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卷一百八十一 志第一百三十四 食貨下三

Volume 181 Treatises 134: Finance and Economics 2c

Chapter 181 of 宋史 · History of Song
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1
Finance and Economics III, continued: Huizi; Salt, part 1
2
便貿 使
The systems of huizi and jiaozi drew largely on the Tang practice of flying money. In the Zhenzong era, while Zhang Yong held Shu, he worried that local iron currency was too heavy for commerce. He introduced exchange certificates—one note redeemable for a full string of cash—with a three-year issue period after which notes were swapped for new ones. Across sixty-five years the system ran through twenty-two issues, known as jiaozi and managed by sixteen prosperous merchant houses. Eventually those merchant backers grew poorer and could not honor their obligations, and litigation went on without end. Transport commissioners Xue Tian and Zhang Ruogu asked to set up a Yizhou Jiaozi Office to control issuance and redemption, banning private printing. Emperor Renzong accepted the plan. The quota for each issue was set at 1,256,340 strings of cash.
3
西便 使西 西
Early in Shenzong's Xining reign, counterfeiters of notes were punished and informants rewarded under the same rules used for forged official seals and documents. Moving iron cash through Hedong was exhausting and expensive, and the burden fell on government and people alike. In year two an edict established a Jiaozi Office at Luzhou. The transport office argued that jiaozi would undercut salt and alum sales and disrupt grain deliveries under the commissary system, and memorialized to abolish the office. In year four the scheme was tried again in Shaanxi and the Yongxing Army salt-certificate depot was closed, but Wen Yanbo warned of drawbacks; Zhang Jingxian, back from a mission to Yanzhou, likewise held that jiaozi suited Shu but not Shaanxi; soon the Shaanxi experiment was dropped entirely. In year five the twenty-second issue was due for replacement, yet the next issue was already overissued. The court ordered 1.25 million notes of a twenty-fifth issue to cover the twenty-third, and from then on two jiaozi issues could circulate at once. Too many jiaozi were outstanding and too little coin was held in reserve, so prices collapsed; without real backing the system failed. Sun Jiong, steward of Xihé revenue, argued: "Traders profit by arbitrage against the state and drive down certificate prices." The Shaanxi jiaozi system was then abolished.
4
西沿
From the Shaosheng period onward new issues were regularly enlarged to fund frontier grain purchases in Shaanxi and recruitment—tens of thousands of strings at the low end, millions at the high; Chengdu too kept asking for extra print runs, so yearly issuance had no fixed ceiling.
5
西仿 貿
Chongning year three set up a Jingxi North Circuit office to manage jiaozi circulation, copying Sichuan's anti-counterfeiting statutes. Collusion in passing forged notes, or neighbors who failed to report it, was criminal; private manufacture of jiaozi paper brought penal servitude and exile. Year four ordered every circuit to adopt qianyin printed to a new design, while Sichuan kept the old rules. Capital and Yongxing jiaozi offices were shut and their staff merged into the salt-certificate purchase office. Qianyin then circulated everywhere except Fujian, Zhejiang, Hunan, and Guang; Zhao Tingzhi remarked that Fujian escaped because it was Cai Jing's native circuit. The following year the Ministry of Revenue reported: "Qianyin were meant to replace salt certificates, but circulation is poor; we ask to suspend printing temporarily. Official holdings should, as before, be reissued as salt certificates; private notes may be traded and gradually redeemed at the purchase office in fractional shares like salt certificates." The court approved.
6
西 使 西 西 便
Daguan year one renamed the Sichuan Jiaozi Office the Qianyin Office. Campaigns for Huang, Guo, and Xining leaned on note issues for frontier costs; issuance swelled to more than twenty times a Tiansheng quota while value kept falling. At the scheduled renewal, four old notes bought only one new note, forcing a thorough reform. Issue forty-three set the new quota; old seals were kept to avoid panic, and thereafter everything was called qianyin. In year two Shaanxi and Hedong funneled old qianyin to Chengdu for exchange, clogging Sichuan while frontier circuits bore transport costs; great families bought cheap and sold dear. The court reopened an exchange office at Yongxing Army for Shaanxi and Hedong notes and posted two civil supervisors. In the eighth month Zhang Chi of Weizhou reported: "Notes once worth a thousand cash now trade for a tenth. Properly managed they could fetch eight hundred; let them circulate at that rate. Pay officials in notes as before, but provide some cash on the side. Zhang Chi was made Chengdu transport judge with charge over Sichuan qianyin. Notes sank further until unusable; Zhang Chi stamped a new seal for official pay, and unstamped notes were abandoned. Critics called this unlawful; Zhang Chi was exiled far away. Year three barred redemption of issues forty-one and forty-two and capped new issues at the Tiansheng quota, forbidding use where copper cash circulated. Year four lent 500,000 strings of Sichuan sealed reserves as office capital; diversion was punished like granary theft.
7
滿 便
Zhenghe year one: the Ministry relayed Chengdu's plea: "Requiring three parts of household notes and seven bought at depots made the seven parts suspect. Drop the three-seven rule, allow free circulation, and let willing buyers still purchase at depots. While reserves lagged, note prices collapsed and prefects paid less when buying them in; reserves are now full—please pay full value to restore confidence. Also let issue forty-three retire unredeemed when its term ends, beginning the reform with issue forty-four. Revenue officials wanted only issue forty-four in circulation and no printing of issue forty-five. If needed, supplemental notes within an issue could be printed and swapped; otherwise sales continued, or coin could be exchanged for reserves at payout sites; diversion matched penalties for sealed funds. The edict approved. Jingkang year one restored direct redemption of Sichuan qianyin at the Chengdu office. Long placement in Chengdu had been convenient, but prefectures abused batch mixing in deliveries—hence the order.
8
Traditionally each new issue carried 360,000 strings of reserve, old and new issues chaining together. Under Daguan they printed without reserves until a one-string note bought barely a dozen coins. When Zhang Shangying took power, the court ordered a return to the old rules. In Xuanhe he reported that under the restored method note prices had leveled again.
9
西 使
Shaoxing year one: troops at Wuzhou needed funds, but the route lacked shipping and coin was too heavy to move. They printed guanzi for Wuzhou, called merchants to commissary delivery, and let them redeem guanzi at the Monopoly Office for cash or commodity certificates. Counties used guanzi to buy grain, often by forced quota; the Monopoly Office paid only a third daily, provoking widespread complaint. Year six established a Jiaozi Office at the court-in-exile. Officials warned: "Guanzi were meant to be cash-backed, but agencies drifted into unsecured jiaozi. Without reserves, why should anyone trust them?" The Jiaozi Office was abolished; the Monopoly Office stored cash and printed guanzi. Year twenty-nine printed public warrants and guanzi for three chief commissioners: 800,000 strings each for Huai West and Huguang guanzi, 400,000 Huai East warrants, in five denominations from 10,000 to 100,000. Guanzi ran three years, warrants two; half cash and half silver redemption was allowed.
10
西 沿
Year thirty: Vice Minister Qian Duanli was ordered to issue huizi backed by stored cash for circulation in and around the capital; all scheduled government disbursements could be tendered to the Left Treasury in huizi. Next year the Huizi Office was subordinated to the tea monopoly. Year thirty-two codified penalties for forging huizi. (The forger is executed. Informants receive ten strings of cash, or appointment as Junior Righteousness Captain if they decline cash. Penal laborers or harborers who inform are pardoned and rewarded, and may take office if they wish.) Huizi paper first came from Huizhou and Chizhou, then Chengdu, then Lin'an. Huizi began in the two Zhe circuits, then spread through Huai, Zhe, Hubei, and Jingxi West. Salt producers still paid capital in cash, but landlocked districts could remit tribute wholly in huizi; riverine prefectures took half cash and half huizi; private sales of land, livestock, and boats followed the same rule, with all-huizi deals allowed.
11
Longxing year one stamped huizi "Longxing Ministry of Revenue Official Seal Huizi," adding 500-, 200-, and 300-cash denominations. A Huizi Office opened at Jiangzhou. Qiandao year two: to curb abuse, a million taels of silver from palace treasuries were used to buy huizi in. That same year, 5,000,000 new notes replaced damaged public huizi. Damaged notes with readable denominations had to be turned in as tribute; magnates who hoarded them cheap faced punishment. Year four: old notes were burned and reprinted on a three-year issue cycle capped at ten million strings per issue. Minister Zeng Huai co-managed the reform and cast the seal "Office for Directing and Managing the Huizi Treasury." Each note carried a twenty-cash fee; odd hundreds paid half. Damaged old notes with legible denominations and seals were exchanged immediately. Year five let the capital monopoly and tea offices take the first issue for commodity certificates, then each issue in succession. Prefectural taxes were collected seventy percent cash, thirty percent huizi. Year nine set rewards for seizing counterfeit huizi.
12
Chunxi year one issued 250,000 strings of huizi to buy surplus salt quotas in Lin'an, Pingjiang, Shaoxing, and Ming-Xiu; certificate proceeds went monthly to sealed reserves for redemption. Year three extended issues three and four three years each and printed 2,000,000 strings of issue four for the southern treasury. Annual revenue was 12,000,000, half huizi; the southern treasury held 4,000,000 in metal redemption while only 2,000,000 circulated. Shaoxi year one extended issues seven and eight three years each. An official protested: "Three-year issues now run nine—how does that inspire confidence?" The court then ordered issue ten with a firm expiration.
13
使 使 使
Shaoding year five: two concurrent issues exceeded 229,000,000 strings. Duanping year two: officials urged storing collected notes in sealed reserves—many were barely a year old and still sound—for emergencies." The throne agreed. Chunyou year two: Han Xiang of the Imperial Clan Court wrote, "Paper money fails from endless reissues; salvation lies in recall and reduction. Since last year note values have held steady without sharp depreciation—because issues were not constantly replaced. Paper offices and bark levies are gone, and recall is stepped up—so prices can recover. The emperor said, "Good. Year three: officials reported that despite lower official print runs, counterfeits kept rising; for issues fifteen and sixteen, redemptions in should have been less than payouts; yet exchanges exceeded the quota while new notes kept arriving. Without forgery, how could volumes be so high? Early issues used fine Sichuan paper and careful workmanship, making counterfeiting hard. Issue seventeen mixed Sichuan and Du paper; issue eighteen used only Du paper. Local paper was cheap—one-fifth the old cost—so forgery became easy. Profit tempts more than law threatens, especially when gain is instant and punishment delayed. Best policy: richer paper, longer production, exquisite workmanship that defeats counterfeiting; second best: stern enforcement and rich rewards against forgery. Year seven made issues seventeen and eighteen permanent without renewal. Year eleven tied officials' performance reviews to note prices. Jingding year four printed 150,000 more strings daily to fund excess land purchases.
14
使 使
Xianchun year four pegged guanzi at 770 cash per string and issue-eighteen huizi at 257 cash each—three per string—circulating like coin; private discounting brought embezzlement charges for officials and registry exile for clerks. Year five again banned discounting guanzi. Year seven ordered Sichuan to supply fine guanzi paper—20 million sheets yearly in four convoys—because capital paper was poor.
15
使
Sichuan qianyin began under Zhang Jun and Zhao Kai to fund grain and armies; overprinting grew unstoppable. Year seven Wu Jie's request for a Hechi silver-note office was denied. Under the early Song, Shu circulated two issues of about 1.2 million each. Three issues now exceed 37.8 million, reaching 41.47 million by late Shaoxing; reserves held only 700,000 strings of iron cash, with salt and wine revenue quietly propping prices. Commissary Wang Zhiwang warned that emergency printing required long-term planning. The court authorized 3 million more; Zhiwang printed only 1 million. Longxing year two: Zhao Yi added 2 million. Chunxi year five capped Shu notes at 45 million. Shaoxi year two extended Sichuan qianyin terms. By late Jiatai two issues exceeded 53 million strings; three issues were higher still.
16
Kaixi's Chen Xian tried small notes for deficits but failed. Jiading opened with notes below 400 iron cash per string; Chen Xian spent 13 million in gold, silver, and certificates to retire half an issue by year's end. Remote prefectures faced tight deadlines and corrupt clerks at redemption. Trade stalled, the people protested, and notes traded at a hundred cash each. The commissioner reversed the recall, restored three-issue circulation, and opened a Chengdu redemption market with gold and silver. Notes then fetched just over 500 iron cash—570 where copper circulated.
17
Xiding spring year three recalled issue 91—over 29 million strings; 12 million were backed by Tea-Horse surplus, appointments, and bullion; the rest with issue 93 qianyin; issue 94 added 5 million to absorb Cheng Song's excess printing; the public received an eight-thousand subsidy per hundred notes surrendered. Redemption mixed seventy percent new notes with thirty percent metal; short assay forced twenty new notes per hundred old ones. After two recall drives in years one and three, prices recovered. Gaozong once praised Shen Gai's "support" doctrine: keep a million strings in reserve and buy notes when prices fall.
18
使 使 滿
Year nine: Sichuan reported that qianyin traditionally renewed every three years. Since Kaixi wars, renewals slipped until two or three issues overlapped; extensions were announced only at expiry, alarming the public. We ask a fixed ten-year issue so travelers need not fear sudden change. Approved.
19
仿使 便 使
Baoyou year four: censors blamed local print-and-spend without recall for Sichuan note abuses. Centralize printing, model Sichuan huizi on issue eighteen at 770 per thousand per Chunyou rules. Destroy old qianyin; keep silver notes temporarily. Clearing old notes and capping new ones will stabilize prices. Prices will balance and all parties benefit. The throne agreed. Xianchun year five restored Chengdu printing under commissioner paper supply and chief-office seals, capped at 5 million yearly.
20
使使 便便
Late Shaoxing huizi were undivided by region; later overissue without reserves caused trouble. Qiandao year two printed 3 million Huai-only jiaozi in four denominations, exchangeable for old huizi. All payments and trade took half jiaozi, half cash. To ease cross-river trade, Zhenjiang and Jiankang each received 200,000 jiaozi and huizi for interchange. Copper was banned on the Huai for iron; huizi gave way to jiaozi—commerce stalled and the region suffered. Chen Liangyou protested; officials agreed too much jiaozi and no cross-river coin or huizi hurt travelers. The court restored cross-river coin and huizi, allowed private jiaozi as cash payments, and recalled official jiaozi to the capital.
21
使 西 滿
Year three printed 1.3 million new jiaozi for Huainan prefectures, with no fixed expiry; stored transport jiaozi went first to the southern treasury. Shaoxi year three issued 3 million jiaozi—2 million east, 1 million west—at 770 iron cash per string for three-year issues. Qingyuan year four extended the second Huai huizi issue one more term until the sixth month next year. Jiading year eleven printed 2 million new Huai jiaozi and added 3 million. Year thirteen printed 2 million and added 1.5 million. Years fourteen and fifteen each hit 3 million. Thereafter volume rose and value fell daily; only repeated extensions propped the system up.
22
便 便 西 便
Initially Xiang-E armies were paid in mixed coin and silver. Longxing year one stored cash at army treasuries and printed 500- and 1,000-cash huizi for army circulation as coin. Monopolized printing swelled daily output; yet notes circulated only locally while Jingnan—a merchant crossroads—lacked convenient exchange. Qiandao year three seized the huizi plates. Year four sent 200,000 Huai guanzi and 800,000 certificates to Hubei for exchange into the Left Treasury, with silver and cash buyback. Year five gave Jingnan 500,000 capital huizi for redemption. Chunxi year seven printed 1 million huizi for Huguang to replace damaged notes. Year eleven: Hubei huizi had not been redeemed in twenty-two years since Longxing—"support" failed. The court ordered Huguang commanders, transport, and chief commissioner to plan a fix. They asked to print 2 million Hubei huizi in two denominations to retire old notes for smoother circulation. Approved.
23
仿
Year thirteen restored three-year Huguang issues. Shaoxi year one ordered Huguang to count all notes and institute capital-style issue renewals. Commissary Liang Zong noted 5.4 million still circulated without ever establishing issues—only damage swaps. He requested two new designs for a formal recall. Approved.
24
便
Jiading year five Wang Fu offered certificates plus tea warrants at 3,000 strings total per old note for one month. Only three sites served twenty-one Jing-Hu prefectures—unworkable. Liu Guangzu offered 50,000 sixth-issue notes at two old for one; then one and a half old for one; and secured 100,000 more from court—relief for the public. Year fourteen printed 300,000 to replace damaged Huguang huizi. Year seventeen issued 2 million of the sixth Huguang issue. Jiaxi year two allocated 9 million seventh-issue Huguang huizi to the field headquarters. Baoyou year two gave the chief office 3 million eighth-issue notes to retire two damaged issues—then routine.
25
Salt falls in two kinds: pool salt, granular salt—the "brine salt" of the Rites of Zhou; sea, well, and alkaline-boil salts are fine salt—the "loose salt" of the Rites of Zhou. After conquering the realm, the Song monopolized all salt profits. Circuits mixed state sales and licensed trade as local needs dictated, with frequent reforms and especially harsh bans on smuggling.
26
西西宿 西西耀
Pool salt was produced at the two pools of Jie Prefecture—in Jie County and Anyi. Fields were leveled and flooded with brine—"planting salt"—until evaporation left crystallized salt. Registered saltern households received government grain and corvée exemptions. A hundred patrol troops—the "Treasure Guard"—were recruited. Work began on the first day of the second month, planting from the fourth month through the eighth. Anyi yielded a thousand beds yearly, Jie twenty fewer, feeding a vast list of capitals, circuits, and armies across north China. Monopoly zones were marked with signs and watch posts. Open trade reached long lists of Jingxi and Shaanxi prefectures plus Hebei Chan counties north of the Yellow River. Both salt types measured five catties per dou; granular salt sold in three grades from forty-four to thirty-four cash per catty. Zhidao year two: 373,545 beds at 116.5 catties each. Year three revenue exceeded 728,000 strings.
27
使西沿 西使殿西 便 便 使 西使
Xianping: Liang Ding urged state sale of Jie salt on the Shaanxi frontier, ending free trade. Ding became Shaanxi commissioner with Du Chengrui for green-white salt policy. Du Chengrui argued frontier Jie salt had replaced banned Tangut green salt at comparable prices. Selling frontier salt at inland prices, he warned, would drive smuggling that armed enemies and anger subjects. More critics spoke; Ding banned trade as soon as he reached Jie Pool. Forced frontier shipments exhausted everyone and emptied frontier markets. Lin Te and Zhang Yong reviewed the policy and urged restoring merchants. Ding was rebuked and dismissed. Xiangfu year nine: Zhang Xiangzhong reported 21.7 million strings of stored salt and sought tighter rules. Zhenzong replied that the land's bounty was already maximal. Pushing for more risked future scarcity. He refused.
28
貿
Five Dynasties salt laws had been brutal. Jianlong year two: ten catties smuggled or three catties illicit boil-salt meant death; thirty catties mulberry salt in cities needed imperial review. Year three raised thresholds but kept harsh penalties. From Qiande year four onward penalties were eased by edict. Taiping Xingguo year two replaced death with tattooing and escort to court for larger amounts. Chunhua year five sent offenders to local garrison labor instead. Yongxi year four graded penalties for Khitan salt smuggling at Daizhou.
29
Tiansheng: 380 saltern households supplied two corvée men each with daily rice and annual payments. Output reached 1.52 million piculs—655,120 beds of 116 catties. Monopoly zones impressed "posted heads" for transport. Frontier circuits also repaid fodder deliveries with salt.
30
西西西 便
Jingxi open trade used southern salt, Shaanxi western salt, monopolies eastern salt—with strict boundaries. Early Tiansheng planners noted merchants once paid cash at the capital for southern salt. Qianxing year one took only 230,000 strings—140,000 below Tiansheng year three. They proposed ending cash sales for commissary fodder only, with stricter bans. Later cash payment at the capital was restored for merchant convenience.
31
使 宿 宿
Twenty-eight circuits and three capitals suffered forced salt transport. Tiansheng year eight: memorialists said monopoly profits were small while salt mountains rotted. Open trade at fair prices would relieve the people. Sheng Du and Wang Sui were ordered to redesign the system. They listed five benefits of liberalization, beginning with ending forced boat transport. Second: ending land corvée and flight of the poor. Third: ending adulterated boat salt that caused disease. Coin is the state's currency. Fourth: merchants' 600,000 strings revived circulation hoarded by the rich. Fifth: cutting salaries to salt officials, troops, and saltern labor. Tenth month: monopolies ended; merchants bought pool salt at the capital with cash or bullion. One year later revenue beat Tiansheng year seven by 150,000 strings. Revenue then fell; Song Qi found the new law lost 2.36 million strings yearly versus the old. Kangding year one restored monopolies in the capital region and selected circuits. Soon the capital reopened trade and Huainan salt fed eight Jingdong circuits.
32
西 調 耀
After Yuanhao's rebellion, frontier fodder deliveries collapsed. Desperate for grain, the state paid certificates redeemable in cash at the capital for commissary deliveries; other goods were repaid in pool salt. Feathers, horn, glue, iron, charcoal, tile, and wood were all traded for salt. Corrupt valuation gave 220 catties of salt for two logs worth a thousand cash. Absurd repayments flooded the market, prices collapsed, and nobody profited. Qingli year two restored the capital monopoly and charged merchants for inflated certificates and unsold salt. Inland private salt was bought up and resold at markup. Eleven circuits banned merchant salt again, using yamen runners for transport. Shu entry was blocked; exchange offices at Yongxing and Fengxiang swapped salt for cash or Shu goods. Soon eastern and southern monopolies returned, exhausting troops and roiling prefectures. Salt revenue no longer met urgent state needs. Frontier fodder deliveries were wildly overvalued, draining the capital treasury.
33
使 西使 西使 西 使 便
Fan Xiang of Guanzhong argued pool profits were huge but lost to corruption before reaching the frontier; reform could save tens of millions yearly. He submitted a reform plan. Han Qi and Tian Kuang backed Fan Xiang's plan. Year four: Xiang debated with Cheng Kan, who disagreed; Xiang then mourned. Year eight: Xiang became commissioner and implemented his reform. The law opened monopolies to trade and allowed salt into Shu; frontier fodder commissary ended; cash payments earned salt at distance-weighted premiums; eastern and southern salt could be bought at Yongxing, Fengxiang, and Hezhong; Annual intake was 375,000 large beds via pool warrants, ending forced haulage. Frontier passes near tribal salt pools suffered green-white salt smuggling. Recruits delivered pool salt at premium rates for certificate repayment; the state sold that salt and banned private and green-white trade. Iron, charcoal, tile, and wood commissary was shut down. Prior inflated certificates and unsold salt had to be paid back. Selected circuits kept official sales until merchant trade sufficed. Cash bought frontier grain while capital coin stayed in the treasury. Within years, smuggling waned, Guanzhong stabilized, and all benefited.
34
使便 貿 使 西使 使
Huangyou year one: He Zheng attacked the reform. Bao Zheng inspected, endorsed the reform, and adjusted prices and bans. The Fiscal Commission sought mixed trade at the capital where merchants were scarce. All approved. Tian Kuang asked to retain Xiang permanently. Xiang became acting transport commissioner with gold-purple robes. Xiang predicted 2.3 million; Huangyou year three brought 2.21 million; year four, 2.15 million. Year four beat Qingli year six by 680,000; and year seven by 200,000. Under the old law the Monopoly Office paid out millions—6.47 million in Qingli year two; 4.8 million in year six. Under the reform, payouts stopped. Revenue fluctuated but still hit 1.78 million by year five; Zhihe year one: 1.69 million. Xiang had been demoted; Li Can replaced him. Year three fixed the year-one intake as the annual quota, covering eight-tenths of frontier costs.
35
使 使 使
Frontier fodder commissary returned, inflating valuations and depressing certificate prices by a million yearly. Jiayou year three: Zhang Fangping and Bao Zheng restored Fan Xiang to salt policy. Xiang banned fodder commissary and charged a thousand cash per old certificate. Merchants selling certificates or salt in the capital, he said, lost money. He proposed a capital stabilization fund of 200,000 strings to buy depressed certificates and salt. Fixed prices—6,000 per certificate, 10,000 per bed—stabilized the market. The Salt Bureau supervisor took charge and policy gradually normalized. Xiang soon died; Xue Xiang succeeded him. Zhiping year two: 1.67 million intake.
36
Xiang had folded transit taxes into commissary rates to protect local revenue. Prefectures still collected transit tax anyway. Jiayou year six: Xiang ended the levies and cut salt prices in eight circuits. Saltern corvée from five circuits abused the people until three-year rotation was ordered. 3.37 million beds of back salt tax were halved by remission. Planting was suspended one to three years when stocks piled up. Halving saltern households and using hired labor eased five circuits.
37
西 西 使西 使
Green-white salt from Wu and Bai pools was controlled by Western Qiang. Li Jiqian's rebellion brought bans, brief openings, then bans again. Qianxing extended Shaanxi penalties to Hedong green-white salt smugglers. Qingli: Yuanhao offered 100,000 piculs yearly to the court. Renzong refused as disruptive to law. Fan Xiang's bans raised official prices and drove deadly green-white smuggling. Zhihe softened tribal death sentences to island exile. Jiayou amnesties eased penalties further. Xining opened with Zhang Jing auditing Shaanxi salt and horses. Xiang exposed Jing; Wang Anshi punished Jing and promoted Xiang. Fan Chunren protested; Xiang kept his post. Xiang set up a Yongxing salt market with 300,000 strings certificate capital.
38
西 便 西 使 西 西 西
Year four tried Shu jiaozi in Shaanxi and ended certificate sales; critics restored the old certificate system. Year seven: empty salt certificates inflated frontier grain costs. They proposed jiaozi matched to cash reserves. Pi Gongbi, Xiong Ben, Song Di, and Zhao Zhan were appointed. Inner treasury lent 200,000; certificate purchases were capped at 1.8 million. Year eight capped issuance: limited capital but excessive certificates cheapened grain. Without government buyback, monopolists depressed certificate prices; frontier crises required stabilization markets. Quotas were set: 2.2 million total—815,000 Yongxing, 1.385 million Qin-Feng. Yongxing bought certificates, loaned them through market offices, and destroyed excess at Jie Pool. Approved—but over-issue continued. Year nine censured Shaanxi over-issue beyond Fiscal Commission quotas.
39
西 西 西
Year ten blamed Xihé certificate excess for cheap salt and dear fodder. Open-trade circuits' official sales blocked merchant travel. They proposed ending official sales. Recall old certificates, mark old salt, require supplemental payments. State buyback of old certificates with stamped beds and tokens for released salt. Old eastern and southern beds cost 3,500; western beds dropped 1,000—all bought by the state. Jie depots had to verify certificates before sale. Self-report deadlines added 2,500–3,000 per bed for new tallies. Ended two monopoly zones; new prices, stamped exchange, cash for old certificates. Open-trade officials, ten-day reporting, supplemental payments, new certificates. All implemented. Official-sale zones remained; the Market Office bought salt with supplements.
40
西 西
Traditionally Henan north and Qin-Feng east ate Jie salt. Under Renzong Jie salt traded freely without state monopoly; Xining's Market Office monopolized Kaifeng region prefectures. Year eight Zhang Jingwen expanded official Jie salt sales across the capital region. Soon many prefectures reopened trade while the commissioner sold in the capital zone.
41
宿 西使便 使
Higher prices brought forced salt purchases scaled by wealth. Informers on private salt took the offender's property as reward. Unused official salt overnight was treated as smuggling. Public outrage followed. Certificates fell from six to two strings per bed; grain deliveries stopped. Pi Gongbi condemned official sales when summoned. Fiscal Commissioner Shen Kuo could not overturn it. Wang Anshi backed Jingwen; Shen Kuo claimed open trade cost 200,000 yearly. After Anshi left, Kuo urged ending official sales. Many prefectures reopened trade; weak markets kept official sales; Chan, Pu, Ji, and nine counties kept official monopoly. Merchant salt in the capital had to sell to the Market Office at floor prices; private sales were reported and confiscated.
42
西 沿 西西 西西西 使 西使
Pi Gongbi capped yearly pool disbursement at 3.3 million strings. Seven capital markets bought eastern and southern certificates for 593,000 strings; the Fiscal Commission sought to resell certificates west for cash; buyers paid thirty percent cash, seventy percent in new frontier certificates; to absorb old certificates and ease new ones. Approved. Gongbi restored stabilization with a 300,000-string capital fund. Jie salt had been split east-west with western sale zones; Frontier fodder over-issue cheapened certificates and split prices. Western prices rose above eastern to unify certificates, adding 120,000 yearly. Jie certificates rose from 2.2 to 2.42 million for frontier grain. Western salt holders paid supplements to match new prices. Yuanfeng year three rewarded Zhang Jingwen for salt-sale surplus.
43
西使 西
Li Ji reported certificate value had depended on issuance volume before reforms. From Xining ten to Yuanfeng three, 1.77 million issued versus 1.17 million produced—590,000 surplus depressed prices. Issuance was halted. Year five halved army-grain certificates but prices still failed to stabilize.
44
西 使
Yuanyou year one: eight frontier circuits sold 15,500 beds officially with Fan Xiang-style merchant exchange. Certificate revenue funded transport; sale proceeds bought grain. A capital market sold certificates for cash to the Salt Bureau. Other agencies were barred from trading without memorial. The office held purchased certificates and could sell when scarce. Approved. Merchant delivery cuts increased capital certificate funds by 27,000. Jie commissary followed Xihé pricing; Chan-Huai salt fixed at 8,200 cash. Shaanxi "inverted salt" from crude saltpeter mimicked Jie salt. Shaosheng year three: inverted-salt offenders were punished one grade below private-salt law.
45
西 使 殿 西 西使使西
Under Shenzong Jie salt was official-sale; Jingxi traded freely. Shen Xiyan monopolized Jie salt with granary loans, forcing prior buyers to resell to the state. Zhezong's accession brought Huang Jiang's impeachment of Xiyan. Yuanyou restored Jingxi trade; Yuanfu ended official sale. Selected counties kept official sales but banned official certificate arbitrage. Flood damage opened alternate salt sources across circuits. Year three ordered pool repairs under Ma Cheng and Xue Sichang.
46
綿 便
Chongning year one restored pools yielding 1.78 million catties. Once a hundred-li salt marsh east of Jie Liang yielded vast salt. Yuanfu rains ruined the pools. Restoration was now debated; pools finished in year four. 2,400 beds reopened amid official celebration. Wang Zhongqian claimed credit by inflating quotas. Critics noted proper Jie salt needed sun and south wind after shallow flooding; deep flooding for quotas yielded bitter salt.
47
西 西 西 西 使 西
Chongning memorialists urged restoring Fan Xiang's stable certificate law. Cai Jing soon touted northeastern fine salt profits at 2 million strings. Shaanxi extension would double profits, he claimed. Han Dunli and others were commissioned by route. Jing limited new Jie certificates to Shaanxi while pushing northeastern salt cash. Year five edict praised certificates and ordered new tally exchange for Jie salt. Five million strings went to Shaanxi first. Hedong took certificates only for grain purchase and southeastern salt exchange. Supplemental cash tiers rose above old rates. Old certificates could be bundled with higher supplemental tiers; refusing supplements meant a twenty-percent certificate discount. Earlier caps targeted merchants who depressed certificates and raised frontier grain prices. Year four caps failed—frontier grain prices and merchant arbitrage persisted. Old Shaanxi certificates could buy southeastern salt at thirty percent cash, seventy percent old notes. Later edicts punished certificate discounts over fifty percent.
48
西
Daguan year four: Zhang Shangying restored Jie circulation and barred northeastern mixing. Agencies resumed old certificate printing after pool restoration. Northeastern salt holdings were registered and bought in within three days. Officials sold seized northeastern salt until Jie salt arrived. Drawn certificates were destroyed; undrawn ones renegotiated. Capital and route counties allowed passage. Wang Zhongqian's northwest expansion was halted. In-transit northeastern salt was endorsed locally; unsold capital stock was bought by the Salt Bureau for retail.
49
西 西 西 使祿 西
Zhenghe year one fixed Shaanxi certificate face value by law. Certificate value still swung grain deliveries despite the 6,000 face. Fixing 6,000 iron-cash face would have overpriced grain deliveries—flexibility was allowed. Year two Cai Jing returned; bad certificates were voided like ruined notes. Year six wild salt blooms brought double-strength harvesting and bonuses; red salt brought congratulations and ranked rewards. Year seven restoration was led by Tong Guan on the Guan-He front. Northeastern salt in Jie zones was state-purchased and resold like Jie salt; undeclared stock faced private-salt penalties. Chonghe year one restored old Jie salt law. A year later losses and falling certificates led Tong Guan to resign salt duties. Unsold northeastern Jie salt had to move to Jie zones or face smuggling penalties. Capital and Jingxi commissioners were reappointed. Chongning kept Jie salt local while sea salt ranged widely. Restoring Jie salt hurt travelers holding northeastern stock; policy reverted to avoid merchant panic; circuits were warned certificate law was now fixed, with doubled penalties for rumor.
50
Jingkang restored pre-reform certificate rules with cash option. Eight-string certificate beds collected full face; grain deliverers could draw salt at pools without capital stamping.
51
Sea salt came from six circuits: Jingdong, Hebei, two Zhe, Huainan, Fujian, Guangnan. Boiling sites were salterns; workers were saltern or stove households. Households delivered salt for cash or tax offsets; two Zhe used soldier quotas. Depot policy shifted with profit and price—no fixed rule. Fine salt had twenty-one price grades from forty-seven to eight cash per catty. Zhidao year three sales exceeded 1.63 million strings.
52
使 使
Yuanfeng year three: Li Cha noted five prefectures ate Jie salt; twelve others ate sea salt—he proposed state buy-sell markets. The state bought all stove salt and banned private trade for 273,000 strings yearly, nearly half profit. Wu Juhou expanded profits after Cha. Year six: eighteen months yielded 360,000 strings profit. Cha and Juhou were promoted; Juhou got third-rank robes. Salt profits were stored at Beijing and copied in Hebei.
53
The Binzhou saltern produced over 21,000 piculs a year for local and selected Jingdong needs, but most Hebei prefectures and garrisons listed in the statute still traded salt freely. Binzhou and Cangzhou depots expanded; open-trade Jingdong circuits were dropped.
54
貿
Since Kaibao Hebei salt traded freely for 150,000 strings transit tax yearly. Yu Jing warned against Hebei monopoly after wartime levies. He argued Khitan cheap salt and light levies kept Hebei loyal in spirit. Taizu had allowed Hebei open salt trade. Monopoly would spike prices and breed lasting resentment. Poor alkali-boilers would flee if boiling were banned. Dear salt meant crime and frontier anger—keep open trade. The proposal died.
55
使 使 使 使
Qingli year six: Wang Gongchen sought full Hebei salt monopoly. Yu Zhouxun said merchants bribed clerks, collecting only twenty to thirty percent of tax. Full ten-tenths collection at sale sites could yield 100,000-plus strings. The Fiscal Commission adopted it. Renzong asked if dear salt was his intent. Before issuance Zhang Fangping challenged renewed Hebei monopoly. The emperor denied it was a second monopoly. Fangping cited Later Zhou's deadly Hebei salt monopoly. Shizong folded salt into two taxes after elders' protest—that is today's salt levy. Fangping asked: is this not monopoly again? Monopoly would help Khitan salt while angering Hebei. Only war could stop Khitan salt—would profits cover war? The emperor ordered immediate abolition. Fangping urged a personal edict before formal issuance. The emperor had Fangping draft the secret edict. Hebei elders celebrated at Chanzhou with a seven-day rite and carved the edict at Beijing. Afterward elders passing the stele always bowed and wept.
56
使 便
Over time revenue halved from the old quota by Huangyou. Wang Boyu proposed bagged salt from Cang and Bin with size limits, waste allowance, and half tax on the rest. Certificates let merchants pass counties and pay transit tax at destination circuits; Over-limit storage or extra salt brought fines and confiscation. Prefect Tian Jing co-memorialized and a trial was ordered. A year later revenue rose 30,000 strings and the rule was fixed. Xining year eight: Zhang Dun sought Hebei monopoly again; Zhou Ge was ordered to plan it. Wen Yanbo blocked it; the old open-trade rule continued.
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