1
李綱下
Li Gang (continued)
2
紹興二年，除觀文殿學士、湖廣宣撫使兼知潭州。 是時，荊湖江、湘之間，流民潰卒群聚為盜賊，不可勝計，多者至數萬人，綱悉蕩平之。 上言：「荊湖、國之上流，其地數千里，諸葛亮謂之用武之國。 今朝廷保有東南，控馭西北。 加鼎、澧、岳、鄂若荊南一帶，皆當屯宿重兵，倚為形勢，使四川之號令可通，而襄、漢之聲援可接，乃有恢復中原之漸。」 議未及行，而諫官徐俯、劉斐劾綱，罷為提舉西京崇福宮。
In the second year of the Shaoxing era, Li Gang was appointed Academician of the Hall for Viewing Literature, Commissioner for Pacification of Huguang, and concurrently Prefect of Tanzhou. At that time, displaced refugees and scattered troops between the Yangzi and Xiang in the Jinghu region had banded together as marauders beyond counting; some groups numbered in the tens of thousands. Li Gang pacified them all. He submitted a memorial: "Jinghu lies in the upper reaches of the realm, its territory stretching thousands of li. Zhuge Liang called it a country made for war. Today the court holds the southeast and keeps the northwest within its grasp. If, in addition, Ding, Li, Yue, E, and the southern Jing corridor were all garrisoned with heavy forces and used as strategic anchors, orders from Sichuan could flow through and reinforcements from Xiangyang and Hanzhong could link up—only then would recovery of the Central Plain become possible step by step." Before the plan could be implemented, remonstrating officials Xu Fu and Liu Fei impeached Li Gang, and he was dismissed to serve as Director of the Chongfu Palace in the Western Capital.
3
四年冬，金人及偽齊來攻，綱具防禦三策，謂：「偽齊悉兵南下，境內必虛。 儻出其不意，電發霆擊，搗潁昌以臨畿甸，彼必震懼還救，王師追躡，必勝之理，此上策也。 若駐蹕江上，號召上流之兵，順流而下，以助聲勢，金鼓旌旗，千里相望，則敵人雖眾，不敢南渡。 然後以重師進屯要害之地，設奇邀擊，絕其糧道，俟彼遁歸，徐議攻討，此中策也。 萬一借親征之名，為順動之計，使卒伍潰散，控扼失守，敵得乘間深入，州縣望風奔潰，則其患有不可測矣。 往歲，金人利在侵掠，又方時暑，勢必還師，朝廷因得以還定安集。 今偽齊導之而來，勢不徒還，必謀割據。 奸民潰卒從而附之，聲勢鴟張，苟或退避，則無以為善後之策。 昔苻堅以百萬眾侵晉，而謝安以偏師破之。 使朝廷措置得宜，將士用命，安知北敵不授首於我？ 顧一時機會所以應之者如何耳。 望降臣章與二三大臣熟議之。」 詔：綱所陳，今日之急務，付三省、樞密院施行。 時韓世忠屢敗金人于淮、楚間，有旨督劉光世、張浚統兵渡河，車駕進發至江上勞軍。
In the winter of the fourth year, the Jurchens and the puppet Qi state launched an attack. Li Gang laid out three defensive strategies, arguing: "The puppet Qi has committed all its forces to the south, so its home territory must be hollow. If we take them by surprise and strike like lightning, raiding Yingchang to threaten the capital region, they will panic and rush back to defend it; our imperial forces can then pursue and follow up—a sure path to victory. That is the best strategy. If the emperor halted on the Yangzi, summoned troops from upstream to descend with the current, and swelled our display of force until drums, banners, and flags stretched for a thousand li, then even a large enemy force would not dare cross south. Then a heavy force should advance and encamp at key positions, lay ambushes, cut enemy supply lines, wait until they withdraw, and only then deliberate on a counterattack. That is the middle strategy. If, under the pretext of a personal campaign, the court were moved on that excuse, troops scattered, strategic passes lost, and the enemy seized the opening to drive deep inland while prefectures and counties fled at the first alarm, the disaster would be beyond reckoning. In earlier years the Jurchens came chiefly to plunder, and midsummer heat forced them to withdraw, allowing the court time to stabilize and resettle the realm. Now the puppet Qi is leading them south; they will not simply turn back, but intend to carve out and hold territory. Wicked subjects and scattered soldiers will flock to them, and their power will swell unchecked. If we retreat, there will be no way to manage what follows. In the past Fu Jian invaded Jin with a million men, yet Xie An defeated him with a detached column. If the court handled matters properly and officers and soldiers obeyed orders, who could say the northern enemy would not surrender to us? Everything turns on how we respond to the opportunities of the moment. I humbly ask that Your Majesty circulate this memorial for thorough discussion among your chief ministers." An edict responded that what Li Gang had presented were urgent priorities of the day and ordered the Three Departments and the Bureau of Military Affairs to carry them out. At that time Han Shizhong had repeatedly defeated the Jurchens between the Huai and Chu regions. An edict ordered Liu Guangshi and Zhang Jun to lead troops across the river, and the imperial carriage advanced to the Yangzi to review the army.
4
五年，詔問攻戰、守備、措置、綏懷之方，綱奏：
In the fifth year, an edict asked for plans on attack, defense, institutional arrangements, and pacification. Li Gang submitted a memorial:
5
願陛下勿以敵退為可喜，而以仇敵未報為可憤； 勿以東南為可安，而以中原未復、赤縣神州陷於敵國為可恥； 勿以諸將屢捷為可賀，而以軍政未修、士氣未振而強敵猶得以潛逃為可虞。 則中興之期，可指日而俟。
May Your Majesty not rejoice that the enemy has withdrawn, but feel anger that your sworn foe remains unavenged; not treat the southeast as secure, but feel shame that the Central Plain remains unrecovered and our sacred homeland lies under enemy rule; not congratulate yourselves on the generals' repeated victories, but worry that military administration remains unreformed, morale unrevived, and a powerful enemy still able to slip away unscathed. Then the day of national restoration would be close at hand.
6
議者或謂敵馬既退，當遂用兵為大舉之計，臣竊以為不然。 生理未固，而欲浪戰以僥倖，非制勝之術也。 高祖先保關中，故能東向與項籍爭。 光武先保河內，故能降赤眉、銅馬之屬。 肅宗先保靈武，故能破安、史而復兩京。 今朝廷以東南為根本，將士暴露之久，財用調度之煩，民力科取之困，苟不大修守備，痛自料理，先為自固之計，何以能萬全而制敵？
Some advisers argue that since the enemy cavalry has withdrawn, we should immediately launch a major military campaign. I respectfully disagree. When our foundations are not yet secure, to gamble on reckless battle is not the way to victory. Gaozu of Han first secured Guanzhong, and only then was able to turn east and contend with Xiang Yu. Emperor Guangwu first secured Henei, and only then was able to subdue the Red Eyebrows, Bronze Horses, and their like. Emperor Suzong first secured Lingwu, and only then was able to defeat An Lushan and Shi Siming and recover the two capitals. Today the court takes the southeast as its foundation. Officers and soldiers have long endured hardship in the field; finances are hard to manage; and the people are exhausted by levies. Unless we greatly strengthen our defenses and put our house in order first, how can we be secure and overcome the enemy?
7
議者又謂敵人既退，當且保據一隅，以苟目前之安，臣又以為不然。 秦師三伐晉，以報殽之師； 諸葛亮佐蜀，連年出師以圖中原，不如是，不足以立國。 高祖在漢中，謂蕭何曰：'吾亦欲東。 '光武破隗囂，既平隴，復望蜀。 此皆以天下為度，不如是，不足以混一區宇，戡定禍亂。 況祖宗境土，豈可坐視淪陷，不務恢復乎？ 今歲不征，明年不戰，使敵勢益張，而吾之所糾合精銳士馬，日以損耗，何以圖敵？ 謂宜於防守既固、軍政既修之後，即議攻討，乃為得計。 此二者，守備、攻戰之序也。
Others argue that since the enemy has withdrawn, we should simply hold one corner of the realm and settle for present security. I disagree with that as well. The armies of Qin attacked Jin three times to avenge the defeat at Xiao; Zhuge Liang served Shu and sent armies out year after year to recover the Central Plain; without that, the state could not endure. While still in Hanzhong, Gaozu said to Xiao He, "I too mean to turn east." Emperor Guangwu, after defeating Wei Xiao and pacifying Long, turned his gaze toward Shu. All of them measured affairs by the whole realm; without that outlook, one cannot unify the empire and quell chaos. How much more so for the lands of our ancestors—can we sit by and watch them fall without striving for recovery? If we neither campaign this year nor fight next, the enemy will grow stronger while the elite troops and horses we have assembled are worn down day by day—how then can we hope to defeat them? I hold that once defenses are secure and military administration restored, we should then discuss offensive action—that is the sound course. These two points define the proper order of defense and attack.
8
至於守備之宜，則當科理淮南、荊襄，以為東南遮罩。 夫六朝之所以能保有江左者，以強兵巨鎮，盡在淮南、荊襄間。 故以魏武之雄，苻堅、石勒之眾，宇文、拓拔之盛，卒不能窺江表。 後唐李氏有淮南，則可以都金陵，其後淮南為周世宗所取，遂以削弱。 近年以來，大將擁重兵于江南，官吏守空城於江北，雖有天險而無戰艦水軍之制，故敵人得以侵擾窺伺。 今當於淮之東西及荊襄置三大帥，屯重兵以臨之，分遣偏師，進守支郡，加以戰艦水軍，上運下接，自為防守。 敵馬雖多，不敢輕犯，則藩籬之勢盛而無窮之利也。 有守備矣，然後議攻戰之利，分責諸路，因利乘便，收復京畿，以及故都。 斷以必為之志而勿失機會，則以弱為強，取威定亂於一勝之間，逆臣可誅，強敵可滅，攻戰之利，莫大於是。
As for proper defense, Huainan and Jing-Xiang should be organized as a protective screen for the southeast. The reason the Six Dynasties were able to hold the lands south of the Yangzi was that their strongest armies and greatest garrisons lay in Huainan and Jing-Xiang. Thus even the prowess of Cao Cao, the vast hosts of Fu Jian and Shi Le, and the power of the Yuwen and Tuoba clans could not in the end threaten the lands south of the Yangzi. When the Later Tang Li house held Huainan, it could make Jinling its capital; once Huainan was taken by Emperor Shizong of Zhou, the dynasty was weakened. In recent years great generals have hoarded heavy forces south of the Yangzi while officials hold empty cities north of the river. Though natural barriers exist, there is no proper system of warships and naval forces, so the enemy has been able to raid and probe at will. We should now appoint three supreme commanders east and west of the Huai and in Jing-Xiang, station heavy forces to face the enemy, dispatch detached columns to hold subsidiary prefectures, and build a linked system of warships and naval forces upstream and downstream to defend ourselves. Even if enemy cavalry is numerous, it will not dare lightly attack, and the strength of our outer defenses will grow with lasting benefit. Once defenses are in place, we can then discuss the gains of offensive action, assign responsibility to each route, seize opportunities as they arise, and recover the capital region and the former capital. With resolute purpose and without missing the moment, weakness can be turned into strength, authority established and chaos settled in a single victory—traitors can be punished and powerful enemies destroyed. No gain from offensive action is greater than this.
9
若夫萬乘所居，必擇形勝以為駐蹕之所，然後能制服中外，以圖事業。 建康自昔號帝王之宅，江山雄壯，地勢寬博，六朝更都之。 臣昔舉天下形勢而言，謂關中為上，今以東南形勢而言，則當以建康為便。 今者，鑾輿未復舊都，莫若且于建康權宜駐蹕。 願詔守臣治城池，修宮闕，立官府，創營壁，使粗成規模，以待巡幸。 蓋有城池然後人心不恐，有官府然後政事可修，有營壘然後士卒可用，此措置之所當先也。
As for where the Son of Heaven resides, he must choose commanding terrain as the place to halt the imperial progress; only then can he control the realm within and without and pursue great undertakings. Jianye has long been called the abode of emperors; its rivers and mountains are majestic and its terrain broad, and the Six Dynasties in succession made it their capital. Your minister once surveyed the strategic geography of the whole realm and ranked Guanzhong first; speaking now of the southeast alone, Jianye is the better choice. Since the imperial carriage has not yet returned to the old capital, it would be best to halt temporarily at Jianye as an expedient measure. I ask that Your Majesty order the local officials to repair walls and moats, restore palaces and halls, establish government offices, and build fortifications until a basic framework is ready for an imperial visit. Only with city walls will the people cease to fear; only with government offices can administration function; only with fortifications can soldiers be deployed. These are the arrangements that must come first.
10
至於西北之民，皆陛下赤子，荷祖宗涵養之深，其心未嘗一日忘宋。 特製於強敵，陷於塗炭，而不能以自歸。 天威震驚，必有結納來歸、願為內應者。 宜給之土田，予以爵賞，優加撫循，許其自新，使陷溺之民知所依怙，莫不感悅，益堅戴宋之心，此綏懷之所當先也。
As for the people of the northwest, all are Your Majesty's own children. Nurtured deeply by our ancestors, their hearts have never for a day forgotten Song. They are only held back by a powerful enemy, sunk in misery, and unable to return on their own. When imperial majesty strikes terror, there will surely be those who forge ties, come over, and offer to serve as internal allies. They should be granted land, given ranks and rewards, treated with special care, and allowed to start anew, so that people sunk in misery know whom to rely on, all are moved to gratitude, and loyalty to Song is strengthened. This is what pacification must prioritize.
11
臣竊觀陛下有聰明睿智之姿，有英武敢為之志，然自臨禦，迨今九年，國不辟而日蹙，事不立而日壞，將驕而難禦，卒惰而未練，國用匱而無贏餘之蓄，民力困而無休息之期。 使陛下憂勤雖至，而中興之效，邈乎無聞，則群臣誤陛下之故也。
Your minister privately observes that Your Majesty possesses a brilliant and discerning mind and a bold, resolute will, yet in the nine years since ascending the throne the realm has not expanded but daily contracts; affairs are not established but daily worsen; generals are arrogant and hard to control; soldiers are lax and untrained; state finances are depleted with no surplus in store; and the people are exhausted with no respite in sight. Though Your Majesty's worry and diligence have been extreme, the fruits of restoration are nowhere to be seen—it is because your ministers have misled you.
12
陛下觀近年以來所用之臣，慨然敢以天下之重自任者幾人？ 平居無事，小廉曲謹，似可無過，忽有擾攘，則錯愕無所措手足，不過奉身以退，天下憂危之重，委之陛下而已。 有臣如此，不知何補于國，而陛下亦安取此？ 夫用人如用醫，必先知其術業可以已病，乃可使之進藥而責成功。 今不詳審其術業而姑試之，則雖日易一醫，無補於病，徒加疾而已。 大概近年，閒暇則以和議為得計，而以治兵為失策，倉卒則以退避為愛君，而以進禦為誤國。 上下偷安，不為長久之計。 天步艱難，國勢益弱，職此之由。
Your Majesty, look at the ministers employed in recent years—how many have truly dared to take the weight of the realm upon themselves? In peaceful times they appear scrupulous and faultless; when sudden crisis erupts, they are bewildered and helpless, doing nothing but protect themselves and withdraw, leaving the weight of the realm's peril entirely to Your Majesty. With ministers such as these, what good are they to the state? And why should Your Majesty keep them? Employing men is like employing physicians: one must first know that their skill can cure the disease before entrusting them with medicine and demanding success. If their skill is not carefully examined and they are simply tried one after another, then even changing physicians every day will not cure the illness but only make it worse. In general, in recent years peace talks have been treated as wise policy in quiet times and military preparation as folly; in crisis, retreat has been treated as loyalty to the ruler and advancing to defend as betrayal of the state. Above and below seek their own ease and make no long-term plans. Heaven's course has grown arduous and the realm ever weaker—this is why.
13
今天啟宸衷，悟前日和議退避之失，親臨大敵。 天威所臨，使北軍數十萬之眾，震怖不敢南渡，潛師宵奔。 則和議之與治兵，退避之與進禦，其效概可睹矣。 然敵兵雖退，未大懲創，安知其秋高馬肥，不再來擾我疆埸，使疲於奔命哉？
Now Heaven has opened Your Majesty's heart; you have seen the errors of earlier peace talks and retreat, and personally faced the great enemy. Where imperial majesty presided, several hundred thousand northern troops trembled in terror and dared not cross south, and their hidden forces fled by night. The contrast between peace talks and military preparation, between retreat and advancing to defend, can now be seen plainly. Yet though the enemy has withdrawn, it has not been severely punished. Who knows whether, when autumn comes and horses grow fat, it will not return to trouble our borders and wear us down with constant alarms?
14
若夫退避之策，可暫而不可常，可一而不可再，退一步則失一步，退一尺則失一尺。 往時自南都退而至維揚，則關陝、河北、河東失矣； 自維揚退而至江、浙，則京東、西失矣。 萬有一敵騎南牧，復將退避。 不知何所適而可乎？ 航海之策，萬乘冒風濤不測之險，此又不可之尤者也。 惟當于國家閒暇之時，明政刑，治軍旅，選將帥，修車馬，備器械，峙糗糧，積金帛。 敵來則禦，俟時而奮，以光復祖宗之大業，此最上策也。 臣願陛下自今以往，勿復為退避之計，可乎？
As for the strategy of retreat, it may be used temporarily but not permanently, once but not twice: one step back loses one step, one foot back loses one foot. In the past, retreat from the Southern Capital to Weiyang meant the loss of Guan-Shaan, Hebei, and Hedong; retreat from Weiyang to Jiang and Zhe meant the loss of the eastern and western capital regions. If by any chance enemy cavalry again drive south, are we to retreat once more? Where could we go that would be acceptable? The strategy of taking to the sea, exposing the Son of Heaven to the unpredictable dangers of wind and waves, is above all what must not be done. We should use the nation's intervals of peace to clarify laws and punishments, discipline the army, select generals, maintain chariots and horses, prepare weapons, stockpile provisions, and accumulate gold and silk. When the enemy comes, defend; when the moment arrives, strike—to restore the great enterprise of our ancestors. That is the supreme strategy. Your minister humbly asks that from this day forward Your Majesty will no longer resort to plans of retreat—is that acceptable?
15
臣又觀古者敵國善鄰，則有和親，仇讎之邦，鮮復遣使。 豈不以釁隙既深，終無講好修睦之理故耶？ 東晉渡江，石勒遣使于晉，元帝命焚其幣而卻其使。 彼遣使來，且猶卻之，此何可往？ 假道僭偽之國，其自取辱，無補於事，祗傷國體。 金人造釁之深，知我必報，其措意為何如？ 而我方且卑辭厚幣，屈體以求之，其不推誠以見信，決矣。 器幣禮物，所費不貲，使軺往來，坐索士氣，而又邀我以必不可從之事，制我以必不敢為之謀，是和卒不成，而徒為此擾擾也。 非特如此，于吾自治自強之計，動輒相妨，實有所害。 金人二十餘年，以此策破契丹、困中國，而終莫之悟。 夫辨是非利害者，人心所同，豈真不悟哉？ 聊復用此以僥倖萬一，曾不知為吾害者甚大，此古人所謂幾何僥倖而不喪人之國者也。 臣願自今以往，勿復遣和議之使，可乎？
Your minister further observes that in antiquity friendly neighboring states exchanged marriage alliances, while sworn enemies rarely sent envoys to one another. Was this not because once enmity runs so deep, there is ultimately no basis for peace and good relations? When Eastern Jin crossed the Yangzi, Shi Le sent envoys to Jin, and Emperor Yuan ordered the gifts burned and the envoys turned away. When they came as envoys, they were still turned away—how then can we go to them? To pass through a usurping puppet state is to invite humiliation, accomplish nothing, and only injure the dignity of the realm. The Jurchens' provocation runs deep; they know we must retaliate—what then do they intend? Yet we demean ourselves with humble words and rich gifts, bowing low to seek peace—they will assuredly not treat us with sincerity or trust. Vessels, silks, and gifts cost incalculable sums; envoys shuttle back and forth, draining morale; and they impose terms we cannot accept and constrain plans we dare not pursue—peace will never be achieved, and all this bustle is for nothing. Not only that—it constantly obstructs our plans for self-governance and self-strengthening and truly does harm. For more than twenty years the Jurchens have used this strategy to break the Khitans and trap China, and we have never awakened to it. Discerning right from wrong and benefit from harm is common to all hearts—are we truly unaware? We simply employ it again hoping for one chance in ten thousand, never realizing how greatly it harms us—this is what the ancients meant by gambling on luck until one loses one's kingdom. Your minister humbly asks that from this day forward no peace envoys be sent—is that acceptable?
16
二說既定，擇所當為者，一切以至誠為之。 俟吾之政事修，倉廩實，府庫充，器用備，士氣振，力可有為，乃議大舉，則兵雖未交，而勝負之勢已決矣。
Once these two positions are settled, choose what ought to be done and pursue it with utmost sincerity. Wait until administration is restored, granaries filled, treasuries stocked, weapons prepared, and morale revived—when our strength permits action—then deliberate on a major campaign. Though armies have not yet clashed, the outcome will already be decided.
17
抑臣聞朝廷者根本也，藩方者枝葉也，根本固則枝葉蕃，朝廷者腹心也，將士者爪牙也，腹心壯則爪牙奮。 今遠而強敵，近而偽臣，國家所仰以為捍蔽者在藩方，所資以致攻討者在將士，然根本腹心則在朝廷。 惟陛下正心以正朝廷百官，使君子小人各得其分，則是非明，賞罰當，自然藩方協力，將士用命，雖強敵不足畏，逆臣不足憂，此特在陛下方寸之間耳。
Moreover, your minister has heard that the court is the root and the provinces the branches and leaves—when the root is firm, the branches flourish; the court is the heart and the officers and soldiers the claws and fangs—when the heart is strong, the claws and fangs strike fiercely. Though our formidable foe lies far away and a puppet regime lurks close at hand, the regions upon which the state depends for defense are on the frontiers, and the generals and troops on whom we rely for offensive campaigns are in the field — yet the root and heart of all this lie in the imperial court itself. If Your Majesty would only set your own heart right to set the court and all officials right — letting the upright and the corrupt each keep to their proper place — right and wrong would be clear, rewards and punishments would be just, the frontier regions would naturally pull together, and troops would follow orders willingly. Then even a mighty enemy would hold no terror, and even traitors would merit no anxiety. All of this rests within the compass of Your Majesty's own mind.
18
臣昧死上條六事：一曰信任輔弼，二曰公選人材，三曰變革士風，四曰愛惜日力，五曰務盡人事，六曰寅畏天威。
At the risk of my life, your servant submits six recommendations: first, trust your chief ministers; second, select talent impartially; third, reform the prevailing character of the scholar-official class; fourth, cherish and make good use of time; fifth, exert every possible human effort; sixth, stand in reverent awe of Heaven's authority.
19
何謂信任輔弼？ 夫興衰撥亂之主，必有同心同德之臣相與有為，如元首股肱之于一身，父子兄弟之于一家，乃能協濟。 今陛下選于眾以圖任，遂能捍禦大敵，可謂得人矣。 然臣願陛下待以至誠，無事形跡，久任以責成功，勿使小人得以間之，則君臣之美，垂於無窮矣。
What does it mean to trust one's chief ministers? A ruler who would reverse decline or restore order from chaos must have ministers of one heart and one purpose working with him — like head and limbs to a single body, like father, sons, and brothers within one household — before such cooperation can succeed. Your Majesty has chosen the right men from among many for the great tasks of state, and so has been able to repel a formidable enemy — this truly counts as finding the right people. Yet I pray Your Majesty will treat them with complete sincerity, without picking at outward signs of loyalty, keep them in office long enough to demand real results, and not let petty men drive wedges between you — then the excellence of the bond between sovereign and minister will endure without end.
20
何謂公選人才？ 夫治天下者，必資于人才，而創業、中興之主，所資尤多。 何則？ 繼體守文，率由舊章，得中庸之才，亦足以共治； 至於艱難之際，非得卓犖瑰偉之才，則未易有濟。 是以大有為之主，必有不世出之才，參贊翊佐，以成大業。 然自昔抱不群之才者，多為小人之所忌嫉，或中之以黯暗，或指之為黨與，或誣之以大惡，或擿之以細故。 而以道事君者，不可則止，難於自進，恥於自明，雖負重謗、遭深譴，安於義命，不復自辨。 苟非至明之主，深察人之情偽，安能辨其非辜哉？ 陛下臨禦以來，用人多矣，世之所許以為端人正士者，往往閑廢於無用之地； 而陛下寤寐側席，有乏材之歎，盍少留意而致察焉！
What does it mean to select talent impartially? To govern the realm one must rely on talent — but founders and restorers of dynasties rely on it above all else. Why is this? When one succeeds to the throne and preserves existing institutions, following established precedent, even men of ordinary ability may suffice to share in governance. In times of hardship, however, without truly exceptional talent, success is hard to attain. Hence a ruler who would accomplish great things must have rare, unequaled talent to assist and advise him if the great enterprise is to succeed. Yet from ancient times, men who possessed exceptional talent have often been envied by the petty-minded — assailed with dark insinuations, denounced as partisans, falsely charged with grave crimes, or trapped over trifling offenses. Yet those who serve their sovereign according to the Way, when rebuffed, simply withdraw; they find it hard to push themselves forward and shameful to plead their own case. Though burdened with heavy slander and deep punishment, they are content with what duty and fate require and do not defend themselves further. Unless the ruler is supremely wise and sees clearly through men's truth and pretense, how can innocent men be distinguished from the guilty? Since Your Majesty took the throne, many men have been appointed — yet those the world acknowledges as upright and principled are often cast aside in positions where they can do no good. Meanwhile Your Majesty tosses sleeplessly on your bed, lamenting the lack of talent — why not look more closely and investigate?
21
何謂變革士風？ 夫用兵之與士風，似不相及，而實相為表裏。 士風厚則議正而是非明，朝廷賞罰當功罪而人心服，考之本朝嘉祐、治平以前可知已。 數十年來，奔競日進，論議徇私，邪說利口，足以惑人主之聽。 元祐大臣，持正論如司馬光之流，皆社稷之臣也，而群枉嫉之，指為奸黨，顛倒是非，政事大壞，馴致靖康之變，非偶然也。 竊觀近年士風尤薄，隨時好惡，以取世資，潝訿成風，豈朝廷之福哉？ 大抵朝廷設耳目及獻納論思之官，固許之以風聞，至於大故，必須核實而後言。 使其無實，則誣人之罪，服讒搜慝，得以中害善良，皆非所以修政也。
What does it mean to reform the prevailing character of the scholar-official class? The use of armies and the character of the scholar-official class may seem unrelated, yet in truth they are the inner and outer of the same thing. When the moral tone of the scholar-official class is strong, debate is upright, right and wrong are clear, and when the court's rewards and punishments fit merit and fault, the people accept them — as can be seen from our own dynasty before the Jiayou and Zhiping reign periods. For decades advancement has grown ever more frantic, debate ever more self-serving, and perverse doctrines and glib tongues have been enough to cloud the sovereign's judgment. The Yuanyou ministers — upright men like Sima Guang who defended sound principle — were all pillars of the state, yet the corrupt envied them, denounced them as a wicked faction, inverted right and wrong, and ruined governance until the Jingkang catastrophe came — hardly by accident. In recent years the moral tone of scholars has grown especially thin — men shift with the fashion, swayed by factional favor and disfavor to win worldly gain, until clamor and slander have become the norm. What blessing is this for the court? In general the court maintains censorial and remonstrance offices that may indeed act on hearsay — but on serious matters they must verify the facts before speaking out. Where no substance exists, false accusation, credulous acceptance of slander, and the hunting out of the innocent can destroy good men — none of which serves to improve governance.
22
何謂愛惜日力？ 夫創業、中興，如建大廈，堂室奧序，其規模可一日而成，鳩工聚材，則積累非一日所致。 陛下臨禦，九年於茲，境土未復，僭逆未誅，仇敵未報，尚稽中興之業者，誠以始不為之規模，而後不為之積累故也。 邊事粗定之時，朝廷所推行者，不過簿書期會不切之細務，至於攻討防守之策，國之大計，皆未嘗留意。 夫天下無不可為之事，亦無不可為之時。 惟失其時，則事之小者日益大，事之易者日益難矣。
What does it mean to cherish and make good use of time? Founding a dynasty and restoring it are like erecting a great mansion: the layout of halls and chambers may be settled in a day, but amassing labor and materials requires long accumulation. Your Majesty has reigned for nine years, yet territory remains unreclaimed, the usurper unpunished, and the enemy unavenged, and the work of restoration still stalls — truly because at the outset no plan was laid, and afterward no foundations were steadily built. When the frontier was somewhat calm, the court occupied itself only with petty paperwork and deadlines unrelated to essentials, while strategies of attack and defense and the state's great plans received no attention at all. Under Heaven there is nothing that cannot be done, and no time when it cannot be done. Miss the right moment, and small problems grow larger day by day while easy tasks grow harder.
23
何謂務盡人事？ 夫天人之道，其實一致，人之所為，即天之所為也。 人事盡於前，則天理應於後，此自然之符也。 故創業、中興之主，盡其在我而已，其成功歸之於天。 今未嘗盡人事，敵至而先自退屈，而欲責功於天，其可乎？ 臣願陛下詔二三大臣，協心同力，盡人事以聽天命，則恢復土宇，剪屠鯨鯢，迎還兩宮，必有日矣。
What does it mean to exert every possible human effort? The Way of Heaven and the way of man are in truth one: what men do is what Heaven does. When human effort has been fully spent first, Heaven's will responds afterward — such is the natural order of things. Founders and restorers therefore do all that lies within their power, and only then ascribe success to Heaven. Yet now, without having done all that human effort requires, you retreat before the enemy and then wish to assign the blame to Heaven — how can this be right? I pray Your Majesty will summon your chief ministers to join hearts and combine strength, do all that human effort allows and then await Heaven's mandate — then the recovery of our lands, the destruction of our monstrous foes, and the return of the Two Sovereigns will surely come in time.
24
何謂寅畏天威？ 夫天之于王者，猶父母之于子，愛之至，則所以為之戒者亦至。 故人主之于天戒，必恐懼修省，以致其寅畏之誠。 比年以來，熒惑失次，太白晝見，地震水溢，或久陰不雨，或久雨不霽，或當暑而寒，乃正月之朔，日有食之。 此皆天意眷佑陛下，丁甯反覆，以致告戒。 惟陛下推至誠之意，正厥事以應之，則變災而為祥矣。
What does it mean to stand in reverent awe of Heaven's authority? Heaven's relation to a king is like that of parents to a child: the greater the love, the greater the warnings. A ruler who receives Heaven's warnings must respond with fear and self-examination, so as to show sincere reverent awe. In recent years Mars has strayed from its course, Venus has shone by day, the earth has shaken and waters have flooded — at times clouds linger without rain, at times rain pours without clearing, at times cold comes in midsummer — and on the first day of the first month the sun was eclipsed. All of these are Heaven's care for Your Majesty — repeated, earnest warnings. If Your Majesty responds with utmost sincerity and sets affairs right, disaster will turn to blessing.
25
凡此六者，皆中興之業所關，而陛下所當先務者。
All six of these bear directly on the work of restoration, and are what Your Majesty should address first.
26
今朝廷人才不乏，將士足用，財用有餘，足為中興之資。 陛下春秋鼎盛，欲大有為，何施不可？ 要在改前日之轍，斷而行之耳。 昔唐太宗謂魏征為敢言，征謝曰：「陛下導臣使言，不然，其敢批逆鱗哉。」 今臣無魏征之敢言，然展盡底蘊，亦思慮之極也。 惟陛下赦其愚直，而取其拳拳之忠。
The court now lacks neither talent nor troops, and resources are sufficient — more than enough to fuel a restoration. Your Majesty is in the prime of life and wishes to accomplish great things — what could not be achieved? The essential thing is to break from the errors of the past and resolutely follow through. Once Emperor Taizong of Tang praised Wei Zheng for his bluntness. Wei Zheng replied: "Your Majesty encouraged me to speak — otherwise, how would I dare touch the dragon's scales?" Your servant lacks Wei Zheng's boldness, yet in laying everything bare I have given all the thought I can. I pray only that Your Majesty will pardon my blunt foolishness and accept my earnest loyalty.
27
疏奏，上為賜詔褒諭。 除江西安撫制置大使兼知洪州。 有旨，赴行在奏事畢之官。 六年，綱至，引對內殿。 朝廷方銳意大舉，綱陛辭，言今日用兵之失者四，措置未盡善者五，宜預備者三，當善後者二。
When the memorial was submitted, the emperor issued an edict praising and instructing him. He was appointed Grand Commissioner for Pacification and Military Affairs of Jiangxi, with concurrent duty as prefect of Hongzhou. An edict ordered him to report to the mobile court and take up his post after presenting his business. In the sixth year Li Gang arrived and was granted a private audience in the inner hall. The court was then set on a major offensive. At audience Li Gang identified four errors in current military policy, five areas where arrangements were still inadequate, three things that ought to be prepared in advance, and two matters requiring careful follow-through.
28
時宋師與金人、偽齊相持於淮、泗者半年，綱奏：「兩兵相持，非出奇不足以取勝。 願速遣驍將，自淮南約岳飛為掎角，夾擊之，大功可成。」 已而宋師屢捷，劉光世、張俊、楊沂中大破偽齊兵於淮、肥之上。
Song forces had been locked in stalemate with the Jurchens and the puppet Qi along the Huai and Si rivers for half a year. Li Gang memorialized: "When two armies stand locked in stalemate, only the unexpected can secure victory. I urge that bold generals be dispatched swiftly from Huainan to coordinate with Yue Fei in a pincer attack — then great victory can be won." Soon afterward Song forces won repeated victories, and Liu Guangshi, Zhang Jun, and Yang Qizhong routed the puppet Qi army along the Huai and Fei.
29
車駕進發幸建康。 綱奏乞益飭戰守之具，修築沿淮城壘，且言：「願陛下勿以去冬驟勝而自怠，勿以目前粗定而自安，凡可以致中興之治者無不為，凡可以害中興之業者無不去。 要以修政事，信賞罰，明是非，別邪正，招徠人材，鼓作士氣，愛惜民力，順導眾心為先。 數者既備，則將帥輯睦，士卒樂戰，用兵其有不勝者哉？」
The emperor set out and proceeded to Jiankang. Li Gang memorialized asking that equipment for battle and defense be further strengthened and fortifications built along the Huai, and said: "I pray Your Majesty will not grow lax after last winter's sudden victories, nor grow complacent because the frontier is roughly stable — do everything that can advance restoration, and remove everything that can harm it. Above all, improve governance, enforce rewards and punishments faithfully, clarify right and wrong, distinguish the wicked from the upright, recruit talent, rouse morale, spare the people's strength, and guide the popular will. When these are in place, generals will work in harmony, soldiers will fight willingly — and how could our armies fail to prevail?"
30
淮西酈瓊以全軍叛歸劉豫，綱指陳朝廷有措置失當者、深可痛惜者及當監前失以圖方來者凡十有五事，奏之。 張浚引咎去相位，言者引漢武誅王恢為比。 綱奏曰：「臣竊見張浚罷相，言者引武帝誅王恢事以為比。 臣恐智謀之士捲舌而不談兵，忠義之士扼腕而無所發憤，將士解體而不用命，州郡望風而無堅城，陛下將誰與立國哉？ 張浚措置失當，誠為有罪，然其區區徇國之心，有可矜者。 願少寬假，以責來效。」
When Li Qiong of Huai West defected to Liu Yu with his entire army, Li Gang identified fifteen problems — missteps in the court's handling, painful failures, and lessons to be drawn for the future — and submitted a memorial. Zhang Jun accepted blame and left the chancellorship; critics compared the case to Emperor Wu of Han executing Wang Hui. Li Gang memorialized: "I have seen Zhang Jun removed from office, with critics citing Emperor Wu's execution of Wang Hui as a parallel. I fear that strategists will fall silent and speak no more of war, loyal men will clench their fists with nowhere to vent their passion, troops will lose heart and refuse to obey, and prefectures will watch which way the wind blows and offer no stout defense — with whom then will Your Majesty sustain the state? Zhang Jun's arrangements were indeed wrong and he was truly at fault, yet his sincere, if limited, devotion to the state deserves some compassion. I pray he may be shown some leniency and held to future results."
31
時車駕將幸平江，綱以為平江去建康不遠，徒有退避之名，不宜輕動。 復具奏曰：
The emperor was then about to move the court to Pingjiang. Li Gang argued that Pingjiang was not far from Jiankang and the move would earn the court nothing but a reputation for retreat — it should not be undertaken lightly. He submitted another detailed memorial, saying:
32
臣聞自昔用兵以成大業者，必先固人心，作士氣，據地利而不肯先退，盡人事而不肯先屈。 是以楚、漢相距于滎陽、成皋間，高祖雖屢敗，不退尺寸之地； 既割鴻溝，羽引而東，遂有垓下之亡。 曹操、袁紹戰於官渡，操雖兵弱糧乏，荀彧止其退避； 既焚紹輜重，紹引而歸，遂喪河北。 由是觀之，今日之事，豈可因一叛將之故，望風怯敵，遽自退屈？ 果出此謀，六飛回馭之後，人情動搖，莫有固志，士氣銷縮，莫有鬥心。 我退彼進，使敵馬南渡，得一邑則守一邑，得一州則守一州，得一路則守一路； 亂臣賊子，黠吏奸氓，從而附之，虎踞鴟張，雖欲如前日返駕還轅，復立朝廷於荊棘瓦礫之中，不可得也。
I have heard that from ancient times those who used armies to accomplish great enterprises first secured the people's loyalty, roused morale, held advantageous ground and refused to retreat first, and did all that human effort required without yielding first. Thus when Chu and Han faced each other between Xingyang and Chenggao, though Emperor Gaozu suffered repeated defeats, he did not yield an inch of ground. Once the Hong Canal agreement was drawn and Xiang Yu withdrew eastward, he met destruction at Gaixia. When Cao Cao and Yuan Shao fought at Guandu, though Cao's army was weak and supplies short, Xun Yu dissuaded him from retreat. Once Yuan Shao's supply train was burned and he withdrew homeward, he lost all of Hebei. From this it follows: how can today's crisis be met by watching which way the wind blows, fearing the enemy because one general defected, and hastily retreating? If this plan is adopted, once the imperial carriage turns back popular resolve will waver and no one will stand firm; morale will collapse and no one will want to fight. We retreat while they advance, allowing enemy cavalry to cross south — they will take each district and hold it, each prefecture and hold it, each circuit and hold it. Rebels and traitors, cunning officials and rogues will flock to them; perched like tigers and spreading like birds of prey, they will make it impossible to turn the court around as before and re-establish government amid thorns and rubble.
33
借使敵騎衝突，不得已而權宜避之，猶為有說。 今疆埸未有警急之報，兵將初無不利之失，朝廷正可懲往事，修軍政，審號令，明賞刑，益務固守。 而遽為此擾擾，棄前功，挑後患，以自趨於禍敗，豈不重可惜哉！ 八年，王倫使北還，綱聞之，上疏曰：
Even if enemy cavalry broke through and a temporary withdrawal were unavoidable, that would at least be understandable. Yet the frontier reports no urgent alarm, and troops have suffered no serious setback — the court ought instead to learn from past mistakes, reform military affairs, tighten command, clarify rewards and punishments, and devote itself all the more to holding firm. To rush into this turmoil instead — abandoning hard-won gains, inviting future trouble, and driving ourselves toward disaster — is this not doubly regrettable! In the eighth year Wang Lun returned from his northern mission. When Li Gang heard of it, he submitted a memorial, saying:
34
臣竊見朝廷遣王倫使金國，奉迎梓宮。 今倫之歸，與金使偕來，乃以「詔諭江南」為名，不著國號而曰「江南」，不雲「通問」而曰「詔諭」，此何禮也？ 臣請試為陛下言之。 金人毀宗社，逼二聖，而陛下應天順人，光復舊業。 自我視彼，則仇讎也； 自彼視我，則腹心之疾也，豈復有可和之理？ 然而朝廷遣使通問，冠蓋相望於道，卑辭厚幣，無所愛惜者，以二聖在其域中，為親屈己，不得已而然，猶有說也。 至去年春，兩宮凶問既至，遣使以迎梓宮，亟往遄返，初不得其要領。 今倫使事，初以奉迎梓宮為指，而金使之來，乃以詔諭江南為名。 循名責實，已自乖戾，則其所以罔朝廷而生後患者，不待詰而可知。
I understand the court dispatched Wang Lun as envoy to the Jin state to escort the imperial coffins home. Now that Lun has returned alongside Jin envoys under the title "Imperial Edict Instructing Jiangnan" — using not our state's name but "Jiangnan," and not "diplomatic exchange" but "imperial edict instructing" — what kind of protocol is this? Allow me to explain what this means, Your Majesty. The Jurchens ravaged our altars of state and captured the Two Sovereigns, while Your Majesty answered Heaven and the people's will and restored our heritage. In our eyes they are mortal enemies. In their eyes we are a mortal affliction at the heart — how could there be any grounds for peace? Yet the court has sent envoys to negotiate, their processions crowding the roads, humble words and lavish gifts offered without restraint — because the Two Sovereigns were held in Jin territory, and yielding for their sake when there was no alternative still had its rationale. But by last spring, when news of the Two Sovereigns' deaths arrived, envoys were sent to escort the coffins — sent in haste and returned in haste, yet grasped nothing of substance. Lun's mission was initially framed as escorting the coffins home, yet the Jin envoys who came did so under the title of "imperial edict instructing Jiangnan." Judging name against reality, the discrepancy is already plain — and one need not probe deeply to see how the court will be deceived and future trouble bred.
35
臣在遠方，雖不足以知其曲折，然以愚意料之，金以此名遣使，其邀求大略有五：必降詔書，欲陛下屈體降禮以聽受，一也。 必有赦文，欲朝廷宣佈，班示郡縣，二也。 必立約束，欲陛下奉藩稱臣，稟其號令，三也。 必求歲賂，廣其數目，使我坐困，四也。 必求割地，以江為界，淮南、荊襄、四川，盡欲得之，五也。 此五者，朝廷從其一，則大事去矣。
Though I am far away and cannot know every detail, I can infer this much: sending envoys under this title, the Jin have roughly five demands — they will require the issuance of an edict for Your Majesty to receive with abased status and lowered ritual — first. They will require an amnesty decree for the court to proclaim throughout the prefectures and districts — second. They will require binding agreements for Your Majesty to serve as a vassal king and accept subject status, obeying their commands — third. They will demand annual tribute at increased levels to exhaust us financially — fourth. They will demand territorial concessions with the Yangtze as the boundary — Huainan, Jing-Xiang, and Sichuan — all of which they want to seize — fifth. If the court accedes to even one of these five demands, the great enterprise is lost.
36
金人變詐不測，貪婪無厭，縱使聽其詔令，奉藩稱臣，其志猶未已也。 必繼有號令，或使親迎梓宮，或使單車入覲，或使移易將相，或改革政事，或竭取租賦，或朘削土宇。 從之則無有紀極，一不從則前功盡廢，反為兵端。 以為權時之宜，聽其邀求，可以無後悔者，非愚則誣也。 使國家之勢單弱，果不足以自振，不得已而為此，固猶不可，況土宇之廣猶半天下，臣民之心戴宋不忘，與有識者謀之，尚足以有為，豈可忘祖宗之大業，生靈之屬望，弗慮弗圖，遽自屈服，冀延旦暮之命哉？
The Jurchens are treacherous beyond prediction and insatiable in greed; even if we obey their edicts and accept vassal status, their ambitions will not cease. More demands will surely follow — that we escort the imperial coffins in person, enter court alone in a single carriage, replace generals and ministers, reform government policy, drain our tax revenues, or whittle away our territory. Obey and there will be no end to it; refuse even once and all prior gains are lost — and war will follow. Whoever thinks that yielding to their demands as a temporary expedient can be done without regret is either a fool or a liar. Even if our power were truly too weak to recover on our own and such submission were unavoidable, it would still be wrong — how much more so when our lands still span half the realm, the people still hold to the Song in their hearts, and with men of insight we could still act? How can we forget the great enterprise of our ancestors and the hopes of the people, fail to plan or consider, and hastily yield ourselves merely to prolong our days?
37
臣願陛下特留聖意，且勿輕許，深詔群臣，講明利害、可以久長之策，擇其善而從之。
I pray Your Majesty will hold your sacred judgment in reserve and not lightly consent; deeply instruct your ministers to debate the gains and losses and the policies that can endure, and choose what is best.
38
疏奏，雖與眾論不合，不上以為忤，曰：「大臣當如此矣。」
When the memorial was submitted, though it ran against prevailing opinion, the emperor did not take it as insubordination, saying: "A chief minister ought to speak like this."
39
九年，除知潭州、荊湖南路安撫大使，綱具奏力辭，曰：「臣迂疏無周身之術，動致煩言。 今者罷自江西，為日未久，又蒙湔祓，畀以帥權。 昔漢文帝聞季布賢，召之，既而罷歸，布曰：'陛下以一人之譽召臣，一人之毀去臣，臣恐天下有以窺陛下之淺深。 '顧臣區區進退，何足少多。 然數年之間，亟奮亟躓，上累陛下知人任使之明，實有系於國體。」 詔以綱累奏，不欲重違，遂允其請。 次年薨，年五十八。 訃聞，上為軫悼，遣使賻贈，撫問其家，給喪葬之費。 贈少師，官其親族十人。
In the ninth year he was appointed prefect of Tanzhou and Grand Commissioner for Pacification of Jinghu South Circuit. Li Gang submitted a detailed memorial vigorously declining, saying: "Your servant is narrow-minded and impractical, with no art of self-preservation, and my actions constantly draw censure. I was recently dismissed from Jiangxi, and scarcely any time has passed before I am rehabilitated and given command over armies. Formerly Emperor Wen of Han heard that Ji Bu was worthy and summoned him; soon afterward he was dismissed and sent home. Ji Bu said: "Your Majesty summoned me on one man's praise and dismissed me on one man's slander — I fear the realm will read the depth or shallowness of Your Majesty's judgment." As for my petty comings and goings, they matter little in themselves. Yet within a few years I have been raised up and cast down in rapid succession — this reflects on Your Majesty's discernment in knowing men and assigning roles, and truly bears on the dignity of the state." An edict noted that Li Gang had memorialized repeatedly; unwilling to gainsay him further, the emperor granted his request. The following year he died, at the age of fifty-eight. When news of his death arrived, the emperor mourned deeply, dispatched envoys with condolence gifts, sent condolences to his family, and provided funeral expenses. He was posthumously granted the title of Junior Preceptor, and ten members of his family were given official posts.
40
綱負天下之望，以一身用舍為社稷生民安危。 雖身或不用，用有不久，而其忠誠義氣，凜然動乎遠邇。 每宋使至燕山，必問李綱、趙鼎安否，其為遠人所畏服如此。 綱有著《易傳》內篇十卷、外篇十二卷，《論語詳說》十卷，文章、歌詩、奏議百餘卷，又有《靖康傳信錄》、《奉迎錄》、《建炎時政記》、《建炎進退志》、《建炎制詔表劄集》、《宣撫荊廣記》、《制置江右錄》。
Li Gang bore the hopes of the empire; whether he was employed or dismissed was bound up with the safety of state and people. Though he was sometimes not employed, or employed only briefly, his loyal integrity and righteous spirit stirred awe near and far. Whenever Song envoys reached Yan Mountain, they were always asked whether Li Gang and Zhao Ding were safe and well — such was the awe he inspired among distant foes. Li Gang authored the Inner Chapters of his Commentary on the Changes in ten volumes and the Outer Chapters in twelve, Detailed Expositions on the Analects in ten volumes, and more than a hundred volumes of essays, poems, and memorials, as well as Records of Trust in the Jingkang Crisis, Records of the Imperial Welcome, Records of Jianyan Government, Records of Advance and Retreat in the Jianyan Era, Collected Jianyan Edicts and Memorials, Records of Pacification in Jing and Guang, and Records of Military Affairs in Jiang Right.
41
論曰：以李綱之賢，使得畢力殫慮于靖康、建炎間，莫或撓之，二帝何至於北行，而宋豈至為南渡之偏安哉？ 夫用君子則安，用小人則危，不易之理也。 人情莫不喜安而惡危。 然綱居相位僅七十日，其謀數不見用，獨于黃潛善、汪伯彥、秦檜之言，信而任之，恒若不及，何高宗之見，與人殊哉？ 綱雖屢斥，忠誠不少貶，不以用舍為語默，若赤子之慕其母，怒呵猶噭々焉挽其裳裾而從之。 嗚呼，中興功業之不振，君子固歸之天，若綱之心，其可謂非諸葛孔明之用心歟？
The historians comment: With a man as worthy as Li Gang, had he been allowed to exhaust his strength and wisdom between the Jingkang and Jianyan reigns without obstruction, how would the Two Sovereigns have been driven north, and how would Song have been reduced to the partial sway of the south? Employ the upright and the state is secure; employ the corrupt and the state is endangered — this principle does not change. None among men fails to love security and hate peril. Yet Li Gang held the chancellorship for barely seventy days, and his counsels were repeatedly rejected — while Huang Qianshan, Wang Boyan, and Qin Hui alone were trusted and entrusted as though there were no time to lose. How strange that Gaozong's vision differed so from ordinary men's! Though Li Gang was repeatedly dismissed, his loyalty was not diminished; he did not choose silence or speech according to whether he was employed — like an infant clinging to its mother, he still cried out and tugged at her hem even when scolded and shouted at. Alas, that the work of restoration did not flourish — upright men may indeed ascribe this to Heaven; yet can Li Gang's devotion be said to fall short of Zhuge Kongming's?