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卷一百八十二 志第一百三十五 食貨下四

Volume 182 Treatises 135: Finance and Economics 2d

Chapter 182 of 宋史 · History of Song
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Chapter 182
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1
Finance and Economics, Part Four — Salt Policy (continued)
2
使 使
In the seventh year of the Yuanfeng reign (1084), Zhao Zhan, prefect of Cangzhou, asked that Daming Prefecture and the prefectures of Chan, En, Xin'an, Xiong, Ba, Ying, Mo, and Ji adopt full government monopoly on salt sales to boost revenue. Within half a year the measure yielded 167,000 strings in interest. After Emperor Zhezong came to the throne, Supervising Censor Wang Yansou memorialized: "For two years Hebei has operated under the new salt law. Prices have doubled everywhere — merchants have been stripped of their margin while commoners pay more so the state can collect interest. I have heard that the poor now treat salt like medicine. The Hebei heartland is the foundation of the empire; our forebears extended this region special favor in salt policy. I beg Your Majesty to seek profit in benefiting the people, not in burdening them — restore the former salt law as an enduring gift to Hebei's millions." Meanwhile Hebei transport commissioner Fan Ziqi reported that salt tax collection was to be raised to the full rate, and Fan E was sent to study the change. Yansou added: "During my service in Hebei I learned that merchants themselves had petitioned the government to end monopoly purchase, offering to pay double the tax instead. The fiscal officers saw only the doubled tax receipts from merchants as gain; they did not see that merchants would pass the cost on to the populace by raising retail prices — that was the real harm. In the sixth year of Qingli (1046) the court rejected both the Three Departments' monopoly-purchase scheme and the transport commission's bid to raise taxes. Emperor Renzong said plainly, "I fear Hebei's soldiers and civilians would suddenly face dear salt — let the old arrangements stand." The proposed change would have added nearly 600,000 strings a year to the treasury. Did Renzong not understand that was revenue for the state? His view was that wealth held by the people was better than wealth held by the government. At the outset of Your Majesty's reign you should follow Renzong's example and not sacrifice popular goodwill for petty gain." The following year the Hebei salt monopoly was abolished and free commerce in salt was restored. In the sixth year (1091) the office charged with Hebei salt taxes proposed letting merchants retail salt, pay tax at market offices, and obtain small transport permits backed by guarantors of equal household rank, with distance limits; outside government-supervised market towns they could arrange boiling. The salt tax rate, formerly five-tenths, was raised to seven-tenths. In this way the salt tax system was already operating.
3
西
In the Two Zhes, the Hangzhou salt works produced over 77,000 piculs yearly; Ming's eastern and western Changguo supervisors over 201,000; Xiuzhou over 208,000; Wenzhou's northern and southern Tianfu supervisors plus the Miying and Yongjia fields over 74,000; and Taizhou's Huangyan supervisor over 15,000 — supplying their home prefectures plus Yue, Chu, Qu, and Wu. Under Emperor Renzong's Tiansheng reign each of Hang, Xiu, Wen, Tai, and Ming had one supervisor; Wenzhou also administered three fields. The circuit's annual salt quota fell by 68,000 piculs from earlier levels, with output allocated to the circuit itself and She Prefecture in Jiangdong.
4
便 使
Early in the Qingli era the fiscal planning office reported that rivers had run shallow, making grain transport costly and wasteful, and asked to raise somewhat the price of government salt sold in the Jiang, Huai, Two Zhe, and Jing-Hu circuits. The Three Departments were consulted. They replied that Jing-Hu had already seen a price hike and proposed raising the price by two or four cash per jin in the other four circuits' thirty-eight prefectures and military commands. The court ordered the increase deferred until river transport returned to normal. Later a transfer depot was set up at Jiangzhou, with more transport vessels and hired merchant boats added; the planning office then asked for a five-cash-per-jin increase across fifty-one prefectures and commands in the six circuits. The people struggled under high official salt prices and could scarcely afford salt for their meals; every circuit reported hardship. Eventually Han Jiang, back from his Jiangnan pacification assignment, spoke out strongly on the same point. Later the Two Zhe transport commissioners Shen Li and Li Suzhi reported: "Annual salt revenue for this circuit had been 790,000 strings; in the third year of Jiayou (1058) it fell to only 530,000; yet in a single year 3,099 people were convicted of illegal private salt trade; the trouble is that official salt is overpriced, private trade never stops, and government revenue keeps falling. They asked to lower official prices, abolish the salt transport convoys, and let shopkeepers and yamen runners fetch salt directly from the production sites — then salt quality would improve, prices would stabilize, people would not risk illegal sales, and government revenue would surely rise." The commissary transport office objected. Shen Li and Li Suzhi pressed to trial the plan for two or three years to judge results; the court approved.
5
使使使
Shen Li had analyzed eastern salt policy, detailing abuses against saltern households, depot officials, and transport workers. He argued: "Care for saltern households so they are not ruined; ease transport laborers so they can earn a living; stop depot extortion; end illegal trade; cut official prices — if all five are enforced, annual revenue could rise by one or two million strings." He submitted a twenty-juan compilation, Salt Policies, stressing above all the dire poverty of saltern households. Since the Huangyou era (1049–1053) repeated edicts had ordered official advance payments to saltern households in hard cash; for salt sold above quota, payment in grain and cloth had to be actual grain; and long-overdue annual quotas that saltern households could not pay were wholly forgiven. The court's intent to protect them was generous, but local officials rarely complied.
6
使
Since the Xining reforms (1068 onward), Hang, Xiu, Wen, Tai, and Ming together ran six supervisors and fourteen fields, but salt prices stayed painfully high, illegal trade flourished, many smugglers turned to banditry, and revenue quotas collapsed. In the second year (1069) a man named Wan Qi proposed abolishing the Two Zhes salt monopoly and returning trade to the people; Wan Qi was sent with commissary transport commissioner Xue Xiang to study the idea. Emperor Shenzong asked Wang Anshi, who replied: "Zhao Bian claimed that ending the monopoly in Quzhou alone could match all Two Zhe revenue. Bian saw only Qu and Hu as candidates; he did not see that Qu salt competes with Rao and Xin, and Hu salt with Guangde and Sheng — so revenue might rise there, but Su and Chang cannot be compared to Qu and Hu. The right course is to organize boiling households, assign local residents to hunt smugglers, keep transport on schedule, and strictly police adulteration — then the salt law will work without systemic overhaul."
7
西
In the fifth year (1072) Lu Bing was dispatched as acting Two Zhe judicial intendant with sole charge of salt administration. Bing had earlier toured Huainan and the Two Zhes with assistant academician Zeng Mo to study the system's strengths and flaws. Previously saltern households boiled salt and sold to the state, but depots often delayed payment, deepening their hardship. Bing first asked to set aside one million strings from transport and miscellaneous funds for prompt payment, and fixed quota shares for each field: Yangcun in Qiantang, bordering Mu and She, with Yue's Qianqing and similar shallow-water sites, at six-tenths; Yangcun's downstream link to Renhe's Tangcun at seven-tenths; the Yanguan field at eight-tenths; east along the coast, Yue's Yuyao Shiyan and Ming's Cixi Minghe at nine-tenths each; at Daishan and Changguo, and southeast to Wenzhou's Shuanghui, southern Tianfu, and northern Tianfu at the full ten-tenths; the shares were scaled roughly to each site's salt yield. From Daishan through the two Tianfu fields, seawater boiling yielded the most salt. Southwest from Minghe through Tangcun they scraped alkali and leached brine, recovering six or seven parts in ten. Yanguan and Tangcun used iron pans, producing bluish-white salt; Yangcun and Qianqing wove bamboo pans coated with lime, giving a slightly yellow cast; east of Shiyan, where seawater is especially briny, even bamboo-pan salt came out exceptionally white. Bing fixed the number of licensed boiling pans to stop illegal production, grouped three to ten stoves into one unit, and organized saltern populations in mutual surveillance groups; and recruited wine-shop operators to assume sales quotas, buy salt from the state, pay monthly, and stay within licensed territories; He also cracked down on smugglers: even when punishment fell short of exile, those merely flogged were relocated with their families five hundred li away. Five hundred additional troops each from the Kaifeng metropolitan zone and Jingdong were assigned to enforcement.
8
西 使
Only Hang, Yue, and Hu still resisted the new law; the transport office impeached them for revenue shortfalls and all were prosecuted. Wang Anshi told Shenzong that strict salt enforcement would eventually reduce criminal penalties. Eventually the court ordered the Two Zhe salt office not to impeach prefectures immediately for revenue shortfalls, but to report three grades by severity of loss and violation. In the seventh year (1074), though Lu Bing had raised salt revenue, criminal cases had multiplied and many feared wrongful conviction; he was transferred to Huainan, replaced by Jiangdong transport official Zhang Jing, and the program was paused for review. Zhang Jing reported that under Bing's tenure Yue supervisors pressing salt payments drove cases as extreme as mothers killing sons. An investigation was ordered, yet Bing was excused and promoted to Erudite of the Imperial Sacrifices for raising revenue, advancing one grade. A year later the Three Departments reported that Two Zhe transport officials had grown lax and salt profits had collapsed; assistant academician Weng Zhongtong was ordered to redesign the system. Early in the Yuanyou era (1086) critics charged that Bing's western Zhe salt policy pursued revenue through harsh punishment, exiling more than 12,000 people; Bing was demoted. Two Zhe saltern households owed salt by household head count; arrears kept mounting until the second year (1087), when an edict forgave them. Arrears piled up again beyond repayment; early in the Yuanfu era (1098) investigators reported that court orders were ignored; Right Remonstrator Zou Hao had memorialized at length on the harm.
9
西
Ming Prefecture's Minghe salt field failed to meet its quota and was reassigned to Yue Prefecture. In the first year of Xuanhe (1119), Lou Yi as Ming prefect asked to restore the former arrangement and receive 50,000 to 70,000 bags of legacy salt from nearby Taizhou. The court replied: "Ming has three salt fields. Poor planning led us to subordinate Minghe to Yue, and only then did merchants converge. The other two fields still hold a million bags in stock with little progress. If we do not address this, Ming will seek supply from Yue in the east and Taizhou in the west — constant rule changes undermine the law and unsettle the trade." He was ordered to submit a detailed report.
10
西
In Huainan: Chuzhou's Yancheng supervisor produced over 417,000 piculs yearly; Tongzhou's Fengli over 489,000; Taizhou's Hailing with Rugao depot and Xiaohai field over 656,000 — supplying their home prefectures plus Huainan's Lu, He, Shu, Qi, and Huang and Wuwei Army; Jiangnan's Jiangning, Xuan, Hong, Yuan, Ji, Jun, Jiang, Chi, Tai, Ping, Rao, Xin, She, and Fu, Guangde and Linjiang; the Two Zhes' Chang, Run, Hu, and Mu; and Jing-Hu's Jiangling, An, Fu, Tan, Ding, Yue, E, Heng, Yong, and Hanyang. Haizhou's Banpu, Huize, and Luoyao fields boiled over 477,000 piculs yearly; Lianshui Army's Haikou over 115,000 — supplying their home commands plus Jingdong's Xuzhou, Huainan's Guang, Si, Hao, and Shou, and the Two Zhes' Hang, Su, Hu, Chang, Run, and Jiangyin. Under Tiansheng, Tong and Chu had seven fields each, Taizhou eight, Haizhou two, Lianshui one; annual output fell by 697,540 piculs from earlier levels to supply the home circuit and Jiangnan east and west and Jing-Hu south and north. Formerly Two Zhe was also supplied until the seventh year of Tiansheng (1029).
11
Incoming salt was received at warehouses: one each at Tong and Chu, three at Taizhou for the three prefectures' output. Two transfer depots were added: one at Zhenzhou receiving salt from Tong, Tai, and Chu's five warehouses; one at Lianshui Army for Haizhou and Lianshui salt. Each year Jiangnan and Jing-Hu sent tribute grain to Huainan and took salt back in exchange. Southeastern salt profits were the richest in the empire. Salt paid to the state was priced at four cash per jin in Huainan, Fujian, and Wen, Tai, and Ming in the Two Zhes; six in Hang and Xiu; five in Guangnan. Retail prices varied with distance from the source, and markups could reach tenfold.
12
使使
In the second year of Mingdao (1033), Vice Grand Councilor Wang Sui proposed: "Huainan salt was once excellent. Transported from Tong, Tai, and Chu to Zhenzhou, then onward to Jiang, Zhe, and Jing-Hu, convoy clerks and boatmen stole, resold, and illicitly boiled salt, adulterating it with sand and dirt. The farther it traveled, the fouler it grew, nearly inedible — officials flogged and exiled men in succession yet could not stop it. In recent years canals ran shallow, grain transport stalled, and distant villages suddenly lacked salt; while Huainan sat on fifteen million piculs with no warehouse space, salt piled in the open under mats and wasted away each year. Saltern households delivered salt but often went unpaid, grew destitute, and frequently turned to banditry — such was the damage. I ask to permit free salt trade for three to five years, let merchants pay cash in the capital, and establish an exchange office at Yangzhou where they pay cash, grain, or cloth and receive salt at calculated value. At roughly 2,000 cash per picul, fifteen million piculs would yield thirty million strings for state use — a first benefit; near and far along the rivers and lakes all would get good white salt — a second benefit; ending annual transport waste, shipwrecks, and criminal punishment for boatmen — a third benefit; former salt transport vessels could carry grain instead — a fourth benefit; merchant payments could reimburse saltern households — a fifth benefit."
13
西 西 西
In the first year of Kangding (1040) merchants delivering fodder to Shaanxi and the border who chose southeastern salt received an extra allotment. When Hebei grain prices fell, the Three Departments asked inland prefectures to adopt the three-exchange method, substituting salt for capital cash payments, limited to 200,000 piculs of grain purchase. In the second year of Qingli (1042) another edict ruled: "Deliverers to Shaanxi and Hedong who brought certificates to the capital would be paid half in cash and half in gold and silk; those who declined gold and silk could take tea, salt, or aromatics as they preferred." Southeastern salt profits were rich, and merchants all preferred salt. In the eighth year (1048) Hebei adopted the four-exchange method with salt as one component; borderland fodder valuations were inflated several times over. At the capital hoarding merchants depressed certificate values; 108 jin of salt that had sold for 100,000 cash now fetched 60,000. Merchants sold certificates cheaply to claim salt and stopped paying cash in the capital, draining the treasury further. In the second year of Huangyou (1050) the capital cash-payment system was restored with slightly more salt per old cash amount. Border deliverers who took salt on certificate first received only 70,000 in salt value for 100,000 in fodder in Hedong and Shaanxi, and 65,000 in Hebei; they also had to deposit 100,000 cash in the capital before receiving the full payment — called "matching paste." Capital cash payments gradually recovered.
14
At first, in the ninth year of Tiansheng the Three Departments asked the monopoly goods office to take cash for southeastern salt sales, with a quota of 1,803,000 strings that was later raised to 4,000,000. In the Jiayou era transport from the circuits fell short and monopoly goods office receipts kept missing their targets, so the consignment transport directorate appointed officials solely responsible for moving salt. Under Zhiping the capital took in 2,270,000 strings, while annual sales in the six southeastern circuits — Huainan, Liang-Zhe, Fujian, Jiangnan, Jing-Hu, and Guangnan — rose from 2,730,000 strings in Huangyou to 3,290,000 in Zhiping.
15
西
Official salt shipped through the Jiang and Hu basins was adulterated and overpriced, so people turned to illicit salt; coastal dwellers who worked in fishing and salt-making earned large profits with little effort. Thus a large number of unruly smugglers appeared, and when the authorities pressed arrests too hard they turned into outright bandits. Even gentry between the Yangtze and Huai, lured by heavy profits, sometimes made their living smuggling salt. In Jiangxi, Qian prefecture bordered Guangnan and Ting prefecture in Fujian lay adjacent; with poor official salt in Qian and no local production in Ting, residents of both prefectures smuggled Guangnan salt for profit. Each autumn and winter, as soon as the harvest ended, they formed bands of dozens or hundreds, armed and bearing banners, and roamed among the eight prefectures of Qian, Ting, Zhang, Chao, Xun, Mei, Hui, and Guang. They robbed grain and cloth, seized women, and fought patrol troops; once they killed officials they became full bandits, holding mountain passes where pursuers could not reach them — or the court pardoned them and brought them in. The problem grew year by year, while official salt sales in the prefecture amounted to only one million jin annually.
16
使 西便 西 使
During Qingli, Guangdong transport commissioners Li Fu and Wang Yao asked to ship Guangzhou salt to Nanxiong to supply Qian and Ji; without waiting for approval they moved more than 4,000,000 jin there; but the Jiangxi transport commission found the arrangement impractical and refused to collect the salt. Later Zhou Zhan, a Three Departments revenue commissioner, and seven colleagues again proposed shipping Guang salt into Qian, and Jiangxi offered to pay the capital costs itself. The court ordered Vice Director of Field Revenue Shi Yuanchang and others to meet, and all endorsed Zhou Zhan's plan. Consignment Commissioner Xu Yuan objected, however, and the plan was dropped.
17
西使
Since Jiayou various proposals circulated: let merchants carry Guangnan salt into Qian and Ting with transit fees at each stop; open salt trade entirely in the seven prefectures of Qian, Ting, Zhang, Xun, Mei, Chao, and Hui; simply ship 7,000,000 jin of Huainan salt yearly to Qian and 2,000,000 jin to Ting so the people would have enough salt and smuggling would die down; or have the state run shops and troops to haul Guangnan and Fujian salt to Qian and Ting — opinions remained divided. Earlier Field Works Vice Director Huang Bing had been sent by imperial courier to consult local commissioners and prefectural officials; they argued that Qian had long relied on Huainan salt and the supply should not be switched, but the recent price hike could be rolled back to forty cash per jin, with households in ten counties required to buy two jin per hundred cash of summer and autumn tax and repay the state through their tax payments. Shen Fu, the mint supervisor, was then told to reassess the plan; he proposed forming ten convoys from Jiangxi transport boats under third-rank commissioners, drawing salt straight from the Tong, Tai, and Chu central stores. The court adopted Huang Bing's scheme, but annual sales rose by only a little over 600,000 jin.
18
西 西 西
When Jiangxi judicial intendant Cai Ting took over salt policy, he required civilians to surrender hidden weapons to patrol troops; smugglers carrying less than twenty jin of salt in fish baskets, with fewer than five men and no arms, had only to pay transit fees and were not arrested. Huainan had already organized new salt convoys; Ting expanded the system to twelve convoys of twenty-five boats each, kept sealed until they reached the prefecture. Surplus salt delivered to the state was allotted to boat crews, whom the government then bought it back from at half price; this cut down theft and improved salt quality. He cut sale prices as well, raising annual receipts to more than 3,000,000 jin over the old level, and ended the mandatory salt-purchase levy tied to Huang Bing's plan. In earlier times Ting smugglers would drum in the hills to rally recruits and set a rendezvous, routinely mustering scores or even hundreds before setting out together. Now prefectures and counties pressed village elders and baojia heads to act: anyone who beat the drum was arrested at once, and smugglers slowly pulled back. The court judged Ting effective and kept him in Jiangxi for several years before moving him elsewhere. In time all Jiangxi salt was shipped in convoys on the Qian model.
19
西
Jing-Hu likewise struggled with bad salt and chronic shortfalls in transport; in the second year of Zhiping deliveries totaled barely 250,000 piculs. The third year they assigned twenty-four Huixi convoys plus hired merchant vessels, and shipments that year reached 400,000 piculs. The fourth year deliveries rose to more than 530,000 piculs.
20
使
Early in Qingli, Wang Qi of the Revenue Review Office reported: "At the start of Tiansi, Jing-Hu salt prices were cut by two or three cash per jin because assessments were too high, and receipts have steadily fallen since. Restore the old price and revenue should rise by 40,000 strings a year." The request was approved. Under Zhiping, Huainan transport commissioners Li Fugui, Zhang Chu, and Su Song, together with fiscal commissioner Han Zong of the Three Departments, repeatedly asked to cut Huainan salt prices, but none of the proposals took effect.
21
西 使 殿 便 仿西 西 西 西 西
Early in Xining Jiangxi salt receipts fell short; in the third year judicial intendant Zhang Ji reported: "Qian's official salt was wet, adulterated, and underweight, yet sold for forty-seven cash a jin. Smuggled Lingnan salt offered a jin and a half for the price of one jin of pure white salt at twenty cash, so Qian residents ate nothing but Lingnan salt. He proposed trimming Qian's official price, reassigning sturdy boats into ten convoys under imperial commissioners. Cai Ting later argued that the Gan River route was treacherous and salt boats should be replaced every three years; convoy officers and crews would be graded on salt purity and losses, which brought receipts back up and curbed smuggling. Since Ting left, five or six tenths of his measures had lapsed; restoring them would be advisable." The court agreed. It also set twelve annual Huainan salt convoys for Qian prefecture. When Zhang Dun toured Hunan he told judicial intendant Zhu Chuping to organize Guang salt shipments and raise sales quotas, but the plan was never carried out. In the third year of Yuanfeng, with Zhang Dun already in power, a protégé named Jia Dan — cunning and ruthlessly ambitious — flattered him by extending the Hunan model and asking to ship Guang salt into Jiangxi. Jian Zhoufu was immediately sent to Jiangxi to survey the plan. Currying favor with Zhang Dun, Zhoufu reported: "Qian's route was long and dangerous, so little Huainan salt arrived; people lacked salt, Guangdong salt was barred, and smuggling flourished openly. Official Huainan salt cost nine cash per jin to deliver; Guang salt at equal total cost could replace it with a one-cash reduction, better quality, and no transport obstacles. Stop shipping Huainan salt and move 10,000,000 jin of Guang salt to Qian and Nan'an in Jiangxi, while reallocating 6,160,000 jin of Huainan salt among Hong, Ji, Jun, Yuan, Fu, Linjiang, Jianchang, and Xingguo to cover the old quota." The court told Zhoufu to draft regulations and report back. Zhoufu submitted the full salt code and summary articles, which on the whole squeezed the populace harshly. Previously Jiangxi salterns could be leased by private bid; Zhoufu placed them all under direct state sale. Zhoufu was then put in remote charge of Jiangxi and Guangdong salt policy, with a bureau set up in the Ministry of Revenue.
22
使 西 西使
The fourth year Zhoufu was reassigned to Hebei transport duties. The following year Ever-Normal Granary intendant Liu Yi reported widespread unrest caused by forced salt sales. Jiangdong judicial intendant Fan Xun was ordered to investigate; before he reported, Liu Yi was removed after criticizing the corvee laws. When Fan Xun's report arrived it blamed local officials for blocking the edict, and no policy change followed. Soon Zhoufu reported: "Qian and Nan'an had run the new salt law for only half a year and already cleared 140,000 strings in profit. He counted it as his achievement. Vice Commissioner Li Cong was told to assess the policy on the ground; knowing Zhoufu was in favor, he merely suggested minor adjustments and did not denounce the harm openly. The sixth year, now Vice Minister of Revenue, Zhoufu proposed extending Guang salt shipments of several million jin into Chen and Dao in Hunan, which border Shao and Lian, while reallocating former Huainan salt sales among Tan, Heng, Yong, Quan, and Shao under the Jiangxi-Guangdong model Jia Dan had first suggested; Chen, Quan, and Dao would sell Guang salt as well. Zhang Shicheng, intendant of the Ever-Normal Granaries, and transport vice commissioner Chen Si were ordered to implement the plan. The next year they submitted detailed regulations, the court put them into effect, quotas rose, and the region erupted in unrest. Huixi adopted Zhoufu's salt law as well; consignment commissioner Jiang Zhiqi asked for reward-and-punishment rules for prefects, vice prefects, and salt officials, which the Revenue Ministry codified.
23
In the third year of Shaosheng the consignment directorate reported that Huainan saltern households were destitute: the state's 640,000 strings in capital funds relied on circuit contributions that arrived late, leaving saltern families without cash and forcing them to borrow at usurious rates. They proposed advancing 100,000 strings in purchase capital, or issuing pawn certificates redeemable at seventy percent of face value with interest waived; once salt capital was collected the remaining thirty percent would be paid and the certificates destroyed.
24
西
In the first year of Chongning, Cai Jing proposed revising the salt law, noting that southeastern salt capital sometimes ran short and sat idle among merchant traders; he asked for an extra 300,000 strings in ordination certificates and sealed-reserve market funds. He added seven provisions: first, allow merchants to ship on private vessels but strictly forbid crossing boundaries or carrying illicit salt; second, saltern officials who short-measured or issued salt out of turn would face penal servitude; third, officials at offices, market posts, locks, and ferries along merchant routes who detained salt shipments would be punished the same way; fourth, ban appointed clerks, yin families, tribute scholars, and petty officials from procuring salt for merchant zones; fifth, provide loans to saltern households; sixth, raise prices where they had fallen too low; seventh, require arranging officials to report fully on costs and benefits. The next year the court exempted salt boats from capacity transit fees to prevent holdups, allowed them to pass out of turn for speed, and penalized official convoys that blocked them. The certificate system was then revised and purchase offices set up at the monopoly goods office. Certificate holders could exchange them for powdered-salt certificates, frankincense, tea certificates with the northeastern one-tenth share, official appointments, ordination certificates, and other goods. Powdered-salt certificates could be redeemed fifty percent in kind and the rest in miscellaneous goods; old certificates could be exchanged only for powdered salt and official appointments. On a ten-part basis only three parts could be settled in cash; the other seven had to include new certificates. Certificate purchase prices were fixed to curb powerful speculators and stabilize border grain procurement. In Hebei the floor was 5,000 per hundred strings; southeastern powdered-salt certificates could not fall below 10,000; Shaanxi salt certificates not below 5,500; unauthorized discounts brought penal servitude or exile, with full rules against official obstruction and deadline extensions.
25
便
The fourth year, because cash-settlement salt prices varied, the six circuits' prices were standardized: former prices of twenty cash or more rose by ten, while forty-five cash stayed unchanged; those settling in cash for southeastern powdered salt could convert payment to gold, silver, or cloth at their option. Interest on loans to saltern households, formerly two percent, was waived. The fifth year the court ruled that cash settlements need not include supplementary cash payments, capped at two-tenths on a ten-part basis. In the first year of Daguan, beyond existing rules on supplementary payments and old certificates for southeastern powdered salt, holders could also include prior supplementary three-tenths salt certificates: four-tenths payers could add two-tenths, five-tenths payers three-tenths. Later four-tenths supplementary payers could add three-tenths and five-tenths payers four-tenths; cash payers exchanging for new southeastern salt certificates followed the same supplementary ratios. Those exchanging for new certificates or paying cash for southeastern powdered salt without six-grade old certificates could receive salt first; if they carried only five-grade old certificates, they ranked above holders of non-supplementary old certificates from before the tenth month of Chongning's fourth year. The six grades were supplementary three-, four-, and five-tenths certificates, ten-for-one certificates, Hebei public vouchers, and certificates exempt from supplementary payment.
26
便 殿 使
Certificate rules shifted constantly, harming both government and private trade. The fourth year, censor Mao Zhu reported: "Since Chongning the salt law abruptly replaced Yuanfeng practice: circuits could no longer profit from return cargo on official boats; merchants could freely use certificates to claim salt, ship it to assigned counties for sale, and those sales became local revenue quotas. Salt intendant offices pressured counties on sales volume as the basis for official rankings; any magistrate who refused to squeeze the people was accused of obstructing policy, impeached, and removed — so who would not compete in cruelty? Across the southeast, third-grade households and above in every county were forced to accept salt quotas based on their wealth and output. Wealthy households faced annual quotas up to 1,000 strings; even the lowest third-grade households owed at least thirty or fifty strings, fixed by register and enforced to meet yearly targets; any delay brought flogging. A county's annual quota could reach thirty or fifty thousand strings, now fixed as a permanent levy — this is the gravest harm."
27
He added:
28
西 西 滿
"The court has long guarded preparedness in the three frontier circuits, keeping grain stores full — and the method was nothing other than circulating certificates so that state and merchants trusted one another. Southeastern powdered salt revenue backed Hebei's frontier stores, northeastern salt backed Hedong's, and Jie-region salt backed Shaanxi's; all proceeds pooled at the capital, and the three circuits received certificates in proportion to what had been amassed. When Hebei grain-and-fodder certificates arrived at the capital, they were redeemed entirely in hard cash — the flying certificates method; Certificates from Hedong's three circuits were redeemed at the capital half in cash and half in silver, gauze, and silk; Shaanxi Jie-salt certificates were exchanged for Jie salt; even when certificates were issued broadly, the capital treasury still paid them out. Cash pooled at the capital while certificates moved through the three circuits; on arrival they were paid out at once, with no delay. Merchants welcomed the arrangement and competed to haul grain and fodder into the frontier prefectures. Trade opened up, and prices steadied; Official and market prices matched; a dou of rice cost barely over a hundred cash, a bundle of fodder no more than thirty; Frontier storehouses stood full wherever one looked.
29
使
From the Chongning era onward the certificate system changed again and again until no one trusted it; the capital had no cash reserves, yet issued several times as many certificates as before. Certificates arriving at the capital found no cash to redeem them, until each was worth less than a tenth of its face value. Border counties received no deliveries and could not meet procurement quotas, so silver, silk, cash, and paper certificates were graded and blended to set the purchase price. Private suppliers stopped counting certificate value and priced only in silver, silk, and cash, forcing grain and fodder prices sharply upward to satisfy inflated quotas. Official prices rose to several times market rates; rice reached four hundred cash per dou and fodder at least a hundred thirty per bundle; military reserves ran dry and the treasury emptied. Jie-salt certificates once worth six thousand each now fetched three thousand; merchants buying southeastern powdered salt certificates paid forty percent cash and sixty percent in salt warrants, yielding the monopoly goods office only seventy thousand while southeastern salt was issued at the official hundred-thousand rate — a hidden loss on salt capital.
30
I submit that unless the certificate system is restored to the Xi-Feng model, prices will not stabilize and frontier reserves will not rebuild — no policy today is more urgent. Xue Xiang had worked out the system in the Jiayou period; within a short time grain prices dropped and frontier stores overflowed; by the Xi-Feng years the method was fully in place. Lately the monopoly goods office ignored how repeated certificate changes undermined frontier planning, demanding only supplemental cash and pushing southeastern salt certificates to inflate revenue and win promotion by fraud. New certificates barely circulated before the rules changed again; prioritizing salt payouts left older certificates worthless, letting schemers profit while merchants groaned. I ask that the chief ministers be plainly ordered to choose capable officials, restore the certificate system, neither treat current practice as an obstacle nor the past as beyond recovery — and enact proven methods such as Xue Xiang's."
31
使貿
Capable administrators who understand certificate policy are not lacking today; The capital's three treasuries were fed by counties across the realm, so reserves were not the problem. If three or four million strings were set aside at the capital and certificates redeemed on arrival without delay, restoring mutual trust, merchants would treat certificates as portable capital and pass them from hand to hand. When payouts exceeded cash on hand, transfer-corridor southeastern powdered salt certificates or ordination slips could be issued; everything except items redeemable only by certificate should be bought with cash in the capital and held as certificate reserves — a workable plan. For older paper certificates already issued, new rules should set proportional salt redemption. Legislation has always been hard — not only to create, but to revive once abandoned. To secure lasting gain, minor present costs may be tolerated; the question is whether the policy can be put into practice.
32
西 西西
Soon Zhang Shangying became chief councillor and proposed restoring Xi-Feng practice: fifteen million strings from the inner treasury would be reserved, the rest redirected, correcting the skew among cash, certificates, and commodities. Shaanxi received five million strings in certificates; the Jiang-Huai transport commission supplied cash vouchers or diverted three million strings of tribute funds. Zhang Cha, outside director of the Left Department, was charged with southeastern salt; Zhang Gen, Jiangxi Ever-Normal intendant, managed Huai salt shipments into Jiangxi; the salt-and-incense intendant was abolished and salt affairs reverted to circuit judicial commissioners. Five grades of old certificates were fixed; merchants who had swapped for new or cash-only certificates without pairing were allowed first claim on southeastern powdered salt for intercircuit trade. Huai and Zhe salt works were ordered to divide salt into tenths: half reserved for official convoys and three-circuit transfer claims, half for new certificates, cash certificates, and unpaired old certificates due priority. The old rule was restored: merchants' five-color old certificates could claim salt only when paired with new ones; fearing long waits with no payout, a supplemental payment scheme was introduced. At the monopoly goods office, grade-three certificates required seventy percent supplemental cash; grade-four, sixty percent; grade-five and ten-for-one, seventy percent; Hebei cash vouchers, fifty percent to qualify for claims.
33
西
Officials argued that the Xi-Feng three-circuit certificate system rested entirely on southeastern powdered salt, so allowing old certificates to claim through supplemental payment directly undercut restoration of that system; Yet banning supplemental redemption left certificates with no outlet. They agreed to cut supplemental payments by twenty percent on Hebei cash vouchers and twenty percent on the rest, redeeming claims with patents, ordination slips, aromatics, goods, and southeastern salt. The emperor ordered: "Under Yuanfeng each of the southeastern six circuits sold salt worth at least several hundred thousand strings annually. Since certificate salt, transport budgets have tightened; in Jiangxi alone cooperative and advance purchases owe substantial sums to the people — how does that honor humane governance?" He commanded southeastern transport commissions to coordinate shipments together.
34
In Zhenghe 1 merchants who wished to trade via the Xi-Feng transfer corridor could claim salt first with new three-circuit certificates and sell it elsewhere at fixed prices. Two-Zhe saltern households received favorable terms on extra salt deliveries, with prices raised three fen per jin. Zhang Cha then set uniform salt prices, citing Shaosheng's two-cash-per-jin increase; the court accepted his plan but added only one cash per jin. Advisers noted: "Formerly salt merchants at the monopoly goods office watched southeastern stockpiles; abundant salt drew certificate seekers and doubled revenue, but merchants would not linger where salt ran short. Under Yuanfeng distant areas kept two or three years' prepared salt, mid-range areas one to two years, nearest areas six months to a year; only then did certificates circulate smoothly. Shaosheng restored the old system with ample reserves, and after prices were averaged revenue doubled. Transport commissions should be pressed not only to ship prepared salt but to match Yuanfeng reserve levels; then certificates would flow and revenue would swell. The state already bought saltern salt at prices above the old rate; Yuanfeng prices alone would suffice, and with new prices, capital advances, and loans, why doubt revenue would grow? Adding another cash per jin would waste far too much." The court ordered the policy enacted. The six circuits jointly appointed salt intendant officials based at Yangzhou, but the office was soon abolished.
35
Advisers added: "Merchants buying southeastern powdered salt at the capital monopoly goods office had two routes: pay in cash, or use the certificate-face transfer corridor. With three-circuit paper certificates already allowed for transfer, restoring cash payment would channel merchant money into the monopoly goods office rather than private hoards — cash staying in the capital while merchants head southeast." The court adopted the proposal. Others argued: "The old law allowed goods and official cash certificates as collateral to support certificate value; banning that was a mistake. Old transfer-corridor salt certificates reached the southeast, but transport offices insisted on cash alone, clogging the trade." Certificate collateral was restored as it had been. Powdered salt was divided into tenths: eight parts paid in powdered-salt certificates, two in cash for boiling; later the cash share rose to three tenths.
36
In year two Jiangning, Guangde, and Taizhou raised prices two cash per jin; Xuan, She, Rao, and Xin three cash; Chizhou, Jiangzhou, and Nankang four — graded by distance from production areas. That year Cai Jing regained influence and overhauled the salt system. In the fifth month the state stopped transporting and selling salt itself; merchants applied at the works to buy, and salt already in transit was sealed in store. Merchants filing claims at the monopoly goods office received bonus salt if they arrived first, as an incentive. For earlier transfer-corridor certificates calculated but unpaid, merchants paid thirty percent supplemental cash per hundred strings and paired new certificates with thirty percent of the old; Where claims had already been paid, each locality recorded the amounts and applied the same paired-sale rule. All claims were paid in cash; salt was issued in priority to full-cash buyers without old salt, then those with old salt, then those with old certificates. Three-circuit procurement certificates redeemable seventy percent in southeastern powdered salt could pair twenty percent cash; northeastern salt followed the same rule. Other paper certificates could not all be paired under one rule. Circuit intendant posts were reinstated. An edict praised Cai Jing's work, but merchants mistrusted the ever-changing rules and few filed claims; the fan-shaking incentive was revived with a five-hundred-string bonus.
37
簿 簿 簿 仿
In year three merchants had been filing early at prefectures before claiming salt at the works, causing delays — the practice was abolished. Large bulk salt claims were officially weighed before payment and certificates were issued. With laws shifting constantly, Cai Jing sought to capture merchant profits through sixteen new rules: official salt sold in three-hundred-jin bags for ten thousand cash, with prices adjustable over time and old surplus allowances abolished. Merchant salt once stored aboard boats was bagged like northeastern salt in official sacks; marking and forgery rules followed the tea-crate system, and reuse was banned. Salt receipt and disbursement were split: works officials weighed and sealed bags; warehouse officials checked warrants, contracts, and ledgers. Every twenty bags earned one verification contract for the merchant; southeastern powdered salt works also issued certificate ledgers; Merchants changing destination had ledgers and certificates cancelled and notified the new site by contract to issue the accompanying salt warrant; After salt was issued, the designated site recorded the transaction. Mid-route changes followed the same procedure. Warrants had to be surrendered within one year; extensions for cause could not exceed six months; At deadline unsold salt required destroying the warrant; remaining stock was registered with the state and could be sold only locally, with no rerouting. Most rules copied the tea monopoly with added clauses that seized merchant profit — nominally to stop smuggling, private boiling, and bulk claims, but in practice relying entirely on paired certificates. Merchants with certificates were often denied immediate salt; they had to buy new certificates matching the original amount before receiving half on the old ones. Fearing noncompliance, the state tightened evasion bans, sabotage penalties, and fan-shaking rewards, comparing results each quarter and driving officials hard to deliver.
38
In year four distant regions drew few merchants, so salt depots prioritized distant areas in disbursement. Merchants then had to buy new certificates within a month when bundled with official salt or forfeit to the state; surplus salt was confiscated on the spot. In year five forged warrants were punished under the Sichuan money-warrant laws. In year six major merchants refused to remain in producing regions; small-bag local sellers could pay twenty cash for a certificate but could not cross the prefecture border.
39
In Xuanhe 2 the six circuits held hundreds of millions in sealed old salt; merchants could transport and sell it, pairing with Huai-Zhe depots against current salt certificates. In year four the monopoly goods office argued: "Tradition held one dou of rice to one jin of salt; before Xi-Feng rice cost six or seven hundred per picul and salt sixty or seventy cash per jin; Today rice runs twenty-five hundred to three thousand per picul while salt still sells for sixty. Chongning had set salt at forty cash per jin by averaging purchase prices; at thirty-seven cash per jin the state lost considerably. They proposed raising bag prices to thirteen thousand and saltern household payments accordingly, so households could support themselves and smuggling would fade." Old salt sales were banned, and registration, supplemental payment, and paired-sale rules were restored.
40
西沿 貿 使
When the salt-certificate system began, salt pooled at Jie Lake, cash at the capital monopoly goods office, and certificates at Shaanxi's frontier counties. Merchants hauled grain to the frontier, delivered it in, and took certificates home. Frontier grain brought several-fold profit, but merchants lacked return cargo — certificates solved that; they could claim Jie salt directly, and Jie salt sold across a wide market; Or they could redeem cash at the capital — six thousand two hundred per certificate, paid instantly, for a fee of only a few dozen copper cash. Trade flourished in every county along the routes. Under Chongning Cai Jing changed the rules: merchants paid first for certificates and collected salt at the source, aiming to drain money from every region into the capital and win favor with inflated revenue; the certificate system collapsed, trade stalled, and frontier reserves emptied; Southeastern salt controls tightened, and prosecutions multiplied. The salt people ate was adulterated with ash and dirt. The fine salt heaven produced at Jie Lake piled up instead alongside muck and refuse. As a rule they let the current system barely keep flowing, then changed it again—the so-called paired-certificate method. By the end of the year paired certificates had become the circulation system. Under circulation, once certificates were sold but salt not yet issued, merchants had to exchange them again; After reissuing certificates, if salt still was not delivered, a supplemental payment was demanded—three separate payments in all before one honest load of salt was obtained. Those who could not afford to exchange certificates lost every coin they had paid; hundreds of thousands of vouchers were voided overnight. Men who were great merchants at dawn were beggars by dusk; some drowned themselves or hanged themselves to death.
41
便
At the time a senior provincial clerk named Wei Bochu enjoyed Cai Jing's full trust and ran the monopoly goods office. In the sixth year of Zhenghe, salt revenue passed forty million strings, and every official involved was promoted. The next year rewards were apportioned by how much revenue exceeded quota. Bochu was promoted every year until he held the ranks of Grandee for Discussion of Governance and Awaiting Orders at the Splendid Writings Pavilion; he then sided with Wang Fu, and Cai Jing had him removed. Bochu was no accountant, but he colluded with certificate brokers and routinely skimmed forty percent of every merchant application to pad intake totals, deceiving the throne with inflated performance figures. When Zhenghe revised the salt law again, Bochu was in Cai Jing's confidence and memorialized: "The court need only open and close the profit lever to set merchants running—no orders required—and millions upon millions pour in. The imperial treasury draws freely, ministries spend freely, and surplus remains after the year's needs—salt monopoly income has become truly vast. In recent years the salt law had no fixed form, shifting whenever it suited officials or merchants; with no stable controls, abuse flourished on every side. Since Zhenghe codified the law, the worst abuses had ceased and both state and people benefited. Once a daily intake of twenty thousand strings was thought enormous; now forty or fifty thousand is routine. On an annual basis, one prefecture—Chuzhou—collected more than five hundred thousand strings in certificate money; and one prefectural warehouse—Taizhou's—where merchants drew more than four hundred thousand bags of salt. The new law was barely two years old and had already taken in forty million strings—more than the old saying about money rotting from abundance could express. I humbly ask that this forty-million-string total be recorded at the historiography office as proof of a policy that enriches the state and the people." Such was the end when petty men, emboldened by the moment, pursued their ambitions without restraint.
42
使
Imperial spending kept rising and revenue targets grew ever higher; annual comparisons and quarterly rankings were reimposed. Leave days no longer counted toward quotas, and even official privilege could not shield violators from the harshest penalties. Rules reached down to individual salt bags and cured salt. Counties raced to raise quotas and avoid punishment while superiors pressed them ever harder. In the seventh year an edict declared: "The recent salt-law changes set heavy rewards and forced allocations so widely that even infants and pack animals were counted, good households suffered, and every home groaned under the burden. Everything shall revert to the original orders for the people's benefit. The Three Departments were to enforce the recent rules and adopt the new certificates." Yet officials failed to comply. Abolished comparisons were restored, waived surcharges reimposed, and bag prices yo-yoed between eleven and thirteen thousand. The people were worn down and banditry spread.
43
After the court fled south, saltern households in Huai and Zhe received capital advances from the state. Prefectures set up warehouses and sold certificates to merchants at eighteen thousand per bag—fifty jin to the picul, six piculs to the bag. In Shaoxing's first year an edict ordered Lin'an and Xiuzhou saltern households to pay their two taxes in salt under the Huangyou rules, with supervising officials and patrol laws against private boiling and leaks. In the ninth month of the second year merchants in Huai and Zhe were ordered to pay three thousand in currency per bag as a supplemental fee; holders of certificates already issued but unsold faced the same rule, and failure to report within ten days brought illicit-salt penalties. Lü Yihao then relied on Supervising Commissioner Zhang Chunyi to overhaul the salt law harshly. In the eleventh month Huai and Zhe salt was divided into tenths: four parts paid in certificates issued after the current edict, four parts in certificates issued after the Jianyan crossing. Lü Yihao had abandoned the paired-certificate method and required supplemental payments; now fractional redemption like paired certificates was restored—and the regime turned harsher. In the third year the levy on private silkworm salt was cut. In the first month of the fourth year Huai and Zhe certificate fees rose by three strings per bag, payable by convoy to the temporary capital; Guang salt soon followed. In the ninth month the supplemental fee was reduced because payments were coming in too slowly. From the Jianyan third-year certificate reform to the present there had been five changes, yet old Jianyan certificates were still unredeemed—so all were ordered paid in sequence regardless of issue date.
44
In the sixth year of Qiandao, Vice Minister of Revenue Ye Heng reported: "Salt monopoly profits now make up half the state's revenue, yet intake has stagnated and legitimate trade has stalled—all because of smuggling. Consider Huai-East and the Two Zhe circuits: Huai-East had 412 salt ovens and an annual quota of more than 2,683,000 piculs; last year its two monopoly offices sold more than 672,300 bags of Huai salt for more than 21,963,000 strings; the Two Zhe quota exceeded 1,970,000 piculs, yet last year only 202,000 bags sold for just over 5,012,000 strings—despite more than 2,400 salt ovens. By quota Huai-East exceeded Two Zhe by a fifth; by last year's sales Huai-East took in two-thirds more cash; yet Two Zhe had three-quarters more ovens—clear proof that smuggling, not production, was the difference. I ask that commissioners be sent to each route to address this."
45
In the eighth year of Chunxi paired sale of stockpiled salt was banned because the paired-sale label had masked borrowing and reallocation at headquarters. In the tenth year Hubei salt merchant Wu Chuan had argued: "Of the state's salt monopoly revenue, reckoned in thirds, Huai-East accounts for two. Tong, Tai, and Chu had sixteen purchase stations, twelve boiling stations, and 412 ovens. Early in Shaoxing most ovens produced no more than eleven ladles of salt, each ladle being one hundred jin. Early in Chunxi saltern households learned to test brine, raising output to twenty-five or thirty ladles per boil—half again the old quota. Salt fields therefore counted an extra twenty to thirty jin per ladle as floating/extra salt when buying from saltern households. More than ten thousand ladles were bought daily; counting only twenty jin per ladle as floating/extra salt yielded two hundred thousand jin—two thousand ladles—at 1,830 cash per ladle, or 1,630 after deducting 200 cash for shipping. Entering that salt twice into government accounts yielded more than 4,517,500 strings in certificate revenue. Convoys also seized a full generation's quota plus assorted fees, and sales were again overstated by weight—so hungry, cold saltern households had no choice but to sell privately. If the court investigated strictly and repaid their capital, private sale could be fully suppressed." An edict then repaid 1,100,000 strings in capital owed to saltern households at salt fields in Tong, Tai, and other prefectures.
46
Early in Qingyuan Emperor Ningzong abolished circulation salt certificates, renamed surplus certificates as regular-disbursement certificates, and ordered them paid together with certificates already lodged at warehouses, in sequence. The order followed Huai-East Intendant Chen Sun's report that circulation certificates bred endless abuse. Wealthy merchants now wished they were poor men. In the second year of Kaixi an edict ordered that each new certificate bag be paired with one old certificate bag for redemption; if new certificates outnumbered old ones, holders might redeem entirely in new certificates or buy new certificates without old ones, ranked by date of new certificate purchase. In the second year of Jiading Huai-East supplemental salt fees were exempted from two-tenths in paper exchange notes; only half could be paid in cash notes. In the third year an edict declared: "For households whose certificates had ceased to circulate, raise the value of old certificates; bags shall sell for one hundred official notes or more. From the order's effective date each salt certificate bag would carry an additional twenty strings in notes; the three monopoly offices would red-stamp certificates "new certificate, month and year," and the surcharge would end once one million bags had sold. Certificates issued before that date but not yet redeemed were treated as old certificates, redeemable within one year at warehouses for ten official notes per bag; after the deadline they would be void." Such, in broad outline, was Huai and Zhe salt policy.
47
使
Early in Tang Qianyuan, Diwu Qi reformed the salt law as salt-and-iron commissioner; Liu Yan succeeded him; At that time all salt profits under heaven came to only four hundred thousand strings a year. By the Dali era it had risen to more than six million strings. Salt profits made up half of all state revenue. During Yuanyou Huai salt and Jie Lake salt together yielded four million strings a year. That alone was two-thirds of all Tang revenue under heaven. Since late Shaoxing a single Taizhou Hailing supervisor alone disbursed more than three hundred thousand seats—six or seven million strings—so one prefecture now surpassed all Tang revenue under heaven.
48
殿
In the second year of Baoqing Investigating Censor Zhao Zhidao argued: "Salt production depends on saltern households and salt sales on merchants—both must be protected and both must prosper. Early Qingyuan brought in 9,908,000 odd strings; Baoqing's first year only 7,499,000 odd—the deficit showed merchants could no longer turn a profit. The remedy is to lighten burdens on traveling merchants and cut taxes, so Qingyuan's salt revenues might return." The court approved. In Shaoding's first year, on Attending Censor Li Zhixiao's recommendation, salt ovens newly built on the tidal flats at Shangyu and Yuyao were shut down. In the second year of Duanping the Imperial Secretariat reported: "Huai and Zhe owe a quota of more than 974,000 bags, yet the last two or three years have fallen short by more than a million bags; people pay dear prices for salt and both state and subjects suffer." The throne ordered each of the three routes' tea-and-salt offices to appoint a clerk devoted to restoring quotas and buying up loose salt, with the Ministry of Revenue ranking their performance at year's end. In Chunyou's first year officials memorialized: "Since the founding of the southern dynasty the state has relied chiefly on salt certificates; Shaoxing and Chunxi reaped their benefits. Yet for twenty or thirty years since Jiading certificates have been toggled on and off while the floating/extra salt system has proved immovable—and the harm is beyond words. I ask that responsible offices meet to decide what to keep and what to abolish, so heaven's bounty may be shared by state and people alike—would that not be glorious?" The court approved. In the fifth year prohibitions on smuggling and excessive taxation were strictly enforced.
49
殿
In Baoyou's first year the Imperial Secretariat reported: "The temporary capital monopoly office's main tea field collected more than 1,181,568,333 strings in tea, salt, and other revenues in Chunyou twelve—more than double the new quota of forty million strings—and should receive double rewards as in Chunyou nine through eleven to encourage future performance." The throne ordered rewards as recommended. In the fifth month of the fourth year, because the temporary capital office exceeded its new quota by more than 91,735,912 strings, everyone overseeing the three monopoly offices—from the main field to the Three Departments, Ministry of Revenue, Grand Storehouse Directorate, and Exchange Certificate Repository—was rewarded by precedent, and this became standing practice. In the twelfth month Palace Attendant Censor Zhu Yi reported: "Salt quotas have collapsed and grow worse by the day. At the Zhenzhou branch alone the shortfall exceeds twenty million—all because regional commissioners and army commanders trade for profit." Private trafficking was again strictly forbidden.
50
使
In the fifth year Zhu Yi again memorialized: "The profit in salt is immense. Shu, Guang, and Zhe together did not equal half Huai salt's quota. Brine flats stretched everywhere for boiling and reeds grew thick for fuel. Along the coast were saltern households and boiler households, regular quota salt and floating/extra salt. Regular quota salt came from saltern households and went to the state. Floating/extra salt came from boiler households and went to peddlers—four parts regular quota salt to one part floating/extra salt. Early in Duanping the court, unwilling to let floating/extra salt profits slip to private hands, set up ten bureaus to buy it up—27,930,000 jin by annual quota. For more than a decade certificate policy shifted again and again, exhausting state and people alike; the 650,000 bags of regular quota salt in Zhen, Yang, Tong, and Tai still fell short of old quotas—who had time to worry about floating/extra salt? Greedy, shameless officials, knowing the court had stopped buying floating/extra salt, monopolized the trade for themselves; saltern households lined the sandbars, living day to day on scraps of salt; merchants could neither sell privately nor sell to the state—their livelihood was cut off entirely. The best course now is to follow the Duanping precedent and buy floating/extra salt from boiler households. If advance payments exceed the price paid for regular quota salt, everyone will sell to the state. Resell that salt in the upper Yangzi region and remit the profits straight to the court — ending frontier commanders' scramble for salt revenue while keeping boiler households in business." The court approved.
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