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卷一百八十一 志第一百三十四 食貨下三

Volume 181 Treatises 134: Finance and Economics 2c

Chapter 181 of 宋史 · History of Song
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1
Finance and Economics III, continued: Huizi; Salt, part 1
2
便貿 使
The systems of huizi and jiaozi drew largely on the Tang practice of flying money. In the Zhenzong era, while Zhang Yong held Shu, he worried that local iron currency was too heavy for commerce. He introduced exchange certificates—one note redeemable for a full string of cash—with a three-year issue period after which notes were swapped for new ones. Across sixty-five years the system ran through twenty-two issues, known as jiaozi and managed by sixteen prosperous merchant houses. Eventually those merchant backers grew poorer and could not honor their obligations, and litigation went on without end. Transport commissioners Xue Tian and Zhang Ruogu asked to set up a Yizhou Jiaozi Office to control issuance and redemption, banning private printing. Emperor Renzong accepted the plan. The quota for each issue was set at 1,256,340 strings of cash.
3
西便 使西 西
Early in Shenzong's Xining reign, counterfeiters of notes were punished and informants rewarded under the same rules used for forged official seals and documents. Moving iron cash through Hedong was exhausting and expensive, and the burden fell on government and people alike. In year two an edict established a Jiaozi Office at Luzhou. The transport office argued that jiaozi would undercut salt and alum sales and disrupt grain deliveries under the commissary system, and memorialized to abolish the office. In year four the scheme was tried again in Shaanxi and the Yongxing Army salt-certificate depot was closed, but Wen Yanbo warned of drawbacks; Zhang Jingxian, back from a mission to Yanzhou, likewise held that jiaozi suited Shu but not Shaanxi; soon the Shaanxi experiment was dropped entirely. In year five the twenty-second issue was due for replacement, yet the next issue was already overissued. The court ordered 1.25 million notes of a twenty-fifth issue to cover the twenty-third, and from then on two jiaozi issues could circulate at once. Too many jiaozi were outstanding and too little coin was held in reserve, so prices collapsed; without real backing the system failed. Sun Jiong, steward of Xihé revenue, argued: "Traders profit by arbitrage against the state and drive down certificate prices." The Shaanxi jiaozi system was then abolished.
4
西沿
From the Shaosheng period onward new issues were regularly enlarged to fund frontier grain purchases in Shaanxi and recruitment—tens of thousands of strings at the low end, millions at the high; Chengdu too kept asking for extra print runs, so yearly issuance had no fixed ceiling.
5
西仿 貿
Chongning year three set up a Jingxi North Circuit office to manage jiaozi circulation, copying Sichuan's anti-counterfeiting statutes. Collusion in passing forged notes, or neighbors who failed to report it, was criminal; private manufacture of jiaozi paper brought penal servitude and exile. Year four ordered every circuit to adopt qianyin printed to a new design, while Sichuan kept the old rules. Capital and Yongxing jiaozi offices were shut and their staff merged into the salt-certificate purchase office. Qianyin then circulated everywhere except Fujian, Zhejiang, Hunan, and Guang; Zhao Tingzhi remarked that Fujian escaped because it was Cai Jing's native circuit. The following year the Ministry of Revenue reported: "Qianyin were meant to replace salt certificates, but circulation is poor; we ask to suspend printing temporarily. Official holdings should, as before, be reissued as salt certificates; private notes may be traded and gradually redeemed at the purchase office in fractional shares like salt certificates." The court approved.
6
西 使 西 西 便
Daguan year one renamed the Sichuan Jiaozi Office the Qianyin Office. Campaigns for Huang, Guo, and Xining leaned on note issues for frontier costs; issuance swelled to more than twenty times a Tiansheng quota while value kept falling. At the scheduled renewal, four old notes bought only one new note, forcing a thorough reform. Issue forty-three set the new quota; old seals were kept to avoid panic, and thereafter everything was called qianyin. In year two Shaanxi and Hedong funneled old qianyin to Chengdu for exchange, clogging Sichuan while frontier circuits bore transport costs; great families bought cheap and sold dear. The court reopened an exchange office at Yongxing Army for Shaanxi and Hedong notes and posted two civil supervisors. In the eighth month, Zhang Chi, prefect of Weizhou, memorialized: "In this circuit a note once worth a thousand cash is now worth only one-tenth. If circulation were sound it could be worth eight hundred; let it circulate thus. Officials' salaries should still be paid in notes; please supply some cash for convenience." Zhang Chi was made Chengdu transport judge with charge over Sichuan qianyin. Notes sank further until unusable; Zhang Chi stamped a new seal for official pay, and unstamped notes were abandoned. Critics called this unlawful; Zhang Chi was exiled far away. Year three barred redemption of issues forty-one and forty-two and capped new issues at the Tiansheng quota, forbidding use where copper cash circulated. Year four lent 500,000 strings of Sichuan sealed reserves as office capital; diversion was punished like granary theft.
7
滿 便
Zhenghe year one: the Ministry relayed Chengdu's plea: "Requiring three parts of household notes and seven bought at depots made the seven parts suspect. Drop the three-seven rule, allow free circulation, and let willing buyers still purchase at depots. While reserves lagged, note prices collapsed and prefects paid less when buying them in; reserves are now full—please pay full value to restore confidence. We also ask that notes of the forty-third issue, when the issue expires, not be exchanged, and that the forty-fourth issue mark the start of the new method." Revenue officials wanted only issue forty-four in circulation and no printing of issue forty-five. If needed, supplemental notes within an issue could be printed and swapped; otherwise sales continued, or coin could be exchanged for reserves at payout sites; diversion matched penalties for sealed funds. The edict approved. Jingkang year one restored direct redemption of Sichuan qianyin at the Chengdu office. Long placement in Chengdu had been convenient, but prefectures abused batch mixing in deliveries—hence the order.
8
Traditionally each new issue carried 360,000 strings of reserve, old and new issues chaining together. Under Daguan they printed without reserves until a one-string note bought barely a dozen coins. When Zhang Shangying took power, the court ordered a return to the old rules. In Xuanhe he reported that under the restored method note prices had leveled again.
9
西 使
Shaoxing year one: troops at Wuzhou needed funds, but the route lacked shipping and coin was too heavy to move. They printed guanzi for Wuzhou, called merchants to commissary delivery, and let them redeem guanzi at the Monopoly Office for cash or commodity certificates. Thereupon prefectures and counties used guanzi as grain-purchase funds, which inevitably involved forced quotas; the Monopoly Office moreover repaid only one-third per day, and everyone lamented. Year six established a Jiaozi Office at the court-in-exile. Officials warned: "Guanzi were meant to be cash-backed, but agencies drifted into unsecured jiaozi. Without reserves, why should anyone trust them?" The Jiaozi Office was abolished; the Monopoly Office stored cash and printed guanzi. Year twenty-nine printed public warrants and guanzi for three chief commissioners: 800,000 strings each for Huai West and Huguang guanzi, 400,000 Huai East warrants, in five denominations from 10,000 to 100,000. Guanzi ran three years, warrants two; half cash and half silver redemption was allowed.
10
西 沿
Year thirty: Vice Minister Qian Duanli was ordered to issue huizi backed by stored cash for circulation in and around the capital; all scheduled government disbursements could be tendered to the Left Treasury in huizi. Next year the Huizi Office was subordinated to the tea monopoly. Year thirty-two codified penalties for forging huizi. (The forger is executed. Informants receive ten strings of cash, or appointment as Junior Righteousness Captain if they decline cash. Penal laborers or harborers who inform are pardoned and rewarded, and may take office if they wish.) Huizi paper first came from Huizhou and Chizhou, then Chengdu, then Lin'an. Huizi began in the two Zhe circuits, then spread through Huai, Zhe, Hubei, and Jingxi West. Salt producers still paid capital in cash, but landlocked districts could remit tribute wholly in huizi; riverine prefectures took half cash and half huizi; private sales of land, livestock, and boats followed the same rule, with all-huizi deals allowed.
11
Longxing year one stamped huizi "Longxing Ministry of Revenue Official Seal Huizi," adding 500-, 200-, and 300-cash denominations. A Huizi Office opened at Jiangzhou. Qiandao year two: to curb abuse, a million taels of silver from palace treasuries were used to buy huizi in. That same year, 5,000,000 new notes replaced damaged public huizi. Damaged notes with readable denominations had to be turned in as tribute; magnates who hoarded them cheap faced punishment. Year four: old notes were burned and reprinted on a three-year issue cycle capped at ten million strings per issue. Minister Zeng Huai co-managed the reform and cast the seal "Office for Directing and Managing the Huizi Treasury." Each note carried a twenty-cash fee; odd hundreds paid half. Damaged old notes with legible denominations and seals were exchanged immediately. Year five let the capital monopoly and tea offices take the first issue for commodity certificates, then each issue in succession. Prefectural taxes were collected seventy percent cash, thirty percent huizi. Year nine set rewards for seizing counterfeit huizi.
12
Chunxi year one issued 250,000 strings of huizi to buy surplus salt quotas in Lin'an, Pingjiang, Shaoxing, and Ming-Xiu; certificate proceeds went monthly to sealed reserves for redemption. In the third year, issues three and four were each extended three years; the Huizi Treasury at the tea monopoly was ordered to print 2,000,000 strings of the fourth issue for storage in the southern treasury. Annual revenue was 12,000,000, half huizi; the southern treasury held 4,000,000 in metal redemption while only 2,000,000 circulated. Shaoxi year one extended issues seven and eight three years each. An official protested: "Three-year issues now run nine—how does that inspire confidence?" The court then ordered issue ten with a firm expiration. In Qingyuan 1, an edict set each huizi issue at a quota of thirty million strings. In Jiading 2, because the three issues of huizi were too numerous and there was no effective method for supporting their value, the eleventh issue, after what had already been exchanged, still had more than 13.6 million strings outstanding, while the twelfth and thirteenth issues, after burned notes were deducted, still had more than 102 million strings outstanding. The twelfth issue had more than 47 million strings, and the thirteenth issue more than 57 million strings. An edict ordered the Sealed Reserve Treasury to allocate 150,000 taels of gold, each tael valued at forty strings; seven thousand ordination certificates, each valued at one thousand strings; official patent silk-paper and frankincense, each set of frankincense valued at one string and six hundred cash; these were gathered to make more than three thousand units and added to the Lin’an Prefecture government bureau for exchanging old huizi, to be accepted in mixed payments by grade. The eleventh-issue huizi made up two-tenths, and the twelfth- and thirteenth-issue huizi four-tenths each. Two old huizi were exchanged for one new huizi. Song Jun, the prefectural official of Quanzhou, and Zhao Chongkang and Chen Mi, the prefectural officials of Nanjianzhou, were all demoted in varying degrees for failing in value support.
13
使 使 使
Shaoding year five: two concurrent issues exceeded 229,000,000 strings. In the second year of Duanping, a court official said: "Of the two issues of huizi, the older has not yet seen several years and the newer has barely reached one year; there is no damage or defacement. The huizi now collected should be stored in the sealed reserve; in an emergency they may serve a purpose." The throne agreed. Chunyou year two: Han Xiang of the Imperial Clan Court wrote, "Paper money fails from endless reissues; salvation lies in recall and reduction. Since last year note values have held steady without sharp depreciation—because issues were not constantly replaced. We have now abolished the various paper-making offices and the prefectures' levies of paper bark, and are collecting and recalling notes by many means; thus there is reason for paper values to rise." The emperor said: "Good." In the third year, a court official said: "Although the amount officially printed has been reduced, forged certificates increase ever more; for issues fifteen and sixteen, redemptions in should have been less than payouts; yet exchanges exceeded the quota while new notes kept arriving. Without forgery, how could volumes be so high? Early issues used fine Sichuan paper and careful workmanship, making counterfeiting hard. Issue seventeen mixed Sichuan and Du paper; issue eighteen used only Du paper. Local paper was cheap—one-fifth the old cost—so forgery became easy. Profit tempts more than law threatens, especially when gain is instant and punishment delayed. Best policy: richer paper, longer production, exquisite workmanship that defeats counterfeiting; laws against capture, with thick rewards and stern prevention so people dare not forge—this is second best." Year seven made issues seventeen and eighteen permanent without renewal. Year eleven tied officials' performance reviews to note prices. Jingding year four printed 150,000 more strings daily to fund excess land purchases.
14
使 使
Xianchun year four pegged guanzi at 770 cash per string and issue-eighteen huizi at 257 cash each—three per string—circulating like coin; private discounting brought embezzlement charges for officials and registry exile for clerks. Year five again banned discounting guanzi. Year seven ordered Sichuan to supply fine guanzi paper—20 million sheets yearly in four convoys—because capital paper was poor.
15
使
Sichuan qianyin began under Zhang Jun and Zhao Kai to fund grain and armies; overprinting grew unstoppable. Year seven Wu Jie's request for a Hechi silver-note office was denied. Under the early Song, Shu circulated two issues of about 1.2 million each. Three issues now exceed 37.8 million, reaching 41.47 million by late Shaoxing; reserves held only 700,000 strings of iron cash, with salt and wine revenue quietly propping prices. Commissary Wang Zhiwang warned that emergency printing required long-term planning. The court authorized 3 million more; Zhiwang printed only 1 million. Longxing year two: Zhao Yi added 2 million. Chunxi year five capped Shu notes at 45 million. Shaoxi year two extended Sichuan qianyin terms. By late Jiatai two issues exceeded 53 million strings; three issues were higher still.
16
Kaixi's Chen Xian tried small notes for deficits but failed. Jiading opened with notes below 400 iron cash per string; Chen Xian spent 13 million in gold, silver, and certificates to retire half an issue by year's end. Remote prefectures faced tight deadlines and corrupt clerks at redemption. Trade stalled, the people protested, and notes traded at a hundred cash each. The commissioner reversed the recall, restored three-issue circulation, and opened a Chengdu redemption market with gold and silver. Notes then fetched just over 500 iron cash—570 where copper circulated.
17
Xiding spring year three recalled issue 91—over 29 million strings; of which 12,000,000 strings were matched with Tea-Horse surplus funds, commissioner blank appointments, and chief-office gold, silver, and certificates; the rest were redeemed with issue ninety-three qianyin; issue 94 added 5 million to absorb Cheng Song's excess printing; the public received an eight-thousand subsidy per hundred notes surrendered. Redemption mixed seventy percent new notes with thirty percent metal; short assay forced twenty new notes per hundred old ones. After two recall drives in years one and three, prices recovered. Gaozong once praised Shen Gai's "support" doctrine: keep a million strings in reserve and buy notes when prices fall.
18
使 使 滿
In the ninth year, the Sichuan pacification and commissioner office said: "Each issue of Sichuan qianyin followed the old rule of exchange every three years. Since Kaixi wars, renewals slipped until two or three issues overlapped; extensions were announced only at expiry, alarming the public. We now wish to fix ten years as one issue by permanent statute, so travelers will no longer be in doubt." Approved.
19
仿使 便 使
In the fourth year of Baoyou, censorial officials memorialized: "The abuses of Sichuan qianyin and silver notes all come from printing and using locally with issuance but no recall. Centralize printing, model Sichuan huizi on issue eighteen at 770 per thousand per Chunyou rules. Destroy old qianyin; keep silver notes temporarily. Clearing old notes and capping new ones will stabilize prices. Prices will level themselves and public and private interests will both be served." The throne agreed. Xianchun year five restored Chengdu printing under commissioner paper supply and chief-office seals, capped at 5 million yearly.
20
使使 便便
Late Shaoxing huizi were undivided by region; later overissue without reserves caused trouble. Qiandao year two printed 3 million Huai-only jiaozi in four denominations, exchangeable for old huizi. All payments and trade took half jiaozi, half cash. To ease cross-river trade, Zhenjiang and Jiankang each received 200,000 jiaozi and huizi for interchange. Copper was banned on the Huai for iron; huizi gave way to jiaozi—commerce stalled and the region suffered. Chen Liangyou protested; officials agreed too much jiaozi and no cross-river coin or huizi hurt travelers. The court restored cross-river coin and huizi, allowed private jiaozi as cash payments, and recalled official jiaozi to the capital.
21
使 西 滿
Year three printed 1.3 million new jiaozi for Huainan prefectures, with no fixed expiry; stored transport jiaozi went first to the southern treasury. Shaoxi year three issued 3 million jiaozi—2 million east, 1 million west—at 770 iron cash per string for three-year issues. Qingyuan year four extended the second Huai huizi issue one more term until the sixth month next year. Jiading year eleven printed 2 million new Huai jiaozi and added 3 million. Year thirteen printed 2 million and added 1.5 million. Years fourteen and fifteen each hit 3 million. Thereafter volume rose and value fell daily; only repeated extensions propped the system up.
22
便 便 西 便
Initially Xiang-E armies were paid in mixed coin and silver. Longxing year one stored cash at army treasuries and printed 500- and 1,000-cash huizi for army circulation as coin. Monopolized printing swelled daily output; yet notes circulated only locally while Jingnan—a merchant crossroads—lacked convenient exchange. Qiandao year three seized the huizi plates. Year four sent 200,000 Huai guanzi and 800,000 certificates to Hubei for exchange into the Left Treasury, with silver and cash buyback. Year five gave Jingnan 500,000 capital huizi for redemption. Chunxi year seven printed 1 million huizi for Huguang to replace damaged notes. Year eleven: Hubei huizi had not been redeemed in twenty-two years since Longxing—"support" failed. The court ordered Huguang commanders, transport, and chief commissioner to plan a fix. The commander, transport official, and chief commissioner said: "We ask permission to print 2,000,000 strings of Hubei huizi in 1,000- and 500-cash denominations to exchange old notes, so circulation may be swift and the system durable." Approved.
23
仿
Year thirteen restored three-year Huguang issues. Shaoxi year one ordered Huguang to count all notes and institute capital-style issue renewals. The commissary Liang Zong memorialized: "From the beginning no issue term was set; damaged notes were exchanged at once; apart from repeated exchanges, more than 5,400,000 still circulate among the people. We ask to make two new issues in a different design for exchange." Approved.
24
便
Jiading year five Wang Fu offered certificates plus tea warrants at 3,000 strings total per old note for one month. Only three sites served twenty-one Jing-Hu prefectures—unworkable. Liu Guangzu offered 50,000 sixth-issue notes at two old for one; then one and a half old for one; and secured 100,000 more from court—relief for the public. Year fourteen printed 300,000 to replace damaged Huguang huizi. Year seventeen issued 2 million of the sixth Huguang issue. Jiaxi year two allocated 9 million seventh-issue Huguang huizi to the field headquarters. Baoyou year two gave the chief office 3 million eighth-issue notes to retire two damaged issues—then routine.
25
Salt falls in two kinds: pool salt, granular salt—the "brine salt" of the Rites of Zhou; sea, well, and alkaline-boil salts are fine salt—the "loose salt" of the Rites of Zhou. After conquering the realm, the Song monopolized all salt profits. Circuits mixed state sales and licensed trade as local needs dictated, with frequent reforms and especially harsh bans on smuggling.
26
西西宿 西西耀
Pool salt was produced at the two pools of Jie Prefecture—in Jie County and Anyi. Fields were leveled and flooded with brine—"planting salt"—until evaporation left crystallized salt. Registered saltern households received government grain and corvée exemptions. A hundred patrol troops—the "Treasure Guard"—were recruited. Work began on the first day of the second month, planting from the fourth month through the eighth. The Anyi pool produced a thousand saltern-beds of salt yearly; the Jie pool twenty fewer, supplying the prefecture, the three capitals, Ji, Yan, Cao, Pu, Dan, Yun prefectures and Guangji Army in Jingdong, Hua, Zheng, Chen, Ying, Ru, Xu, Meng in Jingxi, Hezhong, Shan, Yu, Qingcheng in Shaanxi, Jin, Jiang, Ci, Xi in Hedong, Su and Bo in Huainan, Huai and counties of Chan on the Henan bank in Hebei. Monopoly zones were marked with signs and watch posts. Open trade reached long lists of Jingxi and Shaanxi prefectures plus Hebei Chan counties north of the Yellow River. Both salt types measured five catties per dou; granular salt sold in three grades from forty-four to thirty-four cash per catty. Zhidao year two: 373,545 beds at 116.5 catties each. Year three revenue exceeded 728,000 strings.
27
使西沿 西使殿西 便 便 使 西使
In the Xianping period, Revenue Commissioner Liang Ding said: "Along the Shaanxi frontier, Jie salt should not be traded freely; the government should sell it itself." Ding became Shaanxi commissioner with Du Chengrui for green-white salt policy. Chengrui said: "After green salt was banned in Yan, Yan, Huan, Qing, Yi, Wei, and other prefectures, merchants delivered fodder and transported Jie salt to the frontier for sale; its price was not far from green salt, so the people ate cheap salt, feared the law, and frontier green salt was hard to sell. Now I hear Jie salt at the frontier is sold at inland prices; frontier people will break the law for profit and smuggle green salt into tribal lands—aiding the enemy and breeding popular resentment." More critics spoke; Ding banned trade as soon as he reached Jie Pool. Forced frontier shipments exhausted everyone and emptied frontier markets. Lin Te and Zhang Yong reviewed the policy and urged restoring merchants. Ding was rebuked and dismissed. In the ninth year of Dazhong Xiangfu, Shaanxi transport commissioner Zhang Xiangzhong said: "Salt stored at the two pools is valued at 21,761,080 strings; fearing lost revenue remains, we ask for regulations." Emperor Zhenzong said: "The bounty of this land has reached its height. Seeking more profit may leave a time of shortage." He refused.
28
貿
Five Dynasties salt laws had been brutal. Jianlong year two: ten catties smuggled or three catties illicit boil-salt meant death; thirty catties mulberry salt in cities needed imperial review. Year three raised thresholds but kept harsh penalties. From Qiande year four onward penalties were eased by edict. Taiping Xingguo year two replaced death with tattooing and escort to court for larger amounts. Chunhua year five sent offenders to local garrison labor instead. Yongxi year four graded penalties for Khitan salt smuggling at Daizhou.
29
Tiansheng: 380 saltern households supplied two corvée men each with daily rice and annual payments. Output reached 1.52 million piculs—655,120 beds of 116 catties. Monopoly zones impressed "posted heads" for transport. Frontier circuits also repaid fodder deliveries with salt.
30
西西西 便
Jingxi open trade used southern salt, Shaanxi western salt, monopolies eastern salt—with strict boundaries. Early Tiansheng, the Fiscal Planning Office discussed tea-salt interests and said: "The two pools formerly recruited merchants selling southern salt to pay cash at the capital Monopoly Office. In the first year of Qianxing, yearly intake was only 230,000 strings—140,000 less than Tianxi year three. We ask to abolish this entirely and require only commissary fodder and frontier fodder, with tighter rules and patrols to end private trade." Later cash payment at the capital was restored for merchant convenience.
31
使 宿 宿
Twenty-eight circuits and three capitals suffered forced salt transport. Tiansheng year eight, a memorialist said: "The government monopoly gains little and harms greatly; salt at the two pools piled like a hill with trees as thick as an embrace—countless. Free trade at fair prices would ease the people." Sheng Du and Wang Sui were ordered to redesign the system. They submitted five benefits of open trade: "When trade was banned, felling trees to build boats for transport exhausted soldiers and civilians—removing this is the first benefit; Second: ending land corvée and flight of the poor. Third: ending adulterated boat salt that caused disease. Coin is the state's currency. Fourth: merchants' 600,000 strings revived circulation hoarded by the rich. reducing yearly pay to salt officials, soldiers, and saltern corvée, the fifth benefit." Tenth month: monopolies ended; merchants bought pool salt at the capital with cash or bullion. One year later revenue beat Tiansheng year seven by 150,000 strings. Thereafter yearly intake declined; Hanlin Academician Song Qi and others compared the new law from Tiansheng nine to Baoyuan two with the old law from Qianxing to Tiansheng eight—the yearly intake lost 2,360,000 strings. Kangding year one restored monopolies in the capital region and selected circuits. Soon the capital reopened trade and Huainan salt fed eight Jingdong circuits.
32
西 調 耀
After Yuanhao's rebellion, frontier fodder deliveries collapsed. Desperate for grain, the state paid certificates redeemable in cash at the capital for commissary deliveries; other goods were repaid in pool salt. Feathers, horn, glue, iron, charcoal, tile, and wood were all traded for salt. Corrupt valuation gave 220 catties of salt for two logs worth a thousand cash. Absurd repayments flooded the market, prices collapsed, and nobody profited. Qingli year two restored the capital monopoly and charged merchants for inflated certificates and unsold salt. Inland private salt was bought up and resold at markup. Eleven circuits banned merchant salt again, using yamen runners for transport. Shu entry was blocked; exchange offices at Yongxing and Fengxiang swapped salt for cash or Shu goods. Soon eastern and southern monopolies returned, exhausting troops and roiling prefectures. Salt revenue no longer met urgent state needs. Frontier fodder deliveries were wildly overvalued, draining the capital treasury.
33
使 西使 西使 西 使 便
Fan Xiang of Guanzhong argued pool profits were huge but lost to corruption before reaching the frontier; reform could save tens of millions yearly. He submitted a reform plan. Han Qi and Tian Kuang backed Fan Xiang's plan. In the fourth year, Xiang was ordered by express to discuss with Shaanxi transport commissioner Cheng Kan; Kan disagreed, and Xiang soon left for mourning. Year eight: Xiang became commissioner and implemented his reform. The law opened monopolies to trade and allowed salt into Shu; frontier fodder commissary ended; cash payments earned salt at distance-weighted premiums; eastern and southern salt could be bought at Yongxing, Fengxiang, and Hezhong; Annual intake was 375,000 large beds via pool warrants, ending forced haulage. Frontier passes near tribal salt pools suffered green-white salt smuggling. Recruits delivered pool salt at premium rates for certificate repayment; the state sold that salt and banned private and green-white trade. Iron, charcoal, tile, and wood commissary was shut down. Prior inflated certificates and unsold salt had to be paid back. Selected circuits kept official sales until merchant trade sufficed. Cash bought frontier grain while capital coin stayed in the treasury. Within years, smuggling waned, Guanzhong stabilized, and all benefited.
34
使便 貿 使 西使 使
Huangyou year one: He Zheng attacked the reform. Bao Zheng inspected, endorsed the reform, and adjusted prices and bans. The Fiscal Commission sought mixed trade at the capital where merchants were scarce. All approved. Tian Kuang asked to retain Xiang permanently. Xiang became acting transport commissioner with gold-purple robes. Xiang predicted 2.3 million; Huangyou year three brought 2.21 million; year four, 2.15 million. Year four beat Qingli year six by 680,000; and year seven by 200,000. Under the old law the Monopoly Office paid out millions—6.47 million in Qingli year two; 4.8 million in year six. Under the reform, payouts stopped. Revenue fluctuated but still hit 1.78 million by year five; Zhihe year one: 1.69 million. Xiang had been demoted; Li Can replaced him. Year three fixed the year-one intake as the annual quota, covering eight-tenths of frontier costs.
35
使 使 使
Frontier fodder commissary returned, inflating valuations and depressing certificate prices by a million yearly. Jiayou year three: Zhang Fangping and Bao Zheng restored Fan Xiang to salt policy. Xiang banned fodder commissary and charged a thousand cash per old certificate. Merchants selling certificates or salt in the capital, he said, lost money. He proposed a capital stabilization fund of 200,000 strings to buy depressed certificates and salt. Fixed prices—6,000 per certificate, 10,000 per bed—stabilized the market. The Salt Bureau supervisor took charge and policy gradually normalized. Xiang soon died; Xue Xiang succeeded him. Zhiping year two: 1.67 million intake.
36
Xiang had folded transit taxes into commissary rates to protect local revenue. Prefectures still collected transit tax anyway. Jiayou year six: Xiang ended the levies and cut salt prices in eight circuits. Saltern corvée from five circuits abused the people until three-year rotation was ordered. 3.37 million beds of back salt tax were halved by remission. Planting was suspended one to three years when stocks piled up. Halving saltern households and using hired labor eased five circuits.
37
西 西 使西 使
Green-white salt from Wu and Bai pools was controlled by Western Qiang. Li Jiqian's rebellion brought bans, brief openings, then bans again. Qianxing extended Shaanxi penalties to Hedong green-white salt smugglers. Qingli: Yuanhao offered 100,000 piculs yearly to the court. Renzong refused as disruptive to law. Fan Xiang's bans raised official prices and drove deadly green-white smuggling. Zhihe softened tribal death sentences to island exile. Jiayou amnesties eased penalties further. Xining opened with Zhang Jing auditing Shaanxi salt and horses. Xiang exposed Jing; Wang Anshi punished Jing and promoted Xiang. Fan Chunren protested; Xiang kept his post. Xiang set up a Yongxing salt market with 300,000 strings certificate capital.
38
西 便 西 使 西 西 西
Year four tried Shu jiaozi in Shaanxi and ended certificate sales; critics restored the old certificate system. Year seven: empty salt certificates inflated frontier grain costs. They proposed jiaozi matched to cash reserves. Pi Gongbi, Xiong Ben, Song Di, and Zhao Zhan were appointed. 200,000 strings from the inner treasury were lent to the Fiscal Commission; market officials bought certificates on four routes; Qin-Feng and Yongxing certificates were capped at 1.8 million yearly. Year eight capped issuance: limited capital but excessive certificates cheapened grain. Without government buyback, monopolists depressed certificate prices; frontier crises required stabilization markets. Quotas were set: 2.2 million total—815,000 Yongxing, 1.385 million Qin-Feng. Yongxing bought certificates, loaned them through market offices, and destroyed excess at Jie Pool. Approved—but over-issue continued. Year nine censured Shaanxi over-issue beyond Fiscal Commission quotas.
39
西 西 西
In the tenth year the Fiscal Commission said: "The salt law's abuse comes from Xihé certificates exceeding quota, so prices fall and fodder is dear. Open-trade circuits' official sales blocked merchant travel. They proposed ending official sales. Recall old certificates, mark old salt, require supplemental payments. State buyback of old certificates with stamped beds and tokens for released salt. Old eastern and southern beds cost 3,500; western beds dropped 1,000—all bought by the state. Jie depots had to verify certificates before sale. Self-report deadlines added 2,500–3,000 per bed for new tallies. Ended two monopoly zones; new prices, stamped exchange, cash for old certificates. Each open-trade place should appoint one official; salt beds must report within ten days, then pay supplemental money for stamping and new certificates, old certificates accepted as supplemental payment." All implemented. Official-sale zones remained; the Market Office bought salt with supplements.
40
西 西
Traditionally Henan north and Qin-Feng east ate Jie salt. Under Renzong Jie salt traded freely without state monopoly; Xining's Market Office monopolized Kaifeng region prefectures. In the eighth year Court Doctor Zhang Jingwen was commissioned to sell Jie salt; thereupon in the Kaifeng circuit and Cao, Pu, Chan, Huai, Ji, Dan, Jie, Hezhong, and many counties, all sold officially. Before long merchant opinion was restored: Tang, Deng, Xiang, Jun, Fang, Shang, Cai, E, Sui, Jin, Jin, Jiang, Yu, Chen, Xu, Ru, Xi, Xijing, Xinyang Army opened trade; capital counties and many prefectures had the Jie Salt Commissioner transport and sell, and the Fiscal Commission was ordered to study pros and cons.
41
宿 西使便 使
Higher prices brought forced salt purchases scaled by wealth. Informers on private salt took the offender's property as reward. Unused official salt overnight was treated as smuggling. Public outrage followed. Certificates fell from six to two strings per bed; grain deliveries stopped. Shaanxi transport commissioner Pi Gongbi was summoned; Gongbi strongly said official sale was inconvenient. Fiscal Commissioner Shen Kuo could not overturn it. Wang Anshi backed Jingwen; Shen Kuo claimed open trade cost 200,000 yearly. After Anshi left, Kuo urged ending official sales. Thereupon Heyang, Tong, Hua, Jie, Hezhong, Shan, Chenliu, Yongqiu, Xiangyi, Zhongmou, Guancheng, Weishi, Yanling, Fugou, Taikang, Xianping, Xinzheng opened trade; where intake did not match official sale, the government sold again; Chan, Pu, Ji, Dan, Cao, Huai, Nanjing, and nine counties kept official sale as before. Merchant salt in the capital had to sell to the Market Office at floor prices; private sales were reported and confiscated.
42
西 沿 西西 西西西 使 西使
Pi Gongbi capped yearly pool disbursement at 3.3 million strings. Seven capital markets bought eastern and southern certificates for 593,000 strings; the Fiscal Commission sought to resell certificates west for cash; buyers paid thirty percent cash, seventy percent in new frontier certificates; to absorb old certificates and ease new ones. Approved. Gongbi restored stabilization with a 300,000-string capital fund. Jie salt had been split east-west with western sale zones; Frontier fodder over-issue cheapened certificates and split prices. Western prices rose above eastern to unify certificates, adding 120,000 yearly. Jie Pool certificates had been capped at 2,200,000 strings; transport commissioner Pi Gongbi asked to add 100,000 to aid frontier grain purchase—by then it was 2,420,000. Western salt holders paid supplements to match new prices. Yuanfeng year three rewarded Zhang Jingwen for salt-sale surplus.
43
西使 西
The next year acting Shaanxi transport commissioner Li Ji said: "Before the new law, certificate value depended on how much agencies issued. After the new law certificates had fixed numbers—from winter of Xining ten through Yuanfeng three, 1,770,000-plus beds were issued while pools produced only 1,175,000-plus beds; 590,000-plus surplus circulated public and private and had to fall in price." Issuance was halted. In the fifth year the Ministry of Revenue still found certificates hard to sell; 2,000,000 certificates yearly for Shaanxi army grain were halved, yet certificates remained many and prices never stabilized.
44
西 使
In the first year of Yuanyou, the Ministry and Jie Salt Commissioner discussed: "Yan, Qing, Wei, Yuan, Huan, Zhenrong, Baoan, and Deshun eight circuits all sell officially at 15,500 beds quota; merchants may pay at eight circuits' exchange offices and receive certificates like Fan Xiang's old law. Certificate revenue funded transport; sale proceeds bought grain. A capital market sold certificates for cash to the Salt Bureau. Other agencies were barred from trading without memorial. Purchased certificates were held by this office; if public certificates were few or local strings were given, the Ministry would discuss selling them." Approved. Merchant delivery cuts increased capital certificate funds by 27,000. Jie commissary followed Xihé pricing; Chan-Huai salt fixed at 8,200 cash. Shaanxi "inverted salt" from crude saltpeter mimicked Jie salt. Shaosheng year three: inverted-salt offenders were punished one grade below private-salt law.
45
西 使 殿 西 西使使西
Under Shenzong Jie salt was official-sale; Jingxi traded freely. Shen Xiyan as transport commissioner changed to monopoly law, borrowed 200,000 strings from the Ever-Normal Granary, bought Jie salt himself, sold it in his circuit; people who had bought Jie salt had to buy all into the government; he squeezed for profit and travelers suffered. Zhezong's accession brought Huang Jiang's impeachment of Xiyan. Yuanyou restored Jingxi trade; Yuanfu ended official sale. Yongxing, Weizhou, and Hebei Gaoyang, Liyang, Jingyang counties like Tong, Hua, and five other circuits still sold salt officially, while forbidding officials buying Jie salt at exchange offices for profit. Soon Jie Pool was damaged by flood; Hezhong and Jie small-pool salt, Tong-Hua private earth salt, Jiezhou stone salt, and Tongyuan-Minzhou official well salt were allowed sold in their circuits; Jingdong and Hebei salt also circulated. In the third year, Shaanxi transport vice commissioner and Jie Salt Commissioner Ma Cheng and timber raft supervisor Xue Sichang were ordered to repair Jie salt pools.
46
綿 便
Chongning year one restored pools yielding 1.78 million catties. Once a hundred-li salt marsh east of Jie Liang yielded vast salt. Yuanfu rains ruined the pools. Restoration was now debated; pools finished in year four. 2,400 beds reopened amid official celebration. Wang Zhongqian claimed credit by inflating quotas. Critics noted proper Jie salt needed sun and south wind after shallow flooding; deep flooding for quotas yielded bitter salt.
47
西 西 西 西 使 西
Chongning memorialists urged restoring Fan Xiang's stable certificate law. Though approved, before long Cai Jing said: "Hebei and Jingdong fine salt transported to the capital and Jingxi pays 6,000 cash per bag while salt cost is under 1,000—the policy is new yet already yields 2,000,000-plus strings. If extended to Shaanxi, profit would surely double." Han Dunli and others were commissioned by route. Jing limited new Jie certificates to Shaanxi while pushing northeastern salt cash. In the fifth year an edict said: "Certificate law has long won public trust; flying money enriches the state with great benefit. Comparing laws before and after, weigh pros and cons; issue separate tallies for Jie salt exchange for new certificates. Five million strings went to Shaanxi first. Hedong took certificates only for grain purchase and southeastern salt exchange. Supplemental cash tiers rose above old rates. Old certificates could be bundled with higher supplemental tiers; those unwilling to pay supplemental cash had two-tenths deducted from old certificate price." Earlier caps targeted merchants who depressed certificates and raised frontier grain prices. Year four caps failed—frontier grain prices and merchant arbitrage persisted. Old Shaanxi certificates could buy southeastern salt at thirty percent cash, seventy percent old notes. Later edicts punished certificate discounts over fifty percent.
48
西
Daguan year four: Zhang Shangying restored Jie circulation and barred northeastern mixing. Agencies resumed old certificate printing after pool restoration. Northeastern salt holdings were registered and bought in within three days. Officials sold seized northeastern salt until Jie salt arrived. Drawn certificates were destroyed; undrawn ones renegotiated. Capital circulation continued; Zhengzhou, Zhongmou, Kaifeng Xiangfu, Yangwu along the route might also pass. Wang Zhongqian's northwest expansion was halted. In-transit northeastern salt was endorsed locally; unsold capital stock was bought by the Salt Bureau for retail.
49
西 西 西 使祿 西
Zhenghe year one fixed Shaanxi certificate face value by law. Certificate value still swung grain deliveries despite the 6,000 face. Fixing 6,000 iron-cash face would have overpriced grain deliveries—flexibility was allowed. Year two Cai Jing returned; bad certificates were voided like ruined notes. Year six wild salt blooms brought double-strength harvesting and bonuses; red salt brought congratulations and ranked rewards. Year seven restoration was led by Tong Guan on the Guan-He front. Northeastern salt in Jie zones was state-purchased and resold like Jie salt; undeclared stock faced private-salt penalties. Chonghe year one restored old Jie salt law. A year later losses and falling certificates led Tong Guan to resign salt duties. Unsold northeastern Jie salt had to move to Jie zones or face smuggling penalties. Capital and Jingxi commissioners were reappointed. Chongning kept Jie salt local while sea salt ranged widely. Restoring Jie salt hurt travelers holding northeastern stock; policy reverted to avoid merchant panic; circuits were warned certificate law was now fixed, with doubled penalties for rumor.
50
Jingkang restored pre-reform certificate rules with cash option. Eight-string certificate beds collected full face; grain deliverers could draw salt at pools without capital stamping.
51
貿 使
Sea salt came from six circuits: Jingdong, Hebei, two Zhe, Huainan, Fujian, Guangnan. Boiling sites were salterns; workers were saltern or stove households. Households delivered salt for cash or tax offsets; two Zhe used soldier quotas. Depot policy shifted with profit and price—no fixed rule. Fine salt had twenty-one price grades from forty-seven to eight cash per catty. Zhidao year three sales exceeded 1.63 million strings. In Jingdong, there was the Taoluo Saltern of Mizhou, which boiled more than 32,000 shi a year to supply that prefecture and Yi and Wei prefectures; only Deng and Lai prefectures practiced open trade, and later four salterns were added in Dengzhou. Formerly Nanjing and the seven prefectures and armies of Cao, Pu, Ji, Yan, Shan, Yun, and Guangji used pool salt; the rest all used salt from the two prefectures, which the government boiled itself. In the winter of Qingli 1, because the eight prefectures and armies of Zi, Wei, Qing, Qi, Yi, Mi, Xu, and Huaiyang had again suffered famine and disaster, an edict relaxed the prohibition, allowed people to trade, and had the government collect the tax on it, while abolishing the annual quotas of Mi and Deng and merely ordering households to pay rent money. After this, because Yan and Yun both adjoined these territories, they stopped using pool salt and were allowed to circulate sea salt, with taxes collected as in Zi, Wei, and the other prefectures. From then on, officials in the various prefectures no longer stored salt, and the annual distribution of silkworm-season salt to the people was all abolished, yet they were still made to pay money as before. During Zhihe, an edict first ordered that the money paid by the people be reckoned as ten parts and allowed three parts to be remitted.
52
使 使
In the third year of Yuanfeng, Jingdong transport vice commissioner Li Cha said: "Nanjing, Ji, Pu, Cao, and Dan eat Jie salt; the other twelve prefectures eat sea salt—we ask to set buy-sell salt markets under current tax law." The state bought all stove salt and banned private trade for 273,000 strings yearly, nearly half profit. Wu Juhou expanded profits after Cha. Year six: eighteen months yielded 360,000 strings profit. Cha and Juhou were promoted; Juhou got third-rank robes. Salt profits were stored at Beijing and copied in Hebei.
53
The Binzhou saltern produced over 21,000 piculs a year for local and selected Jingdong needs, but most Hebei prefectures and garrisons listed in the statute still traded salt freely. Binzhou and Cangzhou depots expanded; open-trade Jingdong circuits were dropped.
54
貿
Since Kaibao Hebei salt traded freely for 150,000 strings transit tax yearly. Memorialists once asked monopoly for lost revenue; Remonstrator Yu Jing urgently said: "In recent years armies mobilized in Hebei, militia and levies pressed—people have not rested for years. He argued Khitan cheap salt and light levies kept Hebei loyal in spirit. Taizu had allowed Hebei open salt trade. Monopoly would spike prices and breed lasting resentment. Poor alkali-boilers would flee if boiling were banned. If salt is dear, lawbreaking will multiply, frontier people will resent—this is not the state's blessing; please keep open trade." The proposal died.
55
使 使 使 使
Qingli year six: Wang Gongchen sought full Hebei salt monopoly. Transport commissioner Yu Zhouxun objected and said: "Merchants trafficking salt collude with passing prefecture clerks—of ten parts taxed, only two or three are collected. Please order prefectures to collect the full ten-tenths; let merchants pay transit tax at sale prefectures—yearly could gain 100,000-plus strings." The Fiscal Commission adopted it. Renzong said: "To make people suddenly eat dear salt—is that my intent?" Thereupon the Fiscal Commission revised monopoly law but had not issued it; Zhang Fangping saw the emperor and asked: "Why monopoly Hebei salt again?" The emperor said: "The initial proposal was legislation, not renewed monopoly." Fangping said: "Later Zhou monopolized Hebei salt—violators were executed. Shizong folded salt into two taxes after elders' protest—that is today's salt levy. Fangping asked: is this not monopoly again? Monopoly would help Khitan salt while angering Hebei. More Khitan salt enters; only war can stop it—if the frontier opens, can salt profits cover war costs?" The emperor greatly understood: "Tell the chief councilors to abolish it at once." Fangping said: "Though not issued, households already know—use a personal edict to abolish; do not issue from below." The emperor had Fangping draft the secret edict. Hebei elders celebrated at Chanzhou with a seven-day rite and carved the edict at Beijing. Afterward elders passing the stele always bowed and wept.
56
使 便
Over time revenue halved from the old quota by Huangyou. Wang Boyu proposed bagged salt from Cang and Bin with size limits, waste allowance, and half tax on the rest. Certificates let merchants pass counties and pay transit tax at destination circuits; Over-limit storage or extra salt brought fines and confiscation. Prefect Tian Jing co-memorialized and a trial was ordered. A year later revenue rose 30,000 strings and the rule was fixed. Xining year eight: Zhang Dun sought Hebei monopoly again; Zhou Ge was ordered to plan it. Wen Yanbo blocked it; the old open-trade rule continued.
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