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卷一百八十三 志第一百三十六 食貨下五

Volume 183 Treatises 136: Finance and Economics 2e

Chapter 183 of 宋史 · History of Song
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Chapter 183
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1
Finance and Economics, Part Five: Salt, continued; Tea, beginning
2
In Fujian the Fuzhou Changqing salt works sold 103,000 shi each year to supply the circuit. Since the Tiansheng reign, Fuzhou, Zhangzhou, Quanzhou, and Xinghua Military District all sold salt under monopoly, raising the annual quota by 48,908 shi above the former allotment.
3
In the tenth year of the Xining era, a man named Liao En turned bandit, rallied followers, and raided prefectures across the region. Once Liao En had been suppressed, Vice Censor-in-Chief Deng Runfu said, "Fujian's mountains and forests are rugged and stretch for thousands of li. Ruffians and troublemakers are more numerous here than on other circuits, and for the most part they smuggle salt. Now that En is gone, we have let our guard down. Who is to say no one will follow his example and rise again?" The court then ordered Jian Zhoufu of the Fujian Circuit to weigh the pros and cons. Zhoufu said, "In Jianzhou, Jian, Ting, and Shaowu the government salt monopoly prices are painfully high, while in Zhangzhou, Quanzhou, Fuzhou, and Xinghua they are low. Smugglers therefore carry salt into the high-price regions. Jianzhou had once assessed household wealth and levied a cash payment for salt, but commoners dreaded dealing with officials and often paid without ever receiving salt. I propose abolishing that practice, lowering salt prices somewhat in Jianzhou, Jian, Ting, and Shaowu, recruiting wealthy households as licensed retailers, issuing government vouchers, fixing monthly sales quotas, and having them buy from government depots. Then the people could obtain salt easily and smugglers could not reap large profits. He also proposed restoring some former salt depots and assigning more clerks and soldiers. New statutes provided that smugglers and those who knowingly harbored them would not be pardoned by general amnesties; on a third offense they would be flogged and placed under registered supervision in a neighboring prefecture; repeat offenders already under supervision would be flogged and exiled to the garrison at the place of the crime." All of this was adopted. Annual sales rose by more than 230,000 jin, not counting extra sales by salt officials beyond the quota.
4
使
In the second year of Yuanfeng, Salt Intendant Jia Qing asked that each prefecture set its quota from the three-year median under the revised regulations. He also asked that officers who seized large quantities of illicit salt receive rewards beyond the usual statutory limits. In the third year Jia Qing reported that his subordinates' annual salt revenues exceeded the former quotas. An edict declared, "Zhoufu devised the system on imperial orders, and Qing carried it forward. Within a year revenues rose and smuggling ceased. The southeast benefited greatly." By then Zhoufu had been promoted to Vice Commissioner of the Three Departments, and twenty circuit and supervisory officials had already received rewards in turn.
5
西 使 西 西 退
When Emperor Zhezong ascended the throne, Vice Censor-in-Chief Huang Lü reported that Fujian habitually oppressed the people through salt levies. The court replied, "Last year the late emperor ordered censors and court gentlemen to investigate circuit officials. Censor Huang Jiang was sent to Fujian and Censor Chen Cisheng to Jiangxi." Zhang Ruxian of the Ministry of Personnel was also ordered to investigate the salt system Zhoufu had created. Jiang said, "Because of the old Min kingdom, Fuzhou's property assessment counted one unit of wealth as ten elsewhere, and levies followed that ratio. The salt quota should have been five times higher, yet it was actually cut in half. When Wang Zijing recently instituted the production-based salt law, he failed to investigate local conditions. Quotas were raised uniformly, creating vast disparities between regions, and remote commoners had long had no way to seek redress." The emperor referred the matter to Zhang Ruxian. The following year the investigators reported their findings. Fujian Transport Vice Commissioner Jia Qing and Wang Zijing were convicted of extortion and demoted to supervise salt and wine taxes in Huguang; Ministry of Justice Vice Minister Jian Zhoufu, who had shaped the Jiangxi salt policy, was convicted of extortion and deceit, stripped of rank, and made prefect of Hezhou; Zheng Dan was punished for proposing to ship Guangdong salt into Jiangxi; Zhang Shicheng was punished for helping enforce Zhoufu's system and wantonly harassing the people. Both were dismissed; Minqing magistrate Xu Shou alone, when the new salt law took effect, held firm as an official and did not bend. The people therefore paid fewer levies, and the court rewarded him on report. Zhang Ruxian asked to fix Fujian's production and sales salt quotas, and the court agreed; anyone who forced commoners to become salt producers, or who refused to let them withdraw, would receive one year of penal servitude; salt intendants who knew but failed to report would be punished as accomplices.
6
殿西使 西使 西
Palace Attendant Censor Lü Tao then memorialized, "Because salt abuses in Fujian, Jiangxi, Hunan, and other circuits have poisoned the people, the court sent investigators, dismissed extortionate officials, and comforted the destitute. All the realm now knows that public opinion cannot be ignored. Yet the harm of shipping Guangdong salt into Hunan and Jiangxi with inflated quotas, and the salt monopolies in Jingdong and Hebei, were all Zhang Dun's initiatives. I ask that responsible offices thoroughly punish them, so that officials who harm the people and deceive the throne may learn some fear." Investigating Censor Sun Sheng added, "The salt policies of Jiangxi and Hunan have ravaged both circuits worse than war. Only Intendant Liu Yi dared report their full harm, and for that he was dismissed and suspended." The court restored Liu Yi's office and appointed him prefect of Shaozhou.
7
After the Chongning era, with Cai Jing in power, the salt system changed repeatedly. Fujian alone, at the start of Zhenghe, added seven cash per jin. Under the Yuanfeng system merchants could redeem corridor certificates for salt; as in the six circuits, one-tenth of the terminal salt fee per hundred strings was retained at the redemption point as principal.
8
便
During the Jianyan era, trade from Huai and Zhe was cut off, and Fujian and Guang adopted the salt-certificate system; but soon Huai and Zhe trade resumed, and the certificate systems in Fujian and Guang were abandoned. Under the old system, Fujian's upper four jurisdictions—Jianzhou, Jian, Ting, and Shaowu—used government monopoly sales, while the lower four—Fuzhou, Quanzhou, Zhangzhou, and Xinghua—used the production-based salt levy. Salt was paid together with the tax levy.〉 Once government monopoly sales were abolished, the production levy also proved defective. The certificate system seemed to remedy those flaws, yet local custom created new difficulties. Transport and intendant offices then asked that the upper four jurisdictions follow the monopoly system while the lower four temporarily keep the old practice. After the certificate system ended, the transport commissioner each year paid 200,000 strings in lieu of certificates to the court's Commodity Monopoly Office. The amount was later adjusted and finally fixed at 220,000 strings.
9
使
In the twenty-seventh year of Shaoxing, Ever-Normal Granary Intendant Zhang Ruji again proposed the certificate system, and the emperor consulted his chief ministers. Chen Chengzhi replied, "Jianzhou and Jian are rugged mountain country where commoners smuggle salt despite the law. Even under government monopoly sales smuggling cannot be stopped; if the people sold salt themselves, how could smuggling be avoided? With widespread smuggling, certificate revenues would surely fall short. The emperor said, "We tried certificates before and soon abandoned them. If it truly worked, our forebears would already have kept it. Policies must be gradual and steady; otherwise they cannot last. In the fifth year of Chunxi an edict abolished the property-based salt purchase orders in Taining and Youxi counties.
10
使 便 便
In the eighth year of Chunxi Fujian maritime trade commissioner Chen Xian said, "Since Transport Commissioner Wang Zijing instituted transport salt in the second year of Yuanfeng, Fujian has suffered embezzlement and coercive levies. Every other prefecture uses salt certificates, yet Fujian alone endures the harm of transported salt. Early in Shaoxing Zhao Buyi tried certificates, but they failed because transport commissioners used salt convoys to boost revenues, prefectures and counties depended on them for annual budgets, officials collected salt-sale allowances and overhead fees, and clerks took dispatch and delivery customary payments. With so many conflicting interests, no wonder the system failed. Before certificates were fully organized, convoy transport was suddenly stopped and the people lacked salt. Transport officials cited this as proof certificates would not work and asked to pay a lump sum in lieu of certificates. Once certificates ended and convoys resumed, official salt was costly and illicit salt cheap. The people ate smuggled salt while government stock went unsold, and coercive levies returned." The court then ordered Chen Xian to devise a remedy. Chen Xian proposed that the Commodity Monopoly Office issue certificates in five denominations from fifty to one hundred jin, pre-sell certificates, and advance principal to three depots to stock salt for merchant redemption. In the first month of the ninth year, noting that Fujian had long relied on transported salt and that recent certificate experiments had harmed the people, the court ordered the Fujian transport commission to restore government transport and monopoly sales in all prefectures. In the third month Transport Commissioners Fu Zide and Yang Youyi were ordered to investigate problems with government salt sales and report remedies.
11
In the thirteenth year of Chunxi Sichuan commissioner Zhao Ruyu said, "The people of Tingzhou are poor, yet official salt quotas there are heavier than elsewhere. I ask that Tingzhou be allowed merchant salt certificates." The matter was referred to Intendant Ying Mengming and Tingzhou officials. They replied, "In the upper four jurisdictions some areas lie very close to salt-producing regions. Without government sales smuggling cannot be controlled; if the people eat illicit salt, merchant certificates will not sell. With nowhere to exchange certificates, merchant sales fail. That is why the certificate system has been tried and abandoned so often. Even vast Sichuan cannot sustain certificate exchange. Where would Tingzhou's certificates go? Certificates may be sound in theory but cannot work in Tingzhou. Only by cutting the prefecture and counties' combined levies and strictly enforcing the salt ban might the people of Ting find relief." Transport Commissioner Zhao Yancao and others were ordered to implement cuts. Based on annual transport of 2,004,000 jin, total reductions came to 39,038 strings and odd cash, with apportionments to various agencies waived. Tingzhou's six districts thus saved the people more than 39,000 strings yearly and officials more than 10,000, apart from supplemental prefectural funds. The upper four jurisdictions had almost no other revenue and depended entirely on government salt sales.
12
Coastal prefectures also assessed property and collected cash in lieu of salt the government once supplied for food. That payment became a permanent levy, and the people no longer received salt—a further abuse of the lower four jurisdictions' production-salt system. In the sixth year of Jiading officials spoke forcefully on the matter. The transport commission was ordered to exempt all households in Fuzhou's lower four jurisdictions with assessed wealth of twenty cash or less from the five-jin salt levy, and households whose converted property valuation barely reached twenty cash from salt payments entirely.
13
In the second year of Baoqing Investigating Censor Liang Chengda said, "Half of Fujian's prefectures and counties lie in salt-producing regions. Profit rights belong to the transport commissioner alone, as is proper. Salt was produced in Fuzhou and Xinghua but shipped to Jianzhou, Jian, Ting, and Shaowu for the people of four prefectures and twenty-two counties. Fujian's intendant office handled Ever-Normal Granary and tea but not salt; the transport commissioner paid a net sum to assist revenues. Recently the intendant had overstepped, seizing many salt convoys and delegating them to counties. Counties already procured salt levies for the transport commissioner. Adding the intendant's quota would surely pass every burden to the people—worse, perhaps, than the Green Sprouts policy. I ask that all salt transport be returned to the transport commissioner and that the intendant office cease overstepping, so authority may be unified and the people's burdens eased somewhat." The court approved.
14
In the ninth month of Jingding 1 the Bright Hall amnesty declared, "Fujian's upper four jurisdictions depend on salt revenue. Where collections failed or monthly payments fell behind, all arrears before Baoyou 5 are forgiven. Officials who still illegally levy per capita shall be investigated and reported." In the third year officials said, "Fujian's upper four prefectures are mountainous with little farmland. Tribute, official salaries, imperial clansmen, and troops are all funded from salt sales. Though the transport commission controls salt convoys, it does not sell salt itself. Recently the commission began transporting two convoys itself, later as many as ten to twenty yearly, competing with the upper four jurisdictions' quotas while extra loads convoy clerks carried went uncounted. Prefectures and counties were squeezed out, could not meet their quotas, and had no choice but to levy the people. The harm is beyond words." The court ordered, "The Fujian transport commission must observe the established salt law and not deviate; Jianning Prefecture, Nanjian, Tingzhou, and Shaowu shall comply.
15
西 西西 西
Guangzhou's thirteen salt works, including eastern Yong and Jingkang, sold more than 24,000 shi yearly to supply the circuit, Zhao and Gui prefectures in the west, and Nan'an Military District in Jiangnan. Lianzhou's Baishi and Shikang works sold 30,000 shi annually to supply the prefecture and eighteen others from Rong to Yulin. Gao, Dou, Chun, Lei, Rong, Qiong, Ya, Dan, and Wan'an each sold salt locally without fixed quotas. After Tiansheng all thirteen coastal works in east and west Guang came under Guangzhou, producing 513,686 shi yearly for both circuits. Qiong, Ya, and similar prefectures were remote and barren. Salt often went unsold and was forcibly assigned to yamen runners. Officials posted there sometimes arbitrarily raised salt quotas until boiling households could not meet them and went bankrupt. In the third year of Yuanfeng Zhu Chuping memorialized to cancel unsold salt obligations and fix boiling quotas to actual sales, benefiting remote commoners. Later the Guangxi transport commission reported salt-tax arrears. Even replaced magistrates and supervisors had their salaries withheld until collections were complete. The Guangdong transport commissioner then asked that the Lingnan region follow the six-circuit system: prefectural managers as salt officers, judicial intendants doubling as salt intendants, with standard rewards and punishments. Qiong, Ya, and others again asked to levy salt on the people by household rank in jin, and the people grew poorer still.
16
西 西 西
After the court moved south, salt in both Guang provinces came under transport commissioners, who allotted each prefecture's annual needs. Guangdong was relatively prosperous and trade still flowed; Guangxi was vast, remote, and impoverished, with limited salt consumption and little merchant traffic. Shipping from eastern Guang rode high water without shoals and was relatively easy; from western Guang low water and many shoals made transport very difficult. Late in Jianyan certificates were sold but soon abandoned; government transport and merchant certificates changed repeatedly; and the eastern and western transport commissions were split and merged more than once.
17
西 西
In the third month of Shaoxing 1 native alkali was found in Yangjiang County, Nan'en. The government recruited settlers, built sixty-seven furnaces, produced 708,400 jin of salt, and collected more than 30,000 strings in profit. In the twelfth month the Guangxi Tea and Salt Office was re-established. In the eighth year an edict divided Guangxi salt into tenths: two-tenths sold by government monopoly in Qin, Lian, Lei, Hua, and Gao, and eight-tenths under the certificate system. Soon afterward Guangdong was ordered to use certificates for nine-tenths of its salt and let producing counties sell the remaining tenth. Guangnan lay far from the central plains, with sparse land and poor people whose taxes fell short. Transport commissioners therefore sold salt, assigning four-tenths of the profit to prefectural budgets without extra levies on the people. Zhaozhou collected 36,000 strings yearly from salt sales, using 7,000 to cover Xun and Gui prefectures' horse-purchase tribute to the Pacification Commission and keeping the rest for local use. When government sales ended, the 7,000 strings were levied on households instead as a retention fee. In the ninth year Guangdong ended government sales, adopted merchant certificates, and devoted the proceeds to troops in Ezhou.
18
西 西西西西西 西西
In the fourth year of Qiandao Emperor Xiaozong abolished salt certificates and required the Guangxi transport commissioner to pay 200,000 strings in lieu. Guangxi salt had been sold by its transport commissioner, but in Qiandao 1 Zeng Lian had it merged into Guangdong. Revenue Commissioner Tang Zhuo said, "Guangxi owes nearly 80 million strings in certificate money. When the two Guangs had separate offices, western salt was often diverted eastward. Guangxi once had its own office and revenues did not suffer; now that the western office is abolished and merged with the east, Guangdong salt can no longer be blocked, and Guangxi has lost an entire circuit's income." Hence this order. The chief ministers then presented Jiang Fu's memorial: "Salt profits once belonged to transport commissioners and supplied prefectural budgets; after selling certificate salt they converted grain tax at inflated prices instead. If the court stops issuing certificates and commissioners simply pay the annual quota, they keep salt profits themselves and the abuses of grain conversion and forced procurement end. In the ninth year Guangzhou was ordered to restore government transport and monopoly sales.
19
西
In Chunxi 3 an edict ordered that three-tenths of Guangxi's official salt profits go to prefectures and seven-tenths to transport accounts, as Zhang Shi had requested. After Zhang Shi left, Transport Commissioner Zhao Gonghuan raised the price from one hundred to one hundred sixty cash per jin and increased Qinzhou's annual quota by five per thousand hu. In the sixth year Attendant Censor Jiang Pu reported this. The emperor dismissed Zhao Gonghuan and decreed that Fujian and Guang must keep to established quotas and prices and not raise them without authorization.
20
西 使西 便 西 西便
In the ninth year Hu Tingzhi of the Zhexi pacification staff was sent to investigate salt policy and deliberate with circuit commanders, transport commissioners, and intendants. On his return Hu Tingzhi was appointed Guangdong intendant and charged with reorganizing salt affairs in both Guang provinces. In the tenth year an edict declared, "Guangnan lies thousands of li away, and its people's suffering rarely reaches Us. Our compassion is especially deep. Salt is essential to the people's diet. Officials once profited by selling it themselves, and this has long been a grievance. We changed the law to allow free trade and end government sales, which the people welcomed; yet what helps the people inconveniences officials, who stir up empty talk. We care only for the people's welfare. Why heed idle rumors? We appoint supervisors and local officials to serve the people. Will you not carry out Our good intentions but thwart and ruin them instead? Anyone who does so hereafter will be punished by law. Zhan Yizhi was made prefect of Jingjiang and head of a unified Guang salt office with an annual quota of 165,000 baskets for both circuits. Zhan Yizhi proposed starting with 100,000 baskets and raising the quota after a few years according to results. Cross-circuit certificate fees between east and west were waived to facilitate trade."
21
便 椿
In the sixteenth year Pacification Commissioner Ying Mengming said, "Since Guang adopted certificates on its own, prefectures and counties have forced them on the people for five or six years, causing more harm than government transport." Ying Mengming, Zhu Xiyan, and Guangnan Salt Intendant Wang Guangzu were ordered to devise a lasting system that would not revive coercive levies. In Baoqing 1 the Guangzhou pacification naval forces were found trading heavily in salt. Commander Yin Chun and Controller Huang Shou were dismissed, each demoted one rank.
22
西西
Alkali was boiled into salt at Bingzhou's Yongli Directorate, producing over 125,000 shi yearly for the prefecture and fifteen jurisdictions from Xinzhou to Baode. Merchants could sell within the region but not export it. Under Emperor Renzong Yongli was split into eastern and western directorates under Bingzhou and Fenzhou respectively. Households with alkali soil were registered as cauldron households; each year they delivered quota salt to the government; surplus salt the government bought for cash as middle sales. The system resembled sea-salt monopoly law, with annual sales 3,437 shi below the former quota. In Hedong only Jin, Jiang, Ci, and Xi used pond salt; all others used Yongli salt. Salt purchased by the government at six or eight cash per jin and sold at thirty-six yielded annual revenue of about 189,000 strings.
23
西貿 西 便 滿 便 西
Since Xianping merchants could carry salt to Lin and Fu prefectures and Zhuolun Stockade for border trade at government-set prices. As salt stocks grew, the eastern directorate halted sales for three years at the start of Kangding. In Huangyou the western directorate sales were also suspended until stocks declined. Officials then proposed recruiting merchants to deliver fodder to Lin and Fu and Huoshan in exchange for salt certificates, and the court agreed. Fodder was overvalued, so certificates worth 1,000 cash were discounted by salt merchants to about 400 while the government issued fifty jin of salt, draining the treasury. Some asked to end fodder deliveries and require cash instead, but the transport commission found it impractical and dropped the idea. Alkali deposits varied in quality; thin deposits yielded little profit, and cauldron households often went bankrupt unable to meet their quotas. At the start of Zhihe Han Qi proposed that after three years households could report exhausted deposits and be replaced by others. The following year quotas were set by fractional rates with graded remissions, and substitute households were allowed after floods. The people welcomed this. Hebei and Shaanxi also produced alkali salt, but profits were slim. Early in Mingdao the court abolished alkali works in Hezhong and Qingcheng and banned private salt sales that competed with pond salt.
24
使
In Xining 8 Three Departments Commissioner Zhang Dun said, "The two directorates once yielded over 250,000 strings yearly. Since merchants were allowed to deliver border grain for salt certificates worth 1,000 cash sold at half price, the treasury lost secretly while local merchants profited enormously. Private salt went unchecked and revenues fell to barely 104,000 strings. After inflated fodder valuations the treasury received only about 50,000 strings in real cash—eight-tenths below the old quota. I propose following the Jie salt model: merchants pay cash for salt, or the government transports and sells within the circuit while strictly banning smuggling. Revenues would rise sharply, and border grain purchases would use real cash only." The court adopted his proposal and had the government transport and sell salt within the circuit.
25
使
In the fourth year Chen Anshi, as Hedong transport commissioner, was convicted of currying favor by opening salt wells that harmed the entire circuit and was demoted to prefect of Zhengzhou. Earlier in Xining officials debated seizing Bao Shun's salt wells in Xihe. Some objected, but Wang Anshi said frontier generals might take them as they saw fit without harm. Critics could not prevail.
26
In the sixth year Daizhou's annual salt quota was set at the median of 850,000 jin, adjusted proportionally within the prefecture. In Shaosheng 1 Hedong restored government monopoly sales. In Chongning 3, because Hedong's three-circuit certificates lacked fixed value and depressed grain purchases, three-circuit certificates were abolished in favor of cash certificates as in the new Hebei system. In the fourth year Yongli's native salt remained government property, sold for cash, with merchants redeeming it for Hedong jurisdictions only. Merchant import of northeast salt into Hedong was banned.
27
Well salt was produced in the Yi, Zi, Kui, and Li circuits—four regions in all. Yizhou Circuit: one directorate, ninety-eight wells, 84,522 shi yearly; Zizhou Circuit: two directorates, 385 wells, 141,780 shi; Kuizhou Circuit: three directorates, twenty wells, 84,880 shi; Lizhou Circuit: 129 wells, 12,200 shi—each supplying its own circuit. Large units were directorates run by officials; small units were wells operated by locals who paid quotas and could sell in neighboring areas but not beyond the Sichuan passes. Initially Sichuan followed the old system of direct government salt sales. In Kaibao 7 the price per jin was cut by ten cash, and operators who made surplus profit need submit only nine-tenths of it.
28
西
In Taiping Xingguo 2 Remonstrance Official Guo Bi reported, "Jiannan prefectures sold government salt at seventy cash per jin. Wells were dug ever deeper, making salt production arduous. Firewood grew costly, transport was difficult, and floods sometimes swept away entire loads; wealthy families and corrupt clerks bought cheap from the government and sold dear to the people, sometimes hundreds of cash per jin. The treasury lost revenue while the people paid exorbitant prices. I ask that the price be raised to one hundred fifty cash so profiteers cannot scheme and the people can afford salt. The court approved. Officials reported that Changzhou's extra 18,500 jin of false quota salt came from Prefect Li Pei in Kaibao, who extorted for merit ratings, abolished well firewood payments, and forced locals to sell salt beyond quota. Untrained commoners suffered greatly, went bankrupt, and fled to other circuits while old levies remained due. The court remitted all excess levies and restored the original quota of 27,060 jin. In the seventh month of Duangong 1 western Sichuan lacked salt. Merchants were allowed to import green-white salt from Jie and Wen, gorge well salt, and Yongkang cliff salt without transit duties.
29
使
After Li Shun's rebellion Sichuan prefectures increased garrisons and recruited grain deliveries repaid in salt. In Jingde 2 Acting Three Departments Commissioner Ding Wei said, "Sichuan grain stores are full. I propose exchanging salt for silk and cloth. Prefectures with two years' grain and frontier prefectures with three years' grain were allowed to do so. In Dazhong Xiangfu 1 Luzhou furnace households received three days' leave at New Year, winter solstice, and Cold Food Festival, with daily quotas waived. In the third year Luzhou's Yujing Directorate salt quota was cut by one-third.
30
Under Emperor Renzong the six directorates in Chengdu, Zi, and Kui circuits matched early Song levels, but Chengdu added thirty-nine wells while annual revenue fell by 56,597 shi; Zizhou added twenty-eight wells but revenue fell by 110,019 shi; Lizhou added fourteen wells and lost 492 shi and odd of revenue; Kuizhou added fifteen wells and lost 3,184 shi of revenue. Each circuit supplied itself; Kuizhou also supplied tribal peoples, paying half the salt value in cash and half in silver and silk. Merchants were also recruited to pay cash in prefectures and collect salt where production was abundant. Shi, Qian, and border prefectures recruited rice deliveries instead.
31
西 西 西 西 西 使西
In Kangding 1 Huainan Judicial Intendant Guo Wei said, "Sichuan does not produce silver, yet merchants exchange silver for salt and salt-yard managers pay quotas in silver. Traders rush to the capital and Shaanxi to buy silver, and the government carts it back—wasting public and private resources. I propose allowing silver deposits at the capital Commodity Monopoly Office or Shaanxi border posts for salt certificates in Sichuan, or cash payment of salt and wine quotas at two thousand cash per liang of silver." The court approved. Few submitted silver in Shaanxi, so an extra twenty jin per hundred was offered and submissions were recruited at Fengxiang and Yongxing. When war broke out in the west and rations ran short, fodder deliveries to the border were ordered until supplies were sufficient. Fodder was overvalued and salt undervalued, to merchants' profit. Even after peace in the west, submissions continued as before. Kuizhou Transport Commissioner Jiang Ben said border submissions over ten years had wasted Kui salt worth over 200,000 strings while Shaanxi now had pond salt and full military stores. He asked to restore the original system. The court agreed.
32
Previously Yi and Li circuits had the lowest salt revenues and relied on Daning and Jiechi salt supplied by merchants. In Qingli merchants paying cash in Yizhou for Daning salt received an extra thousand strings of small cash per ten thousand jin, ten small cash equaling one large cash. Merchants grew scarce as Sichuan salt prices soared to 2,200 small cash per jin. Yizhou prefect Wen Yanbo reported the hardship, and the court restored the former arrangements.
33
Salt revenues from the four circuits sustained the treasury, but wells waxed and waned while quotas stayed fixed. Officials often inflated levies to win credit, leaving problems for their successors. The court was then intent on easing popular hardship, especially for remote regions, and routinely granted reductions whenever officials petitioned. At first salt taxes could be paid half in silver, silk, or satin, with one jin of salt valued at twenty to thirty cash and one liang of silver or one bolt of cloth at six hundred to twelve hundred cash. Later edicts required current market rates for such conversions. In Jinghu the prefectures of Gui and Xia each had two wells yielding 2,820 shi yearly, each supplying its own prefecture.
34
使
During the Xining era private salt selling was widespread in Sichuan; and prohibition failed to stop it. Officials proposed registering all private wells and shipping Jiechi pond salt to make up the shortfall, but the plan was not adopted. Shenzong asked Expositor of the Diary Shen Kuo, who replied, "If private wells are already subject to government purchase, private trade cannot be eliminated. Registering all wells and shipping Jiechi salt for sole government sale would spare punishments and capture lost revenue; yet countless small wells lie along the Yi frontier between Zhong, Wan, Rong, and Lu and are hard to suppress. Posting guards would likely cost more than it yields. The proposal was dropped. In the ninth year Liu Zuo went to Sichuan to oversee tea affairs and once shipped one hundred thousand bundles of Jiechi salt per year. Attending Censor Zhou Yin reported, "Chengdu Circuit has long relied on Dongchuan salt. When the transport commission sold Lingjing Yard it halted eastern salt and closed Zhuotong wells, leaving many jobless. Profit-seeking officials then resumed Jiechi shipments over dangerous routes at great hardship; Chengdu salt soared in price while Dongchuan salt stayed cheap, driving people to violate the law. I ask that Dongchuan salt again supply Chengdu, that Zhuotong wells stay open, and that government shipment of Jiechi salt be abolished. The court ordered trade to continue as before, Jiechi salt sold under merchant rules, and forced allocation to the populace forbidden. Soon afterward government transport of Jiechi salt was abolished entirely.
35
In Yuanyou 1 the court assigned Chengdu Judicial Intendant Guo Gai to investigate salt policy. Right Office Supervisor Su Zhe impeached Gai for currying favor and filing false reports, noting that several Sichuan prefectures sold Qiongzhou Pujiang government salt at 120 cash per jin while brine yields had fallen and much salt was adulterated with sand and earth; while merchant and private small-well white salt in Zi and Kui sold for only seventy or eighty cash, yet officials forced the expensive government salt on the people, which Gai ignored. Gai was removed and Huang Lian was ordered to investigate and report. A sealed memorial reported that beyond regular taxes officials annually exacted fifty strings per well, called official stream money. Huang Lian was ordered to abolish the levy entirely. An edict forbade any further rent beyond levy and salt tax on wells along streams.
36
綿 綿
In Chongning 2 the Sichuan prefectures of Li, Yang, Xing, Jian, Peng, Lang, Ba, Mian, Han, and Xingyuan were all opened to northeast salt. In the fourth year salt from Zi, Su, Kui, Mian, Han, and Daning still sold within Sichuan, with encroachment on Jiechi salt territory alone forbidden.
37
仿 西
In Shaoxing 2 Sichuan Overall Commander Zhao Kai reformed the salt law, following the Daguan model with contract depots and certificate taxes broadly like the tea monopoly but even stricter. Each jin owed twenty-five cash in certificate fees, about nine and four-tenths cash in native-product and supplemental taxes, seven fen transit tax, one and a half cash lodging tax, and sixty-six cash investigation fees per certificate, with further surcharges added later. Sichuan's more than 4,900 wells produced over ten million jin yearly. When certificates were introduced one bundle was one hundred jin with ten extra jin allowed as a concession, but revenues eventually rose to over four million strings. In the twenty-ninth year Xihe Prefecture's salt price was cut in half.
38
西使便
In Chunxi 6 Sichuan Pacification Commissioner Hu Yuanzhi and Overall Commander Cheng Jia reported, "In reassessing 2,375 wells and 405 yards across the four circuits, 1,174 wells and 150 yards would remain at the old quota; 125 wells and 24 yards with self-reported or adjudicated increases, plus 479 old wells being dredged and registered; wells without salt would be struck off, and those unable to meet quotas would receive proportional reductions; reducing certificates by 409,888 while adding 137,349, so well households might escape crushing quotas. In the seventh year Yuanzhi added that reassessment should shift surplus to deficit, but officials seeking profit over-collected productive wells, under-reduced dry ones, and acted from private motives. Henceforth reassessment must use gains to offset losses and may not exceed prior reductions. In the eleventh year Jingxi Transport Vice Commissioner Jiang Pu reported that Jinzhou's military command had set up depots to seize merchant salt and resell it at inflated prices, harming traders and forcing the people to eat dear salt. Jinzhou was ordered to let merchants trade freely and not establish coercive depots.
39
When Zhao Kai first established the monopoly, merchants paid cash for certificates while well households sold only their quota and paid native-product tax. But brine yields fluctuated and monthly quotas varied, so empty notes were sometimes issued while taxes were still collected, and the certificate system collapsed. Pressed by merchants, well households increased bundle weights, some to as much as 160 jin per bundle. Abandoned wells could be claimed with inflated quotas. Commoners eager for wells raised quotas beyond what they could sell, leaving certificate fees and native-product taxes unpaid. Suicides followed in succession, to the harm of all.
40
使 西
In Shaoxi 3 Minister of Personnel Zhao Ruyu said Zhao Kai's Shaoxing salt law had set no fixed well quotas, banned only private sales, and placed contract depots in every jurisdiction to recruit merchants, equalizing salt weights near and far so regions did not undercut one another and prices rose and fell with the season. That system is now wholly abandoned. The Sichuan Overall Office should restore it. Yang Fu, then overall accountant, removed false quotas, closed abandoned wells, enforced contract-depot rules, banned excess bundle weights, and stiffened penalties for smuggling, and salt prices suddenly soared. Fu also asked to abolish the six salt shops of the Lizhou Eastern Route Pacification Commission, salt fees at ferry crossings, and the Xingzhou salt shop on the western route. Later Overall Commander Chen Ye removed all increased quotas on government wells.
41
使
In the fifth year the Ministry of Revenue reported that Tongchuan salt and wine were among Sichuan's gravest burdens. Salt already collected native-product fees before issuing government certificates, yet officials taxed again. Prefectures and counties added wine-purchase fees, landing fees, stall fees, and other newly invented levies. Strict prohibitions were then announced to the Chengdu, Tongchuan, and Lizhou offices. In Jiading 7 Ningzong ordered Sichuan salt wells placed solely under the Overall Office, but Pacification Commissioner An Bing said autumn defense needed the revenue for military campaigns and they were seized back.
42
Tea. Under the Song tea monopoly, six Commodity Monopoly Offices were established at strategic hubs: Jiangling, Zhen, Hai, Hanyang, Wuwei, and Qikou in Qizhou. At first offices were also set up in the capital, Jian'an, and Xiangfu, but the latter two were abolished. The capital office survived only to exchange notes and did not stockpile tea. In Huainan the government operated thirteen mountain tea depots across Qi, Huang, Lu, Shu, Guang, and Shou, each staffed by officials; and all tea-growing households in those six prefectures were registered as tea garden households. They paid tea as rent on the annual levy, and the government bought all remaining tea. Sales to the government were paid in advance, called principal advances; and tea submitted in lieu of tax was called tax-conversion tea. The annual levy totaled over 8.65 million jin, all sold at the local depot. In Jiangnan were Xuan, She, Jiang, Chi, Rao, Xin, Hong, Fu, Jun, and Yuan, plus the military districts of Guangde, Xingguo, Linjiang, Jianchang, and Nankang; in Liangzhe were Hang, Su, Ming, Yue, Wu, Chu, Wen, Tai, Hu, Chang, Qu, and Mu; in Jinghu were Jiangling, Tan, Li, Ding, E, Yue, Gui, Xia, and Jingmen; in Fujian were Jian and Jian, which paid rent and tax-conversion tea yearly like the mountain depots. Annual levies totaled over 10.27 million jin in Jiangnan, 1.279 million in Liangzhe, 2.47 million in Jinghu, and 393,000 in Fujian, all sent to the six monopoly offices for sale.
43
Tea fell into two categories: cake tea and loose tea. Cake tea was steamed, pressed into molds, and strung on cords. Only Jian and Jian ground it after steaming, set it in bamboo frames in roasting rooms, and produced the finest grades, which other regions could not replicate. Twelve grades such as Dragon, Phoenix, Stone Nipple, and White Nipple supplied annual tribute and state needs. Tea from Qian, Yuan, Rao, Chi, Guang, She, Tan, Yue, Chen, Li, Jiangling, Xingguo, and Linjiang had twenty-six grades such as Immortal Fungus, Jade Ford, Early Spring, and Green Sprout, while Liangzhe and Xuan, Jiang, and Ding used upper, middle, lower, or first through fifth grades. Loose tea from Huainan, Gui, Jiangnan, and Jinghu had eleven grades such as Dragon Brook, Before Rain, and After Rain, with Jiang and Zhe again using upper, middle, lower, or first through fifth grades. Government purchase prices ranged across sixteen grades for wax tea from twenty to 190 cash per jin, fifty-five grades for large cake tea from sixty-five to 250 cash, and fifty-nine grades for loose tea from sixteen to 38.5 cash; Sale prices had twelve grades for wax tea from forty-seven to 420 cash per jin, sixty-five for cake tea from seventeen to 917 cash, and one hundred ninety for loose tea from fifteen to 121 cash.
44
貿
Those who wanted tea bought from the government; tea for daily use was called food tea, and certificates were issued for export. Merchants paid cash or valuables at the capital Commodity Monopoly Office to bid for tea from the six offices and thirteen depots and received matching certificates. They might also pay in the southeast at values calculated like the capital. By the end of Zhidao sales reached 2,852,900 strings; by the end of Tianxi they had risen by another 450,000 strings. Tea was monopolized empire-wide except in Sichuan and Guangnan, where private trade was allowed but export was forbidden.
45
貿
Tea withheld beyond tax conversion or sold privately was confiscated and punished according to its value. Tea garden households who destroyed tea trees were punished according to the tea they would have produced. Old gardens too depleted to meet quotas were exempted. Those owing tea tax without tea could pay in other goods. Head clerks who privately traded government tea worth 1,500 cash or more were executed. Later statutes were progressively lightened. In Taiping Xingguo 2 head clerks who stole and sold government tea worth three strings or more were tattooed and sent to court; in Chunhua 3 the threshold was ten strings, with tattooing and assignment to the local garrison prison, while patrol soldiers who smuggled tea received one grade heavier punishment. Gangs armed with staves who traded private tea and resisted arrest were all executed. In Taiping Xingguo 4 selling one jin of counterfeit tea brought one hundred strokes, and twenty jin or more brought execution. In Yongxi 2 counterfeit warm-mulberry tea was punished at two-tenths the penalty for real tea of equal value. In Chunhua 5 officials proposed adding one grade to the penalty for private salt smuggling for encroaching on revenue, while non-monopoly jurisdictions would follow Taiping Xingguo statutes.
46
西
Tea profits were enormous; merchants who shipped it northwest often gained several times their cost. After Yongxi war made rations urgent, merchants delivered fodder to the frontier at inflated prices based on distance and received exchange notes redeemable in cash at the capital or in tea and granulated and powdered salt in Jiang, Huai, and Jinghu. In Duangong 2 exchange granaries were set up so merchants could deliver grain to the capital at favorable rates and receive tea and salt in Jiang and Huai.
47
使使 沿 便 使 西使西 使 使
In Chunhua 3 Investigating Censor Xue Ying and Secretariat Assistant Liu Shi asked to abolish the monopoly offices and let merchants buy directly at tea-producing government depots, saving transport costs and giving merchants fresh tea. Lei Youzhong was appointed Tea and Salt Commissioner for All Circuits, with Zhang Guan and Xue Ying as deputies. In the second month of the fourth year the eight riverside monopoly offices were abolished and tea prices sharply cut. Merchants complained that the river route was too long and inconvenient, and officials cited lost revenue from lower prices. In the seventh month the eight offices were restored and the commissioner posts abolished. Early in Zhidao Liu Shi still pressed his plan, but Yang Yungong argued that buying tea by prefecture mixed new and old stock, that different regions needed blended varieties for profit, and that abolishing monopoly offices for direct mountain purchase was impractical. Taizong sought to weigh the arguments and had chief ministers convene Chen Shu with Liu Shi and Yang Yungong. Merchants testified that they preferred the Chunhua reduced prices or wished to return to the old system. Revenue officials, reluctant to accept cuts, sided with Yang Yungong, and Liu Shi's proposal was dropped. Yang Yungong was appointed transport and tea-salt commissioner for Jiangnan, Huainan, and Liangzhe. In the second year, at Yang Yungong's request, private salt in Huainan's twelve jurisdictions was banned and sold by the government, and merchants who had paid cash or goods in the capital or at Yangzhou were repaid in tea. Thereafter salt sales brought in real cash, tea stocks cleared, annual revenues rose by 508,000 strings, and Yang Yungong and his colleagues were rewarded.
48
At first merchants flocked to salt. After Jiang and Huai salt was banned, tea was added to the system. On top of base quantities came official wastage allowances and increased ten-year yard wastage, with surplus benefits varying by location. Merchants who delivered frontier grain brought exchange notes to the capital, where sedentary shopkeepers registered with the Commodity Monopoly Office and pooled note holders. Traveling merchants had shop merchants act as guarantors, received cash at the capital monopoly office, and obtained tea in the southern prefectures; non-traveling merchants had shop merchants sell the notes and resell them to tea merchants. After peace ended the wars, frontier stores eased and prices fell, but the inflated face value of exchange notes was not adjusted. Tea replaced salt, but tea purchases did not cover payouts, so notes piled up and merchants waited years for tea. Capital notes fell until some were worth only the real price of the grain delivered, leaving neither the state nor merchants with profit. That year the court fixed penalties: purchasing supervisors with deficits of one li or more lost salary and rank.
49
使使綿 西 便 使
In Jingde 2 Lin Te, Li Pu, and others were sent to the Three Departments to review all old regulations and consult tea merchants on a new law. At the capital, fifty thousand in real value of gold, silver, or silk bought one hundred strings of tea; Haizhou tea required fifty-five thousand in cash; on the Hebei frontier, gold, silk, and grain followed capital rates, but tea premiums added ten thousand at the border and five thousand at the second zone; Hedong used the same tiers with eight- and six-thousand differences; Shaanxi added fifteen thousand; Haizhou tea required goods worth fifty-two thousand, with second-zone premiums as on the Hebei frontier. Nearby districts in all three frontier circuits followed capital rates for both payments and tea issued. Hebei's second zone and Hedong's border zones could not bid for Haizhou tea. Transit duties were recorded along the route and paid in full at the capital. Mountain depots were also tightened to control receipts and disbursements. The Three Departments approved the proposal. In the fifth month Li Pu was appointed Huainan transport vice commissioner to implement the reform. After one year Zhenzong worried the reform was incomplete, and in the third year ordered Li Jun to compare the old and new laws. Merchants were confused by the new law, and Lin Te persuaded the emperor to cancel the comparison.
50
Officials reported annual receipts: 5.69 million strings under the old law in year one, 4.1 million under the new law in year two, and 2.8 million in year three. Lin Te argued that higher returns reflected lower principal and real profit, while the drop was only in inflated note values. In autumn of the fourth year they were promoted, and the court ordered the Three Departments to keep the new law unchanged. In Dazhong Xiangfu 2 they submitted the compiled Tea Law Regulations and twenty-three revenue policies.
51
使
Under the new law, outstanding notes—whether unpaid, paid but not yet in the capital, or in the capital but not canceled—were settled at fixed rates and surrendered to the state. Merchants holding thousand-string old notes paid two hundred thousand yearly for five years until old and new obligations were fully redeemed. Government tea used for public expenses was replaced with other goods lest cheap tea undermine the monopoly. Depots limited wastage allowances and transit taxes were enforced more strictly. Monopoly offices allocated tea to yards by grade in the order notes arrived. Major merchants who knew the best tea sent runners day and night with certificates to reach the offices first. Small merchants had already suffered when Huainan salt was banned, and now they could scarcely operate at all.
52
In year six purchasing supervisors were judged on tea that entered transit accounts and rent delivered in full with surplus; tea outside transit accounts did not count regardless of volume. Dazhong Xiangfu 5 brought over two million strings; year 6 reached three million; year 7 added nine hundred thousand; year 8 fell to only 1.6 million.
53
便 西
For years the capital needed cash urgently. Merchants with notes received tea at the yards on arrival, but deadlines were imposed; late delivery required a supplemental payment of two parts in cash per ten. Wealthy merchants met deadlines; small merchants who missed them or could not pay the supplement sold notes cheaply to the wealthy. Clerks who knew how to shift funds made a dozen minor document changes in a year, confusing merchants and slowing trade. Feng Zheng and Wang Zeng were ordered to revise the rules and urged caution and trust, but memorialists still attacked every change. In year 9 Li Di, Ling Ce, and Lü Yijian were ordered to draft regulations with the Three Departments. Much tea was poor quality, merchants gained little, traveling merchants earned thin profits, and Shaanxi notes sold for only eight thousand in the market. Cao Wei, prefect of Qinzhou, asked Yongxing, Fengxiang, and Hezhong to buy the notes with government funds, and the court agreed. Li Di proposed requiring four or five parts in cash out of ten for frontier deliveries and set supplemental bounty rates. Li Pu was still left to decide most details and clung to the old system with few changes.
54
便 西 西
In Tianxi 2 Li Chui asked to free tea from monopoly control. Sun Shi said: "The tea law has changed too often and inconveniences merchants. This undermines trust. I ask that a lasting system be fixed." The court ordered Sun Shi and the Three Departments to revise the law along lenient and simple lines. Soon Sun Shi was posted to Heyang and the reform stopped. The Three Departments proposed Shaanxi frontier grain follow Hebei: raise measured prices, pay real cash in certificates, redeem in the capital for cash, and pay tea at market rates in cash rather than grain certificates. The court added five thousand in tea per eight hundred thousand and approved the rest. Shaanxi notes fell further, to five thousand in the capital, and officials regretted the tea spent redeeming them. In year 5 the court spent five hundred thousand strings from the inner treasury for Li Deming to buy and destroy the notes in the capital.
55
西 貿 使
After Qianxing northwest military costs outran revenue, and merchants were recruited to deliver frontier grain for tea certificates as under Yongxi. Later southeast cash, aromatics, and ivory were added—the Three Categories method; the frontier urgently needed grain and inflated valuations to fill stores, so submitters profited from phantom credits and rushed to participate. As the system broke down, inflated valuations rose, tea prices fell, and real cash and goods paid in dwindled. Many submitters were locals, not traveling merchants, who knew little of tea profits and sold certificates quickly to tea merchants or capital note shops for slim returns; while tea merchants and note shops redeemed or hoarded certificates for large profits. Inflated profits went to great merchants. Notes piled up until two or three years of tea could not cover them, frontier submitters stopped coming, border stores shrank, and the tea law collapsed. In Jingde Ding Wei had calculated that frontier grain cost only five hundred thousand while over 3.6 million in southeast tea profits went to merchants. His analysis was considered definitive, yet repeated reforms could not remove the flaw.
56
使 使 使 使
In Tiansheng 1 Li Zi and others were ordered to compare tea, salt, and alum revenues and reform the laws. A Planning Office was set up under Zhang Shixun, Lü Yijian, and Lu Zongdao. They reported that thirteen-yard tea revenue had fallen from five hundred thousand strings to two hundred thirty thousand under Tianxi 5, with certificates nominally worth one hundred thousand selling for fifty-five thousand and yielding only thirty thousand in real interest after principal—official costs excluded. They asked to end the Three Categories method and adopt direct offset. The new method totaled principal and interest at the thirteen yards, ended government advances, let merchants and growers trade at median prices, and the state collected interest. At Shuzhou's Luoyuan yard, for example, tea sold at fifty-six cash per jin with twenty-five principal; the government paid no principal and merchants paid thirty-one in interest. Tea still had to enter government stores and be issued to merchants' orders with certificates as proof—hence the name direct-offset. If direct offset fell short or found no takers, the government bought tea as before. Growers who missed deadlines paid shortfalls at merchant interest rates. The old wastage tea surcharge of twenty to thirty-five jin per hundred was abolished. Cash bids for tea at the six monopoly offices followed the old system.
57
使
Earlier in Tianxi the capital rate was eighty thousand cash for Haizhou and Jingnan tea; seventy-four thousand odd for Zhen, Wuwei, Qikou, Hanyang, and thirteen-yard tea, all nominally worth one hundred thousand to enrich merchants; but Haizhou and Jingnan tea sold well, so merchants paid less cash for those grades than elsewhere. Up to six-tenths of cash payments could be made in gold and silk. Under the thirteen-yard reform and renewed cash recruitment at the six offices, Haizhou and Jingnan rose to eighty-six thousand and Zhen, Wuwei, Qikou, and Hanyang to eighty thousand. Frontier grain was priced by local valuation with distance-based increases. Per ten thousand cash, distant deliveries gained up to seven hundred and nearby three hundred; certificates redeemed in cash at the capital—the cash redemption method; holders could choose gold, silk, other regional cash, tea, salt, or aromatics instead. Tea and frontier grain were to be paid in real cash without cross-subsidy, ending inflated valuation. The court adopted the proposal.
58
便 西 使
After one year great merchants could no longer manipulate prices, but critics feared cash redemption of frontier grain would drain the capital treasury. The Jiang-Huai Planning Office reported spoiled stagnant tea and asked to burn it all. The court suspected reform failure, rebuked the Planning Office, and sent inspectors to review tea stocks. Li Zi replied that inspections in Shaanxi and Hebei showed Zhenrong grain worth twenty-eight thousand and Ding forty-five thousand while tea certificates still paid one hundred thousand. Qizhou tea principal against Zhenrong grain value lost a third of principal; tea and frontier grain had to be decoupled, hence the new law. Under Qianxing's Three Categories method, hundred-string certificates redeemed tea at 51–62 thousand, aromatics and ivory at 41 thousand odd, and southeast cash at 83 thousand, while the capital received only 57 thousand odd per certificate and frontier stores held 2.5 million enclosures of fodder and 2.98 million shi of grain. Under Tiansheng's new law by year two, hundred-string payouts brought 74–80 thousand in real cash for tea, 72 thousand odd for aromatics and ivory, and 100,500 for southeast cash, while capital receipts rose 1.4 million strings and frontier stores gained 11.69 million enclosures of fodder and 2.13 million shi of grain. Old inflated certificates were redeemed in the capital for cash or tea at market rates. Merchants who had sold cheaply paid fifty thousand more per hundred-thousand certificate for Tianxi 5 tea worth one hundred fifty thousand; small merchants under one million paid nothing and received seventy to seventy-five thousand in tea per certificate; after Tianxi stock ran out they received post-Qianxing tea, with the fifty-thousand supplement raised to seventy thousand and wastage as before until old notes were cleared. This saved 1.71 million strings in combined tea, aromatics, ivory, and southeast cash payouts. The two departments reported total savings and increased receipts of over 6.5 million strings. Frontier stores that once could not last a year now held two to four years of supplies, and southeast tea no longer stagnated. The tea marked for burning was only years-old spoiled stock. The new law was already showing results. Years of corruption had been cut off at once. Merchants who wanted the old system tried to shake the reform, and critics who did not examine the facts helped spread rumors. They urged firm implementation and resistance to rumor. The court posted notices assuring merchants the reform would stand, rewarded clerks with silver and silk, yet criticism continued.
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