Volume 184 Treatises 137: Finance and Economics 2f

食貨下六○茶下

Finance and Economics, Part 6 — Tea (continued)

茶天聖三年八月，詔翰林侍講學士孫奭等同究利害，奭等言：“十三場茶積而未售者六百一十三萬餘斤，蓋許商人貼射，則善者皆入商人，其入官者皆粗惡不時，故人莫肯售。又園戶輸歲課不足者，使如商人入息，而園戶皆細民，貧弱力不能給，煩擾益甚。又奸人倚貼射為名，強市盜販，侵奪官利，其弊不可不革。 ”十月，遂罷貼射法，官復給本錢市茶。商人入錢以售茶者，奭等又欲優之，請凡入錢京師售海州、荊南茶者，損為七萬七千，售真州等四務十三場茶者，又第損之，給茶皆直十萬。自是，河北入中復用三說法，舊給東南緡錢者，以京師榷貨務錢償之。

On tea: in the eighth month of Tiansheng 3 (1025), the court ordered Hanlin Academician Reader-in-Waiting Sun Shi and others to study the policy’s costs and benefits together. Shi and his colleagues reported: “At the thirteen tea markets, more than 6.13 million jin of tea had piled up unsold. The reason was that once merchants were allowed supplementary bidding, all the good tea went to them, while what the government received was coarse, poor-quality, and out of season—so no one would buy it.” Plantation households who fell short of their annual quota were also required to pay interest like merchants—but they were petty cultivators, too poor and weak to meet the payments, and official harassment only grew worse. Worse, unscrupulous men used supplementary bidding as cover to force purchases and smuggle tea, stripping the state of its profits—abuses that had to be ended. In the tenth month the supplementary-bidding system was abolished, and the government resumed advancing capital to buy tea directly. Shi and his colleagues also wanted to favor merchants who paid cash for tea rights: they proposed cutting the fee to 77,000 cash for those buying Haizhou and Jingnan tea at the capital, and reducing it further in tiers for tea from the four monopoly offices and thirteen markets such as Zhenzhou—while still issuing tea worth 100,000 cash in every case. Thereafter Hebei grain-forage deliveries again used the three-item exchange method, and former payments in Southeast string-cash were settled from the capital Monopoly Goods Office instead.

奭等議既用，益以李諮等變法為非。明年，摭計置司所上天聖二年比視增虧數差謬，詔令嚐典議官張士遜等條析。夷簡言：“天聖初，環慶等路數奏芻糧不給，京師府藏常闕緡錢，吏兵月奉僅能取足。自變法以來，京師積錢多，邊計不聞告乏，中間蕃部作亂，調發兵馬，仰給有司，無不足之患。以此推之，頗有成效。三司比視數目差互不同，非執政所能親自較計。 ”然士遜等猶被罰，諮罷三司使。初，園戶負歲課者如商人入息，後不能償。至四年，太湖等九場凡逋息錢十三萬緡，詔悉蠲之。然自奭等改製，而茶法浸壞。

After Shi’s recommendations took effect, he increasingly condemned the reforms of Li Zi and his allies as mistaken. The following year officials seized on errors in the Planning Office’s year-on-year profit-and-loss figures for Tiansheng 2; the emperor ordered Remonstrance Official Zhang Shixun and others to parse the accounts line by line. Yijian argued: “Early in the Tiansheng reign, Huanqing and neighboring circuits repeatedly reported shortages of forage and grain; the capital treasury was chronically short of cash; and clerks’ and soldiers’ monthly pay could barely be met. Since the reforms, cash had piled up in the capital and the frontiers no longer reported shortfalls; even when border tribes rebelled and armies were mobilized, supply offices could meet demand without strain.” By that measure the changes had clearly worked. The Three Departments’ comparative figures simply did not agree—something no chief minister could audit by himself. Nevertheless Shixun and his colleagues were still penalized, and Zi was dismissed as Three Departments commissioner. At first plantation households behind on their annual quotas had been charged merchant-style interest, but they soon could not pay it back. By year four the nine markets including Taihu owed 130,000 strings in interest; an edict remitted the entire sum. Yet from the moment Shi and his allies reworked the rules, the tea monopoly steadily unraveled.

景祐中，三司使孫居中等言：“自天聖三年變法，而河北入中虛估之敝，復類乾興以前，蠹耗縣官，請復行見錢法。 ”時諮已執政矣。三年，河北轉運使楊偕亦陳三說法十二害，見錢法十二利，以謂止用三說所支一分緡錢，足以贍一歲邊計。遂命諮與參知政事蔡齊等合議，且令詔商人訪其利害。是歲三月，諮等請罷河北入中虛估，以實錢償芻粟，實錢售茶，皆如天聖元年之製。又以北商持券至京師，舊必得交引鋪為之保任，並得三司符驗，然後給錢，以是京師坐賈率多邀求，三司吏稽留為奸，乃悉罷之，命商持券徑趣榷貨務驗實，立償之錢。初，奭等雖增商人入錢之數，而猶以為利薄，故競市虛估之券，以射厚利，而入錢者寡，縣官日以侵削，京師少蓄藏。至是，諮等請視天聖三年入錢數第損一千有奇，入中增直亦視天聖元年數第加三百。詔皆可之。前已用虛估給券者，給茶如舊，仍給景祐二年已前茶。

During the Jingyou era (1034–1038), Three Departments Commissioner Sun Juzhong and others argued: “Since the Tiansheng 3 reforms, Hebei deliveries have again suffered inflated valuations like those before Qianxing, bleeding the treasury—we ask that the cash-payment method be restored.” By then Li Zi himself sat among the chief ministers. In year three Hebei transport commissioner Yang Jie listed twelve evils of the three-item method and twelve benefits of cash payment, claiming that a mere tenth of the string-cash spent under the three-item system would cover a full year’s frontier budget. The court ordered Zi to confer with Vice Grand Councilor Cai Qi and others, and publicly invited merchants to testify on what helped or hurt them. That March Zi’s group asked to end inflated Hebei valuations, pay for forage and grain in real cash, and sell tea for real cash—restoring the Tiansheng 1 rules. Northern merchants bringing certificates to the capital had once needed exchange-note shops to guarantee them and Three Departments seals before payment—giving local wholesalers and clerks endless chances to extort and stall. Those steps were abolished: merchants now went straight to the Monopoly Goods Office for verification and prompt cash. Although Shi’s reforms had raised merchants’ cash payments, profits still looked thin, so traders snapped up inflated certificates for outsized gains while few paid cash at all—the treasury eroded daily and capital reserves dwindled. Zi’s group now proposed tiered cuts of just over 1,000 cash from the Tiansheng 3 payment schedule, and tiered increases of 300 cash on Hebei delivery valuations relative to Tiansheng 1. The emperor approved every item. Certificates already issued on inflated terms still received tea as before, including stock from before Jingyou 2 (1035).

既而諮等又言：“天聖四年，嚐許陝西入中願得茶者，每錢十萬，所在給券，徑趣東南受茶十一萬一千。茶商獲利，爭欲售陝西券，故不復入錢京師，請禁止之。 ”並言商人所不便者，其事甚悉，請為更約束，重私販之禁，聽商人輸錢五分，餘為置籍召保，期半年悉償，失期者倍其數。事皆施行。諮等復言：“自奭等變法，歲損財利不可勝計，且以天聖九年至景祐二年較之，五年之間，河北入中虛費緡錢五百六十八萬；今一旦復用舊法，恐豪商不便，依托權貴，以動朝廷，請先期申諭。 ”於是帝為下詔戒敕，而縣官濫費自此少矣。

Soon afterward Zi’s group added: “In Tiansheng 4 the court had allowed Shaanxi deliverers who wanted tea to receive, for every 100,000 cash paid locally, certificates redeemable in the Southeast for 111,000 cash worth of tea. Tea merchants profited and rushed to sell Shaanxi certificates instead of paying cash in the capital—we ask that this be banned.” They also catalogued every merchant grievance and proposed tighter rules, stricter bans on private trade, payment of half the fee upfront with the balance registered under guarantors due in six months—doubled if overdue. Every measure was adopted. Zi’s faction added: “Since Shi’s reforms, annual revenue losses are incalculable; comparing Tiansheng 9 through Jingyou 2, Hebei inflated deliveries alone wasted 5.68 million strings in five years; restoring the old rules overnight may anger great merchants who will lobby the powerful—we ask for advance public notice.” The emperor then issued a warning edict, and treasury waste fell sharply thereafter.

久之，上書者復言：“自變法以來，歲輦京師金帛，易芻粟於河北，配擾居民，內虛府庫，外困商旅，非便。 ”寶元元年，命御史中丞張觀等與三司議之。觀等復請入錢京師以售真州等四務十三場茶，直十萬者，又視景祐三年數損之，為錢六萬七千，入中河北願售茶者，又損一千。既而詔又第損二千，於是入錢京師止為錢六萬五千，入中河北為錢六萬四千而已。

Years later memorialists again complained: “Since the reforms the court yearly hauls capital gold and silk to swap for Hebei forage, burdening locals, draining the treasury, and squeezing traveling merchants—this helps no one.” In Baoyuan 1 (1038) the court ordered Censor-in-Chief Zhang Guan and the Three Departments to review the policy. Guan’s group again proposed capital cash payments for tea from the four offices and thirteen markets: for tea nominally worth 100,000, fees would drop below the Jingyou 3 rate to 67,000 cash, with another 1,000 cut for Hebei deliverers who wanted tea. An edict then cut another 2,000 in tiers, leaving capital payments at 65,000 cash and Hebei deliveries at 64,000.

康定元年，葉清臣為三司使，是歲河北穀賤，因請內地諸州行三說法，募人入中，且以東南鹽代京師實錢。詔糴止二百萬石。慶曆二年，又請募人入芻粟如康定元年法，數足而止，自是三說稍復用矣。八年，三司鹽鐵判官董沔亦請復三說法，三司以為然，因言：“自見錢法行，京師錢入少出多，慶曆七年，榷貨務緡錢入百十九萬，出二百七十六萬。以此較之，恐無以贍給，請如沔議，以茶、鹽、香藥、緡錢四物如之。 ”於是有四說之法。初，詔止行於並邊諸州，而內地諸州有司蓋未嚐請，即以康定元年詔書從事。自是三說、四說二法並行於河北，不數年間，茶法復壞。芻粟之直，大約虛估居十之八，米鬥七百，甚者千錢。券至京師，為南商所抑，茶每直十萬，止售錢三千，富人乘時收蓄，轉取厚利。三司患之，請行貼買之法，每券直十萬，比市估三千，倍為六千，復入錢四萬四千，貼為五萬，給茶直十萬。詔又損錢一萬，然亦不足以平其直。久之，券比售錢三千者，才得二千，往往不售，北商無利，入中者寡，公私大弊。

In Kangding 1 (1040) Ye Qingchen became Three Departments commissioner. With Hebei grain cheap that year, he asked inland prefectures to adopt the three-item method, recruit deliverers, and pay with Southeast salt instead of capital cash. Purchases were capped at two million shi. In Qingli 2 (1042) he again recruited forage and grain deliveries under the Kangding 1 rules until quotas were met—and the three-item method slowly returned. In year eight Salt and Iron Vice Commissioner Dong Mian also urged restoring the three-item method. The Three Departments agreed, noting: “Under the cash method the capital bled money—in Qingli 7 the Monopoly Goods Office took in 1.19 million strings but paid out 2.76 million. At that rate supplies could not be sustained—we ask to follow Mian and use tea, salt, aromatics, and cash as four exchange items.” Thus the four-item method was born. The edict was meant only for Bing-border prefectures, yet inland officials who had never asked for it simply applied the Kangding 1 order anyway. Soon both three-item and four-item methods operated in Hebei together, and within a few years the tea monopoly collapsed again. Forged valuations ran to about eighty percent of nominal price; rice reached seven hundred cash per dou, sometimes a thousand. At the capital southern merchants drove certificates down: tea worth 100,000 fetched only 3,000 cash, while the rich hoarded and flipped them for huge gains. The Three Departments, alarmed, proposed supplementary purchase: for each 100,000 certificate worth only 3,000 on the market, double the cash component to 6,000, add another 44,000 for a 50,000 total payment, and issue 100,000 worth of tea. An edict cut another 10,000 cash from the fee, yet prices still would not stabilize. In time certificates that should have brought 3,000 cash sold for barely 2,000 and often not at all; northern merchants saw no profit, few men delivered, and both state and traders suffered.

皇祐二年，知定州韓琦及河北轉運司皆以為言，下三司議。三司奏：“自改法至今，凡得穀二百二十八萬餘石，芻五十六萬餘圍，而費緡錢一百九十五萬有奇，茶、鹽、香藥又為緡錢一千二百九十五萬有奇。茶、鹽、香藥，民用有限，榷貨務歲課不過五百萬緡，今散於民間者既多，所在積而不售，故券直亦從而賤。茶直十萬，舊錢六萬五千，今止二千；以至香一斤，舊售錢三千八百，今止五六百；公私兩失其利。請復行見錢法，一用景祐三年約束。 ”乃下詔曰：“比食貨法壞，芻粟價益倍，縣官之費日長，商賈不行，豪富之家，乘時牟利，吏緣為奸。自今有議者，須究厥理，審可施用，若事已上而驗問無狀者，置之重罰。”

In Huangyou 2 (1050) Dingzhou prefect Han Qi and the Hebei transport office reported the crisis, and the Three Departments were ordered to deliberate. The Three Departments reported: “Since the reforms we have received 2.28 million shi of grain and 560,000 bundles of forage, but spent 1.95 million strings in cash—while tea, salt, and aromatics issued cost another 12.95 million strings. Tea, salt, and aromatics have limited civilian demand—the Monopoly Goods Office earns under five million strings a year—yet so much now sits in private hands unsold everywhere that certificate values have collapsed.” Tea worth 100,000 once brought 65,000 cash; now only 2,000; fine aromatics once sold for 3,800 cash per jin now fetch five or six hundred; state and merchants alike have lost their gain. We ask to restore the cash method under the Jingyou 3 rules alone. The emperor then decreed: “Lately the commodities system has failed: forage prices have doubled, state costs mount daily, trade has stalled, the rich exploit the moment, and clerks turn fraud into routine. From now on anyone proposing change must prove the reasoning and show it will work; memorials that fail verification will face severe punishment.

是時雖改見錢法，而京師積錢少，恐不足以支入中之費，帝又出內藏庫錢帛百萬以賜三司。久之，入中者浸多，京師帑藏益乏，商人持券以俟，動彌歲月，至損其直以售於蓄賈之家。言利者請出內藏庫錢稍增價售之，歲可得遺利五十萬緡。既行，而諫官範鎮謂內藏庫、榷貨務皆領縣官，豈有榷貨務故稽商人，而令內藏乘時射利？傷體壞法，莫斯為甚。詔即罷之，然自此並邊虛估之弊復起。

Although the cash method was restored, capital reserves were thin and might not cover delivery costs; the emperor therefore released one million in cash and silk from the inner treasury for the Three Departments. Over time more men delivered tribute while the capital treasury emptied; merchants waited months or years with certificates, finally discounting them to hoarding wholesalers. Fiscal advocates proposed using inner-treasury cash to bid certificates up slightly, promising five hundred thousand strings in annual surplus. Once enacted, remonstrance official Fan Zhen objected: “Both the inner treasury and the Monopoly Goods Office are state agencies—how can one office stall merchants while another speculates for profit?” Nothing could more damage the state’s integrity and its laws. An edict ended the scheme at once, but inflated valuations along the Bing frontier soon returned.

至和三年，河北提舉糴便糧草薛向建議：“並邊十七州軍，歲計粟百八十萬石，為錢百六十萬緡，豆六十五萬石，芻三百七十萬圍，並邊租賦歲可得粟、豆、芻五十萬，其餘皆商人入中。請罷並邊入粟，自京輦錢帛至河北，專以見錢和糴。 ”時楊察為三司使，請用其說。因輦絹四十萬匹當緡錢七十萬，又蓄見錢及擇上等茶場八，總為緡錢百五十萬，儲之京師。而募商人入錢並邊，計其道裏遠近，優增其直，以是償之，且省輦運之費，唯入中芻豆計直償以茶如舊。行未數年，論者謂輦運科折，煩擾居民，且商人入錢者少，芻豆虛估益高，茶益賤。詔翰林學士韓絳等即三司經度。絳等言：“自改法以來，邊儲有備，商旅頗通，未宜輕變。唯輦運之費，悉從官給，而本路舊輸稅絹者，毋得折為見錢，入中芻豆罷勿給茶，所在平其市估，至京償以銀、綢、絹。 ”自是茶法不復為邊糴所須，而通商之議起矣。

In Zhihe 3 (1056) Hebei grain commissioner Xue Xiang calculated that the seventeen Bing-border commands needed 1.8 million shi of grain (1.6 million strings), 650,000 shi of beans, and 3.7 million bundles of forage yearly—while border taxes supplied only half a million units combined; merchants delivered the rest. He asked to end Bing-border grain deliveries, haul capital cash and silk to Hebei, and buy grain there with cash alone. Three Departments commissioner Yang Cha endorsed the plan. They shipped 400,000 bolts of silk worth 700,000 strings, stockpiled cash, and earmarked eight top tea markets—1.5 million strings in all kept at the capital. Merchants paid cash along the border with premiums scaled to distance, saving haulage costs; only forage and bean deliveries were still repaid in tea at assessed value. Within a few years critics said transport levies harassed the people, few merchants paid cash, forage valuations inflated further, and tea prices fell still lower. The court ordered Hanlin academician Han Jiang and others to review the system with the Three Departments on the spot. Jiang’s group replied: “Since the reform border stores are stocked and trade flows reasonably well—the policy should not be changed lightly. Only haulage costs should be fully state-paid; silk-tax payments must not be commuted to cash; forage and bean deliveries should no longer receive tea but be valued locally and paid at the capital in silver, gauze, or silk.” Tea was no longer needed to fund border grain purchases, and debate over liberalizing trade began.

初，官既榷茶，民私蓄盜販皆有禁，臘茶之禁又嚴於他茶，犯者其罪尤重，凡告捕私茶皆有賞。然約束愈密而冒禁愈繁，歲報刑辟，不可勝數。園戶困於征取，官司並緣侵擾，因陷罪戾至破產逃匿者，歲比有之。又茶法屢變，歲課日削。至和中，歲市茶淮南才四百二十二萬餘斤，江南三百七十五萬餘斤，兩浙二十三萬餘斤，荊湖二百六萬餘斤，唯福建天聖末增至五十萬斤，詔特損五萬，至是增至七十九萬餘斤，歲售錢並本息計之，才百六十七萬二千餘緡。官茶所在陳積，縣官獲利無幾，論者皆謂宜弛禁便。

Once the state monopolized tea, private stockpiling and smuggling were banned outright; winter tea faced even tighter controls and heavier penalties, with rewards for informers. Yet tighter rules bred more violations, and annual criminal cases became uncountable. Plantation households buckled under levies while officials preyed on them; every year some were ruined, convicted, bankrupted, or driven into hiding. Repeated policy shifts also eroded annual tea revenue day by day. By the Zhihe era annual purchases were only 4.22 million jin in Huainan, 3.75 million in Jiangnan, 230,000 in Liangzhe, and 2.6 million in Jinghu; Fujian alone had risen from 500,000 jin at the end of Tiansheng (after a 50,000-jin cut) to 790,000 jin. Total annual receipts, principal and interest included, were just 1.672 million strings. Official tea stockpiled everywhere while the treasury gained little; critics agreed the monopoly should be eased.

先是，天聖中，有上書者言茶、鹽課虧。帝謂執政曰：“茶、鹽，民所食，而強設法以禁之，致犯者眾。顧經費尚廣，未能弛禁爾！ ”景祐中，葉清臣上疏曰：

Earlier, in the Tiansheng period, memorialists had reported deficits in tea and salt revenue. The emperor told his ministers: “Tea and salt are staples of daily life, yet we impose harsh bans and thereby multiply offenders. But state expenses are still vast—we cannot lift the bans yet!” During Jingyou, Ye Qingchen submitted a memorial that read:

“山澤有產，天資惠民。兵食不充，財臣兼利，草芽木葉，私不得專，對園置吏，隨處立筦。一切官禁，人犯則刑，既奪其資，又加之罪，黥流日報，逾冒不悛。誠有厚利重貨，能濟國用，聖仁恤隱，矜赦非辜，猶將弛禁緩刑，為民除害。度支費用甚大，榷易所收甚薄，刳剝園戶，資奉商人，使朝廷有聚斂之名，官曹滋虐濫之罰，虛張名數，刻蠹黎元。

“Mountains and marshes yield bounty Heaven meant to enrich the people. When armies lack supplies, finance officials seize every profit: even grass sprouts and leaves may not be privately held; clerks are posted at every garden and barriers raised everywhere. Everything is state monopoly: violation brings punishment—first confiscation, then criminal charge; tattooing and exile are reported daily, yet defiance never ends. If the monopoly truly filled the treasury, a sage ruler might still pity the oppressed, pardon the innocent, and ease bans and punishments for the people's sake. Yet Revenue Bureau costs are huge while monopoly receipts are thin: plantation households are flayed to feed merchants, the court earns a reputation for exaction, offices multiply abusive fines, nominal targets are inflated, and common people are carved to the bone.

建國以來，法敝輒改，載詳改法之由，非有為國之實，皆商吏協計，倒持利權，幸在更張，倍求奇羨。富人豪族，坐以賈贏，薄販下估，日皆朘削，官私之際，俱非遠策。臣竊嚐校計茶利所入，以景祐元年為率，除本錢外，實收息錢五十九萬餘緡，又天下所售食茶，並本息歲課亦隻及三十四萬緡，而茶商見通行六十五州軍，所收稅錢已及五十七萬緡。若令天下通商，隻收稅錢，自及數倍，即榷務、山場及食茶之利，盡可籠取。又況不費度支之本，不置榷易之官，不興輦運之勞，不濫徒黥之辟。

Since the dynasty’s founding, broken laws have been rewritten again and again—yet the records show no true state interest behind the changes, only merchants and clerks colluding, inverting profit to their grip, rejoicing at every reform to double their extraordinary gains. Great clans sit on trade profits, undercut sales and depress valuations, and daily bleed both state and people—no far-sighted policy on either side. I have reckoned tea revenue using Jingyou 1 as the benchmark: aside from capital costs, actual interest was only 590,000 strings; empire-wide beverage-tea sales, principal and interest included, yielded just 340,000 strings—yet tea merchants already trade through sixty-five commands and pay 570,000 strings in taxes. If trade were opened empire-wide and only taxes collected, receipts would naturally multiply several times over—encompassing every profit now taken at monopoly offices, mountain stations, and beverage-tea sales. Moreover, the state would spend no Revenue Bureau capital, employ no monopoly officers, impose no transport levies, and inflict no flood of tattooing and exile.

臣意生民之弊，有時而窮，盛德之事，俟聖不惑。議者謂榷賣有定率，征稅無彝準，通商之後，必虧歲計。臣按管氏鹽鐵法，計口受賦，茶為人用，與鹽鐵均，必令天下通行，以口定賦，民獲善利，又去嚴刑，口數出錢，人不厭取。景祐元年，天下戶千二十九萬六千五百六十五，丁二千六百二十萬五千四百四十一，三分其一為產茶州軍，內外郭鄉又居三分之一，丁賦錢三十，村鄉丁賦二十，不產茶州軍郭鄉村鄉如前計之，又第損十錢，歲計已及緡錢四十萬。榷茶之利，凡止九十餘萬緡，通商收稅，且以三倍舊稅為率，可得一百七十餘萬緡，更加口賦之入，乃有二百一十餘萬緡，或更於收稅則例，微加增益，即所增至寡，所聚愈厚，比於官自榷易，驅民就刑，利病相須，炳然可察。 ”時下三司議，皆以為不可行。

I believe the people's suffering must someday reach its limit, and a matter of true virtue awaits a sage ruler's clear judgment. Critics say monopoly sales have fixed rates whereas taxes lack a steady standard, and free trade would surely shrink the annual budget. I follow Guanzi’s salt-and-iron model of per-capita levy: tea, like salt and iron, is a daily necessity. Let it circulate freely empire-wide, tax by headcount, let the people prosper, end harsh punishments, and charge a per-person fee the public will not resent. In Jingyou 1 (1034), the empire had 10,296,565 households and 26,205,441 adult males. One-third lived in tea-producing circuits; of urban and rural districts, another third were included. The levy was thirty cash per adult male and twenty in villages and townships; non-tea circuits used the same formula with a further ten-cash reduction at each tier—yielding about four hundred thousand strings per year. Monopoly tea revenue totaled barely nine hundred thousand strings. Under free trade taxed at triple the old rate, receipts could reach 1.7 million; add the head tax and the total would exceed 2.1 million. Even a modest rate tweak would swell collections—whereas official monopoly drove commoners into the courts. The trade-off was plain. ” The Three Departments then reviewed the plan and unanimously judged it unworkable.

至嘉祐中，著作佐郎何鬲、三班奉職王嘉麟又皆上書請罷給茶本錢，縱園戶貿易，而官收租錢與所在征算，歸榷貨務以償邊糴之費，可以疏利源而寬民力。嘉麟為《登平致頌書》十卷、《隆衍視成策》二卷上之，淮南轉運副使沈立亦集《茶法利害》為十卷，陳通商之利。時富弼、韓琦、曾公亮執政，決意向之，力言於帝。三年九月，命韓絳、陳升之、呂景初即三司置局議之。十月，三司言：“茶課緡錢歲當入二百二十四萬八千，嘉祐二年才及一百二十八萬，又募人入錢，皆有虛數，實為八十六萬，而三十九萬有奇是為本錢，才得子錢四十六萬九千，而輦運麋耗喪失，與官吏、兵夫廩給雜費，又不預焉。至於園戶輸納，侵擾日甚，小民趨利犯法，刑辟益繁，獲利至少，為弊甚大。宜約至和以後一歲之數，以所得息錢均賦茶民，恣其買賣，所在收算，請遣官詢察利害以聞。 ”詔遣官分行六路，還言如三司使議便。

During Jiayou (1056–1063), Associate Editorial Gentleman He Ge and Third-Class Service Attendant Wang Jialin each petitioned to end government tea advances, let growers trade freely, and fund border grain purchases through rent and transit taxes paid into the Monopoly Goods Office—widening revenue while easing the public burden. Jialin submitted ten scrolls entitled Ascending Peace and Offering Praise and two scrolls entitled Grand Extension and Gazing on Completion; Huainan transport vice commissioner Shen Li also compiled ten scrolls on the tea law’s costs and benefits, arguing for free trade. Fu Bi, Han Qi, and Zeng Gongliang were then in charge, firmly favored reform, and pressed the emperor at length. In the ninth month of Jiayou 3 (1058), Han Jiang, Chen Shengzhi, and Lü Jingchu were ordered to set up a Three Departments bureau to study the change. In the tenth month the Three Departments reported: “Annual tea revenue should be 2,248,000 strings; in Jiayou 2 it barely reached 1,280,000, and much of that was inflated. Net receipts were really 860,000, of which 390,000 was principal—only 469,000 profit—while transport losses and official, soldier, and ration costs were not even counted. Growers faced ever worse exactions; petty cultivators broke the law chasing profit; punishments multiplied; profits shrank while abuses ballooned. They proposed averaging one post-Zhihe year’s interest across all tea growers, freeing trade, levying transit taxes locally, and sending officials to report on the results. ” The throne sent commissioners through six circuits; on their return all endorsed the Three Departments plan.

四年二月，詔曰：“古者山澤之利，與民共之，故民足於下，而君裕於上，國家無事，刑罰以清。自唐建中時，始有茶禁，上下規利，垂二百年。如聞比來為患益甚，民被誅求之困，日惟谘嗟，官受濫惡之入，歲以陳積，私藏盜販，犯者實繁，嚴刑重誅，情所不忍，是於江湖之間幅員數千里，為陷阱以害吾民也。朕心惻然，念此久矣，間遣使者往就問之，而皆歡然願弛其禁，歲入之課以時上官。一二近臣，條析其狀，朕猶若慊然，又於歲輸裁減其數，使得饒阜，以相為生，俾通商利。曆世之敝，一旦以除，著為經常，弗復更製，損上益下，以休吾民。尚慮喜於立異之人、緣而為奸之黨，妄陳奏議，以惑官司，必置明刑，無或有貸。”

In the second month of Jiayou 4 (1059) an edict declared: “In antiquity mountain and marsh bounty was shared with the people, so the populace prospered below and the ruler was secure above; the realm was tranquil and punishments few. Tea bans began in Tang’s Jianzhong era (780s); for nearly two centuries court and people alike chased monopoly profit. Recently the harm has worsened: the people groan under exaction while the state stockpiles shoddy tea; smuggling flourishes and punishments are cruel beyond endurance—we have turned thousands of li along the rivers and lakes into a trap for our own subjects. We have long grieved over this and sent envoys to inquire; everywhere the people gladly asked for an end to the ban and promised timely payment of the annual duty. After close ministers analyzed the figures We still felt the burden too heavy, cut the annual quota further so the people could recover, and opened the way to free trade. Abuses of ages were swept away in a day, fixed as permanent law, never to be reversed—sacrificing revenue to give Our people rest. Yet We warn those who love novelty and factions that would abuse the change: whoever rashly petitions to overturn this policy will face stern punishment without mercy.

初，所遣官既議弛禁，因以三司歲課均賦茶戶，凡為緡錢六十八萬有奇，使歲輸縣官。比輸茶時，其出幾倍，朝廷難之，為損其半，歲輸緡錢三十三萬八千有奇，謂之租錢，與諸路本錢悉儲以待邊糴。自是唯臘茶禁如舊，餘茶肆行天下矣。論者猶謂朝廷誌於恤人，欲省刑罰，其意良善；然茶戶困於輸錢，而商賈利薄，販鬻者少，州縣征稅日蹙，經費不充，學士劉敞、歐陽修頗論其事。敞疏大要以謂先時百姓之摘山者，受錢於官，而今也顧使之納錢於官，受納之間，利害百倍；先時百姓冒法販茶者被罰耳，今悉均賦於民，賦不時入，刑亦及之，是良民代冒法者受罪；先時大商富賈為國懋遷，而州郡收其稅，今大商富賈不行，則稅額不登，且乏國用。修言新法之行，一利而有五害，大略與敞意同。時朝廷方排眾論而行之，敞等雖言，不聽也。

When the commissioners first planned to lift the ban, they spread the Three Departments’ annual tea quota—about 680,000 strings—across all tea households as a yearly payment to local government. Cash payment proved several times costlier than delivering tea, so the court halved the assessment to 338,000-odd strings, termed “rent money,” with circuit principal funds banked for border grain purchases. Henceforth only the wax-tea monopoly remained; all other tea could trade freely empire-wide. Critics conceded the court meant to spare the people and reduce punishments—a worthy aim; yet growers struggled under cash levies, merchant margins thinned, sales fell, and local tax receipts shrank. Academician Liu Chang and Ouyang Xiu both analyzed the fallout. Chang’s memorial chiefly argued that mountain pickers once received state advances but now paid the state—inverting the flow multiplied the harm a hundredfold; once only smugglers were punished; now every household owes a quota, and late payment brings criminal sanction—law-abiding subjects pay for smugglers’ crimes; once great merchants moved goods nationwide and localities collected transit tax; now that they stayed home, transit revenue collapsed and the treasury suffered. Xiu judged the reform one gain against five losses—substantially Chang’s view. The court pressed ahead over opposition; Chang and his allies were ignored.

治平中，歲入臘茶四十八萬九千餘斤，散茶二十五萬五千餘斤，茶戶租錢三十二萬九千八百五十五緡，又儲本錢四十七萬四千三百二十一緡，而內外總入茶稅錢四十九萬八千六百緡，推是可見茶法得失矣。自天聖以來，茶法屢易，嘉祐始行通商，雖議者或以為不便，而更法之意則主於優民。

Under Zhiping (1064–1067) wax tea receipts were 489,000-odd jin and loose tea 255,000-odd jin; grower rent yielded 329,855 strings; stored principal totaled 474,321 strings; empire-wide tea tax brought 498,600 strings—figures enough to show how the law fared. Since Tiansheng the tea law had shifted often; Jiayou inaugurated free trade. Critics found fault, but reformers aimed chiefly to benefit the people.

熙寧四年，神宗與大臣論昔茶法之弊，文彥博、吳充、王安石各論其故，然於茶法未有所變。及王韶建開湟之策，委以經略。七年，始遣三司幹當公事李杞入蜀經畫買茶，於秦鳳、熙河博馬。而韶言西人頗以善馬至邊，所嗜唯茶，乏茶與市。即詔趨趣杞據見茶計水陸運致，又以銀十萬兩、帛二萬五千、度僧牒五百付之，假常平及坊場餘錢，以著作佐郎蒲宗閔同領其事。初，蜀之茶園，皆民兩稅地，不殖五穀，唯宜種茶。賦稅一例折輸，蓋為錢三百，折輸綢絹皆一匹；若為錢十，則折輸綿一兩；為錢二，則折輸草一圍。役錢亦視其賦。民賣茶資衣食，與農夫業田無異，而稅額總三十萬。杞被命經度，又詔得調舉官屬，乃即屬諸州創設官場，歲增息為四十萬，而重禁榷之令。其輸受之際，往往厭其斤重，侵其價直，法既加急矣。八年，杞以疾去。

In Xining 4 (1071) Shenzong reviewed past tea-policy failures with his ministers; Wen Yanbo, Wu Chong, and Wang Anshi each explained the causes, but the law itself was not altered. When Wang Shao advanced his plan to open the Huang frontier, the court gave him strategic command. In year 7 (1074) the court first sent Three Departments duty officer Li Qi into Sichuan to organize tea purchases for horse trade at Qin-Feng and Xi-He. Shao reported that western peoples brought fine horses to the border but would trade only for tea—without tea, no deal. An edict ordered Qi to rush available tea by land and water, advanced 100,000 liang of silver, 25,000 bolts of silk, and 500 ordination certificates, and lent Ever-Normal and market-yard reserves, with Associate Editorial Gentleman Pu Zongmin as his deputy. Sichuan’s tea gardens stood on land already subject to the two-tax levy; grain would not grow there—only tea thrived. Taxes were commuted in fixed equivalents: about three hundred cash per bolt of silk or damask; ten cash to one liang of cotton; two cash to one bundle of fodder grass. Corvée payments followed the same scale. Tea sales clothed and fed them like farming, yet total tax assessments ran to three hundred thousand. Ordered to reorganize the trade, Qi could recruit staff, set up government tea markets in subordinate prefectures, raise annual profit by four hundred thousand strings, and reimpose strict monopoly enforcement. At delivery officials often short-weighted purchases and shaved prices—the regime had already turned harsh. In year 8 Qi resigned on grounds of illness.

先是，杞等歲增十萬之息，既而運茶積滯，歲課不給，即建畫於彭、漢二州歲買布各十萬匹，以折腳費，實以布息助茶利，然茶亦未免積滯。都官郎中劉佐復議歲易解鹽十萬席，顧運回車船載入蜀，而禁商販，蓋恐布亦難敷也。詔既以佐代杞，未幾，鹽法復難行，遂罷佐。而宗閔乃議川峽路民茶息收什之三，盡賣於官場，更嚴私交易之令，稍重至徒刑，仍沒緣身所有物，以待賞給。於是蜀茶盡榷，民始病焉。

Qi’s team had boosted annual profit by one hundred thousand, but tea then backed up and quotas failed; they arranged for Peng and Han to buy one hundred thousand bolts of cloth each yearly to cover transport costs—cloth profits subsidizing tea—yet tea still piled up unsold. Capital Bureau director Liu Zuo proposed trading in one hundred thousand bundles of solution salt yearly, shipping it into Sichuan on return convoys while banning private merchants—fearing cloth alone could not cover costs. Zuo replaced Qi by edict, but the salt scheme soon failed and Zuo was removed. Zongmin then proposed taxing Sichuan tea profits at thirty percent, forcing all sales through government markets, tightening private-trade bans to penal servitude with confiscation of offenders’ goods for informer rewards. Sichuan tea was fully monopolized, and the populace first felt the pain.

十年，知彭州呂陶言：“川峽四路所出茶，比東南十不及一，諸路既許通商，兩川卻為禁地，虧損治體。如解州有鹽池，民間煎者乃是私鹽，晉州有礬山，民間煉者乃是私礬，今川蜀茶園，皆百姓己物，與解鹽、晉礬不同。又市易司籠製百貨，歲出息錢不過十之二，然必以一年為率；今茶場司務重立法，盡榷民茶，隨買隨賣，取息十之三，或今日買十千之茶，明日即作十三千賣之，變轉不休，比至歲終，豈止三分？ ”因奏劉佐、李杞、蒲宗閔等苟希進用，必欲出息三分，致茶戶被害。始詔息止收十之一，佐坐措置乖方罷，以國子博士李稷代之，而陶亦得罪。稷依李杞例兼三司判官，仍委權不限員舉劾。

In year 10 Pengzhou prefect Lü Tao argued: “Tea from the four Sichuan circuits is less than a tenth of the southeast’s output; free trade is allowed elsewhere, yet both Shu regions remain closed—a breach of good governance. Jiezhou’s salt pond and Jinzhou’s alum hill involve state resources illicitly worked; Sichuan’s tea gardens are ordinary household property—quite unlike Jie salt or Jin alum. The Market Exchange Office, which monopolizes general merchandise, takes barely twenty percent annual interest on a one-year basis; yet the Tea Market Office monopolizes all private tea, buying and reselling at thirty percent markup—ten thousand today, thirteen thousand tomorrow, turnover endless—far more than thirty percent by year’s end. ” He charged Liu Zuo, Li Qi, Pu Zongmin, and others with courting promotion by squeezing thirty percent interest from growers. The court first capped interest at ten percent; Zuo was dismissed for mismanagement; Guozijian doctor Li Ji replaced him, and Tao was punished. Ji held a concurrent Three Departments judgeship like Qi and received unlimited impeachment authority.

侍御史周尹論蜀中榷茶為民害，罷為提點湖北刑獄。利州路漕臣張宗諤、張升卿議廢茶場司，依舊通商，詔付稷，稷方以茶利要功，言宗諤等所陳皆疏謬，罪當無赦。雖會赦，猶皆坐貶秩二等。於是稷建議賣茶官非材，許對易，如闕員，於前資待闕官差；茶場司事，州郡毋得越職聽治。又以茶價增減或不一，裁立中價，定歲入課額，及設酬賞以待官吏，而三路三十六場大小使臣並不限員。重園戶采造黃花秋葉茶之禁，犯者沒官。蒲宗閔亦援稷比，許舉劾官吏，以重其權，二人皆務浚利刻急。茶場監官買茶精良及滿五千馱以及萬馱，第賞有差，而所買粗惡偽濫者，計虧坐贓論。凡茶場州軍知州、通判並兼提舉，經略使所在，即委通判。又禁南入熙河、秦鳳、涇原路，如私販臘茶法。

Attending censor Zhou Yin denounced Sichuan’s tea monopoly as a public harm and was transferred to judicial intendant of Hubei circuit. Lizhou transport officials Zhang Zong’e and Zhang Shengqing urged abolishing the Tea Market Office and restoring free trade; the memorial went to Ji, who—seeking credit from tea profits—called their views absurd and unpardonable. Despite a general amnesty, both were still demoted two ranks. Ji then allowed unqualified tea-market officials to be replaced by exchange appointment and vacant posts filled from the senior waiting list; and barred prefectures and counties from interfering in Tea Market Office business. Because tea prices fluctuated, he set a median price, fixed annual quotas, offered official rewards, and staffed thirty-six markets across three circuits without personnel caps. He banned growers from making yellow-flower and autumn-leaf tea on pain of confiscation. Pu Zongmin likewise received impeachment powers like Ji; both men pursued profit ruthlessly. Market supervisors who bought fine tea in quantities of five or ten thousand loads earned graded bonuses; those who bought coarse or adulterated tea were prosecuted for embezzlement by the shortfall. Prefects and vice-prefects concurrently oversaw tea markets; where a frontier commissioner resided, the vice-prefect took charge. Southward shipment into Xi-He, Qin-Feng, and Jingyuan was banned under the same rules as illicit wax-tea trade.

五年，李稷死永樂城，詔以陸師閔代之。師閔言稷治茶五年，百費外獲淨息四百二十八萬餘緡，詔賜田十頃。而師閔榷利，尤刻於前，建言：“文、階州接連，而茶法不同，階為禁地，有博馬、賣茶場，文獨為通商地。乞文、龍二州並禁榷；仍許川路餘羨茶貨入陝西變賣，於成都府置博賣都茶場。 ”事皆施行。初，群牧判官郭茂恂言，賣茶買馬，事實相須，詔茂恂同提舉茶場。至是，師閔以買馬司兼領茶場，茶法不能自立，詔罷買馬司兼領；令茶場都大提舉視轉運使，同管幹視轉運判官，以重其任。賈種民更立茶法，師閔論奏茶場與他場務不同，詔並用舊條。初，李杞增諸州茶場，自熙寧七年至元豐八年，蜀道茶場四十一，京西路金州為場六，陝西賣茶為場三百三十二，稅息至稷加為五十萬，及師閔為百萬。

In year 5 Li Ji died at Yongle Fort; Lu Shimin succeeded him by edict. Shimin reported that in five years Ji had cleared 4.28 million strings net after all costs; the throne rewarded him with ten qing of land. Shimin’s monopoly was harsher still. He noted that adjacent Wen and Jie prefectures followed different rules: Jie was closed, with horse and tea markets, while Wen remained open to merchants. He asked that Wen and Long be placed under monopoly as well; allow surplus Sichuan tea into Shaanxi for resale, and establish a central monopoly sales market at Chengdu. ” All were approved. Earlier Herd Administration judge Guo Maoxun had argued that tea sales and horse purchases were inseparable; he was ordered to co-supervise tea markets. Now Shimin’s dual role as horse-purchase chief and tea chief blurred accountability; the court ended the combined appointment; elevating the tea grand supervisor to parity with the transport commissioner and joint managers to parity with the transport vice commissioner. When Jia Zhongmin proposed a new tea law, Shimin argued tea markets differed from other agencies; the court kept the old regulations. From Li Qi’s expansion in Xining 7 through the eighth year of Yuanfeng (1085), Sichuan had forty-one tea markets, Jingxi’s Jinzhou six, and Shaanxi three hundred thirty-two selling stations; annual tax profit rose from five hundred thousand under Ji to one million under Shimin.

元祐元年，侍御史劉摯奏疏曰：“蜀茶之出，不過數十州，人賴以為生，茶司盡榷而市之。園戶有茶一本，而官市之，額至數十斤。官所給錢，靡耗於公者，名色不一，給借保任，輸入視驗，皆牙儈主之，故費於牙儈者又不知幾何。是官於園戶名為平市，而實奪之。園戶有逃而免者，有投死以免者，而其害猶及鄰伍。欲伐茶則有禁，欲增植則加市，故其俗論謂地非生茶也，實生禍也。願遣使者，考茶法之敝，以蘇蜀民。 ”右司諫蘇轍繼言：“呂陶嚐奏改茶法，止行長引，令民自販，每緡長引錢百，詔從其請，民方有息肩之望。孫迥、李稷入蜀商度，盡力掊取，息錢、長引並行，民間始不易矣。且盜賊贓及二貫，止徒一年，出賞五千，今民有以錢八百私買茶四十斤者，輒徒一年，賞三十千，立法苟以自便，不顧輕重之宜。蓋造立茶法，皆傾險小人，不識事體。 ”且備陳五害。呂陶亦條上利害，詔付黃廉體量；未至，摯又言陸師閔恣為不法，不宜仍任事。詔即罷之。先是，師閔提舉榷茶，所行職務，他司皆不得預聞，事權震灼，為患深密。及黃廉就領茶事，乃請凡緣茶事有侵損戾法，或措置未當及有訴訟，依元豐令，聽他司關送。十一月，蒲宗孟亦以附會李稷賣茶罷。

In Yuan You 1 (1086) attending censor Liu Zhi memorialized: “Sichuan tea comes from only a few dozen prefectures on which people depend for livelihood, yet the Tea Office monopolizes and retails it all. A grower with one bush may be forced to sell dozens of jin to the state. Official payment is eaten up by fees, guarantors, delivery, and inspection—all brokered—so broker charges alone are incalculable. The state calls it fair purchase; in truth it seizes growers’ goods. Some flee, some die by suicide to escape—and neighbors still suffer. Cutting tea is forbidden; planting more triggers heavier purchase quotas—locals say the soil grows not tea but disaster. We ask that envoys review the tea law’s abuses and relieve the people of Shu. ” Right Office remonstrator Su Zhe added: “Lü Tao once reformed the law to long-distance transit permits alone—growers could sell freely for one hundred cash per string. The throne approved and the people briefly hoped for relief. But Sun Jiong and Li Ji went to Sichuan and imposed both profit tax and transit permits—the people were worse off than before. Theft of two strings brings one year’s penal servitude and a five-thousand reward; buying forty jin of tea privately for eight hundred cash brings one year and a thirty-thousand reward—laws drafted for official convenience without regard to proportion. Those who framed the tea law were, in short, reckless petty officials who understood nothing of governance. ” He then listed five specific harms. Lü Tao also submitted a detailed critique; the court ordered Huang Lian to investigate; before Huang arrived, Zhi again urged that Lu Shimin’s lawlessness disqualified him from office. An edict promptly removed him. Under Shimin the tea monopoly had operated in secrecy; other agencies could not intervene; his power was absolute and the abuses entrenched. When Huang Lian took over, he restored Yuanfeng rules allowing other offices to handle tea-related violations, disputes, and maladministration. In the eleventh month Pu Zongmeng was dismissed for colluding in Li Ji’s tea monopoly.

明年，熙河、秦鳳、涇原三路茶仍官為計置，永興、鄜延、環慶許通商，凡以茶易穀者聽仍舊，毋得逾轉運司和糴價，其所博斛鬥勿取息。七年，詔成都等路茶事司，以三百萬緡為額本。

The following year government procurement continued on the Xi-He, Qin-Feng, and Jingyuan frontier, while Yongxing, Fuyan, and Huanqing allowed free trade; tea-for-grain exchanges followed old rules without exceeding the transport commissioner’s harmonized grain price, and no interest could be charged on grain received. In year 7 an edict fixed three million strings as capital quota for the Chengdu tea administration.

紹聖元年，復以陸師閔都大提舉成都等路茶事，而陝西復行禁榷。師閔乃奏龍州仍為禁茶地，凡茶法並用元豐舊條。師閔自復用，以訖哲宗之世，其掊克之跡，不若前日之著，故建明亦罕見焉。

In Shaosheng 1 (1094) Lu Shimin was reappointed grand supervisor of Chengdu tea affairs, and Shaanxi’s monopoly was restored. Shimin then memorialized that Long Prefecture should stay a restricted-tea zone and that every tea rule should revert to the Yuanfeng code. From his return to power through Zhezong's reign his extortion was less blatant than before, and bold new schemes were rare.

茶之在諸路者，神宗、哲宗朝無大更革。熙寧八年，嚐詔都提舉市易司歲賈商茶，以三百萬斤為額。元祐五年，立六路茶稅租錢諸州通判轉運司月暨歲終比較都數之法。七年，以茶隸提刑司，稅務毋得更易為雜稅收受。紹聖四年，戶部言：“商旅茶稅五分，治平條立輸送之限既寬，復慮課入無準，故定以限約，毋得更展。元祐中，輒展以季，課入漏失。且茶稅歲計七十萬緡，積十年未嚐檢察，請內外委官，期一年驅算以聞。 ”詔聽其議，展限令出一時，毋承用。

Tea policy in the regional circuits saw no major overhaul under Shenzong and Zhezong. In Xining 8 (1075) the court ordered the Market Exchange Office to buy three million jin of merchant tea each year. In Yuanyou 5 (1090) a system required the six tea circuits' intendants and transport commissioners to report and compare monthly and annual tea-tax totals for every prefecture. In year 7 tea enforcement was assigned to the judicial-intendant circuits, and tax stations could no longer substitute miscellaneous levies for tea dues. In Shaosheng 4 (1097) the Ministry of Revenue reported: “The traveling-merchant tea tax at fifty percent: the Zhiping rules already allowed generous delivery deadlines; fearing unstable revenue, the court had fixed a firm deadline that must not be extended again. During Yuanyou officials kept extending deadlines by quarters, and collections fell short. Tea tax was supposed to yield seven hundred thousand strings a year, yet no audit had been conducted in ten years; the ministry asked that officials be appointed inside and outside the capital to complete a full reckoning within one year and report back. ” The court approved the plan but ruled that any extension would be a one-time exception, not a standing policy.

崇寧元年，右仆射蔡京言：“祖宗立禁榷法，歲收淨利凡三百二十餘萬貫，而諸州商稅七十五萬貫有奇，食茶之算不在焉，其盛時幾五百餘萬緡。慶曆之後，法製浸壞，私販公行，遂罷禁榷，行通商之法。自後商旅所至，與官為市，四十餘年，利源浸失。謂宜荊湖、江、淮、兩浙、福建七路所產茶，仍舊禁榷官買，勿復科民，即產茶州郡隨所置場，申商人園戶私易之禁，凡置場地園戶租折稅仍舊。產茶州軍許其民赴場輸息，量限斤數，給短引，於旁近郡縣便鬻；餘悉聽商人於榷貨務入納金銀、緡錢或並邊糧草，即本務給鈔，取便算請於場，別給長引，從所指州軍鬻之。商稅自場給長引，沿道登時批發，至所指地，然後計稅盡輸，則在道無苛留。買茶本錢以度牒、末鹽鈔、諸色封樁、坊場常平剩錢通三百萬緡為率，給諸路，諸路措置，各分命官。 ”詔悉聽焉。

In Chongning 1 (1102) Right Vice Director Cai Jing said: “Our forebears’ monopoly law yielded more than 3.2 million guan in annual net profit, plus over 750,000 guan in prefectural merchant tax—not counting tea-consumption duties; at its peak revenue approached five million strings. After the Qingli era the system eroded, smuggling flourished openly, and the monopoly was abandoned in favor of free trade. For more than forty years merchants traded with the state wherever they went, and fiscal gains steadily drained away. He urged restoring state purchase monopolies on tea from Jing-Hu, the Yangzi, Huai, Liang-Zhe, and Fujian—without levying the populace directly—reinstating market bans on private sales between merchants and growers, and leaving plantation rent and conversion taxes unchanged. In producing districts growers could pay interest at the market up to a fixed weight limit, receive short permits, and sell nearby; all other tea would be sold by merchants who paid silver, cash, or frontier grain at the Monopoly Goods Office, received certificates, drew tea at the markets, and obtained long permits to sell in designated prefectures. Tax would be stamped when the long permit was issued, recorded along the route, and paid in full only at the destination, so travelers were not detained and squeezed on the road. Purchase capital of three million strings—drawn from ordination certificates, salt vouchers, sealed reserves, and market surplus funds—would be allocated to each circuit, with officials appointed locally to manage the scheme. ” An edict approved the entire proposal.

俄定諸路措置茶事官置司：湖南於潭州，湖北於荊南，淮南於揚州，兩浙於蘇州，江東於江寧府，江西於洪州。其置場所在：蘄州即其州及蘄水縣，壽州以霍山、開順，光州以光山、固始，舒州即其州及羅源、太湖，黃州以麻城，廬州以舒城，常州以宜興，湖州即其州及長興、德清、安吉、武康，睦州即其州及青溪、分水、桐廬、遂安，婺州即其州及東陽、永康、浦江，處州即其州及遂昌、青田，蘇、杭、越各即其州，而越之上虞、餘姚、諸暨、新昌、剡縣皆置焉，衢、台各即其州，而溫州以平陽。大法既定，其製置節目，不可毛舉。四年，京復議更革，遂罷官置場，商旅並即所在州縣或京師給長短引，自買於園戶。茶貯以籠篰，官為抽盤，循第敘輸息訖，批引販賣，茶事益加密矣。

Offices were soon established for circuit tea commissioners: Hunan at Tanzhou, Hubei at Jingnan, Huainan at Yangzhou, Liang-Zhe at Suzhou, Jiangdong at Jiangning, and Jiangxi at Hongzhou. Markets were placed as follows: at Qizhou and Qishui; Huoshan and Kaishun in Shouzhou; Guangshan and Gushi in Guangzhou; Luoyuan and Taihu in Shuzhou; Macheng in Huangzhou; Shucheng in Luzhou; Yixing in Changzhou; Changxing, Deqing, Anji, and Wukang in Huzhou; Qingxi, Fenshui, Tonglu, and Suian in Muzhou; Dongyang, Yongkang, and Pujiang in Wuzhou; Suichang and Qingtian in Chuzhou; markets in Suzhou, Hangzhou, and Yuezhou, with additional sites in Shangyu, Yuyao, Zhuji, Xinchang, and Shan; Quzhou and Taizhou; and Pingyang in Wenzhou. Once the main framework was set, its detailed provisions cannot be listed one by one. In year 4 Jing pushed another overhaul: government markets were abolished, and merchants obtained long or short permits at local prefectures, counties, or the capital and bought directly from growers. Tea was stored in baskets and crates, inspected by officials, graded for interest payments, then stamped for resale—the trade grew ever tighter.

大觀元年，議提舉茶事司須保驗一路所產茶色高下、價直低昂，而請茶短引以地遠近程以三等之期。復慮商旅影挾舊引，冒詐規利，官吏因得擾動，以御筆申飭之。又以諸路再定茶息，多寡或不等，令後各增錢十。三年，計七路一歲之息一百二十五萬一千九百餘緡，榷貨務再歲一百十有八萬五千餘緡。京專用是以舞智固權，自是歲以百萬緡輸京師所供私奉，掊息益厚，盜販公行，民滋病矣。

In Daguan 1 (1107) the tea supervision office was required to certify each circuit's tea grades and prices, and short-permit deadlines were set in three tiers by distance. Fearing merchants would smuggle extra tea under old permits and that officials would exploit the fraud, the emperor issued a written admonition. Because circuits had reset tea interest at uneven rates, each circuit was ordered to add ten cash per unit. In year 3 the seven circuits yielded 1,251,900 strings in annual interest, and the Monopoly Goods Office another 1,185,000 strings over two years. Jing wielded these revenues to display cleverness and tighten his grip, sending a million strings yearly to the capital for private use; extortion deepened, smuggling flourished, and the people suffered more.

政和二年，大增損茶法。凡請長引再行者，輸錢百緡，即往陝西，加二十，茶以百二十斤；短引輸緡錢二十，茶以二十五斤。私造引者如川錢引法。歲春茶出，集民戶約三歲實直及今價上戶部。茶籠篰並皆官制，聽客買，定大小式，嚴封印之法。長短引輒竄改增減及新舊對帶、繳納申展、住賣轉鬻科條悉具。初，客販茶用舊引者，未嚴斤重之限，影帶者眾。於是又詔凡販長引斤重及三千斤者，須更買新引對賣，不及三千斤者，即用新引以一斤帶二斤鬻之，而合同場之法出矣。場置於產茶州軍，而簿給於都茶場。凡不限斤重茶委官司秤製，毋得止憑批引為定，有贏數即沒官，別定新引限程及重商旅規避秤製之禁，凡十八條，若避匿抄劄及擅賣，皆坐以徒。復慮茶法猶輕，課入不羨，定園戶私賣及有引而所賣逾數，保內有犯不告，並如煎鹽亭戶法。短引及食茶關子輒出本路，坐以二千里流，賞錢百萬。

In Zhenghe 2 (1112) the tea law was overhauled again. A second long permit cost one hundred strings; for Shaanxi add twenty, with tea fixed at one hundred twenty jin; short permits cost twenty strings for twenty-five jin of tea. Forging permits was punished under the same rules as Sichuan currency notes. Each spring growers were assembled to fix three-year average and current prices for reporting to the Ministry of Revenue. Official baskets and crates were standardized in size, sold to customers, and subject to strict sealing rules. Statutes covered tampering with permits, pairing old and new certificates, payment extensions, halting sales, and resale transfers in full detail. At first merchants using old permits faced no strict weight limits, and many smuggled extra tea. An edict then required anyone selling three thousand jin on a long permit to buy a new paired permit; below that limit one jin on the new permit could carry two jin of tea—and the contract-market system was introduced. Markets were located in producing prefectures, but ledgers and permits were issued at the capital tea office. All tea had to be weighed by officials, not judged by permits alone; surplus was confiscated; eighteen articles set new permit deadlines and barred merchants from evading the scales; concealing tally slips or unauthorized sales brought penal servitude. Fearing the law was still too lenient and revenue too thin, private sales by growers, excess sales under permit, and neighbors who failed to report violations were punished like salt-boiler households. Taking short permits or tea ration slips outside the home circuit brought exile two thousand li and a reward of one million cash.

陝西舊通蜀茶，崇寧二年，始通東南茶。政和中，陝西沒官茶令估賣，繼以妨商旅，下令焚棄。俄令正茶沒官者聽與販，引外剩茶及私茶數以給告者。長引限以一年，短引限以半歲繳納。久之，令已買引而未得於園戶者，期七年，許民間同見緡流轉，長引聽即本路住賣，以二浙鹽香司有言而止。其科條纖悉紛更，不可勝記，慮商旅疑豫，茶貨不通，乃重扇搖之令。於時掊克之吏，爭以贏羨為功，朝廷亦嚴立比較之法。州郡樂賞畏刑，惟恐負課，優假商人，陵轢州郡，蓋莫有言者。獨邠州通判張益謙奏：“陝西非產茶地，奉行十年，未經立額，歲歲比較，第務增益，稍或虧少，程督如星。州縣懼殿，多前路招誘豪商，增價以幸其來，故陝西茶價，斤有至五六緡者，或稍裁之，則批改文引，轉之他郡。及配之鋪戶，安能盡售？均及稅農，民實受害，徒令豪商坐享大利。 ”言竟不行。

Shaanxi had long traded in Sichuan tea; in Chongning 2 (1103) southeastern tea was first admitted. Under Zhenghe confiscated tea in Shaanxi was ordered sold at appraisal; when that obstructed merchants, the court ordered it burned. Soon confiscated licensed tea could be sold with merchants; surplus beyond permits and quantities of private tea were awarded to informers. Long permits expired in one year; short permits in six months. Later holders who had bought permits but not yet drawn tea from growers were given seven years; private transfer of permits was allowed, and long permits could be held for local resale until the Liang-Zhe Salt and Incense Office objected and the rule was withdrawn. Provisions multiplied and shifted beyond counting; fearing merchants would hesitate and trade would stall, the court again issued reassuring edicts. Extortionate officials competed to report surpluses as merit, and the court imposed strict performance comparisons. Local officials, eager for rewards and fearful of punishment, coddled merchants and bullied their own districts to meet quotas—and almost no one dared object. Only Zhang Yiqian, vice prefect of Binzhou, memorialized: “Shaanxi does not produce tea, yet the law has been enforced for ten years without a fixed quota; yearly comparisons demand ever higher yields, and the slightest shortfall brings relentless pressure. Fearing dismissal, prefectures enticed wealthy merchants with inflated prices, so tea in Shaanxi reached five or six strings per jin; if prices were trimmed, permits were altered and the tea routed to other counties. When tea was forced on retail shops, how could they sell it all? The burden was spread to tax-paying farmers who truly suffered, while wealthy merchants reaped the profit. ” His protest was ignored.

然自茶法更張，至政和六年，收息一千萬緡，茶增一千二百八十一萬五十一百餘斤。及方臘竊發，乃詔權罷比較。臘誅，有司議招集園戶，借貸優恤，止於文具，奸臣仍用事，蠹國害民，又慮人言，扇搖之令復出矣。靖康元年，詔川茶侵客茶地者，以多寡差定其罪。

From the overhaul through Zhenghe 6 (1116), however, interest reached ten million strings and tea volume rose by more than 12.81 million jin. When Fang La's rebellion erupted, the court temporarily suspended performance comparisons. After Fang La was killed, officials debated relief loans for growers, but it remained paperwork; corrupt ministers still ruled, draining the state and harming the people, and reassuring edicts were issued again for fear of public criticism. In Jingkang 1 (1126) an edict fixed penalties for Sichuan tea encroaching on other regions according to the amount involved.

初，熙寧五年，以福建茶陳積，乃詔福建茶在京、京東西、淮南、陝西、河東仍禁榷，餘路通商。元豐七年，王子京為福建轉運副使，言“建州臘茶，舊立榷法，自熙寧權聽通商，自此茶戶售客人茶甚良，官中所得惟常茶，稅錢極微，南方遺利，無過於此，乞仍舊行榷法。建州歲出茶不下三百萬斤，南劍州亦不下二十餘萬斤，欲盡買入官，度逐州軍民戶多少及約鄰路民用之數計置，即官場賣，嚴立告賞禁。建州賣私末茶，借豐國監錢十萬緡為本。 ”並從之；所請均入諸路榷賣，委轉運司官提舉：福建王子京，兩浙許懋，江東杜偉，江西朱彥博，廣東高鎛，然子京蓋未免抑配於民。

Initially, in Xining 5 (1072), stale Fujian tea stockpiles led the court to keep Fujian tea under monopoly in the capital, Jingdong, Huainan, Shaanxi, and Hedong while allowing free trade elsewhere. In the seventh year of Yuanfeng (1084) Wang Zijing, Fujian transport vice commissioner, argued: “Jianzhou tribute tea was once monopolized; since Xining free trade has let growers sell their best tea to merchants while the state receives only ordinary grades for a pittance—no greater loss in the south; we ask that the monopoly be restored. Jianzhou produces at least three million jin yearly and Nanjian over two hundred thousand; we propose buying it all for government sale after estimating local population and neighboring demand, with strict informer rewards and prohibitions. Jianzhou's sale of private powdered tea would be capitalized with one hundred thousand strings borrowed from the Fengguo Directorate. ” The court approved all of it; The request was approved for monopoly sales across circuits under transport commissioners: Wang Zijing in Fujian, Xu Mao in Liang-Zhe, Du Wei in Jiangdong, Zhu Yanbo in Jiangxi, and Gao Bang in Guangdong—though Zijing still imposed forced quotas on the people.

時遠方若桂州修仁諸縣、夔州路達州有司皆議榷茶，言利者踵相躡，然神宗聞鄂州失催茶稅，輒蠲之。建州園戶等以茶粗濫當剝納，為錢三萬六千餘緡，慮其不能償，令準輸茶。初，成都帥司蔡延慶言邛部川蠻主苴克等願賣馬，即詔延慶以茶招來，後聞邊計蠻情非便，即罷之。哲宗嗣位，御史安惇首劾王子京買臘茶抑民，詔罷子京事任，令福建禁榷州軍視其舊，餘並通商。桂州修仁等縣禁榷及陝西碎賣芽茶皆罷。

Distant districts such as Xiuren in Guizhou and Dazhou in Kuizhou also debated tea monopolies as profit-seekers piled on, yet when Shenzong learned that Ezhou had failed to collect tea tax, he promptly remitted it. Jianzhou growers faced a levy of more than thirty-six thousand strings for inferior tea they could not pay in cash, so the court allowed payment in tea instead. Initially Chengdu commissioner Cai Yanqing reported that Qiong-Bu-Chuan chief Juke wished to sell horses, and the court ordered tea used to attract them; when frontier officials judged the policy unwise, it was dropped. When Zhezong succeeded, Censor An Dun impeached Wang Zijing for buying tribute tea and oppressing the people; Zijing was removed, Fujian monopoly districts reverted to prior rules, and the rest returned to free trade. Monopolies in Xiuren and other Guizhou counties and Shaanxi's retail sale of bud tea were abolished.

崇寧二年，尚書有言：“建、劍二州茶額七十餘萬斤，近歲增盛，而本錢多不繼。 ”詔更給度牒四百，仍給以諸色封樁。繼詔商旅販臘茶蠲其稅，私販者治元售之家，如元豐之製。臘茶舊法免稅，大觀三年，措置茶事，始收焉。四年，私販勿治元售之家，如元符令。政和初，復增損為新法。三年，詔免輸短引，許依長引於諸路住賣，後末骨茶每長引增五百斤，短引仿此；諸路監司、州郡公使食茶禁私買，聽依商旅買引。六年，詔福建茶園如鹽田，量土地產茶多寡，依等第均稅。重和元年，以改給免稅新引，重定福建末茶斤重，長引以六百斤為率。

In Chongning 2 the Secretariat reported: “Jian and Nanjian produce over seven hundred thousand jin yearly, output has grown, but purchase capital often runs short. ” The court issued four hundred more ordination certificates and additional sealed-reserve funds. A follow-up edict exempted merchants' tribute-tea sales from tax and punished private trafficking at the source household, as under Yuanfeng rules. Tribute tea had been tax-exempt; in Daguan 3 (1109) the tea administration began collecting tax on it. In year 4 private trafficking no longer punished the source household, per Yuanfu rules. At the start of Zhenghe the law was revised again. In year 3 an edict waived short-permit fees and allowed sales under long permits across circuits; later powdered tea added five hundred jin per long permit, with short permits following suit; circuit commissioners and prefectural envoys were barred from private tea purchases and had to buy permits like merchants. In year 6 Fujian tea gardens were taxed like salt fields, with rates set by graded land productivity. In Chonghe 1 (1118) new tax-exempt permits were issued and Fujian powdered-tea weights were reset, with long permits fixed at six hundred jin.

元豐中，宋用臣都提舉汴河堤岸，創奏修置水磨。凡在京茶戶擅磨末茶者有禁，並許赴官請買。而茶鋪入米豆雜物揉和者募人告，一兩賞三千，及一斤十千，至五十千止。商賈販茶應往府界及在京師，須令產茶山場州軍給引，並赴京場中賣，犯者依私販臘茶法。諸路末茶入府界者，復嚴為之禁。訖元豐末，歲獲息不過二十萬，商旅病焉。

During Yuanfeng Song Yongchen, director of Bian River embankments, proposed building water-powered tea mills. Capital tea dealers were forbidden to grind powdered tea privately but could apply to buy from the government mills. Tea shops adulterating tea with grain or beans faced informer rewards of three thousand cash per liang detected, ten thousand per jin, up to fifty thousand. Merchants selling tea in the metropolitan circuit or capital had to obtain permits from producing districts and sell at capital markets; violators were punished like illegal tribute-tea traffickers. Powdered tea from other circuits entering the metropolitan region was again strictly banned. By the end of Yuanfeng annual profit barely reached two hundred thousand strings, and merchants suffered under the system.

元祐初，寬茶法，議者欲罷水磨。戶部侍郎李定以失歲課，持不可廢；侍御史劉摯、右司諫蘇轍等相繼論奏，遂罷。紹聖初，章惇等用事，首議修復水磨。乃詔即京、索、大源等河為之，以孫迥提舉，復命兼提舉汴河堤岸。四年，場官錢景逢獲息十六萬餘緡，呂安中二十一萬餘緡，以差議賞。元符元年，戶部上凡獲私末茶並雜和者，即犯者未獲，估價給賞，並如私臘茶獲犯人法。雜和茶宜棄者，斤特給二十錢，至十緡止。

Early in Yuanyou the tea law was relaxed and some officials proposed abolishing the water mills. Vice Minister of Revenue Li Ding argued they could not be abolished without losing annual revenue; Attendant Censor Liu Zhi, Remonstrator Su Zhe, and others memorialized in turn, and the mills were abolished. Early in Shaosheng, with Zhang Dun in power, officials first moved to restore the water mills. Edicts placed mills on the Jing, Suo, Dayuan, and other rivers under Sun Jiong, who was also reappointed to oversee Bian River embankments. In year 4 market officer Qian Jingfeng reported profit of more than 160,000 strings and Lü Anzhong more than 210,000; rewards were set by rank. In Yuanfu 1 (1098) the Ministry of Revenue ruled that seized private powdered or adulterated tea merited appraisal rewards even if the offender escaped, under the same rules as illegal tribute-tea cases. For adulterated tea to be destroyed, informers received twenty cash per jin detected, up to ten strings.

初，元豐中修置水磨，止於在京及開封府界諸縣，未始行於外路。及紹聖復置，其後遂於京西鄭、滑、潁昌府，河北澶州皆行之，又將即濟州山口營置。崇寧二年，提舉京城茶場所奏：“紹聖初，興復水磨，歲收二十六萬餘緡。四年，於長葛等處京、索、潩水河增修磨二百六十餘所，自輔郡榷法罷，遂失其利，請復舉行。 ”從之。尋詔商販臘茶入京城者，本場盡買之，其翻引出外者，收堆垛錢。裁元豐製更立新額，歲買山場草茶以五百萬斤為率。客茶至京者，許官場買十之三，即索價故高，驗元引買價量增。三年，詔罷之。

Initially Yuanfeng mills were built only in the capital and Kaifeng metropolitan counties, not in outer circuits. After Shaosheng restoration they spread to Zhengzhou, Huazhou, and Yingchang in Jingxi and Cao Prefecture in Hebei, with plans for a site at Jizhou Shankou. In Chongning 2 the capital tea-market supervisor reported: “When Shaosheng restored the mills, annual revenue exceeded 260,000 strings. In year 4 more than 260 mills were added along the Jing, Suo, and Weishui rivers near Changge; when the auxiliary-commandery monopoly ended, profits vanished—we ask that the mills be restored. ” The request was approved. Soon an edict required the capital market to buy all tribute tea brought in by merchants and charged storage fees for tea taken back out under permit. Yuanfeng rules were trimmed and new quotas set, with annual purchases of mountain-field rough tea fixed at five million jin. Merchants bringing tea to the capital had to sell three-tenths to the government depot, which drove up prices; purchase amounts on Yuanfeng permits were raised accordingly. In year 3 an edict abolished the measure.

明年，改令磨戶承歲課視酒戶納曲錢法。五年，復罷民戶磨茶，官用水磨仍依元豐法，應緣茶事並隸都提舉汴河堤岸司。大觀元年，改以提舉茶事司為名，尋命茶場、茶事通為一司。三年，復撥隸京城所，一用舊法。政和元年，京城所請商旅販茶起引定入京住賣者，即許借江入汴，如元豐舊制；其借江入汴卻指他路住賣者禁，已請引者並令赴京。二年，以課入不登，商賈留滯，詔以其事歸尚書省。於是尚書省言：“水磨茶自元豐創立，止行於近畿，昨乃分配諸路，以故至弊，欲止行於京城，仍行通客販，餘路水磨並罷。 ”從之。四年，收息四百萬貫有奇，比舊三倍，遂創月進。

The next year mill households were made to bear the annual levy on the model of distillers paying yeast-money dues. In year 5 private milling was abolished again; official water mills followed Yuanfeng rules, and all tea affairs were placed under the metropolitan Bian River embankment office. In Daguan 1 (1107) it was renamed the Tea Affairs Supervisory Office, and soon tea markets and tea administration were merged into one agency. In year 3 authority reverted to the Capital Markets Office and former practice was restored in full. In Zhenghe 1 (1111) the Capital Markets Office asked that merchants who took out permits to bring tea into the capital for local sale be allowed, as under Yuanfeng, to use the Yangtze route into the Bian; but those who used that route yet planned to sell in other circuits were forbidden, and holders of existing permits were ordered to the capital. In year 2, with revenues falling short and merchants stuck in transit, an edict returned tea administration to the Ministry of Revenue. The ministry then reported: “Water-mill tea, introduced in Yuanfeng, had worked only in the capital region; spreading it to every circuit caused the worst abuses. We propose limiting mills to the capital, keeping open trade to merchants, and abolishing mills elsewhere.” The proposal was approved. In year 4 profits exceeded four million strings—triple the former take—and monthly deliveries to court were instituted.

高宗建炎初，於真州印鈔，給賣東南茶鹽。當是時，茶之產於東南者，浙東西、江東西、湖南北、福建、淮南、廣東西，路十，州六十有六，縣二百四十有二。霅川顧渚生石上者謂之紫筍，毗陵之陽羨，紹興之日鑄，婺源之謝源，隆興之黃龍、雙井，皆絕品也。建炎三年，置行在都茶場，罷合同場十有八，惟洪、江、興國、潭、建各置場一，監官一。罷食茶小引，捕私茶法視捕私鹽。二十一年，秦檜等始進《茶鹽法》。先是，臣僚或因事建明，朝廷亦因時損益，至是審訂成書，上之。

Early in Jianyan, Gaozong's court printed notes at Zhen Prefecture to fund sales of southeastern tea and salt. At that time southeastern tea came from ten circuits—eastern and western Zhe, Jiang, Hunan, Fujian, Huainan, and Guang—spanning sixty-six prefectures and 242 counties. Famed grades included Purple Shoot from stone-grown Guzhu tea in Zha, Yangxian from Piling, Rizhu from Shaoxing, Xieyuan from Wuyuan, and Huanglong and Shuangjing from Longxing. In Jianyan 3 the court set up a metropolitan tea market at the temporary capital, closed eighteen joint-contract depots, and retained one market and one supervisor each at Hong, Jiang, Xingguo, Tan, and Jian. Small permits for household tea were abolished, and penalties for illegal tea matched those for illegal salt. In year 21 Qin Hui and others first submitted the Tea and Salt Code. Officials had long proposed piecemeal reforms and the court had adjusted policy as needed; now the rules were reviewed, codified, and submitted.

孝宗隆興二年，淮東宣諭錢端禮言：“商販長引茶，水路不許過高郵，陸路不許過天長。如願往楚州及盱眙界，引貼輸翻引錢十貫五百文；如又過淮北，貼輸亦如之。 ”當是時，商販自榷場轉入虜中，其利至博，幾禁雖嚴，而民之犯法者自若也。乾道二年，戶部言：“商販至淮北榷場折博，除輸翻引錢，更輸通貨儈息錢十一緡五百文。 ”八年，減輸翻引錢止七緡，通貨儈見錢止八緡。淳熙二年，以長短茶引權以半依原引斤重錢數，分作四緡小引印給，而翻引貼輸錢隨小引輸送。光宗紹熙初，漳州守臣朱熹奏除屬邑科茶七千餘緡。臣僚申明長短小引相兼，從人之便。戶部言給賣小引，除金銀、會子分數入輸，餘願專以會子算請者聽。

In Longxing 2 (1164) Huaidong commissioner Qian Duanli proposed: “Tea on long permits may not pass Gaoyou by water or Tianchang by land. Merchants bound for Chuzhou or the Xuyi frontier must pay a supplemental permit fee of ten strings and five hundred cash; and the same fee applies for crossing north of the Huai.” Yet merchants still funneled tea from monopoly markets into Jurchen territory for vast profit, and despite strict bans illegal trade continued unchecked. In Qiandao 2 (1166) the Ministry of Revenue ruled that merchants bartering at north-of-Huai monopoly markets must pay, beyond supplemental permit fees, a brokerage charge of eleven strings and five hundred cash. In year 8 supplemental permit fees were cut to seven strings and the brokerage charge to eight strings cash. In Chunxi 2 (1175) long and short tea permits were temporarily split in half by weight and fee, reissued as four-string small permits, with supplemental fees paid on the small-permit basis. Early in Shaoxi, Zhangzhou prefect Zhu Xi memorialized to abolish tea levies totaling more than seven thousand strings in subordinate counties. Officials ruled that long and short small permits could be used together for merchants' convenience. The ministry allowed small permits to be bought partly in gold, silver, or huizi paper notes, with the balance payable entirely in huizi if the merchant chose.

寧宗嘉泰四年，知隆興府韓邈奏請：“隆興府惟分寧縣產茶，他縣無茶，而豪民武斷者乃請引，窮索一鄉，使認茶租，非便。 ”於是禁非產茶縣不許民擅認茶租。

In Jiatai 4 (1204) Longxing prefect Han Miao reported: “Only Fenning County in Longxing produces tea, yet local strongmen obtain permits and squeeze whole townships for tea rents where no tea grows. ” The court then barred counties without tea production from allowing private claims to tea rent.

建寧臘茶，北苑為第一，其最佳者曰社前，次曰火前，又曰雨前，所以供玉食，備賜予。太平興國始置，大觀以後製愈精，數愈多，胯式屢變，而品不一，歲貢片茶二十一萬六千斤。建炎以來，葉濃、楊等相因為亂，園丁亡散，遂罷之。紹興二年，蠲未起大龍鳳茶一千七百二十八斤。五年，復減大龍鳳及京鋌之半。十二年，興榷場，遂取臘茶為榷場本，凡胯、截、片、鋌，不以高下多少，官盡榷之，申嚴私販入海之禁。議者請鬻建茶於臨安，移茶司事於建州買發。明年，以失陷引錢，復令通商。自是上供龍鳳、京鋌茶料，凡製作之費、篚笥之式，令漕司專之。

Among Jianning tribute teas Beiyuan ranked first; its finest grades were Before the Sacrifice, then Before the Fire, then Before the Rain, reserved for the imperial table and court gifts. The garden was founded in Taiping Xingguo; after Daguan craftsmanship grew finer, output larger, and cake molds ever-changing, with grades proliferating, annual tribute reached 216,000 jin of compressed tea. Since Jianyan rebellions led by Ye Nong, Yang, and others scattered the gardeners, the imperial garden was abandoned. In Shaoxing 2 (1132) the court remitted 1,728 jin of Great Dragon-Phoenix tea not yet tendered. In year 5 Great Dragon-Phoenix and capital ingot tribute were halved again. In year 12 monopoly markets opened, tribute tea became their stock-in-trade, and the state monopolized every grade of cake, section, slice, and ingot tea while tightening bans on private export by sea. Advisers proposed selling Jian tea at Lin'an and moving procurement to Jian Prefecture. The next year, with permit revenues falling short, free trade was restored. Thereafter transport commissioners alone handled production costs and hamper styles for tribute Dragon-Phoenix and capital ingot teas.

蜀茶之細者，其品視南方已下，惟廣漢之趙坡，合州之水南，峨眉之白牙，雅安之蒙頂，土人亦珍之，但所產甚微，非江、建比也。舊無榷禁，熙寧間，始置提舉司，收歲課三十萬；至元豐中，累增至百萬。建炎元年，成都轉運判官趙開言榷茶、買馬五害，請“用嘉祐故事盡罷榷茶，而令漕司買馬。或未能然，亦當減額以蘇園戶，輕價以惠行商，如此則私販衰而盜賊息。 ”遂以開同主管川、秦茶馬。二年，開至成都，大更茶法，仿蔡京都茶場法，以引給茶商，即園戶市茶，百斤為一大引，除其十勿算。置合同場以譏其出入，重私商之禁，為茶市以通交易。每斤引錢春七十、夏五十，市利頭子錢不預焉。所過征一錢，所止一錢五分。自後引息錢至一百五萬緡。至十七年，都大茶馬韓球盡取園戶加饒之茶為額，茶司歲收二百萬，而買馬之數不加多。

Fine Shu teas ranked below southeastern grades; only Zhaopo in Guanghan, Shuinan in Hezhou, Baiya on Emei, and Mengding in Ya'an were locally prized, yet output was tiny compared with Jiangnan or Jianning. Tea had once been free of monopoly; in Xining a supervisory office was set up, yielding three hundred thousand strings annually; by Yuanfeng cumulative receipts reached one million. In Jianyan 1 Chengdu transport vice-commissioner Zhao Kai listed five harms of the tea monopoly and horse trade, asking “to follow the Jiayou precedent by ending tea monopoly and letting transport offices buy horses. Failing that, quotas should be cut to relieve growers and prices lowered for merchants, so smuggling would fall and banditry subside.” Kai was then appointed to supervise Sichuan and Qin tea and horse affairs. In year 2 Kai reached Chengdu and overhauled tea law on Cai Jing's capital model: merchants received permits, bought from growers, and took one great permit per hundred jin with ten jin tax-free. Joint-contract depots inspected traffic, private trade was strictly banned, and public tea markets were opened for exchange. Permit fees were seventy cash per jin in spring and fifty in summer, excluding market surcharges. Transit dues were one cash per jin; stopping dues one and a half. Permit revenues later reached 1.5 million strings. By year 17 grand commissioner Han Qiu counted growers' bonus tea toward quotas; the tea office took in two million strings yearly while horse purchases barely rose.

乾道末年，青羌作亂，茶司增長細馬名色等錢歲三十萬。淳熙六年以後，累減園戶重額錢十六萬，又減引息錢十六萬。至紹熙初，楊輔為使，遂定為法。成都府、利州路二十三場，歲產茶二千一百二萬斤，通博馬物帛歲收錢二百四十九萬三千餘緡。朝廷歲以一百一十三萬緡隸總領所贍軍，然茶馬司率多難之；乾道以後，歲撥止一二十萬緡，至淳熙十年，遂以五十萬緡為準。

Late in Qiandao, after Qing Qiang revolted, the tea office added three hundred thousand strings yearly in fees for fine horses and related charges. After Chunxi 6 growers' excess-quota payments were cut by 160,000 strings in all, and permit-interest fees by another 160,000. Early in Shaoxi commissioner Yang Fu codified the revised rates as permanent law. Twenty-three markets in Chengdu and Lizhou produced 21.2 million jin of tea yearly and took in 2,493,000-odd strings from horse barter and related trade. The court diverted 1,130,000 strings yearly to the general supervisory office for army support, a levy the tea-horse office often resisted; after Qiandao annual transfers fell to about 120,000 strings, and by Chunxi 10 the quota was fixed at 500,000 strings.

宋初，經理蜀茶，置互市於原、渭、德順三郡，以市蕃夷之馬；熙寧間，又置場於熙河。南渡以來，文、黎、珍、敘、南平、長寧、階、和凡八場，其間盧甘蕃馬歲一至焉，洮州蕃馬或一月或兩月一至焉，疊州蕃馬或半年或三月一至焉，皆良馬也。其他諸蕃馬多駑，大率皆以互市為利，宋朝曲示懷遠之恩，亦以是羈縻之。紹興二十四年，復黎州及雅州碉門靈犀砦易馬場。乾道初，川、秦八場馬額九千餘匹，淳熙以來，為額萬二千九百九十四匹，自後所市未嚐及焉。

Early in the dynasty Shu tea was organized and mutual markets opened in Yuan, Wei, and Deshun to buy tribal horses; in Xining a market was added at Xihe as well. After the court moved south eight markets operated—at Wen, Li, Zhen, Xu, Nanping, Changning, Jie, and He—supplying fine horses from Lugan yearly, from Taozhou monthly or bimonthly, and from Diezhou every three to six months. Most other tribal horses were poor nags; tribes profited chiefly from trade, and the Song court cultivated favor and loose-rein control through these markets. In Shaoxing 24 (1154) horse markets were restored at Lizhou and at Diaomen Lingxi stockade in Yazhou. Early in Qiandao the eight Sichuan and Qin markets were allotted more than nine thousand horses; since Chunxi the quota rose to 12,994, yet purchases never met even that figure.

Cite this Chapter