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卷五十二 志第四十二 食貨二

Volume 52 Treatises 48: Finance and Economics 2

Chapter 52 of 新唐書 · New Book of Tang
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Chapter 52
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1
25%調 調
The zu-yong-diao tax system was founded on the registered male population. After the Kaiyuan period, national household registers went unrevised for years. Deaths and transfers went unrecorded, land changed hands, and the real distribution of wealth no longer matched the books. State expenditure then ran without limit, major rebellions broke out, and war drained the treasury until the zu-yong-diao system collapsed.
2
使 簿 使 調 使
Under Daizong, taxes were first assessed by acre and collected in summer and autumn installments. When Dezong elevated Yang Yan to chief minister, he enacted the Two-Tax Law, setting a summer deadline in the sixth month and an autumn deadline in the eleventh. He appointed Two-Tax commissioners to administer the system, fixing revenue by estimating expenditures first. Registers no longer distinguished "resident" from "guest" households; whoever actually lived in a district was recorded there. Adult and youth categories were dropped; liability was graded by wealth instead. Merchants paid a thirty-to-one levy and bore corvée obligations on the same basis as residents. Land tax was pegged to the acreage under cultivation as recorded in Dali year 14. The throne dispatched inspection commissioners to verify registers, rank productive capacity by circuit, and exempt widowers, widows, orphans, and others too poor to pay. Any official who imposed surcharges was liable for prosecution as a law-breaker. Opponents argued that zu, yong, and diao were the fiscal foundations laid by Gaozu and Taizong and must not be lightly discarded. Dezong, however, was wholly convinced by Yang Yan and would not be swayed. The old registers listed 3,805,000 households; after review, resident households totaled 3,800,000 and guest households 300,000. The people were tied to where they actually lived without redrawing territorial boundaries, and the government learned the real situation without overhauling the registers. Annual collections yielded more than 20.5 million strings of cash and four million bushels of grain for provincial circuits. The capital received more than 9.5 million strings of cash and over sixteen million bushels of grain.
3
巿 使
The new tax law had barely taken effect and the people had not yet felt relief when Zhu Tao, Wang Wujun, and Tian Yue rebelled together. Revenue fell short, and the court ordered loans from merchants. Erudites of the Imperial Ancestral Temple Wei Dubin and Chen Jing first proposed borrowing from rich merchants. Dezong consulted Du You, director of revenue, who replied that army funds would last only a few months but that five million strings from merchants could sustain the war for half a year. Zhao Zan, vice minister of revenue, was assigned to the directorate of revenue to replace Du You and enforce the loan order, with repayment promised after the armies stood down. Wei Zhen, vice prefect of Jingzhao, and Xue Cui, assistant magistrate of Chang'an, enforced collection with brutal severity. Some victims hanged themselves in despair; households were stripped as if by bandits. Yet valuing the mansions, land, and slaves of the capital's rich produced only eight hundred thousand strings. They also levied one quarter on pawn deposits and on grain sold in the markets. Chang'an shut its markets; crowds blocked the chief minister's path, weeping in protest, while Lu Qi drove past without stopping. Fearing riot, Wei Zhen secured exemption for sums under one hundred strings or fifty bushels of grain, but the haul still reached only two million strings. Chen Shaoyou, military governor of Huainan, raised his circuit's tax assessment to two hundred cash per nominal string, and an edict extended the increase empire-wide.
4
Taizong had established charity granaries and ever-normal granaries against famine. After Gaozong they were repeatedly diverted to other expenses, and by the Shenlong era the reserves were nearly gone. Xuanzong restored them on his accession. Later Diwu Qi proposed that every ever-normal granary in the empire maintain storehouses holding operating capital. Zhao Zan now argued: "Since the wars began, ever-normal granaries have been neglected for nearly thirty years. Famine drove people apart; they starved in such numbers that corpses fed the living beyond counting. Since Your Majesty's accession, ever-normal officers in the capital's two markets have kept grain prices steady despite poor rains. The system should be expanded, and cloth and silk stockpiled as well. He proposed ever-normal funds from one million strings down to one hundred thousand at the two capitals, Jiangling, Chengdu, Yangzhou, Bian, Suzhou, and Hongzhou, stockpiling grain, cloth, silk, and hemp to sell cheap when prices rose and buy dear when they fell. Tax agents at circuit crossings were to inspect merchant funds, levy twenty cash per string, and take one-tenth on bamboo, timber, tea, and lacquer to fund the ever-normal reserves. Dezong accepted the plan. Military demand soon consumed the reserves, and ever-normal stockpiles could not be maintained.
5
使
While circuits campaigned against rebels, the directorate of revenue supplied grain to armies operating outside their home territories. Each army appointed one capital official as grain commissioner to manage supplies. Soldiers received wine and meat once they crossed a border. A single soldier abroad cost the treasury three men's rations. Officers profited from the arrangement and kept troops camped across borders.
6
貿
Zhao Zan next proposed the structure tax and the transaction-stamp levy. Two roof-bays formed one taxable unit: upper units at two thousand cash, middle at one thousand, lower at five hundred cash; concealing a unit brought sixty blows of the staff; informers received fifty thousand cash. For the transaction-stamp levy on public and private trade, the old rate of twenty cash per thousand was raised to fifty; where goods were bartered, estimated value set the rate. Popular resentment deepened. When Jingyuan troops mutinied, they shouted through Chang'an: "We will not seize your pawn deposits or tax your structure and stamp dues! The structure tax, stamp levy, and taxes on bamboo, timber, tea, lacquer, and iron were all abolished.
7
After Zhu Ci's defeat, two-thirds of the empire's registered population was gone. In Zhenyuan 4 an edict ordered circuits to review two-tax grades and fix household registers every three years. When the two taxes were first fixed, commodities were costly and cash cheap, so assessments were reckoned in money but paid in silk. Prices then kept falling while payments rose: a bolt of silk worth 3,200 cash, later only 1,600, yet taxpayers still owed more than double the original quota. The nominal rate never rose, but the burden doubled. The directorate distributed tax goods to ministries at inflated "book" valuations, then forced prefectures to accept shoddy goods at slashed prices—"folded collection." New labels appeared—"tribute presented," "imperial requisition"—while corvée became "summoned hire" and requisitions "harmonized purchase." Evasions of statute doubled Dali-era exactions. Plague, flood, and drought shrank the population; prefects split households and padded registers to meet quotas. Taxes lost to flight and death were shifted onto those who stayed; one vacant house could ruin an entire neighborhood. Registers fell into disorder and vagrancy went unchecked. Counties lured neighbors' subjects with favors, easing taxes on newcomers while long-settled households paid ever more. The emperor asked chief minister Lu Zhi for remedy. Zhi memorialized with six major reforms. The first point:
8
:調 調 便 簿
The state's tax and corvée system comprises zu, diao, and yong. Its reach was broad, its burdens even, and its hold on the people secure. Land brought zu, households diao, persons yong. Law was uniform empire-wide; even migrants could not easily evade duty, so people felt secure in their obligations. In the Tianbao years the realm convulsed; maps were lost as people fled; tax law broke down under army supply demands. The old system had run a century and people considered it workable. War made supply irregular and exactions wrecked administration—that was a failure of the moment, not of the statute itself. Timely abuses went unreformed while a sound law was discarded. The new two-tax system drained the registered peasantry daily. On accession you should have eased burdens on the people; instead each province's highest Dali-era annual exaction became the fixed two-tax quota—turning arbitrary surcharges into permanent law. All wealth comes from human labor. The two taxes assess property, not persons: the poor pay little, the rich much. They cannot see cash hoarded on one's person—wealth invisible to assessors; farmyards and granaries valued cheaply yet deemed wealthy by neighbors; trading stock that turns over fast with small inventory but steady profit; mansions and tools priced high yet yielding little annual return. Cash-string assessments are unfair and invite fraud: those with portable wealth flee; those tied to farming bear the heaviest levies. The system rewards deceit and flight from duty. Corvée and tax burdens now vary a hundredfold, yet old quotas stand. Heavy districts lose population; light ones gain settlers. Flight forces surcharges onto those who remain, worsening already heavy districts; settlement disperses quotas, easing already light districts. The people are crushed between the two. Let relevant offices and chief ministers tally annual needs, abolish non-urgent spending, and cut extravagance. Wartime surcharges and circuit emergency taxes should cease. Tax goods should be valued at monthly fair prices; capital deliveries must match samples, without false "folded" discounts. Punish officials for shoddy goods, not commoners. Each circuit should assign one two-tax officer with the directorate to count households and rank land fertility and products; poorer prefectures owe less cash, richer ones more. Without changing the law itself, flight would gradually end.
9
The second point:
10
: 調 貿 調
Agriculture requires labor; ancient kings therefore levied cloth, hemp, silk, and grain to reward work. They also feared unstable prices and fixed currency to regulate value. Monetary profit and power belonged to the state, held by officials, not delegated downward. Grain and cloth are what people produce; cash is what government mints. What people make supplies zu and tax; what government mints is kept out of direct levies. Dynastic law had zu from grain, yong from silk, diao from silk and cloth—when did the throne forbid private coinage yet demand cash as tax? The two taxes imitate late cash-string assessment, grade by property, fix dues in cash and grain, then convert to assorted goods—annual quotas wildly inconsistent. Taxpayers must deliver what they do not grow, at prices they cannot control, while farming and weaving capacity is finite and markets swing without warning. At first ten thousand cash equaled three bolts of silk—high prices, modest quantities. Army issue counted bolts, not value—revenue fell short. Recently ten thousand cash buys six bolts—cheap goods, doubled quantities. Households weave no more than before yet pay double—burdens outran labor. Offices should restore the original silk and cloth valuations from the first two-tax year, reinstate yong and diao, and let each household pursue its local craft as soil permits. When prices are very low, payments should not rise; when prices are very high, collections should not fall. Routine spending needs cash only for salaries and stipends, which can be paid in cloth by cash value. Expand minting and ban private copperware, and money will suffice. Salt sales and wine monopolies can fund the state—why strip farmers?
11
The third point:
12
:使 滿 殿
Inspectors ranked officials on four counts: population growth, land reclaimed, tax revenue growth, and early quota completion. Praising population growth invites fraud and family-splitting to dodge tax; the lured flee when rates ease, the split cannot pay and die—counties are ruined. Praising reclamation drives planting wasteland with rent holidays; new acres open while old fields lie fallow. When exemptions expire, fields revert to waste—tillage never truly grows. Praising revenue growth crushes the weak and rewards extortionists—officials forget the people. Praising early collection leaves no time to weave or thresh; the poor flee—production itself is harmed. All four ills stem from performance reviews divorced from reality. In practice, added tax burdens someone: one prefecture's "growth" is another's loss of residents. Growing districts chase rewards and raise quotas; shrinking ones fear punishment and never lower them. The examination system was never meant to glorify extraction. Offices should audit performance carefully, fix prefectural tax and corvée grades, and report to the Ministry of Revenue only after verification. Where population and wealth grow and quotas exceed need, cut assessments by thirty, twenty, or ten percent by grade. Where flight is heavy and survivors are surcharged, officials should be demoted likewise. Payments should follow last year's actual delivery, not quota targets. Reclamation must not raise rent; abandoned fields must not reduce headcounts artificially. Household registration should weigh miscellaneous production fairly. Land already paying regular rent should not be taxed again under the two-tax system. Then people would farm willingly without coercion.
13
The fourth point:
14
:
Wise rulers do not fund the state by starving the people. Ancient kings used labor in season and taxed only after households were secure. Collection is rushed: silk is demanded at mulberry season, grain before harvest ends. Owners sell cheap in panic; the poor borrow at usurious rates. Early two-tax rules lacked clear deadlines; wartime exactions forced premature collection. Set tax seasons by local custom to relieve the people.
15
The fifth point:
16
: 使
Constant warfare left granaries for soldiers alone; famine relief was neglected. Minor want drove men to usury; utter ruin forced sale of land and home. Fresh harvest brought loan sharks; in famine years families cast off kin, offered themselves as slaves unsold, and hanged themselves on the roads. Disasters struck every region in turn. Tea-tax reserves at the Ministry of Revenue should be distributed by circuit population. At harvest, the state should buy grain fairly through charity-granary offices under patrol commissioners. In bumper years hurtful to farmers, buy generously at fair prices until prices rise; in lean years, lend. Rotate stockpiles so hoarders cannot profit from famine.
17
The sixth point:
18
:使
Antiquity allotted one cultivator no more than a hundred mu so none would abandon farming or leave land idle. Today the rich hold ten thousand mu while the poor lack footing, attaching to great houses as dependents, laboring all year yet still hungry. Landlords live on rent: capital fields owed the state five sheng per mu but private landlords ten times that—one part to the throne, ten to the lord—how could peasants eat their fill? Set land ceilings, cap rents, tax the rich lightly and aid the poor—classic policy for social balance and not to be abandoned. Zhi's counsel was urgent, but slander drove him out and none of it was enacted.
19
In year twelve, Henan prefect Qi Kang renewed the critique: war had widened spending, ad hoc taxes multiplied, and clerks tormented the people. Your Majesty's two-tax reform timed collection and checked official extortion. Within twenty years the treasuries filled. At first cash was cheap and goods dear, so the throne taxed in money. Now money is dear and goods cheap. Renaming the tax to follow commodity values would yield six gains: first, officials could not cheat; second, the people would not be harassed; third, revenue would rise without turmoil; fourth, the treasury would not lack coin; fifth, rules would be simple; sixth, farming and sericulture would revive themselves. Farmers produce cloth and silk, yet taxes are assessed in cash and collected in cloth after triple valuation—prefectures manipulate prices at will. Fix payment in cloth and silk and valuation fraud ends. Cash taxation exhausts labor while officials remain blind to it. The two taxes fall on farmers, who own only cloth and silk. Cloth and silk circulate widely; coin is needed less, and minting aids the treasury—why burden farmers? The memorial went in and again received no answer.
20
西使西使使使使 祿 使
Early in Dezong's refuge at Fengtian, stores were bare. Soldiers scouting rebels begged for winter coats the emperor could not supply; he sold princes' belt gold instead. After Zhu Ci's defeat, Dezong turned to hoarding; beyond regular taxes, "presented tribute" never stopped. Wei Gao in Jiannan sent "daily tribute," Li Jian in Jiangxi "monthly tribute"; Du Ya, Liu Zan, Wang Wei, and Li Qian converted regular taxes into "surplus" gifts for favor. Each new appointee brought fresh "presented tribute." Revenue offices everywhere hoarded funds, forged secret edicts for surcharges, cut salaries, and taxed ferries, corpses, even fruit and vegetables. Succession tributes skimmed two or three tenths of tax intake, and none dared object. Changzhou prefect Pei Su sold firewood and paper as tribute and won promotion to Zhedong observer. Prefectural tribute began with Pei Su. When Liu Zan died, aide Yan Shou emptied the commandery treasury for tribute and became vice minister of justice. Staff-level tribute began with Yan Shou. Under Pei Yanling the emperor's private hoard grew and the people suffered doubly. When Yanling died, people celebrated.
21
使 漿
The palace then bought through eunuch "palace market" agents. Hundreds of "white watchers" in the two markets priced goods with salt as a standard, paying threadbare cloth and silk penny by penny. They also extorted tribute fees and porterage; merchants sometimes returned with nothing. Whenever eunuchs appeared, noodle and cake shops shut their doors. Censors protested repeatedly, but the emperor ignored them; the abuse was unbearable. Su Bian argued: millions in the capital lived off the palace market—how could it close? The emperor agreed and was pleased. Wei Cou, prefect of Jingzhao, proposed county supply instead because palace-market fraud was rampant. The emperor approved. Eunuchs claimed the people needed the palace market; Cou was punished instead.
22
使使 使 調使
Shunzong abolished the palace market and monthly salt-iron tribute. Xianzong ended succession tribute and circuit monopolies beyond the two taxes; and split revenues into three shares: central tribute, envoy funds, and local retention. Pei Ji required governors to fund expenses from governed prefectures, then subordinates; surpluses went to the directorate of revenue.
23
使使
Thanks to Dezong's hoard, Xianzong cut spending and wore patched robes. After suppressing Liu Pi and Li Qian, seized wealth filled the inner treasury. Yu Di and Wang E sent lavish gifts. Li Jiang warned: frontier gifts invite fraud and hurt the people—unworthy of sage rule. The emperor sighed: he knew it was wrong, yet the heartland had long ceased tribute audiences, the northwest was lost, and beacons burned at the capital's edge. He was redeeming ancestral shame and could not bear to tax the people further—so he said. Yet he failed to see that presentations weighed heavier still on the people.
24
西 西使 使使 使 使 西
Campaigning against Huai-Xi, Yang Yuling was demoted for supply failures; Huangfu Bo replaced him and extraction grew crueler. Wang Sui and Li Chong, famed extortionists, were sent to rich Xuan-She and Zhexi to raise revenue. Wang Bo said Liu Yan had audited zu and yong himself to learn each prefecture's true fiscal condition. He sent vice commissioner Cheng Yi to tour Jiang-Huai and audit tribute funds. Yi recovered 1.85 million strings from Jiang-Huai. That year Yi replaced Wang Bo as salt-iron commissioner. While Hebei forces fought Wang Chengzong, the court recruited grain donors of a thousand bushels or more to Hebei and Huai-Xi with official posts. Revenue, salt-iron, and circuit gifts surged under the name "aid-the-army funds." After victories came congratulatory gifts and victory banquets. Honorific ceremonies brought further congratulatory gifts.
25
Muzong abolished these exactions; adding even one cash above the two taxes was treated as corruption. Yet as heir he had learned to indulge generals and soldiers as a matter of policy. On accession he showered the Shence armies with unscheduled rewards beyond count. Youzhou imprisoned Zhang Hongjing and Zhenzhou killed Tian Hongzheng; war between the two circuits followed, with north and south supply offices created. Yet a field army of 150,000 could not overcome the two circuits' ten thousand-odd troops. Supply lines failed; armies seized grain and cloth on the roads before official deliveries arrived.
26
貿使 使使 調
Since Jianzhong fixed the two taxes, commodities had been cheap and cash dear—a forty-year affliction for the people. Silk dues that had been two and a half bolts became eight—roughly tripled. Great merchants hoarded coin to play on price swings; farmers grew poorer while commerce expanded. Seeing goods cheap, cash dear, and revenue short, the emperor ordered officials to debate remedies. Most urged harsher anti-hoarding laws on copper. Revenue minister Yang Yuling said: "The throne regulates currency to balance trade and keep prices stable—the key lies with the sovereign alone. How so? What the court values, people follow. Antiquity kept monetary power above; today it is squeezed from below; once coin circulated widely; now it is locked in public vaults; minting was expanded for use; now furnaces are cut and production idled; once currency served the heartland; now it drains to the frontiers. Village funeral hoards, merchant loans, and losses in transit further drain coin—no wonder cash is dear and goods cheap. Kaiyuan had seventy mints yielding a million a year; now barely ten mints yield 150,000. Once rebellious circuits coined base metal and the south used gold and silver; now only official coin circulates, so money is scarce. Pay two taxes, monopolies, tribute, and retention in cloth and grain; then release imperial stores, buy up market surpluses, expand minting, limit border outflow, and ban private hoarding—commodities will rise and coin will cheapen. Chief ministers approved. Two taxes and tribute shifted to cloth and silk; zu, yong, and diao were paid in kind. Only salt and wine monopolies still used cash.
27
In Wenzong Dahe 9, remnant coin was assigned as ever-normal and charity granary capital, replenished by annual purchases. Officials who failed to increase reserves except in flood or drought lost salary and received poor evaluations; prefectural borrowing was prosecuted as corruption.
28
使
Wenzong asked supervising granary censor Cui Yu how much grain the Great Granary held; he answered 2.5 million shi. The emperor said: "Expenses are high and stores low—what can be done? He ordered envoys and censors to investigate counties hoarding grain and funds. Great families swallowed estates without registering them; counties dared not conscript the powerful, taxing only the poorest. Dependents of rich houses faced harsher labor and penalties than from the state. Each year magistrates sent clerks to re-audit field tax, harassing the people.
29
Wuzong suppressed Buddhism: 4,600 monasteries and 40,000 shrines destroyed, 265,000 clergy and 150,000 dependents secularized, millions of mu seized, and over 2,000 Manichean and Zoroastrian priests expelled. The two capitals kept two temples per ward with thirty monks each; circuits kept up to twenty by grade. Fertile monastic land was sold for revenue; lesser land went to former dependents registered as taxpayers at ten mu each. With clergy gone, charity hospitals in the capitals received ten qing of former temple land, seven in the provinces, run by elders.
30
From late Huichang a frontier reserve treasury absorbed revenue, salt-iron, and ministry funds. Xuanzong renamed it the Extended-Funds Treasury. Initially a revenue bureau director managed it; later it fell under the chief minister with greater weight. The Ministry of Revenue sent 200,000 yearly, revenue and salt-iron 300,000, and circuit aid-the-army gifts—all to this treasury.
31
Under Yizong, Nanzhao raids drove troops south to Lingnan. Huaibei flooding prevented tax collection; rebellion was on every mind. Pang Xun's rebellion drew sixty or seventy thousand followers. Drought from Guandong to the coast destroyed winter crops; the poor ate cogon-root flour and pagoda-leaf relish. At Qianfu's start, floods brought famine to Shandong. Eunuch Tian Lingzi, Shence director, abused power and squeezed taxes ever harder. Wang Xianzhi and Huang Chao rose; the empire collapsed and treasuries emptied. Besieged at Fengxiang by Liang forces, Zhaozong ate gruel while the court starved; the city turned to cannibalism. Destitution reached this point—and the dynasty fell.
32
西西 西
In late Qianyuan the empire reported 169 prefectures and 1,933,124 households, 1,174,592 non-taxable; and 16,990,386 persons, 14,619,587 non-taxable. This was 5,982,584 fewer households and 35,928,723 fewer persons than Tianbao. By Yuanhe only eight southeastern circuits—1,440,000 households—paid annual levies, a quarter of Tianbao levels. Government-fed troops reached 830,000, a third above Tianbao—two households per soldier. The capital northwest and Hebei, thick with garrisons, sent no central tribute. By Changqing, 3,350,000 households supported 990,000 soldiers—three households per soldier. At Wuzong's accession: 2,114,960 households. By late Huichang: 4,955,151 households.
33
After Xuanzong recovered the northwest, annual revenue from two taxes and monopolies reached 9.22 million strings, yet routine spending still ran three million short—offices borrowed from future years. When widespread rebellion broke out, circuits ceased reporting accounts altogether.
34
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Collation notes for this chapter.
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