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Volume 190 Treatises 143: Military 4

Chapter 190 of 宋史 · History of Song
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1
Local Militia, Part 1
2
使西調 西使 西 便
Local militia were drawn from household registers or recruited among local inhabitants, then organized and drilled in their districts to serve as defensive forces. During the Later Zhou reign era Guangshun, tax-registered households in Qin Prefecture were drafted into the Baoyi corps, and the Song continued the system. Beginning in the fourth year of Jianlong, imperial envoys were sent in turn to the Guanxi circuit to mobilize local militia for Qing Prefecture. In the fourth year of Xianping, each tax-registered household in Shaanxi was required to furnish one man, called a Baoyi; the state issued grain and stipends and had them take turns on frontier garrison duty. In the fifth year, the number of able-bodied men along the Shaanxi frontier enrolled as Baoyi reached 68,775. In the seventh month, because recruiting soldiers away from home was thought to disturb local harmony, an edict ruled that households drafted as stalwart militia in each prefecture should pay taxes only within that prefecture, and officials were forbidden to redirect collection elsewhere. Previously in Hebei, men in the Loyal Martyrs and Manifest Valor corps who had no successor could not be struck from the rolls even when old or infirm. On this occasion an edict declared that hereafter men who truly lacked a household estate to supply a replacement might be discharged as they wished. From then until the Tianxi era, among the Broad Sharp troops of Bing and Dai, substitutes were allowed for aged or sick soldiers even when not related, provided someone was willing to take their place. For Hebei stalwart militia, to avoid disrupting the farming season, they were assembled and drilled only on the ten-day rest days between the tenth month and the first month. Vacancies left when Loyal Martyrs, Manifest Valor, or Broad Sharp men returned to farming were all filled by replacements dispatched from the capital; those who had garrisoned the Yellow River frontier for many years were specially rotated and reassigned; and men who were poor and alone and could not afford to find a substitute were to be certified locally and released from service.
3
西西西西西
At that time the empire fielded a patchwork of local forces: Shenrui, Loyal Valor, and stalwart militia in Hebei and Hedong; Loyal Obedience troops and scouts in Hebei; Baoyi, stockade households, scouts, and scout bowmen in Shaanxi; archers in Hedong and Shaanxi; righteous volunteers in eastern Hebei and Shaanxi; righteous troops at Lin; native and sturdy levies in Chuan-Shaan; crossbowmen and native levies in northern and southern Jinghu; spearmen and native levies in eastern and western Guangnan; stream-cave sturdy youths and native levies at Yong; and sturdy youths again in eastern and western Guangnan.
4
西西 西
By Emperor Renzong's reign, Shenrui, Loyal Valor, and stalwart militia had long since lapsed, and only remnants of Loyal Obedience and Baoyi remained. Early in the Kangding era, the court ordered fresh enrollment of stalwart militia in Hebei and Hedong—293,000 in Hebei and 144,000 in Hedong—all to be trained on a regular schedule. After repeated defeats in the western campaigns left the regular army short-handed, the state registered Shaanxi inhabitants, selecting one man from every three, as local bowmen. Before long they were branded and drafted into the Baojie corps as 185 commands, posted to garrison frontier prefectures. When the western war ended, most were screened out and released. In the second year of Qingli the state registered Hebei stalwart militia, mustering 295,000 men; seven-tenths were chosen as righteous volunteers, and additional civilian males were enrolled to fill the gaps. Hedong applied the same selection and enrollment procedures as Hebei.
5
西使 便使 便
Later commentators argued that righteous volunteers were Hebei's hidden reserve: drilled on schedule, they required no state granaries, reviving the ancient ideal of soldiers living among farmers. Yet they regretted that the men were tied to individual prefectures and used only for local garrison duty. If Xing and Ji in Hebei were split into eastern and western commands under two prefects who drilled them on schedule, invaders would find volunteers from both routes converging at once to strike front and rear—then more than thirty Hebei districts would always have elite troops in reserve.' The court circulated the proposal; Hebei commander Li Zhaoliang and others replied: 'In Tang times the Ze-Lu commissioner Li Baozhen enrolled household males, taking one in three; in slack farming seasons they drilled by squads in archery contests, and at year's end the whole force was tested for rewards and punishments. Within three years every man could shoot well, and the circuit fielded 20,000 crack troops. Without granary costs the treasury grew richer; they outfitted armor and weapons and came to dominate Shandong. All under Heaven then hailed the Zhaoyi infantry as the finest in the realm—a striking recent precedent—yet some still claim militia can only hold cities and cannot fight in the field; that is no universal rule. Yet to split the volunteers into two commands in peacetime, with officials over each, merely to display military might would invite enemy suspicion abroad and unsettle the people at home—not a sound plan. For the present let each district muster and train them; in two or three years their skills will sharpen and they will gradually learn field maneuvers. When danger comes, put a commander like Baozhen in charge, set their formations, and enforce rewards and punishments—what foe could they not face? As for deploying units, sizing up the enemy, and adapting on the spot—that must be left to commanders in the moment and cannot be charted beforehand. Besides, Hebei and Hedong are frontier regions where each prefecture maintains its own volunteers and county officials inspect them on schedule; commanders already know the men, so deployments raise no doubts.' The court adopted their recommendation.
6
西西西 西 西
In the first year of Zhiping, Chief Councilor Han Qi said: 'In antiquity civilians were registered as soldiers; though their numbers were vast, state support was meager. The Tang fubing system came closest to that ideal, yet once abolished it could never be revived. Today's righteous volunteers number nearly 150,000 in Hebei and 80,000 in Hedong—fierce, honest men by nature, with farms, families, and property at stake; with a little more drilling, how would they differ from Tang fubing? Shaanxi once branded bowmen into the Baojie corps; Hebei, Hedong, and Shaanxi all secure the northwest and ought to be handled as one system. I ask that Shaanxi prefectures enroll righteous volunteers too, branding only the back of the hand; there will be brief local disruption, but lasting gain in the end.' The emperor accepted his advice and ordered enrollment of Shaanxi righteous volunteers, mustering 138,465 men.
7
西 使 ' ' 退 西
At this time Remonstrance Official Sim Guang repeatedly memorialized: 'Shaanxi had just enrolled local bowmen after promising they would never leave home. Then they were branded as Baojie regulars and posted to frontier prefectures; later, found useless, they were discharged as civilians, throwing the whole circuit into turmoil with no gain for the state. Besides, when our founding emperors pacified the realm, did they ever rely on righteous volunteers? Since Zhao Yuanhao's rebellion, commanders have lost army after army, yet never led even a single brigade into Tangut territory. At that time the three circuits fielded hundreds of thousands of local militia—when did they contribute the strength of a single soldier? Advocates will surely say: 'Hebei and Hedong need no state rations, yet yield hundreds of thousands of crack troops drilled to perfection—all fit for battle; and soldiers drawn from the people match ancient practice. I say otherwise. Those hundreds of thousands are paper figures; their flawless drills are mere show; and troops 'from the people' share the ancient label but not the ancient reality. Prefectures and counties, obeying the court, chase head counts alone. On inspection days spectators see bright banners, full drums and gongs, neat ranks, and crisp maneuvers, and assume they are battle-ready. They do not realize it is still pageantry; faced with the enemy they would scatter like stars, each man fleeing wherever he could. In antiquity soldiers lived on their own farming income, so at home they were prosperous and in the field they fought as elites. Today farmers' grain and cloth feed the regular army while their bodies are enrolled as militia—one household is taxed to sustain two armies. How can popular wealth and strength fail to buckle under such a burden? I hold that even the already branded men of Hebei and Hedong ought to be sent home—how much more the unbranded people of Shaanxi?' The emperor would not listen. Thereafter among the three circuits' local forces, righteous volunteers alone flourished most.
8
沿
From the Xining reforms onward the court especially emphasized tribal auxiliaries and the baojia system, while most other arrangements followed earlier practice. Earlier evolution is not rehearsed in full; only changes of real consequence are recorded here. After the court moved south, though territory shrank, military institutions largely persisted; relevant changes to local and stockade militia are noted in the sections below.
9
西
Shaanxi Baoyi Militia
10
西
In Kaibao 8 the state drafted men from Pingliang and Panyuan in Wei Prefecture to repair fortifications and enrolled them as Baoyi archers, posted to frontier forts and stockades. Men who furnished their own horses were exempt from labor service. Deserters and the dead were replaced by relatives, following the Later Zhou Guangshun precedent.
11
使綿 西沿
Early in Xianping only 1,000 men were posted on Qin's outer frontier, serving in rotating shifts. Active-duty men received six dou of grain per month; in mid-winter commanders through deputy squad leaders were given purple damask cotton robes and junior leaders black damask robes. In the fifth year the state drafted 68,000 able-bodied frontier men in Shaanxi as Baoyi. They received rations and garrisoned frontier prefectures alongside regular troops.
12
Early in Qingli an edict branded them all into the Baojie corps; Qin alone added 3,000 men, and Huan, Qing, and Bao'an each enrolled their own contingents. At that time the prefectures together fielded 6,518 men in 31 commands.
13
西
In Huangyou 5 Jingyuan supreme commander Cheng Zhan reported: 'Shaanxi Baoyi lately serve only as corvée labor for local governments and are no longer drilled in arms. Even after branding as Baojie, families remain on Baoyi registers; some sell land cheaply, and buyers must share corvée duty in proportion. Qin now has only 3,000 men who have long neglected farming; I ask that the corps be abolished and the men released.' An edict declared that anyone who privately impressed them into service would be punished under the statutes on unlawful hiring. Early in Zhiping holders of Baoyi land quotas were all selected and branded as righteous volunteers. In Xining 4 the court abolished the corps.
14
In year 9 stockade households and scout bowmen of Huan and Qing were ordered to follow forbidden-army rules, report their rolls to the Horse Army Directorate, and receive rations equal to middle-grade palace troops.
15
Hebei Loyal Obedience Troops
16
沿
From Taizong's reign Loyal Obedience corps of 3,000 were raised in Ying, Mo, Xiong, Ba, Qianning, Shun'an, and Baoding, rotating on patrol under the frontier war-boat patrol office. From the tenth month all reported for duty with two sheng of grain per man until the second month, when half the men rotated home to farm. In Qingli 7 Xia Song proposed posting them alongside regular troops. In the eighth year floods drove many to desert, and regular troops temporarily filled the gaps. In Huangyou 4 they were temporarily sent back to farming and never refilled.
17
西
Hebei and Shaanxi Scouts and Stockade Households
18
西 使
Scouts, stockade households, and scout bowmen in Hebei and Shaanxi went under various names. In Xianping 4 the state recruited Hebei men who knew Khitan routes and were bold enough for scouting, appointing squad chiefs and commanders. In peacetime they lived scattered in the countryside; when raiders came they were called up, issued arms, rations, and pay, and sent across the border to strike enemy camps; head counts and captured horses were rewarded on the bounty scale. All enemy goods and livestock they captured were theirs to keep. In Qingli 2 Huan Prefecture enrolled them too, branding the back of the hand; men supplied arms and horses; officers, squad heads, and team leaders were appointed; households of the fourth rank or lower were exempt from corvée; on active duty they garrisoned the frontier with monthly stipends. In the third year every frontier city and stockade on the Jingyuan circuit had them in place.
19
沿
Huan and Qing also fielded stockade households; in Kangding frontier bowmen were branded on the hand and called up when alarms sounded, like the Baoyi archers.
20
西
Dashun City and Xigu Stockade had scout bowmen recruited between Tianxi and Qingli who rotated as frontier scouts with a daily grain ration. Each man was granted eighty mu of land; those who furnished their own horses received forty mu more. During the autumn defense season the state issued armor, and between rotations they drilled with the army. They were organized into six commands.
21
Hebei and Hedong Stalwart Militia
22
使 使退
Stalwart militia in Hebei and Hedong dated to the Five Dynasties, when Ying, Ba, and other prefectures first raised them. In Xianping 3 the court ordered Hebei households to enroll stalwart militia by male count: one man from households of two or three sons, two from four or five, three from six or seven, and four from eight or more. Every five hundred men formed a command under a commander; every hundred formed a company with chief and deputy heads and four rank officers. Each district kept rolls, promoting skilled riders and archers as squad leaders; men who supplied their own horses were allowed to do so, and the best armored fighters were exempt from household corvée. In the fifth year the brave were recruited, grouped as palisade auxiliaries to the main army, and issued government armor. In Jingde 1 envoys were sent to Hebei and Hedong to muster stalwart militia, issue arsenal arms and grain for training, drill interior districts in rotating shifts, mass everyone for city defense when raiders came, and send them back to the fields when raiders withdrew.
23
使
By early Kangding local governments had stopped inspecting drills and most rolls were lost. An edict ordered both circuits to refill the ranks, increase numbers, and form five-man mutual-security groups to report idlers and criminals. Twenty-five men formed a platoon under a supervising officer; four platoons formed a company with chief and deputy heads; five companies formed a command under a commander, with rank determining subordination. Men entered the rolls at twenty and left at sixty, replaced by relatives or other households. Each first month counties forwarded rolls to prefectures, prefectures reported to the Ministry of War, and violators were prosecuted. In Qingli 2 all were screened for righteous volunteer service; men not selected were released but kept on the rolls for wall repair and garrison duty. Hedong stalwart militia thereafter gradually lapsed.
24
Hebei recruits had been given pond and river-silt land they could not farm, and the burden of rotating drills made few men volunteer. In Xining 7 the system was abolished; the land was rented to farmers at two qing per household with tax remission for the baojia system.
25
西
Hedong and Shaanxi Frontier Archers
26
西
Hedong and Shaanxi frontier archers began in Later Zhou Guangshun, when Zhen Prefecture drafted one brave man from every ten households while the other nine supplied arms, armor, fodder, and grain. In Jianlong 2 an edict discharged all 1,400 of them.
27
使使
In Jingde 2 Zhenrong commander Cao Wei proposed granting idle land and tax exemption to border volunteers enrolled as archers so that, when alarms sounded, they could serve as vanguard alongside regulars without state expense for rations or arms.' The court ruled that each man received two qing of land and furnished one armored soldier, while holders of three qing also furnished a war horse. Forts were built, units organized, officers appointed through commander rank, meritorious men promoted even to army commander, and patrol inspectors placed over them.' Thereafter Fuyan, Huan-Qing, Jingyuan, and Hedong circuits each raised their own archer corps.
28
使 使便
During the Qingli era the circuits together fielded 32,474 archers in 192 commands. At this time Hedong transport commissioner Ouyang Xiu urged recruiting settlers to farm the twenty or thirty thousand qing of frontier land in Dai, Kelan, Ninghua, and Huoshan as archers.' The court referred the plan to Pacification Commissioner Fan Zhongyan, who approved it. Settlers were then recruited to farm forbidden land at Caocheng River north of Kelan, ten li beyond the enemy border; more than 2,000 households paid tens of thousands of hu in rent yearly, supplied their own bows and horses, and were branded on the hand as archers. The scheme was soon halted when Bing Prefecture's Ming Hao blocked it.
29
便
In Zhihe 2 Han Qi argued that Ming Hao was mistaken: 'When Pan Mei, troubled by repeated Khitan raids, drove frontier farmers inland, he only avoided blame for a momentary lapse in defense. After peace with the Khitan the court never let them return; the land became forbidden territory, and over time foreign peoples farmed it until the border itself eroded. Today Dai and Ninghua still hold ten thousand qing of forbidden land; recruiting archers as at Caocheng River could yield more than 4,000 households.' The proposal was referred to Fu Bi in Bing Prefecture. Fu Bi endorsed Han Qi's plan. An edict laid down rules: land was allotted by terrain at two qing per man; with a single autumn payment of five sheng per mu on valley land and three on slopes and plains, and no added corvée conversions. They were to build houses on defensible heights, remain ready for campaigns, and not be impressed for unauthorized labor.
30
西
Earlier Lin, Fu, and Feng had recruited archers on idle land, granting houses and two shi of grain loans; the archers beyond the moat at Jingbian Stockade in Deshun were especially formidable. The Tanguts coveted the land and repeatedly encroached, so the court built forts to hold it. By the end of Zhiping Hedong's seven prefectures and armies fielded 7,500 archers, and Shaanxi's ten prefectures and armies with stockade households 46,300. Earlier, in Kangding 1, Lin and Fu were ordered to recruit returned farmers into the righteous army, letting them farm their old lands tax-free. The system resembled that of archers but without land grants.
31
西
In Xining 2 the Ministry of War reported Hedong's seven prefectures at 7,000 men on the rolls versus 7,500 formerly, and Shaanxi's ten prefectures down from 46,300 archers and stockade households to stockade households in Qinfeng alone.
32
使 退
In the third year Qinfeng commissioner Li Shizhong reported: 'Two years ago we built Shuyang and other forts, accepted tribal land grants, and enrolled archers. Three years on, the recruits have been poor subjects, never organized or drilled and never devoted to farming. We should now establish farm colonies and a chain of forts for defense and offense. Colonies would comprise one hundred men each, granted land beside frontier forts; officers would supervise farming and drill martial skills in off seasons. Oxen, tools, farm implements, flags, and drums would all be state-issued. Forts would be built jointly from near to far; when raiders came the colonists would shelter in them, and when raiders withdrew they would sally out in ambush.' The court approved the plan.
33
In the fifth year Zhao Xu on the Fuyan circuit used 15,900 qing of land to recruit 4,900 Han and tribal archers. The emperor praised his savings on recruitment costs and rewarded him. In the sixth year Xu reported that the new archers were well drilled and asked to rotate them in place of regulars sent back to the capital. The court ordered a review. In the tenth month the Xihe circuit was ordered to recruit archers on public land; brave frontier settlers who claimed land and paid taxes, joined mutual-security groups, volunteered as righteous militia, or accepted tribal land were all allowed to enroll.
34
''
In the first month of the seventh year Bearer of Imperial Arms Wang Zhongzheng went to Xihe to recruit archers with land grants. Recruits were not limited by circuit boundaries or usual quotas; officials were dispatched to enroll them under his personal supervision. In the third month Wang Shao proposed recruiting Han archers on He Prefecture's lowland near the city and tribal archers on the slopes—one qing per man, two for tribal officers, and three for senior tribal officers. Han archers would serve as squad heads, and once quotas were met rank officers would be appointed to administer them jointly with tribal officers. On campaign Han soldiers had often killed tribal auxiliaries in secret to claim head rewards. Tribal soldiers now asked to tattoo the words 'tribal soldier' before the left ear.' The court approved. In the tenth month the Central Secretariat Regulations Office ruled that archers and stockade households in the five circuits could be dispatched only for frontier defense, patrol, and emergencies; other tasks such as wall repair required approval from pacification and military control offices. Unauthorized dispatch, requisition, or hired labor would be punished as a regulatory violation. The court approved. The same rules applied to Kuizhou righteous troops, Guangnan spearmen and native and cave levies, Hunan crossbowmen, and Fujian local spearmen.
35
In the eighth year Jingyuan's roughly 70,000 rotating regulars, archers, and tribal troops at seven grain stations were divided into five commands, with a separate Xihe support deputy. In the tenth year Yan Prefecture prefect Lü Huiqing reported that since Xining 5 recruited archers had only been filled in temporarily and never organized into fixed commands. His office proposed dividing the circuit's organized units into command sections under officers so they could be mustered quickly when needed.' The court approved.
36
In the second year of Yuanfeng the Border Defense Planning Office proposed organizing Jingyuan's regulars and Han and tribal archers into eleven commands posted across the prefectures. The court approved.
37
In the third year an edict ordered archer infantry and cavalry formed into fifty-man squads with battle-leaders, standard-bearers, flank guards, and tribal chiefs as escorts, all under regular army rules. Tribal scouts, tribal dare-to-dies, and mountain-river households followed the same rules. Recruits for archers, tribal scouts, strong men, and mountain-river households were chosen regardless of status, provided they had guarantors, were at least seventeen, could shoot seven dou, and could bear armor. Fuyan's old and new tribal scouts, Huan-Qing strong men, Han archers on every circuit, and Fuyan's returned-submission-border tribal-household archers were all branded on the hand.'
38
In the fourth year Jingyuan reported 9,700 qing of archer land still vacant and more than 4,000 qing along Long Mountain in Wei where 2,000 archers could be recruited—or, if none volunteered, the land should revert to the state.' The Xihe supreme control office added: 'It asked that Jingyuan, Qinfeng, Huan-Qing, and Xihe archers be allowed to transfer under the old Xihe rule, keeping their original land for two years of farming before the state reclaimed it and enrolled new archers.' Both proposals were approved.
39
In the first month of the fifth year Fuyan asked to settle Han and tribal archers on newly recovered land at the five stockades of Mizhi, Wubao, Yihe, Xifutu, and Saimen for spring planting, under the old appointment rules. The court approved. In the second month archer, military-farm, and tribal affairs for Xihe and related circuits were combined under one office subordinate to Jingyuan. In the fourth month the court ruled that tribal archers killed in battle received the same funeral gifts as Han archers. Archers wounded or too ill to return from battle received family grants under army precedent.' In the seventh month supervisors Kang Shi and Zhang Daning asked that newly recovered land be surveyed, with knowledgeable garrison troops assigned one qing each to farm it. Rewards and punishments for platoon officers, rank officers, and hired labor followed Xihe official-estate rules. The rest would be farmed by archer colonies of fifty qing each under an agricultural officer.' The court approved.
40
退西
In the sixth year Fuyan reported that archers held land in two nearby counties; households of four males or more should furnish one baojia member and one archer, while households of two or three should temporarily supply an archer.' Baojia members who wished to become archers were allowed, but active archers fulfilling the male quota could not revert to baojia; Shaanxi and Hedong followed the same rule.
41
In the eighth year the court abolished Qinfeng's centralized archer training grounds and ordered the commissioner to draft rules suited to local practice.
42
殿使
In Yuanyou 1 the Supervisory Office for Xihe Archers, Military Farms, and Tribal Affairs was abolished. In the third year the Ministry of War reported that government land along Long Mountain in Jingyuan was routinely encroached upon and paid virtually no tax or corvée. Only a court office to recruit settlers and allocate the land could stop the abuses.' The court approved. Later deputy Palace Front commander Liu Changzuo reported surveying 10,990 qing along Long Mountain and enrolling 5,261 archers and horses; the emperor rewarded him with a commendatory edict. In the fourth year Long Mountain archers and horses were placed under a separate command, still called the Twelfth Command of Jingyuan. In the fifth year Revenue officials were sent to the Xihe-Lan-Min circuit to replace Sun Lu in managing archer land grants.
43
使使 西
In Shaosheng 1 the Bureau of Military Affairs reported that the Xihe-Lan-Min commissioner asked to return archers promoted for merit to third-rank posts or above to their original assignments, let relatives inherit their land by branding, and recruit successors where no kin existed. In the first month of the third year, the throne decreed that whenever Han and tribal subjects cross-enrolled each other as militia archers, local offices were forbidden to press them into registered service with the customary hand-tattoo; offenders were to be beaten one hundred strokes. In the fifth month, an edict transferred every mounted lancer in the capital region and across the circuits into the archer corps, requiring them to master tribal spear-fighting as well. In the fourth year, the court charged Zhang Xun and Ba Yi with a thorough land survey of the rich soil in Anxi and Jincheng, calculating how many archers the districts could support and submitting a complete plan for their recruitment and grouping.
44
In the eleventh month of Chongning 2, An Shiwen reported that Lu Fengyuan, acting vice-prefect of De Shun Army, had surveyed the territories under the Four Commands and found 48,731-odd qing of land—covering five stockades plus newly seized ground beyond the old trench line—and requested special commendation for the work. The throne responded by promoting An Shiwen to Left Grandee for Discussion of Governance while leaving him in his present post. Lu Fengyuan received a special appointment as Gentleman for Attending at Court.
45
使使 使 便
In the ninth month of the second year, Zheng Jin, chief transport commissioner of Xihe, was ordered to evaluate the new frontier defenses there. He submitted that the court had originally given land to Han and tribal archers so they would hold the border like a living palisade, tied to their homes and fighting from self-interest rather than compulsion. With the empire's reach stretching ever westward, the Han and tribal archers of Xi and Qin had been left behind in what was now the heartland; logically they should be redeployed to the new front. But resettlement was bitterly unpopular. He therefore proposed a compromise: each household would detail one man, the state would feed him, and the men would be organized as tenant farmers on government estates. At harvest, seed grain would be deducted first; the rest would be split evenly between the treasury and the farmers. Only after the system had settled into a steady rhythm would they be given greater freedom to arrange matters as they saw fit. The court accepted the plan.
46
西 使
In the third month of the fifth year, Zhao Tingzhi reported that holding Huang and Shan was draining the treasury of over fifteen million strings a year in supplies alone. When Zheng Jin had first proposed government farming estates, the court had audited their annual returns—and found that revenue from five estates barely covered the running costs of one. Shan and Huang, after all, had once been two petty kingdoms of the Western Tribes—Huang known as Miaochuan, Shan as Qingtang—part of a trio with Henan, all their lands strung along the river in broad belts of fertile ground. Under the old tripartite order, subjects had paid heavily to their own rulers; every clan had its chief, and those chiefs lived well—clothed, fed, and sustained entirely by the labor of the people beneath them. After imperial recovery, the policy was nominally one of letting tribal people return to their ancestral lands; in practice ceaseless war, massacre, and displacement had reduced the population to almost nothing. Nowadays commanders, circuit officials, and prefects were filling the land with opportunistic settlers; the corrupt sold plots for gold, skimmed off sheep, horses, and camels for themselves, and still sent not a copper of rent or tax to the state. Collect even one percent of what those peoples had once rendered to the three kingdoms, he argued, and Huangzhou would run a surplus. The emperor found the argument deeply persuasive.
47
使 西
The next day Zhang Kangguo, head of the Bureau of Military Affairs, pressed the opposite case before the throne: taxing the new settlers would only stir unrest among them. Besides, he asked, the tribal people had already been branded on the hand as soldiers—how could they be taxed like ordinary farmers? The emperor cut the debate short with a public directive: the new settlers were not to be shaken; the court was already recruiting archers in greater numbers. Tingzhi pressed on in a memorial: archers received land from the state rent-free—that was Chinese law. Tribal warriors were another matter: by ancient custom they had always rendered supplies to their rulers, and in wartime every man fought. They could not be equated with militia archers. Yet the court was spending without measure. After years of struggle it had won this western territory—only to reap no revenue at all while officials, garrisons, and supply lines drained the treasury. What folly! The emperor replied that Yao Xiong had already been put in charge of working out a solution. Repeated edicts had already sent Yao Xiong to identify vacant land and bring settlers in to farm it and pay tax—so on this point, at least, the emperor sided firmly with Tingzhi. Tingzhi went on: since Shan and Huang had been retaken, the Qiang had rebelled again and again. Xipo Luosa had defected to Western Xia, which sheltered him and sent him raiding across the border. The garrisons never stood down, and moving grain to the front became a nightmare. Under the court's grain-purchase program, a single shi cost seventy strings at Shan and more than fifty at Huang. The reason was simple corruption: warehouse contractors profited when outside merchants delivered grain on credit; local officials profited when they requisitioned disbursements. Middlemen multiplied their gains a hundred times over, and everyone along the chain grew fat. Officialdom and contractors colluded from top to bottom—and the treasury paid the price.
48
使
In Xining 3, the Xihe transport commission, short on its annual budget, asked to barter official tea for grain at three jin of tea per shi—a trade wildly in its favor. The court ruled that the Tea-and-Horse Bureau existed to trade for horses, not grain. It therefore authorized a separate purchase of twice the usual allotment of Sichuan tea, funded by two million strings from the central treasury and held under seal by the judicial-intendant office. Cheng Zhi Shao of the Tea-and-Horse Bureau was also made transport commissioner; for several years after that, frontier needs were more or less met. When Tingzhi returned as chief councilor, Xihe's grain commissioners kept warning that military rations were critically short. Last year's appropriations alone had totaled eleven million pack-loads—each load valued anywhere from three to forty thousand strings—with transfers in the hundreds of loads beyond easy reckoning. Nine million in silver, cash, and silk had already been sent down this year; the court now ordered another million pack-loads' worth of the supplemental double tea released. Zhang Kangguo joined in the presentation, secured the emperor's assent, and then quietly dug up the Yuanfeng orders restricting tea to horse purchases and laid them before the throne. Kangguo, however, failed to grasp that the supplemental double tea had never belonged to the horse-trade quota—and He Zhizhong and Deng Xunwu piled on in agreement. The double tea was cut off—and with it went the means to pay for the armies at Shan and Huang.
49
In the seventh year, an edict lamented that the borderlands were vast but barely farmed: fertile ground lay fallow, fodder and grain prices rocketed, and the annual cost of purchased grain had become incalculable. Repeated orders had already gone out directing the Jingyuan military commissioner and the archer-supervision office to bring settlers in, break new ground, and build up grain reserves beyond the frontier passes—an inexhaustible source of strength for border defense. Word reached the court, however, that the archer office and the military commissioner were at cross purposes, quarreling over policy instead of coordinating it. Qian Guishan, the Jingyuan archer commissioner, was to be removed from office."
50
西 使
In the second month of Daguan 3, court officials warned that since Xining's recovery the frontier had consumed ever more supplies while storehouses stayed thin, purchase prices climbed again and again, and markets followed suit. Land remained undeveloped and rolls understrength—not because the region lacked potential, but because no one had seriously worked out how to recruit settlers or make farming pay. They asked that circuit commanders and supervisory commissioners study the problem: by recruitment or summons, what would it take to fill the archer rolls without shortfall? By coercion or incentive, what would bind tribal communities to the land and hold them to the plow? Open the fields and grain would follow; fill the ranks and the army would stiffen—thus reclaiming the frontier triumph of Ban Chao and the agrarian strategy of Zhao Chongguo in full. The throne replied that Xi, He, Tao, and Min had been taken back over many years—yet the empire held the territory without harvesting its wealth, and held the people without putting them to use. Land lay idle, rolls empty, and every year the treasury bore the whole burden of supply—no policy built to endure. Officials were ordered to trace the problem to its roots and submit detailed plans."
51
使
In Zhenghe 3, He Chang, military commissioner and pacification commissioner of the Qin-Feng Circuit, submitted a memorial:
52
西 西 沿 使
Since antiquity, armies have fought on horseback or on foot, as terrain dictates. The manuals say: "Frontier cavalry excel at the thundering charge; Han forces excel at the crossbow pincer." For the frontier peoples were masters of the horse, and the Han masters of the crossbow. That is no longer the case. The Western Xia field a mountain tribe called the Bubazi—men who climb and descend steep slopes, cross streams and ravines, leap heights and cover great distances, swift of foot and tireless runners. They also field Pingxia horsemen called the Iron Hawks, who can ride a hundred li in a day and keep a thousand-li rendezvous, appearing and vanishing like lightning or clouds driven by wind. On open plains suited to a galloping charge, they rely chiefly on the Iron Hawks for assault and breakout. In steep, narrow valleys they deploy the Bubazi for close strikes and ambush. Such were the strengths of the enemy's foot and horse. Along our frontier circuits the inhabitants are enrolled as archers, who in peace hone their skill at hunting and mounted archery and in war pride themselves on the chase and the charge. Frontier native levies know the hills and streams and are hardened to hard riding. The garrison troops of Guandong are chiefly heavy crossbowmen and shield-bearers who not only turn aside the enemy's shafts but can panic and scatter his horses. Such were the strengths of our own foot and horse.
53
穿
In the Zhidao era Wang Chao and Ding Han campaigned against Li Jiqian; mounted crossbowmen then loosed ten thousand bolts at once, leaving the enemy no room to move before they fled. During Yuanfeng Liu Changzuo marched on Ling Prefecture but found the enemy holding the passes and blocking the army's advance. Liu deployed shield-bearers as vanguard. The enemy dismounted and pressed the attack with overwhelming force, whereupon Changzuo's men leapt and feinted with their shields, rattling the noise-rings until the enemy horses bolted in panic. In wooded defiles, send shield-men first, then strike the enemy vanguard with powerful bows, heavy crossbows, and Divine Arm crossbows—every shaft finding its mark, piercing heart and breast. On open plains, a volley of mounted crossbow fire could annihilate the enemy in a single discharge. Both shield tactics and mounted crossbows had been proven in battle and deserved the fullest attention. Thus one could gain both the charging horse and the crossbow pincer—and the enemy's Bubazi and Iron Hawks would no longer suffice to break one's line. Among the infantry, select the stoutest and strongest men, arm them with horse-chopping sabers, and place them under a dedicated commander—as Li Siye of Tang had wielded the modao corps. When Iron Hawks broke through—whether skirting the flank or riding down infantry—advancing with horse-chopping sabers was a decisive stratagem.
54
The court ordered the Bureau of Military Affairs to circulate the memorial to each circuit pacification commission.
55
西 使 西
In the fourth year of the reign an edict declared: "The Western Qiang have long plagued the frontier, rebelling one day and submitting the next, treacherous and unpredictable. Even when their envoys were received at our court under the late emperor, they still raided the border. Though nurtured for years and now weakened by repeated famine, and though they have submitted written oaths, the Qiang and Yi cannot be trusted to keep their word. To prepare defenses in peacetime and guard against sudden attack when they mass their forces—that urgency is now. The commanders of Shaanxi and Hedong were ordered to drill troops, maintain arms, repair towers and stockades, stock fodder and grain, and stand ready as though the enemy were at the gates. Officials must not grow complacent because oaths had been filed, or fall prey to enemy treachery. Archers and tribal auxiliaries were to be well treated: deserters promptly re-enrolled, the destitute granted loans. Commanders found timid or negligent were to be reported by name; any who failed when the enemy came would face military punishment."
56
西西 西 使 殿
In the second month of the fifth year an edict noted that since the Shaosheng frontier expansion, new territories including Xining, Huang, Kuo, Tao, and Jishi had fertile land set aside and archers recruited to serve as a frontier cordon. Yet after many years much land still lay unused and recruitment had fallen short. This owed largely to the abolition of dedicated archer overseers and their subordination to the pacification commissions, which diluted authority and left affairs poorly managed. Surveying, supervising cultivation, and adjudicating land disputes all took place on the remotest frontier, where circuit commanders could not personally oversee the work. The Xia were currently sending tribute and the frontier was calm. Unless officials were now dispatched to recruit archers, open idle land, ease the burden of emergency requisition, and supplement frontier finances, procrastination would leave ever more land fallow, deplete militia quotas, and undermine frontier defense. Moreover the civil overseers had been scholars devoted to comfort and ill suited to hardship in the field. Shaanxi and Hedong were each to restore an Office for Overseeing Archers, staffed by a military officer, with tenure, pay, and perquisites per the baojia regulations. Each circuit would also appoint two commissioners to handle routine business. Each year the Bureau of Military Affairs would review each circuit's archer recruitment and land reclaimed, rank officials by performance, and recommend promotions and demotions. The appointed officials were to submit a detailed plan for implementing these measures."
57
沿 便
In the eighth month the Bureau of Military Affairs proposed surveying all archer lands in the interior districts where disputes or encroachments had arisen, to end abuses of land-grabbing." The court approved. That month the Hedong Office for Overseeing Archers reported that frontier recruitment had often seized long-cultivated tenant farmland, leaving the original tillers destitute. The rent collected was only a fifth of what tenants had paid—harmful to public revenue and private interest alike. Fields on official estates already rented for five years or more were to be excluded from archer land claims. The Hedong inspection commission had neglected frontier militia in favor of indulging tenants, causing the problem. For official fields rented before Xining 8, tenants should first be consulted; those willing to enroll as archers would receive two qing fifty mu of their present holding per man furnished; those refusing, and any surplus land unassigned after enrollment, would revert to the state." The court approved.
58
In the eleventh month, the Border Defense Bureau reported that He Guan, intendant of archers for the Xihe, Lanzhou, and Huangshui circuit, stated that Han settlers often buy large tracts of land; recent cadastral surveys had left them uneasy, and more than a thousand qing had already been volunteered. If archers were recruited from this land, five hundred men could be raised at once; If rent and taxes were levied at three dou and five sheng of grain per mu and two bundles of fodder, the circuit could also collect thirty-five thousand shi of grain and two hundred thousand bundles of fodder in a single year. After deliberation, the bureau proposed that Han men who had bought tribal land and wished to serve as archers should be registered at one man for every two qing or more, and two men for every four qing or more. Volunteers would pay rent and taxes at the rates fixed under the regulations. Those who fraudulently concealed or misrepresented holdings would be strictly forbidden. The court approved the proposal.
59
祿 貿
In the third month of the seventh year, the court issued an edict: since the opening of the Xihe, Shanzhou, and Huangshui region, the frontier had widened yet usable land mostly remained under Qiang control while official pay still came from the state treasury, which could not be sustained as a long-term policy. The circuit commanders were to consider trading money, grain, tea, dyed cloth, or other goods the Qiang desired in exchange for farmland. Once enough land was secured, militia archers would be recruited to farm in peacetime and fight in war, strengthening the frontier.
60
西
In the seventh month of Xuanhe 6, an edict directed that after the Shaanxi earthquake had destroyed buildings and killed or wounded archers, eligible heirs should be verified and reported at once.
61
西 使 西 西使西
In the second month of Jingkang 1, officials argued that Shaanxi depended on militia archers as a national bulwark; they had once answered to the military command but lately a dedicated intendant had been appointed who prized head counts over quality. Selection and training thereafter grew slack, and the institution eroded. They asked that the intendant post be abolished and archers returned to commandery control so the frontier's strength could be restored. The court agreed; the Hedong Circuit was ordered to follow the same policy. In the fourth month, the Bureau of Military Affairs reported that Han militia archers in Shaanxi and Hedong had long received fertile allotments, but lately officials had split existing holdings to enroll new recruits. Intendants had sought rewards and inflated numbers by improperly enrolling men without real incentives. The court had just abolished the intendant and restored commandery control; with border defense relying on militia, delay risked serious failure. The court ordered Commissioner Qian Gai of the five Shaanxi circuits and each Shaanxi and Hedong commander to restore subdivided archer lands to their original holders, grant separate plots to new recruits, and ensure equitable treatment. Commanders were ordered to enforce the policy strictly. That month Xu Churen submitted another memorial; both were sent to the Detailed Deliberation Office.
62
調
In Xining 5, Cai Ting of the Jingyuan pacification commission reported that 344 Jingyuan Braves had long lacked drill and existed only on paper. He assigned two generals to quarterly inspections, promoting or demoting men by mounted and foot archery skill, appointing meritorious men as squad leaders and recruiting seasoned frontier soldiers to fill vacancies. He also recruited registered tribal households as tribal Braves—1,380 men with 1,194 horses, each drawing a one-shi bow and drilling in mounted charge and thrust. Meritorious men received the lowest Brave stipend; when mobilized, others received three hundred cash each plus fodder. The court ordered every circuit to follow Cai Ting's model.
63
殿使 使使 使 使 使
In Xining 6, the Bureau of Military Affairs noted that Braves enlisted for martial skill, enjoyed generous rations and state-provided horses and arms, and could live at home in peacetime, yet merit could advance them in four steps to provisional rank—ten grades faster than archers—far from equal merit-based reward. They proposed quotas of three hundred Braves each for Hedong, Fuyan, Qinfeng, Huanqing, and Xihe, and five hundred for Jingyuan. First grade required one shi one dou at foot and nine dou mounted, with a stipend of one thousand cash; each lower grade reduced archery by one dou, with stipends from seven hundred to five hundred cash. Seasonal trials at the pacification commission rewarded hits in target or field combat; total misses cut stipends, and two seasons of failure meant dismissal. Eight grades of battle reward were set: official certificate, squad leader, acting army captain, army captain, palace attendant, provisional Third Rank appointment, dispatched service, and provisional rank. Archers with merit had eight grades as well: pressing officer or clerk; (2) captain, orderly, or ten-captain; (3) vice cavalry commissioner or army commissioner; (4) vice commandant; (5) chief orderly; (6) chief commandant; (7) Third Rank dispatched service; (8) provisional rank. Vacancies would be filled in order by the next eligible man.
64
In the third year of Yuanfeng, Jingyuan was ordered to recruit Braves on the Fuyan model, quota one hundred. Thereafter tribal numbers grew, and militia archers were increasingly tribal soldiers.
65
Bow-and-Arrow Societies in Hebei and Other Circuits
66
便
Bow-and-arrow societies had long existed in Hebei. In the twelfth month of Xining 3, Dingzhou prefect Teng Fu noted that in Hebei counties near hills, locals already had bow-and-arrow societies and hunters as skilled as frontier tribesmen. He asked that each county recruit willing clerks and townspeople with martial skill to form their own societies. Each spring the local chief would inspect and test them. Northerners were hardy and could be relied on in crisis. The court approved.
67
In the eleventh month of Yuanyou 8, Dingzhou prefect Su Shi memorialized:
68
沿 西 沿
The northern frontier had been peaceful and the Hebei region quiet. Border prefectures had slack discipline, proud officers and idle troops who might fail in crisis; their arms and training lagged far behind Shaanxi and Hedong. Su Shi granted that no crisis seemed likely within a few years, yet nations must prepare in peace; without prior planning, emergencies could not be met. He observed that since the founding era heavy garrisons on key frontiers had served chiefly to overawe enemies by presence—the classic "thunder before rain" strategy of deterrence. Deep offensives and pitched battles still required regular imperial troops. Day-to-day defense against small raids, he argued, must rely on frontier locals alone. That principle, he said, had never changed.
69
{} 西
Chao Cuo and Emperor Wen had outlined border defense in two moves: relocate outsiders to fill empty districts and organize frontier counties against enemies. When Zhao Yuanhao rebelled in the Baoyuan and Qingli eras, despite 400,000 troops and 250,000 levied militia, nothing availed and the campaign failed. Fan Zhongyan, Liu Yicheng, Zhong Shihang, and others focused on organizing registered tribal households and archers, supporting families and hardening men by many means. Once that bulwark stood, raiders gained nothing and Yuanhao resubmitted. On the Hebei western frontier since the Chanyuan treaty, households had formed bow-and-arrow societies on their own, contributing one man regardless of wealth. They elected respected men of means and skill as head, deputy, and recorder— the "leaders." They farmed with bows slung and cut wood with swords belted, living in the hills with the same skills and diet as the enemy. Private discipline exceeded official law; shift patrols linked watch posts, and failure to catch northern raiders or local bandits brought heavy punishment on the duty rotation. At alarm, drumbeats could muster a thousand men within moments. Armor, saddles, and horses were kept battle-ready. With kin and graves at stake, men fought for themselves and enemies feared them deeply. Former Dingzhou commanders Han Qi and Pang Ji had carefully governed and comforted them as local eyes and ears; Pang Ji had also adjusted their rules of reward and punishment.
70
使
In Xining 6 the baojia system was imposed and strong-men and bow-and-arrow societies were abolished together. In Xining 7 dual-supply households kept existing societies, strong men, and yiyong units but were not reorganized into baojia. Review of those orders showed only dual-supply villages might keep societies; all others should have been abolished. In practice societies were never abolished; multi-male households simply doubled as baojia, and counties drove bow-and-arrow households to hunt bandits. Counties now relied on them for night patrol; bow-and-arrow societies were plainly vital to border defense and could not be abolished. Yet dual service as baojia wasted time and livelihood; though the institutions survived, their practical value had declined.
71
西 沿西 使 使
Shaanxi and Hedong archers received official land for arms and horses, he noted. Hebei societies used hereditary land at no cost to the state yet defended the border with the same gear as Shaanxi and Hedong; unequal hardship left their strength underused. Recent raids in Wen'an, Bazhou, and Zhending's northern fort had left officials helpless, showing regular troops and archers were ineffective. If every county had active societies willing to die in defense, northern raiders would not stroll through border forts unopposed. He had admonished local officers to enforce rewards and punishments and govern and comfort the people carefully, reviving Pang Ji's old rules with revisions in separate articles. He asked the court to legislate modest privileges and clear rewards and punishments as encouragement. He had ascertained that on the frontier of Ding and Bao, three commands, seven counties, and one fort there were 588 societies, 651 household units, totaling 31,411 men. If approved, officers should constantly govern and comfort them so 30,000 men patrolled in shifts, catching small raiders immediately and not letting habit embolden enemies. Routine would continue unchanged; enemies would neither suspect nor be provoked—clear benefit without harm.
72
He submitted twice; neither memorial was answered.
73
In Zhenghe 6 an edict stated that in Hebei counties with bow-and-arrow societies, top performers were to be reported upward. County magistrates were to hold year-end drills; commanderies would report best and worst for imperial reward and punishment. The rules were also to be codified. The Gaoyang Pass pacification commission noted that in Daguan 3 society members were ranked under the Baojia Law and Zhenghe regulations, reducing magistrates' merit-review years by varying degrees. The court ordered rewards and punishments under the baojia regulations.
74
In the second month of Xuanhe 7, officials memorialized:
75
西仿西 使 西西 西 使
Western Circuit intendant Liang Yangzu had urged households into societies; the Eastern Circuit was then ordered to follow suit. The law had meant only voluntary members would drill for self-defense. Merit-seekers counted enrollments as achievement, deceiving the court and angering the people, pressing counties urgently, ranking fifth-class household registers house by house with coercive runners. All were driven into societies without exception. The Western Circuit had already received lavish rewards; Eastern surveillance memorials grew ever more inflated. The Eastern Circuit lately reported 241,700 men and 116,000 skilled fighters—claiming only double the west. The emperor knew this was false; though ordered to verify, commanders and inspectors would hardly report truthfully. Nearly twenty Eastern Circuit surveillance staff and incumbent officers in Deng and Zi prefectures had already received rank promotions for this work, while county magistrates and assistants had not. Who, then, was actually walking the lanes to recruit them? The exaggeration was obvious. If the numbers were real, why had Shandong bandits not been suppressed after many months? The claimed 241,000 and 116,000 were largely fictitious and clearly could not fight bandits. Endless harassment drove the people to exhaustion: the old and weak fled on the roads and the strong turned bandit—another way the policy bred outlaws.
76
使
Recently the emperor had sent generals with plans, dispatched close ministers with reassuring edicts, opened the inner treasury, moved Huai grain for relief, waived taxes, and pardoned crimes—every care taken. Just as people were returning to their fields to reform, how could they be tormented with what they feared most? Private arms were strictly forbidden by law. Under the three-circuit baowu system, drill occurred in farming slack seasons and weapons were then stored in government offices. Now bow-and-arrow society weapons stayed in private homes—was that not arming bandits? He asked the emperor to abolish Jingdong bow-and-arrow societies, confiscate all weapons, and spare the people untimely summons and coercion. Promotions granted in both circuits for society work should be revoked, initiators punished, and later fabricators penalized so officials would fear to lie—an urgent priority.
77
The court accepted the memorial: Liang Yangzu was dismissed, weapons confiscated, and society members dispersed under existing orders.
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