jianghuai and Zhe regions arrived annually, with southeast luxuries beyond counting. Western Hills charcoal rode the same waterway to feed the capital and Hebei's emergencies—the realm depended on this conduit. Among rivers none weighed heavier in statecraft. Depth was regulated by statute; canal officers answered to the Directorate of Waterways. Yet the Yellow River's course shifted; the intake moved almost yearly; and each time officials had to read the land and bend a new mouth against the current. Every spring brought corvée from several prefectures at ruinous cost—workers often drowned. Officials fattened on graft, and the capital lived under perennial flood terror.
36
In spring of Taizu's second Jianlong year, the Suo River was channeled from Zhanran to join the Xu and feed the Bian. In the tenth month of year three, an edict ordered Bian Canal magistrates each spring to set the people planting elms and willows along both banks.
37
使
In Taizong's seventh month of Taiping Xingguo year two, Kaifeng reported the Bian had burst the Daining dike, flooding fields and ruining crops. The court sent 3,500 corvée workers from Huai and Meng to plug the breach. In the first month of year three a thousand troops restored the canal intake. In the sixth month Songzhou reported that at Ningling the river had overflowed and broken the dike. Four thousand five hundred corvée laborers from Song and Bo were sent under dispatched commissioners. In the eighth month of year four the river broke again at Songcheng; three thousand five hundred local laborers sealed it.
38
殿使
In the sixth month of Chunhua year two the Bian breached Junyi. The emperor walked a litter out the Qianyuan Gate; chancellor and Military Affairs commissioners met him. He said: "Eastern Capital feeds hundreds of thousands of soldiers and a million households—the empire's transport hangs on this single ditch. How could I ignore it?" The procession plunged into mud for more than a hundred paces; attendants trembled. Palace Front commander Dai Xing kowtowed and pleaded for retreat, then bore the litter back to firm ground. Xing was ordered to seal the breach with several thousand foot soldiers. Before noon the water stilled. The emperor then took refreshment from the Imperial Pantry. Princes and close ministers stood filthy with mud. County magistrate Song Yan had fled in hiding; he received a special pardon. That same month the Bian broke again at Songcheng; two thousand nearby corvée workers plugged it.
39
In the ninth month of Zhidao year one, noting that the Bian yearly moved five to seven million bushels of Jianghuai grain to the capital, the emperor asked how the canal had been cut and ordered Zhang Bi to research and report. Zhang Bi answered:
40
西便 鹿 西
Yu channeled the river from Jishi to Longmen, south to Huayin, east to Dizhu; then east to Mengjin and past Luoyin to Mount Daqi—today's Chenggao, also called Liyang Hill. Because the river's vast floods ravaged the central plains, Yu at Beiqiu cut two canals to split its force: one east of Wuyang feeding the Luo, which ran northeast through Qiansheng to the sea—the present Yellow River; another drew field channels along the western hills; where northeastern terrain rose high enough to threaten dikes, overflow was checked and the stream was guided past Jieshi into the Bohai. The Documents' "north past the Ji to the Great Plain" means the muddy Zhang and the Julu marsh of Xingzhou. "It was spread into nine channels, together forming the opposing river, and entered the sea." From Guixiang in Weijun it once split into nine branches down to Cangzhou; now only one remains. "Opposing river" describes how backwater and main current alternately receive each other. Duke Huan of Qi dammed channels to reclaim farmland, leaving a single stream whose eastern limit today is the Mangwu River. Yu also split the main river below Rong Marsh into the Yin Ditch toward the Huai and Si. Northwest of Daliang at Junyi it again forked: one branch ran under Zhongmou in Yangwu as Guandu water; another was the First Emperor's Hong Ditch to irrigate Weijun, fed by the Langdang channel from five outlets at Chiyang in Xingyang. The Hong Ditch is the river's outlet channel, also termed Langdang.
41
西 西 西
Under Han Ming, Wang Jing of Lelang and attendant Wang Wu rebuilt the Junyi Canal along the old river trench. When complete, its flow entered Junyi and took that county's name. In Ling's fourth Jianning year, masons piled a stone gate northwest of Aocheng to throttle the mouth—the Stone Gate of later ages. East of the canal it mingled with the Ji; river, canal, and Ji thundered eastward, and at Aoshan's north Bi water joined—the stream of the Jin–Chu battle at Bi. Bi was also read bian—the origin of the character "Bian"; ancients shunned the homophone "fan" and wrote "Bian" instead. The canal ran east past Xingyang's north, where Zhanran water entered from the county's east. Twenty li west of Xingyang stand twin Guangwu towns on Sanguan Hill a hundred paces apart; the Bian issued between them through a narrow gorge, and the Ji ended there. The canal head takes only Zhanran water—then called the Hong Canal. In Eastern Jin's Taihe era Huan Wen, campaigning against Former Yan, tried to reopen it but failed. In the thirteenth year of Yixi, Liu Yu, marching west against Yao Qin, dredged the channel again—swift water returned, though banks still collapsed until further cuts restored transport. In Sui Yang's third Daye year, Left Chancellor Huangfu Yi conscripted a million Henan workers to open the Bian from Rong Marsh to the Huai—a thousand li—the Tongji Canal. Another hundred thousand Huainan troops cut the Han Gou from the Huai at Shanyang to the Yangzi, three hundred li wide enough for forty paces, before Yang undertook his tours. Thereafter the realm reaped the benefits of long-distance transport. As early as Emperor Wen’s reign, Jia Yi wrote that the Han took the Yangtze and Huai as its provisioning lands—fish, salt, grain, and cloth flowed chiefly from the southeast. By the Wufeng reign period, Geng Shouchang reported that precedent called for shipping four million hu of eastern grain yearly to the capital. Most of that grain, too, moved along this canal.
42
耀西 使
Early in Tang the Tongji Canal was renamed the Guangji Canal. During Kaiyuan, Grand Councilor Pei Yaoqing noted that Jianghuai tribute fleets sailed northwest up the Hong Gou from the lower Huai and transshipped grain into granaries at Heyin, Hanjia, Taiyuan, and elsewhere. Over three years they moved seven million shi of rice—the gain lay in this route. Late in Kaiyuan, Qi Huan of Henan and Bianzhou, seeing Jianghuai grain boats wrecked in Huai surf, dredged the lower Guangji from Hong in Sizhou to Huaiyin in Chuzhou—eighty li to the Huai—and finished, though past deadline. The current proved too swift for safe travel, so the cut was abandoned and traffic reverted to the old channel.
43
使西
In Dezong’s reign four hundred thousand shi of Jianghuai rice were shipped annually to supply Guanzhong. Rebel commanders Li Zhengji and Tian Yue held Xuzhou and the Woguo crossing; Liang Chongyi blocked Xiangyang and Dengzhou—north–south grain routes were severed. Transport Commissioner Du You proposed a new route: ten li west of Junyi, open the south bank into Pipa Ditch, follow the Cai to Chenzhou and the Ying—an ancient Qin–Han channel silted shut. Minor dredging and bank work, he argued, would reopen it cheaply; Between Luzhou and Shouzhou a level ridge called Jiming Hill blocked the waterway; Du You urged cutting both ends so only a forty-li portage remained, letting grain from the Yangtze basin, the southwest, and Hanzhong float down in fleets. Grain would run from Baisha to Dongguan, through Lu and Shou, down the Ying and Cai, into Pipa Ditch and the Bian—avoiding the Huai ascent yet saving two thousand li, with modest cost and great gain. The court was poised to adopt the plan when Xuzhou submitted and the Huai route reopened. When the dynasty took the Mandate, Daliang stood where the realm converged—a hub from which to command the four seas—so the court chose it and fixed the capital there.
44
祿
Han Gaozu once said, “I called the empire’s armies with urgent dispatches, and they still did not come.” Emperor Wen added, “When I first took the throne I would not even issue tiger tallies to summon the commanderies.” Both remarks show that real military power lay in the provinces. Only the capital guards—the Northern and Southern Armies, the Qimen, and the Yulin cadets—served as the emperor’s personal escort. Tang kept Sui’s twelve guard units of farmer-soldiers. After the frontier armies were dissolved, the Shenwu and Shence formed a palace guard of barely thirty thousand—enough for escort duty alone, so when An Lushan stormed the pass he had to press townsfolk into battle; and when Dezong fled the capital his escort numbered four hundred horsemen while arms and armor sat in the provinces. Deployable frontier forces—aside from the three Hebei circuits—numbered about one hundred thousand each at Taiyuan and Qingqi, sixty thousand at Binning and Xuanwu, fifty thousand at Lu, Xu, Jing, and Yang, twenty thousand at Xiang, Xuan, Shou, and Zhenhai, and at least ten thousand at every other strategic garrison. Now hundreds of thousands of soldiers and horses crowd the capital, with subjects from seven conquered kingdoms packed under the throne—a population ten times that of Han or Tang Chang’an. Flood and drought in the capital region rarely brought famine: four canals—the Huimin, Jinshui, Wuzhang, and Bian—fed the city in an unbroken line of barges for public and private stores alike. The capital never wanted for goods because the Bian crossed the empire, took the Yellow River at its head, drew the Yangtze and lakes, and reached the southern sea—half the realm’s taxes and every mountain and marsh product came this way. Yu had split the waters by dredging; Yang of Sui had cut channels for his tours—time and again they silted up, yet the current never failed the dynasty for long. Perhaps heaven meant the Bian to endure.
45
使 沿 使 使西 宿沿使
In the eighth month of the second Xiangfu year (1009) the Bian flooded from the capital to Zhengzhou and covered the highways. The court sent fast couriers to lower the headworks at the Bian intake. When the level dropped and barges stalled, officials dredged the intake again. In the sixth month of year eight (1015) the throne ruled that a rise of seven and a half chi on the Bian would trigger three thousand palace guards along the levees. That autumn Ma Yuanfang urged cutting the mid-reach five zhang wide and five chi deep so dikes could be trimmed. The emperor ordered a survey and dredging at once. The envoy reported that from Sizhou west to Kaifeng the channel was wide, shallow, and calm—dredging unnecessary there. Dredging should begin at the Sizhou hills—865,438 corvée days from Suzhou and Bozhou, saving 7.31 million units overall. Along the reach they should build towpaths, notch the banks, and set saw-tooth groins to pinch the flow; River-Clear and Lower-Unload crews must finish before the spring rise under local magistrates’ supervision. Henceforth the Bian would be dredged every few years as needed. Flood-relief cuts were also ordered at Zhongmou and Xing Marsh. The court approved everything.
46
使
In the twelfth month of Tianxi 3 (1019) Zheng Xifu reported that ponds along both Bian banks were flooding fields with nowhere to drain at the toe of the levee. He asked that the transport commissioner survey linking the Ming River and Ao into the Huai south of the canal and report back."
47
使 西 輿 輿 使 使 滿 便 使
In Tiansheng 3 (1025) the Bian ran low and the court sent a special mission to clear the intake. The next year a flood threatened the levees and panic gripped the capital; officials cut a spill west of the city into the Hulong River. In year six Kang Deyu, overseer of the Bian intake, argued after inspection that sluices at Yangwu Bridge and Wansheng must stay open. Three gates at Lianggu should close, he said, while a new culvert on the Xiangfu north bank would bleed off excess flow." Wang Zhongyong, his counterpart, wanted a stone weir at Sun Village; the court granted both plans. In year seven Deyu reported farmers seizing river-maintenance land on the floodplain. They had one month to confess encroachments before surveyors restored the land to the state. In Huangyou 3 (1051) the court sent an officer to repair Zhongmou’s levees. The following autumn the channel dried up; the Canal Bureau was told to dredge the intake annually thereafter. By old rule a seven-and-a-half-chi rise mobilized palace guards, artisans, and bank troops to heap earth along the levee. After five days they received a bonus called the "special payout"; but repeated surges often ended the emergency before five days, leaving men exhausted and unpaid. In the seventh month of that year daily flood pay was introduced—one-tenth of the old bonus—and troops approved. The following year an inspector toured the canal to weigh costs and gains.
48
便 便
In Jiayou 6 (1061) low, sluggish water on the Bian repeatedly delayed tribute fleets. The Directorate reported that from Yingtian to Sizhou the current was swift and unobstructed. Only the reach above Yingtian to the intake was wide and shallow; narrowing it to sixty paces with timber revetments would pinch the flow and deepen the channel. Timber cut from the banks would supply the revetments. The throne ordered the project, though many called it ill-advised. Cai Jing urged the emperor to ignore critics: “Our forebears already narrowed the channel; common talk always blocks useful work.” Midway through, timber ran short and civilians were hired to furnish mixed revetment poles. Once the revetments stood, opposition died away. Former bends that had slowed and sunk boats were straightened, and traffic eased.
49
便
In Xining 4 (1071) the court cut the Zijia intake with forty thousand laborers a day and finished in a month. Within three months it silted shut; reopening the old mouth with ten thousand men restored a modest current in four days. Ying Shunchen alone argued that the new cut below Gubai Ridge sat in the main current and should stay open—sluices for floods, a feeder ditch in drought. Wang Anshi endorsed the plan.
50
使使
In year five Zhang Fangping—palace commissioner and Zhongtaiyi envoy—had warned: “Imperial transport rests on the canals. The founders opened three routes to the capital and fixed quotas: six million hu on the Bian, 620,000 on the Guangji, 600,000 on the Huimin. The Guangji fed only garrisons around Taikang, Xianping, and Weishi. Only the Bian carried polished rice and wheat—the substance of the Great Granary. Millions in the capital, not just the armies, live on surplus transport grain; the dynasty’s fate hangs on the canal. The Bian is the dynasty’s lifeline—not some local irrigation ditch. The Guangji had been shut and Huimin grain no longer reached the central stores; the people depended solely on the Bian. Memorials debating the Bian had multiplied. If debate never ends and plans keep changing, the canal will erode year by year. This is no minor affair of hydraulics—it is national policy. I beg Your Majesty to look far, examine deeply, and secure the foundation of the realm." Zhang’s memorial was aimed at Wang Anshi.
51
That summer Hou Shuxian proposed flooding suburban fields with Bian water; Wang Anshi backed him firmly. Repeated draw-downs sometimes dried the channel; heavy barges grounded and some were wrecked. Public alarm moved the emperor to order analysis by the Directorate and a joint inspection by the Three Departments and capital commissioners. In the eleventh month Fan Ziqi urged leaving the Bian mouth open through winter so sea-route fleets could sail straight to the capital, ending relay labor. Wang Anshi agreed. Intake officers surveyed the scheme and the court adopted it. Later, Goryeo tribute missions were told to sail up the Bian to the capital.
52
便
In the spring of year seven floodwater backed up and burst the levees. That autumn Censor Sheng Tao attacked the twin intakes and had Song Changyan measure both flows with intake officer Wang Xiu. Wang Xiu reported the Zijia cut took three-tenths of the flow and the feeder seven-tenths. Song Changyan urged sealing Zijia while keeping the feeder ditch. Han Jiang and Lü Huiqing, then in power, approved.
53
調
In the spring of year eight, with Wang Anshi back as chancellor, Hou Shuxian reported dredging the Bian from Nanjing to Sizhou to a depth of three to five chi throughout. East of Hong, he noted, thirty li of bedrock resisted dredging and asked for civilian contractors to cut through." The court ordered a cost survey. In the seventh month Hou added that annual intake cuts flooded fields and tied up corvée. Relying solely on Zijia would save tens of thousands in labor and supplies, he said, and asked to cut one River-Clear regiment." The throne agreed. Soon a twelve-chi flood forced them to seek a temporary closure of the intake.
54
使
In the tenth month of year nine the Directorate was told to sound the Bian and log depths by section. In year ten Fan Ziyuan proposed deploying the Junchuan dredge rake from the sixth month, boasting clear returns, and asked that after winter dredging "rake gear and boats be allotted by district. Envoys should then survey silt after the intake closed and resume cutting when the spring freshet arrived. Few of these schemes paid off. Soon the great Clear-Bian project began.
← Previous Chapter
Back to Chapters
Next Chapter →